Personnel Clearances
Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes Gao ID: GAO-08-352T February 27, 2008In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act to reform security clearance processes. Much of GAO's experience in evaluating personnel security clearance processes over the decades has consisted of examining the Department of Defense's (DOD) program, which maintains about 2.5 million clearances on servicemembers, DOD civilian employees, legislative branch employees, and industry personnel working for DOD and 23 other federal agencies. Long-standing delays in processing applications--and other problems in DOD's clearance program--led GAO to designate it a high-risk area in 2005. GAO also has documented clearance-related problems in other agencies. For this hearing, GAO was asked to identify key factors that could be applied in personnel security clearance reform efforts. To identify key factors, GAO drew upon its past reports and institutional knowledge. For those reports, GAO reviewed laws, executive orders, policies, reports, and other documentation related to the security clearance process; examined samples of cases of personnel granted top secret eligibility; compared documentation in those sampled cases against federal standards; and interviewed a range of cognizant government officials.
Current and future efforts to reform personnel security clearance processes should consider, among other things, the following four key factors: determining whether clearances are required for positions, incorporating quality control steps throughout the clearance processes, establishing metrics for assessing all aspects of clearance processes, and providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform. Requesting a clearance for a position in which it will not be needed, or in which a lower- level clearance would be sufficient, will increase both costs and investigative workload unnecessarily. For example, changing the clearance needed for a position from a secret to top secret increases the investigative workload for that position about 20-fold and uses 10 times as many investigative staff hours. Emphasis on quality in clearance processes could promote positive outcomes, including more reciprocity among agencies in accepting each others' clearances. Building quality throughout clearance processes is important, but government agencies have paid little attention to quality, despite GAO's repeated suggestions to place more emphasis on quality. Even though GAO identified the government's primary metric for assessing quality--the percentage of investigative reports returned for insufficiency during the adjudicative phase--as inadequate by itself in 1999, the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management continue to use that metric. Concerns about the quality of investigative and adjudicative work underlie the continued reluctance of agencies to accept clearances issued by other agencies; as a result, government resources are used to conduct duplicative investigations and adjudications. Many efforts to monitor clearance processes emphasize measuring timeliness, but additional metrics could provide a fuller picture of clearance processes. The emphasis on timeliness is due in part to recent legislation that provides specific guidelines regarding the speed with which clearances should be completed and requires annual reporting of that information to Congress. GAO has highlighted a variety of metrics in its reports (e.g., completeness of investigative and adjudicative reports, staff's and customers' perceptions of the processes, and the adequacy of internal controls), all of which could add value in monitoring clearance processes and provide better information to allow improved oversight by Congress and the Executive Branch. Another factor to consider in reform efforts is providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to implement changes to security clearance processes. DOD's August 2007 congressionally mandated report on industry clearances identified its immediate funding needs but did not include information on the funding requirements for fiscal year 2009 and beyond. The inclusion of less than 2 future years of budgeting data in the DOD report limits Congress's ability to carry out its long-term oversight and appropriations functions pertaining to industry personnel security clearances.
GAO-08-352T, Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-352T
entitled 'Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to
Reform Security Clearance Processes' which was released on February 27,
2008.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management, Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST:
Wednesday, February 27, 2008:
Personnel Clearances:
Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance
Processes:
Statement of Brenda S. Farrell:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-08-352T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-352T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Intelligence Community Management, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act to reform security clearance processes. Much of GAO‘s
experience in evaluating personnel security clearance processes over
the decades has consisted of examining the Department of Defense‘s
(DOD) program, which maintains about 2.5 million clearances on
servicemembers, DOD civilian employees, legislative branch employees,
and industry personnel working for DOD and 23 other federal agencies.
Long-standing delays in processing applications”and other problems in
DOD‘s clearance program”led GAO to designate it a high-risk area in
2005. GAO also has documented clearance-related problems in other
agencies.
For this hearing, GAO was asked to identify key factors that could be
applied in personnel security clearance reform efforts. To identify key
factors, GAO drew upon its past reports and institutional knowledge.
For those reports, GAO reviewed laws, executive orders, policies,
reports, and other documentation related to the security clearance
process; examined samples of cases of personnel granted top secret
eligibility; compared documentation in those sampled cases against
federal standards; and interviewed a range of cognizant government
officials.
What GAO Found:
Current and future efforts to reform personnel security clearance
processes should consider, among other things, the following four key
factors: determining whether clearances are required for positions,
incorporating quality control steps throughout the clearance processes,
establishing metrics for assessing all aspects of clearance processes,
and providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements of
security clearance reform. Requesting a clearance for a position in
which it will not be needed, or in which a lower-level clearance would
be sufficient, will increase both costs and investigative workload
unnecessarily. For example, changing the clearance needed for a
position from a secret to top secret increases the investigative
workload for that position about 20-fold and uses 10 times as many
investigative staff hours.
Emphasis on quality in clearance processes could promote positive
outcomes, including more reciprocity among agencies in accepting each
others‘ clearances. Building quality throughout clearance processes is
important, but government agencies have paid little attention to
quality, despite GAO‘s repeated suggestions to place more emphasis on
quality. Even though GAO identified the government‘s primary metric for
assessing quality”the percentage of investigative reports returned for
insufficiency during the adjudicative phase”as inadequate by itself in
1999, the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel
Management continue to use that metric. Concerns about the quality of
investigative and adjudicative work underlie the continued reluctance
of agencies to accept clearances issued by other agencies; as a result,
government resources are used to conduct duplicative investigations and
adjudications.
Many efforts to monitor clearance processes emphasize measuring
timeliness, but additional metrics could provide a fuller picture of
clearance processes. The emphasis on timeliness is due in part to
recent legislation that provides specific guidelines regarding the
speed with which clearances should be completed and requires annual
reporting of that information to Congress. GAO has highlighted a
variety of metrics in its reports (e.g., completeness of investigative
and adjudicative reports, staff‘s and customers‘ perceptions of the
processes, and the adequacy of internal controls), all of which could
add value in monitoring clearance processes and provide better
information to allow improved oversight by Congress and the Executive
Branch.
Another factor to consider in reform efforts is providing Congress with
the long-term funding requirements to implement changes to security
clearance processes. DOD‘s August 2007 congressionally mandated report
on industry clearances identified its immediate funding needs but did
not include information on the funding requirements for fiscal year
2009 and beyond. The inclusion of less than 2 future years of budgeting
data in the DOD report limits Congress‘s ability to carry out its long-
term oversight and appropriations functions pertaining to industry
personnel security clearances.
To view the full product, click on [hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-352T].
For more information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or
farrellb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today for this hearing on
security clearance reform which is intended to cover efforts being
undertaken to improve the process, impediments to those reforms,
planned future steps, and possible changes in the strategy for
improving clearance processing timeliness. Congress passed and the
President signed into law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to mandate a variety of steps be taken
to reform security clearance processes.
One recent step taken to reform security clearance processes was the
formation of an interagency security clearance process reform team in
June 2007. Agencies included in this governmentwide effort are the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The team's memorandum of
agreement indicates that it seeks to develop, in phases, a reformed DOD
and intelligence community security clearance process that allows the
granting of high-assurance security clearances in the least time
possible and at the lowest reasonable cost. The team's July 25, 2007,
terms of reference indicate that it plans to deliver "a transformed,
modernized, fair, and reciprocal security clearance process that is
universally applicable" to DOD, the intelligence community, and other
U.S. government agencies, no later than December 31, 2008.
Since 1974, we have been examining personnel security clearance
processes on behalf of the Congress. Through scores of reports and
testimonies, we have acquired broad institutional knowledge that gives
us a historical view of key factors that should be considered in
clearance reform efforts. See a list of our related GAO products at the
end of this statement. My comments will focus on four key factors that
should be considered in clearance reform efforts. Before offering
observations on these factors, I would like to provide some background
information on our prior work and recent government reform efforts.
Our reports have documented a wide variety of problems present in DOD's
clearance program. Some of the problems that we noted in our 2007 high-
risk report included incomplete and delayed investigative reports from
OPM, which supplies about 90 percent of all federal clearance
investigations, and DOD adjudicators granting clearance eligibility
even though data were missing from the investigative reports used to
make such determinations. While some of those findings are now about 2
years old, DOD's August 2007 congressionally-mandated report on
clearance investigations for industry personnel[Footnote 1] noted
continuing problems. For example, during the first 6 months of fiscal
year 2007, the end-to-end processing of initial top secret clearances
took an average of 276 days; renewal top secret clearances averaged 335
days; and both initial and renewal secret clearances averaged 208 days.
On the other hand, DOD's report also noted progress that the department
had made to improve its industry clearance program, including
submitting 100 percent of the clearance requests electronically to
improve timeliness and reduce the number of rejected applications and
conducting research in an effort to improve the accuracy of its
projections for future industry clearance needs.
Much of our experience in evaluating personnel security clearance
processes over the decades has emphasized examinations of DOD's program
that maintains approximately 2.5 million clearances on servicemembers,
DOD civilian employees, industry personnel for DOD and 23 other federal
agencies, and employees in the federal legislative branch. Long-
standing delays in determining clearance eligibility and other
clearance challenges led us to designate DOD's personnel security
clearance program as a high-risk area in January 2005 and continue that
designation in the updated list of high-risk areas that we published in
2007.[Footnote 2] The areas on our high-risk list received their
designations because they are major programs and operations that need
urgent attention and transformation in order to ensure that our
national government functions in the most economical, efficient, and
effective manner possible.
You asked that we identify key factors that should be considered in
personnel security clearance reform efforts. As requested, my statement
today will address four factors for your consideration based on our
prior work. They are (1) having a sound requirements-determination
process in place, (2) building quality into every step of the clearance
processes, (3) having a valid set of metrics for evaluating efficiency
and effectiveness, and (4) providing Congress with the long-term
funding requirements of security clearance reform. My statement draws
on our prior work on clearance processes, which included reviews of
clearance-related documents and interviews of senior officials at DOD
and OPM, which has the primary responsibility for providing
investigation services to DOD. Our work was performed in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions, based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence we obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
Determining whether clearances are required for positions, establishing
quality control steps throughout the clearance processes, developing
metrics for assessing all aspects of clearance processes, and providing
Congress with the long-term funding requirements of security clearance
reform are important factors to consider in current and future efforts
to reform personnel security clearance processes. Developing a sound
requirements process is important because requests for clearances for
positions that do not need a clearance or need a lower level of
clearance increase investigative workload and costs unnecessarily. For
example, changing the clearance needed for a position from secret to
top secret increases the investigative workload for that one position
about 20-fold. That is, top secret clearances must be performed twice
as often as secret clearances (every 5 years versus 10 years) and
require 10 times as many investigative staff hours (about 60 versus 6).
Emphasis on quality in all processes could promote positive outcomes
such as greater reciprocity of clearances. The steps to build quality
throughout clearance processes are important, but government agencies
have paid little attention to this factor despite our repeated
suggestions to place more emphasis on it and its measurement. Even
though in 1999 we identified the government's primary metric for
assessing quality--the percentage of investigations returned because of
problems--as being inadequate by itself, OMB and OPM have continued to
use that metric as late as February 2008. Concerns about the quality of
investigative and adjudicative work underlie the continued reluctance
of agencies to accept the clearances issued by other agencies, thus
using government resources to conduct duplicative investigations and
adjudications.
Efforts to monitor clearance processes emphasize timeliness
measurement, but additional metrics could provide a fuller picture of
clearance processes. The emphasis on timeliness is partially due to
recent legislation which provides specific guidelines regarding the
speed with which clearances should be completed and requires annual
reporting of that information to Congress. Still, our past reports on
clearance processes have highlighted a wide variety of metrics (e.g.,
completeness of investigative and adjudicative reports, staff and
customers' perceptions of the processes, and adequacy of internal
controls) which could add value in monitoring clearance processes and
supply better information for greater congressional oversight.
Providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to implement
changes to security clearance processes could enable more informed
congressional oversight. DOD's August 2007 congressionally mandated
report on industry personnel security clearances identified its
immediate needs by submitting a projected need of $178.2 million for
fiscal year 2007 and a projected need of approximately $300 million for
fiscal year 2008. However, the report did not include information on
the funding requirements for fiscal year 2009 and beyond. The inclusion
of less than 2 future years of budgeting information in the DOD report
limits Congress's ability to carry out its long-term oversight and
appropriations functions pertaining to industry personnel security
clearances.
Background:
Although our high-risk designation covers only DOD's program, our
reports have also documented clearance-related problems affecting other
agencies. For example, our October 2007 report on state and local
information fusion centers cited two clearance-related challenges: (1)
the length of time needed for state and local officials to receive
clearances from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and (2) the reluctance of some
federal agencies--particularly DHS and FBI--to accept clearances issued
by other agencies (i.e., clearance reciprocity).[Footnote 3] Similarly,
our April 2007[Footnote 4] testimony on maritime security and selected
aspects of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE
Port Act[Footnote 5]) identified the challenge of obtaining clearances
so that port security stakeholders could share information through area
committees or interagency operational centers. The SAFE Port Act
includes a specific provision requiring the Secretary of Homeland
Security to sponsor and expedite individuals participating in
interagency operational centers in gaining or maintaining their
security clearances.
Our reports have offered findings and recommendations regarding current
impediments, and they offer key factors to consider in future reforms.
For example, as the interagency security clearance process reform team
develops a new governmentwide end-to-end clearance system, this reform
effort provides an opportune time to consider factors for evaluating
intermediate steps and the final system in order to optimize efficiency
and effectiveness. The Director of National Intelligence's July 25,
2007, memorandum provided the terms of reference for the security
clearance process reform team and noted that a future Phase IV would be
used to perform and evaluate demonstrations and to finalize the
acquisition strategy.
In designing a new personnel security clearance system, the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) may be a useful resource for
the team designing the system and the congressional committees
overseeing the design and implementation. GPRA provides a framework for
strategic performance planning and reporting intended to improve
federal program effectiveness and hold agencies accountable for
achieving results. Agencies that effectively implement GPRA's results-
oriented framework clearly establish performance goals for which they
will be held accountable, measure progress towards those goals,
determine strategies and resources to effectively accomplish the goals,
use performance information to make the programmatic decisions
necessary to improve performance, and formally communicate results in
performance reports. Our reports have also identified a number of
directly relevant factors, such as those found in our November 2005
testimony that evaluated an earlier governmentwide plan for improving
the personnel security clearance process.[Footnote 6]
Four Key Factors Should Be Considered in Efforts to Reform Security
Clearance Processes:
I will address the need for consideration of four key factors in my
testimony: (1) a strong requirements-determination process, (2) quality
emphasis in all clearance processes, (3) additional metrics to provide
a fuller picture of clearance processes, and (4) long-term funding
requirements of security clearance reform.
A Strong Requirements-Determination Process Can Help Manage Clearance
Workloads and Costs:
The interagency security clearance process reform team established in
July 2007 might want to address whether the numbers and levels of
clearances are appropriate since this initial stage in the clearance
process can affect workloads and costs in other clearance processes.
For instance, the team may want to examine existing policies and
practices to see if they need to be updated or otherwise modified. We
are not suggesting that the numbers and levels of clearances are or are
not appropriate--only that any unnecessary requirements in this initial
phase use government resources that can be utilized for other purposes
such as building additional quality into other clearance processes or
decreasing delays in clearance processing.
Figure 1 highlights the fact that the clearance process begins with
establishing whether an incumbent's position requires a clearance, and
if so, at what level. The numbers of requests for initial and renewal
clearances and the levels of such clearance requests (phase 2 in fig.
1) are two ways to look at outcomes of requirements setting in the
clearance process.
Figure 1: Six Phases in the Personnel Security Clearance Process:
[See PDF for image]
This figure illustrates the six phases in the personnel security
clearance process, as follows:
1. Requirements Setting:
The agency determines if a position requires the incumbent to access
classified information, and if so, the level of clearance needed.
2. Application Submission:
Potential or actual incumbent provides application materials, and
security officer reviews and submits request for investigation.
3. Investigation:
OPM, another agency, or one of their contractors conducts an
investigation and forwards an investigative report to an adjudication
facility.
4. Adjudication:
On the basis of information in the investigative report, adjudicators
determine eligibility to access classified information.
5. Appeal:
If a clearance is denied or revoked, potential or actual incumbent can
appeal the adjudicative decision.
6. Clearance Updating:
If incumbent has long-term need to access classified information,
clearance is updated: top secret, 5 years; secret, 10 years; and
confidential, 15 years.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD-provided information.
[End of figure]
In our prior work, DOD personnel, investigations contractors, and
industry officials told us that the large number of requests for
investigations could be attributed to many factors. For example, they
ascribed the large number of requests to the heightened security
concerns that resulted from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
They also attributed the large number of investigations to an increase
in the operations and deployments of military personnel and to the
increasingly sensitive technology that military personnel, government
employees, and contractors come in contact with as part of their jobs.
While having a large number of cleared personnel can give the military
services, agencies, and industry a great deal of flexibility when
assigning personnel, the investigative and adjudicative workloads that
are required to provide the clearances and flexibility further tax a
clearance process that already experiences delays in determining
clearance eligibility.
A change in the level of clearances being requested also increases the
investigative and adjudicative workloads. For example, in our February
2004 report on impediments to eliminating clearance backlogs,[Footnote
7] we found that a growing percentage of all DOD requests for
clearances for industry personnel was at the top secret level: 17
percent of those requests were at the top secret level in 1995 but 27
percent were at the top secret level in 2003. This increase of 10
percentage points in the proportion of investigations at the top secret
level is important because top secret clearances must be renewed twice
as often as secret clearances (i.e., every 5 years versus every 10
years). In August 2006, OPM estimated that approximately 60 total staff
hours are needed for each investigation for an initial top secret
clearance and 6 total staff hours are needed for the investigation to
support a secret or confidential clearance. The doubling of the
frequency along with the increased effort to investigate and adjudicate
each top secret reinvestigation adds costs and workload for the
government.
* Cost. For fiscal year 2008, OPM's standard billing rate is $3,711 for
an investigation for an initial top secret clearance; $2,509 for an
investigation to renew a top secret clearance, and $202 for an
investigation for a secret clearance. The cost of getting and
maintaining a top secret clearance for 10 years is approximately 30
times greater than the cost of getting and maintaining a secret
clearance for the same period. For example, an individual getting a top
secret clearance for the first time and keeping the clearance for 10
years would cost the government a total of $6,202 in current year
dollars ($3,711 for the initial investigation and $2,509 for the
reinvestigation after the first 5 years). In contrast, an individual
receiving a secret clearance and maintaining it for 10 years would
result in a total cost to the government of $202 ($202 for the initial
clearance that is good for 10 years).
* Time/Workload. The workload is also affected by the scope of coverage
in the various types of investigations. Much of the information for a
secret clearance is gathered through electronic files. The
investigation for a top secret clearance, on the other hand, requires
the information needed for the secret clearance as well as data
gathered through time-consuming tasks such as interviews with the
subject of the investigation request, references in the workplace, and
neighbors. Since (1) the average investigative report for a top secret
clearance takes about 10 times as many investigative staff hours as the
average investigative report for a secret clearance and (2) the top
secret clearance must be renewed twice as often as the secret, the
investigative workload increases about 20-fold. Additionally, the
adjudicative workload increases about 4-fold. In 2007, DOD officials
estimated that it took about twice as long to review an investigative
report for a top secret clearance, which would need to be done twice as
often as the secret clearance.
Unless the new system developed by the interagency security clearance
process reform team includes a sound requirements process, workload and
costs may be higher than necessary.
Emphasis on Quality in All Processes Could Promote Positive Outcomes
Such as Greater Clearance Reciprocity:
Since the late 1990s, GAO has emphasized a need to build more quality
and quality monitoring into clearance processes to achieve positive
goals such as promoting greater reciprocity and maximizing the
likelihood that individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized
more closely. In our November 2005 testimony on the earlier
governmentwide plan to improve the clearance process, we noted that the
plan devoted little attention to monitoring and improving the quality
of the personnel security clearance process, and that limited attention
and reporting about quality continue. When OMB issued its February 2007
Report of the Security Clearance Oversight Group Consistent with Title
III of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, it
documented quality with a single metric. Specifically, it stated that
OPM has developed additional internal quality control processes to
ensure that the quality of completed investigations continue to meet
the national investigative standards. OMB added that, overall, less
than 1 percent of all completed investigations are returned to OPM from
the adjudicating agencies for quality deficiencies. When OMB issued its
February 2008 Report of the Security Clearance Oversight Group, it did
not discuss the percentage of completed investigations that are
returned to OPM or the development or existence of any other metric
measuring the level of quality in security clearance processes or
products.
As part of our September 2006 report,[Footnote 8] we examined a
different aspect of quality--the completeness of documentation in
investigative and adjudicative reports. We found that OPM provided
incomplete investigative reports to DOD adjudicators, which the
adjudicators then used to determine top secret clearance eligibility.
Almost all (47 of 50) of the sampled investigative reports we reviewed
were incomplete based on requirements in the federal investigative
standards. In addition, DOD adjudicators granted clearance eligibility
without requesting additional information for any of the incomplete
investigative reports and did not document that they considered some
adjudicative guidelines when adverse information was present in some
reports.
GAO has long reported that it is problematic to equate the quality of
investigations with the percentage of investigations that are returned
by requesting agencies due to incomplete case files. For example, in
October 1999 and again in our November 2005 evaluation of the
governmentwide plan, we stated that the number of investigations
returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator of quality
because adjudication officials said they were reluctant to return
incomplete investigations in anticipation of further delays.[Footnote
9] We additionally suggested that regardless of whether this metric
continues to be used, the government might want to consider adding
other indicators of the quality of investigations, such as the number
of counterintelligence leads generated from security clearance
investigations and forwarded to relevant units. Further, our September
2006 report recommended that OMB's Deputy Director of Management
require OPM and DOD to (1) submit their procedures for eliminating the
deficiencies that we identified in their investigative and adjudicative
documentation and (2) develop and report metrics on completeness and
other measures of quality that will address the effectiveness of the
new procedures. We believe that our recommendation still has merit, but
the previously cited passage from the February 2007 OMB report does not
describe the new procedures or provide statistics for the recommended
new quality measures and the 2008 OMB report is silent on quality
measures.
As we noted in September 2006, the government cannot afford to achieve
its timeliness goal by providing investigative and adjudicative reports
that are incomplete in key areas required by federal investigative
standards and adjudicative guidelines. Incomplete investigations and
adjudications undermine the government's efforts to move toward greater
clearance reciprocity. An interagency working group, the Security
Clearance Oversight Steering Committee,[Footnote 10] noted that
agencies are reluctant to be accountable for poor quality
investigations and/or adjudications conducted by other agencies or
organizations. To achieve fuller reciprocity, clearance-granting
agencies need to have confidence in the quality of the clearance
process. Without full documentation of investigative actions,
information obtained, and adjudicative decisions, agencies could
continue to require duplicative investigations and adjudications.
Earlier, we stated that reciprocity concerns continue to exist, citing
FBI and DHS reluctance to accept clearances issued by other agencies
when providing information to personnel in fusion centers.
Government Clearance Metrics Emphasize Timeliness Measurement, but
Additional Metrics Could Provide a Fuller Picture of Clearance
Processes:
Much of the recent quantitative information provided on clearances has
dealt with how much time it takes for the end-to-end processing of
clearances (and related measures such as the numbers of various types
of investigative and adjudicative reports generated); however, there is
less quantitative information on other aspects of the clearance
process. In our November 2005 testimony, we noted that the earlier
government plan to improve the clearance process provided many metrics
to monitor the timeliness of clearances governmentwide, but that plan
detailed few of the other elements that a comprehensive strategic plan
might contain. A similar emphasis on timeliness appears to be emerging
for the future governmentwide clearance process. In the Director of
National Intelligence's 500 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration
issued on October 10, 2007, the core initiative to modernize the
security clearance process had only one type of metric listed under the
heading about how success will be gauged. Specifically, the plan calls
for measuring whether "performance of IC [Intelligence Community]
agency personnel security programs meet or exceed IRTPA guidelines for
clearance case processing times."
While the February 2007 and 2008 OMB reports to Congress contain
statistics and other information in addition to timeliness metrics
(e.g., use of information technology and reciprocity-related
procedures) and the joint team developing the new clearance process may
be considering a wider range of metrics than timeliness only, an
underlying factor in the emphasis on timeliness is IRTPA. [Footnote 11]
Among other things, IRTPA established specific timeliness guidelines to
be phased in over 5 years. The Act also states that, in the initial
period which ends in 2009, each authorized adjudicative agency shall
make a determination on at least 80 percent of all applications for
personnel security clearance within an average of 120 days after the
receipt of the application for a security clearance by an authorized
investigative agency. The 120-day average period shall include a period
of not longer than 90 days to complete the investigative phase of the
clearance review and a period of not longer than 30 days to complete
the adjudicative phase of the clearance review. Moreover, IRTPA also
includes a requirement for a designated agency (currently OMB) to
provide information on among other things the timeliness in annual
reports through 2011, as OMB did in February 2008.
Prior GAO reports as well as inspector general reports identify a wide
variety of methods and metrics that program evaluators have used to
examine clearance processes and programs. For example our 1999
report[Footnote 12] on security clearance investigations used multiple
methods to examine numerous issues that included:
* documentation missing from investigative reports;
* the training of investigators (courses, course content, and number of
trainees);
* investigators' perceptions about the process;
* customer perceptions about the investigations; and:
* internal controls to protect against fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement.
Including these and other types of metrics in regular monitoring of
clearance processes could add value in current and future reform
efforts as well as supply better information for greater congressional
oversight.
Long-Term Funding Requirements Information Could Enable More Informed
Congressional Oversight of Security Clearance Reform:
The joint Security Clearance Process Reform team may also want to
consider providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to
implement changes to security clearance processes enabling more
informed congressional oversight. In a recent report to Congress, DOD
provided funding requirements information that described its immediate
needs for its industry personnel security program, but it did not
include information about the program's long-term funding needs.
Specifically, DOD's August 2007 congressionally mandated report on
clearances for industry personnel provided less than 2 years of data on
funding requirements. In its report, DOD identified its immediate needs
by submitting an annualized projected cost of $178.2 million for fiscal
year 2007 and a projected funding need of approximately $300 million
for fiscal year 2008. However, the report did not include information
on (1) the funding requirements for fiscal year 2009 and beyond even
though the survey used to develop the funding requirements asked
contractors about their clearance needs through 2010 and (2) the tens
of millions of dollars that the Defense Security Service Director
testified before Congress in May 2007 were necessary to maintain the
infrastructure supporting the industry personnel security clearance
program.
As noted in our February 2008 report, the inclusion of less than 2
future years of budgeting information in the DOD report limits
Congress's ability to carry out its oversight and appropriations
functions pertaining to industry personnel security
clearances.[Footnote 13] Without more information on DOD's longer-term
funding requirements for industry personnel security clearances,
Congress lacks the visibility it needs to fully assess appropriations
requirements. In addition, the long-term funding requirements to
implement changes to security clearance processes are also needed to
enable the executive branch to compare and prioritize alternative
proposals for reforming the clearance processes. As the joint Security
Clearance Process Reform team considers changes to the current
clearance processes, it may also want to consider ensuring that
Congress is provided with the long-term funding requirements necessary
to implement any such reforms.
Concluding Observations:
We were encouraged when OMB undertook the development of an earlier
governmentwide plan for improving the personnel security clearance
process and have documented in our prior reports both DOD and
governmentwide progress in addressing clearance-related problems.
Similarly, the current joint effort to develop a new governmentwide end-
to-end security clearance system represents a positive step to address
past impediments and manage security clearance reform efforts. Still,
much remains to be done before a new system can be designed and
implemented. GAO's experience in evaluating DOD's and governmentwide
clearance plans and programs as well as its experience monitoring large-
scale, complex acquisition programs could help Congress in its
oversight, insight, and foresight regarding security clearance reform
efforts.
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this
testimony are Jack E. Edwards, Acting Director; James P. Klein, Joanne
Landesman, Charles Perdue, Karen D. Thornton, and Stephen K. Woods.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More
Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:
February 13, 2008.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some
Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.
GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Defense Business Transformation: A Full-time Chief Management Officer
with a Term Appointment Is Needed at DOD to Maintain Continuity of
Effort and Achieve Sustainable Success. GAO-08-132T. Washington, D.C.:
October 16, 2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found For
Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port
Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: January
2007).
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed To Improve
The Security Clearance Process, GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.:
September 2006.
Managing Sensitive Information: DOD Can More Effectively Reduce the
Risk of Classification Errors, GAO-06-706. Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record
Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security
Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances
for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow
Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.: May
17, 2006.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance
Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process.
GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing
Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06-233T.
Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection Issues
Associated with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. GAO-06-71SU.
Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2005.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance
Program. GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors
under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington, D.C.:
July 15, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles
Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires
Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T.
Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January
2005.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11
Commission's Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.:
September 14, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce
Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for
Industry Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs
and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry
Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its
Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332.
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington,
D.C.: February 9, 2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] DOD, Annual Report to Congress on Personnel Security Investigations
for Industry and the National Industrial Security Program (August
2007). This first of a series of annual reports was mandated by The
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Pub. L. No. 109-364, §347 (2006).
[2] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005); and GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310
(Washington, D.C.: January 2007).
[3] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate
Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion
Centers, GAO-08-35 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007). This report
indicated that according to the 9/11 Commission, a breakdown in
information sharing was a major factor contributing to the failure to
prevent the attacks of September 11, 2001. Since then most states and
some local governments have, largely on their own initiative,
established fusion centers to address gaps in homeland security,
terrorism, and law enforcement information sharing by the federal
government and to provide a conduit of this information within the
state.
[4] GAO, Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the
SAFE Port Act, GAO-07-754T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2007).
[5] Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1184 (2006).
[6] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-
standing Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain, GAO-06-233T
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2005).
[7] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size, GAO-04-344 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004).
[8] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to
Improve the Security Clearance Process, GAO-06-1070 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 28, 2006).
[9] GAO-06-233T; and GAO, DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security
Investigations Pose National Security Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999).
[10] At that time, the committee was led by OMB's Deputy Director for
Management and was composed of representatives from DOD, Homeland
Security, Energy, Justice, Transportation, Commerce, State, the
Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Council, and
the National Archives and Records Administration.
[11] Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, §3001 (g) Reduction of Length of Personnel Security
Clearance Process (2004).
[12] GAO, DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations
Pose National Security Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
27, 1999).
[13] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would
Enable More Informed Congressional Oversight, GAO-08-350 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 13, 2008).
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
