Defense Acquisitions
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs Gao ID: GAO-08-467SP March 31, 2008This report is GAO's sixth annual assessment of selected weapon programs. Since 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) has roughly doubled its planned investment in new systems from $790 billion to $1.6 trillion in 2007, but acquisition outcomes in terms of cost and schedule have not improved. Total acquisition costs for major defense programs in the fiscal year 2007 portfolio have increased 26 percent from first estimates, compared with 6 percent in 2000. Programs have also often failed to deliver capabilities when promised. DOD's acquisition outcomes appear increasingly suboptimal, a condition that needs to be corrected given the pressures faced by the department from other military and major nondiscretionary government demands. This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of defense programs, identifying potential risks when a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges from best practices. The programs assessed--most of which are considered major acquisitions by DOD--were selected using several factors: high dollar value, acquisition stage, and congressional interest. This report also highlights overall trends in DOD acquisition outcomes and issues raised by the cumulative experience of individual programs. GAO updates this report annually under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
Of the 72 programs GAO assessed this year, none of them had proceeded through system development meeting the best practices standards for mature technologies, stable design, or mature production processes by critical junctures of the program, each of which are essential for achieving planned cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. The absence of wide-spread adoption of knowledge-based acquisition processes by DOD continues to be a major contributor to this lack of maturity. Aside from these knowledge-based issues, GAO this year gathered data on four additional factors that have the potential to influence DOD's ability to manage programs and improve outcomes--performance requirements changes, program manager tenure, reliance on nongovernmental personnel to help perform program office roles, and software management. GAO found that 63 percent of the programs had changed requirements once system development began, and also experienced significant program cost increases. Average tenure to date for program managers has been less than half of that called for by DOD policy. About 48 percent of DOD program office staff for programs GAO collected data from is composed of personnel outside of the government. Finally, roughly half the programs that provided GAO data experienced more than a 25 percent increase in the expected lines of software code since starting their respective system development programs. In response to previous GAO recommendations and congressional direction, DOD has recently taken actions that could help move the department toward more sound, knowledge-based acquisition processes. For example, a new concept decision review initiative, guidance for determining acquisition approaches based on capability need dates, and the establishment of review boards to monitor weapon system configuration changes could enable department officials to make more informed decisions in the early stages of a program and better match program requirements and resources, a key first step. Improvements to individual program acquisition outcomes will likely hinge on the success of initiatives like these, paired with knowledge-based strategies.
GAO-08-467SP, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
March 2008:
Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs:
GAO-08-467SP:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-467SP, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
This report is GAO‘s sixth annual assessment of selected weapon
programs. Since 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) has roughly
doubled its planned investment in new systems from $790 billion to $1.6
trillion in 2007, but acquisition outcomes in terms of cost and
schedule have not improved. Total acquisition costs for major defense
programs in the fiscal year 2007 portfolio have increased 26 percent
from first estimates, compared with 6 percent in 2000. Programs have
also often failed to deliver capabilities when promised. DOD‘s
acquisition outcomes appear increasingly suboptimal, a condition that
needs to be corrected given the pressures faced by the department from
other military and major nondiscretionary government demands.
This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an
independent, knowledge-based assessment of defense programs,
identifying potential risks when a program‘s projected attainment of
knowledge diverges from best practices. The programs assessed”most of
which are considered major acquisitions by DOD”were selected using
several factors: high dollar value, acquisition stage, and
congressional interest. This report also highlights overall trends in
DOD acquisition outcomes and issues raised by the cumulative experience
of individual programs. GAO updates this report annually under the
Comptroller General‘s authority to conduct evaluations on his own
initiative.
What GAO Found:
Of the 72 programs GAO assessed this year, none of them had proceeded
through system development meeting the best practices standards for
mature technologies, stable design, or mature production processes by
critical junctures of the program, each of which are essential for
achieving planned cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. The absence
of wide-spread adoption of knowledge-based acquisition processes by DOD
continues to be a major contributor to this lack of maturity. Aside
from these knowledge-based issues, GAO this year gathered data on four
additional factors that have the potential to influence DOD‘s ability
to manage programs and improve outcomes” performance requirements
changes, program manager tenure, reliance on nongovernmental personnel
to help perform program office roles, and software management. GAO
found that 63 percent of the programs had changed requirements once
system development began, and also experienced significant program cost
increases. Average tenure to date for program managers has been less
than half of that called for by DOD policy. About 48 percent of DOD
program office staff for programs GAO collected data from is composed
of personnel outside of the government. Finally, roughly half the
programs that provided GAO data experienced more than a 25 percent
increase in the expected lines of software code since starting their
respective system development programs.
In response to previous GAO recommendations and congressional
direction, DOD has recently taken actions that could help move the
department toward more sound, knowledge-based acquisition processes.
For example, a new concept decision review initiative, guidance for
determining acquisition approaches based on capability need dates, and
the establishment of review boards to monitor weapon system
configuration changes could enable department officials to make more
informed decisions in the early stages of a program and better match
program requirements and resources, a key first step. Improvements to
individual program acquisition outcomes will likely hinge on the
success of initiatives like these, paired with knowledge-based
strategies.
Table: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios
(fiscal year [FY] 2008 dollars):
Portfolio size: Number of programs:
FY 2000 Portfolio: 75;
FY 2005 Portfolio: 91;
FY 2007 Portfolio: 95.
Portfolio size: Total planned commitments:
FY 2000 Portfolio: $790 Billion;
FY 2005 Portfolio: $1.5 Trillion;
FY 2007 Portfolio: $1.6 Trillion.
Portfolio size: Commitments outstanding:
FY 2000 Portfolio: $380 Billion;
FY 2005 Portfolio: $887 Billion;
FY 2007 Portfolio: $858 Billion.
Portfolio performance: Change to total RDT&E costs from first estimate:
FY 2000 Portfolio: 27 percent;
FY 2005 Portfolio: 33 percent;
FY 2007 Portfolio: 40 percent.
Portfolio performance: Change in total acquisition cost from first
estimate:
FY 2000 Portfolio: 6 percent;
FY 2005 Portfolio: 18 percent;
FY 2007 Portfolio: 26 percent.
Portfolio performance: Estimated total acquisition cost growth:
FY 2000 Portfolio: $42 Billion;
FY 2005 Portfolio: $202 Billion;
FY 2007 Portfolio: $295 Billion.
Portfolio performance: Share of programs with 25 percent or more
increase in program acquisition unit cost:
FY 2000 Portfolio: 37 percent;
FY 2005 Portfolio: 44 percent;
FY 2007 Portfolio: 44 percent.
Portfolio performance: Average schedule delay in delivering initial
capabilities;
FY 2000 Portfolio: 16 months;
FY 2005 Portfolio: 17 months;
FY 2007 Portfolio: 21 months.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-467SP]. For more
information, contact Michael Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or
SullivanM@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Foreword:
Letter:
Summary:
Weapon Acquisition Outcomes Continue to Undermine DOD Investments:
DOD Weapon System Programs Are Still Not Following a Knowledge-Based
Approach:
DOD Practices Continue to Contribute to Program Risk and Instability:
Additional Factors Can Contribute to Poor Weapon Acquisition Outcomes:
Recent DOD Actions Provide Opportunities for Improvement:
How to Read The Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed:
Assessments of Individual Programs:
Airborne Laser (ABL):
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD):
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites:
Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS) Increment 2:
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH):
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System:
B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability:
B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP):
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System:
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP):
C-130J Hercules:
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP):
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):
CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR):
Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X):
CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier:
Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A):
DDG 1000 Destroyer:
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE):
EA-18G:
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)--Atlas V, Delta IV:
Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS):
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
Extended Range Munition (ERM):
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:
F-22A Modernization Program:
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T):
Future Combat Systems (FCS):
Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System:
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
H-1 Upgrades:
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM):
Joint Cargo Aircraft:
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV):
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS):
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF):
Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS
AMF):
Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR):
JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS):
KC-X Program:
Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI):
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
Littoral Combat Ship: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW):
Littoral Combat Ship: Mine Countermeasures (MCM):
Littoral Combat Ship: Surface Warfare (SuW):
LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program:
Longbow Apache Block III:
Light Utility Helicopter (LUH):
Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS):
Multiple Kill Vehicle:
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program:
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform:
Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System:
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle:
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control:
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):
P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft:
PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit:
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High:
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II:
Sky Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS):
Space Radar (SR):
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT):
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft:
VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program:
Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN 774):
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS):
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 1:
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 2:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Technology Readiness Levels:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios:
Table 2: Examples of Program Delays and Impacts:
Table 3: Planned RDT&E and Procurement Funding for Major Defense
Acquisition Programs, as of December 2006:
Table 4: Outcomes for Weapon Programs in 2008 Assessment:
Table 5: Significant Changes to Contract Prices for DOD Development
Contracts:
Table 6: Program Office Staffing Composition for 52 DOD Programs:
Figures:
Figure 1: Schedule Delays for Major Weapon Systems:
Figure 2: Knowledge Achievement for Weapon System Programs in 2008
Assessment at Key Junctures:
Figure 3: Maturity Levels of Critical Technologies for DOD Programs:
Figure 4: Percentage of Programs Achieving Technology Maturity at Key
Junctures:
Figure 5: Percentage of Programs Releasing 90 Percent of Engineering
Drawings by Key Junctures:
Figure 6: Best Practices Compared to DOD Practices for Programs in 2008
Assessment:
Figure 7: Average RDT&E Cost Growth for Programs since Initial
Estimates:
Figure 8: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared
with Best Practices:
Abbreviations:
AESR: Advanced Electromagnetic Signature Reduction:
AIRSS: Alternative Infrared Satellite System:
AOA: Analysis of Alternatives:
CASPER: Communication and Subsystem Processing Embedded Resource
Communication Controller:
CAVES WAA: Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sensor Wide Aperture Array:
CBA: Capital Budget Account:
CCD: Cockpit Control Display:
CDR: critical design review:
DACS: divert and attitude control system:
DCMA: Defense Contract Management Agency:
DDR&E: Director for Defense Research and Engineering:
DIB: DCGS Integration Backbone:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DRR: Design Readiness Review:
EMALS: electromagnetic aircraft launch system:
ER: Extended Range:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FPA: focal plane array:
FY: fiscal year:
GAO: Government Accountability Office:
GBI: Ground-based interceptors:
GEO: geosynchronous earth orbit:
HEO: highly elliptical orbit:
HMSD: helmet-mounted sight displays:
IAMD: Integrated Air and Missile Defense:
ICAP: Improved Capability:
IMU: inertial measurement units:
ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
JNN-N: Joint Network Node - Network:
JPALS: Joint Precision Approach and Landing System:
JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System:
LRIP: low-rate initial production:
KDP: Key Decision Point:
KP: knowledge points:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
MDAP: Major Defense Acquisition Program:
MLP: Mobile Landing Platform:
NA: not applicable:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NLOS-C: Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
NSS AP: National Security Space Acquisition Policy:
RDT&E: research, development, test and evaluation:
SAR: Selected Acquisition Report:
SDACS: Solid Divert and Attitude Control System:
SDB: Small Diameter Bomb:
SM-3: Standard Missile 3:
TBD: to be determined:
TIP: Technology Insertion Program:
TRTF: Tanker Replacement Transfer Fund:
TSRM: Third Stage Rocket Motor:
UAS: unmanned aircraft system:
UHF: Ultra High Frequency:
ULA: United Launch Alliance:
[End of section]
Comptroller General of the United States:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
March 31, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
I am pleased to present GAO's sixth annual assessment of selected
weapon programs. It comes at a time of large and growing national
government fiscal imbalance and budget deficits that continue to strain
all of our federal agencies' resources. Our nation faces a range of
challenges that will require a more disciplined and balanced approach
to discretionary and mandatory spending as we move into the 21ST
century. In the coming decades, our ability to sustain even the
constitutionally enumerated responsibilities of the federal government
will come under increasing pressure. Budget experts now agree that
growing entitlement costs for mandatory spending programs like Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will, absent fundamental reforms, put
intense and increasing pressure on discretionary spending programs or
tax levels or both.
DOD's investment in weapon systems represents one of the largest
discretionary items in the budget. While overall discretionary funding
is declining, DOD's budget continues to demand a larger portion of what
is available, thereby leaving a smaller percentage for other
activities. DOD's investment in weapon acquisition programs is now at
its highest level in two decades. The department expects to invest
about $900 billion (fiscal year 2008 dollars) over the next 5 years on
development and procurement with more than $335 billion, or 37 percent,
going specifically for new major weapon systems. Every dollar spent
inefficiently in developing and procuring weapon systems is less money
available for many other internal and external budget priorities--such
as the global war on terror and growing entitlement programs. These
inefficiencies also often result in the delivery of less capability
than initially planned, either in the form of fewer quantities or
delayed delivery to the warfighter.
Unfortunately, our review this year indicates that cost and schedule
outcomes for major weapon programs are not improving over the 6 years
we have been issuing this report. Although well-conceived acquisition
policy changes occurred in 2003 that reflect many best practices we
have reported on in the past, these significant policy changes have not
yet translated into best practices on individual programs. Flagship
acquisitions, as well as many other top priorities in each of the
services, continue to cost significantly more, take longer to produce,
and deliver less than was promised. This is likely to continue until
the overall environment for weapon system acquisitions changes. For
example, a balanced, well-prioritized portfolio of weapon system
acquisitions that allows for the right mix of weapon systems would
alleviate the pressure each program now faces in winning funding from
others; a knowledge-based business case at the outset of each program
would alleviate overpromising on cost, schedule, and performance and
would empower program managers; and more immediate accountability in
the execution of each program would alleviate untimely decision making
when programs do get into trouble.
The current DOD leadership has recently established initiatives
designed to change the strategic environment at the weapon acquisition
portfolio level. These initiatives reflect sound business concepts and
could lead to better outcomes if implemented fully and correctly.
However, policy without practice is not uncommon within the Department
and the upcoming change in administration presents challenges in
advancing progress through sustained implementation of best practices,
as well as addressing new issues that may emerge. Significant changes
will only be possible with greater, and continued, department level
support, including strong and consistent vision, direction, and
advocacy from DOD leadership, as well as sustained oversight by the
Congress. Successful implementation will have significant implications
for decisions made on individual programs, DOD's larger modernization
goals, and the nation at large.
Signed by:
Gene L. Dodaro:
Acting Comptroller General of the United States:
[End of letter]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
March 31, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
This is GAO's sixth annual assessment of selected Department of Defense
(DOD) weapon programs. During the past 6 years, GAO has reported on
individual programs as well as many crosscutting problems with the
acquisition process and has offered numerous recommendations on how DOD
could improve acquisition outcomes. DOD's planned investment for new
weapon systems now reflects the highest funding levels in two decades,
with no significant decline expected in the near term. These levels
will be difficult to sustain as the nation begins to address other long-
term fiscal imbalances and as DOD encounters considerable pressure to
reduce its investment in new weapons. DOD faces pressures within its
own budget as new weapon system investments compete with funding needed
to procure equipment and support military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
This report provides information on 72 individual weapon programs and
assesses overall trends in DOD acquisition outcomes for decision makers
to use as they determine the best ways to invest limited resources in
the face of competing demands. Programs were selected for individual
assessment based on several factors, including (1) high dollar value,
(2) stage in acquisition, and (3) congressional interest. The majority
of the 72 programs covered in the report are considered major defense
acquisition programs by DOD.[Footnote 1] We conducted this performance
audit from June 2007 to March 2008 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. Appendix I contains detailed information on our scope and
methodology.
Summary:
Since fiscal year 2000, DOD has significantly increased the number of
major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them.
Unfortunately, during this same time period, acquisition outcomes did
not improve. Based on our analysis, total acquisition costs for the
fiscal year 2007 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs
increased 26 percent from first estimates, whereas the 2000 portfolio
increased by 6 percent. Likewise, development costs for fiscal year
2007 programs increased by 40 percent from first estimates, compared to
27 percent for fiscal year 2000 programs. In most cases, programs also
failed to deliver capabilities when promised--often forcing warfighters
to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. Our analysis
shows that current programs are experiencing an average delay of 21-
months in delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter, a 5-month
increase over fiscal year 2000 programs.
Of the 72 weapon programs we assessed this year, no program had
proceeded through system development meeting the best practices
standards for mature technologies, stable design, and mature production
processes--all prerequisites for achieving planned cost, schedule, and
performance outcomes.[Footnote 2] Eighty-eight percent of the programs
in this assessment began system development without fully maturing
critical technologies according to best practices. Ninety-six percent
of the programs had not met best practice standards for demonstrating
mature technologies and design stability before entering the more
costly system demonstration phase. Finally, no programs we assessed had
all of their critical manufacturing processes in statistical control
when they entered production, and most programs were not even
collecting data to do so. Also, programs assessed this year did not
improve on the level of knowledge attained at critical junctures from
those assessed in 2005. This year, in an effort to further understand
the cause of poor DOD outcomes, we gathered data to determine whether
two key systems engineering tools--preliminary design reviews and
prototypes--had been used by key junctures to ensure appropriate
knowledge before moving forward. Our analysis showed that only a small
percentage of programs used either key tool to demonstrate the maturity
of the product's design by critical junctures.
The results of our analysis indicate that DOD programs continue to be
suboptimal and that the lack of knowledge at key junctures of system
development continues to be a major cause of these outcomes. The final
result is lost buying power and opportunities to recapitalize the
force. About 60 percent of the programs we assessed had to reset their
business case at least once because they lacked necessary knowledge to
reasonably estimate the cost and time it would take to develop and
produce the product. The continuing absence of knowledge-based
acquisition processes steeped in disciplined systems engineering
practices--aimed at analyzing requirements to determine their
reasonableness before a program starts--contributed significantly to
this. Our work has shown that systems engineering is a best practice
used by commercial firms to ensure that requirements are well
understood and achievable within given resources before system
development starts. Our analysis of requirements changes occurring
after system development began within DOD programs indicates that this
practice is not always used. Likewise, increased risks to the
government can occur when DOD enters into contracts to develop these
complex systems before performing thorough requirements analysis to
ensure specific needs can be met. Finally, long development cycle times
invite additional instability for programs.
In addition to gathering information on acquisition outcomes and the
achievement of critical knowledge at key junctures, this year we also
present new data as an indicator of other factors that could
potentially influence DOD's ability to manage its programs and improve
cost and schedule outcomes. These factors include changes in
performance requirements, program manager tenure, composition of the
government workforce, and because of its increasing importance to
performance, software management. Our analysis of these factors can be
summarized as follows:
* Unsettled requirements in acquisition programs can create significant
turbulence. Sixty-three percent of the programs we received data from
had requirement changes after system development began. These programs
encountered cost increases of 72 percent, while costs grew by 11
percent among those programs that did not change requirements.
* Frequent program manager turnover occurs during system development.
For programs started since 2001, the average tenure to date for program
managers has been 17 months--less than half of what is prescribed by
DOD policy--challenging continuity and accountability.
* DOD relies heavily on contractors to perform roles that have in the
past been performed by government employees. For programs we assessed,
about 48 percent of their staff was made up of individuals outside of
the government; performing engineering, business, and supporting
program management related roles. These data raise questions about
whether DOD has the appropriate mix of staff and capabilities within
its workforce to effectively manage programs.
* Programs continue to have difficulty managing software development
for weapon systems. Roughly half of the programs that provided us data
had more than a 25 percent growth in their expected lines of code since
starting system development. Changes to the amount of software needing
to be developed for such programs often indicate the potential for cost
and schedule problems.
There is reason for optimism. Based in part on GAO recommendations and
congressional direction, DOD has recently begun to develop several
initiatives that, if adopted and implemented properly, could provide a
foundation for establishing sound, knowledge-based business cases for
individual acquisition programs and improving program outcomes. For
example, a new concept decision review initiative, guidance for
determining acquisition approaches based on capability need dates, and
the establishment of review boards to monitor weapon system
configuration changes are all designed to enable key department leaders
to make informed decisions well ahead of a program's start. This should
help DOD attain a closer match between each program's requirements and
available resources. Improvements to individual acquisition program
outcomes hinge on the success of these initiatives paired with rigorous
knowledge-based acquisition strategies.
Weapon Acquisition Outcomes Continue to Undermine DOD Investments:
DOD is not receiving expected returns on its large investment in weapon
systems. Our analysis does not show any improvements in acquisition
outcomes as programs continue to experience increased costs and delays
in delivering capabilities to the warfighter. In fact, when compared to
the performance of the fiscal year 2000 portfolio of major defense
acquisition programs, cost and schedule performance for current
programs is actually worse. Without improved acquisition outcomes in
the future, achieving DOD's transformational objectives in a
constrained fiscal environment is highly unlikely.
Trends in DOD's Weapon Acquisitions Investments and Outcomes since
2000:
While DOD is committing substantially more investment dollars to
develop and procure new weapon systems, our analysis shows that the
2007 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs is experiencing
greater cost growth and schedule delays than programs in fiscal years
2000 and 2005.[Footnote 3] For example, as shown in table 1, total
acquisition costs for 2007 programs increased 26 percent from first
estimates, whereas programs in fiscal year 2000 increased by 6 percent.
Total RDT&E costs for programs in 2007 increased by 40 percent from
first estimates, compared to 27 percent for programs in 2000.
Table 1: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios
(Fiscal year 2008 dollars):
Portfolio size: Number of programs:
FY 2000 Portfolio: 75;
FY 2005 Portfolio: 91;
FY 2007 Portfolio: 95.
Portfolio size: Total planned commitments:
FY 2000 Portfolio: $790 Billion;
FY 2005 Portfolio: $1.5 Trillion;
FY 2007 Portfolio: $1.6 Trillion.
Portfolio size: Commitments outstanding:
FY 2000 Portfolio: $380 Billion;
FY 2005 Portfolio: $887 Billion;
FY 2007 Portfolio: $858 Billion.
Portfolio performance: Change to total RDT&E costs from first estimate:
FY 2000 Portfolio: 27 percent;
FY 2005 Portfolio: 33 percent;
FY 2007 Portfolio: 40 percent.
Portfolio performance: Change in total acquisition cost from first
estimate:
FY 2000 Portfolio: 6 percent;
FY 2005 Portfolio: 18 percent;
FY 2007 Portfolio: 26 percent.
Portfolio performance: Estimated total acquisition cost growth:
FY 2000 Portfolio: $42 Billion;
FY 2005 Portfolio: $202 Billion;
FY 2007 Portfolio: $295 Billion.
Portfolio performance: Share of programs with 25 percent or more
increase in program acquisition unit cost:
FY 2000 Portfolio: 37 percent;
FY 2005 Portfolio: 44 percent;
FY 2007 Portfolio: 44 percent.
Portfolio performance: Average schedule delay in delivering initial
capabilities;
FY 2000 Portfolio: 16 months;
FY 2005 Portfolio: 17 months;
FY 2007 Portfolio: 21 months.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Data were obtained from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports (dated
December 1999, 2004, and 2006) or, in a few cases, data were obtained
directly from program offices. Number of programs reflects the programs
with Selected Acquisition Reports. In our analysis we have broken a few
Selected Acquisition Report programs (such as Missile Defense Agency
systems) into smaller elements or programs. Not all programs had
comparative cost and schedule data, and these programs were excluded
from the analysis where appropriate. Also, data do not include full
costs of developing Missile Defense Agency systems.
[End of table]
One way to measure Table: Program Performance is in examining the cost
growth as expressed in changes to program acquisition unit cost. This
represents the value DOD gets per unit for the acquisition dollars
invested in a certain program and shows the net effect of cost growth
and quantity changes. According to our analysis of the 2007 portfolio,
44 percent of DOD's major defense acquisition programs are paying at
least 25 percent more per unit than originally expected. The proportion
of programs experiencing a 25 percent or more increase in program
acquisition unit costs in fiscal year 2000 was 37 percent.
The consequence of cost growth is reduced buying power and lost
opportunity costs for DOD. Every dollar spent on inefficiencies in
acquiring one weapon system is less money available for other
opportunities. Total acquisition cost for the current portfolio of
major programs under development or in production has grown by nearly
$300 billion over initial estimates. As program costs increase, DOD
must request more funding to cover the overruns, make trade-offs with
existing programs, delay the start of new programs, or take funds from
other accounts.
Delivery of Operational Capabilities Continues to Be Late:
As important as wasting investment dollars, DOD has already missed
fielding dates for many programs and many others are behind schedule.
The services' requirement for a new system is often based on replacing
aging, legacy systems or filling an expected gap in capability, or
both. The warfighter's urgent need for the new weapon system is often
cited when the case is first made for developing and producing the
system. However, on average, the current portfolio of programs has
experienced a 21-month delay in delivering initial operational
capability to the warfighter. As shown in figure 1, about two-thirds of
the current programs have encountered some form of a delay.
Figure 1: Schedule Delays for Major Weapon Systems:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart, depicting the following data:
Schedule Delays for Major Weapon Systems: Programs 1 to 24 months late:
38%; Programs 25 to 48 months late: 15%; Programs more than 48 months
late: 14%; Programs on time: 33%.
Note: This reflects planned or actual delivery of initial capabilities
for programs with comparable schedule data.
[End of figure]
Because of program delays, warfighters often have to operate costly
legacy systems longer than expected, find alternatives to fill
capability gaps, or go without the capability. Table 2 shows examples
where program delays in delivering initial capabilities have affected
the military services.
Table 2: Examples of Program Delays and Impacts:
Program delays: WIN-T;
Impacts: The Army had to take extraordinary efforts to acquire an
interim capability to fulfill a gap in communication capabilities for
soldiers. The Army's optimistic acquisition approach for the Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) program created the impression
that the capability gap was far smaller than it really was, and when
the program experienced delays it forced the Army to work outside the
normal processes and use supplemental funding to meet an urgent
warfighter need. This effort later became the first increment of the
WIN-T program.
Program delays: F-22A and JSF;
Impacts: Because of delayed deliveries and quantity reductions with the
F-22A and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft, legacy systems (with
less capability) will make up a larger proportion of the future fighter
fleet for a longer period of time, and the services must now invest
billions of dollars to modernize legacy aircraft to keep them available
and capable to meet mission requirements. Despite this investment,
several legacy F-15 aircraft were recently grounded because of
structural safety concerns. Service officials have also raised concerns
about whether the number of new aircraft will be sufficient to meet
national security requirements with an acceptable level of risk.
Program delays: Aerial Common Sensor;
Impacts: Significant delays in delivering the capabilities expected
from the Aerial Common Sensor program are now requiring the Army and
Navy to make unanticipated investments in already existing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems at the same time
that they are developing the new replacement systems.
Program delays: Global Hawk;
Impacts: Delays in the Global Hawk program have contributed to the need
to keep the U-2 in the inventory longer than anticipated. The Air Force
is now developing a plan to fully retire the U-2s a year later in 2013
and at a slower rate, which will increase the funds needed to operate
and support these aircraft over this extended period.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Current U.S. Fiscal Challenges Will Affect DOD's Acquisition Funding:
DOD is in a period of high investment that will be difficult to sustain
given the many internal and external budgetary pressures faced by the
department in today's fiscal environment. Over the next 5 years, DOD
expects to expend approximately $900 billion in research, development,
test, and evaluation and procurement funds (fiscal year 2008 dollars).
About $335 billion, or 37 percent, is for the acquisition of its
current portfolio of 95 major defense acquisition programs. To
illustrate the significance of these investments, table 3 lists the top
10 programs that will dominate DOD's budget over that time. If the
trend DOD is experiencing today continues into the future years, one
can easily see how these programs, now 58 percent of funding for all
Major Defense Acquisition Programs, could encompass a much larger share
of the funding.
Table 3: Planned RDT&E and Procurement Funding for Major Defense
Acquisition Programs, as of December 2006 (Fiscal year 2008 dollars in
billions):
Program: Ballistic Missile Defense System;
Fiscal year: 2008: $8.9;
Fiscal year: 2009: $9.1;
Fiscal year: 2010: $9.1;
Fiscal year: 2011: $8.9;
Fiscal year: 2012: $8.8;
Total: $44.9.
Program: Joint Strike Fighter;
Fiscal year: 2008: $6.7;
Fiscal year: 2009: $6.9;
Fiscal year: 2010: $8.1;
Fiscal year: 2011: $8.4;
Fiscal year: 2012: $11.3;
Total: $41.4.
Program: Virginia Class Submarine;
Fiscal year: 2008: $2.9;
Fiscal year: 2009: $3.7;
Fiscal year: 2010: $3.9;
Fiscal year: 2011: $3.8;
Fiscal year: 2012: $4.7;
Total: $19.0.
Program: Future Combat Systems;
Fiscal year: 2008: $3.6;
Fiscal year: 2009: $3.2;
Fiscal year: 2010: $3.2;
Fiscal year: 2011: $3.2;
Fiscal year: 2012: $3.7;
Total: $17.0.
Program: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft;
Fiscal year: 2008: $3.0;
Fiscal year: 2009: $3.1;
Fiscal year: 2010: $3.1;
Fiscal year: 2011: $2.8;
Fiscal year: 2012: $3.0;
Total: $15.0.
Program: DDG 1000 Destroyer;
Fiscal year: 2008: $3.5;
Fiscal year: 2009: $2.8;
Fiscal year: 2010: $2.9;
Fiscal year: 2011: $2.7;
Fiscal year: 2012: $2.6;
Total: $14.4.
Program: Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21;
Fiscal year: 2008: $3.1;
Fiscal year: 2009: $4.6;
Fiscal year: 2010: $1.7;
Fiscal year: 2011: $0.6;
Fiscal year: 2012: $3.4;
Total: $13.4.
Program: F-22A;
Fiscal year: 2008: $4.4;
Fiscal year: 2009: $4.3;
Fiscal year: 2010: $0.5;
Fiscal year: 2011: $0.4;
Fiscal year: 2012: $0.5;
Total: $10.1.
Program: P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft;
Fiscal year: 2008: $0.9;
Fiscal year: 2009: $1.2;
Fiscal year: 2010: $2.9;
Fiscal year: 2011: $2.7;
Fiscal year: 2012: $2.5;
Total: $10.1.
Program: F/A-18 EF;
Fiscal year: 2008: $2.1;
Fiscal year: 2009: $1.7;
Fiscal year: 2010: $1.9;
Fiscal year: 2011: $1.6;
Fiscal year: 2012: $1.5;
Total: $8.8.
Program: Funding for Top 10 MDAP programs;
Fiscal year: 2008: $39.1;
Fiscal year: 2009: $40.6;
Fiscal year: 2010: $37.3;
Fiscal year: 2011: $35.2;
Fiscal year: 2012: $42.0;
Total: $194.2.
Program: Funding for other 85 MDAP programs;
Fiscal year: 2008: $33.2;
Fiscal year: 2009: $31.5;
Fiscal year: 2010: $26.9;
Fiscal year: 2011: $25.4;
Fiscal year: 2012: $24.1;
Total: $141.1.
Program: Total;
Fiscal year: 2008: $72.3;
Fiscal year: 2009: $72.1;
Fiscal year: 2010: $64.2;
Fiscal year: 2011: $60.6;
Fiscal year: 2012: $66.1;
Total: $335.3.
Program: Top 10 MDAP programs (percentage of total);
Fiscal year: 2008: 54;
Fiscal year: 2009: 56;
Fiscal year: 2010: 58;
Fiscal year: 2011: 58;
Fiscal year: 2012: 64;
Total: 58.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. The Ballistic Missile
Defense System is composed of several programs. We have assessed
several of these programs later in this report.
[End of table]
In addition, other military needs can be expected to challenge the
funding for these investments. Within DOD's internal budget, investment
in new weapon systems competes with those funds necessary to replace
equipment and sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between
September 2001 and May 2007, DOD has been provided $542.9 billion to
support the global war on terror. War operations have identified the
need for new, alternative systems and have resulted in greater wear on
existing weapons that will need refurbishment or replacement sooner
than expected. For example, DOD's urgent need for armored vehicles to
protect personnel from mine blasts, are not included in the planned
acquisition costs for the December 2006 major defense programs
discussed above. These vehicles are estimated to cost about $13.5
billion between 2006 and 2008.[Footnote 4]
Other government spending priorities will place external pressure on
DOD's planned investment in major weapon systems. As nondiscretionary
programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid consume a growing
percentage of the available budget, discretionary programs--including
defense--face competition for increasingly scarce resources. As a
result, sustaining real topline budget increases in any discretionary
program will be difficult. DOD's investment in weapon systems
represents one of the largest discretionary items in the budget. Since
1978, discretionary funding has decreased from 52 percent of the
federal budget to an estimated 37 percent in 2007. While the percentage
of discretionary funding is declining, DOD's budget continues to demand
a larger portion of what is available, thereby leaving a smaller
percentage for other activities.
DOD Weapon System Programs Are Still Not Following a Knowledge-Based
Approach:
We continue to find that a prime contributor to DOD's poor program
outcomes is the lack of widespread adoption of a knowledge-based
acquisition process within DOD despite polices that support such a
process. Our assessment of 72 weapon systems shows that DOD programs
continue to proceed through critical junctures with knowledge gaps that
expose programs to significant, unnecessary technology, design, and
production risks. Because of this, many programs in our assessment have
experienced cost growth and schedule delays. Our analysis also shows
that there has not been an increase in the share of programs achieving
key elements of product knowledge at critical junctures over what we
found in our 2005 assessment. As a result, DOD programs are likely to
continue to experience a cascade of negative effects that affect both
costs and schedules.
A Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach Can Lead to Better Program
Outcomes:
In order to have good outcomes, best commercial practices require the
use of a knowledge-based approach to product development that
demonstrates high levels of knowledge before significant commitments
are made. This type of strategy is essential for getting better
outcomes for DOD programs. The achievement of the right knowledge at
the right time enables leadership to make informed decisions about when
and how best to move into various acquisition phases. In essence,
knowledge supplants risk over time. This building of knowledge consists
of information that should be gathered at three critical points over
the course of a program:
* Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. Achieving a high level
of technology maturity by the start of system development is an
important indicator of whether this match has been made.[Footnote 5]
This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended
environment. In addition, the producer has completed a preliminary
design of the product that shows the design is feasible.
* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when a
program determines that a product's design is stable--that is, it will
meet customer requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability
targets. A best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-
level critical design review, usually held midway through system
development. Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings
at the system design review provides tangible evidence that the design
is stable, and a prototype demonstration shows that the design is
capable of meeting performance requirements.
* Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature. This point is
achieved when it has been demonstrated that the company can manufacture
the product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A best practice
is to ensure that all key manufacturing processes are in statistical
control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, and capable of
consistently producing parts within the product's quality tolerances
and standards--at the start of production. Demonstration of a fully
integrated product in its intended environment shows that the product
works as needed.
Outcomes for the Programs We Assessed Mirror Outcomes for the Overall
DOD Major Acquisition Program Portfolio:
For this report, we assessed 72 individual programs and found that
outcomes for a large portion of those programs are consistent with
DOD's overall portfolio of major defense acquisition programs--they
cost more and are taking longer to field than originally planned (see
table 4).[Footnote 6]
Table 4: Outcomes for Weapon Programs in 2008 Assessment:
Performance indicators: Increase in RDT&E costs from first estimate;
Outcomes to date: 38 percent.
Performance indicators: Share of programs with more than 25 percent
growth in program acquisition unit cost;
Outcomes to date: 47 percent.
Performance indicators: Average schedule delay in delivering initial
capabilities;
Outcomes to date: 23 months.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Not all programs in our assessment have entered system
development or had comparable first and latest estimates to measure
outcomes. These programs were not included in our analysis. Details of
our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.
[End of table]
In assessing the 72 weapon programs, we found no evidence of widespread
adoption of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy. The majority of
programs in our assessment this year proceeded with lower levels of
knowledge at critical junctures and attained key elements of product
knowledge later in development than expected under best practices. The
building of knowledge over a product's development is cumulative, as
one knowledge point builds on the next, and failure to capture key
product knowledge can lead to problems that eventually cascade and
become magnified throughout product development and production.
Consequently, programs managed without the knowledge-based process are
more likely to have surprises in the form of cost and schedule
increases. Figure 2 compares the degree of cumulative product knowledge
at critical decision points for DOD programs in our assessment versus
best practices standards.
Figure 2: Knowledge Achievement for Weapon System Programs in 2008
Assessment at Key Junctures:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a table depicting the following information:
Key junctures: Best practices;
Development start: Knowledge point 1: Mature all critical technologies;
Design review: Knowledge point 2: Achieve knowledge point 1 on time and
complete 90 percent of engineering drawings;
Production start: Knowledge point 3: Achieve knowledge points 1 and 2
on time, and have all critical processes under statistical control.
Key junctures: DOD outcomes[A];
Development start: 12% of programs;
Design review: 4% of programs;
Production start: 0% of programs[B].
[A] Not all programs provided information for each knowledge point or
had passed through all three key junctures.
[B] In our assessment, two programs--the Light Utility Helicopter and
the Joint Cargo Aircraft--are depicted as meeting all three knowledge
points when they began at production start. We excluded these two
programs from our analysis because they were based on commercially
available products and we did not assess their knowledge attainment
with our best practices metrics.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Programs Enter System Development without Mature Technologies or Sound
Preliminary Design:
Very few programs start system development with evidence that the
proposed solution is based on mature technologies and proven design
features. Achieving knowledge point 1 at system development start makes
it easier to reach the remaining two knowledge points at the right
time. Only 12 percent of the programs in our assessment demonstrated
all of their critical technologies as fully mature at the start of
system development, meaning that 88 percent fell short of achieving
knowledge point 1. Without mature technologies, it is difficult to know
whether the product under design will meet customer requirements or if
the design allows enough space for technology integration. As shown in
figure 3, for the 356 critical technologies at system development start
in the programs we assessed, only 31 percent were fully mature and only
another 23 percent were approaching full maturity. This means that
programs accepted 164 technologies, or 46 percent, into their product's
design based on no more than a laboratory demonstration of basic
performance, technical feasibility, and functionality, and not on a
representative model or prototype demonstration close to form and fit
(size, weight, and materials) in a relevant or realistic environment.
In some cases, technologies were in very early technology development
stages when weapon program managers accepted them as part of their
system development programs.
Figure 3: Maturity Levels of Critical Technologies for DOD Programs:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Maturity Levels of Critical Technologies for DOD Programs:
Technologies immature: 46%;
Technologies approaching maturity: 23%;
Technologies fully mature: 31%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Programs that are still working to mature technologies while they are
also maturing the system design and preparing for production have
higher cost growth than programs that start system development with
mature technologies. For those programs in our assessment with immature
technologies at system development start, the total RDT&E costs grew by
44 percent more than for programs that began with mature technologies.
More often than not, programs were still maturing technologies late
into system development and even into production. This trend is
troublesome, as we have found the share of programs with fully mature
technologies prior to production has actually decreased from our 2005
assessment (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: Percentage of Programs Achieving Technology Maturity at Key
Junctures:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple bar graph depicting the following data:
Development start:
2005 assessment: 15%;
2006 assessment: 10%;
2007 assessment: 16%;
2008 assessment: 12%.
DOD design review:
2005 assessment: 45%;
2006 assessment: 43%;
2007 assessment: 44%;
2008 assessment: 41%.
Production decision:
2005 assessment: 86%;
2006 assessment: 67%;
2007 assessment: 67%;
2008 assessment: 64%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
In addition to ensuring that technologies are mature by system
development start, best product development practices suggest that the
developer should have delivered a preliminary design of the proposed
solution based on a robust systems engineering process before
committing to system development. This process should allow the
developer to analyze the customer's expectations for the product and
identify gaps between resources and expectations, which then can be
addressed through additional investments, alternate designs, and
ultimately trade-offs. Only 10 percent of the programs in our
assessment had completed their preliminary design review prior to
committing to system development. For programs that had not completed
the preliminary design review, it was an average of about 2 1/2 years
into system development before the review was completed or was planned
to be completed. GAO's work has shown that successfully completing this
review and delivering a sound preliminary design based on mature
technological solutions leads to better and more predictable program
outcomes. DOD programs, like the Aerial Common Sensor and Joint Strike
Fighter, that did not deliver sound preliminary designs at system
development start and discovered problems early in their design
activities required substantial resources be added to the programs or,
in the case of Aerial Common Sensor, termination of the system
development contract.
Programs Continue to Move into System Demonstration and Production
without Achieving Design Stability:
As previously shown in figure 2, only a small portion of the programs
in our assessment that have held a design review captured the necessary
knowledge to ensure that they had mature technologies at system
development start and a stable design before entering the more costly
system demonstration phase of development. Over half of the programs in
our assessment did not even have mature technologies at the design
review (knowledge that actually should have been achieved before system
development start). Also less than one-quarter of the programs that
provided data on drawings released at the design review reached the
best practices standard of 90 percent, which is a smaller share than
programs in our 2005 assessment (see fig. 5). Knowing that a product's
design is stable before system demonstration reduces the risk of costly
design changes occurring during the manufacturing of production
representative prototypes--when investments in acquisitions become more
significant. Even by the beginning of production, more than a third of
the programs that had entered this phase still had not released 90
percent of their engineering drawings.
Figure 5: Percentage of Programs Releasing 90 Percent of Engineering
Drawings by Key Junctures:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple bar graph depicting the following data:
Percentage of Programs Releasing 90 Percent of Engineering Drawings by
Key Junctures:
DOD design review:
2005 assessment: 42%;
2006 assessment: 35%;
2007 assessment: 27%;
2008 assessment: 26%.
Production decision:
2005 assessment: 75%;
2006 assessment: 58%;
2007 assessment: 67%;
2008 assessment: 65%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
We have found that programs moving forward into system demonstration
with low levels of design stability are more likely than other programs
to encounter costly design changes and parts shortages that in turn
cause labor inefficiencies, schedule delays, and quality problems. In
addition, we found that over 80 percent of the programs providing data
did not or did not plan to demonstrate the successful integration of
the key subsystems and components needed for the product through an
integration laboratory, or better yet through testing an early system
prototype by the design review. Demonstrating that the system can be
successfully integrated before the critical design review is a best
practice that provides additional evidence of design stability before a
program makes costly investments in materials, manufacturing equipment,
and personnel to begin building production representative prototypes
for the system demonstration phase. For example, the Navy's E-2D
Advanced Hawkeye moved past the design review and entered systems
demonstration without fully proving--through the use of an integration
lab or prototype--that the design could be successfully integrated. The
program did not have all the components operational in a systems
integration lab until almost 2 years after the design review. While the
program estimated it had released 90 percent of the drawings needed for
the system by the design review, as it was conducting system
integration activities, it discovered that it needed substantially more
drawings. This increase means that the program really had completed
only 53 percent of the drawings prior to the review, making it
difficult to ensure the design was stable.
Programs Enter Production without Demonstrating Acceptable
Manufacturing and Test Performance:
In addition to lacking mature technologies and design stability, most
programs have not or do not plan to capture critical manufacturing and
testing knowledge before entering production. This knowledge ensures
that the product will work as intended and can be manufactured
efficiently to meet cost, schedule, and quality targets. Of the 26
programs in our assessment that have had production decisions, none of
them provided data showing that they had all their critical processes
in statistical control by the time they entered into the production
phase.[Footnote 7] In fact, only three of these programs indicated that
they had even identified the key product characteristics or associated
critical manufacturing processes--key initial steps to ensuring
critical production elements are stable and in control. Failing to
capture key manufacturing knowledge before producing the product can
lead to inefficiencies and quality problems. For example, the Wideband
Global SATCOM program encountered cost and schedule delays because
contractor personnel installed fasteners incorrectly. Discovery of the
problem resulted in extensive inspection and rework to correct the
deficiencies, contributing to a 15-month schedule delay. The Missile
Defense Agency's Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system continues to
encounter quality issues with delivered interceptors. Officials believe
inadequate controls may have allowed less reliable or inappropriate
parts to be incorporated into the manufacturing processes of two key
subsystems.
In addition to demonstrating that the product can be built efficiently,
GAO's work has shown that production and post-production costs are
minimized when a fully integrated, capable prototype is demonstrated to
show it will work as intended and in a reliable manner. We found that
many programs are very susceptible to discovering costly problems late
in development, when the more complex software and advanced
capabilities are tested. Of the 33 programs that provided us data about
the overlap between system development and production, almost three-
quarters still had or planned to have system demonstration activities
left to complete after production had begun. For nine programs, the
amount of system development work remaining was estimated to be over 4
years. This practice of beginning production before successfully
demonstrating that the weapon system will work as intended increases
the potential for discovering costly design changes that ripple through
production into products already fielded, and usually require
substantial modification costs at a later time.
Forty programs we assessed provided us information on when they had or
planned to have first tested a fully configured, integrated production
representative article (i.e., prototype) in the intended environment.
Of these, 38 percent reported that they had already conducted or
planned to conduct a development test of a fully configured, integrated
prototype before they make a production decision. In other cases, we
found instances where it would be several years after production has
begun before the fully integrated, capable product was first tested. We
also found examples where product reliability is not being demonstrated
in a timely fashion. Making design changes to achieve reliability
requirements after production begins is inefficient and costly. For
example, during flight tests in 2007, the Air Force's Joint Air-to-
Surface Standoff Missile encountered four failures during four tests,
resulting in an overall missile reliability rate of less than 60
percent despite being more than 5 years past the production decision.
The failures halted procurement of new missiles by the Air Force until
the problems could be resolved.
DOD's Practices Lead to Concurrent Development, Test, and Production:
The absence of a knowledge-based acquisition process results in DOD
continuing to develop new weapon systems in a highly concurrent
environment, which forces acquisition programs to manage technology,
design, and manufacturing risks at the same time and can lead to waste
from costly rework. This environment has made it difficult for either
DOD or congressional decision makers to make informed decisions because
appropriate knowledge has not been available at key decision points.
Rather than seeking to reduce risk early in programs, DOD's common
practice for managing this environment has been to create aggressive
risk mitigation plans in its programs after poor investment decisions
have been made. Figure 6 shows a generalization of the overlapping,
concurrent approach that DOD uses to develop its weapon systems. As
discussed earlier, in a large percentage of cases, DOD programs were
still maturing technologies, stabilizing designs, and bringing
production processes into control long after the program had entered
production. This means that these programs were not achieving all three
knowledge points (KP) until after entering production, long after the
programs passed through decision points when this knowledge should have
been available--a high-risk approach.
Figure 6: Best Practices Compared to DOD Practices for Programs in 2008
Assessment:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a timeline comparison, as follows:
Best practice:
Begin: Concept refinement and technology development;
KP1: System development and demonstration: System integration;
KP 2: System development and demonstration: System demonstration;
KP 3: Production and deployment.
DOD practice for many programs in 2008 assessment:
Begin: Concept refinement and technology development;
At about 10% of Concept refinement and technology development: begin
System development and demonstration;
At about 50% of System development and demonstration: begin Production
and deployment;
KP1, KP2, KP3: occur at about 25% intervals during Production and
deployment.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
More important, the problems created by this concurrent approach on
individual programs can profoundly affect the pressure placed on DOD's
budget. It is difficult to prioritize and allocate limited budgets
among needed requirements when acquisition programs' costs and
schedules are always in question. Programs that are managed without the
knowledge-based process are more likely than other programs to have
unpredictable cost and schedule implications that are accommodated by
either reducing overall program quantities or disrupting the funding of
other programs. Because of these disruptions, decision makers are not
able to focus on a balanced investment strategy.
DOD Practices Continue to Contribute to Program Risk and Instability:
Our work has shown that knowledge-based acquisition processes for
individual programs are often lacking because DOD acquisition practices
necessary to ensure effective implementation are not always followed,
despite policies and guidance to the contrary. We have frequently
reported on the importance of having a solid, executable business case
before committing resources to new product development. In its simplest
form, a sound business case provides evidence that (1) the warfighter's
needs are valid and can best be met with the chosen concept and (2) the
chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources-
-that is, proven technologies, along with adequate funding, design
knowledge, and time to deliver the product when needed. Without the
timely use of systems engineering activities, DOD does not effectively
translate customer wants into specific product characteristics and
functions, and ultimately into a preferred design. As a result, DOD
weapon programs suffer from unexecutable business cases, resulting in
unsettled requirements and funding instability, which can lead to
unnecessary risks and long development cycle times.
Absence of Disciplined Systems Engineering Practices Leads to
Unexecutable Business Cases:
The absence of a knowledge-based acquisition process steeped in
disciplined systems engineering practices contributes greatly to DOD's
poor acquisition outcomes. Systems engineering is a process that
translates customer wants into specific product features for which
requisite technological, software, engineering, and production
capabilities can be identified. These activities include requirements
analysis, design, and testing to ensure that the product's requirements
are achievable and designable given available resources. However, it is
not just the use of systems engineering in the development of a new
product or weapon system, but also when it is used, that makes it a
best practice. Early systems engineering provides knowledge that
enables a developer to identify and resolve gaps before product
development begins, such as overly optimistic requirements that cannot
be expected to be met with current resources. Consequently,
establishing a sound acquisition program with an executable business
case depends on determining achievable requirements, based on systems
engineering, that are agreed to by both the acquirer and the developer
before a program's initiation.
DOD programs often do not conduct systems engineering in a timely
fashion to support critical investment junctures within programs or, in
some cases, omit key systems engineering activities altogether. For
example, the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program did not adequately
analyze the product's requirements at the program's outset, a key
systems engineering activity. As a result, when the program needed to
integrate new avionics into the test aircraft, the amount of wiring and
the number of harnesses and brackets needed for the installation had
been underestimated by 400 percent. In another example, B-2 Radar
Modernization Program officials also stated some key aspects of the
systems engineering process were not completed. This caused schedule
delays when technical problems with the antenna performance were
discovered during flight testing. We have recently reported on the
impact that poor systems engineering practices have had on several
programs such as the Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System, F-22A,
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile,
and others.[Footnote 8]
While these are anecdotal examples, they are indicative of the type of
uncertainty that exists when DOD programs begin. Based on information
obtained from 43 programs, our analysis shows that 58 percent of the
programs had to reset their baseline at least once. Some programs have
had a significant number of rebaselines, such as the V-22 program,
which has had to reset its baseline 10 times.
Program Uncertainties Lead to Unnecessary Risks:
DOD often sets optimistic requirements for weapon programs that require
new and unproven technologies. Unfortunately, when early analysis is
not performed to ensure that specific DOD needs can be met and that
requirements are firmly established and understood prior to starting
system development, increased cost risk to the government can occur.
During weapon system development, DOD often asks prime contractors to
develop cutting-edge systems and awards cost reimbursement type
contracts for which the government pays the allowable incurred costs to
the extent provided by the contract.[Footnote 9] In these cases, the
government reimburses the contractor for its best efforts in completing
the contract requirements. However, because the government often does
not perform the proper up-front analysis to determine whether its needs
can be met, significant contract cost increases can occur as the scope
of the requirements changes or becomes better understood by the
government and contractor. As such, the consequences of poorly formed
and analyzed requirements are manifested in these changes to contract
costs over the course of the period of performance, with the government
taking on the burden of the increases. For example, the Joint Strike
Fighter and Future Combat Systems (FCS) are expected to be developed on
a cost reimbursable basis for 12 years. As of fiscal year 2007, DOD
anticipates having to reimburse the prime contractors on these two
programs nearly $13 billion more for their work activities than
initially expected. Table 5 illustrates eight development programs
within the scope of our review that use cost reimbursement type
contracts and have experienced or anticipate significant increases to
initial contract prices.
Table 5: Significant Changes to Contract Prices for DOD Development
Contracts (Then year dollars in millions):
Program: Joint Strike Fighter;
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Initial contract target price [A]: $18,981.9;
DOD's estimated price at completion: $25,873.2;
Actual or anticipated price change: $6,891.3;
Percentage change: 36.
Program: Future Combat Systems[B];
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Initial contract target price [A]: $14,924.8;
DOD's estimated price at completion: $20,882.9;
Actual or anticipated price change: $5,958.1;
Percentage change: 40.
Program: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System;
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Initial contract target price [A]: $2,942.7;
DOD's estimated price at completion: $5,106.0;
Actual or anticipated price change: $2,163.3;
Percentage change: 74.
Program: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites;
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Initial contract target price [A]: $2,839.0;
DOD's estimated price at completion: $4,149.3;
Actual or anticipated price change: $1,310.3;
Percentage change: 46.
Program: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle;
Prime contractor: General Dynamics;
Initial contract target price [A]: $712.1;
DOD's estimated price at completion: $1,283.9;
Actual or anticipated price change: $571.8;
Percentage change: 80.
Program: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery
Projectile;
Prime contractor: Raytheon;
Initial contract target price [A]: $51.2;
DOD's estimated price at completion: $518.0;
Actual or anticipated price change: $466.8;
Percentage change: 912.
Program: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program;
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Initial contract target price [A]: $484.6;
DOD's estimated price at completion: $2,048.4;
Actual or anticipated price change: $1,563.8;
Percentage change: 323.
Program: Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio;
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Initial contract target price [A]: $235.5;
DOD's estimated price at completion: $966.3;
Actual or anticipated price change: $730.8;
Percentage change: 310.
Source: GAO analysis of data from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports.
[A] Price means cost plus any fee or profit applicable to the contract
type.
[B] Future Combat Systems began under an Other Transaction Authority
agreement but was converted to a traditional contract subject to the
Federal Acquisition Regulation in 2005. Both the agreement and the
contract provided for reimbursement of the vendors costs. The initial
contract target price reflects the price under the Other Transaction
Authority agreement and DOD's estimated price at completion reflects
estimated costs of the contract.
[End of table]
We have found examples of programs extending the use of cost
reimbursement contracts into the production phase instead of using
fixed priced contracts, reflecting uncertainties as programs enter
production. For example, the Joint Strike Fighter plans to use cost
reimbursement contracts for as many as 7 years worth of low-rate
initial production orders. According to program officials, it hopes to
transition to a fixed price contract sometime before full-rate
production, but by this time it could have procured over 275 aircraft
at a cost of over $40 billion.
Long DOD Development Cycle Times Contribute to Instability:
A hallmark of an executable program with a sound business case is short
development cycle times. Long cycle times promote instability,
especially considering DOD's tendency to have changing requirements and
program manager turnover. In fact, DOD itself suggests that system
development should be limited to about 5 years. Time-defined
constraints such as this are important because they serve to limit the
initial product's requirements, allow for more frequent assimilation of
new technologies into weapon systems, and speed new capabilities to the
warfighter. Most programs we assessed were based on cycle times much
longer than those prescribed through best practices. While there are
isolated examples of programs with cycle times shorter than 5 years,
the majority of programs included in our assessment were established
with cycle times much longer than this. For 34 programs that have been
started since 2001, only 11 programs (32 percent) even planned their
development cycle times to be less than 5 years.
Additional Factors Can Contribute to Poor Weapon Acquisition Outcomes:
This year we also gathered new data focused on other factors we believe
could have a significant influence on DOD's ability to improve cost and
schedule outcomes. Foremost, several DOD programs in our assessment
incurred requirements changes after the start of system development and
also experienced cost increases. At the same time, DOD's practice of
frequently changing program managers during a program's development
makes it difficult to hold them accountable for the business cases that
they are entrusted to manage and deliver. We also found that DOD is
relying more on contractors to support the management and oversight of
weapon system acquisitions and contracts, which could add risk to
programs. Finally, as programs rely more heavily on software to perform
critical functions for weapon systems, we found that a large number of
programs are encountering difficulties in managing their software
development.
Stable Requirements Are Needed for Improved Outcomes:
As stated previously, establishing a valid need and translating that
into system requirements is essential for obtaining the right program
outcome. Without these, DOD increases the risk that it will pay too
much for the system or enter too quickly into a business case that
exposes the department to unnecessary risks. However, once DOD system
development programs are under way, and despite efforts to define
needed capabilities, product requirements often do change--the problem
or threat the program was seeking to address changes or the user and
acquisition communities may simply change their minds about a program.
Among the 46 programs we surveyed, 63 percent of them indicated that
requirements had changed in some fashion (additions, reductions, or
deferments) since system development start. Our analysis of program
data shows that this instability can have a profound impact on a
program's costs. Figure 7 illustrates how RDT&E costs increased by 11
percent over initial estimates for programs that have not had
requirements changes, while they increased 72 percent among those that
had requirements changes.[Footnote 10]
Figure 7: Average RDT&E Cost Growth for Programs since Initial
Estimates:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple bar graph depicting the following data:
Average RDT&E Cost Growth for Programs since Initial Estimates:
Programs without requirements changes: 11%;
Programs with requirements changes: 72%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Frequent Changes to Program Management Reduce Accountability:
DOD frequently changes program managers during a product's development
program, making it difficult to hold one program manager accountable
for the content of the program's business case when it is established
and to ensure that a knowledge-based acquisition process is followed.
According to DOD policy, the assignment period for program managers is
required to be at least until completion of the major milestone that
occurs closest in time to the date on which the manager has served in
the position for 4 years. We recently reported that rather than lengthy
assignment periods, as suggested by best practices and DOD's own
policy, many of the programs we reviewed had multiple program managers
within the same milestone.[Footnote 11] Our analysis indicates that for
39 major acquisition programs started since March 2001, the average
time in system development was about 37 months. The average tenure for
program managers on those programs during that time was about 17
months--less than half of what is required by DOD policy. This practice
may promote shortsightedness, challenge continuity, and reduce
accountability for poor outcomes. It might also discourage managers
from raising issues and addressing problems early, keeping them from
realistically estimating the resources needed to deliver the program.
Consequently, program managers may have little incentive to pursue
knowledge-based acquisition approaches, as program funding is not tied
to successfully reaching knowledge points before a program can move
forward.
As part of a new strategy for program manager empowerment and
accountability, DOD plans a variety of actions to enhance development
opportunities, provide more incentives, and arrange knowledge-sharing
opportunities. For example, DOD intends to increase "just-in-time"
training, establish a formal mentoring program, and plans to explore
the use of monetary awards. However, the new practices DOD is planning
to implement will not be as effective as they could be until DOD
ensures that program managers are given acquisition programs that are
executable--that is, programs that are the result of an integrated,
portfolio-based approach to investments and that have a sound business
case. Only then will program managers be placed in a better position to
carry out their programs in a manner suited for successful outcomes.
DOD Relying Heavily on Contractors to Support Program Management
Responsibilities:
The federal government is increasingly reliant on the private sector in
general and contractors in particular to deliver a whole range of
products and services, provide hard to find skills, augment capacity on
an emergency basis, and reduce the size of government.[Footnote 12] At
a time when weapon acquisitions are becoming more complex and larger in
size, DOD is likewise relying more on contractors and other non-
government personnel to help manage and oversee weapon system programs
and their contractors. On the basis of our work looking at various
weapon systems, we have observed that DOD has given contractors
increased program management responsibilities for activities such as
developing requirements, designing products, and estimating costs--key
aspects of setting and executing a program's business case. Table 6
shows that the 52 DOD programs that provided information indicated that
about 48 percent of the program office staff was composed of
individuals outside of the government.
Table 6: Program Office Staffing Composition for 52 DOD Programs
(Percentage of staff):
Government:
Program management: 70%;
Administrative support: 39%;
Business functions: 64%;
Engineering and technical: 48%;
Other: 45%;
Total: 52%.
Support contractors:
Program management: 22%;
Administrative support: 60%;
Business functions: 35%;
Engineering and technical: 34%;
Other: 55%;
Total: 36%.
Other non-government[A]:
Program management: 8%;
Administrative support: 1%;
Business functions: 1%;
Engineering and technical: 18%;
Other: 1%;
Total: 12%.
Total non-government:
Program management: 30%;
Administrative support: 61%;
Business functions: 36%;
Engineering and technical: 52%;
Other: 56%;
Total: 48%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Table may not add due to rounding.
[A] Other includes federally funded research and development centers,
universities, and affiliates.
[End of table]
GAO has noted that the DOD workforce faces serious challenges and has
expressed concerns about DOD's reliance on contractors to perform roles
that have in the past been performed by government employees. Without
the right-sized workforce, with the right skills, we believe this could
place greater risk on the government for fraud, waste, and abuse.
[Footnote 13] In part, this increased reliance has occurred because DOD
is experiencing a critical shortage of certain acquisition
professionals with technical skills as it has downsized its workforce
over the last decade. For example, in a prior review of space
acquisition programs, we found that 8 of 13 cost-estimating
organizations and program offices believed the number of cost
estimators was inadequate and we found that 10 of those offices had
more contractor personnel preparing cost estimates than government
personnel. We also found examples during this year's assessment where
the program offices expressed concerns about having inadequate
personnel to conduct their program office roles.
Effective Software Management Necessary for Delivering Critical
Capability:
Modern weapon systems are increasingly more dependent on software than
anytime before, and the development of complex software represents a
potential leap forward in operational capability for any number of DOD
defense acquisitions. Much of a system's functionality is controlled by
software. Technological advancements have even made it possible for
software to perform functions once handled by hardware. As this demand
for complex software grows, the use of disciplined, structured
development processes that measure, manage, and control software
requirements is essential to delivering software-intensive systems on
time and within budget. Our prior work has shown that one key metric
used by leading software developers is to measure changes to the amount
of software code developed for the program.[Footnote 14] Size metrics,
such as lines of code, are used to compare the amount of software code
produced with the amount originally estimated. Changes to the size
needed can indicate potential cost and schedule problems.
We have found cases where programs continue to have difficulties in
managing software development for weapon systems. Roughly half of the
programs that provided us software data had at least a 25 percent
growth in their expected lines of code since system development
started. For example, software requirements were not well understood on
the FCS program when the program began, and as the program moves toward
preliminary design activities, the number of lines of software code has
nearly tripled. Also, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program
experienced software growth during system development, and the Marine
Corps testing agency identified software test failures as a factor
affecting the system's reliability.
Recent DOD Actions Provide Opportunities for Improvement:
In February 2007, DOD, in response to congressional direction, issued a
report on the department's acquisition transformation initiatives and
the goals established to achieve change.[Footnote 15]Within that
report, DOD noted that every aspect of how the department does business
was being assessed and streamlined to deliver improved capabilities to
the warfighter and visibility to executive leadership. The report also
noted the need for continuous and evolutionary changes across the DOD
acquisition system, especially with regard to determining which assets
and investments to acquire in order to meet desired capabilities.
Future reports on acquisition transformation are expected to build on
the outcomes of initiatives described in that report. As such, DOD has
set forth its intention to change the strategic environment at the
portfolio level. DOD also plans to implement new practices mentioned
earlier, similar to past GAO recommendations that are intended to
provide program managers more incentives, support, and stability. The
department acknowledges that any actions taken to improve
accountability must be based on a foundation whereby program managers
can launch and manage programs toward greater performance, rather than
focusing on maintaining support and funding for individual programs.
DOD acquisition leaders have told us that any improvements to program
managers' performance hinge on the success of these departmental
initiatives.
We have reported that DOD should develop an overarching strategy and
decision-making processes that prioritize programs based on a balanced
match between customer needs and available department resources. Within
its strategy and other reports, DOD has highlighted several initiatives
that, if adopted and implemented properly, could provide a foundation
for improved outcomes. For example, DOD is experimenting with a new
concept decision review practice, selection of different acquisition
approaches according to expected fielding times, and panels to review
weapon system configuration changes that could adversely affect program
cost and schedule. The DOD strategy emphasizes that initiatives
designed to improve program manager performance can be successful only
if the strategic objectives are accepted and implemented. In addition,
in September 2007 the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued a policy memorandum to
ensure weapon acquisition programs are able to demonstrate key
knowledge elements that could inform future development and budget
decisions. This policy directed pending and future programs to include
acquisition strategies and funding that provide for two or more
competing contractors to develop technically mature prototypes through
Milestone B (knowledge point 1), with the hope of reducing technical
risk, validating designs and cost estimates, evaluating manufacturing
processes, and refining requirements. Each of the initiatives is
designed to enable more informed decisions by key department leaders
well ahead of a program's start, decisions that provide a closer match
between each program's requirements and the department's resources. Our
work has shown that if this is to occur, all of the players involved
with acquisitions--the requirements community, the comptroller, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics;
and perhaps most importantly, the military services--must be unified in
implementing these new policies from top to bottom.
How to Read The Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed:
We assess each program in two pages and depict the extent of knowledge
in a stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary at the bottom of
the first page. As illustrated in figure 8, the knowledge graph is
based on the three knowledge points and the key indicators for the
attainment of knowledge: technology maturity (depicted in orange),
design stability (depicted in green), and production maturity (depicted
in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based on the ideal attainment
of the three types of knowledge at the three knowledge points. The
closer a program's attained knowledge is to the best practice line, the
more likely the weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and
schedule. A knowledge deficit at the start of development--indicated by
a gap between the technology knowledge attained and the best practice
line--means the program proceeded with immature technologies and faces
a greater likelihood of cost and schedule increases as technology risks
are discovered and resolved.
Figure 8: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared
with Best Practices:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge
as Compared with Best Practices. An interpretation of this depicting
follows in the next paragraph.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system
development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing
knowledge point 1. Knowledge point 2 was not attained at the design
review, as some technologies were still not mature and only a small
percentage of engineering drawings had been released. Projections for
the production decision show that the program is expected to achieve
greater levels of maturity but will still fall short. It is likely that
this program would have had significant cost and schedule increases.
Assessments of Individual Programs:
Our assessments of the 72 weapon programs follow.
Airborne Laser (ABL):
{See PDF for image]
Figure: Photograph of Airborne Laser (ABL).
Source: Airborne Laser Program Office.
MDA's ABL element is being developed to destroy enemy missiles during
the boost phase of their flight. Carried aboard a modified Boeing 747
aircraft, ABL employs a beam control/fire control subsystem to focus
the beam on a target, a high-energy chemical laser to rupture the fuel
tanks of enemy missiles, and a battle management subsystem to plan and
execute engagements. We assessed the system's prototype design that is
expected to lead to a lethality demonstration in 2009.
Timeline: Technology/System development to Initial capability:
Program start: 11/96;
Transition to MDA: 10/01;
Long duration laser test: 12/05;
GAO review: 1/08;
Lethality demonstration: 2009;
Demonstrated capability: 2016/2017.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Kirtland AFB, N.M.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $3,496.0 million;
* Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $3,496.0 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $8,127.4;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 0;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $8,127.4;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Cost data include all known costs from the program's inception through
fiscal year 2013.
[End of table]
None of ABL's critical technologies are fully mature, yet MDA has
released 100 percent of the prototype's engineering drawings. Program
officials expected to demonstrate the prototype's critical technologies
during a flight test planned for late 2008, but recent integration
issues and technical challenges delayed that test until 2009.
Additional drawings may be needed if problems encountered during future
testing necessitate design changes. The work for ABL's prime contract
was rebaselined in 2004 and refined again in 2005. However, the
contractor continued to experience cost and schedule delays in 2006. In
May 2007, the program replanned its contract work again, increasing
costs and extending the length of the contract. Subsequent to the
replan, the contractor continued to overrun its cost and schedule
budgets through fiscal year 2007.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
ABL Program:
Technology Maturity:
The program office assessed all seven of its critical technologies--the
six-module laser, missile tracking, atmospheric compensation,
transmissive optics, optical coatings, jitter control, and managing the
high-power beam--as nearly mature. According to program officials, all
of these technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant environment.
Although the program office assessed jitter control as nearly mature,
it considers this technology to be a high risk to the program. Jitter
is a phenomenon pertaining to the technology of controlling and
stabilizing the high-energy laser beam so that vibration unique to the
aircraft does not degrade the laser's aimpoint. It is critical to
imparting sufficient energy to the target to rupture its fuel tank. The
program's assessment of this technology is based on models that have
been anchored to measurements taken during recent ground and flight
tests. On the basis of current jitter measurements, officials are
confident that they can successfully execute a key flight test planned
for 2009.
The program plans to demonstrate all of its critical technologies
during this flight test of the system prototype, referred to as a
lethality demonstration, in which ABL will attempt to shoot down a
short-range ballistic missile. Although the program had expected to
complete the lethality demonstration in 2008, software integration
issues and recent technical challenges associated with the system's
beam control/fire control component delayed the demonstration until
2009.
Design Stability:
We could not assess ABL's design stability because the element's
initial capability will not be fully developed until the second
aircraft is well underway. While the program has released 100 percent
of its engineering drawings for the prototype, it is unclear whether
the design of the prototype aircraft can be relied upon as a good
indicator of design stability for the second aircraft. More drawings
may be needed if the design is enhanced or if problems encountered
during flight testing force design changes.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the production maturity for the system's prototype
because statistical process control data are not available due to the
limited quantity of hardware being produced for the prototype aircraft.
Other Program Issues:
MDA estimates that it will have spent approximately $5.1 billion for
its ABL element from its inception in 1996 through its lethality
demonstration in 2009. For years, the program has faced significant
cost and schedule growth. In 2004, the ABL program restructured its
prime contract work to focus on executing near-term milestones within
budget and on schedule. However, since that restructure, the program
has continued to experience cost growth and schedule delays. During
2005, the program further refined its work plan to ensure it could meet
its cost and schedule objectives. However, a year later, the ABL
program encountered new technical challenges that contributed to
additional cost increases and schedule slippage. Consequently, program
officials reevaluated the program and implemented a new baseline for
all remaining work. In 2007, the ABL program once again modified its
prime contract, increasing the cost ceiling by $253 million and
extending the period of performance by approximately 1 year. The prime
contract is currently valued at about $3.9 billion and is expected to
end in February 2010.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the ABL Program Office
concurred with our assessment. The program office also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD):
{See PDF for image]
Figure: Photograph of Aegis BMD.
Source: Aegis BMD Program Office.
[End of figure]
MDA's Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system being
developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to protect deployed
U.S. forces, allies, and friends from short-to-medium range ballistic
missile attacks. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 radar,
Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) missiles, and command and control systems. It
will also be used as a forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and
tracking of intercontinental ballistic missiles. We assessed the SM-3
Block IA, to be delivered in Block 2006.
Timeline: Technology/System development to Initial capability:
Program/development start: 10/95;
Transition to MDA: 1/02;
Missile contract awarded: 8/03;
Design review: 10/04;
Block 2004 completion: 12/05;
Block 2006 start: 1/06;
GAO review: 1/08.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin, Raytheon;
Program office: Dahlgren, Va;
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $6,196.9 million;
* Procurement: NA;
Total funding: $6,196.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 07/2007: $11,233.1;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 0;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $11,233.1;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include known costs from the program‘s inception through fiscal
year 2013.
[End of table]
Program officials report all Block IA critical technologies are mature.
Our data indicate that one of the technologies is less mature. The
Solid Divert and Attitude Control System (SDACS) pulse one has been
successfully flight tested since our last report. However, the zero
pulse mode of the missile's third stage rocket motor has not been
demonstrated in an operational environment. Officials also report the
missile's design is stable with 100 percent of its drawings released to
manufacturing and they do not anticipate any design changes. The Block
IA missile is in production but officials state that the contractor's
processes are not mature enough to collect statistical data. Instead,
other means are being used to gauge production readiness.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Aegis BMD Program:
Technology Maturity:
We reported last year that two of the three technologies critical to
the SM-3 Block IA missile, the Solid Divert and Attitude Control System
(SDACS) and the Third Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM), were not mature. Since
our last report, one of the SDACS's pulse modes, pulse one, which
allows the kinetic warhead to divert in order to adjust its aim, has
flown three times, in April, June, and November 2007. Pulse one was
used to shift the warhead's aim just prior to intercept and all tests
resulted in successful intercepts. The other pulse mode of the SDACS,
pulse two, is identical in technology and functionality as pulse one
but has not been flight tested. Program officials state that both pulse
modes have been successfully tested in four consecutive ground tests
but that it is difficult for the SDACS to use both pulse modes in a
flight test because the first pulse has provided sufficient divert
capability to make the intercept. Program officials state that an
artificiality would have to be built into the flight test in order to
guarantee the use of pulse two. Additionally, program officials
consider pulse two to be a margin to the system since it is designed to
provide additional energy, if needed, after employing pulse one, to
make the necessary maneuvers to intercept the target in the desired
spot for maximum destruction. Similarly, the zero pulse mode of the
TSRM that increases the missile's capability against shorter-range
threats has not been flight tested. Although the production design of
the TRSM attitude control system passed qualification testing in
February 2007 and has been integrated into the manufacturing line, the
zero pulse mode is not scheduled for flight testing due to range safety
limitations.
Design Stability:
Program officials reported that the design for the SM-3 Block IA
missiles being produced during Block 2006 is stable, with 100 percent
of its drawings released to manufacturing. Program officials do not
anticipate additional design changes.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the production maturity of the SM-3 missiles being
procured for Block 2006. Program officials stated that the contractor's
processes are not yet mature enough to statistically track production
processes. The Aegis BMD program continues to use other means to assess
progress in production and manufacturing, such as tracking rework
hours, cost of defects per unit, and other defect and test data.
Other Program Issues:
The original Aegis BMD program goals for Block 2006 included delivery
of 19 SM-3 Block IA U.S. missiles. Last year, program officials reduced
the goal to 15. Since that time, delivery goals have been reduced to
12, because the contractor did not have the production capacity to
deliver both foreign military sales missiles and U.S. missiles.
Although Raytheon reported no cost or schedule growth, because much of
the SM-3 Block IA contract work was being reported as a level of
effort, it was difficult to assess true performance since it could not
be practically measured by discrete earned value techniques. According
to American National Standards Institute guidelines adopted by DOD,
only work that does not result in a product should be reported as level
of effort under earned value management. However, in August 2007,
Raytheon reported 73 percent of the contract work as level of effort,
some of which was identified as possibly unjustified and appearing
excessive by a team composed of technical and functional experts during
a 2007 review. Since that time, program officials report that they were
able to implement earned value management reporting on future delivery
contracts and stated in January 2008 that Raytheon had reduced the
contract level of effort work to 18 percent.
Agency Comments:
Technical comments provided by the program office were incorporated as
appropriate. In addition, program officials stated that they believe
the TSRM is a mature technology and add that is has been successfully
flown in multiple missions in increasingly realistic operational
environments. Program officials consider the zero pulse mode of the
third stage rocket motor to be marginal to the system and explain that
the capability is difficult to demonstrate in an operational
environment due to range safety limitations. Additionally, program
officials state that all design verification tests for both the SDACS
and the TSRM have been completed, all requirements have been exceeded,
and qualification tests for the capabilities have been completed and
verified by Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and the
Indian Head Division, Naval Warfare Center.
[End of section]
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing
Milstar system with higher-capacity, survivable, jam-resistant,
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and tactical
warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission control
segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications are
acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international
partnership program that includes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and mission control segments.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: 4/99;
Development start: 9/01;
Design review: 4/04;
Production decision: 6/04;
GAO review: 1/08;
First launch: 11/08;
Initial capability: 6/10.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,078.9 million;
* Procurement: $93.6 million;
Total funding: $1,172.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 0:
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/2001: $4,669.0;
Latest, 12/2006: $6,098.9;
Percent change: 30.6.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/2001: $1380.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $718.9;
Percent change: -47.9.
Total program cost;
As of 10/2001: $6,050.0;
Latest, 12/2006: $6,817.3;
Percent change: 12.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/2001: $1,209.993;
Latest, 12/2006: $2,272.443;
Percent change: 87.8.
Total quantities;
As of 10/2001: 5;
Latest, 12/2006: 3;
Percent change: -40.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/2001: 111;
Latest, 12/2006: 134;
Percent change: 20.7.
[End of table]
The AEHF program's technologies are mature and the design is stable. We
could not assess production maturity because the program office does
not collect statistical process control data. In September 2007, the
program announced a launch slip of over 6 months because technical
problems with some hardware components delayed the start of system-
level environmental testing. Because of concerns about the development
of the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) and a
possible gap in capabilities, the conference report accompanying the
Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 encouraged the Air
Force to procure an additional AEHF satellite.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
AEHF Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, all 14 AEHF critical technologies are
mature, having been demonstrated in a relevant environment. All
hardware has been integrated into the first satellite for system-level
environmental testing.
Design Stability:
The AEHF's design is stable. All expected design drawings have been
released and the program completed system-level critical design review
in April 2004.
Production Maturity:
Production maturity could not be assessed, as the program office does
not collect statistical process control data.
Other Program Issues:
Since our assessment of the AEHF last year, subcontractors delivered
all major subsystems, including the propulsion unit, antennas, and
payload to the prime contractor for final integration into the first
satellite. However, because of technical difficulties with some key
hardware components, the payload was incomplete when delivered.
Although the program began system integration and some functional
testing, it could not proceed with system-level environmental testing
until all satellite hardware was in place. Because of this delayed
start, the launch of the first two satellites will also be delayed. In
September 2007, the program office determined the launch of the first
satellite will slip over 6 months, from April 2008 to November 2008.
The second satellite will be delayed over 3 months, from April 2009 to
August 2009. The program office estimated the cost of the slip to be
between $230 million and $250 million. The program office expects to
keep the same schedule of April 2010 for the third satellite.
The original AEHF program included the acquisition of five satellites.
In December 2002, satellites 4 and 5 were deleted from the program with
the intention of using three AEHF satellites and the first TSAT
satellite to achieve full operational capability. However, because of
concerns that delays in developing and fielding TSAT could result in a
gap in protected communications capability, the conference report
accompanying the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008
encouraged the Air Force to procure an additional AEHF satellite and
provided funding for advanced procurement of the forth AEHF satellite.
Program officials stated the primary challenges associated with
procuring a fourth satellite are obsolescence of electronic components
and a minimum 3-year production gap between the third and fourth
satellites, making the fourth satellite much more costly than the third
satellite. The officials stated if the fourth satellite is fully
funded, the earliest possible launch would be in 2013.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS) Increment 2:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS)
Increment 2:
Source: 30th Intelligence Squadron, U.S. Air Force.
[End of figure]
AF DCGS provides a global intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capability for the Air Force. AF DCGS provides all-
source intelligence information, including time critical targeting and
direct threat warning information from various sensors to the joint
task force commander and echelons below. AF DCGS is part of DOD's DCGS
Enterprise, a cooperative effort among the military services and
national agencies to provide interoperable ISR systems and data. We
assessed AF DCGS Increment 2.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
GAO review: 1/08;
Development start: 4th quarter, FY 2009;
Specific program event dates are in development as the acquisition
strategy is being formulated.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD:
Program office: Hanscom AFB, Mass.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $318.3 million:
* Procurement: $943.6 million:
Total funding: $1,278.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 1:
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $477.4;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,545.2;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $2,126.5;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $2,126.518;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 1;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
The current estimate is representative of the entire AF DCGS effort,
which includes funding for Block 10.1, Block 10.2, and Increment 2. In
addition, DCGS is considered a single system with multiple sites;
therefore only one system will be procured.
[End of table]
AF DCGS is an operational system undergoing net-centric and technology
transformation. The program is composed of three blocks or increments:
(1) Block 10.1 is currently fielded and provides operational networked
ISR; (2) Block 10.2, considered a technology refresh program, will
provide a net-centric infrastructure and is scheduled for fielding in
fiscal year 2008; and, (3) Increment 2, a future capability, will
provide multi-intelligence net-centric operations, a layered service
oriented architecture, and automated analysis and fusion, among other
capabilities. The Increment 2 Capabilities Development Document is
currently undergoing review by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, while Increment 2 is scheduled to enter system development in
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009. Specific program event dates
are still in development as the acquisition strategy is being
formulated.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure] ]
AF DCGS Program:
Technology Maturity:
AF DCGS provides the Air Force with a ground-based "system of systems"
capable of (1) tasking intelligence sensors, and (2) receiving,
processing, exploiting, and disseminating data from airborne and
national reconnaissance platforms and commercial sources. Increment 2
will upgrade the net-centric baseline system, focusing on signal
intelligence and data fusion. These upgrades will use commercial
hardware and software for most of the fielded capabilities. No
development or specially produced hardware will be utilized. Those
items that are government-unique will be procured through other
programs.
The program has yet to define specific critical technologies for
Increment 2, but has identified critical technology areas such as data
fusion, imagery automated extraction, and knowledge management, among
others. A technology readiness assessment is planned for the third
quarter of fiscal year 2008.
Design Stability:
Design drawings are not available, as Increment 2 has yet to begin
development.
Other Program Issues:
AF DCGS and other DCGS systems are highly dependent on the DCGS
Integration Backbone (DIB). The DIB is a common set of enterprise
services and standards that serves as the foundation for the
interoperability and data sharing across the DCGS enterprise. The DIB
program is pursuing an evolutionary acquisition strategy and has
delivered early versions of the product. To date, the DIB has achieved
successful connectivity and data sharing in a demonstration with Army,
Air Force, and Navy laboratories. According to a DIB program official,
the next major milestone for the DIB is the planned delivery of a new
version that will focus on interoperability testing and certification.
The delivery of the new DIB software is scheduled for the first quarter
of fiscal year 2009 to support the DCGS-Army version 4.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH);
Source: ARH Prototype #1 Flight Testing at Bell Helicopter, ©2006 Bell
Helicopter, A Textron Company.
[End of figure]
The Army's ARH is expected to provide reconnaissance and security
capability for air and ground maneuver teams. The ARH was to combine a
modified off-the-shelf airframe with a non-developmental item mission
equipment package and is replacing the Kiowa Warrior helicopter fleet.
A streamlined acquisition strategy was proposed for the ARH program in
order to support current military operations.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: 7/05;
Design review: 1/07;
GAO review: 1/08;
Low-rate decision: 6/08;
Full-rate decision: 12/10;
Initial capability: 7/11.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Bell Helicopter Textron;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $386.5 million;
* Procurement: $4,977.4 million;
Total funding: $5,363.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 512;
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 07/2005: $388.3;
Latest, 08/2007: $750.9;
Percent change: 93.4.
Procurement cost;
As of 07/2005: $3,019.5;
Latest, 08/2007: $4,977.4;
Percent change: 64.8.
Total program cost;
As of 07/2005: $3,407.7;
Latest, 08/2007: $5,728.3;
Percent change: 68.1.
Program unit cost;
As of 07/2005: $9.260;
Latest, 08/2007: $11.188;
Percent change: 20.8.
Total quantities;
As of 07/2005: 368;
Latest, 08/2007: 512;
Percent change: 39.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 07/2005: 47;
Latest, 08/2007: 72;
Percent change: 53.2
[End of table]
Since our assessment of the ARH program last year, the program has
progressed through the critical design review, but has experienced
multiple issues integrating and qualifying one of two critical
technologies. Program officials currently project the sensor technology
will not demonstrate maturity until at least the planned production
decision in June 2008. While the current ARH design is stable, the ARH
program issued a stop-work order in March 2007 and remains in flux
until a future Defense Acquisition Board meeting. According to program
officials, the board will consider the current acquisition program as
well as the results from a Center for Naval Analyses study to help
define the future plan for the program.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
ARH Program:
Technology Maturity:
One of the program's two critical technologies, the engine, is mature.
The sensor is not projected to be fully mature until at least the
planned production decision in June 2008. The sensor selected for the
ARH was designed and developed as a collaborative effort with the
Marines and the Navy for combat helicopter operations. An earlier
version of the sensor is currently fielded in the Iraqi theater on a
Marine helicopter. An updated version of the currently fielded sensor
was proposed by the lead contractor for integration onto the ARH
platform. Although previous sensor technology has been used in the
Marine helicopter, the updated sensor hardware and related software
have not been integrated and tested at the component system level
within the ARH sensor suite to determine their functionality and
reliability. This is an important consideration since the lead
contractor has proposed the Army use results from the original sensor
configuration's testing to support its qualification on the ARH.
According to program officials, the integration and qualification
issues with the sensor have contributed heavily to the risks of the
program. At the beginning of the program, the lead contractor proposed
the Navy lead efforts to flight test and qualify the sensor. However,
according to the Army Test and Evaluation Command, there were
significant differences between sensor and airframe configurations that
could result in additional test requirements that were not anticipated
by the lead contractor's proposal. Program officials stated that after
contract award, it became apparent that the Navy effort was behind
schedule projections and that ARH would bear the burden of development.
Subsequently, the lead contractor performed significant development and
testing in order to mature the sensor, which resulted in placing the
development, integration, and qualification risk on the ARH program.
Design Stability:
According to the program office, the basic design of the ARH is stable
with 98 percent of drawings released to manufacturing at the design
review in January 2007. Additionally, program office officials stated
the ARH program is an assembly and integration effort with moderate
design effort.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because, according to the
program office, it does not plan to collect statistical process control
data. However, to determine the maturity of the ARH production
capability for the June 2008 decision, the Army will conduct a
Production Readiness Review (including an assessment of the Engineering
and Manufacturing Readiness Levels), review facility plans and limited
tooling development, conduct an operations capacity analysis, and
assess lean manufacturing initiatives.
Other Program Issues:
In March 2007, the ARH program office released a stop-work order to the
contractor as a result of greater than 50 percent development cost
growth and low-rate initial production pricing disagreements. The
contractor requested and received permission to continue work at its
own risk and submitted a plan to convince the Army that it can complete
the contract as intended. According to program officials, the Army has
met with the Army System Acquisition Review Council and the Army
Acquisition Executive, to consider proposed alternative courses of
action. Further, an independent study by the Center for Naval Analyses
was completed as directed by the Army Acquisition Executive to
determine the root cause of failures prior to continuing work on
meeting the ARH requirement. According to program officials, the study
made numerous recommendations to be considered at a future Defense
Acquisition Board meeting.
Prior to the stop-work order, an increase in acquisition quantities and
delays in receiving low-rate initial procurement quantities required to
support the initial operational test and evaluation led to cost
increases and negative schedule variances during development.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the program office
stated that leveraging off the Navy testing is a positive approach
because the Navy shipboard standards are more stringent with regard to
electro magnetic interference and emission-shielding requirements.
Other technical comments were provided and incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile
Warning System:
[End of figure]
The Army's and Special Operations Command's ATIRCM/CMWS is a component
of the Suite of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures planned to defend
U.S. aircraft from advanced infrared-guided missiles. The system will
be employed on Army and Special Operations aircraft. ATIRCM/CMWS
includes an active infrared jammer, missile warning system, and
countermeasure dispenser capable of loading and employing expendables,
such as flares and chaff.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/development start: 6/95;
Design review: 2/97;
Low-rate decision: 11/03;
GAO review: 1/08;
Initial capability: To be determined;
Full-rate decision: 6/10;
Last procurement: 2023.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: BAE Systems North America;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $155.1 million;
* Procurement: $3,105.9 million;
Total funding: $3,260.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 1,347:
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 03/1996: $636.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $797.9;
Percent change: 25.3
Procurement cost;
As of 03/1996: $2,604.8;
Latest, 12/2006: $4,515.3;
Percent change: 73.3.
Total program cost;
As of 03/1996: $3,241.7;
Latest, 12/2006: $5,313.2;
Percent change: 63.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 03/1996: $1.048;
Latest, 12/2006: $1.480;
Percent change: 41.3
Total quantities;
As of 03/1996: 3,094;
Latest, 12/2006: 3,589;
Percent change: 15.9.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 03/1996: Classified;
Latest, 12/2006: Classified;
Percent change: Classified.
[End of table]
The ATIRCM portion of the program is in low-rate production and the
CMWS portion is in full-rate production. The technologies for CMWS are
mature and the design is stable. Currently, the program's production
processes are at various levels of control. The CMWS portion of the
program entered limited production in February 2002 to meet urgent
deployment requirements. However, full-rate production for both
components was delayed because of reliability problems. Over the past
several years, the program has had to overcome cost and schedule
problems brought on by shortfalls in knowledge. Key technologies were
demonstrated late in development, and only a small number of design
drawings were completed by the design review.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
ATIRCM/CMWS Program:
Technology Maturity:
All five critical technologies are now considered mature. Four of the
critical technologies did not mature until after the design review in
February 1997. Although the infrared jam head is now considered mature,
it still has reliability problems. A reliability test was to be
conducted in November 2007 to determine if problems were resolved.
Design Stability:
The basic design of the system is complete, with 100 percent of the
drawings released to manufacturing. However, the program office expects
the number of drawings to change because the infrared jam laser and the
infrared lamp will be replaced with a multi-band laser. The number of
drawings or potential changes is not known because the technical data
package has not been received.
Production Maturity:
According to program officials, the number of key manufacturing
processes dropped from 26 to 17 in the past year because the program
outsourced some of the electro-optic mission sensor's components. The
processes are in various phases of control. The CMWS production portion
of the system has stabilized and benefited from increased production
rates. Also, processes supporting both ATIRCM and CMWS will continue to
be enhanced as data are gathered, and lessons learned will be included
in the processes.
The Army entered limited CMWS production in February 2002 to meet an
urgent need. Subsequently, full-rate production was delayed for both
components due to reliability testing failures. The program implemented
reliability fixes to six production representative subsystems for use
in initial operational test and evaluation. These systems were
delivered in March 2004. Due to ATIRCM performance issues, the full-
rate production decision for the complete system was delayed until June
2011. However, the program office has an objective of achieving full-
rate production in June 2010.
Other Program Issues:
The Army uses the airframe as the acquisition quantity unit of measure
even though it is not buying an ATIRCM/CMWS system for each aircraft.
When the program began, plans called for putting an ATIRCM/CMWS on each
aircraft. Due to funding constraints, the Army reduced the number of
systems to be procured and will rotate the systems to aircraft as
needed. The Army is buying kits for each aircraft, which include the
modification hardware, wiring harness, and cables necessary to install
and interface the ATIRCM/CMWS to each platform. Previously, the
approved program was for 1,710 ATIRCMs; however, in May 2007, the Army
reduced the number of ATIRCMs to 1,076 after a comprehensive
requirements review. The current approved program is for 1,076 ATIRCMs,
1,710 CMWSs, and 3,571 kits to use for aircraft integration. However,
the Army acquisition objective for planning purposes is for a quantity
of 2,332 ATIRCMs, 2,752 CMWSs, and 4,393 kits. To determine the
acquisition objective, the U.S. Army Aviation Warfighting Center looked
at each aircraft and determined aircraft survivability equipment suites
based on aircraft missions. According to a program official, a new cost
estimate for the additional systems has not been completed because the
new quantity has not been approved.
Agency Comments:
The ATIRCM/CMWS program continues to focus efforts on Global War on
Terrorism force protection requirements. In response to a November 2003
memo from the Acting Secretary of the Army to equip all Army
helicopters deployed to combat theaters with the most effective
defensive systems, the program office accelerated the CMWS portion.
These accelerated efforts provided the CMWS ahead of the planned
schedule (February 2007). CMWS Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
and full-rate production decision events were successfully completed
during this reporting period.
Due to delays in receipt of reprogramming funding, funds intended for
the ATIRCM program were utilized to maintain the CMWS acceleration. The
rebaselined ATIRCM program efforts are now continuing, with Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation planned for November 2009. This
rebaselined plan was presented and approved by the Army Acquisition
Executive in December 2005.
[End of section]
B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM
Capability.
[End of figure]
The Air Force B-2 EHF SATCOM is a new satellite communication system
designed to upgrade the current avionics infrastructure, replace the
ultra high frequency (UHF) system, and ensure continued secure,
survivable communication capability while maintaining the B-2 low-
observable signature. The program has three increments: Increment 1
includes upgraded flight management computer processors, Increment 2
adds antennaes and radomes, and Increment 3 allows connectivity to the
Global Information Grid. Increment 1 is the only increment currently in
system development.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: 3/20;
Development start: 2/07;
GAO review: 1/08;
Design review: 6/08;
Low-rate decision: 7/11;
Full-rate decision: 4/12;
Initial capability: 3/14;
Last procurement: 2016.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio;
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $436.5 million;
* Procurement: $117.6 million;
Total funding: $554.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 21.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2007: $557.9;
Latest, 08/2007: $557.9;
Percent change:NA.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2007: $117.6;
Latest, 08/2007: $117.6;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2007: $675.5;
Latest, 08/2007: $675.5;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2007: $32.167;
Latest, 08/2007: $32.167;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2007: 21;
Latest, 08/2007: 21;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2007: 85;
Latest, 08/2007: 85;
Percent change: NA.
The total quantity of 21 units includes 4 to be bought with R&D funds
and 17 to be bought with procurement funds. All 21 units will
eventually be placed on operational B-2 aircraft. Data reflects
Increment 1 only.
[End of table]
All five of the B-2 EHF SATCOM critical technologies for Increment 1
are approaching maturity, but are not expected to be fully mature until
after the design review. The program office considers the design to be
stable since it uses hardware that is currently in use in another
aircraft. However, the uncertainty with technology maturity could
affect system integration activities and design stability. While
Increments 2 and 3 are not yet in development, areas of potential
concern already exist. According to the program office, Increment 2
will require physical changes--integration of large radomes and
antenna--that present additional risk to the low-observable nature of
the aircraft. Further, Increment 3 requirements are not yet defined or
funded.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
B-2 EHF SATCOM Program:
Technology Maturity:
The B-2 EHF SATCOM program entered system development in February 2007
with all five of its critical technologies approaching maturity.
However, the program office does not expect the technologies to be
demonstrated in a realistic environment, and therefore fully mature,
until after the design review. This increases the risk that the program
could encounter further technology issues as it integrates those
technologies into the B-2 aircraft. For example, the program is still
developing the disk drive unit--a high-risk item that is essential to
Increment 1 modernization efforts. If unable to mature this technology
as expected, the program could face schedule delays and increased
costs. The program currently does not have back-up technologies.
Design Stability:
The program has released nearly 63 percent of its drawings, but plans
all to be released by the Critical Design Review in June 2008. The
program office considers the design to be stable since it incorporates
hardware that is currently in use in another aircraft. However, the
uncertainty with technology maturity could affect system integration
and design stability. We have found some programs that underestimated
the complexity of integrating hardware onto existing platforms and have
experienced unanticipated cost growth and schedule delays.
Production Maturity:
The program office does not plan to collect statistical process control
data because it believes the production quantities are too small. A
production readiness review is scheduled for January 2011, followed by
a low-rate initial production decision in July 2011 and a full-rate
production decision in April 2012.
Other Program Issues:
Increments 1 and 2 of the B-2 EHF SATCOM program are estimated to cost
nearly $1.9 billion. While Increments 2 and 3 are not yet in
development, areas of potential concern already exist. The program
office expects Increment 2 to represent a major modification to the
system. Specifically, Increment 2 requires physical changes that
present additional risk to the low-observable nature of the aircraft
because of the integration of large radomes and antenna. Increment 2
currently plans to incorporate six additional technologies, two of
which are very immature. The program began a component advance
development phase in November 2007 to define requirements and begin
preliminary design activities. System development for Increment 2 is
expected to begin in November 2010. Fielding the completed EHF
capability in time to meet operational needs is currently at risk due
to funding constraints and other program dependencies. For example, the
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) is a
supporting program that could negatively affect B-2 EHF SATCOM
development efforts, since it has already experienced significant
delays. In addition to the risks identified for Increment 2, Increment
3 requirements are not yet defined or funded and its four critical
technologies are immature.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force noted that
it expects the risks associated with the disk drive unit to be fully
mitigated when hardware testing is complete in May 2009. At that time
it believes all critical technologies will be demonstrated to be low or
moderate risk. System integration is expected to be demonstrated with
lab testing complete by September 2009, flight testing beginning in
November 2009, and completion of an operational assessment prior to the
low-rate initial production decision in July 2011. The Air Force also
noted that the current FAB-T program plans support the B-2 EHF SATCOM
schedule. The Air Force provided additional technical comments, which
were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP).
Source: B-2 Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system
to resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage. Program
officials told us that to comply with federal requirements, the
frequency must be changed to a band where DOD has been designated as
the primary user. The modified radar system is being designed to
support the B-2 stealth bomber and its combination of stealth, range,
payload, and near-precision weapons delivery capabilities.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: 3/02;
Development start: 2/07;
GAO review: 1/08;
Design review: 6/08;
Low-rate decision: 7/11;
Full-rate decision: 4/12;
Initial capability: 3/14;
Last procurement: 2016.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio;
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $81.9 million;
* Procurement: $394.1 million;
Total funding: $475.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 10;
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2004: $716.9;
Latest, 07/2007: $579.9;
Percent change: -19.1.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2004: $560.9;
Latest, 07/2007: $552.9;
Percent change: -1.4.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2004: $1,277.6;
Latest, 07/2007: $1,132.5;
Percent change: -11.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2004: $60.836;
Latest, 07/2007: $53.928;
Percent change: -11.3.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2004: 21;
Latest, 07/2007: 21;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2004: 63;
Latest, 07/2007: 65;
Percent change: 3.2.
The total quantity of 21 operational units includes 14 to be bought
with procurement funds and 7 with R&D funds. Quantities and costs
reflect the program of record but are expected to change after the
program restructures its procurement profile.
[End of table]
The four B-2 RMP critical technologies were considered mature at the
May 2005 design review. By 2006, the program had released 100 percent
of its design drawings. However, in early 2007, the program experienced
problems with the radar antenna. Due to an aggressive development
schedule, some important systems engineering and systems integration
tasks were not completed. As a consequence, antenna performance
deficiencies forced a delay in the development program, including
flight test, in January 2007. These issues caused a 1 year delay in the
start of production. Consequently, the Air Force reprogrammed fiscal
year 2007 production funds to other priorities. Flight testing resumed
in June 2007 to verify the problems have been fixed. The program is
currently planning to enter production in August 2008.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
B-2 RMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
All 4 of B-2 RMP's critical technologies are currently mature.
Design Stability:
Eighty-five percent of the expected drawings were released to
manufacturing at the program design readiness review. Since then, all
drawings have been released. However, in early 2007, the program
experienced technical problems with the radar antenna. During flight
testing, the radar had difficulties staying powered on and
characterizing weather conditions. These difficulties delayed testing
and production by at least a year.
Production Maturity:
The program does not use manufacturing process control data because of
the small number of production units. However, the program has
identified one key process related to the assembly of the radar antenna
array. The B-2 RMP is now approaching the point of conducting complete
systems-level testing. This testing will establish whether or not the
program is ready to enter production, which is currently scheduled for
August 2008. Program officials noted that they are still monitoring and
addressing test asset and equipment resource constraints.
Other Program Issues:
In late January 2007, the development program, including flight
testing, was delayed and replanning efforts were initiated because of
radar antenna performance problems. The Air Force subsequently
reprogrammed fiscal year 2007 funds for the first four production radar
units. This delayed the start of production by 1 year. Program
officials noted that pursuing an aggressive schedule to change the
radar frequency caused significant execution problems. Specifically,
certain important tasks were not completed, such as some aspects of
systems engineering, integration and testing. This led to difficulty in
understanding the causes of the radar antenna's technical problems
encountered during flight testing.
After addressing the technical problems of the radar antenna, flight
testing resumed in June 2007. The program is currently planning to
enter production in August 2008.
Although the Air Force intends to enter production in fiscal year 2008,
important testing events, including the completion of development
flight testing and operational testing, are not scheduled for
completion until fiscal year 2009. Producing units before testing is
able to demonstrate the design is mature and can work in its intended
environment increases the risk of costly design changes in the future.
The program office noted that it plans to mitigate concurrency between
development and production by completing qualification tests, flight-
testing for conventional combat capability, and an operational
assessment prior to a production decision.
Program Office Comments:
The program office concurred with this assessment and provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft
System.
Source: BAMS Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System
(BAMS UAS) is to provide a persistent maritime intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Along with the Multi-
mission Maritime Aircraft and the future EP-X electronic surveillance
aircraft, BAMS UAS will be part of a maritime patrol and reconnaissance
force family of systems integral to the Navy's recapitalization of its
airborne ISR. Australia is participating in pre-system development
activities with the program.
Timeline: Concept to system design to production:
GAO review: 1/08;
Program/development start: 2/08;
Design review: 2/10;
Low-rate decision: 8/11;
Initial capability: 8/14;
Last procurement: to be determined.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $2,139.5 million;
* Procurement: $690.9 million;
Total funding: $2,830.5 million;
Procurement quantity: TBD.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $2,139.5;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $691.0;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $2,830.5;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The BAMS UAS program plans to begin system development during the
second quarter of fiscal year 2008. The program is currently evaluating
proposals for source selection and developing documents to meet formal
design decision requirements. The program previously planned to start
system development by October 2007, but according to a program
official, additional time is needed to evaluate contractor proposals.
Program officials indicated that the system development solicitation
requires critical technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant
environment prior to contract award. The program is conducting a
technology readiness assessment in parallel with source selection. BAMS
UAS initial operational capability has also been delayed from fiscal
year 2013 to the last quarter of fiscal year 2014.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
BAMS Program:
Technology Maturity:
BAMS UAS is working to evaluate technologies prior to the start of
system development. As part of the previous Persistent Unmanned
Maritime Airborne Surveillance effort, the program awarded contracts to
develop mission performance metrics and determine capabilities
necessary for optimal performance of the maritime intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance mission within a family of systems.
Program officials are requiring contractors to identify critical
technologies in their proposals as part of source selection. According
to program officials, critical technologies must be approaching
maturity and demonstrated in a relevant environment prior to the start
of system development.
Other Program Issues:
BAMS UAS is intended to serve as an adjunct to the Multi-mission
Maritime Aircraft (MMA). The Navy intends to position BAMS UAS mission
crews with maritime patrol and reconnaissance forces personnel to allow
operators to closely coordinate missions and utilize a common support
infrastructure. If BAMS UAS does not develop as planned or continues to
experience schedule delays, Navy officials state that additional MMA
will be purchased as a fallback, increasing the overall cost of the MMA
program.
The Navy's future EP-X electronic surveillance aircraft is also
intended to be a part of the maritime patrol and reconnaissance forces
family of systems as a replacement for the Navy's current airborne
intelligence platform, the EP-3. The EP-X program replaced development
efforts previously being conducted through the Army's Aerial Common
Sensor program, which was terminated due to a significant weight
increase. According to BAMS UAS officials, the EP-X schedule will not
affect the BAMS UAS program.
DOD is continuing to exchange information and coordinate with allied
and friendly nations that have common maritime surveillance goals and
objectives. Program officials indicated that Australia is participating
in BAMS UAS pre-system development activities and has provided specific
requirements that were included in the BAMS UAS solicitation as an
option. Australia has also expressed interest in participating in the
system development and demonstration phase of the program.
Program Office Comments:
The BAMS UAS program office provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP).
Source: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, System Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit configurations and
avionics for three combat delivery configurations of the C-130 fleet,
which provides increased reliability, maintainability, and
sustainability. The program is intended to ensure C-130 global access
and deployability by satisfying navigation and safety requirements,
installing upgrades to the cockpit systems, and replacing many systems
no longer supportable due to diminishing manufacturing sources.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: 7/01;
Design review: 8/05;
GAO review: 1/08;
Low-rate decision: 6/08;
Full-rate decision: 1/12;
Last procurement: 2017.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio;
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $589.9 million;
* Procurement: $3,324.3 million;
Total funding: $3,914.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 219.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 07/2001: $736.4;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,977.0;
Percent change: 168.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 07/2001: $3,188.1;
Latest, 08/2007: $3,371.4;
Percent change: 5.7.
Total program cost;
As of 07/2001: $3,924.5;
Latest, 08/2007: $5,348.4;
Percent change: 36.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 07/2001: $7.562;
Latest, 08/2007: $24.092;
Percent change: 218.6.
Total quantities; 519;
As of 07/2001: 519;
Latest, 08/2007: 222;
Percent change: -57.2.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 07/2001: TBD;
Latest, 08/2007: TBD;
Percent change: TBD.
[End of table]
The C-130 AMP's technologies are currently mature and its design is
stable. However, the program has had ongoing problems for more than 2
years. The program is presently being restructured to provide a better
balance between requirements and resources. In the past year, the
program reduced the number of aircraft and variants to be modified and
increased estimated costs, which resulted in a critical Nunn-McCurdy
breach concerning unit cost increases. The program acquisition unit
costs have increased to over three times what was expected at
development start. The program now plans to enter production in June
2008, over 3 years later than originally planned. However, production
maturity will not be fully known at that time because the program does
not plan to collect key manufacturing information.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
C-130 AMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
The C-130 AMP critical technologies are fully mature. Removal of 11 of
the 14 C-130 aircraft configurations previously included in the program
is expected to stabilize the program through reduced requirements and
led to the removal of three critical technologies during 2007. The
three remaining critical technologies--global air traffic management,
defensive systems, and combat delivery navigator removal--are specific
to the combat delivery configurations of the C-130 fleet, which
comprises the entire AMP following program restructuring in 2007.
Design Stability:
The C-130 AMP combat delivery configuration is stable, with over 3,200
expected drawings released. However, at the critical design review held
in 2005, the program had not proven that all subsystems and components
could be successfully integrated into the aircraft. According to the
program office, the complexity of the engineering efforts needed to
modify the different configurations of the C-130 was misjudged.
Specifically, upon integration of the new avionics into the test
aircraft, the amount of wiring and the number of harnesses and brackets
needed for the installation had been underestimated by 400 percent. As
a result, the design had to be reworked, delaying the delivery of the
test aircraft and increasing costs. The program believes it has
addressed these integration issues.
Two of the three C-130 aircraft configurations included in the AMP have
begun flight testing. However, several key development activities
remain that may necessitate design changes if problems arise, including
demonstration on the fully integrated test aircraft. Developmental
flight testing is expected to conclude in June 2009. The first flight
of a fully configured, integrated production representative prototype
occurred for the initial C-130 aircraft configuration in September
2006, while the first flight for the final C-130 configuration is
scheduled for February 2009.
Production Maturity:
The program expects to begin production in June 2008 but will not have
data that shows the total number of key product characteristics, the
maturity of critical manufacturing processes, or capability indices.
Program officials stated they will meet the approved exit criteria
established by the milestone decision authority, which includes a
Production Readiness Review scheduled for March 2008, before entering
into low-rate initial production. Since the beginning of 2006, the low-
rate initial production decision has been delayed 19 months due to
program uncertainties related to program funding and changing customer
requirements. However, changes in the program schedule should allow
more testing before the program increases production rates.
Other Program Issues:
The C-130 AMP has experienced uncertainty and restructuring for more
than 2 years. In February 2007, the program announced it encountered a
critical Nunn-McCurdy breach concerning unit cost increases that led to
DOD certification, resulting in a formal replan effort to revise
requirements. At the time of our review, the program was still
finalizing the details of the replan, which included reallocating
resources within the program and reducing requirements (fewer aircraft
quantities and fewer configurations for the program). The program
manager expects that the replan will better position the program to
deliver the C-130 AMP within cost and schedule targets. However, the
program does not have an updated acquisition strategy, test and
evaluation master plan, or service cost position. This information is
expected by the production decision in June 2008. The Air Force also
must develop an investment strategy, as stipulated in the DOD
certification, for 166 C-130 aircraft that are no longer part of the
program.
Given the significant changes to the C-130 program, the Air Force is
paying more to modernize the avionics for far fewer aircraft than
originally planned. At the same time, the warfighter is waiting longer
than originally planned for the new capability.
Air Force Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated the C-
130 AMP is focused on restructuring the development effort and
proceeding into low-rate initial production in June 2008. The program
recently accomplished first flight without a serious software
deficiency, incremental software was delivered on time, and flight
testing is slightly ahead of schedule. The program has also addressed
past issues and is committed to providing the warfighter a critically
needed capability.
[End of section]
C-130J Hercules:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: C-130J Hercules.
Source: C-130J Program Office (657th AESS), U.S. Air Force.
[End of figure]
The C-130J is a tactical airlift aircraft designed primarily for the
transport of cargo and personnel within a theater of operation. It is
the latest addition to DOD's fleet of C-130 aircraft, providing
performance improvements over legacy aircraft in the series. Variants
of the C-130J are being acquired by the Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast
Guard, and several foreign militaries to perform their respective
missions. We reviewed the baseline configuration of the Air Force's C-
130J aircraft and related modernization efforts.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/production start: 6/96;
First delivery: 3/99;
GAO review: 1/08;
Last procurement: FY 2008.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company - Marietta;
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio;
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $327.7 million;
* Procurement: $1,348.5 million;
Total funding: $1,676.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 9.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/1996: $10.9;
Latest, 11/2007: $430.3;
Percent change: 3,847.7.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/1996: $890.2;
Latest, 11/2007: $8,375.1;
Percent change: 840.8.
Total program cost;
As of 10/1996: $901.2;
Latest, 11/2007: $8,929.5;
Percent change: 890.8.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/1996: $81.928;
Latest, 11/2007: $102.637;
Percent change: 25.3.
Total quantities;
As of 10/1996: 11;
Latest, 11/2007: 87;
Percent change: 690.9.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/1996: 16;
Latest, 11/2007: 33;
Percent change: 106.3.
These figures reflect only the Air Force's procurement of the C-130J.
[End of table]
We did not assess technology, design, or production maturity for the
baseline aircraft because the Air Force did not maintain visibility
into this information as part of the C-130J's original commercial
acquisition strategy. Program officials stated they evaluated these
areas to their satisfaction in other ways. The Air Force is funding
modernization efforts to correct deficiencies and provide improvements
to fielded C-130Js. Program officials stated there are no issues with
technology, design, or production maturity for the modernization
efforts now under way. Both the modernization efforts and remaining
procurement are being executed under noncommercial negotiated
contracts, completing the move from the original commercial item
acquisition strategy. This transition provided insight into the cost
and pricing of the remaining aircraft buy and data rights for all
modernization efforts.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
C-130J Hercules Program:
Technology Maturity:
We did not assess the critical technologies of the baseline aircraft,
since the contractor initiated development of the C-130J at its own
expense in the early 1990s and DOD took no responsibility for its
technology maturity. Program officials also reported no issues with the
technology maturity of modernization efforts currently under way.
Design Stability:
We did not assess the design of the baseline aircraft because the Air
Force does not maintain visibility into design drawing information that
GAO would normally utilize to measure design maturity. Because the C-
130J was originally procured as a commercial item, rights to this
information were not included as part of the acquisition. While program
officials believed the initial C-130J design was stable, deficiencies
were discovered that had to be corrected in order to meet minimum
warfighter requirements, which resulted in the current baseline
aircraft. Other design shortfalls to the baseline aircraft have
recently been discovered that affect the C-130J's ability to complete
certain airdrop operations. Program officials stated that options to
address these shortfalls are being developed and should result in
aircraft testing in the summer of 2008. Air navigation improvements
must also be made so the C-130J can continue to successfully operate in
international airspace. These improvements and others will be added to
the aircraft through modernization efforts, resulting in a significant
development cost increase. Program officials reported no issues with
the design maturity of modernization efforts currently under way.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the production maturity of the baseline aircraft
because the C-130J was originally procured as a commercial item and DOD
has limited access to the full range of contractor manufacturing
process and quality control information. Instead, the program relies on
oversight by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) at the
contractor's facility to ensure that the C-130J aircraft is
manufactured in accordance with applicable quality standards. DCMA
officials informed us that their oversight into the contractor's
manufacturing processes has improved as a result of the recently
completed transition from a commercial item acquisition to a
noncommercial negotiated acquisition. Furthermore, production schedules
were not affected by the transition and aircraft continue to be
delivered on time.
Other Program Issues:
In April 2006, test officials deemed the C-130J to be effective in only
a low to medium threat environment. The ongoing modernization efforts
are expected to correct known deficiencies and address future needs
such as communication, navigation, and safety improvements so that the
aircraft can accomplish its intended missions. The first of four
planned modernization efforts to upgrade the baseline aircraft were
tested during 2007, and installation on fielded aircraft will begin in
2008. The second modernization effort, a collaborative endeavor funded
by both the Air Force and foreign military customers, is in the initial
planning stages, with developmental testing scheduled to begin in
fiscal year 2010. The other two modernization efforts are in a
preliminary planning stage, with upgrade activities expected to
continue through 2015. The Air Force has budgeted approximately $400
million in development funding to pursue the four modernization efforts
that does not include the additional costs to install these upgrades on
fielded C-130Js in the future.
In October 2006, the Air Force finalized the program's transition from
a commercial item acquisition to a noncommercial negotiated acquisition
for the remaining procurement. The Air Force now has data rights
related to development efforts under the modernization program and full
insight into cost and pricing of the C-130J, which resulted in a
downward price adjustment of $364 million. However, according to the
DOD Inspector General, DOD has assumed responsibility for costs related
to shutting down production of the C-130J that were previously factored
into the commercial item price for the aircraft. In the future, these
potential cost increases may reduce the estimated savings of the
transition.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP).
Source: Edwards AFB, CA. Photo taken by Air Force.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5
to improve mission capability rate and transport capabilities and to
reduce ownership costs. The AMP incorporates Global Air Traffic
Management, navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment,
and an all-weather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the
engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We
assessed the C-5 AMP.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: 1/99;
Design review: 5/01;
Production decision: 2/03;
Initial capability: 2/07;
GAO review: 1/08;
Last procurement: FY 2013.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio;
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $14.3 million;
* Procurement: $519.9 million;
Total funding: $534.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 52.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/1998: $381.0;
Latest, 08/2007: $460.9;
Percent change: 20.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/1998: $666.5;
Latest, 08/2007: $989.8;
Percent change: 48.5.
Total program cost;
As of 11/1998: $1,047.6;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,450.5;
Percent change: 38.5.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/1998: $8.314;
Latest, 08/2007: $12.951;
Percent change: 55.9.
Total quantities;
As of 11/1998: 126;
Latest, 08/2007: 112;
Percent change: -11.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/1998: 83;
Latest, 08/2007: 97;
Percent change: 16.9.
[End of table]
The C-5 AMP technologies and design are used in other aircraft and are
considered mature. We did not assess production maturity as the
components are commercial off-the-shelf items. While the program is
currently in production, 250 deficiencies were identified by the end of
Operational Test and Evaluation. These deficiencies are reviewed and
prioritized by the Air Force annually, and the top priority
deficiencies will be included in the software maintenance builds
released in the fourth quarter of every year. Further, 14 operational
requirements have been waived; four will be addressed by the C-5 RERP
and others may be included in a possible block upgrade for fiscal year
2010. At the time of our review, DOD was studying options to meet its
airlift requirements, due to cost increases in the C-5 RERP. This could
result in a smaller number of C-5 aircraft receiving the modernization
upgrades.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
C-5 AMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies because the
program uses commercial technologies that are considered mature.
Design Stability:
The program reports that the contractor has now released all of the
drawings for the AMP.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the production maturity because most components are
readily available as commercial off-the-shelf items. This equipment is
being used on other military and commercial aircraft. To ensure
production maturity, the contractor annually surveys its suppliers to
assess future availability of AMP modification kits and works with the
program office and end user to ensure that installations can be
completed according to the installation schedule.
According to the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the
program is not operationally suitable. According to program officials,
250 deficiencies, including software issues related to autopilot
disconnects, currently exist, and 14 operational requirements have been
waived. Program officials expect that 44 of the deficiencies will be
corrected as part of a sustainment contract software build in August
2008. The corrections to 24 of these 44 deficiencies will also be
included in the C-5 RERP. The C-5 RERP program is also expected to
address 4 of the 14 previously waived operational requirements, such as
the Auto Take Off and Go Around functionality and memory improvement
for the Flight Management System database. Air Force officials are
considering a block upgrade program beginning in 2010 to correct the
remaining deficiencies and the 10 unmet operational requirements.
Other Program Issues:
Program unit costs have increased approximately 56 percent since the
original estimate because of a reduction in the total number of
aircraft scheduled to receive the AMP upgrade, as well as increases in
development and procurement estimates related to software reliability
problems.
Last year we reported that the program did not have enough funding to
implement an Air Force mobility study recommendation to modify all C-5
aircraft. At that time, there was only funding for 59 aircraft. The Air
Force requested funding in fiscal year 2008 to complete the AMP upgrade
for all aircraft in the C-5 fleet. However, officials continue to study
options to meet its airlift requirements because of cost increases
associated with the C-5 RERP. This could result in a smaller number of
C-5 aircraft receiving the modernization upgrade.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5
RERP).
Source: Edwards AFB, CA. Photo taken by Air Force.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. The
RERP is designed to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and
availability of the C-5 by replacing the propulsion system and
modifying the mechanical, hydraulic, avionics, fuel, and landing gear
systems as well as other structural modifications. Together with the C-
5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), these upgrades are intended to
improve the mission capability rates and reduce total ownership costs.
We assessed the C-5 RERP.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: 2/99;
Development start: 11/01;
Design review: 4/04;
GAO review: 1/08;
Low-rate decision: 3/08;
Full-rate decision B-Model: 12/10;
Full-rate decision A-Model: 10/13;
Last procurement: FY 2019.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio;
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $403.6 million;
* Procurement: $13,501.4 million;
Total funding: $13,905.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 108.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/2001: $1,664.4;
Latest, 09/2007: $1,744.4;
Percent change: 4.8.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/2001: $8,688.6;
Latest, 09/2007: $13,531.6;
Percent change: 55.7.
Total program cost;
As of 11/2001: $10,356.7;
Latest, 09/2007: $15,283.9;
Percent change: 47.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/2001: $82.196;
Latest, 09/2007: $137.693;
Percent change: 67.5.
Total quantities;
As of 11/2001: 126;
Latest, 09/2007: 111;
Percent change: -11.9.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/2001: 100;
Latest, 09/2007: 139;
Percent change: 39.0.
These numbers are expected to change after DOD completes its Nunn-
McCurdy certification.
[End of table]
The C-5 RERP technologies are mature and the design is stable. We did
not assess production maturity because the Air Force is buying
commercially available items. Despite the high degree of product
knowledge, the program has faced a series of development and production
issues over the past year. The RERP experienced a 1-year delay in
starting low-rate initial production because of rising production
costs. The program resolved complications related to a requirement that
certain specialty metals be bought only from American sources. The Air
Force notified Congress that program unit costs have increased over 50
percent, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost increase over the critical
cost growth threshold. At the time of our review, DOD was examining
options to meet its airlift requirements. There are also concerns about
the contractor's ability to track costs and the funding needed to fix
some C-5 AMP problems.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
C-5 RERP Program:
Technology Maturity:
The C-5 RERP's technologies are mature based on an independent
technology readiness assessment conducted in October 2001.
Design Stability:
The basic design of the C-5 RERP is now complete with over 90 percent
of the drawings released. At the critical design review, program
officials believed that about 80 percent of the drawings had been
released. However, since then, a redesign of the pylon/thrust reverser
was needed to address weight requirements and safety concerns for the
engine mount area as well as control of asymmetric thrust reverser
conditions in flight. According to program officials, the now completed
redesign effort contributed to a 4-month modification program delay.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air
Force is buying commercially available items.
The program awarded a long-lead contract for Lot 1, which comprises one
aircraft, in April 2007, 14 months later than planned. The primary
causes of the delay were increased costs in producing engines and
pylons and estimate revisions associated with the automation of
production processes and material installation touch labor. During this
delay, the Air Force granted a permanent waiver from the specialty
metal provisions of the Berry Amendment, permitting the use of non-U.S.
sources for certain specialty materials.
According to program officials, the program office and prime contractor
have expended considerable effort in preparing the RERP for production.
For example, a production readiness review has been conducted, three
test aircraft were produced in the system development and demonstration
phase, and the lessons learned are being applied to production plans.
The program office is reviewing the contractor's proposal for low-rate
initial production in preparation for award of Lot 1, with options for
Lots 2 and 3, in April 2008. Final work to be accomplished includes
about 30 percent of flight test verification points, flight test
completion, a software verification review, and operational test and
evaluation preparatory work.
However, the production program continues to be a major issue for the
RERP as the costs to fund first-unit production and related expenses
have increased by about 108 percent since last year. According to
program officials, the prime contractor did not maintain long-term
contracts with key suppliers that could have kept costs down and
significantly underestimated the amount of touch labor needed to
complete each aircraft. In addition, the C-5 RERP program will pay up
to an additional $16 million to the prime contractor to address 4
deviation waivers and 24 deficiencies from the C-5 AMP.
Flight testing has been extended to August 2008, an increase of 8
months, to allow sufficient time for additional test points, reflights,
weather, maintenance, and other factors. The low-rate initial
production decision has now been scheduled for March 2008. Producing
units before testing is able to demonstrate the design is mature and
works in its intended environment increases the likelihood of future
costly design changes during production.
Other Program Issues:
The Air Force recently reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost increase over
the critical cost growth threshold because program costs have increased
more than 50 percent. Air Force leadership is currently working with
DOD and Congress to determine the most prudent course for the U.S.
strategic airlift fleet. Options could include reducing the number of C-
5 aircraft that will receive the RERP modification and procuring
additional C-17 aircraft to fulfill the airlift mission.
The Defense Contract Audit Agency has identified significant
deficiencies with the prime contractors' earned value management system
that affects the Air Force's ability to oversee the cost aspects of the
program.
Agency Comments:
The program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate.
[End of section]
CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR).
Source: Sikorsky Aircraft Company, © 2003 Sikorsky Aircraft Company.
[End of figure]
The Marine Corps' CH-53K helicopter will perform the marine
expeditionary heavy-lift assault transport of armored vehicles,
equipment, and personnel to support distributed operations deep inland
from a sea-based center of operations. The CH-53K program is expected
to replace the current CH-53E helicopter with a new design to improve
range and payload, survivability and force protection, reliability and
maintainability, coordination with other assets, and overall cost of
ownership.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: 11/03;
Development start: 12/05;
GAO review: 1/08;
Design review: 3/09;
Low-rate decision: 12/12;
Initial capability: 9/15;
Full-rate decision: 12/15;
Last procurement: 2021.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Sikorsky Aircraft;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $3,429.8 million;
* Procurement: $11,664.2 million;
Total funding: $15,094.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 152.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2005: $4,158.7;
Latest, 12/2006: $4,159.5;
Percent change: 0.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2005: $11,565.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $11,664.2;
Percent change: 0.8.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2005: $15,724.7;
Latest, 12/2006: $15,823.8;
Percent change: 0.6.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2005: $100.799;
Latest, 12/2006: $101.434;
Percent change: 0.6.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2005: 156;
Latest, 12/2006: 156;
Percent change: 0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2005: 119;
Latest, 12/2006: 117;
Percent change: -1.3.
[End of table]
The CH-53K program entered system development in December 2005 without
demonstrating that its three critical technologies had reached full
maturity. The program has decided to use an alternative technology for
one of these technologies and expects the remaining two technologies to
be mature by 2012, three years after the program's design review.
Elements of other technology areas are not considered critical,
although they may still present challenges to the program as many of
them are currently being developed or used by other programs and will
be integrated later into the CH-53K. Due to attrition in the fleet of
CH-53Es, the program has recognized the need for fielding the CH-53Ks
as soon as possible. To address these challenges, it plans to
manufacture a large portion of aircraft during low rate initial
production and concurrent with operational testing.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
CH-53K Program:
Technology Maturity:
Two critical technologies for the CH-53K program--the main rotor blade
and the main gearbox--are not expected to be fully mature until 2012,
three years after the program's design review. The main rotor blade
will be the same diameter (79 feet) and 11 percent wider than that of
the CH-53E design. The CH-53K main rotor blade has demonstrated
improved performance to meet new vertical lift requirements. Program
officials stated that smaller-scale models of the main rotor blade
performed well in tests and the actual-sized rotor blade is expected to
achieve full maturity by 2012. The main gearbox has not achieved full
maturity, which is expected by fiscal year 2012. While other
helicopters have utilized similar technology, their intended payload
was less than that of the CH-53K. Program officials stated that through
testing to date, the main gearbox has achieved greater than 100 percent
of its torque requirement.
The viscoelastic lag damper, which serves to control the lead-lag
motion of the blade, was originally considered a critical technology
and expected to be fully mature by 2009. However, program officials
told us that the program has now decided to use a linear hydraulic
damper as an alternative. While this may result in a reduction of
planned CH-53K reliability, program officials stated that modifications
have doubled the reliability of the current damper used on the CH-53E.
An assessment conducted in September 2004 reduced 10 original critical
technologies to the 3 above. Of the 7 technologies that were determined
to not be critical, 2 are being developed by the CH-53K program,
including the engine for which a supplier was selected in December
2006. The other 5 are being developed by or used on other programs, and
4 of them will be integrated onto the CH-53K platform. While the
program does not anticipate problems with the 4 technologies, they are
dependent on the development and maturity schedules of the other
programs.
Design Stability:
CH-53K design stability is being assessed through reviews and approvals
of relevant design baselines at the system engineering technical
reviews. The program has completed a review and approved the systems
requirements baseline and has also conducted a systems-level review and
approved the system functional baseline. A critical design review is
scheduled for March 2009.
Other Program Issues:
Due to unexpected attrition of CH-53E aircraft, the need for the
deployment of the CH-53K as a replacement has increased, resulting in
the return of decommissioned CH-53E helicopters to operational status.
According to program officials, all available aircraft have been
reclaimed while the program continues to review the condition of other
usable aircraft for potential spare parts.
Currently deployed CH-53E aircraft have flown at three times the
planned utilization rate. This operational pace is expected to result
in higher airframe and component repair costs, including short-term
fatigue repairs necessary to minimize CH-53E inventory reductions until
CH-53K deliveries reach meaningful levels.
Program officials stated that to address the challenges that have led
to this attrition, the requirements of the CH-53K have expanded the CH-
53E's thresholds for heat, distance, and load capacity. The program
also intends to manufacture 29 of the 156 total helicopters (19
percent) during low-rate initial production and concurrent with initial
operational testing. While concurrent production may help to field the
systems sooner, it could also result in greater retrofit costs if
unexpected design changes are required.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X).
Source: 669 AESS/TH CSAR-X Program Office.
Note: Photo is of the HH-60 Pavehawk, the aircraft the CSAR-X will
replace.
[End of figure]
The Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X) is planned to
provide the United States Air Force with a vertical take-off and
landing aircraft that is quickly deployable and capable of main base
and austere location operations for worldwide CSAR and personnel
recovery missions. The CSAR-X will be developed in two blocks and will
replace the aging HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter fleet. We assessed CSAR-
X Block 0, the first block to be developed.
Timeline: concept to system development to production:
Development start: 10/06;
GAO review: 1/08;
Production decision: 9/09;
Full-rate decision: 6/12;
Initial capability: 9/12.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD;
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio;
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $491.9 million;
* Procurement: $7,271.9 million;
Total funding: $7,874.5 million;
Procurement quantity: 141.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost:
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $836.5;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost:
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $7,271.9;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $8,219.1;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost:
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $57.077;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities:
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 144;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 70;
Percent change: NA.
Cost and schedule data are based on estimates developed prior to legal
rulings and are subject to change pending contract award in spring
2008.
[End of table]
The CSAR-X program received approval to begin product development in
October 2006, and program officials reported that all critical
technologies were mature at that time. However, two related consecutive
bid protests filed by competitors required the program to suspend
development activities. GAO sustained both protests, and currently, the
Air Force is amending the request for proposals to address GAO's
recommendations. As a result, information regarding technology maturity
is subject to change pending the contract award, which is not expected
to occur before spring 2008. Design stability and production maturity
information was not available at the time of this review.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
CSAR-X Program:
Technology Maturity:
CSAR-X program officials identified eight critical technologies for
Block 0 and reported that all eight were mature based on a program
office assessment of industry standards and market research. However,
since that assessment was completed, two separate but related bid
protests were filed by competing contractors and sustained by GAO. In
response to GAO's concerns, the Air Force is currently amending the
request for proposals and does not anticipate awarding a development
contract before spring of 2008. As such, it is possible that the
technology readiness information could change upon contract award. The
Air Force also identified a number of other critical technologies
expected to support the next segment of CSAR-X vehicles (Block 10), but
did not provide related maturity information. These additional
technologies will be assessed prior to the start of Block 10
development.
Program Issues:
CSAR-X is being managed as an incremental development program. Block 0,
the block assessed in this review, and Block 10 will be managed as
separate programs, each with its own requirements, program baselines,
and milestone reviews.
The initiation of CSAR-X Block 0 development has been delayed several
times, in part due to two bid protests. The Air Force awarded the CSAR-
X Block 0 development contract to Boeing in November 2006, but a bid
protest by competing contractors filed with GAO required the Air Force
to suspend the beginning of product development activities. In February
2007 GAO sustained the protest. In response, the Air Force amended its
request for proposals. However, the competitors filed another bid
protest in response to the Air Force's amended request. This second
protest was also sustained by GAO in August 2007. As a result, the Air
Force is again amending the request for proposals to respond to GAO's
latest recommendations.
These schedule delays in Block 0 development will likely affect the
entire CSAR-X acquisition strategy including the development of Block
10, which is currently scheduled to start in 2009. Program officials do
not expect to award a Block 0 development contract before spring 2008.
According to program officials, the Air Force still desires to have the
first unit of CSAR-X helicopters in the field by 2012, but due to the
delayed start of product development they acknowledge that initial
operational capability could occur as late as 2014.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials provided
technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier.
Source: CVN-21 Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Navy's CVN 21 program is developing a new class of nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers that will replace USS Enterprise and the Nimitz-class
as the centerpiece of the carrier strike group. The new carriers are to
include advanced technologies in propulsion, weapons handling, aircraft
launch and recovery, and survivability designed to improve operational
efficiency and enable higher sortie rates while reducing required
manpower. The Navy expects to award a contract for construction of the
lead ship, CVN 78, in June 2008.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (6/00);
Development start: (4/04);
Production decision-1st ship: (7/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Construction contract award-1st ship: (6/08);
Construction contract award-2nd ship: (1/12);
Initial capability: (9/16).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,450.9 million;
* Procurement: $22,059.9 million;
Total funding: $23,510.5 million;
Procurement quantity: 3.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/2004: $4,561.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $4,083.2;
Percent change: -10.4.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/2004: $29,224.1;
Latest, 12/2006: $25,652.6;
Percent change: -12.2.
Total program cost;
As of 04/2004: $33,786.0;
Latest, 12/2006: $29,735.8;
Percent change: -11.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/2004: $11,261.997;
Latest, 12/2006: $9,911.948;
Percent change: -11.9.
Total quantities;
As of 04/2004: 3;
Latest, 12/2006: 3;
Percent change: 0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/2004: 137;
Latest, 12/2006: 149;
Percent change: 8.9.
Program costs decreased due to changes in the estimated costs for the
second and third ships and the application of new outyear inflation
indices.
[End of table]
Five of 15 current critical technologies are fully mature, including
the nuclear propulsion and electric plant. Six technologies are
expected to approach maturity, while four others will remain at lower
maturity by construction contract award. Since last year, the Navy has
eliminated an armor protection system from CVN 78, but is evaluating
use on follow-on ships, and the air conditioning plant and automated
weapons information system are no longer considered developmental. Of
CVN 21's technologies, the electromagnetic aircraft launch system
(EMALS), the advanced arresting gear, and the dual band radar (composed
of the volume search and multifunction radars) present the greatest
risk to the ship's cost and schedule. By January 2008, 76 percent of
the design was complete. Challenges in technology development could
lead to delays in maintaining the design schedule needed for
construction.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
CVN 21 Program:
Technology Maturity:
EMALS will not be tested at sea, but a production model is now
scheduled to begin land-based testing in 2009. Difficulties developing
the generator and meeting detailed Navy requirements have already led
to a 15-month schedule delay. Problems manufacturing the generator
recently delayed testing scheduled to begin by February 2008. The Navy
is considering authorizing production of the generators prior to
completing initial testing in order to ensure delivery to support CVN
78's construction schedule. As a consequence, production may begin
prior to demonstrating that the generators work as intended. Timely
delivery of EMALS remains at risk. Problems that occur in testing or
production will likely prevent EMALS from being delivered to the
shipyard to meet the construction schedule.
The dual band radar is being developed as part of the DDG 1000 program.
In 2007 DOD reassessed the multifunction radar's readiness. Since modes
critical to CVN 21 have not yet been tested, including electronic
protection and air traffic control, the radar could not be considered
fully mature. While the multifunction radar has been tested at sea,
considerable testing remains for the volume search radar. Due to
problems with a critical circuit technology, the volume search radar
will not demonstrate the power output needed to meet requirements
during upcoming testing. Full power output will not be tested on a
complete system until the first production unit in 2010, and the radar
will not be fully demonstrated until operational testing on DDG 1000 in
2013. Problems discovered during testing may affect installation on the
carrier scheduled to begin in 2012.
The advanced arresting gear completed early verification tests that
proved the system's concept and tested components. Integrated testing
with simulated and live aircraft is scheduled to begin in 2009. Delays
have led the Navy to consolidate test events in order to maintain the
shipyard delivery date, leaving little time to address any problems
prior to production. Late delivery will require the shipbuilder to
install this system after the flight deck has been laid, disrupting the
optimal build sequence and increasing cost.
Other technologies will not be fully matured by construction contract
award, but present less risk to ship construction. The advanced weapons
elevator cannot be tested at sea until ship delivery but will complete
full-scale testing in 2008. A shipboard replenishment system is a
modification of current technology and full-scale testing concluded
this year. The shipboard weapons loader is critical for achieving
manpower reductions, but will be stored on the flight deck and not
required until ship delivery. A GPS-based landing system (JPALS) is
still in development, but the carrier will use a backup to land
aircraft that are not JPALS-capable. A missile uplink will not be
operationally tested until 2013, but CVN 78 can achieve its key
performance parameters without this improvement.
Design Stability:
By January 2008, 76 percent of the design was complete. Rather than
conducting discrete design reviews, the Navy reviews each design zone
(or separate units that make up the ship's design) as it completes an
interim phase of the product model and measures design progress by the
number of zones completed. According to the Navy, the design is on
track to support construction. However, the program may face challenges
in maintaining its design schedule due to delays in the receipt of
technical information on some key technologies. In particular, late
delivery of information on EMALS is driving inefficiencies in design
development and must be resolved to prevent late delivery of design
products needed for construction.
Agency Comments:
The Navy generally concurred with our assessment that concurrent
technology development, particularly regarding EMALS, the advanced
arresting gear, and the dual-band radar system, presents the highest
programmatic risk, but stated that all critical technologies are being
managed through established processes to mitigate cost, schedule, and
development risk. Additionally, a lengthy construction period allows
technologies to mature and helps ensure technologies do not become
obsolete by ship delivery. The Navy noted that the program has
maintained key performance parameters through product modeling, which
indicates design stability. Production risk is being mitigated by the
advanced construction of structural units low in the ship. As of
December 2007, 25 percent of the ship's units were under construction.
[End of section]
Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A).
Source: PM DCGS-A, U.S. Army.
[End of figure]
The Army's DCGS-A is an automated information system providing
commanders at various echelons with access to a variety of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data. DCGS-A
allows commanders to visualize and understand threats, execute
targeting, conduct ISR integration, and support information operations.
The Army plans ongoing enhancement of DCGS-A by incrementally fielding
more capable versions of the system over time. We assessed Version 4,
which is intended to provide commanders with a mobile capability.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start; (4/06);
Design review: (3/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Limited users test: (3/10);
Production decision: (8/10).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $204.1 million;
* Procurement: $1,012.3 million;
Total funding: $1,216.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $637.5;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,206.8;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,844.3;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 0;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Northrop Grumman is the development contractor; the production
contractor is to be determined.
Funding needed to complete includes appropriations through fiscal year
2013, future funding needed is to be determined.
[End of table]
DCGS-A Version 4 began system development in April 2006. Currently, all
three Version 4 critical technologies are mature. DCGS-A is scheduled
to undergo a limited users test in March 2010 to support a Version 4
production decision in August 2010. We were unable to assess design
stability because the program does not use drawings to assess design
stability. Additionally, we did not assess production maturity because
the production phase does not involve any critical manufacturing
processes.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
DCGS-A Program:
Technology Maturity:
Currently, all critical technologies are mature and were demonstrated
in the 2007 Empire Challenge ISR demonstration. A program official
noted that all critical technologies will be tested through a series of
Software Blocking Operational Evaluations culminating in a Limited
Users Test in March 2010.
Design Stability:
We were unable to assess design stability because the program does not
use drawings to assess design stability. A program official stated that
design stability was demonstrated during the critical design review in
March 2007 and through the delivery of the first test article in
September 2007.
Production Maturity:
DCGS-A has no critical manufacturing processes, as it integrates
existing ISR capabilities through the use of hardware and software.
DCGS-A is an integration of commercial off-the-shelf and government off-
the-shelf hardware and software with additional software functionality
being added to meet the requirements of the Army's capabilities
development document. Program officials expect that the Version 4
production decision to occur in August 2010.
Other Program Issues:
DCGS-A is composed of multiple versions split into three capability
development increments: Versions 2 and 3 are in Increment 1, Version 4
is in Increment 2, and Version 5 is in Increment 3. Version 4 will meet
about 85 percent of the DCGS-A operational requirements and be further
modified to achieve the system's full objective capability in Version
5. Version 4 upgrades current software, increases system mobility, and
consolidates existing ISR capabilities, including the Common Ground
Station, All Source Analysis System family of systems, Digital
Topographic Support System, Integrated Meteorological System, Counter
Intelligence and Interrogation Operations Workstation, and Prophet
Control. Version 5 will consist primarily of software upgrades to the
Version 4 configuration to provide advanced fusion capabilities and the
ability to receive and process data from emerging and developing
sensors.
Each military service has a DCGS system and all are highly dependent on
the DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB); without this they cannot work
together. The DIB is a common set of enterprise services and standards
that serves as the foundation for interoperability and data sharing
across the DCGS enterprise. The DIB program is pursuing an evolutionary
acquisition strategy and has delivered early versions of the product.
To date, the DIB has achieved successful connectivity and data sharing
in a demonstration with Army, Air Force, and Navy laboratories.
According to a DIB program official, the next major milestone for the
DIB is the planned delivery of a new version that will focus on
interoperability testing and certification. The delivery of the new DIB
software is scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2009 to
support the DCGS-A Version 4.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
DDG 1000 Destroyer:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: DDG 1000 Destroyer.
Source: PEO Ships (PMS 500).
[End of figure]
The Navy's DDG 1000 destroyer (formerly known as DD(X)) is a
multimission surface ship designed to provide advanced land attack
capability in support of forces ashore and contribute to U.S. military
dominance in littoral operations. The program awarded contracts for
detail design in August 2006 and negotiated contract modifications for
construction of two lead ships in February 2008. The program will
continue to mature its technologies and design as it approaches
construction start, currently planned for July 2008.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: 1/98);
Development start: (3/04);
Design review: (9/05);
Production decision-1st ships: (11/05);
GAO review: (1/08);
Construction start: (7/08);
Initial capability: (1/14).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: BAE Systems, Bath Iron Works, Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding, Raytheon;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $2,336.4 million;
* Procurement: $20,291.3 million;
Total funding: $22,627.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 10.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of: 01/1998; $2,163.3;
Latest, 12/2006: $9,342.4;
Percent change: 331.9.
Procurement cost;
As of: 01/1998; NA;
Latest, 12/2006: $23,734.9;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of: 01/1998; NA;
Latest, 12/2006: $33,076.9;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost; NA.
As of: 01/1998; NA;
Latest, 12/2006: $3,307.694;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of: 01/1998; 0;
Latest, 12/2006: 10;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of: 01/1998; 128;
Latest, 12/2006: 192;
Percent change: 50.
Quantity based on the approved program estimate, the Navy's
shipbuilding plan estimates 7 ships. Costs increased due to changes in
quantities, technology development, and program restructuring.
[End of table]
Three of 12 DDG 1000 critical technologies are fully mature, having
been demonstrated in a sea environment. While 7 other technologies are
approaching full maturity, 5 of them will not demonstrate full maturity
until after installation on the ship. Two technologies remain at lower
levels of maturity--the volume search radar and total ship computing
environment. Land-based testing of a volume search radar prototype is
expected to begin in May 2008--a delay of over 12 months since last
year's assessment. Software development for the total ship computing
environment has been replanned, shifting functionality to later
software blocks. The Navy plans on completing 85 percent of the ship's
detail design prior to the start of construction.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
DDG 1000 Program:
Technology Maturity:
The volume search and multifunction radars constitute the dual band
radar system. While the multifunction radar has been tested at sea, the
volume search radar continues to experience delays. Problems in
developing the prototype and constructing the test facility have
delayed land-based testing of the volume search radar by over a year.
In order to support the ship construction schedule, the Navy has begun
initial testing at an alternate test site. Because of issues with a
critical circuit technology, the volume search radar will not
demonstrate full power output until at least 2010--after production of
the dual band radar is well under way. Problems or delays discovered
during testing will likely affect radar production and installation.
The total ship computing environment includes hardware and six blocks
of software code. Current software development is focused on the fourth
block. The Navy has reduced its software development efforts in order
to accommodate available funding. As a consequence, some functionality
has been deferred to blocks five and six. The Navy believes that cost
and schedule parameters will still be achieved by leveraging non-
development items and existing software code. However, full maturity
will not occur until after the start of ship construction.
Of the seven technologies approaching full maturity, the Navy expects
to demonstrate full maturity of the integrated deckhouse and peripheral
vertical launch system by the start of ship construction in July 2008.
Production of a large-scale deckhouse test unit is under way and final
validation of the vertical launching system will occur in spring 2008.
Practical limitations prevent the Navy from fully demonstrating all
critical technologies at sea prior to ship installation. Testing of
other technologies continues through ship construction start.
Due to scheduling issues for the lead ships, the Navy did not have time
to fully test the integrated power system prior to shipyard delivery
and instead requested funds in fiscal year 2008 to procure an
additional unit. The Navy will conduct integrated power system testing
in 2010 using this unit at a land-based test site. Considerable
software development remains and land-based testing will mark the first
integrated testing between the power generation and distribution system
and the control system. If problems are discovered during testing,
construction plans and costs could be at risk because the power systems
needed for the first two ships will already have been delivered to the
shipyards.
The Navy continues to test prototypes of the ship's hull form to
demonstrate stability in extreme sea conditions at higher speeds.
According to Navy officials, existing computer simulation tools over-
predicted the ship's tendency to capsize. The Navy is now relying on
testing of scale models in tanks and on the Chesapeake Bay, and is
updating its computer simulation tool. Ongoing testing is aimed at
developing guidance for operating the ship safely under different sea
conditions.
Design Stability:
The Navy estimates that it will complete 85 percent of the detail
design prior to the start of lead ship construction. While design
progress is being made, the program faced initial technical
difficulties in sharing the design tool between shipbuilders.
Processing changes between shipyards and contractors resulted in some
delays. According to the Navy, the program is on track to reach its
design targets. Successfully meeting its target requires that DDG 1000
technologies develop according to plan.
Agency Comments:
The Navy stated that DDG 1000 will have the most mature design of any
surface combatant at the start of fabrication, resulting in a more
affordable construction, with fewer changes. According to the Navy,
successful completion of its design review in 2005 certifies that its
critical technologies are capable of performing at planned levels and
sufficiently mature to remain in the ship baseline, continuing into
detail design and construction. Due to the long timeline required to
design, develop, and deliver a Navy ship, the Navy stated that some
concurrency is unavoidable to prevent the immediate obsolescence of
technologies and preclude additional costs associated with stretching
the timeline to allow all technologies to reach readiness levels
meeting GAO best practice criteria prior to the start of ship
construction. The Navy concluded that DDG 1000 strikes the best balance
between management risk and delivering required capability within cost
and schedule.
[End of section]
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE).
Source: Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft Programs (PEO(T)).
[End of figure]
The Navy's E-2D AHE is an all-weather, twin-engine, carrier-based,
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. It
is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The E-2D AHE is
designed to improve battle space target detection and situational
awareness, especially in littoral areas; support Theater Air and
Missile Defense operations; and improve operational availability.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/development start: (6/03);
Design review: (10/05);
GAO review: (1/08);
Low-rate decision: (3/09);
Initial capability: (4/11);
Full-rate decision: (12/12).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop-Grumman;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,650.8 million;
* Procurement: $11,414.7 million;
Total funding: $13,065.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 70.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 06/2003: $3647.7;
Latest, 12/2006: $3,902.9;
Percent change: 6.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 06/2003: $10,362.1;
Latest, 12/2006: $11,414.7;
Percent change: 10.2.
Total program cost;
As of 06/2003: $14,009.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $15,317.7;
Percent change: 9.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 06/2003: $186.798;
Latest, 12/2006: $204.236;
Percent change: 9.3.
Total quantities;
As of 06/2003: 75;
Latest, 12/2006: 75;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 06/2003: 95;
Latest, 12/2006: 94;
Percent change: -1.0.
[End of table]
Since our assessment of the E-2D AHE last year, the program reported an
increase in its baseline procurement cost due to, among other factors,
the addition of one aircraft to the program's procurement budget and an
increase in the program's material cost estimate. One of the E-2D AHE's
four critical technologies is mature. Since our last assessment, two of
these technologies have continued to mature as the program has
completed high-fidelity laboratory testing. Although the design met
best practice standards at the time of the October 2005 design review,
continued increases in the number of required drawings indicated that
the design may not be stable. The program office reports that the
design is currently 93 percent complete, but system integration
activities may result in additional design changes.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
E-2D AHE Program:
Technology Maturity:
One of the E-2D AHE's four critical technologies--the space time
adaptive processing algorithms--is mature. Since the last assessment,
two additional technologies--the rotodome antenna and the power
amplifier module UHF transistor--are currently approaching maturity as
the program completed high-fidelity laboratory testing. The program
office anticipates that all four critical technologies will be fully
mature through mission system flight testing, which is scheduled to
begin at the end of 2007. The program plans to complete a Technology
Readiness Assessment in late fiscal year 2008 in support of the low-
rate initial production decision.
Design Stability:
The program office reports that 93 percent of total drawings are
complete. However, continued growth in the number of required drawings
indicates that the design may not be stable. While the program had
completed 90 percent of planned drawings at the time of its October
2005 design review, the number of total drawings has continued to
increase. Since the last assessment, the number of required drawings
has increased by 39 percent. The program attributes the increase in
drawings to, among other things, releases of wiring diagrams, wiring
adjustments due to system maturation, and engineering changes that
apply to multiple aircraft platforms including the E-2D AHE. This
increase in drawings means that the program had completed only 53
percent of planned drawings prior to the design review. The program
office anticipates that 100 percent of the drawings will be complete by
the planned start of production in March 2009.
The program office reported that all components were operational in the
system integration laboratory in September 2007, and that the first
development test of a fully integrated prototype will take place in
early 2008. Without the benefit of a systems integration laboratory or
a fully integrated prototype prior to entering the systems
demonstration phase, the program increases the likelihood of additional
design changes and that problems may be discovered late in development
when they are more costly to address.
Production Maturity:
The program expects a low-rate initial production decision in March
2009, but does not require the contractor's major assembly site to use
statistical process controls to ensure its critical processes are
producing high-quality and reliable products. The program initiated a
series of production assessment reviews in February 2008 and plans a
production readiness review in August 2008 to assess the contractor's
readiness for low-rate initial production.
Other Program Issues:
The program reported a procurement cost increase in its December 2006
Selected Acquisition Report. Reasons for the cost increase include the
addition of one aircraft to the program's procurement budget and an
increase in the program's material cost estimate. The program has
initiated its developmental flight test program, but to date has
completed fewer test points than planned due to weather delays and
issues with the aircraft's hydraulic lines. The program is developing
options to make up for the delays, but any additional testing delays
may complicate the program's ability to complete its flight test
program as planned.
Agency Comments:
The Navy stated that the E-2D program is executing to the approved
acquisition program baseline plan, has met all major program events on
schedule, and is on track to meet future major program schedule events
including the operational assessment in fiscal year 2008 and the low-
rate initial production decision in fiscal year 2009. Regarding design
stability, the growth for E-2D unique drawings is 13 percent. The
additional 26 percent of drawing growth includes global engineering
orders common to the E-2C and C-2A. The E-2D System Integration
Laboratory was stood up between critical design review and aircraft
test activities as per NAVAIR system engineering best practices and has
been an invaluable resource to the program to date. The Navy has chosen
not to fund integration of aircraft manufacturing statistical process
controls due to the maturity of the 30-plus years of E-2 production
history.
[End of section]
EA-18G:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: EA-18G.
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
The Navy's EA-18G Growler will replace the carrier-based EA-6B and
provide electronic warfare capability beginning in 2009. The EA-18G is
designed to support friendly air, ground, and sea operations by
suppressing enemy radar and communications. The aircraft is a
combination of the new, more capable Improved Capability (ICAP) III
electronic suite and the F/A-18F airframe. The Navy accepted the first
production configuration EA-18G in September 2007 and expects to begin
operational testing by September 2008.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (8/02);
Development start: (12/03);
Design review: (4/05);
Low-rate decision: (4/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Full-rate decision: (4/09);
Initial capability: (9/09);
Last procurement: (2012).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $567.9 million;
* Procurement: $5,084.4 million;
Total funding: $5,675.3 million;
Procurement quantity: 68.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2003: $1,815.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $1,952.7;
Percent change: 7.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2003: $6,708.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $6,151.9;
Percent change: -8.3.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2003: $8,524.4;
Latest, 12/2006: $8,127.9;
Percent change: -4.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2003: $94.716;
Latest, 12/2006: $101.599;
Percent change: 7.3.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2003: 90;
Latest, 12/2006: 80;
Percent change: -11.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2003: 70;
Latest, 12/2006: 69;
Percent change: -1.4.
[End of table]
The EA-18G began system development without demonstrating that its five
critical technologies had reached full maturity, but all have since
made progress. However, the software needed to demonstrate full
functionality for three of these technologies, while having been
delivered, has not yet demonstrated full functionality in a realistic
environment. The design appears stable, with almost all drawings
complete. However, until all technologies are demonstrated using fully
matured software, the potential for redesign remains. The first
production configuration aircraft has been delivered with 3 more in
production. There are an additional 26 low-rate initial production
aircraft planned. During development testing the Navy identified six
deficiencies that needed correction prior to the start of operational
testing. Fixes for some of these deficiencies have yet to be
identified.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
EA-18G Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, all five of the EA-18G's critical
technologies are mature. While the 2.0 software build, needed to
demonstrate full functionality for three of the technologies--the ALQ-
218 Receiver System, the Communications Countermeasures Set, and the
Multimission Advanced Tactical Terminal system--has been delivered,
tests to demonstate full functionality in a multithreat environment
will not start until late this summer. However, the program expects
that ongoing development and operational tests will demonstrate full
functionally of these technologies before then.
The effect of noise and vibration on the aircraft is being done in two
phases. Phase I, which investigates noise and vibration with no
external stores except for the ALQ-218 receiver pod, has been completed
on two aircraft. Phase II is conducted with external stores,
specifically the ALQ-99 jamming pods on the aircraft. This test started
in the fall of 2007 and was approximately 25 percent complete at that
time.
Design Stability:
The design of the EA-18G appears stable, with 97 percent of drawings
released. According to program officials, more of the ALQ-218 receiver
software from the ICAP III on the EA-6B can be reused than was
previously estimated--almost 80 percent versus 60 percent. However, the
potential for redesign remains until all technologies are demonstrated
with fully mature software.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the program does not
collect statistical process control data. In April 2007, the Navy
approved the program's low-rate initial production decision and by
September 2007, the first production configuration EA-18G aircraft was
delivered. The Navy has a total of 8 low-rate initial production
aircraft on contract, plus the conference report accompanying the 2007
Supplemental Appropriation indicates the conferee's intent to fund 1
additional aircraft. Congress has not yet authorized or appropriated
funds for an additional 18 aircraft planned for procurement in the
second low-rate initial production lot.
The F/A-18E/F and EA-18G share a production line. The two-seat Growler
airframe has about 90 percent parts commonality with the F/A-18F
airframe.
The Navy is planning to buy about one-third of the total production
quantity, 26 of 80 aircraft, during low-rate initial production prior
to the completion of development and operational tests. Concurrency in
testing and production could result in significant additional costs
should later tests determine that changes are needed to already
produced aircraft.
Other Program Issues:
Development tests of the EA-18G revealed 28 deficiencies, six of which
need to be corrected before beginning operational testing. Operational
testing is expected to begin in September 2008 and will not be
completed until December 2008. According to the program office, it has
fully addressed two of the six problems--a failure to detect a threat
without operator indicator and the assignment of jammers to incorrect
emitters--and is working to correct the remaining deficiencies. These
additional deficiencies include airborne electronic attack system
lockups, the lack of adequate threat warning information about pop-up
weapon system emitters, and addressing the excessively time-consuming
and cumbersome process to build the mission planning system and
database.
In addition, the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
identified operator workload of the two-man EA-18G crew in electronic
attack and electronic support missions--currently performed by the four-
man EA-6B crew--as a program risk.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.
Additionally, the Navy stated that the program continues to progress on
schedule and within cost while meeting or exceeding all performance
requirements. According to the Navy, there are currently no high-level
risks associated with program completion, and identified deficiencies
are being addressed to stay on schedule for the September 2008 Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation.
[End of section]
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)--Atlas V, Delta IV:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)--Atlas V, Delta
IV.
Source: United Launch Alliance, © 2007 United Launch Alliance, LLC. All
Rights Reserved.
[End of figure]
The Air Force EELV program acquires satellite launch services for
military, intelligence, and civil missions from two families of launch
vehicles---Atlas V and Delta IV. The program's goal is to preserve the
space launch industrial base, sustain assured access to space, and
reduce life cycle costs of space launches by at least 25 percent over
previous systems. A number of vehicle configurations are available,
depending on satellite vehicle weight and mission specifications. We
assessed both the Atlas V and Delta IV.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (12/96);
Development start and production decision: (6/98);
First flight-Delta IV: (11/02);
First flight-Atlas V: (8/02);
Initial capability: (12/06);
GAO review: (1/08).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Launch Services, Lockheed Martin Space
Systems;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $0.0 million;
* Procurement: $25,155.1 million;
Total funding: $25,155.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 109.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/1998: $1,690.9;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,837.2;
Percent change: 8.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/1998: $14,810.2;
Latest, 08/2007: $30,443.9;
Percent change: 105.9.
Total program cost;
As of 10/1998: $16,500.9;
Latest, 08/2007: $32,281.2;
Percent change: 95.6.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/1998: $91.165;
Latest, 08/2007: $233.922;
Percent change: 156.9.
Total quantities;
As of 10/1998: 181;
Latest, 08/2007: 138;
Percent change: -23.5.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/1998: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 120;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
We did not assess technology, design, and production maturity
information. The EELV contracts do not include requirements for
delivery of such data from the contractors. The EELV program completed
production and transitioned into the sustainment phase in August 2007.
However, only 9 of 15 possible configurations of launch vehicles have
been launched. As of November 1, 2007, all 18 EELV launches (8
government, 3 NASA, and 7 commercial) have been successful. Twelve
additional launches are scheduled through the end of fiscal year 2008.
The United Launch Alliance (ULA), a joint venture between Boeing Launch
Services and Lockheed Martin Space Systems, was established on December
1, 2006. Over about a 4-year period from establishment, the joint
venture is to combine production, engineering, test, and launch
operations associated with U.S. government launches of Atlas and Delta
vehicles.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
EELV Program:
Technology Maturity:
We did not assess technology maturity because, according to the program
office, the EELV contracts do not require the delivery of information
needed to conduct this assessment.
Design Stability:
We did not assess design stability because the EELV contracts do not
require the delivery of information needed to conduct this assessment.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess production maturity because the EELV contracts do not
require the delivery of information needed to conduct this assessment.
Other Program Issues:
Efforts to complete the ULA merger are currently under way. The
intention of the joint venture is to combine and centralize the
production of launch vehicles into one plant location and all
management and engineering activities into another facility. Nearly all
transition efforts are expected to be completed by the end of 2010. The
current challenge is the consolidation of Atlas and Delta facilities
and personnel while maintaining mission success.
As part of the revised acquisition strategy, the EELV program awarded
cost-plus-award-fee contracts for launch capabilities to Lockheed
Martin and Boeing in 2006. A firm fixed price contract for launch
services was awarded to Lockheed Martin in February 2007 and to Boeing
in January 2008. According to DOD officials, contract awards for launch
services have been delayed because the EELV program is understaffed.
Further, under the revised contracting strategy, the program office
will assume greater responsibilities with regard to program oversight
and financial execution and will continue to monitor every aspect of
booster procurement and production. However, program officials are
concerned about a shortage of skilled program office staff to
effectively carry out its increased oversight responsibilities.
In August 2007, a revised acquisition program baseline transitioned the
EELV program to the sustainment phase. However, only 9 of 15 possible
configurations of launch vehicles have been launched. Additionally, the
program office has yet to revise the life cycle cost estimate to
reflect this transition and is awaiting further guidance on changes to
program reporting requirements.
According to EELV officials, the program is close to resolving issues
related to the RL-10 upper stage engine and the Russian-built RD-180
Atlas V engine. Program officials explained that a technical review
held in September 2007 approved a "return-to-flight" plan for the RL-10
that includes improvements to the fuel inlet valve, the direct cause of
an early shut off during a June 2007 Atlas V launch. During the same
month, the Air Force also received approval to maintain a sufficient
inventory of RD-180 engines in lieu of implementing a domestic RD-180
co-production capability. Furthermore, the Air Force is investigating
the costs and benefits of implementing a single RS-68 Delta IV upgrade.
This upgrade is intended to support future launch needs of the Air
Force, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force was provided an opportunity to comment on a draft of this
assessment, but did not have any comments.
[End of section]
Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS).
Source: EFSS Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Marine Corps' EFSS is an indirect fire support system used for the
Marines' vertical assault operations and is designed for internal
transport on the MV-22 and CH-53E aircraft. The EFSS consists of two
vehicles: a rifled mortar that fires 120 millimeter shells and an
ammunition trailer. The program conducted operational testing in July
2007. In response to a letter from a member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, the full-rate production decision was delayed; it
is now scheduled for May 2008.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: (11/04);
Design review: (4/05);
Low-rate decision: (6/05);
GAO review: (1/08);
Full-rate decision: (5/08);
Initial capability: (2008).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics;
Program office: Quantico, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $24.8 million;
* Procurement: $128.9 million;
Total funding: $170.3 million;
Procurement quantity: 54.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/2004: $52.8;
Latest, 01/2008: $78.5;
Percent change: 48.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/2004: $600.0;
Latest, 01/2008: $174.6;
Percent change: -70.9.
Total program cost;
As of 11/2004: $751.8;
Latest, 01/2008: $272.7;
Percent change: -63.7.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/2004: $10.895;
Latest, 01/2008: $3.895;
Percent change: -64.2.
Total quantities;
As of 11/2004: 69;
Latest, 01/2008: 70;
Percent change: 1.4.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/2004: 52;
Latest, 01/2008: 71;
Percent change: 36.5.
Latest estimate excludes ammunition procurement from 2014 through 2025,
which was included in the 2004 estimate.
[End of table]
Since our assessment last year, the EFSS program has completed
operational testing. However, the aggressive test schedule allowed no
time to implement corrective actions for problems previously discovered
during developmental testing. As a result, the EFSS was determined to
be operationally effective and suitable with safety, reliability, and
performance limitations. In response to congressional concerns, the
program subsequently rescheduled the full-rate production decision
until after an expanded follow-on test and evaluation effort assesses
progress in fixing these limitations. The follow-on testing is expected
to be conducted in early calendar year 2008. In the past year, the
program has obtained its internal and external flight certification for
use on the MV-22 and CH-53 aircraft. Naval concurrence regarding the
ammunition's compliance with safety standards is pending.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
EFSS Program:
Technology Maturity:
EFSS is approaching full-rate production. According to the program
office, no critical technologies have been identified because EFSS is
relying on existing technologies.
Design Stability:
At the program design review, less than 50 percent of the total system
level drawings were complete. Now, the design appears stable because
the program office set the EFSS baseline design, and ordered the first
production vehicles. However, design changes to address safety,
reliability, and performance issues discovered during testing have not
yet been fully validated, so the potential for redesign remains.
The EFSS program faces unique design challenges due, in part, to the
internal MV-22 Osprey transportability key performance parameter
requirement. The EFSS design must fit within the MV-22 cabin size and
meet its weight restrictions. The program office initially planned to
meet EFSS requirements by using a mostly commercial off-the-shelf
system. However, EFSS needed more development than originally
anticipated. Many changes were incorporated into the design due to the
internal MV-22 transportability requirement and due to issues that
arose with the vehicle's axle, hub assembly, driveshaft, chassis, and
electrical system. The aggressive test schedule allowed no time to
incorporate corrections identified during developmental testing into
assets for use in operational testing. In addition, a design issue with
the tail charge of the mortar round was recently discovered and must be
fixed prior to starting cold weather testing, currently scheduled for
early calendar year 2008.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the production maturity because the program office
does not collect statistical control data. The design changes and
aggressive test schedule led program officials to make a production
decision in June 2005 before the development scope was fully
recognized. This contributed to a year long delay between the
production decision and the actual award of the low-rate initial
production contract. In August 2007, the program office completed the
production readiness review and accepted delivery of the first
production vehicles in November 2007.
Other Program Issues:
Operational testing revealed several safety, reliability, and
performance issues. For example, there were safety concerns regarding
instability with the ammunition trailer (which could cause harm to
personnel riding in the rear seat). In addition, the EFSS vehicle could
not carry the recommended combat load; the radiator was unable to
sufficiently cool the engine and transmission during operations; the
compressor was not robust enough to support the air ride system and
central tire inflation system; and the vehicle had problems starting at
higher altitudes. These issues led the operational testers to determine
that EFSS was operationally effective with limitations and suitable
with limitations. The testers characterize the EFSS as a "niche
capability," which must operate within a small performance envelope.
The Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee requested that the
Marine Corps delay the EFSS full-rate production decision that had been
scheduled for September 2007. This decision is now planned for May 2008
and the program office is revising the test plan to support validation
of the corrections required for the identified limitations.
Finally, the program office recently authorized additional limited
production before reaching agreement on the scope and price of the
work. Under this undefinitized contract action, the contactor is
authorized to begin work before reaching a final agreement on contract
terms. We have previously reported that these types of arrangements
provide little incentive to the contractor to control cost until the
terms of the work are finalized. The program office expected to reach
agreement on the terms of work between the end of 2007 and January
2008.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
[See PDF for image]
Photographs (4): Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV).
Source: EFV Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Marine Corps' EFV is designed to transport troops from ships
offshore to inland destinations at higher speeds and from longer
distances than the system it is designed to replace, the Assault
Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 (AAV-7A1). The EFV will have two variants---a
troop carrier for 17 combat equipped Marines and 3 crew members and a
command vehicle to manage combat operations in the field. We assessed
both variants.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (3/95);
Development start: (12/00);
Design review: (1/01);
GAO review: (1/08);
2nd design review: (9/08);
Low-rate decision: (9/11);
Initial capability: (8/15).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics;
Program office: Woodbridge, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,279.5 million;
* Procurement: $9,632.3 million;
Total funding: $10,978.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 573.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2000: $1,569.1;
Latest, 08/2007: $3,565.0;
Percent change: 127.2.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2000: $7,037.3;
Latest, 08/2007: $9,846.9;
Percent change: 39.9.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2000: $8,696.7;
Latest, 08/2007: $13,504.4;
Percent change: 55.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2000: $8.485;
Latest, 08/2007: $22.773;
Percent change: 168.4.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2000: 1025;
Latest, 08/2007: 593;
Percent change: -42.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2000: 138;
Latest, 08/2007: 245;
Percent change: 77.5.
[End of table]
The EFV's technologies are mature. However, the system design proved
unstable following the original design review. After reliability
shortfalls were discovered, the program was restructured to extend
development, initiate a design-for-reliability process, and to enhance
program oversight and monitoring. The EFV is scheduled to have a second
design review in September 2008, and projected initial capability has
been delayed by almost 5 years, to 2015. Program officials said that
the redesign of key systems should enable the program to meet
reliability metrics. The program has currently identified 12 critical
manufacturing processes, but does not require the contractor to use
statistical process controls. The Navy reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost increase over the critical cost threshold in part because of
reliability issues and quantity reductions.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
EFV Program:
Technology Maturity:
All four of the EFV system's critical technologies are mature and have
been demonstrated in a full-up system prototype. According to program
officials, the current redesign effort will not affect the maturity of
any of the existing critical technologies.
Design Stability:
The EFV design was thought to be approaching stability at the time of
the original design review. However, reliability shortfalls were
discovered during an operational assessment in 2006 when the EFV
achieved only a fraction of the required operational goal of 43.5 hours
of operations before maintenance was required. Given the discovery of
problems with reliability, the program was restructured to extend
development efforts and build a second set of prototypes. The program
is redesigning various systems, such as the drivetrain, and plans to
monitor their predicted and demonstrated reliability. The program
reports that 70 percent of its design drawings have been released to
manufacturing and expects to release all drawings by the newly
established design review in September 2008. This schedule may be
ambitious given the design instability related to ongoing redesign and
testing efforts to resolve reliability issues.
The EFV design currently has a flat hull, which enables the vehicle to
move very quickly over the water. Program officials said they recently
completed a review of using a "v-shaped" hull, and found that such a
hull would reduce the vehicle's vulnerability to ground-based explosive
devices, but would make it impossible to meet its key performance
parameters. In order to provide additional blast protection, officials
said additional hull belly armor could be added to the vehicle for land
operations.
Production Maturity:
The program office currently does not require the contractor to use
statistical process controls to ensure critical processes will produce
products within cost, schedule, performance, and quality targets.
Instead, the program is using production representative processes for
the manufacture of prototype vehicles during development. Twelve
critical processes have been identified so far and will be used to
manufacture the next seven prototype vehicles. The program expects to
continue to evolve these processes.
Other Program Issues:
In February 2007, the Navy reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost increase
over the critical cost growth threshold. Various factors contributed to
cost increases, including reliability challenges, optimistic estimating
assumptions, and reduced procurement quantities because of changes in
the Marine Corps ground mobility strategy. After a comprehensive
review, the program was restructured in June 2007 to extend system
development. This will delay initial production to 2011 to allow for
development of a second set of prototypes to resolve reliability
issues. Furthermore, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics has established a set of oversight,
monitoring, and reporting mechanisms to ensure successful management of
the program.
Agency Comments:
The program office provided technical comments to a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Extended Range Munition (ERM):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Extended Range Munition (ERM).
Source: Naval Gunnery Project Office, PEO IWS3C/Raytheon, ©2006
Raytheon.
[End of figure]
The Navy's ERM is a 5-inch, rocket-assisted projectile that will
provide fire support to expeditionary forces operating near coastal
waters. ERM is being designed to fire to an objective range of 63
nautical miles using modified 5-inch guns onboard 32 Arleigh Burke-
class destroyers. ERM represents a continuation of the Navy's Extended
Range Guided Munition program, which entered system development and
demonstration in 1996. The Navy is currently restructuring the program,
and the planned initial fielding date of 2011 is under review.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/development start: (7/96);
Design review: (5/03);
GAO review: (1/08);
Low-rate decision: (9/10);
Initial capability: (9/11);
Full-rate decision: (5/12).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $108.6 million;
* Procurement: $858.9 million;
Total funding: $967.6 million;
Procurement quantity: 15,000.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/1997: $86.9;
Latest, 08/2007: $500.1;
Percent change: 475.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/1997: $343.5;
Latest, 08/2007: $858.9;
Percent change: 150.0.
Total program cost;
As of 04/1997: $430.4;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,359.1;
Percent change: 215.7.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/1997: $.050;
Latest, 08/2007: $.090;
Percent change: 79.2.
Total quantities;
As of 04/1997: 8,570;
Latest, 08/2007: 15,100;
Percent change: 76.2.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/1997: 50;
Latest, 08/2007: 182;
Percent change: 264.0.
[End of table]
Of ERM's 17 critical technologies, 8 have reached maturity.
Obsolescence issues facing ERM have prompted the Navy to replace
components for a number of critical technologies. Testing of these new
components inside gun-fired canisters has revealed a number of
structural weaknesses. While analysis of recent test results continues,
program officials have begun to question the validity of these tests
and are focused on moving forward with flight testing. Also, while all
of ERM's design drawings have been released, continuing component test
failures may necessitate design changes. Further, program officials
report that DOD continues to evaluate plans for completing development
of ERM. Until these plans are approved and performance of new
components is validated in testing, it is uncertain whether the Navy's
goal to begin fielding ERM in 2011 is realistic.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
ERM Program:
Technology Maturity:
Currently, 8 of ERM's 17 critical technologies are mature. Another 8
technologies are approaching maturity. Recent engineering changes to
the munition prompted the Navy to reduce its assessment for ERM's
rocket motor, rocket motor igniter, and height-of-burst fuze
technologies from mature to approaching maturity. Engineering changes
also affected the control actuation system, and the Navy now assesses
this technology as immature.
The Navy recently replaced components for a number of ERM technologies
due to obsolescence and is testing these new components inside 8-inch
canisters fired from guns. This canister testing is intended to help
the Navy evaluate ERM reliability by exposing components to
representative gun pressure and acceleration environments. Although the
Navy initially outlined a robust plan for testing the new ERM
components, hardware fabrication errors and delays as well as supplier
cost growth have prompted the Navy to scale back these plans. Component
testing completed to date has identified a number of structural
weaknesses with ERM components. For instance, in a July 2007 canister
test, ERM's radome separated from the guidance section, the canard
covers buckled, and subassemblies of the control actuation system
fractured and deformed. Program officials report that although they
continue to analyze test results, they have begun to question the
validity of canister testing for ERM. Specifically, there is concern
that the gun pressure loads placed upon the canisters in testing far
exceed those induced in a normal 5-inch gun. Alternatively, the program
has begun testing the structural integrity of new components using
centrifuge and air gun assets and is moving forward with engineering
flight testing in advance of a 20-round reliability demonstration test
phase planned for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008.
Design Stability:
The program has released 100 percent of ERM's anticipated 143
production representative engineering drawings. None of these drawings
were released in time for the munition's May 2003 design review.
Instead, the Navy conducted this review with less mature drawings and
used them to validate the design of the developmental test rounds.
According to program officials, recent changes to ERM components to
address obsolescence and reliability issues have required significant
redesign of the munition. If the munition does not perform as expected
in remaining component and flight tests or technologies do not mature
as planned, additional design changes may be needed. Program officials
stated they are concerned that ERM's development schedule may not allow
sufficient time to fix technical problems should they occur during
engineering flight testing planned for the second quarter of fiscal
year 2008.
Production Maturity:
The Navy plans to collect statistical process control data for ERM once
production begins. According to Navy officials, 100 ERM units will be
built during system development using lessons learned and process
control methods developed in the Excalibur program. The Navy
anticipates that this strategy will result in mature production
processes for ERM at the beginning of low-rate initial production.
Other Program Issues:
The Navy has proposed a restructuring of the ERM program following cost
growth that led to an elevation in oversight responsibility for the
program. According to program officials, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has approved a new
acquisition strategy for the program and is reviewing a new acquisition
program baseline and systems engineering plan for ERM. In addition,
program officials stated that a new test and evaluation master plan for
ERM is under review and anticipate it will be completed in spring 2008.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery
Projectile.
Source: PM Excalibur.
[End of figure]
The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based,
fire-and-forget, 155 mm cannon artillery precision munitions intended
to provide improved range and accuracy. The Excalibur's near-vertical
angle of fall is intended to reduce collateral damage around the
intended target, making it more effective in urban environments than
current projectiles. The Future Combat System's Non-Line-of-Sight
Cannon requires the Excalibur to meet its required range. Only the
unitary variant is currently being developed.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/development start: (5/97);
Design review/low-rate decision: (5/05);
GAO review: (1/08);
Full-rate decision: (10/08);
Initial capability: (1/09);
Last procurement: (2020).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon;
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $184.4 million;
* Procurement: $1,119.9 million;
Total funding: $1,303.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 29,301.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 02/2003: $726.9;
Latest, 07/2007: $954.8;
Percent change: 31.4.
Procurement cost;
As of 02/2003: $3,809.1;
Latest, 07/2007: $1,364.0;
Percent change: -64.1.
Total program cost;
As of 02/2003: $4,536.1;
Latest, 07/2007: $2,358.7;
Percent change: -48.0.
Program unit cost;
As of 02/2003: $.059;
Latest, 07/2007: $.078;
Percent change: 31.2.
Total quantities;
As of 02/2003: 76,677;
Latest, 07/2007: 30,388;
Percent change: -60.3.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 02/2003: 136;
Latest, 07/2007: 140;
Percent change: 2.9.
[End of table]
The Excalibur program has begun early production to support an urgent
early fielding requirement in Iraq for more accurate artillery that
will reduce collateral damage. According to program officials, this
early production run of the Excalibur's first increment has completed
testing necessary to field the projectile for use in combat operations.
They also noted that Excalibur's critical technologies reached full
maturity in May 2005, and all of its 790 drawings were completed in
July 2005. The Excalibur unitary variant will be developed in three
incremental blocks, which will incorporate increased capabilities and
accuracy over time. Since development began in 1997, the program has
encountered a number of significant changes, including four major
restructures, reduced initial production quantities, and increased unit
costs.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Excalibur Program:
Technology Maturity:
All three of the unitary variant's critical technologies reached full
technology maturity in May 2005 at the time of the Excalibur's design
review. These technologies were the airframe, guidance system, and
warhead.
Design Stability:
Excalibur's design appears to be stable. In May 2005, Excalibur held
its design review and concurrently entered production to support an
urgent fielding requirement in Iraq. At the time of the design review,
750 of 790 design drawings were released. All 790 were complete for the
first Excalibur block in July 2005. By August 2006, the number of
drawings had increased by almost 20 percent to 943, all of which have
been released.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess Excalibur's production maturity. The program is
taking steps to utilize statistical process control at subsystem and
component levels, but the production processes remain inconsistent at
this point.
Other Program Issues:
Excalibur started as a combination of three smaller artillery programs
with the intent to extend the range of artillery projectiles with an
integrated rocket motor. It is expected to enable three different Army
howitzers and the Swedish Archer howitzer to fire farther away and
defeat threats more quickly while lowering collateral damage and
reducing the logistics support burden. The program has encountered a
number of changes and issues since development began in 1997, including
a decrease in planned quantities, a relocation of the contractor's
plant, early limited funding, technical problems, and changes in
program requirements. Since 1997, it has been restructured four times.
In 2002, the program was directed to include the development of the
Excalibur for the Army's Future Combat System's Non-Line-of-Sight
Cannon (NLOS-C). The net effect of these changes has been to lengthen
the program's schedule, substantially decrease planned procurement
quantities, and dramatically increase unit costs.
The Excalibur acquisition plan currently focuses on developing its
unitary version in three incremental blocks. In the first block, which
has been made available for early fielding, the projectile would meet
its requirements for lethality and accuracy in a non-jammed
environment. In the second block, the projectile would be improved to
meet its requirements for accuracy in a jammed environment, with
extended range and increased reliability, and would be fielded with the
NLOS-C when the cannon is available. Finally, in the third block, the
projectile would be improved to further increase reliability, lower
unit costs, and would be available for fielding to all systems in late
fiscal year 2011. The other two Excalibur variant blocks--smart and
discriminating--are expected to enter system development in fiscal year
2010, although both variants are unfunded.
In 2002, an early fielding plan for the unitary version was approved.
According to the program office, a limited user test was completed in
fiscal year 2007, almost 2 years after entering production, with
results that exceeded the objective requirements for accuracy and
reliability. Excalibur was fielded in Iraq with its first use in combat
in the third quarter of fiscal year 2007. The program office reported
the munition performed well in combat operations.
According to program officials, compatibility with NLOS-C has been
identified as one of its top program risks because the muzzle brake on
that platform is different than that on a standard howitzer. An
engineering study was completed in May 2007 that identified
modifications to both the Excalibur projectile and the NLOS-C. Testing
of the new designs is scheduled to begin in December 2007, with firing
of the projectile from the redesigned NLOS-C in the third quarter of
fiscal year 2008. If the redesigned projectile is successfully fired
from the NLOS-C, the projectile will then have to be retested in the
Paladin and lightweight 155 mm howitzer platforms.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
F-22A Modernization Program:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: F-22A.
Source: F-22A System Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's F-22A, originally planned to be an air superiority
fighter, will now also have air-to-ground attack capability. It was
designed with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics, to
make it less detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for
long ranges. The Air Force established the F-22A modernization and
improvement program in 2003 to add enhanced air-to-ground, information
warfare, counter air, reconnaissance, and other capabilities and to
improve the reliability and maintainability of the aircraft.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: (3/03);
Design review: (12/06);
GAO review: (1/08);
Development complete: (FY 2012);
Initial capability: (FY 2014).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio;
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $3,064.8 million;
* Procurement: $1,606.6 million;
Total funding: $4,671.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 03/2003: $3,055.5;
Latest, 08/2007: $4,127.7;
Percent change: 35.1.
Procurement cost;
As of 03/2003: $529.4;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,779.9;
Percent change: 236.2.
Total program cost;
As of 03/2003: $3,584.9;
Latest, 08/2007: $5,907.6;
Percent change: 64.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 03/2003: $13.131;
Latest, 08/2007: $34.148;
Percent change: 160.0.
Total quantities;
As of 03/2003: 273;
Latest, 08/2007: 173;
Percent change: -36.6.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 03/2003: 133;
Latest, 08/2007: 133;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
The Air Force originally planned to field the enhanced F-22A
capabilities in three development increments to be completed in 2010.
However, due to numerous funding decreases, schedule slips, and changes
in requirements and work content in each increment, the last increment
will not be integrated on the F-22A until 2013, 3 years later than
planned. The program has achieved less than 30 percent design maturity
for its first major increment. The Air Force also plans to integrate
additional capabilities beyond the current three planned increments in
a separate Acquisition Category I program.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
F-22A Program:
Technology Maturity:
One of four critical technologies--processing memory--is mature and has
been demonstrated in a realistic environment. The three remaining
technologies--stores management system, cryptography, and radio
frequency--are approaching maturity, having been tested in a relevant
environment. According to program office officials the current F-22
production and modernization plans do not commit to incorporating new
technology into developmental increments until the underlying
technologies have been tested in a relevant environment, and also do
not commit to fielding these technologies until they have been proven
in a developmental and operational environment. The number and mix of
technologies identified by program officials has changed somewhat over
the years, reflecting the changes in program direction, priorities, and
work content. Two critical technologies associated with the program
last year (larger bandwidth and low observables) were removed from the
current funded modernization program to be addressed in future
increments, which will be implemented as a separate Acquisition
Category I program.
Design Stability:
The design for the first major increment of enhanced capabilities of
the F-22A Modernization Program is not mature and, as of October 2007,
less than one-third of the planned engineering drawings had been
released. The program office had released no engineering drawings when
critical design review (CDR) was held and approved in December 2006.
According to program officials, they did not plan to release drawings
at CDR because most of the design consisted of software changes or
modifications of existing hardware to enable the aircraft to carry and
deliver the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) on preplanned missions as well as
to use an air-to-ground radar mode to permit attack of emerging targets
using SDBs, and to save radar imagery for post-mission analysis.
Program officials further mentioned final instrumentation that is
planned for installation--such as radio frequency data links and other
items--will not be installed in test aircraft until fiscal year 2011.
Consequently, there are a significant number of engineering drawings
that have to be released before the design is mature.
Other Program Issues:
The F-22A modernization program has experienced numerous budget
decreases and program restructurings that have resulted in delaying the
planned implementation of the development increments by 3 years. Since
fiscal year 2002, the F-22A's modernization budget has been decreased
by nearly $330 million. Some of these decreases were the result of
congressional budget cuts. However, more than 50 percent of the
decreases can be attributed to program restructuring by the Air Force
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In its fiscal year 2008
budget submission to Congress, the Air Force requested $743 million in
development funding for F-22A modernization. The conference reports
accompanying the 2008 National Department of Defense Authorization Act,
and Defense Appropriations Act both recommended providing the F-22A
modernization program with $611 million, about $132 million less than
requested. Program officials indicated that this decrease in funding
required changes to minimize the impact on the planned modernization
program.
The Air Force also budgeted $132 million in fiscal years 2007 and 2008
for reliability and maintainability upgrades, $28 million more than the
amount budgeted for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Despite these efforts,
the F-22A continues to operate below its expected reliability rates. A
key reliability requirement for the F-22A is a 3-hour mean time between
maintenance intervals, which is required by the time the program
achieves 100,000 operational flying hours, now projected for fiscal
year 2010. Mean time between maintenance is defined as the number of
operating hours divided by the number of maintenance actions.
Currently, the mean time between maintenance is less than 1 hour, or
about half of what was expected by the end of system development in
December 2005. There has been no significant change reported regarding
the current mean time between maintenance since last year's review.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T).
Source: Boeing Corp., Anaheim, CA.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's FAB-T will provide a family of satellite communications
terminals for airborne and ground-based users. FAB-T will address
current and future communications capabilities and technologies,
replacing many program-unique terminals. FAB-T is being developed
incrementally; the first increment will provide voice and data military
satellite communications for nuclear and conventional forces as well as
airborne and ground command posts, including the B-2, B-52, RC-135, E-
6, and E-4 aircraft. We assessed the first increment.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/development start: (9/02);
GAO review: (1/08);
Design review: (12/08);
Low-rate decision: (2/10);
Full-rate decision: (12/11).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Hanscom AFB, Mass.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $668.9 million;
* Procurement: $1,916.2 million;
Total funding: $2,585.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 197.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 09/2002: $1,459.9;
Latest, 04/2007: $1,468.9;
Percent change: 0.6.
Procurement cost;
As of 09/2002: $1,568.3;
Latest, 04/2007: $1,886.1;
Percent change: 20.3.
Total program cost;
As of 09/2002: $3,028.1;
Latest, 04/2007: $3,354.7;
Percent change: 10.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 09/2002: $14.019;
Latest, 04/2007: $15.111;
Percent change: 7.9.
Total quantities;
As of 09/2002: 216;
Latest, 04/2007: 222;
Percent change: 2.9.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 09/2002: 129;
Latest, 04/2007: 129;
Percent change: 0.
[End of table]
Although FAB-T entered system development in 2002, its critical
technologies were not assessed until January 2007, after being
designated an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1 program. Currently, the
seven critical technologies are approaching maturity and the program
office expects that all will reach full maturity by the low-rate
initial production decision in February 2010. While the program reports
that the FAB-T design is nearly stable, it expects further minor design
changes, including those to address vibration issues in the modem
processor group. In 2006, the program was restructured to address
design changes caused by the concurrent development of the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency satellite and cryptological devices, as well
as issues with contractor performance.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
FAB-T Program:
Technology Maturity:
All seven critical technologies are approaching maturity, and program
officials expect they will be fully mature by the end of the first
quarter of fiscal year 2010, well before the scheduled development and
operational tests in the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. According
to program officials, when FAB-T began system development in 2002, a
technology readiness assessment was not required. Critical technologies
were not assessed until after it was designated an ACAT 1D program in
August 2006. In January 2007, the program office initially identified
and assessed 9 critical technologies.
In June 2007, the milestone decision authority requested an independent
technology readiness assessment for FAB-T. While the program office
estimated that most critical technologies were mature, the independent
panel determined that they were not, in part because some of them had
not been flight tested in a realistic environment. The review team also
added an additional critical technology that had not previously been
identified by the program. In addition, four technologies identified by
the program office as critical were removed because the review
concluded that they were more appropriately categorized as engineering,
integration and/or interoperability issues. The Deputy Under Secretary
for Science and Technology did not agree with the removal of one of
these technologies, redesignated it as critical, and assessed it as
approaching maturity based on additional information provided by the
program office.
Because FAB-T is a software-defined radio, another risk facing the
program is the large amount of new software code. Since the start of
program development, the total lines of code expected in the final
system has increased by 40 percent, with 69 percent of the total lines
of code to be newly developed. Program officials noted that the
software growth was necessary to accommodate the design and interface
requirement changes with the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
satellite and cryptological devices. The software budget has increased
significantly, and program officials explained that this was due to the
additional lines of code and to lower than expected levels of
productivity.
Design Stability:
Program officials reported that 98 percent of design drawings have been
released to manufacturing. Prior to system-critical design review,
scheduled for early in fiscal year 2009, there have been a number of
line replaceable unit critical design reviews. Each of the line
replaceable unit critical design reviews was completed successfully,
and there were no significant design issues identified. Testing to date
has been conducted at the component, shop replaceable unit, and line
replaceable unit levels. Program officials noted that testing revealed
vibration issues with two cards within the modem processor group; these
cards are being modified and will undergo retest. As of February 2008,
over 70 percent of the software lines of code had been coded, tested
and integrated.
The program has allowed 4 months to execute initial operational
testing. Program officials said that this is sufficient, but noted it
will allow only minimal time for retesting any required design changes.
Other Program Issues:
Increment 1 of the program was restructured in 2006 because concurrent
development of the terminal and the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
satellite and cryptologic devices resulted in a need to revise the
terminal requirements. In addition, contractor design teams were
restructured to improve performance and efficiency. Program officials
said that costs for development have more than tripled since the
contract was awarded due to design changes and contractor cost growth.
Program officials also said the concurrent development and contractor
performance issues resulted in a delay to the start of low-rate initial
production from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2010.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the FAB-T program office
provided additional background information and technical comments,
which were incorporated as appropriate. As part of the background
information, the program office noted that, as of 2006, FAB-T is being
managed in accordance with National Security Space Acquisition Policy
03-01. This includes program milestones that are different than those
for a DOD 5000 program. The program office established a new program
baseline under these guidelines in calendar year 2007.
[End of section]
Future Combat Systems (FCS):
[See PDF for image]
Diagram: Future Combat Systems (FCS).
Source: U.S. Army.
[End of figure]
The FCS program consists of an integrated family of advanced, networked
combat and sustainment systems; unmanned ground and air vehicles; and
unattended sensors and munitions intended to equip the Army's new
transformational modular combat brigades. Within a system-of-systems
architecture, FCS features 14 major systems and other enabling systems
along with an overarching network for information superiority and
survivability. This assessment focuses on the full FCS program.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (5/00);
Development start: (5/03);
GAO review: (1/08);
Design review: (2/11);
Low-rate decision: (2/13);
Full-rate decision: (2/17);
Initial capability: (6/15);
Last procurement: (unknown).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Hazelwood, Mo.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $16,651.9 million;
* Procurement: $99,275.0 million;
Total funding: $116,657.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 15.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2003: $20,537.8;
Latest, 12/2006: $28,478.2;
Percent change: 38.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2003: $67,060.0;
Latest, 12/2006: $99,275.0;
Percent change: 48.0.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2003: $88,278.7;
Latest, 12/2006: $128,483.8;
Percent change: 45.5.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2003: $5,885.245;
Latest, 12/2006: $8,565.589;
Percent change: 45.5.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2003: 15;
Latest, 12/2006: 15;
Percent change: 0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2003: 91;
Latest, 12/2006: 145;
Percent change: 59.3.
[End of table]
Since last year's assessment, the Army has made progress maturing six
technologies, but three other critical technologies are now assessed as
less mature. The Army continues to define the requirements for core FCS
systems, and contractors continue to refine their initial designs.
Testing of the initial FCS items to be delivered to current Army forces
is expected to begin in fiscal year 2008. The Army also plans to begin
initial production of both the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon and a few other
related systems in fiscal year 2009. The Army has eliminated four of
the core FCS systems due to budget considerations. The Army's
development cost estimate for FCS is much lower than two independent
estimates and is based on less demonstrated knowledge than would
normally be expected near the midpoint of development.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
FCS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Only 2 of the program's 44 technologies are fully mature and 30 are
nearing full maturity. Based on the Army's assessment, 6 technologies
have demonstrated higher maturity since last year, but 3 are now
assessed as less mature. All critical technologies may not be fully
mature until the Army's production decision in February 2013. The next
independent verification of FCS critical technologies should be
available in early 2009 for the preliminary design review.
The Army is using a phased approach to "spin out" mature FCS equipment
to current forces, provided the equipment demonstrates military utility
during testing. Testing of the initial spinout items should begin in
fiscal year 2008. Because technical issues have delayed development of
new radios, the Army will be testing spinout hardware using surrogate
radios. As currently scheduled, production-representative radios will
not be available for testing until at least 2009, which is after the
production decision for spinout items.
Design Stability:
The Army plans to conduct a preliminary design review in February 2009
and a critical design review in February 2011. At the critical design
review, the Army expects to have completed 90 percent of FCS design
drawings. FCS contractors have released some design drawings for a
small number of systems that are candidates for near-term spinout
fielding including unattended sensors, the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch
System, and various communications equipment. Contractors have also
released some design drawings for an early production version of the
Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon. The vehicles are being built to satisfy a
congressional mandate for the early fielding of cannon vehicles.
Production Maturity:
Since the low-rate production decision for the core FCS systems is not
scheduled until February 2013, we did not assess production maturity.
However, the Army plans to spend more than $5 billion to begin initial
production of both the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon and a few spinout
systems in 2009--4 years before the program's system-of-systems
production decision and before any of the other manned ground vehicles
are subject to any developmental, live fire, or operational testing.
The Army intends to use a sole source contract with the current lead
system integrator for all FCS low-rate production.
Other Program Issues:
Since last year's assessment, the Army deleted four systems and made
several other adjustments to the FCS development program based largely
on budgetary constraints. The Army also reduced the annual FCS
production rate and stretched out the production phase by about 5
years, also due to budgetary limitations. As a result, total cost
estimates for the program were slightly reduced.
The Army's FCS development cost estimate depends on a number of
assumptions. Historically, programs using such assumptions tend to
underestimate costs. Program officials stated they will not spend more
in development than the current value of the FCS development contract.
Any projected cost overruns would be eliminated by deleting
requirements, forcing the user to forego certain capabilities.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System.
Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high-altitude, long-endurance
unmanned aircraft with integrated sensors and ground stations providing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. After a
successful technology demonstration, the system entered development and
limited production in March 2001. The acquisition program has been
restructured several times. The current plan acquires 7 aircraft
similar to the original demonstrators (the RQ-4A) and 47 of a larger
and more capable model (the RQ-4B).
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Demonstration program start: (2/94);
Development start/low-rate decision: (3/01);
GAO review: (1/08);
Full-rate decision: (4/09);
Last procurement: (2013).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio;
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,603.1 million;
* Procurement: $3,894.9 million;
Total funding: $5,500.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 30.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 03/2001: $989.3;
Latest, 09/2007: $3,682.4;
Percent change: 272.2.
Procurement cost;
As of 03/2001: $4,101.7;
Latest, 09/2007: $5,773.9;
Percent change: 40.9.
Total program cost;
As of 03/2001: $5,121.0;
Latest, 09/2007: $9,599.8;
Percent change: 87.5.
Program unit cost;
As of 03/2001: $81.286;
Latest, 09/2007: $177.773;
Percent change: 118.7.
Total quantities;
As of 03/2001: 63;
Latest, 09/2007: 54;
Percent change: -14.2.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 03/2001: 55;
Latest, 09/2007: TBD;
Percent change: TBD.
[End of table]
RQ-4A production is complete and RQ-4B aircraft are currently in
production. Key technologies are mostly mature. The program is
collecting manufacturing process control data and bringing them into
control, but test delays constrain these efforts. The first RQ-4B had
its first flight in March 2007 but encountered problems. Flight testing
is ongoing but proceeding slowly. Representative prototypes of the two
sensors driving the requirement for the larger aircraft are in flight
test on surrogate platforms. However, critical imaging sensors are not
yet fully mature. Airframe design appears stable, but differences
between the two models were much more extensive and complex than
anticipated; these differences resulted in extended development times,
frequent engineering changes, and significant cost increases. The
program was rebaselined for the third time since its 2001 inception.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Global Hawk Program:
Technology Maturity:
Critical technologies on the RQ-4B are mature or approaching maturity.
This includes the advanced signals intelligence and improved radar
sensors, two key capabilities that are critical for developing and
acquiring the larger aircraft. Representative prototypes of both
sensors are in flight tests on surrogate aircraft. However, critical
imaging sensors are not yet fully mature.
Design Stability:
The RQ-4B basic airframe design is now stable with all its engineering
drawings released. During the first year of production, however,
frequent and substantive engineering changes increased development and
airframe costs and delayed delivery and testing schedules. Differences
between the two aircraft models were much more extensive and complex
than anticipated.
Production Maturity:
The contractor has built all seven RQ-4A aircraft and production
efforts are now focused on the larger, more advanced RQ-4B aircraft.
The first block of RQ-4B's (six aircraft, which do not include the
advanced radar or signal intelligence capabilities) have all been
produced. The program office is collecting statistical process control
data for several of its critical manufacturing processes, and many of
these are in control. Other performance indicators, such as defects and
rework rates, are also being used to monitor quality.
The first RQ-4B aircraft completed production in August 2006 and had
its first flight in March 2007. This aircraft is more than 1 year
behind schedule. The first flight had been delayed, in part, due to
problems identified during testing. Developmental testing is ongoing
but has proceeded slowly. Continued test delays may affect efforts to
further mature production processes. Performance and flight issues
identified during tests could result in design changes, revised
production processes, and rework. Operational tests to verify that the
basic RQ-4B design works as intended are planned to be completed in
February 2009, a delay of more than 2 years. By that time the Air Force
expects to have bought about one-half of the total quantities.
Schedules for integrating, testing, and fielding the new advanced
sensors have had delays, raising risks that these capabilities may not
meet the warfigther's requirements.
An operational assessment was completed in March 2007 on the RQ-4A,
over 2 years later than originally estimated. Performance problems were
identified in communications, imagery processing, and engines. These
issues have not yet been completely resolved.
Other Program Issues:
We have previously reported significant cost, schedule, and performance
problems for the Global Hawk program. Soon after its March 2001 start,
DOD restructured the program from a low-risk incremental approach to a
high-risk, highly concurrent strategy. Specifically, the restructuring
aimed to develop and acquire the larger RQ-4B aircraft with advanced
but immature technologies on an accelerated production schedule. The
program has been rebaselined three times, and aircraft unit costs have
more than doubled since program start. Significant cost increases
between 2002 and 2005 culminated in a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of
the critical cost growth threshold, which led to certification to
Congress. The program still faces risks, as the most advanced aircraft
variant will not be fully tested until mid-fiscal year 2010. By this
point, the program plans to have purchased over 60 percent of the total
aircraft quantity. Also, software and subcontractor management continue
to be risk areas for the program.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on an assessment draft, the Air Force stated that the
Global Hawk program made progress in the last year and continues to
execute what it calls a challenging acquisition program. Three deployed
RQ-4A aircraft supported military operations, amassing 5,700 combat
hours in 2007. Two advanced technology sensors, which were once a
technology maturity concern, are being successfully tested on surrogate
aircraft: a risk management initiative. The RQ-4B aircraft entered a
rigorous development test phase. The methodical collection of test data
paces this testing, not the test schedule. Integration of the two
advanced technology sensors into the RQ-4B aircraft is beginning or in
planning. Current program challenges include: software production, RQ-
4B (Block 20) testing, and normalization of sustainment and operations.
[End of section]
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD).
Source: Department of Defense.
[End of figure]
MDA's GMD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks to defend against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks
during the midcourse phase of the missile's flight. GMD is an
integrated system consisting of radars, an interceptor (a booster and
an exoatmospheric kill vehicle) and a fire control system that
formulates battle plans and directs components. We assessed the
maturity of technologies critical to the Block 2006 GMD element, but we
assessed design and production maturity for the interceptor only.
Timeline: Technology/system development to Initial capability:
Program start: (2/96);
Directive to field initial capability: (12/02);
Integrated design review: (3/03);
Initial capability: (8/04);
Block 2006 start: (1/06);
1st end-to-end test: (9/06);
Block 2006 completion: (12/07);
GAO review: (1/08).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $10,422.4 million;
* Procurement: NA;
Total funding: $10,422.4 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: $37,334.2;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: 0;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: $37,334.2;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include known costs and quantities from the program's inception
through fiscal year 2013.
[End of table]
Block 2006 enhances GMD's Block 2004 design by adding two new
technologies that are expected to improve the performance of the
interceptor. All Block 2004 technologies are mature, but the Block 2006
technologies have not been demonstrated in an operational environment.
MDA has released all drawings related to the Block 2004 interceptor to
manufacturing and has emplaced 24 interceptors for operational use.
However, technical problems with the 2004 design and efforts to mature
new technologies may lead to design changes. Although MDA is producing
hardware for operational use, it has not made a formal production
decision, and we could not assess the stability of production processes
because the program is not collecting statistical data.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
GMD Program:
Technology Maturity:
All nine Block 2004 technologies are mature. Block 2006 adds two new
technologies--an upgraded infrared seeker and onboard discrimination--
to the interceptor's exoatmospheric kill vehicle. These two
technologies are approaching maturity but have not yet been
demonstrated in an operational environment. The GMD program expects to
integrate these technologies into the interceptor's design and field
the enhanced interceptor in 2008.
One critical technology was removed since last year's assessment.
Lockheed Martin's Boost Vehicle Plus program, including its guidance
navigation and control subsystem, was canceled in 2006 because of
fiscal constraints and the program's success with the Orbital Booster
Vehicle.
Design Stability:
The design of the Block 2004 ground-based interceptor appears stable,
with 100 percent of its drawings released to manufacturing. However,
the number of drawings may increase if ongoing tests of the Block 2004
interceptor identify needed design changes. Additionally, the design of
the Block 2006 configuration is incomplete, as the program is still
maturing the kill vehicle's infrared seeker and onboard discrimination.
Production Maturity:
Officials do not plan to make an official production decision, and the
program intends to keep production quantities low. Because production
quantities are small, the program does not collect statistical control
data, and we could not assess the maturity of the production processes.
Instead, the GMD program measures production capability and maturity
with a monthly evaluation process called a manufacturing capability
assessment that evaluates critical manufacturing indicators for
readiness and execution.
Other Program Issues:
GMD's flight test program continues to experience delays. GMD planned
three flight tests in 2007, including two intercept attempts and one
radar characterization test. The program successfully accomplished one
intercept attempt and the radar characterization flight. The first
intercept attempt was originally declared a "no test" when the target
malfunctioned. To make-up for the no test, the program held another
test with the same objectives. This test was successfully completed in
September 2007.
Quality control procedures have allowed less reliable or inappropriate
parts to be incorporated into the manufacture of the booster and the
kill vehicle. The program has corrected some reliability problems by
incorporating new parts into the manufacturing line. However, numerous
emplaced interceptors include unproven parts because they were
manufactured before the improved parts were introduced into the
production line. The program expects to remedy this problem by
retrofitting the emplaced interceptors, but this is not scheduled to
begin until fiscal year 2008.
As reported in our last assessment, we estimate that at the contract's
completion, the GMD prime contractor, Boeing, could experience a cost
overrun between $1.0 billion and $1.4 billion. As of September 2007,
the GMD program was overrunning its fiscal year 2007 cost budget by $22
million.
Agency Comments:
MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated where
appropriate.
[End of section]
H-1 Upgrades:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: H-1:
Source: Bell Helicopter, © 2007 Bell Helicopter.
[End of figure]
The Navy's H-1 Upgrades Program converts the AH-1W attack helicopter
and the UH-1N utility helicopter to the AH-1Z and UH-1Y configurations,
respectively. The mission of the AH-1Z attack helicopter is to provide
rotary wing fire support and reconnaissance capabilities in day/night
and adverse weather conditions. The mission of the UH-1Y utility
helicopter is to provide command, control, and assault support under
the same conditions.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: (10/96);
Design review: (9/98):
GAO review: (1/08);
Production decision: (7/08);
Initial capability UH-1Y: (9/08);
Initial capability AH-1Z: (3/11).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Bell Helicopter Textron;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $21.7 million;
* Procurement: $5,282.1 million;
Total funding: $5,303.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 246.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/1996: $663.3;
Latest, 09/2007: $1,521.7;
Percent change: 129.4.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/1996: $2,780.8;
Latest, 09/2007: $6,734.9;
Percent change: 142.2.
Total program cost;
As of 10/1996: $3,444.1;
Latest, 09/2007: $8,256.7;
Percent change: 139.7.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/1996: $12.127;
Latest, 09/2007: $29.073;
Percent change: 139.7.
Total quantities;
As of 10/1996: 284;
Latest, 09/2007: 284;
Percent change: 0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/1996: 105;
Latest, 09/2007: 143;
Percent change: 36.2.
[End of table]
The H-1 Upgrades Program did not assess technology maturity at program
start, but faces challenges with key technologies, including the target
sight system and helmet-mounted sight display. The program office
reported that it currently has 2,611 AH-1Z drawings and 3,169 UH-1Y
drawings. The program does not track data for critical process control
in manufacturing, but utilizes postproduction quality metrics. The H-1
upgrades program was approved for Low-Rate Initial Production Lot 4 in
July 2007 and currently has 34 aircraft on contract. The program
reported that three AH-1Z and five UH-1Y have been delivered to date.
The program is currently undergoing its fourth major restructuring,
which has delayed the expected full-rate production decision by 18
months, now expected for July 2008.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
H-1 Upgrades Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials reported that technologies and related maturity were
not assessed at program start, but that all technologies are currently
considered mature.
Design Stability:
The program reported there are currently 2,611 AH-1Z drawings, 475 of
which are legacy, and 3,169 UH-1Y drawings, 765 of which are legacy.
Production Maturity:
Program officials reported they do not collect critical process control
data. However, postproduction quality metrics and engineering change
metrics are used to assess product maturity.
A recent operational test report identified performance issues with key
technologies that will need to be resolved prior to initial operational
capability. For example, the program's target sight system continues to
experience a high failure rate, which could affect the AH-1Z's
readiness for fielding. Further, flight restrictions are in effect for
both the AH-1Z and UH-1Y during operational test and evaluation due to
the poor performance of the helmet-mounted sight displays (HMSD), a key
weapon system upgrade. The visual sharpness of the HMSD does not
support shipboard landings at night, depth perception cues are
misleading, and HMSD components are not reliable. The program reported
designed improvements are currently being tested to address these
challenges. Upon implementation of these improvements, the aircraft
will go through a second phase of operational evaluation. However, if
deficiencies in the HMSD are not corrected, or if the upgrade is not
delivered on time, initial operational capability cannot be supported
for the UH-1Y.
The program was approved for Low-Rate Initial Production Lot 4 in July
2007. To date, the program has 34 aircraft on contract, consisting of
eight AH-1Z and 26 UH-1Y. Program officials reported that the third AH-
1Z and fifth UH-1Y were delivered in October and November 2007,
respectively.
Other Program Issues:
In an effort to minimize the time aircraft are out of service for
remanufacturing, the UH-1Y acquisition strategy was adjusted to a new
build airframe in fiscal year 2006. Additionally, the program office is
using fiscal year 2007 funding for preliminary engineering for new AH-
1Z airframes. The program has experienced significant delays and cost
growth in the manufacturing of initial production aircraft, leading to
140 percent cost growth and 36 percent schedule growth. The cost growth
experienced by the program is due primarily to revised estimates for
labor, material, and tooling based on manufacturing performance data
from development and initial production aircraft. The program reported
that requirements changes in previous years have also contributed to
cost growth.
In May 2006, the Navy initiated the program's fourth major
restructuring effort, resulting in an approximate 18-month delay in the
full-rate production decision (now expected for July 2008), a reduction
in production quantities from 47 to 38 in fiscal years 2006 to 2008,
and the extension of low-rate production. At the same time, the
contractor has failed to meet the commitments of an increased
production rate. Program officials stated that the prime contractor's
delivery schedule is a key risk that could affect the UH-1Y initial
operational capability. The prime contractor has experienced challenges
with supply chain management, manufacturing standards, and built-in
quality, affecting program schedule and resulting in aggressive
training timelines with little margin. If the planned September 2008
initial operational capability is not met, the program may face an
acquisition program baseline breach and risk undergoing a fifth
restructuring. Additionally, the contractor's earned value management
system was decertified. The program expects recertification during
spring 2008.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM).
Source: JASSM Program Office.
[End of figure]
JASSM is a long-range Air Force air-to-ground precision missile that is
able to strike targets from a variety of aircraft, including the B-1, B-
2, and F-16. The Air Force plans for the JASSM Extended Range (ER)
variant to add greater range capability to the baseline missile.
According to the program office, the baseline JASSM and the ER variant
share approximately 70 percent commonality in components. We assessed
both variants.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (6/96);
Development start: (11/98);
Low-rate decision: (12/01);
Initial capability: (9/03);
Full-rate decision: (7/04);
GAO review: (1/08);
Last procurement: (2020).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Eglin AFB, Fla.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $138.1 million;
* Procurement: $3,375.3 million;
Total funding: $3,513.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 3,958.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/1998: $970.1;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,407.3;
Percent change: 45.1.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/1998: $1,207.9;
Latest, 08/2007: $3,998.5;
Percent change: 231.0.
Total program cost;
As of 11/1998: $2,200.9;
Latest, 08/2007: $5,670.1;
Percent change: 157.6.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/1998: $0.891;
Latest, 08/2007: $1.133;
Percent change: 27.1.
Total quantities;
As of 11/1998: 2,469;
Latest, 08/2007: 5,006;
Percent change: 102.9.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/1998: 75;
Latest, 08/2007: 87;
Percent change: 16.0.
[End of table]
The baseline JASSM entered production in 2001. Both variants have the
same three critical technologies, and the program office indicates that
all three are mature. However, the JASSM design is still not stable. In
test flights during April and May 2007, the program experienced four of
four test failures, producing an overall missile reliability rate of
less than 60 percent. The program office has planned reliability
improvements, and it expects to demonstrate those in ground and flight
tests during the December 2007 through March 2008 time frame. No
additional procurement will occur until the reliability improvements
have been demonstrated. The program also experienced a Nunn-McCurdy
unit cost breach of the critical cost growth threshold that may require
a certification by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JASSM Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JASSM program identified the same three critical technologies for
both variants--composite materials, global positioning system anti-
spoofing receiver module, and stealth/signature reduction--and
indicated all three are mature.
Design Stability:
Test results show that the JASSM design is not stable. The program
office is not acquiring drawings because the contractor has Total
System Performance Responsibility wherein, according to program
officials, the contractor guarantees the missile performance.
In test flights during April and May 2007, the program experienced four
of four test failures, producing an overall missile reliability rate of
less than 60 percent. Of the four test failures, three were related to
the global-positioning system and one was a repeat of a previously-
experienced fuze failure.
The program office has developed a plan to solve the reliability
problems by: (1) implementing a software change to the GPS receiver,
(2) correcting a design flaw by moving a cable associated with the
weapon's anti-spoofing capability farther away from the engine, and (3)
reworking the software code for a key data processor.
The program office plans a minimum of nine ground tests in late 2007
and early 2008 as well as a 16-shot test-flight program in the February
through mid-March 2008 time frame. These tests are expected to verify
the planned improvements to JASSM's reliability. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will evaluate the
test results.
Production Maturity:
Production maturity could not be assessed because the program does not
collect production process control data. The program office stated that
the contractor collects limited production process control data from
its vendors, but it does not formally report the data to the Government
under JASSM's contract terms. However, program office personnel review
production control data during monthly program management reviews.
Additionally, program officials believe that none of the manufacturing
processes that affect critical system characteristics are a problem,
although there are key production processes that have cost
implications, such as the bonding for various subassemblies within the
missile body.
Other Program Issues:
Following the test failures, the Air Force officially halted
procurement of JASSM missiles in July 2007. Of the 942 missiles
currently on contract (Lots 1-6) from the total planned buy of 4,900
baseline and ER variants, 611 have been delivered. According to program
officials, if the planned tests validate JASSM's reliability, the Air
Force expects to restart procurement by renegotiating the Lot 7 buy.
The program has also experienced a cost increase of over 60 percent.
This cost increase resulted in a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the
critical cost growth threshold. The primary drivers for the cost breach
were the addition of 2,500 of the more expensive Extended Range variant
(increasing total missile quantity from 2,400 to 4,900) and a
reliability improvement program. As a result, even if JASSM performs
successfully in its ground and flight tests, the program cannot
continue unless the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics certifies that it is essential to national
security, no feasible alternatives exist, cost estimates are
reasonable, and the program's management structure is adequate. The
Under Secretary has delayed certification pending the test results.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force reiterated
that JASSM remains in the Nunn-McCurdy certification process. The Air
Force added that previous independent reviews found reliability issues
primarily driven by supplier quality control problems. It was further
stated that significant progress has been made towards the resolution
of the GPS issue and once corrective actions are validated and verified
through continued testing they will be incorporated into additional
JASSM test missiles. The Air Force also provided technical comments
which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Cargo Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Joint Cargo Aircraft.
Source: C-27J Spartan www.c-27j.com, ©2006 C-27J Team.
[End of figure]
Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is a joint acquisition by the Army and the
Air Force for a medium lift, fixed-wing aircraft which will move
mission-critical and time-sensitive cargo to tactical units in remote
and austere locations. The six JCA missions are (1) critical resupply,
(2) casualty evacuation, (3) air drop (personnel/supplies), (4) aerial
sustainment, (5) troop transport, and (6) homeland security. This is a
fully-developed commercial-off-the-shelf aircraft that is currently
being delivered to multiple military customers worldwide.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Low-rate decision: (5/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Initial capability: (2/10);
Full-rate decision: (3/10).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: L-3 Communications;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $98.7 million;
* Procurement: $3,590.7 million;
Total funding: $3,689.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 76.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $113.9;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $3,669.5;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $3,783.1;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $48.502;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 78;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 32;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
Costs reflect Army's and Air Force's dollars through fiscal year 2013.
Total program cost beyond fiscal year 2013 is to be determined.
The JCA is a commercial off-the-shelf procurement. No developmental
efforts are planned, and the system's technology and design are mature.
Production maturity is high since this aircraft is currently in use
commercially. On June 13, 2007, the Army awarded a $2.04 billion
contract with L-3 Communications for an initial quantity of 78 aircraft
by 2013, along with training and support. The delivery date for the
first aircraft is September 2008. The system is scheduled to undergo
initial operational test and evaluation from September to November 2009
and its initial operational capability is planned for February 2010.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JCA Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JCA is an off-the-shelf procurement of a fully developed commercial
aircraft that is currently produced and delivered to multiple military
customers worldwide. As such, the JCA program office states that the
system's technologies are mature. The Army submitted a technology
readiness assessment for JCA in support of program entry at Milestone
C. This assessment concluded that nondevelopmental capabilities
presently embodied in both military and commercially available aircraft
are sufficient to meet the JCA mission requirements without further
technology development. The assessment also determined that there are
no technology elements associated with the JCA's performance,
manufacturing process, material, or tooling/manufacturing
infrastructure that are new or novel or are being used in a new or
novel way. The Office of the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering concurred with this conclusion in a memorandum on May 30,
2007, and noted that the aircraft has been demonstrated in a relevant
environment. It was also noted that if any future technology insertions
are included in the JCA program, a technology certification should be
revisited for those technologies.
Design Stability:
We did not assess the JCA's design stability because program officials
said that the design of the JCA is stable, since the aircraft is
already a fully developed commercial aircraft.
Production Maturity:
Program officials state that the production maturity is at a high level
because the aircraft is commercially available, and production lines
are already established. The delivery date for the first aircraft to
the JCA program is September 2008. The system will undergo initial
operational tests from September to November 2009 and be fielded
shortly thereafter, in February 2010.
Other Program Issues:
The Army awarded a low-rate initial production contract for 13 aircraft
on June 13, 2007, with full-rate production decision scheduled for
March 2010. A bid protest that was filed shortly after the contract
award was resolved, but program officials stated that this had a 3
month impact on the JCA's schedule.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration of Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) logo.
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) is a cooperative Army and Navy
effort to acquire a high-speed, shallow-draft vessel capable of
operating without existing ports for rapid intratheater transport of
personnel and cargo. The program awarded three preliminary design
contracts in January 2008 and intends to award a detailed design and
construction contract in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008. The
program expects to mature its design as it approaches construction,
currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (4/06);
Preliminary design contract award: (1/08);
GAO review: (1/08);
Design review: (TBD);
Production decision: (8/08);
Detailed design start: (9/08);
Construction start: (9/09);
Last ship delivery: (2015).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $58.0 million;
* Procurement: $1,421.0 million;
Total funding: $1,479.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 8.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $112.0;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,421.0;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,533.0;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $191.625;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 8;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
In 2007, DOD and the Navy determined that the JHSV program had no
critical technologies because all of the technologies have been
previously demonstrated on ships leased by DOD. However, a number of
existing designs and technologies, such as at-sea tension refueling,
hull design, the fire suppression system, and the engines, may need to
be modified to support additional performance requirements. These
performance requirements may be amended if the associated technologies
do not mature on time. The JHSV is designated as part of the Capital
Budget Account (CBA), a DOD pilot program designed to keep shipbuilding
programs on budget.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JHSV Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JHSV program intends to modify existing commercial fast ferry
technologies and designs in order to produce a ship that meets its key
performance parameters. According to the program office, the three most
important key performance parameters are payload, speed, and un-
refueled range. The ship design will include a helicopter flight deck
and a ramp capable of supporting an Abrams main battle tank.
According to the program office, all of the ship's key performance
parameters have been demonstrated on ships leased by the government and
used in military operations. On the basis of the results of these
operations, program officials estimate that there is only a low risk
that a new high-speed vessel derived from commercial designs would fail
to meet JHSV key performance parameters.
In addition to the key performance parameters, other requirements have
been established for the ship. These additional requirements may
require the use of existing technologies that have not been proven on
similar vessels and are in development in other programs. For example,
one requirement is the installation of a fire suppression system that
uses high-expansion foam. While high-expansion foam fire suppression
systems are in use, they have never been used in an open cargo bay of a
moving ship. There is also a requirement for at-sea tensioned
refueling, a technology that has not been demonstrated on lightweight
vessels that rely on waterjet propulsion. This technology is scheduled
for testing on the Littoral Combat Ship. Another JHSV requirement
includes engine reliability specifications that have not been
demonstrated by existing commercial engines. JHSV may be able to
leverage other shipbuilding programs, such as the Littoral Combat Ship,
that are currently testing engines with similar requirements. According
to program officials the additional requirements for JHSV can be
amended or removed from the ship if associated technologies do not
mature on time or fail to meet basic performance specifications.
Design Stability:
The program is pursuing a phased approach to designing the ship. In
phase I the program office selected three contractors to develop
competing preliminary designs based on JHSV requirements. The contracts
for preliminary design were awarded in January 2008. In phase II the
program office will select a single contractor and award a contract for
detailed design and construction sometime in the summer of 2008. Follow-
on ships will be modified versions of this contractor's design.
Modifications to existing commercial designs may be necessary to meet
JHSV specifications. For example, existing high-speed structural
designs may not be adequate to meet the required open ocean transit
capability. The program office believes that all of the key performance
parameters have been sufficiently demonstrated on the four leased ships
and that any necessary modifications are not significant.
Other Program Issues:
The Office of the Secretary of Defense designated the JHSV program for
the CBA. CBA is a program that establishes metrics used to measure a
program's progress against an established budget. According to
officials, the metrics against which the JHSV program will be measured
have not yet been established. Even when established, CBA metrics will
not be applied to the program until after the program enters
development-currently planned for August 2008-when the program's budget
and requirements will be set.
Agency Comments:
The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted
Sensor System (JLENS).
Source: JLENS Product Office.
[End of figure]
The Army's JLENS is designed to provide over-the-horizon detection and
tracking of land attack cruise missiles and other targets. The Army is
developing JLENS in two spirals. Spiral 1 is complete and served as a
test bed to demonstrate initial capability. Spiral 2 will utilize two
aerostats with advanced sensors for surveillance and tracking as well
as mobile mooring stations, communication payloads, and processing
stations. JLENS provides surveillance and engagement support to other
systems, such as PAC-3 and MEADS. We assessed Spiral 2.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
GAO review: (1/08);
Design review: (2/09);
Low-rate decision: (3/11);
Full-rate decision: (6/13);
Initial capability: (9/13);
Development start: (8/05);
Last procurement: (2019).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,586.5 million;
* Procurement: $4,411.1 million;
Total funding: $6,070.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 14.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2005: $1,904.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $1,932.9;
Percent change: 1.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2005: $4,357.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $4,411.1;
Percent change: 1.2
Total program cost;
As of 08/2005: $6,330.5;
Latest, 12/2006: $6,416.8;
Percent change: 1.4.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2005: $395.655;
Latest, 12/2006: $401.052;
Percent change: 1.4.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2005: 16;
Latest, 12/2006: 16;
Percent change: 0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2005: 97;
Latest, 12/2006: 97;
Percent change: 0.
[End of table]
The program began development in August 2005 with one of its five
critical technologies mature. The program has reduced the number of
technologies from five to four, and of those, one is approaching
maturity, while three are not yet mature. All technologies are expected
to be mature in late 2010. Although the program plans to release nearly
90 percent of engineering drawings by the design review in February
2009, risks for redesign remain until technologies demonstrate full
maturity. The synchronization of JLENS development with the Army's
effort to integrate its air and missile defense systems also poses a
risk to the program's schedule.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JLENS Program:
Technology Maturity:
JLENS entered system development in August 2005 with only one of its
five critical technologies mature. Since that time, the program has
combined the communications payload and the processing station into the
communications processing group. The communications processing group,
which includes radios and fiber optic equipment and also serves as the
JLENS operations center, is approaching full maturity. Both sensors--
the fire control radar and the surveillance radar--along with the
platform, have not yet reached maturity. The program expects to
demonstrate these technologies by late 2010.
According to program officials, JLENS development predominately
requires integration of existing technologies, and therefore all have
been demonstrated as mature. However, components of the JLENS platform
and the two sensors will require modification to their form and fit
before demonstration in the JLENS operational environment.
While many of the JLENS sensor technologies have legacy components, key
hardware that proves functionality, such as the surveillance radar's
element measurement system that provides data for signal processing,
have yet to be demonstrated in the size and weight needed for
integration on the aerostat. Tests to characterize and integrate fire
control radar and surveillance radar components are currently being
conducted in the program's system integration laboratory. Furthermore,
sensor software items related to signal processing, timing, and
control, as well as element measurement, are not yet mature.
Design Stability:
The program estimates that 88 percent of its 17,000 drawings will be
released by the design review in February 2009. The program will hold a
number of preliminary design reviews and subsystem design reviews over
the next year in preparation for this event. However, until the
maturity of the JLEN'S critical technologies has been demonstrated, the
potential for design changes remains.
The platform consists of the aerostat, mobile mooring station, power
and fiber optic data transfer tethers, and ground support equipment.
The mobile mooring station--used to anchor the aerostat during
operations--is the least defined component of the JLENS system and is
based on a fixed mooring station design. The program has yet to
demonstrate the mobility of the mooring station, as the design
parameters associated with modifying it from a fixed to a mobile asset
have not yet been identified. Consequently, the weight of the mobile
mooring station may affect its ability to meet transportability
requirements.
Other Program Issues:
JLENS will be a crucial part of the Army's Integrated Air and Missile
Defense (IAMD) program expected to start development in fiscal year
2009. IAMD will develop a standard set of interfaces between systems
such as JLENS and other sensors, weapons, and the battle management,
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
components to provide a common air picture. According to program
officials, the impact of synchronizing the IAMD schedule with JLENS
development and test schedule is currently unknown.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army concurred with
the information provided in this report.
[End of section]
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Source: JSF Program Office.
[End of figure]
The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy
strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S.
allies, with maximum commonality to minimize costs. The carrier-
suitable variant will complement the Navy's F/A-18 E/F. The
conventional takeoff and landing variant will primarily be an air-to-
ground replacement for the Air Force's F-16 and the A-10 aircraft, and
will complement the F-22A. The short takeoff and vertical landing
variant will replace the Marine Corps' F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (11/96);
Development start: (10/01);
Design review: (6/07);
Low-rate decision: (6/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Initial capability, USMC: (3/12);
Initial capability, USAF: (3/13);
Initial capability, Navy: (3/15);
Last procurement: (2034).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $13,976.3 million;
* Procurement: $192,764.7 million;
Total funding: $207,178.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 2,441.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/2001: $37,015.8;
Latest, 12/2006: $45,826.0;
Percent change: 23.8.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/2001: $164,221.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $193,652.1;
Percent change: 17.9.
Total program cost;
As of 10/2001: $202,956.7;
Latest, 12/2006: $239,974.3;
Percent change: 18.2.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/2001: $70.815;
Latest, 12/2006: $97.630;
Percent change: 37.9.
Total quantities;
As of 10/2001: 2,866;
Latest, 12/2006: 2,458;
Percent change: -14.2.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/2001: 175;
Latest, 12/2006: 196;
Percent change: 12.0.
[End of table]
Cycle time calculations are based on the Air Force's initial capability
because they represent over 70 percent of the procurement quantities.
Two of the eight JSF critical technologies are mature, three are
nearing maturity, and three (mission systems integration, prognostics
and health management, and manufacturing technologies) are still
immature 6 years past the start of development. None of the variants
demonstrated design stability at their design review, though two have
now met the standard. The program collects data to manage manufacturing
maturity, but currently unproven processes and a lack of flight testing
could mean costly future changes to design and manufacturing processes.
Program costs have continued to increase and the schedule has slipped
since the 2004 rebaseline. Very little flight testing has occurred to
date and the first fully integrated aircraft will not begin flight
testing for at least 4 years. In 2007 DOD cut the number of test
aircraft and flight test hours to maintain cost and schedule plans.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JSF Program:
Technology Maturity:
Two of the JSF's eight critical technologies are fully mature and three
are approaching maturity, but three (mission systems integration,
prognostics and health management, and manufacturing technologies) are
immature despite being past the design review. Maturing critical
technologies during development has led to cost growth, with the
electric-hydraulic actuation and power thermal management systems costs
increasing by 195 and 93 percent respectively since 2003.
Design Stability:
As of August 2007, the contractor said it had released 99 percent of
planned engineering drawings for the short takeoff and vertical landing
variant, 91 percent for the conventional takeoff and landing variant,
and 46 percent for the carrier variant. All three variants fell
significantly short of meeting the best practices standard of 90
percent of drawings released by the critical design reviews--46 percent
for the short takeoff and landing variant, 43 percent for the carrier
variant, and 3 percent for the conventional takeoff and landing
variant. The late release of drawings led to late parts deliveries,
delaying the program schedule and forcing inefficient manufacturing
processes. The program began production before delivering an aircraft
representing the expected design.
Production Maturity:
The program is collecting information on production maturity and
reports that about 10 percent of its critical manufacturing processes
are in statistical control. While we credit the program for collecting
this information, efforts to mature production are constrained because
the designs are not fully proven and tested, and manufacturing
processes are not demonstrated. The first test aircraft completed
needed 35 percent more labor hours than planned, and follow-on aircraft
are not meeting a revised schedule put in place in 2007. Because of
parts shortages and schedule delays, the test aircraft are being built
differently from the process expected for the production aircraft.
Flight testing, began in late 2006, is still in its infancy, with only
19 of some 5,500 planned flights completed as of November 2007. A fully
integrated, capable aircraft is not expected to enter flight testing
until 2012, increasing risks that problems found may require design and
production changes, as well as retrofit expenses for aircraft already
built.
Other Program Issues:
Since the program rebaseline in fiscal year 2004, estimated acquisition
costs have increased by about $55 billion (then-year dollars).
Estimated procurement costs rose due to greater material costs, labor
costs, and labor hours, a 7-year extension of the procurement schedule
from fiscal year 2027 to 2034, and a reduction in annual production
rates. Development costs since the rebaseline have been stable largely
because the program removed about $2.8 billion for risk reduction and
an alternate engine program. The program recently restructured
development efforts to meet schedule and budget requirements. DOD cut
the number of flight test aircraft and flight test sorties, putting
greater reliance on the remaining flight test aircraft as well as
ground tests to free up funds to replace dwindling management reserves.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials
challenged its balance, use of best practices, and depiction of program
status. They noted the first aircraft is in flight test, includes all
major subsystems, and along with other aircraft in work is showing
unprecedented assembly fit and quality improvements with each aircraft.
They stated the flying test bed is flying mission systems software and
reducing risk prior to their first flight on a JSF in early 2009, and
all mission systems are maturing as planned. The final software block
enters testing in 2011, and later blocks mainly incorporate sensor and
weapons updates after lab testing. Officials asserted that data on
design maturity and drawing release at critical design reviews are not
accurately presented, saying drawing changes are very low compared to
legacy systems. They said their plan for spiral blocks of capability
balances cost, schedule and risk, while GAO's approach would increase
costs by billions and delay delivery of capability to warfighters.
GAO Response:
JSF cost increases and schedule delays are indicative of a program that
consistently proceeds through critical junctures with knowledge gaps
that expose the program to significant risks. The new plan to cut test
assets and test activities is another example of adding risk.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS
AMF):
[See PDF for image]
Photographs: Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-
Station (JTRS AMF).
Source: JTRS JPEO.
[End of figure]
The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across
the services. Program/product offices develop hardware and software for
users with similar requirements. The AMF program will develop radios
and associated equipment for integration into nearly 100 different
types of aircraft, ships, and fixed stations for all the services.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Pre-SDD competitive contract award: (9/04);
GAO review: (1/08);
Development start: (TBD);
Design readiness: review: (3/09);
Production decision: (9/11).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD;
Program office: Hanscom AFB, Mass.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,478.0 million;
* Procurement: TBD;
Total funding: TBD;
Procurement quantity: TBD.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of: NA: NA;
Latest, 12/2007: $1,850.71;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of: NA: NA;
Latest, 12/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of: NA: NA;
Latest, 12/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of: NA: NA;
Latest, 12/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of: NA: NA;
Latest, 12/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of: NA: NA;
Latest, 12/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The JTRS AMF program has taken steps to mature technologies prior to
the start of system development, scheduled for early 2008. A presystem
development phase started in 2004 with the award of competitive system
design contracts to two industry teams. During 2006 and 2007, an
independent technology readiness assessment found that all critical
technologies had been demonstrated in a relevant environment and were
approaching full maturity. However, there are concerns about four
critical technologies needed by JTRS AMF; the program is dependent on
another JTRS domain for the development of those technologies. In
addition, JTRS AMF may experience cost, schedule, or performance
problems if other related program capabilities are delivered late.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JTRS AMF Program:
Technology Maturity:
To help mitigate technical risks and address key integration
challenges, the JTRS AMF program awarded competitive predevelopment
contracts to two industry teams led by Boeing and Lockheed Martin. In
early 2008, after a full and open competition, a contracting team is
expected to be selected for the JTRS AMF system development.
During 2006 and 2007, an independent technology readiness assessment
was completed by the Army in support of the start of system
development. This assessment found that all critical technologies have
been demonstrated in a relevant environment. An independent review team
representing the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and
Technology concurred with that assessment. As a result, the JTRS AMF
program is expected to enter system development with all critical
technologies approaching full maturity.
While noting the maturity of the JTRS AMF technologies, the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology also expressed
concern about four critical technologies on which JTRS AMF is
dependent, including waveforms and network management services. These
technologies are being developed by the JTRS Network Enterprise Domain-
-a separate domain under the Joint Program Executive Office. To address
the concern, the Deputy Under Secretary recommended that the Joint
Program Executive Office conduct an independent technical assessment of
the Network Enterprise Domain's waveforms, networking, and network
management approaches. In addition, the Deputy Under Secretary
recommended that a technology readiness assessment be conducted on the
networking and Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) waveforms, as well
as network management software, to show that they are mature before
being inserted into the JTRS AMF program.
Other Program Issues:
Differences among the program's estimated costs and approved budget
were resolved at the November 2007 JTRS Board of Directors meeting. The
effort to reach a joint consensus caused a delay in the program
schedule but resulted in a full funding decision for system
development. However, production funding and quantities have not yet
been finalized.
The disparity between the cost estimates and approved budget was
attributable to a number of factors. For example, program office cost
estimates were influenced by assumptions about the number of JTRS AMF
variants and waveforms, the number of engineering development models,
test costs, and contract costs for award fees and engineering change
orders. The Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimate was derived, in
part, from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter communication, navigation and
identification friend or foe cost history and cost performance reports.
The approved budget included the effects of prior congressional
adjustments and reductions to the overall JTRS budget, the overall
restructuring of the JTRS program, and transfers to the Multifunctional
Information Distribution System part of the JTRS program. Exacerbating
the concerns about the difference between cost and budget was that
estimates of overall program risk for the JTRS AMF program ranged from
moderate to high.
The restructuring of the JTRS program has resulted in an Increment 1
requirement for JTRS AMF to develop (1) a small radio variant for
airborne platforms that will support the Wideband Networking Waveform,
the Soldier Radio Waveform, the NATO Link 16/Tactical Digital
Information Link J waveform, and the MUOS waveform and (2) a large
radio variant for ships and fixed stations that will support MUOS and
legacy UHF satellite communications. Currently, the JTRS AMF program
office assesses the delivery of the MUOS waveform to the program as
high risk. If the final development documentation and software for the
MUOS waveform are delivered late, then the design and development of
JTRS AMF will likely experience cost growth (estimated at $10 million
to 25 million), schedule delays (estimated at 4-7 months), and
performance problems (a significant loss of required functionality and/
or required operational performance).
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office provided technical comments which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR):
[See PDF for image]
Photographs: Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS
GMR).
Source: JTRS JPEO.
[End of figure]
The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with select radios and also increase communications and
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across
the services, while product offices are developing radio hardware and
software for users with similar requirements. The JTRS Ground Mobile
Radio (formerly Cluster 1) product office, within the JTRS Ground
Domain program office, is developing radios for ground vehicles.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: (6/02);
Design review: (12/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Low-rate decision: (7/10);
Full-rate decision: (12/11);
Initial capability: (12/11).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $588.6 million;
* Procurement: $13,895.6 million;
Total funding: $14,484.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 104,285.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 06/2002: $968.5;
Latest, 12/2006: $1,586.5;
Percent change: 63.8.
Procurement cost;
As of 06/2002: $15,576.6;
Latest, 12/2006: $13,897.2;
Percent change: -10.5.
Total program cost;
As of 06/2002: $16,545.0;
Latest, 12/2006: $15,483.7;
Percent change: -6.4.
Program unit cost;
As of 06/2002: $.153;
Latest, 12/2006: $.148;
Percent change: -2.7.
Total quantities;
As of 06/2002: 108,388;
Latest, 12/2006: 104,425;
Percent change: -3.3.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 06/2002: 55;
Latest, 12/2006: 114;
Percent change: 107.3.
Costs and quantities reflect the program of record. Both are expected
to change as part of the program's restructuring.
[End of table]
Twelve of JTRS GMR's 20 critical technologies are mature. While 5 other
technologies are approaching maturity, 3 are not expected to mature
until the production qualification test in early 2009. This includes 2
technologies--security architecture and the modem hardware and
software--that were recently downgraded because early prototypes did
not meet performance requirements. In addition, the program is still
working to obtain security certification from the National Security
Agency and has only demonstrated limited networking capabilities. The
program reports a nearly stable design and expects to have fully
functioning prototypes in early fiscal year 2009. The program's
restructuring received final approval by the milestone decision
authority in November 2007.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JTRS GMR Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JTRS GMR program started system development in 2002 with none of
its 20 critical technologies mature by best practice standards or even
DOD policy. Currently, 12 critical technologies are mature, 5 are
approaching maturity, and 3 critical technologies--the bridging
retransmission software, modem hardware and software, and the security
architecture--are immature. The maturity of the modem hardware and
software and the security architecture was downgraded because early
prototypes did not meet performance requirements. The program expects
to demonstrate the maturity of all critical technologies during a
production qualification test scheduled for early 2009.
Developing multiple levels of security and obtaining security
certification from the National Security Agency continues to be a
challenge for JTRS GMR. Security challenges persist, in part because
waveform software is being developed while security requirements are
still evolving. Nonetheless, the program office said that it is on
track to obtain security certification in fiscal year 2010, as
scheduled, in time for its low-rate production decision later that
year.
A central feature of JTRS GMR's networking capabilities is the Wideband
Networking Waveform being developed under the JTRS Network Enterprise
Domain, a separate domain under the JTRS Joint Program Executive
Office. Progress has been made in developing the waveform but testing
and demonstrations on the JTRS GMR have been limited. The radio's
closing range and throughput performance have both exceeded
requirements in field tests. However, the tests were completed using a
network of only two to six nodes, and key networking functions have yet
to be demonstrated. Program office officials expect to demonstrate
progressively greater Wideband Networking Waveform functionality--
including mobile ad hoc networking, subnetting, and throughput tests--
in field experiments leading up to the Limited User Test scheduled to
begin in the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, when 35 nodes will be
tested. More extensive functionality will be demonstrated in the Multi-
Service Operational Test and Evaluation scheduled for early fiscal year
2012. This test is expected to include 60 nodes and may be augmented
with additional assets from the Future Combat Systems program. The
program is also in discussion with the testing community regarding the
possibility of using complex modeling to test up to 150 nodes.
Design Stability:
The program has released approximately 83 percent of its planned 1,575
drawings. According to the program office, most size, weight, and power
issues have been addressed, although the program is still working to
integrate the radios onto legacy platforms. The program has delivered
71 early prototypes to the Army's Future Combat Systems. While the
program expects to have fully functioning prototypes available in early
fiscal year 2009, the immature technologies related to the security
requirements raise concerns about the program's design stability.
Production Maturity:
The program expects that approximately 77 percent of its key
manufacturing processes will be in statistical control when the program
makes its low rate production decision in 2010. By not having all
processes in statistical control, there is a greater risk that the
radio will not be produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets.
Other Program Issues:
The JTRS program was restructured in 2006 due to significant cost and
schedule problems. While significant technical issues remain, the
restructuring appears to put the program in better position to succeed
by emphasizing an incremental, more moderate risk approach to
developing and fielding capabilities. The restructuring--including
program costs--received final approval by the Milestone Decision
Authority in late November 2007, and was completed with the report to
Congress on the significant Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breaches in late
January 2008.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office provided technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate.
[End of section]
JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS).
Source: JTRS JPEO.
[End of figure]
The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with select radios and increase communications and
networking capabilities. The JTRS HMS product office, within the JTRS
Ground Domain program office, is developing handheld, manpack, and
small form radios. The program includes two concurrent phases of
development. Phase I includes select small form variants, while Phase
II includes small form radios with enhanced security as well as
handheld and manpack variants. This report assesses both phases.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/development start: (4/04);
Design review: (3/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Low-rate decision, Phase I: (2/09);
Low-rate decision, Phase II: (4/10);
Full-rate decision, Phase I: (8/10);
Full-rate decision, Phase II: (10/11);
Initial capability, Phase II: (1/12).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems;
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $298.3 million;
* Procurement: $9,015.5 million;
Total funding: $9,313.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 328,514.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2004: $517.3;
Latest, 08/2007: $688.2;
Percent change: 33.0.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2004: $9,015.5;
Latest, 08/2007: $9,015.5;
Percent change: 0.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2004: $9,532.8;
Latest, 08/2007: $9,703.6;
Percent change: 1.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2004: $.029;
Latest, 08/2007: $.029;
Percent change: 1.9.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2004: 329,574;
Latest, 08/2007: 329,574;
Percent change: 0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2004: 85;
Latest, 08/2007: 93;
Percent change: 9.4.
Costs and quantities reflect the program of record. Both are expected
to change as part of the program's restructuring.
[End of table]
The critical technologies for JTRS HMS have undergone some changes as a
result of the program's 2006 restructuring. Currently, Phase I includes
two critical technologies, both of which are approaching maturity.
Critical technologies for Phase II have yet to be defined. Developing
multiple layers of communication security and obtaining National
Security Agency certification continues to be a challenge. In addition,
while the key networking waveform has been integrated onto JTRS HMS
radios in a static laboratory environment, program officials report
that it will take additional efforts to transition the waveform to a
realistic operational platform. Furthermore, achieving size, weight,
and heat dissipation requirements for the two-channel handheld radio
remains a significant challenge.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JTRS HMS Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JTRS HMS program started system development in 2004 with only one
of its six critical technologies mature. However, changes were made to
the program's acquisition approach and critical technologies as a
result of the program's restructuring in 2006. The restructured program
currently includes two concurrent phases of development. Phase I
development intends to maximize the use of commercial off-the-shelf
components and products. As such, the program currently reports only
two critical technologies--logical partitioning and software power
management--for Phase I products. Both technologies are approaching
maturity and are expected to be fully mature to support the program's
low rate production decision in 2009.
Phase II development will encompass a customized design. Critical
technologies and associated technology maturity levels for Phase II
will be defined in a technology readiness assessment scheduled to begin
12 months prior to the Phase II low-rate production decision in-process
review currently scheduled for April 2010. The program expects that all
critical technologies for Phase II will mature sufficiently to begin
low-rate production deliveries by the second quarter of fiscal year
2011.
Developing multiple levels of communication security and obtaining
security certification from the National Security Agency is a challenge
for JTRS HMS. The security challenges persist, in part, because
waveform software is being developed while security requirements are
still evolving.
Developing the Operating Environment software and integrating it with
waveform software also remains a significant challenge. JTRS HMS radios
will operate the Soldier Radio Waveform, which is a low-power, short-
range networking waveform optimized for radios with severe size,
weight, and power constraints such as dismounted soldier radios and
small form radios. The waveform is being developed by the JTRS Network
Enterprise Domain, which is a separate domain under the JTRS Joint
Program Executive Office. The initial version of the Soldier Radio
Waveform has been successfully integrated into early prototypes. While
the waveform has demonstrated some functionality in a static laboratory
environment, program officials noted that it will take some effort to
transition the waveform to a realistic operational platform. In
particular, program officials are concerned about the waveform's
security architecture and how this may affect integrating it into a
JTRS radio. Given these concerns, the waveform's development schedule
may be ambitious.
Design Stability:
Program officials stated that there will be 527 drawings associated
with the program. Of that total, 121 are associated with Phase I and
406 with Phase II. To date, only 55 percent of the Phase I drawings
have been released to the manufacturer. The program expects the
remaining drawings to be released in the second quarter of fiscal year
2008. None of the Phase II drawings are expected to be released until
after the Phase II critical design review scheduled for the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2008. Achieving size, weight, and heat
dissipation requirements are still significant challenges on the two-
channel handheld radio, in part because of security requirements. The
program expects early prototypes of the 2-channel hand-held to be
available in early fiscal year 2008.
Other Program Issues:
The JTRS program was restructured in 2006 due to a number of high-risk
elements of the JTRS program. Despite the significant challenges that
remain, the restructuring appears to put the program in better position
to succeed by emphasizing an incremental, more moderate risk approach
to developing and fielding capabilities. The restructuring received
final approval by the milestone decision authority in late November
2007.
Agency Comments:
The JTRS Joint Program Executive Office provided technical comments,
which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
KC-X Program:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: KC-X.
Source: ASC/PAM.
Note: Photo is of the KC-135 Stratotanker, the aircraft the KC-X will
replace.
[End of figure]
The Air Force KC-X program is the first of three phases in the
recapitalization of the current KC-135 aerial refueling tanker fleet.
It is planned to provide sustained aerial refueling capability to
facilitate global attack, air-bridge, deployment, sustainment, homeland
defense, theater support, specialized national defense missions, as
well as airlift capabilities for passenger and palletized cargo
deployment. The current KC-X acquisition strategy is to procure 179
commercial aircraft and modify them for military use.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
GAO review: (1/08);
Development start: (1/08-3/08);
Low-rate decision: (1/10-3/11);
Initial capability: (7/12-3/13).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD;
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,834.3 million;
* Procurement: $10,631.2 million;
Total funding: $12,465.5 million;
Procurement quantity: 48.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,941.7;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $10,631.2;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $12,572.9;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $241.787;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 52;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 69;
Percent change: NA.
Cost and quantity data are budgeted amounts for fiscal year 2005
through fiscal year 2013. An additional $89.8 million remains available
in the Tanker Replacement Transfer Fund (TRTF).
[End of table]
Program officials state the KC-X program will enter system development
in fiscal year 2008 with mature or near-mature technologies. While the
candidate commercial airframes and engines are in wide use, with mature
manufacturing processes and established logistic chains, program
officials believe the systems integration effort required to meet
military requirements will be complex and technically challenging. The
program is the Air Force's highest acquisition priority, yet a
comprehensive business case analysis that fully considered life cycle
costs was not conducted in deciding its acquisition strategy. The
primary decision factor was budgetary--limited funds for system
development and a $3 billion ceiling on future annual procurements.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
KC-X Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials state that the KC-X program will enter system
development sometime in fiscal year 2008 with mature technologies or
technologies approaching maturity. However, actual maturity levels will
be dependent upon the aircraft design and source selected. Program
officials assess technical risks as medium, as they anticipate that
critical technologies will be at least in prototype form and
demonstrated in a relevant environment.
Design Stability:
Because the program has not begun system development, it has not yet
scheduled a critical design review. While the candidate commercial
airframes and engines are in wide use with mature manufacturing
processes and established logistic chains, program officials believe
that systems integration required to meet military requirements will be
very complex and technically challenging. The program acknowledges that
experiences from other programs, particularly avionics modernization
programs, confirm that systems integration and software developments
are inherently risky from cost, schedule, and performance standpoints.
We have also found this to be the case in our review of other programs.
Although new immature technologies are not likely to be applied to KC-
X solutions, it is envisioned that the technical integration of
existing avionics systems will drive significant software development
as part of the total development effort. While physical integration of
the KC-X hardware is not particularly challenging, it is the
electrical, antenna, and software integration that will require
significant effort.
Other Program Issues:
The KC-135 recapitalization is in the first of three expected phases--
KC-X, KC-Y, and KC-Z--which may involve the procurement of a total of
about 600 aircraft over about 40 years. The Air Force considers this
its highest acquisition priority, and the entire cost for
recapitalization could exceed $100 billion.
A March 2006 analysis of alternatives (AOA) formed the foundation for
much of the cost, schedule, and budgeting assumptions. An internal Air
Force estimate indicates the potential for higher development and
production costs for the KC-X program than estimated in the AOA.
Specifically, development costs could range from $2 billion to $4
billion. It is expected that final costs for the program will be
determined by both the program office and an Office of the Secretary of
Defense independent estimate prior to the beginning of system
development later this year.
For the KC-X program, the Air Force is using a competitive approach
that will select a single source for development and procurement. While
other options were considered, the Air Force did not conduct a
comprehensive business case analysis that fully considered life cycle
costs in deciding its approach. Instead, the acquisition strategy was
based primarily on budgetary constraints--including limited available
near-term funding for system development and a $3 billion ceiling on
future annual procurements.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on this draft, the Air Force stated that program costs
and program dates are dependent upon the outcome of source selection
and Milestone B, and currently vary by offeror.
A full analysis of alternatives was performed for the purpose of
developing the KC-X acquisition strategy. Additionally, a detailed
analysis of a dual source contract award was completed, and the results
were presented to senior leadership. The KC-X acquisition strategy
emphasizes competition and the first 80 KC-X aircraft will be
competitively priced. Furthermore, the follow-on KC-Y and KC-Z programs
will be competitively priced.
[End of section]
Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI).
Source: ATK.
[End of figure]
MDA's KEI element is a missile defense system designed to destroy
medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles during
the boost and midcourse phases of flight. The objective system will
include a fire control and communications unit, hit-to-kill
interceptors, and launchers. MDA plans to launch the KEI interceptor
from a variety of platforms, including land-based, and sea-based
platforms. We assessed the land-based, mobile KEI program.
Timeline: Technology/system development to initial capacity:
Program start: (10/02);
Prime contractor selection: (12/03);
GAO review: (1/08);
Booster flight test: (3rd Q/FY 2009);
Design review: (8/11);
MKV characterization flight: (1st Q/FY 2014).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $2,911.7 million;
* Procurement: NA;
Total funding: $2,911.7 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: $4,038.2;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: 0;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: $4,038.2;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 09/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include known costs and quantities from the program's inception
through fiscal year 2013.
[End of table]
According to program officials, in April 2007 MDA directed the KEI
program to focus on development of technologies critical to the
interceptor's booster and defer work on the fire control and
communications unit and the launcher. The program is developing four
critical booster technologies and none are expected to reach full
maturity until after system design review in fiscal year 2011.
Additionally, MDA transferred development responsibility for the
interceptor kill vehicle critical technologies to other programs.
Although the program responsible for developing 16 of the 17 kill
vehicle technologies reports that most are nearly mature, we disagree
because the technologies have not been demonstrated in the smaller form
or with the fit required for the KEI interceptor.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
KEI Program:
Technology Maturity:
This year, the KEI program increased the total number of critical
technologies from 7 to 21, recognizing that technologies being
developed by other programs will be essential to the KEI interceptor's
kill vehicle. The KEI program office is responsible for 4 technologies,
while the other 17 are the responsibility of the Multiple Kill Vehicle
(MKV) and Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) program
offices. In some cases, these technologies were originally being
developed by the KEI program.
The KEI program's current focus is on developing 4 booster
technologies. These include the attitude control system, booster
motors, third stage rocket motor, and trapped ball thrust vector
control. These technologies are at relatively low levels of maturity
and are not projected to be nearing maturity until the fourth quarter
of fiscal year 2011, 2 years after the 2009 booster flight test could
lead to a commitment to fully develop KEI. Backup technologies exist
for the 4 booster technologies, but they are at the same low level of
maturity.
During fiscal year 2007, program officials conducted several static
fire tests of the first and second stage rocket motors and wind tunnel
tests of the boost vehicle. The static fire tests collect data on
rocket motor performance in induced environments, while the wind tunnel
tests, which were completed in April 2007, helped to validate
aerodynamic models for the boost vehicle.
Of the 17 technologies, the MKV program is responsible for maturing 16,
and the STSS program is responsible for 1. According to the MKV
program, 14 of the 16 technologies are nearing maturity, while the
other 2 are at relatively low levels of maturity. However, only the
carrier vehicle's divert and attitude control system which allows the
vehicle to alter its course to its target, has demonstrated that it is
nearing maturity. The other 15 technologies have been used in other
weapon programs, but the hardware has not been tested in the smaller
form and with the fit required for the KEI interceptor. Program
officials agree that these technologies may need to be repackaged to
properly fit the KEI and further testing may be needed at that time to
ensure the technology is ready to be incorporated into KEI's design.
The STSS Program Office is developing the algorithms that enable the
kill vehicle to discriminate between the exhaust plume and the missile
body itself. This technology is at a relatively low level of maturity
and will not reach full maturity until after KEI holds its system
design review in 2011.
Design Stability:
Last year, KEI officials estimated the KEI element would incorporate
about 7,500 drawings and that 5,000 of these drawings would be complete
when the program holds a critical design review in the fourth quarter
of fiscal year 2011. However, program officials recently noted that the
number of drawings was based on the fire control and communications
component, the mobile launcher, and the booster. The number of drawings
is expected to increase when MDA begins developing all the components
because more interfaces with the Ballistic Missile Defense System's
(BMDS) Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications
component will be required as it matures, as more sensors with which
KEI must connect are fielded, and as the BMDS as a whole becomes more
complex. The number of drawings will also be adjusted to remove kill
vehicle drawings and software that will be reported by other programs,
such as the MKV program.
Other Program Issues:
According to program officials, prior to the replan in April 2007, KEI
was focused on developing a three-stage interceptor capable of engaging
ballistic missiles in the boost phase of their flight. The first two
rocket motor stages are being developed and flight tested under the
first booster flight program. The original baseline third stage was a
shrouded Standard Missile-3 third stage rocket motor. Program officials
stated that because MDA also wants KEI to engage ballistic missiles
during the midcourse of their flight, the interceptor will eventually
develop a third stage rocket motor to accommodate this wider flight
envelope. The third stage will not be tested prior to or as part of the
first booster flight test.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
The Navy's LCS is designed to perform mine countermeasures, anti-
submarine warfare, and surface warfare missions. It consists of the
ship itself--referred to as a seaframe--and the mission package it
carries and deploys. The Navy plans to construct the first eight LCS
seaframes--known as Flight 0--in two unique designs. Two seaframes--one
of each design--are under construction and expected to deliver in
August and October 2008. We assessed only the Flight 0 seaframes. See
pages 119 to 124 for analyses of mission packages.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (9/02);
Development start: (6/04);
Production decision–first design: (12/04);
Production decision–second design: (10/05);
GAO review: (1/08);
First ship delivery: (8/08);
Initial capability: (7/09).
Second ship delivery: (10/08);
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $267.4 million;
* Procurement: $2,701.7 million;
Total funding: $2,969.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 9.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2004: $1,304.6;
Latest, 10/2007: $1,516.9;
Percent change: 16.2.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2004: $0.0;
Latest, 10/2007: $3,716.3;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2004: $1,304.6;
Latest, 10/2007: $5,233.2;
Percent change: 301.1.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2004: $652.297;
Latest, 10/2007: $348.880;
Percent change: -46.5.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2004: 2;
Latest, 10/2007: 15;
Percent change: 650.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2004: 41;
Latest, 10/2007: 62;
Percent change: 51.2.
Research and development funding includes detail design and
construction of two ships.
[End of table]
Fifteen of 19 critical technologies for the two LCS seaframe designs
are fully mature, and another 2 technologies are approaching maturity.
The overhead launch and retrieval system in the Lockheed Martin design
and the aluminum structure in the General Dynamics design are immature.
In addition, the Navy identified watercraft launch and recovery as a
major risk affecting both seaframe designs, and the aviation landing/
retrieval system planned for the Lockheed Martin design may not be
qualified for use. Further, weight increases experienced in
construction degraded the hydrodynamic performance of each seaframe,
prompting the Navy to reduce range at transit speed requirements for
LCS. Cost growth led the Navy to cancel construction of the third and
fourth LCS and defer construction of additional ships. The Navy
continues to modify its acquisition strategy for LCS.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
LCS Program:
Technology Maturity:
The Navy identifies a total of 19 critical technologies across both LCS
seaframe designs. Fifteen of these technologies are fully mature, and
another 2 technologies are approaching maturity. Two other
technologies--the overhead launch and retrieval system in the Lockheed
Martin design and the aluminum structure in the General Dynamics
design--remain immature.
The Navy has identified the watercraft launch and recovery concept as a
major risk to both LCS seaframe designs. This capability is essential
to complete anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures missions
planned for LCS. According to the Navy, industry watercraft launch and
recovery designs are untested and unproven. To mitigate this risk, the
Navy is conducting launch and recovery modeling and simulation, model
basin testing, and experimentation. The Navy is encouraging the LCS
seaframe industry teams to adopt similar approaches. Final integration
of watercraft to each LCS seaframe design is not expected until the
third quarter of fiscal year 2009--after the Navy has accepted delivery
of the first two LCS seaframes.
In addition, while the Navy has identified the aviation landing/
retrieval system as a mature technology, it is concerned that this
system may not be qualified for use on the Lockheed Martin seaframe and
may, in fact, result in damage to aircraft. The Navy has developed a
system qualification and certification plan to mitigate this risk and
intends to conduct pierside testing and training of the aviation
landing/retrieval system in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009.
Design and Production Maturity:
The Navy assesses LCS seaframe design stability by monitoring changes
to the requirements documents, execution of engineering change
proposals, and the completion of contract deliverables related to
drawings, ship specifications, and independent certification of the
design. Seaframe construction is monitored through use of earned value
management to measure cost and schedule performance as well as
evaluation of manufacturing hours spent on rework, deficiencies
detected and corrected, and the number of test procedures performed.
The Navy adopted a concurrent design-build strategy for the first two
LCS seaframes, which has since proven unsuccessful. Contributing
challenges included implementation of new design guidelines (referred
to as Naval Vessel Rules), delays to major equipment deliveries, and an
unwavering focus on achieving schedule and performance goals.
Subsequently, these events drove low levels of outfitting, out-of-
sequence work, and rework on the lead ships--all of which increased
construction costs.
In addition, the lack of a complete and integrated design prior to ship
construction led to weight increases for both seaframe designs. This
weight growth degraded the hydrodynamic performance of each seaframe
and shortened endurance ranges below threshold requirements. To
compensate, the Navy has revised the LCS capability development
document to reduce the speeds associated with threshold and objective
endurance range requirements. The Navy now expects both seaframe
designs to meet endurance range requirements.
Other Program Issues:
The Navy expects the first two LCS to exceed their combined budget of
$472 million by over 100 percent and anticipates lead ship delivery
will occur nearly 18 months later than initially planned. As a result
of these challenges, the Navy canceled construction of the third and
fourth LCS and deferred construction of additional seaframes. The Navy
plans to use funds previously appropriated for construction of the
fifth and sixth LCS seaframes to pay for cost growth on the remaining
two ships under contract. The Navy continues to modify its acquisition
strategy for LCS.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Littoral Combat Ship: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Littoral Combat Ship: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW).
Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation.
[End of figure]
The ASW mission package is one of three mission packages for the Navy's
Littoral Combat Ship. ASW is designed to counter threats from
submarines in waters close to shore, called littorals, using manned and
unmanned mission systems. The mission package is being developed and
delivered in increments of capability, with the first package--
consisting primarily of prototypes--to be delivered in 2008. For
discussions on the other mission packages, as well as LCS itself, see
pages 117, 121, and 123.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: (5/04);
Design review: (12/06);
GAO review: (1/08);
First package delivery: (2/08);
Procurement start: (4/09).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $13.1 million;
* Procurement: $703.6 million;
Total funding: $716.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 14.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $191.5;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $721.2;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $912.7;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $57.046;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 16;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
The cost to procure the MH-60R and the Vertical Take-off Autonomous
Aerial Vehicle are not reflected in the mission package program costs,
as they are not procured directly by the program.
[End of table]
As the delivery of the first anti-submarine warfare mission package
approaches, the critical technologies and design both continue to
mature. The program office identified 12 technologies as critical for
this package, 5 of which remain immature. A production representative,
deployable package will not be delivered until fiscal year 2011. The
program tracks design drawings for only those portions of mission
systems that require alteration to deploy from LCS, as well as those
for the containers in which mission systems are stored and transported.
The design was not complete at critical design review. Neither the
critical technologies nor the design of this package are expected to be
fully mature until after they have been demonstrated as prototypes
aboard the second LCS ship. The program office does not currently track
critical process control data or use other production metrics.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
LCS ASW Program:
Technology Maturity:
Delivery of the first anti-submarine warfare mission package for LCS is
expected to occur in February 2008. Of the 12 critical technologies
identified, seven are fully mature, two are approaching full maturity,
and three are immature. The technologies currently requiring further
development include sensors for submarine detection intended for use on
unmanned platforms. If they fail to develop as expected, it could
increase reliance on the manned MH-60R helicopter, which has reached
full maturity, or the unmanned surface vehicle and its towed array
sensor, both of which are nearing full maturity.
Design Stability:
The Navy's warfare center in Newport, Rhode Island and systems center
in San Diego, California are responsible for the ASW mission package
design. This mission package contains a number of systems that have
been developed and designed by other programs for other purposes, such
as the MH-60R and the Vertical Take-off Autonomous Aerial Vehicle. The
LCS mission module program office tracks design stability for only
those portions of mission systems that require alterations to deploy
from LCS and the containers in which they are transported and stored.
Seventy-four percent of the drawings needed for these alterations are
currently complete. For example, while the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle
was developed as a mine countermeasures system for use on destroyers,
the program office is working to integrate it with sensors to detect
submarines and to enable its launch and recovery from the LCS. These
design changes will be integrated into production through the
submission of engineering change proposals to the affected system's
original program office. Quantities with designs specific to LCS will
then be ordered as extensions to existing contracts where available.
Production Maturity:
The LCS ASW mission package containers--which include the connections
necessary for the utilities needs of mission systems--are designed by
the Navy and will be produced by Northrop Grumman Corporation,
Integrated Systems Division. Northrop Grumman will be responsible for
collecting the mission systems and integrating them with the containers
beginning with the package delivered in 2011.
The first two ASW mission modules will be assembled by the Navy's
warfare center in Newport, which does not track critical process
control data or other production metrics. The program relies on others
for the production of mission systems when possible, and on its
contractor for production of the mission package containers. The
exception is the unmanned surface vehicle, where no current production
contractor exists. According to the program office, these systems are
being produced by U.S. Naval laboratories.
Other Program Issues:
The first two ASW mission packages, expected to deliver in fiscal year
2008, will consist largely of prototypes or low-rate initial production
items. According to the program office, these mission packages are not
considered deployable and will be used only to demonstrate performance
and concepts of operation from LCS seaframes. The mission systems
delivered in these packages will eventually be upgraded to production
representative, deployable systems. The first mission packages may also
deliver without some of the software needed for full functionality. The
third mission package, expected for delivery in 2011, should consist of
fully mature, deployable, and production representative mission
systems. According to program officials, the final number of anti-
submarine warfare mission packages to be procured and the concepts of
operation that guide their use are currently under review.
Agency Comments:
LCS mission modules program officials noted they define production of a
mission package as the support container procurement, assembly,
checkout, and verification of readiness for issue of the mission module
components that constitute an integrated package. They contend
traditional manufacturing processes and metrics may not be applicable
to the production of a mission package.
These officials also stated that the the first two ASW unmanned surface
vehicles were designed and built under a contract to build a total of
four. They plan to transition production responsibility to a program of
record in fiscal year 2009 for future mission packages.
[End of section]
Littoral Combat Ship: Mine Countermeasures (MCM):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Littoral Combat Ship: Mine Countermeasures (MCM).
Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation.
[End of figure]
The Mine Countermeasures (MCM) for the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship
include mine hunting, neutralization, and sweep systems deployed from
the MH-60S helicopter and other unmanned underwater, aerial, and
surface vehicles. Packages represent increments of capability, the
first of which was delivered in September 2007 and included six of 11
planned systems. The third delivery, scheduled for fiscal year 2011,
will contain the full capability needed for the MCM mission. Pages 117,
119 and 123 describe LCS and its other mission packages.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: (5/04);
Design review: (9/06);
First package delivery: (9/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Production start: (6/08);
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $4.2 million;
* Procurement: $1,841.4 million;
Total funding: $1,854.3 million;
Procurement quantity: 22.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $119.9;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $847.7;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $976.0;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $40.665;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 24;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Quantities are subject to change pending finalization of concepts of
operation and alignment with LCS seaframe characteristics.
[End of table]
Technologies used in the MCM package are all mature or approaching
maturity. However, delays in testing some airborne systems from the MH-
60S helicopter--due to both integration challenges and competing fleet
demands for the MH-60S--may delay the fielding of some MCM systems to
later packages. Some systems in the MCM package were initially
developed for fielding on other ships, and the Navy is redesigning them
to accommodate launch and recovery systems planned for LCS. The MCM
package design is not yet stable; at the design readiness review, only
47 percent of design drawings were releasable. The program does not
track production metrics and is relying on test results using ships
other than LCS to inform full-rate production decisions.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
LCS MCM Program:
Technology Maturity:
The program office identified 11 technologies for use in the fully
capable MCM package: four vehicles, five sensors for hunting and
sweeping, and two weapons for neutralization. All technologies are
mature or approaching maturity. We evaluated five of these systems last
year in our review of Airborne Mine Countermeasures--a capability
dependent on successful integration of new systems with the MH-60S
helicopter. Difficulty scheduling and conducting some system tests with
the helicopter may affect plans to field MCM systems with the package.
Recent tests identified technical challenges with a cable the
helicopter uses to tow MCM systems. If the cable continues to
malfunction in testing, fielding of airborne MCM systems may be
delayed.
Design Stability:
The MCM package design is not yet stable. The Navy only tracks the
design of mission system elements that require modification for use on
LCS, along with drawings for system storage, support, and transport
containers. At the design readiness review, 47 percent of expected
drawings were releasable; subsequently the expected number of drawings
increased by about 12 percent due to changes driven by weight, cost,
and producibility issues.
Although the MCM package has yet to be fully demonstrated aboard LCS,
the Navy plans to make full-rate production decisions on several MCM
systems. These systems are scheduled for tests that assess their
suitability and effectiveness, but the Navy plans to conduct these
tests aboard other ships, not LCS. LCS features a new automated launch,
recovery, and handling system that is fully integrated with the
seaframe; however, the Navy will not be able to test MCM systems with
it until a seaframe is delivered in fiscal year 2009. As a result, the
Navy may not fully understand the suitability of new MCM systems to
operate from LCS.
Production Maturity:
The program office is not tracking critical process control or other
production data. Although the Navy will deliver packages in fiscal
years 2009 and 2010, they will continue to be configured with
prototypes and low-rate initial production articles as they become
available. The package will not be configured in production-
representative form until the third package, expected for delivery in
fiscal year 2011, the same time the design is to be stable. The LCS
program has primary responsibility for integrating mission systems into
modules for use on LCS, but relies on other program offices and
contractors for production of mission systems when possible.
Other Program Issues:
The Navy continues to refine concepts of operation for LCS and its
mission packages. While initial packages meet the Navy's weight
requirement, they lack some systems required for full mission
capability. Currently, the fully configured package is expected to
exceed its weight requirement by about 10 percent. The Navy is
exploring ways to reduce weight while maintaining capability. If
desired weight reductions are not achieved, the Navy may be forced to
reduce MCM capability or accept a reduction in the ship's speed and
endurance. This would affect earlier packages the Navy plans to backfit
to be fully capable. Also, the crew members needed to operate the MCM
package may exceed seaframe capacity. Navy mission planners and
operators estimated 19 mission package and 23 aviation detachment crew
would be needed per ship to complete planned missions--seven more than
capacity.
Agency Comments:
Program officials state they define production as support container
procurement, assembly, checkout and verification of readiness for issue
of mission module components constituting an integrated package. They
note design stability will be achieved at completion of the Technical
Data Package for the first production package planned for delivery in
fiscal year 2011. Traditional manufacturing processes and metrics may
not be applicable to mission package production, and the LCS seaframe
construction schedule allows limited access for package testing prior
to delivery. Mission modules and systems are undergoing extensive
testing in ways that do not require the ship. Surrogate platforms are
being used to test some systems. Crew workload has been reassessed; the
original estimate of 19 has been reduced to 15 mission package crew
members, and the aviation detachment will increase from 20 to 23 to
meet the mission requirement.
[End of section]
Littoral Combat Ship: Surface Warfare (SuW):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Littoral Combat Ship: Surface Warfare (SuW).
Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation.
[End of figure]
The SuW mission package is one of three mission packages for the Navy's
Littoral Combat Ship. SuW is designed to detect, track, and engage
small boat threats to maximize striking power and successfully move
through waters close to shore, called littorals. The mission package is
being developed and delivered in increments of capability, with the
first SuW package--consisting primarily of prototypes--scheduled for
delivery in June 2008. For discussions on the other mission packages,
as well as LCS itself, see pages 117, 119, and 121.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: (5/04);
GAO review: (1/08);
First package delivery: (6/08);
Design review–30mm gun: (10/08);
Design review–missile system: (6/09);
Procurement start: (8/09).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Washington, D.C:
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $33.7 million;
* Procurement: $493.2 million;
Total funding: $526.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 22.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $156.0;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $493.2;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $649.1;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $27.047;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 24;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
The cost to procure the MH-60R and the Vertical Take-off Autonomous
Aerial Vehicle are not reflected in the mission package costs as they
are not procured directly by the program.
[End of table]
The program office identified four critical technologies for the SuW
mission package, three of which are mature. A production
representative, deployable package will not be delivered until fiscal
year 2011. The non-line-of-sight missile system is not mature and the
program relies on the Army to develop that system. Design of the SuW
mission package is tracked in a unique manner, as many of the
technologies are complete systems in themselves. The program office
tracks only the changes to those systems needed to interface and deploy
with LCS. Design completion of the SuW mission package has been delayed
due to the immaturity of the missile system and funding issues for the
30 mm gun. The program office does not currently track critical process
control data or other production metrics.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
LCS SuW Program:
Technology Maturity:
The program office identified four technologies for use in the SuW
mission package. Of these the manned MH-60R helicopter, unmanned
Vertical Take-off Autonomous Aerial Vehicle, and 30 mm gun system are
considered fully mature, while the non-line-of-sight missile system
remains immature. While the program office considers the 30 mm gun
itself to be mature, its integration with LCS is not complete.
The Navy relies on the Army's Future Combat System for development of
the missile system and will work with FCS to integrate it with LCS. As
a result, the first SuW package, currently scheduled for delivery in
June 2008, will not include the missile system. The first missile
launcher will be delivered as a prototype without missiles in the
second mission package in 2009, and missiles will deliver with the
fourth mission package in fiscal year 2011. Should this technology fail
to develop as anticipated, LCS will become more reliant on its guns for
self-defense and upon the MH-60R for striking targets at greater
distances.
Design Stability:
Design of the SuW mission package is tracked in a unique manner. To
ensure the technologies used will be compatible with LCS, the program
has established interface specifications that each system must meet.
The program office tracks design drawings, which are at 34 percent, for
those parts of the systems it adapts to ensure the correct interface
with LCS. According to program officials, the SuW mission package
differs from other mission packages in that it will not be placed in
containers for deployment on LCS. Instead, the 30 mm gun and missile
system will be placed directly on the ship.
Due to a lack of technical maturity, completion of the missile system
design for LCS has been delayed and is scheduled to complete in fiscal
year 2011, after the missile system is demonstrated aboard LCS.
According to the program office, the main challenge in the design is
passing Navy munitions and safety requirements.
The Navy delayed design of the 30 mm gun module for budgetary reasons
and will not complete the design until fiscal year 2009. In addition,
the program has been discussing adding a capability for manned firing
of the 30 mm gun as well as the planned remote firing capability.
Introduction of this requirement could lead to further design changes.
According to the program office, developmental testing of the gun will
begin in 2009.
Production Maturity:
According to the program office, the first three mission packages will
be assembled and delivered by the Navy warfare center in Dahlgren,
Virginia, which does not track critical process control data or other
production metrics. Beginning in 2011, production-representative
mission packages will be produced and delivered by Northrop Grumman.
The LCS program relies on other program offices and their contractors
for the production of mission systems when possible.
Other Program Issues:
The first two mission packages are scheduled for delivery in fiscal
years 2008 and 2009. However, neither of these is complete or
deployable. For example, the first package will contain only a
prototype of the 30 mm gun system. The first mission package delivery
with all key systems present in production representative variants does
not occur until the fourth mission package in fiscal year 2011.
According to program officials, the quantities and concept of
operations for the mission package are not yet finalized.
Agency Comments:
The LCS mission modules program office defines production of a mission
package as the support container procurement, assembly, checkout and
the verification of readiness for issue of the mission module
components that constitute an integrated mission package. Traditional
manufacturing processes and metrics may not be applicable to the
production of a mission package.
The delivery strategy for the SuW mission package includes an
incremental capability approach that delivers mature mission modules
first, such as the 30mm gun module, followed by the delivery of the
missile capability, after its technology maturity has been achieved.
The Army is leading the development of the missile system and the Navy
continues to work closely with the Army on its integration into LCS.
[End of section]
LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship.
Source: Amphibious Warfare Program Office, LHA 6 Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Navy's LHA 6 will replace aging Tarawa-class amphibious assault
ships and is designed to embark, land, and support expeditionary
forces. The LHA 6 is a modified variant of the LHD 8 amphibious assault
ship currently under construction. The LHA 6 design will feature
enhanced aviation capabilities and is optimized to support new aircraft
such as the V-22 Osprey and Joint Strike Fighter. The LHA 6 is
scheduled to start fabrication in April 2008 and is expected for
delivery in 2012.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (7/01);
Development start: (5/05);
Design review: (10/05);
Production decision: (1/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Construction start: (4/08);
Ship delivery: (8/12);
Initial capability: (2/14).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Ship Systems;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $31.9 million;
* Procurement: $1,378.1 million;
Total funding: $1,409.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 01/2006: $209.8;
Latest, 08/2007: $211.3;
Percent change: 0.7.
Procurement cost;
As of 01/2006: $2,810.4;
Latest, 08/2007: $2,980.9;
Percent change: 6.1.
Total program cost;
As of 01/2006: $3,020.3;
Latest, 08/2007: $3,192.1;
Percent change: 5.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 01/2006: $3,020.258;
Latest, 08/2007: $3,192.086;
Percent change: 5.9.
Total quantities;
As of 01/2006: 1;
Latest, 08/2007: 1;
Percent change: 0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 01/2006: 146;
Latest, 08/2007: 151;
Percent change: 3.4.
Another LHA ship--LHA 7--is being acquired separately through the
Maritime Prepositioning Force Future program and is not reflected here.
[End of table]
In 2005, DOD and the Navy determined that the LHA 6 program had no
critical technologies because all of the ship's critical systems and
equipment utilize technologies from existing Navy programs. Almost 45
percent of LHA 6 design is based on LHD 8, currently under
construction. The program office identified six key subsystems needed
to achieve the system's full capability, one of which is not fully
mature. In addition, there are two subsystems that may pose some risk-
-the air conditioning plant and the machinery control system. The ship
design is about 30 percent complete.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
LHA 6 Program:
Technology Maturity:
In 2005, DOD and the Navy concluded that all LHA 6 components and
technologies were fully mature, technology requirements were sufficient
to enter system development, and the program could proceed without a
formal technology readiness assessment. The program did identify six
key subsystems needed to achieve full LHA 6 capability. Five of these
subsystems are mature technologies used on numerous Navy ships.
According to program officials, these technologies will not be modified
for LHA 6 and further development will not be required for ship
integration. The sixth key subsystem, the Joint Precision Approach and
Landing System (JPALS)--a Global Positioning System (GPS)-based
aircraft landing system--is not mature. JPALS will be used to support
the all-weather landings of next-generation Navy aircraft, including
the Joint Strike Fighter. JPALS is still in development and is expected
to be fielded on other ships prior to its integration on LHA 6.
According to the program office, JPALS is not needed to achieve the LHA
6 operational requirements, and the ship's construction schedule is not
dependent on JPALS availability. Although JPALS is already planned as a
post-delivery item, officials state that the LHA 6 design has
incorporated space for JPALS based on initial estimates of its
specifications and that legacy aviation control will serve as the
backup technology in the event that JPALS development is delayed.
Though they are not considered critical technologies, the program
office has identified two subsystems that may pose some risk--the air
conditioning plant and the machinery control system. The 500-ton air
conditioning plant for the LHA 6 is the only machinery/auxiliary system
that differs from the LHD 8 ship and, according to program officials,
is a minor adaptation of plants used aboard Virginia-class submarines.
Program officials state that the LHA 6 air conditioning plants are
undergoing shock and vibration testing and have begun production.
According to program officials, the machinery control system on LHA 6-
-which controls the ship's propulsion and electric plants, damage
control, and auxiliary systems--is an area of risk. LHA 6 will reuse 75
percent of the machinery control system software from LHD 8, and while
the LHA 6 machinery control system is to be a less complex version of
the system on LHD 8, program officials have stated it is the biggest
technology risk on LHD 8. Due to increasing quantity and automation of
machinery control systems on ship classes in coming years, the Navy
conducted an internal review to determine capacity and availability of
technical resources to oversee the implementation and introduction of
these systems into the fleet. Although the program office previously
stated that the reuse of LHD 8 machinery control system software is a
deliberate strategy to mitigate cost, schedule, and technical risk,
officials are now concerned about difficulty and delays in the LHD 8
machinery control system; this may affect the schedule for LHA 6.
Design Stability:
The Navy conducted a design review of LHA 6 in October 2005, and
determined that its preliminary design was stable. According to program
officials almost 45 percent of the design effort is expected to be
based on LHD 8, while more than half of the ship will require newly
created designs or modifications from LHD 8. Major adjustments from the
LHD 8 design will include expansion of the aviation hanger deck to
create more space for future aircraft, removal of the well deck to
accommodate increased hanger space and additional aviation fuel
capacity, and updated warfare systems.
The Navy finalized a fixed-price incentive contract for detail design
and construction with Northrop Grumman Ship Systems in June 2007.
According to the program office, design of the ship is about 30 percent
complete.
Navy officials noted that a production readiness review that will
assess design progress is scheduled for March 2008.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Longbow Apache Block III:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Longbow Apache Block III.
Source: U.S. Air Force, Apache PMO.
[End of figure]
The Army's AH-64D Longbow Apache can be employed day or night, in
adverse weather and obscurants, and is capable of engaging and
destroying advanced threat weapon systems. The primary targets of the
aircraft are mobile armor and air defense units, with secondary targets
being threat helicopters. Block III enhancements are intended to ensure
the Longbow Apache is compatible with the Future Combat System
architecture, is a viable member of the future force, and is
supportable through 2030. We assessed all phases of the program.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: (7/06);
Design review: (1/08);
GAO review: (1/08);
Low-rate decision: (4/10);
Initial capability: (1/13);
Last procurement: (2024).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $793.2 million;
* Procurement: $6,388.3 million;
Total funding: $7,181.5 million;
Procurement quantity: 634.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2006: $1,097.5;
Latest, 12/2006: $1,082.9;
Percent change: -1.3.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2006: $5,780.8;
Latest, 12/2006: $6,388.3;
Percent change: 10.5.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2006: $6,878.3;
Latest, 12/2006: $7,471.2;
Percent change: 8.6.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2006: $11.426;
Latest, 12/2006: $11.692;
Percent change: 2.3.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2006: 602;
Latest, 12/2006: 639;
Percent change: 6.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2006: 79;
Latest, 12/2006: 78;
Percent change: -1.2.
[End of table]
The Apache Block III entered system development and demonstration in
July 2006 with one critical technology--an improved drive system--which
is approaching full maturity. The program plans to complete three
phases of development and meet requirements through a series of
technology insertions, each requiring integration, test, and
qualification. The Army reports that these technology insertions were
fully mature at development start. Only the first phase of insertions
will need to be installed at the factory; the others can be installed
in the field. A production decision for the first phase is scheduled in
fiscal year 2010. Since development start, an increase in production
quantities and a subsequent delivery restructure have led to an
increase of total procurement costs. Weight is closely monitored to
avoid affecting performance while not exceeding required limits.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Longbow Apache BLIII Program:
Technology Maturity:
The system entered development in July 2006 with one critical
technology, an improved drive system, which is approaching full
maturity. This technology will be used in a helicopter transmission for
the first time and is expected to improve the available power and
reliability over the existing transmission. The drive system has been
demonstrated in a relevant environment, and the Army has plans for
flight testing in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to evaluate its full
maturity.
To upgrade and modernize the Apache system, a time-phased series of
technical insertions is planned for development. The Apache Block III
funding profile does not allow all of the required system improvements
to be fielded with the first aircraft lot. The insertion plan was based
on (1) program funding availability, (2) aircraft going to the factory
one time for modification, and (3) a single final Block III
configuration. The technology insertion approach leverages other
development programs with mature, production ready technologies that
will require integration, test, and qualification on the Apache Block
III platform.
System development occurs in three phases. The first phase will
complete integration qualification of all required hardware changes
applied to Apache Block III helicopters. Two limited development phases
with follow-on improvements requiring further technical insertions will
be necessary. With the exception of the common data link hardware, the
follow-on development phases will consist of software improvements that
although limited in scope, still require planning, test, and
evaluation. These insertions will be applied in the field, and aircraft
will not be required to return to the factory to achieve the later
configuration upgrades. A low-rate production decision for the first
phase of development is scheduled for April 2010, with a full-rate
decision scheduled for April 2012. Subsequent configuration upgrades
for the remaining development phases will be dependent on successful
interim design reviews scheduled for fiscal years 2014 and 2016.
Design Stability:
According to program officials, 92 percent of design drawings were
released at the design review in January 2008. Criteria established in
the development contract requires 85-90 percent of the total drawings
be complete for a successful design review. If they are not releasable,
the program office will assess the criticality of the drawing shortage
and require the contractor to provide a plan for completion. Until the
maturity of the critical technology and technology insertions have been
demonstrated, the potential for design changes remains.
The weight of the Apache Block III aircraft is considered a moderate
cost risk. The current design weight margin is approximately 100 pounds
below specification empty weight. Historical data from other new
helicopter development programs indicate a 5-percent typical weight
growth. As a result, subsystem integrated product teams monitor weight
allocations weekly and are trying to minimize weight increases to the
aircraft.
Other Program Issues:
Since the start of program development, the Vice Chief of Staff of the
Army approved a program change increasing the Apache Block III
production quantity from 597 to 634. Further, deliveries were
restructured from 60 to 48 a year, thereby stretching the program
schedule by 4 years. The costs associated with both the remanufacture
of the additional 37 aircraft and the stretched delivery schedule led
to an increase in total procurement costs, as reported in the December
2006 Selected Acquisition Report.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Light Utility Helicopter (LUH):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Light Utility Helicopter (LUH).
Source: LUH Product Office.
[End of figure]
The Army's Light Utility Helicopter is a new aircraft acquisition that
will conduct exclusively noncombat missions in support of specific Army
tasks, to include homeland security support operations, disaster
relief, search and rescue, general support, medical evacuation, and
support for Army training and test centers. The Army is purchasing a
commercially available helicopter for this mission rather than enter
into a new development program. The commercial system has been in use
as a medical evacuation helicopter.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start/production review: (6/06);
Initial operational test and evaluation: (3/07);
Initial capability: (5/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Last procurement: (2016).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: EADS North America Defense Co.
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $0.0 million;
* Procurement: $1,555.9 million;
Total funding: $1,555.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 280.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 06/2006: $0.0;
Latest, 08/2007: $3.4;
Percent change: 100.0.
Procurement cost;
As of 06/2006: $1,617.0;
Latest, 08/2007: $1789.5;
Percent change: 10.9.
Total program cost;
As of 06/2006: $1,617.0;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,792.8;
Percent change: 10.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 06/2006: $5.022;
Latest, 08/2007: $5.568;
Percent change: 10.9.
Total quantities;
As of 06/2006: 322;
Latest, 08/2007: 322;
Percent change: 0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 06/2006: 10;
Latest, 08/2007: 11;
Percent change: 10.0.
The system is a commercial system with no developmental efforts or
design review. Acquisition cycle time measurement is not applicable.
[End of table]
The LUH is a commercial off-the-shelf procurement. No further
developmental efforts are planned, and the system's technology and
design are mature. Production maturity is high since the selected
system--the Eurocopter-145--is a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
certified aircraft and currently in use commercially. The contract for
the system was awarded on June 30, 2006. Limited operational test and
evaluation was conducted in March 2007. The system is currently in low-
rate production and 16 aircraft were delivered as of November 2007.
Full-rate production was approved in August 2007.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
LUH Program:
Technology Maturity:
The LUH is an off-the-shelf procurement of a fully developed, FAA-
certified commercial aircraft. The LUH program office considers the
system's five critical technologies as mature. These critical
technologies are (1) network-ready communications, (2) cabin size
sufficient for 2 crew and 6 passenger seats, (3) force protection--
defined as the capability of the crew to operate all flight controls
while wearing standard protection suits, (4) survivability--defined as
meeting FAA standards for crashworthy seats and fuel tanks, and (5)
performance--defined as the ability to carry 2 patients on litters with
a medical attendant and equipment. Four modifications were approved to
be added to the aircraft: a secure military radio, a cabin temperature
ventilation system to mitigate a temperature elevation observed during
limited operation test and evaluation, an engine inlet barrier filter,
and a modification to the medical evacuation mission support kit.
Program officials state that no development efforts are necessary for
the aircraft or the modifications.
Design Stability:
We did not assess the status of the LUH design because program
officials said that the aircraft was based on a fully developed
commercial aircraft and therefore stable. Also, since the LUH aircraft
is already flying, the program office is not requiring the contractor
to provide technical drawings for the system.
Production Maturity:
Program officials state that production maturity is at a high level
because the aircraft is a commercially available helicopter and
production lines are already established. For this reason, they will
not require statistical process control data on the system as it is
produced.
The Army awarded a low-rate initial production contract for up to 42
aircraft in June 2006 and full-rate production was approved in August
2007. Sixteen aircraft have been delivered as of November 2007. The
Army plans to acquire a total of 322 aircraft.
Other Program Issues:
The helicopter will not fly combat missions or be deployed into combat
areas and the contractor will provide total logistics support. Due to a
reprogramming of funding in fiscal year 2007, some of the aircraft buys
have been moved to later in the program. This action and the four
modifications discussed earlier have resulted in an increase in total
procurement costs.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS).
Source: MIDS JTRS Program Office.
[End of figure]
The MIDS program is transforming the existing MIDS Low Volume Terminal-
-a jam-resistant, secure voice and data information distribution
system--into a 4-channel, JTRS-compliant radio that will be used in
different types of aircraft, ships, and ground stations for the
military services. We assessed the development of the MIDS-JTRS core
terminal. We also reviewed the status of the planned JTRS platform
capability package, which includes an airborne networking waveform,
being developed by the JTRS Network Enterprise Domain.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/development start–core terminal: (12/04);
Design review–core terminal: (5/06);
GAO review: (1/08);
Low-rate decision–core terminal: (3/08);
Initial capability–core terminal: (3/09).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Data Link Solutions, ViaSat;
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $95.9 million:
* Procurement: $194.4 million;
Total funding: $290.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 371.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2004: $295.1;
Latest, 08/2007: $417.1;
Percent change: 41.3.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2004: $0.0;
Latest, 08/2007: $205.5;
Percent change: 100.0.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2004: $295.1;
Latest, 08/2007: $622.6;
Percent change: 110.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2004: $9.223;
Latest, 08/2007: $1.438;
Percent change: -84.4.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2004: 32;
Latest, 08/2007: 433;
Percent change: 1253.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2004: 50;
Latest, 08/2007: 50;
Percent change: 0.
Procurement costs and quantity relate only to core terminal.
[End of table]
All four of the core terminal critical technologies are approaching
maturity. In addition, core terminal engineering development models
have been integrated into F/A-18 aircraft and are now undergoing
testing in an operational environment. Test results will be used to
support a planned low-rate initial production decision. The design of
the core terminal is considered stable and production processes are
considered mature. However, in September 2007, the JTRS Board of
Directors suspended the design, development, fabrication, and testing
of the JTRS platform capability package pending a determination of
whether there were enough potential users among the military services
to support this effort.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MIDS Program:
Technology Maturity:
The core terminal's four critical technologies--(1) Link-16 waveform
software, (2) Link-16 architectural design, (3) operating environment,
and (4) programmable crypto module--are approaching maturity. Several
technical issues emerged during development, but they have largely been
resolved. In 2006, cryptographic subsystem component stability and
power issues caused a delay in software and firmware development,
leading to delays in radio integration, test, and qualification
efforts. Also, since the core terminal will be the first JTRS radio to
undergo National Security Agency certification, it has faced challenges
in meeting security requirements. Presently, it has received National
Security Agency design concurrence and over-the-air approval in a F/A-
18 aircraft. In addition, a delay in requirements approval has resulted
in a 12-month delay of the program's low-rate initial production
decision. To mitigate the impact of this delay, program officials have
modified and accelerated the delivery plan for air worthiness and
production transition terminals. According to program officials, the
accelerated delivery of these terminals will support the developmental
and operational testing schedule and allow the program to meet the
planned initial operational capability date scheduled for fiscal year
2009. They further noted that the program office began demonstrating
the terminal's capabilities in an operational environment during the
first quarter of fiscal year 2008 and thus far have not disclosed any
significant technical issues. Program officials stated that these test
results will be used to support the core terminal program's low-rate
initial production decision, scheduled for March 2008.
Design Stability:
According to program officials, the core terminal's design is stable,
as the program has released 100 percent of its design drawings to the
manufacturer. However, until the maturity of the core terminal's
critical technologies has been demonstrated in an operational
environment, the potential for design changes remain.
Production Maturity:
Program officials stated that production maturity is high because the
core terminal is a form, fit, and function replacement for the MIDS Low
Volume Terminal. They further noted that the MIDS-JTRS program type
manufacturing processes are the same as those employed in the MIDS Low
Volume Terminal program.
Other Program Issues:
In March 2006, the program office began preliminary studies and
specification work on the JTRS platform capability package. This
package will allow the MIDS-JTRS radio to operate a wideband networking
waveform specifically designed for low latency airborne missions. In
September 2007, the JTRS Board of Directors suspended the design,
development, fabrication, and testing of the JTRS platform capability
package, pending a determination of whether there were enough potential
users among the military services to support this effort. Furthermore,
the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office has been advised by the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology to conduct an
independent technical assessment of waveforms, networking, and network
management approaches. As a result, the award of the development
contract has been delayed. Program officials stated that continuance of
this delay may affect the terminal's system detail design schedule,
funding, and its ability to meet the initial operational capability
scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 2011 for the Air Force.
Program officials also noted that platform integration costs for the
core terminal will be minimal due to the terminal's form, fit, and
function replacement of the MIDS Low Volume Terminal. However, like
other JTRS waveforms, integration costs for the JTRS platform
capability package will be significant and are not currently funded as
part of the JTRS program. According to Navy officials, the cost to
integrate the full networking functionality of the JTRS platform
capability package into four variants of airborne platforms is
estimated to be $868 million.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the MIDS-JTRS program
office provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Multiple Kill Vehicle:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Multiple Kill Vehicle.
Source: MDA/MK.
[End of figure]
MDA's MKV is being designed to provide multiple kill capability to all
midcourse defense system interceptors. The payload in its current
concept is expected to engage midcourse threat clusters by deploying
multiple kill vehicles from a larger carrier vehicle. Key components of
the carrier and kill vehicles include the seekers and the divert and
attitude control systems. An initial capability is expected in 2017. We
assessed the carrier and kill vehicle concept currently being developed
for the Ground-based and Kinetic Energy interceptors.
Timeline: Technology/system development to initial capacity:
Program start: (2/06);
GAO review: (1/08);
System requirements review: (12/08);
Preliminary design review: (12/09);
Critical design review: (9/11);
Initial capability: (2017).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin, Raytheon;
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $2,957.8 million;
* Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $2,957.8 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $3,197.6;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: 0;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $3,197.6;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Costs include all known costs from program inception through fiscal
year 2013.
[End of table]
The MKV program was started in 2006, and the program remains in the
technology development phase. We assessed only one technology--the
divert and attitude control system on the carrier vehicle--as mature.
Conversely, the MKV program assessed 14 of the 16 technologies critical
to the MKV concept as approaching maturity because they have been
tested in other programs. However, despite being used on other
programs, most of these technologies must be repackaged if they are to
fit onto the Ground-based (GBI) and Kinetic Energy (KEI) interceptors.
The program continues to mitigate its highest risk, engagement
management algorithms, and expects to demonstrate the system's ability
to manage multiple kill vehicles in 2010.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MKV Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to our analysis, only 1 of the 16 MKV critical technologies
is mature. The technologies for the carrier vehicle include the divert
and attitude control system (DACS), cooler, inertial measurement units
(IMU), focal plane array (FPA), optics, power, processor, and carrier
vehicle-ground datalink. The technologies critical to the kill vehicle
include the DACS, seeker FPA, cooler, optics, IMUs, power, processors,
and carrier vehicle-to-kill vehicle datalink. According to the program,
all 16 assessed MKV technologies are mature, with the exception of 2--
the carrier vehicle's optics and FPA. We disagree with the program's
evaluation and consider only 1 of the 16 technologies, the carrier
vehicle DACS, as nearing maturity. Although all of the critical
technologies have been used in other programs, most need to be
repackaged to have the correct form and fit for the GBI and KEI. To
date, only the carrier vehicle DACS hardware has been repackaged and
successfully tested.
The program continues to mitigate its top risk, the engagement
management algorithms, which are necessary to ensure the multiple kill
vehicles can engage targets successfully. According to program
officials, in 2010 the program plans to perform hardware testing using
a digital simulation test bed intended to demonstrate this engagement
functionality.
Design Stability:
We were unable to assess the design maturity of the MKV program because
the program has not yet estimated the number of drawings that will be
required. According to program officials, the program will not have a
good estimate until it holds a preliminary design review in 2009.
Other Program Issues:
MDA plans to employ a parallel path to develop the MKV for the GBI,
KEI, and Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIB missile.
Currently, Lockheed Martin is developing MKV concepts for the GBI and
KEI, and it is also expected to develop a design for the Aegis BMD SM-
3. In 2007, the MKV program added a contractor--Raytheon--to design a
second concept in parallel with Lockheed Martin's concept. Raytheon has
been contracted to develop MKV solutions for Aegis BMD SM-3 as well as
for the GBI and KEI, although, according to program officials, they
have just begun work and have not yet developed a firm concept.
Raytheon's work, funded under the KEI program through 2007, was
expected to become a part of the Aegis BMD SM-3 contract in 2008.
However, in the conference report accompanying the 2008 Defense
Appropriation Act, the conferees indicated their intent to remove all
funds from the MKV program designated for the SM-3 effort, citing
concerns that MDA does not have the resources to adequately fund both
this work and its current work on an MKV for the GBI and KEI.
Furthermore, the conferees also agreed that no funding under the Aegis
BMD SM-3 program be used for the MKV program. Although MDA's parallel
path approach emphasizes common standards, architecture, and interfaces
that allow flexibility to increase the likelihood of delivery to the
weapon system integrators, its development has caused at least a year
delay in key milestone reviews.
Agency Comments:
The program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate.
[End of section]
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program.
Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-
RTIP) is designing a modular, scalable, two-dimensional active
electronically scanned array radar for integration into the Global Hawk
unmanned aerial vehicle platform. The radar will provide improved
ground moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar imaging.
The MP-RTIP program funds research, development, and test and
evaluation activities only; the Global Hawk program will fund
production of the radars.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/development start: (10/03);
Design review: (9/06);
Global Hawk flight test: (9/06);
GAO review: (1/08).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Hanscom AFB, Mass.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $80.0 million;
* Procurement: NA;
Total funding: $80.0 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2003: $1,706.1;
Latest, 12/2006: $1,325.4;
Percent change: -22.3.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest, 12/2006: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2003: $1,706.1;
Latest, 12/2006: $1,325.4;
Percent change: -22.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest, 12/2006: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest, 12/2006: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest, 12/2006: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
Seven of MP-RTIP's eight critical technologies for the Global Hawk
radar are mature, and the design is stable. In 2006, the MP-RTIP
program completed three Global Hawk MP-RTIP development units and
several software builds, and also commenced system-level testing. A
Global Hawk MP-RTIP radar unit was installed on a surrogate testbed
aircraft (Proteus) and flight testing began in September 2006. Expected
completion of Proteus flight testing has been delayed from September
2007 to summer of 2008 because software necessary for this testing has
taken longer to develop than planned. However, program officials stated
that the revised testing time-frame will not affect Global Hawk's
ability to integrate the radar in fiscal year 2009 for developmental
and operational testing.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MP-RTIP Program:
Technology Maturity:
Of the eight critical technologies MP-RTIP is developing for the Global
Hawk radar, seven are fully mature, while the remaining technology--
software modes necessary to operate the radar--is approaching maturity.
According to program officials, this technology is being matured during
ongoing flight testing and is expected to be fully mature by summer
2008.
Design Stability:
The program had completed 100 percent of its planned drawings as of
August 2007. The total number of drawings has decreased by about 8
percent since design review because some of the previously completed
drawings were not part of the current MP-RTIP Global Hawk radar
configuration. Going forward, the potential for design changes remains
until the maturity of the remaining critical technology is demonstrated
in an operational environment.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess MP-RTIP's production maturity because the program
only consists of research, development, and test and evaluation
activities; the Global Hawk program is responsible for radar
production.
Other Program Issues:
Originally, the MP-RTIP program also included the development of the
Wide Area Surveillance radar for integration into a wide-body aircraft,
specifically the E-10A aircraft. However, the fiscal year 2008
President's budget eliminated funding for the Wide Area Surveillance
radar, and the E-10A Technology Development Program was terminated by
the Air Force in February 2007. The Senate Committee on Armed Services
noted that the MP-RTIP radar should be on platforms larger than the
Global Hawk in its report on the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 2008. The committee recommended an increase in funding of
about $275 million so that MP-RTIP radar technology can be retrofitted
into the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint
STARS) aircraft. In Conference Report number 110-477 accompanying the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the conferees
authorized approximately $178 million in supplemental funding for the E-
10A program. This funding was requested primarily to further the
development of MP-RTIP, including possibly investigating the use of MP-
RTIP radar technology on platforms other than the Global Hawk.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred
with our findings. Program officials also provided technical comments,
which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing
Platform logo.
Source: MPF(F)/MLP Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Navy's Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) is a vessel in the planned
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)--MFP(F)--squadron that would
facilitate at-sea vehicle and cargo transfer and serve as a staging
area for supplies that support activities on shore. The Navy plans to
procure a total of three MLP ships. The MLP program--a new ship design
for the Navy--is currently in the technology development phase.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (12/02);
Development start: (8/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Production decision–first ship: (TBD);
Construction start: (TBD);
Initial capability: (TBD).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $36.7 million;
* Procurement: $2,629.4 million;
Total funding: $2,666.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 3.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: $58.9;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: $2,628.3;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: $2,687.1;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: $895.700;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: 3;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
In 2006, the Navy identified two critical technologies that will be
used on the MLP--skin-to-skin replenishment and landing platform
technologies. After completing a series of at-sea tests on the skin-to-
skin replenishment system between fiscal years 2005 and 2006, the Navy
focused its attention on a component of landing platform technologies
that it believed would be more efficient. Landing platform
technologies--now reported as the only critical technology--is not
currently mature, but the MLP program office expects it to be mature by
early 2008. Design and production maturity could not be assessed
because these activities have not begun.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MPF(F)/MLP Program:
Technology Maturity:
In 2006, the program office identified two critical technologies--skin-
to-skin replenishment and landing platform technologies--with skin-to-
skin replenishment reported as mature and landing platform technologies
as approaching maturity. The Navy conducted a series of at-sea tests to
assess the skin-to-skin replenishment system's ability to transfer
vehicles between an MLP surrogate ship and another ship at very close
proximity. The tests were conducted using commercial-based technology
similar to the technology desired by the Navy. While the program office
concluded that skin-to-skin replenishment had been successfully
demonstrated, it decided to instead use a component of landing platform
technologies--dynamic positioning--which it believed would offer more
efficient vehicle and cargo transfer.
In 2007, the program office identified only one critical technology for
MLP--landing platform technologies--and listed it at a lower level of
maturity than in 2006. According to the program office, this technology
has three components: (1) dynamic positioning, which aligns the MLP
with other ships using position sensors and the ship's propulsion
system to adjust its relative position; (2) test article vehicle
transfer system ramp for transferring vehicles and cargo between ships;
and (3) surface craft interfaces that allow the MLP to partially
submerge in water, which facilitates at-sea boarding by Landing Craft
Air Cushion and Army amphibious vehicles. The landing platform
technologies enable the MLP to serve as a staging area for vehicles and
equipment in support of on-shore military activities.
The program office has tested the functionality of the surface craft
interface component and plans to develop a test article of the ramp in
2008. The program office conducted an at-sea test of the dynamic
positioning component using a commercially available system on a leased
barge. The test was conducted in sea conditions less challenging than
those during the skin-to-skin replenishment tests.
The MLP program office reported that landing platform technologies was
not mature and that no formal technology readiness assessment on the
technology had been conducted, but it expected to fully mature the
technology by early 2008. The program office also stated that the use
of a backup technology for landing platform technologies would cause
substantially degraded performance by the MLP. The Navy identified
other relevant systems expected on board the MLP, including cargo
handling systems, cranes, and forklifts to maneuver cargo and
munitions, but did not believe these additional systems required new
development.
Design Stability:
There is no existing MLP design that could be assessed. According to
the Navy, the MLP design will be similar to that of existing commercial
heavy lift ships. The MLP will be used to transport, embark, and
disembark various amphibious military vehicles.
Other Program Issues:
According to the program office, because the ship is linked to the
overall acquisition of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), the
MLP acquisition cannot move forward until these future force
requirements are approved by DOD. Until the MPF(F) requirements are
determined, any technology development and testing activities for the
MLP are considered concept demonstration.
Agency Comments:
The program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate.
[End of section]
Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Reaper Unmanned Aircraft.
Source: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper (formerly Predator B) is a multirole,
medium-to-high altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system
capable of flying at higher speeds and higher altitudes than its
predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator A. The Reaper is designed to provide a
ground attack capability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and
assess small ground mobile or fixed targets. Each system will consist
of four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite
communications suite.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (1/02);
Development start: (2/04);
GAO review: (1/08);
Low-rate decision: (2/08);
Design review: (6/08);
Initial capability: (9/08);
Last procurement: (2013).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems;
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio:
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $225.9 million;
* Procurement: $993.3 million;
Total funding: $1,367.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 50.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2004: $192.1;
Latest, 08/2007: $353.2;
Percent change: 83.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2004: $500.2;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,733.0;
Percent change: 246.5.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2004: $692.3;
Latest, 08/2007: $2,234.6;
Percent change: 222.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2004: $20.978;
Latest, 08/2007: $27.587;
Percent change: 31.5.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2004: 63;
Latest, 08/2007: 81;
Percent change: 28.6.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2004: 70;
Latest, 08/2007: 56;
Percent change: -20.0.
Latest cost and quantity data are through fiscal year 2013; earlier
cost and quantity data only go through fiscal year 2009. The Air Force
could not provide comparable cost information.
[End of table]
The Reaper entered system development in February 2004 with three of
its four critical technologies mature. The fourth technology--stores
management system--experienced several delays, but is now considered
mature. The Reaper's critical design review has been delayed until June
2008, nearly 3 years later than originally planned. By that point, the
program office estimates that 94 percent of the design drawings will be
complete. Despite the design review delay, the program continues to
produce and field aircraft. The lack of demonstrated design and
production maturity represents a significant risk to the program. In
addition, initial operational testing is not scheduled to be completed
until the third quarter of fiscal year 2008, when about 45 percent of
the aircraft quantity will have already been placed on contract.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MQ-9 (Reaper) Program:
Technology Maturity:
All four of the Reaper's critical technologies--the synthetic aperture
radar, the multispectral targeting system, the air vehicle, and the
stores management subsystem--are now mature. Development of the stores
management subsystem was initially expected to be mature in 2004, but
it encountered several delays. In December 2006, it began weapons
release testing and is now considered mature. Subsequent increments may
require other new technologies.
Design Stability:
The program office currently reports that over 80 percent of the
drawings for the first increment aircraft are complete and expects that
94 percent of the drawings will be complete by the critical design
review. The design review was initially planned for September 2005, but
has slipped repeatedly since the program began development, and is now
scheduled for June 2008, 4 months after the production decision.
According to program officials, the delays were caused by the user's
requirement for early fielding of the aircraft. Program officials
acknowledge that additional drawings will be needed for subsequent
aircraft increments.
Production Maturity:
The program does not use statistical process controls to ensure product
quality. Instead, it uses other quality control measures such as scrap,
rework, and repair to track product quality. Although the contractor
has met the MQ-9 production requirements to date, the concurrent
production of the Predator, Reaper, and Warrior has greatly increased
the contractor's business base and workforce requirements. The Air
Force is in the process of completing a manufacturing readiness
assessment for the program.
Other Program Issues:
Since inception, the Reaper program has followed a nontraditional
acquisition path highlighted by changing requirements. Within the past
year, total program quantities have increased from 63 to 81 aircraft
and the fiscal year 2007 purchase quantity increased from 2 to 12
aircraft. Since development started, program unit costs have increased
by over 30 percent--primarily due to a user requirement for an early
operational capability that included the Hellfire missile and a digital
electronic engine control. These changes also increased the weight of
the aircraft, requiring stronger landing gear, fuselage, and control
surfaces. Further requirements changes resulted in an even more robust
early fielding configuration. Subsequent aircraft will have upgrades to
the radar and weapons as well as further software developments. The
production of these aircraft before the critical design review and
operational testing adds significant risk to the program. To date, the
Air Force has taken delivery of 14 aircraft and plans to make a
production decision prior to the system critical design review. By the
time the program completes initial operational testing, the Air Force
will have already contracted for about 45 percent of the total
production aircraft quantity. Changes stemming from the test program
would further disrupt the aircraft's cost, schedule, and manufacturing
plan.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
it was forced into a nontraditional acquisition path to rapidly meet
the demands of the Global War on Terrorism. While this path has
introduced some inefficiencies, the Air Force stated that it has
delivered effective combat capability well ahead of what would have
been achievable using a traditional acquisition path. It also noted
that the majority of the production to date has been the result of
congressional direction and funding provided in excess of DOD requests.
Program officials maintain there is manageable and accepted risk with
production taking place before critical design review and operational
testing. The Reaper underwent an integrated system exercise in
September 2007 to operationally assess its readiness for early
deployment. A second exercise will assess its readiness for initial
operational testing.
GAO Response:
Our reviews of DOD weapon systems confirm that producing the system
before the completion of the design review and operational testing adds
significant cost risk to the program. Further, the first integrated
system exercise was a limited developmental test and not a replacement
for rigorous operational testing.
[End of section]
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle.
Source: Joint MRAP Family of Vehicles Program Office.
[End of figure]
The MRAP is a joint program led by the Navy and Marine Corps to procure
a family of armored vehicles to protect personnel from mine blasts, and
fragmentary and direct-fire weapons. DOD will acquire three categories
of vehicles: Category I for urban combat missions; Category II for
convoy escort, troop transport, explosive ordinance disposal, and
ambulance missions; and Category III for clearing mines and improvised
explosive devices. The Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Special
Operations Command are acquiring vehicles.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Production decision: (1/07);
Contract awards: (1/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Full-rate decision: (2/08).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Various;
Program office: Quantico, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: TBD;
* Procurement: TBD;
Total funding: TBD;
Procurement quantity: TBD;
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $177.3;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $12,552.6;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $13,501.4;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $1.430;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: 9439;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Latest cost and quantity estimate is based on the President's budgets
and supplemental requests for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 but does
not include recent orders for more vehicles.
[End of table]
The MRAP program is DOD's highest-priority acquisition program. To meet
an urgent, joint-service operational need, DOD is buying MRAP as
nondevelopmental items. The greatest challenge for vendors will be
obtaining sufficient quantities of ballistic-grade steel. Another
significant challenge will be producing enough tires to equip the fleet
and provide for replacements. Finally, integration of government-
furnished equipment is taking three times longer than desired. DOD is
pursuing a very aggressive schedule while at the same time grappling
with a significant number of unknowns that could delay fielding or
increase costs. The program is trying to concurrently produce the
baseline MRAP, develop and produce various upgrades, and develop an
MRAP II vehicle.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MRAP Program:
Production Maturity:
DOD is buying MRAP vehicles as nondevelopmental items, so we did not
assess whether production processes were mature. We did assess the
ability of vendors to manufacture the required number of vehicles in
the time frames needed to achieve accelerated production and fielding
requirements.
The greatest challenge for vendors is obtaining sufficient quantities
of ballistic-grade steel. A DOD assessment found there is sufficient
steel available to produce the 11,891 contracted vehicles. However, as
the total number of vehicles procured increases and the amount of armor
per vehicle grows to meet the threat, there may not be enough steel. A
second challenge is producing enough tires to equip the fleet and
provide replacements. Tire production was expected to reach 9,500 per
month by February 2008, but 20,000 per month could be needed to support
production and replacement in the field. Replacement rates are not yet
known.
DOD has taken steps to ensure availability of key materials. For
example, DOD has given MRAP contracts a higher priority (DX rating)
that requires these contracts to be accepted and performed before all
other nonpriority government and commercial contracts. DOD has also
allocated funds to procure an advance reserve of steel and to increase
tire production capacity. In addition, some of the vendors and
suppliers have made corporate investments to maximize capacity.
All vehicles come from the vendor without mission equipment, which must
be integrated onto vehicles before fielding. This equipment is 20
percent of the total program cost and includes items such as a tracking
system that identifies friendly forces and a system to jam improvised
explosive devices. A large challenge is integrating the entire suite of
mission equipment onto the vehicles in a timely manner. It currently
takes an average of 21 days to install the equipment on a vehicle, but
the goal is to reduce that to 7 days. The plan is to process 50
vehicles per day for a total of 1,000 vehicles per month.
Other Program Issues:
Due to urgent fielding requirements, the MRAP program is pursuing a
very aggressive schedule while at the same time grappling with a
significant number of unknowns, such as the total quantity required and
the long-term sustainment strategy. DOD has taken steps to reduce these
risks, including implementing a contracting strategy that only
committed the government to purchase initial test assets. Additional
purchases are based on demonstrated performance and production
capability. Further, the focus of the effort is on crew protection,
with reliability given less priority.
In order to rapidly field the vehicles, DOD substantially reduced the
normal scope of test and evaluation. For example, there is no minimum
requirement for vehicle reliability, and durability testing covered
only 300 hard surface miles and 200 off-road miles in the first test
phase. By the time the first phase of developmental testing had been
completed, over 3,700 vehicles were already on order--a commitment of
nearly $2 billion. The current plan places 11,891 vehicles on contract
before operational effectiveness and operational suitability are
determined. As a result, test results could lead to costly retrofits or
replacements.
The program is concurrently pursuing the original baseline MRAP,
various upgrades, and an MRAP II variant. In order to avoid a break in
production, orders for additional vehicles may be necessary before test
results are available for the upgrade efforts or the MRAP II.
DOD acknowledges that a long-term sustainability strategy and full life
cycle support cost estimate has yet to be established. This is an area
of risk that could have a large impact on DOD.
Agency Comments:
Joint Program Office officials provided technical comments, which were
incorporated. In commenting, officials characterized the test program
as phased to support key decisions in order to field the most
survivable vehicles as quickly as possible while addressing upgrades or
modifications in future testing. As developmental and operational tests
continue, vehicles will undergo additional reliability and durability
testing. Changes resulting from these tests will be incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS).
Source: Lockheed Martin, © 2007 Lockheed Martin.
[End of figure]
The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to
provide a worldwide, multi-service population of mobile and fixed-site
terminal users with an increase in narrowband communications capacity
and improved availability for small terminals. It is to replace the
Ultra High Frequency Follow-On satellite system currently in operation
and provide interoperability with legacy terminals. MUOS consists of a
network of satellites and an integrated ground network. We assessed
both the space and ground segments.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (9/02);
Development start: (9/04);
Design review: (3/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Production decision: (2/08);
On-orbit capability: (3/10);
Full capability: (3/14).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems;
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,808.3 million;
* Procurement: $2,353.3 million;
Total funding: $4,184.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 4.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 09/2004: $3,464.2;
Latest, 08/2007: $3,574.1;
Percent change: 3.2.
Procurement cost;
As of 09/2004: $2,882.4;
Latest, 08/2007: $2,353.3;
Percent change: -18.3.
Total program cost;
As of 09/2004: $6,383.4;
Latest, 08/2007: $5,991.7;
Percent change: -6.1.
Program unit cost;
As of 09/2004: $1,063.893;
Latest, 08/2007: $998.609;
Percent change: -6.1.
Total quantities;
As of 09/2004: 6;
Latest, 08/2007: 6;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 09/2004: 91;
Latest, 08/2007: 91;
Percent change: -27.4.
[End of table]
In September 2004, the MUOS program was authorized to begin
development. All of the program's critical technologies are mature, and
about 95 percent of design drawings had been completed at the critical
design review in March 2007. Production maturity could not be
determined because the program does not collect statistical process
control data. The delivery of MUOS capabilities has become time-
critical due to the operational failure of two UHF Follow-On
satellites. The program is at risk of cost and schedule growth, and
problems encountered under the Joint Tactical Radio System program may
result in underutilization of MUOS capabilities.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MUOS Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, all critical technologies are mature.
Design Stability:
At critical design review, about 95 percent of the expected number of
design drawings had been completed. According to the program office,
the size of the spacecraft at critical design review was much larger
than at development start. The program considers satellite mass growth
to be of moderate risk to the program. If the mass of the spacecraft
grows to exceed the capability of the planned launch vehicle, design
changes to the spacecraft would be made which could reduce mission
performance. The program stated that this risk can be eliminated in
2008 if more than 50 percent of the predicted spacecraft mass has been
validated with actual values and launch vehicle mass margins are not
exceeded. According to the program office, as of November 2007,
satellite mass had remained stable since the completion of critical
design review.
Production Maturity:
The program office does not collect statistical process control data.
However, it is collecting and tracking data on defects in manufacturing
processes to assess the maturity of MUOS production. The program began
production activities in May 2007 after the contractor successfully
completed a production readiness review.
Other Program Issues:
The importance of the first MUOS launch has increased due to the
unexpected failures of two UHF Follow-On satellites, one in June 2005
and another in September 2006. As a result, UHF communication
capabilities are predicted to degrade below the required level of
availability in February 2009, 14 months before the first MUOS
satellite is to become operational. DOD is examining options for
addressing this capability gap, including developing an integrated
waveform to increase communications capacity provided by existing
satellites and continuing to lease additional satellite communications
capacity. Additionally, U.S. Strategic Command has tasked the
Operationally Responsive Space office to review and identify other
potential near-term options to augment UHF satellite communications.
While the MUOS space segment is only slightly behind schedule,
contractor costs have increased over budget. Through October 2007,
space segment costs were about $149 million, or about 32 percent, over
the contractor's initial estimate due primarily to subcontract cost
increases, piece part material cost increases, the addition of
personnel to resolve design issues and test anomalies, and higher costs
for increases in satellite structure size. The program office does not
expect the trend in cost increases to breach the program office's cost
estimate.
According to the program office, development of MUOS ground software
represents one of the highest risks to the program due to the size and
complexity of the contractor's design. As of September 2007, software
development was nearly on schedule, with about 70 percent of the total
effort complete. However, the program office projects the effort to
cost $251 million, 54 percent over the initial contractor estimate of
about $163 million. Additionally, a May 2007 independent software
review concluded the development is at high risk for cost increases and
schedule delays due, in part, to an optimistic assumption of software
development productivity and code growth.
Full utilization of MUOS capabilities is dependent on the fielding of
terminals developed by the Joint Tactical Radio System program.
However, development problems encountered under the JTRS program have
resulted in deferrals of requirements and have increased risk that MUOS
capabilities will be underutilized until MUOS-compliant terminals are
fielded. According to the program office, MUOS satellites can be
launched and their legacy payload capability can be used to support
warfighter requirements if problems are encountered with MUOS ground
software and/or JTRS synchronization.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control.
Source: Global Positioning Systems Wing.
[End of figure]
GPS is an Air Force-led joint program with the Army, Navy, Department
of Transportation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, United
Kingdom, and Australia. This space-based radio-positioning system
nominally consists of a 24-satellite constellation providing navigation
and timing data to military and civilian users worldwide. In 2000,
Congress approved the modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF
satellites. In addition to satellites, GPS includes a control system
and receiver units. We focused our review on Block IIF.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (1/99);
Development start: (2/00);
Production decision: (7/02);
GAO review: (1/08);
First satellite launch: (1/09);
Initial capability: (NA).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing, Lockheed Martin;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $362.9 million;
* Procurement: $641.9 million;
Total funding: $1,004.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 02/2002: $2,090.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $2,597.4;
Percent change: 24.2.
Procurement cost;
As of 02/2002: $3,813.3;
Latest, 12/2006: $4,459.3;
Percent change: 16.9.
Total program cost;
As of 02/2002: $5,904.2;
Latest, 12/2006: $7,056.7;
Percent change: 19.5.
Program unit cost;
As of 02/2002: $178.915;
Latest, 12/2006: $213.841;
Percent change: 19.5.
Total quantities;
As of 02/2002: 33;
Latest, 12/2006: 33;
Percent change: 0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 02/2002: TBD;
Latest, 12/2006: TBD;
Percent change: TBD.
[End of table]
The program office estimates that the launch of the first Block IIF
satellite will be delayed to January 2009, over two years from its
original launch estimate. This delay is due to risks and challenges in
working through development and production concerns, such as technical
issues with signal capabilities. The program also continues to
experience development and production cost overruns. In addition,
problems with control system software development have resulted in the
deferral of requirements and commensurate capabilities.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
NAVSTAR GPS-Space & Control Program:
Technology Maturity:
The Block IIF critical technology--space--qualified atomic frequency
standards-is mature.
Design Stability:
We could not assess design stability because the Block IIF contract
does not require that design drawings be delivered to the program.
According to the program office, it assesses design maturity through
reviews of contractor testing, technical interchange meetings, periodic
program reviews, and participation in the contractor development
process.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the contractor is not
required to collect statistical process control data on the Block IIF
satellite development and production contract.
Other Program Issues:
The program estimates that the launch of the first Block IIF satellite
will be delayed over 2 years from its original launch date (December
2006 to January 2009), due in part to (1) late hardware deliveries, (2)
technical challenges with signal transponders, and (3) the addition of
mission assurance activities. Recently, the program successfully
completed the integration of new software for the control segment that
will replace the legacy mainframe system and provide command and
control capability. However, additional critical tests such as thermal
vacuum testing are still needed to confirm the satellite's ability to
operate in the harsh space environment.
The program continues to experience cost increases due to technical
problems resulting in production cost overruns. In fiscal year 2006,
the Air Force reprogrammed an additional $148 million into the Block
IIF program to cover the contractor's estimate for production of the
first three satellites. At the same time, the Air Force requested an
addition $66 million in fiscal year 2008 and $46 million in fiscal year
2009 to cover the government's independent estimate for production of
these satellites.
Ongoing delays with software development for the Block IIF control
system have resulted in the deferral of requirements to the future
control segment of the next generation of GPS satellites. The program
expects this deferral to reduce control system costs to the Block IIF
segment by $101 million, which could then be used to offset the
contractor cost overruns.
A DOD report recently found that the development of GPS user equipment-
-under separately funded and managed programs--has not been
synchronized with the development of the satellites and control system,
increasing the risk of substantial delays in realistic operational
testing and fielding of capabilities.
GPS III, the next generation of satellites, recently experienced a
budget cut of $100 million. In addition, the current launch date for
the first GPS III satellite has slipped from 2013 to 2014. According to
program officials, the potential gap in capabilities will occur between
the time the last GPS IIF satellite is launched (currently scheduled
for around 2012) and the first GPS III satellite is launched.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force concurred with this assessment and provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS).
Source: NPOESS Integrated Program Office.
[End of figure]
NPOESS is a tri-agency--National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration--
satellite program to monitor the weather and environment through the
year 2026. Current NOAA and DOD satellites will be merged into a single
national system. NOAA and DOD each provide 50 percent of the funding
for NPOESS. The program consists of four segments: space; command,
control, and communications; interface data processing; and the launch
segment. We assessed the space segment.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (3/97);
Development start/production decision: (8/02);
GAO review: (1/08);
First satellite launch: (1/13);
Initial capability: (10/13).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology;
Program office: Silver Spring, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $3,798.1 million;
* Procurement: $2,816.6 million;
Total funding: $6,614.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 2.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2002: $5,044.4;
Latest, 08/2007: $7,892.5;
Percent change: 56.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2002: $1,302.2;
Latest, 08/2007: $2,816.6;
Percent change: 116.3.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2002: $6,346.6;
Latest, 08/2007: $10,709.1;
Percent change: 68.7.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2002: $1,057.758;
Latest, 08/2007: $2,677.286;
Percent change: 153.1.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2002: 6;
Latest, 08/2007: 4;
Percent change: -33.3.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2002: 172;
Latest, 08/2007: 200;
Percent change: 16.3.
[End of table]
In July 2007, the NPOESS program restructure was finalized in response
to a Nunn-McCurdy program acquisition unit cost breach of the critical
cost growth threshold. As part of the restructure, seven of the
original 14 critical technologies were removed from the program. Of the
remaining technologies, three are immature but are expected to be
mature by the design review in April 2009. While the program
restructure lowered risk for future cost and schedule problems, it
increased the risk of a satellite coverage gap and significantly
reduced climate data collection capabilities. As of November 2007,
about 75 percent of the design drawings had been released. Production
maturity could not be assessed because the program is not collecting
statistical process control data.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
NPOESS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Only one of the program's 14 original critical technologies was mature
at the development and production decision in August 2002. As part of
the program's restructure, seven of the critical technologies were
removed from the program. Of the remaining seven technologies, four are
mature, and the program projects that all will be mature by the design
review in April 2009.
The primary purpose of the NPOESS Preparatory Project, an effort funded
by NASA to develop and operate a demonstration satellite, is to reduce
development risk by providing processing centers with an early
opportunity to work with sensors, ground control, and data-processing
systems and allow for incorporating lessons learned into the four
NPOESS satellites. Under the restructured NPOESS program, the satellite
is expected to demonstrate the performance of three of four sensors
deemed critical (because they are to provide data for key weather
products) and one noncritical sensor in an operational environment. The
launch of this satellite has been delayed about 40 months to September
2009.
Design Stability:
In August 2002, the program began development and production before
achieving design stability or production maturity. The program office
revised the estimated number of design drawings to accommodate the
deletion of a major sensor and estimates a total of 6,648 drawings. As
of November 2007, about 75 percent of the drawings had been released.
The design review date has been delayed 36 months to April 2009.
Production Maturity:
The program office does not collect statistical process control data
due to the small number of satellites to be built. However, program
officials stated that the contractors track and use various metrics for
subcomponent production, such as rework percentages, defect
containment, and schedule and cost performance.
Other Program Issues:
In response to a Nunn-McCurdy program acquisition unit cost breach of
the critical cost growth threshold, the program office, in conjunction
with the prime contractor, completed a program restructuring of NPOESS
in July 2007. The restructure included acquiring fewer satellites, an
overall increase in program costs, delays in satellite launches, and
deletions or replacements of satellite sensors.
At an estimated life cycle cost of about $12.5 billion through 2026 for
four satellites, the cost of the restructured NPOESS program is about
$4.1 billion over the previous cost estimate of $8.4 billion for six
satellites. The launch of the first satellite has been delayed from
November 2009 to January 2013. The launch of the second satellite has
been delayed from June 2011 to January 2016. As we recently reported,
the delayed launches of fewer satellites will result in reduced
satellite data collection coverage, requiring dependence on a European
satellite for coverage during midmorning hours. Additionally, the
launch delays increase the risk of a coverage gap for the existing
constellation of satellites should there be premature satellite
failures or unsuccessful launches of legacy satellites.
The restructured program also deleted four of 13 original instruments
and reduced the functionality of four sensors. As a result, the revised
NPOESS system will have significantly less capability for providing
global climate measures than was originally planned. According to the
program office, key performance parameters, or critical user
requirements, have not changed as a result of the revised program.
Consequently, the reduced capability of the system will not meet all
critical requirements.
As we recently reported, the program office has made progress in the
acquisition since the restructure. However, significant risks remain.
For example, two critical sensors have experienced major developmental
problems, adding risk to the Preparatory Project schedule, which could
have associated impacts on schedule and costs of the overall program.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the NPOESS Integrated
Program Office noted that while the NPOESS system will not meet all
critical science requirements, it is expected to meet all critical
operational weather requirements and provide considerable science
benefit.
[End of section]
P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft.
Source: The Boeing Company.
[End of figure]
The Navy's P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A), a militarized
version of the Boeing 737, is the replacement for the P-3C. Its primary
roles are persistent antisubmarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The P-8A shares an
integrated maritime patrol mission with the Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System and the EPX (formerly the Navy
Aerial Common Sensor). These systems are intended to sustain and
improve the Navy's maritime warfighting capability.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (3/00);
Development start: (5/04);
Design review: (6/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Low-rate decision: (5/10);
Full-rate decision: (4/13);
Initial capability: (7/13);
Last procurement: (2017).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $3,886.9 million;
* Procurement: $21,969.1 million;
Total funding: $25,968.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 108.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2004: $7,152.7;
Latest, 08/2007: $6,669.9;
Percent change: -6.7.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2004: $22,190.3;
Latest, 08/2007: $21,969.1;
Percent change: -0.9.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2004: $29,473.8;
Latest, 08/2007: $28,773.6;
Percent change: -2.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2004: $256.294;
Latest, 08/2007: $252.400;
Percent change: -1.5.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2004: 115;
Latest, 08/2007: 114;
Percent change: -0.7.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2004: 160;
Latest, 08/2007: 160;
Percent change: 0.
Figures shown are based on the December 2006 Selected Acquisition
Report and do not reflect the total cost increase discussed below and
in the Other Program Issues section.
[End of table]
The P-8A program entered development with four critical technologies.
Since then, the program has removed one critical technology, replaced
two with backups, and added a new critical technology. Of the current
critical technologies, only one is mature. The program office completed
critical design review (CDR) in June 2007 and design readiness review
(DRR) in August 2007. However, only 70 percent of the design drawings
were complete at CDR. The P-8A has experienced a $1.2 billion contract
cost increase due to inefficiencies in the release of design drawings,
software development risks, and subcontractor cost and scope increases.
Further, the program office is currently assessing how its production
aircraft will meet the specialty metals provision of the Berry
Amendment.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
P-8A MMA Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of the P-8A's initial four critical technologies were mature when
it entered development in May 2004. The program identified mature
backup technologies for each of the four, which, according to program
officials, would still allow the P-8A to meet minimum requirements.
Last year, we reported that the acoustic bellringer algorithm
technology was replaced with a less capable but more mature backup.
More recently, during a technology readiness assessment in November
2006, the program made significant changes to the critical technologies
list. First, the integrated rotary sonobuoy launcher was removed from
the critical technologies list. While the program still plans to
utilize this technology, it was recategorized as a developmental risk.
As such, it may not be fully mature prior to production and could lead
to delays should design changes or a backup technology be necessary.
Second, the program replaced the data fusion technology with its
backup. Program officials stated that alternative algorithms can be
utilized in place of the data fusion technology, which will provide
less capable data fusion, but will still meet minimum P-8A
requirements. Third, the Magnetic Anomaly Detector Control Surface
Compensation Algorithms were added as a critical technology. These
compensation algorithms, needed to reduce noise interference, pose an
additional technical risk because they have not been tested on an
aircraft. The program currently estimates that this technology will
reach maturity by low rate decision in 2010, which is 6 years later
than recommended best practices. Finally, the ESM digital receiver,
which is being leveraged from the EA-18G program, is currently the only
critical technology for the program that has been demonstrated in a
realistic environment, and is considered mature.
Design Stability:
The P-8A program released only 70 percent of its design drawings to the
manufacturer by CDR in June 2007. According to P-8A officials, the
program experienced schedule delays and cost increases associated with
the completion and release of design drawings because of contractor
coordination problems. The Navy endorsed funding for four operational
flight test aircraft in September 2007.
Production Maturity:
The contractor has estimated that the cost of producing an aircraft
that is compliant with the specialty metals provision of the Berry
Amendment would be significantly greater than current program cost
estimates. The program office is currently assessing how its production
aircraft will comply with these restrictions.
The P-8A will undergo structural modifications while on the production
line. This effort to reduce production time and cost represents the
first time that DOD will attempt to militarize an aircraft on a
commercial production line and has added risk to the program.
Other Program Issues:
As of June 2007, the System Development and Demonstration contract
costs had risen from $3.8 billion to $5.0 billion as a result of
contract modifications to address software development risks as well as
delays in releasing system design drawings. This will delay the build
and delivery dates for the seven aircraft test articles by 7 to 14
months. The cost increase was also driven by subcontractor/supplier
issues, according to the program office. For example, at the
subcontractor level, some development costs have exceeded estimates and
schedules have slipped. Despite the cost increase and delays, the
program is still attempting to meet its milestones and cost targets by
combining the developmental and operational test programs.
Because the P-8A mission overlaps with that of the BAMS UAS, changes or
delays in the development of that program may result in the need to
procure additional P-8A aircraft. See page 51 for more information on
BAMS UAS.
Agency Comments:
The program office states that the maturation of critical technologies
is on schedule to support the System Development and Demonstration
phase. The airplane remains about 60-65 percent common with the
commercial 737. Although contract costs have grown, they remain below
the program objective value for development cost parameters and below
the system development cost estimates. The program continues to meet or
exceed the cost, schedule, and performance parameters defined in the P-
8A Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement.
[End of section]
PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit.
Source: Lower Tier Project Office, Combined Aggregate Program (LTPO-
CAP).
[End of figure]
The Army's Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) transitions
the Patriot missile system to MEADS. MEADS's mission is to provide low
to medium altitude air and missile defense with the capability to
counter, defeat, or destroy tactical ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, or other air-breathing threats. MEADS is a codevelopment
program among the United States, Germany, and Italy. We assessed the
MEADS fire unit portion of the program that includes the launchers,
radars, Battle Management component, and launcher reloaders.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: (8/04);
GAO review: (1/08);
Design review: (10/09);
Initial production decision: (11/12);
Last production decision: (3/17);
Initial capability: (9/17).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: MEADS International;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $4,023.3 million;
* Procurement: $12,851.5 million;
Total funding: $16,874.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 48.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2004: $5,041.1;
Latest, 12/2006: $4,746.8;
Percent change: -5.8.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2004: $13,348.6;
Latest, 12/2006: $12,851.5;
Percent change: -3.7.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2004: $18,389.7;
Latest, 12/2006: $17,598.3;
Percent change: -4.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2004: $383.119;
Latest, 12/2006: $366.631;
Percent change: -4.3.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2004: 48;
Latest, 12/2006: 48;
Percent change: 0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2004: 158;
Latest, 12/2006: 157;
Percent change: -0.6.
[End of table]
MEADS fire unit began development in 2004 with two mature critical
technologies, three critical technologies nearing maturity, and one
immature critical technology. The technologies remain at these levels.
Program plans call for a system design review in 2009, but officials
estimate that only one of the six fire unit technologies will be more
mature at that time than at development start. The program office
anticipates that all critical technologies will be mature by the start
of production in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013.
Current plans call for insertion of MEADS components into Patriot Fire
Units beginning with acquisition decisions in 2008 and continuing in
2010 and 2013. However, MEADS will need to rebaseline its program cost
and schedule because development of the Battle Management component is
being transferred to the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Project
Office.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit Program:
Technology Maturity:
Only two of the six critical technologies--the launcher electronics and
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile integration--are mature.
Three other critical technologies--the low noise exciter that manages
the radars' frequencies, the cooling system for the radars, and a slip
ring that carries power and coolants to the radars--are nearing
maturity. The remaining critical technology--the fire control radar
transmit/receive module--is immature.
The program office estimates that the maturity level of the low noise
exciter, the radar cooling system, and the slip ring will remain
unchanged when product development begins and that the transmit receive
module will be nearing full maturity. The office expects all critical
technologies to be fully mature by the start of production in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2013. There are no backup technologies for any
of the MEADS critical technologies.
Design Stability:
We could not assess the design stability of MEADS because the number of
releasable drawings and total drawings expected was not available. The
program office expects to identify the total number of releasable
drawings at a design review scheduled in 2009.
Other Program Issues:
MEADS is being developed to employ the PAC-3 Missile Segment
Enhancement variant. The Missile Segment Enhancement is funded by the
U.S. to improve on the current PAC-3 missile capability. Program
estimates indicate that the Army plans to develop and procure missiles
at a cost of approximately $6.1 billion. We did not assess the Missile
Segment Enhancement variant of the PAC-3, and the associated costs are
not included in our funding information.
The MEADS program adopted an acquisition approach wherein MEADS major
items are incrementally inserted into the current Patriot force. The
three insertions will be based on acquisition decisions in 2008, 2010,
and 2013 and each increment is expected to physically introduce new or
upgraded capability into the program in 2009, 2011, and 2015.
A 2006 Army initiative, to provide a common Battle Management system
for MEADS and other Army air and missile defense systems has in part,
resulted in the establishment of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Project Office that will lead the Battle Management component
development effort. According to the MEADS program office, because
MEADS CAP is dependent on the Battle Management Command component, it
cannot execute its schedule as planned and will need to rebaseline the
program cost and schedule after the Integrated Air and Missile Defense
system development demonstration decision in March 2009.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High.
Source: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, Sunnyvale, Calif,
© 2007 Lockheed Martin Corporation.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's SBIRS High satellite system is intended to meet
requirements for missile warning, missile defense, technical
intelligence, and battlespace awareness missions. A planned replacement
for the Defense Support Program, SBIRS High is a constellation of four
satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), two sensors on host
satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and fixed and mobile
ground stations. Last year, two additional HEO sensors were authorized
for procurement. We assessed the space segment.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (2/95);
Development start: (10/96);
Design review/production decision: (8/01);
First sensor delivery: (8/04);
Second sensor delivery: (9/05);
GAO review: (1/08);
First satellite delivery: (11/09);
Second satellite delivery: (11/10).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,697.8 million;
* Procurement: $1,572.0 million;
Total funding: $3,329.6 million;
Procurement quantity: 1.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/1996: $4,156.1;
Latest, 12/2006: $8,542.7;
Percent change: 105.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/1996: 0;
Latest, 12/2006: $1,682.7;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 10/1996: $4,365.2;
Latest, 12/2006: $10,470.4;
Percent change: 139.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/1996: $873.041;
Latest, 12/2006: $3,490.125;
Percent change: 299.9.
Total quantities;
As of 10/1996: 5;
Latest, 12/2006: 3;
Percent change: -40.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/1996: TBD;
Latest, 12/2006: TBD;
Percent change: TBD.
[End of table]
The SBIRS High program's critical technologies are mature. Based on the
number of design drawings released and the total number expected, the
design is considered mature. Production maturity could not be
determined because the contractor does not collect production
statistical process control data. After delays of 18 and 21 months, two
HEO sensors have been delivered. According to program officials, the
first sensor's on-orbit performance is exceeding expectations. The
first GEO satellite launch is estimated for December 2009, representing
a schedule slip of about a year, and program office confidence in this
estimate is moderate. Further, design problems have recently emerged
and additional schedule slippage of the GEO launches is possible.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
SBIRS High Program:
Technology Maturity:
The SBIRS High program's critical technologies are mature.
Design Stability:
The program's design is considered stable since almost all drawings
have been released, but design-related problems could still emerge.
Design problems delayed the delivery of the first two HEO sensors and
increased program costs. A design flaw recently identified on the GEO
satellites will likely delay the launch of the first satellite and
increase costs. Specifically, the flight software that controls the
health and status of the space vehicle was found to be inadequate.
Correcting the problem may necessitate hardware and software changes
that could, according to the Air Force, cause a minimum delay of 1 year
and cost increases of up to $1 billion. The complexity of the GEO
satellites is greater than that of the HEO sensors, and as of September
2007, only 20 percent of planned integration testing on the first
satellite was complete. As such, there is high probability that further
design flaws may be discovered, leading to more cost and schedule
increases.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess production maturity because the contractor does not
collect statistical process control data. The program tracks and
assesses production maturity by reviewing monthly test data and
updates.
Other Program Issues:
Recent program assessments by the Defense Contract Management Agency
indicate cost and schedule variances are high risk, and worsening. The
cost variance at completion is over $133 million, more than five times
what we noted in our September 2007 report. Cost and schedule variances
are expected to increase due to spacecraft rework, software redesign,
and delays in integration and test activities. Software overall is
considered high risk, due in part to the need for redesign.
The program continues to have problems with its flight software system
and the pointing and control assembly software. DCMA reported that the
flight software system is more than 50 percent behind schedule due to
replanning and testing delays, and delivery of the pointing and control
assembly software is about 45 percent behind schedule due in part to
poor planning and execution, slips in rehearsal activities, and
problems with the ground system. Software problems have already delayed
the first GEO satellite launch by about a year.
While program officials are expected to implement the program within
the existing funding profile, they acknowledge that management reserves
set aside to fix unexpected problems will likely be depleted in early
2009. Subsequent problems may further affect cost and schedule.
In December 2005, the Air Force was directed to begin efforts to
develop a viable competing capability in parallel with the SBIRS
program, previously known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System
(AIRSS). We reported in September 2007 that the Air Force had not
positioned the AIRSS effort for success, because knowledge that could
inform technology development and design was not fully leveraged. DOD
agreed, revised the effort's development strategy, and gave it a new
name--the Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS). Sensor
development under 3GIRS--now a follow-on to the SBIRS High program--
continues, and sensor prototypes are slated for delivery around March
2008.
Agency Comments:
According to the program office, the first GEO space vehicle and
payload have completed thermal vacuum testing, and the satellite is
completing the first phase of a test to verify system interfaces and
demonstrate connectivity. The principal SBIRS activity is completing
first-time integration of a complex satellite, and is designed to
discover issues. While the recent flight software issues are
disappointing, the recovery plan presented in November 2007 to the
Secretary of the Air Force and the Defense Acquisition Executive is
expected to succeed. The Air Force further expects that correcting the
problem will cost well below the original estimate of $1 billion
dollars.
[End of section]
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II.
Source: SDB II Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's Small Diameter Bomb Increment II will provide the
capability to attack mobile targets from standoff range in adverse
weather. The program builds on a previous increment that provided
capability against fixed targets. SDB II will add capability for
multiple kills per pass, multiple ordnance carriage, near-precision
munitions, and reduced munitions footprint. SDB II will be installed on
the Air Force F-15E and the Navy and Marine Corps Joint Strike Fighter,
and is designed to work with other aircraft, such as the F-22A.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Competitive risk reduction start: (5/06);
GAO review: (1/08);
Competitive down selection: (9/09);
Development start: (12/09);
Low-rate decision: (12/12);
Initial capability: (9/14);
Last procurement: (TBD).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing, Raytheon;
Program office: Eglin AFB, Fla.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $627.8 million;
* Procurement: TBD;
Total funding: $627.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 12,000.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $765.4;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 12,046;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 57;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
Two of the five critical technologies for SDB II are currently in use
on legacy Air Force and Navy systems. All technologies are expected to
be nearing full maturity by development start in December 2009. In May
2006, the Air Force awarded competitive risk-reduction contracts to
Boeing and Raytheon. The 42-month risk reduction phase is expected to
allow the contractors to further develop the immature technologies. The
contractors will compete for the system development and demonstration
contract, which the program plans to award in December 2009. Each
competing contractor is attempting to reach critical design review-
level maturity. If achieved, this will allow the program to focus
development efforts on qualification, validation, and testing. The
first SDB II delivery is expected in fiscal year 2014.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
SDB II Program:
Technology Maturity:
While the program office reports that two of the technologies are
mature, that assessment refers to their use on legacy Air Force and
Navy systems. The technologies' application to SDB II-specific
requirements still requires additional development work. Three other
technologies, the multimode seeker, net-ready data link, and payload
(warhead and fuze), also need further development. According to program
officials, the seeker will be the most challenging technology to
demonstrate due to the complexity of the algorithms it will require and
the need to package the multi-mode seeker into a small volume. The
program's technology levels were assessed prior to beginning the risk
reduction phase, and their status will not be updated until the program
selects a single contractor design in December 2009. The program
expects that each critical technology will be mature or approaching
full maturity when the program begins system development and
demonstration, regardless of the winning contractor.
Program officials plan to mature these technologies through extensive
early testing using modeling and simulation techniques, and relying on
other programs that have used the same or similar technologies. Each
contractor will conduct these activities separately. In order to select
a winning design, the program plans to evaluate the level of technology
maturity achieved by each contractor during the risk reduction phase.
Design Stability:
The two SDB II contractors are competing under separate risk reduction
contracts. One contractor will be selected at the end of the risk
reduction phase for the system development and production efforts.
Specific details pertaining to each contractor's current design are
competition sensitive and contractor proprietary. The program office
utilizes a variety of program milestones and technical reviews to
assess each contractor's design stability. The program office will
further assess the contractors' progress through interim feedback
sessions. Additionally, the program office participates in contractor
risk reviews on a recurring basis to maintain insight into the system's
current design maturity. In order to maximize their chance of being
selected for the design and production contracts, the competing
contractors are attempting to reach critical design review level
maturity. If achieved, this will reduce system design risk carried
forward into the system development and demonstration phase.
Other Program Issues:
The government plans to procure the SDB II based on contractor-
developed and government-approved system performance specifications.
The requirements in the risk reduction contracts are performance-based,
whereby each contractor must meet a set of objectives stated in the
contract. As such, the contractors will control their own activities,
with the government maintaining insight and leveraging the competitive
environment to mitigate risk. Each contractor will submit system
performance specifications as part of its offer to the government for
system development. These specifications become contractually binding
once a single contractor is selected in fiscal year 2009. At that time,
the contractor will be accountable for system performance. Accordingly,
the contractor is responsible not only for the design of the weapon
system, but also for planning the developmental test and evaluation
program to verify the system performance. The government will assess
the contractor's verification efforts for adequacy before three major
decision points: award of the low-rate production contract, declaration
that the system is ready for dedicated operational test, and award of
the full-rate production contract after the beyond-low-rate production
assessment.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred
with the information presented and provided technical comments, which
were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Sky Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Sky Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS).
Source: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.
[End of figure]
The Army expects its Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft
System, Sky Warrior, to fill a capability gap for an unmanned aircraft
system at the division level. The system will include 12 aircraft,
ground control stations, ground and air data terminals, automatic
takeoff and landing systems, and ground support equipment. The Army
plans for Sky Warrior to operate alone or with other platforms such as
the Apache helicopter and perform missions including reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition and attack.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: (4/05);
Design review: (10/06);
GAO review: (1/08);
Low-rate decision: (7/08);
Full-rate decision: (2/10);
Initial capability: (3/10);
Last procurement: (TBD).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $111.3 million;
* Procurement: $1,463.1 million;
Total funding: $1,649.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 11.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/2005: $327.5;
Latest, 08/2007: $375.0;
Percent change: 14.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/2005: $636.9;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,161.6;
Percent change: 82.4.
Total program cost;
As of 04/2005: $964.2;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,536.7;
Percent change: 59.4.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/2005: $192.836;
Latest, 08/2007: $128.055;
Percent change: -33.1.
Total quantities;
As of 04/2005: 5;
Latest, 08/2007: 12;
Percent change: 140.0
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/2005: 50;
Latest, 08/2007: 59;
Percent change: 18.0.
Development and procurement costs and quantities shown are from program
inception through fiscal year 2015.
[End of table]
The maturity of Sky Warrior's four critical technologies remains the
same as reported last year, with two mature critical technologies and
two nearing maturity. The program office anticipates all technologies
will be mature by the time of production start, currently scheduled for
August 2008. There are backup technologies in place should the
technologies not mature as planned, but their use would result in a
less capable system. Program officials stated that 96 percent of
drawings have been released to manufacturing. However, the total number
of drawings increased by over 37 percent from the program office's
original projection at design review in October 2006. Program officials
indicated that the increase largely resulted from requirements changes
and redesign. DOD recently directed the Sky Warrior and Predator
programs be combined into a single program.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Sky Warrior UAS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Two of Sky Warrior's four critical technologies--the heavy fuel engine
and the automatic takeoff and landing system--are mature. The other two
critical technologies--the Ethernet and the tactical common data link-
-are nearing maturity. The Sky Warrior program office expects they will
be fully mature by the production start planned for August 2008.
The Ethernet is expected to provide communications between Sky Warrior
aircraft and ground control stations as well as interoperability with
other Army aviation platforms. Although the program office considers
the Ethernet a proven technology, there are no unmanned systems to date
that have employed it in the same way it will be used on the Sky
Warrior. The data link has been demonstrated on the Air Force's
Predator A unmanned aircraft system, but it has not yet been fielded on
any unmanned aerial vehicle.
The program office has technologies in place as backups for the
Ethernet and data link, but it does not anticipate their use. If it
became necessary to use the backups, they would result in a less
capable system. Backups for the data link are not mature or have slower
data transmission rates.
Design Stability:
Program officials stated that they have released 96 percent of drawings
to manufacturing. However, the Sky Warrior's design has proven more
difficult to mature than anticipated. The program office now
anticipates a total of 4,428 drawings, over 37 percent more than the
total expected at the time of the design review in October 2006.
According to program officials, several factors contributed to the
increased number of drawings. These include reliability and redundancy
improvements to the aircraft, requirement changes due to the Sky
Warrior's migration from a military intelligence asset to an aviation
asset, and redesign of the system's ground control station.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess Sky Warrior's production maturity because the
contractor does not use statistical process control as its metric.
Instead, the contractor employs global technology standards per the
International Standards Organization as its method for monitoring,
controlling, and improving processes. The Sky Warrior program office
stated that this approach is acceptable because Sky Warrior production
is relatively low volume, and the contractor generally employs nearly
100 percent testing of all critical items.
Other Program Issues:
In September 2007, DOD issued a memorandum directing that the Predator
and Sky Warrior programs be combined into a single acquisition program
in order to achieve common development, procurement, sustainment, and
training activities. The memo indicated that the two programs would
migrate to a single contract by October 2008. According to Sky Warrior
program officials, the impact of this direction on the program is not
yet known because all aspects of the merger are still being determined.
Agency Comments:
The Sky Warrior program office stated that the majority of the increase
in drawing numbers resulted from requirements changes as well as
technology improvements for enhancing system performance. The office
indicated that it believes Sky Warrior was designed in a reasonable
amount of time once final requirements were decided, and that it does
not feel the system design was more difficult to mature than
anticipated. Additionally, the office noted that although the Sky
Warrior contractor does not use statistical process control to assess
production maturity, the office itself employs measurements for that
purpose. Those measurements include design stability, infrastructure
tooling, test equipment, facilities, materials and personnel training,
and process capability.
[End of section]
Space Radar (SR):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Space Radar (SR).
Source: Space Radar Integrated Program Office.
[End of figure]
DOD and the intelligence community are collaborating to develop a
single common radar system to provide global, persistent, all-weather,
day and night, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities, particularly in denied areas. As envisioned by the
program office, SR is to consist of a constellation of low-earth-
orbiting satellites, ground systems, and communications network, and
would generate large volumes of radar data for transmission to ground-
, air-, ship-, and space-based platforms. We assessed the space
segment.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
GAO review: (1/08);
Development start: (6/09);
Design review: (4/12);
Production decision: (6/13).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD;
Program office: Chantilly, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: TBD;
* Procurement: TBD;
Total funding: TBD;
Procurement quantity: 8.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $12,219.5;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $5,290.6;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $19,400.4;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $1,940.041;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 10;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The SR program is supported by five critical technologies that remain
immature. The program office is focusing its efforts on technology risk
reduction and concept development activities. The Integrated Program
Office has made several changes to the acquisition approach, including
those related to cost and schedule, to address continuing concerns
about the affordability of SR. The program also revised its development
start date from the last quarter of 2008 to the third quarter of 2009,
an 8-month extension. Launch of the first SR satellite is scheduled for
fiscal year 2016. Design and production maturity could not be assessed
because SR has not begun product development.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
SR Program:
Technology Maturity:
The five critical technologies that we reported in our last assessment
of SR have not changed and remain immature. The technologies are the
advanced analog/digital converter, integrated radio frequency assembly,
low earth orbit laser communication terminals, surface moving target
indication processing algorithms, and open ocean surveillance
processing algorithms. According to program office officials, these
technologies will continue to evolve and reflect an initial attempt to
define what is critical to the program. Two prime contractors were
awarded risk reduction contracts to help mature SR's critical
technologies. These contractors are competing for SR's system
development contract and may have different approaches in how they plan
to provide a space radar capability, which could result in a different
set of critical technologies than currently defined by the program
office. The program office expects all critical technologies to be
mature when the product development phase begins in the third quarter
of 2009. However, as we reported in August 2007, the program office
will need to gain significant knowledge on these technologies to be
well positioned for success by program start.
Other Program Issues:
In January 2005, DOD and the intelligence community committed to pursue
a single space radar capability and have worked to establish a key
funding agreement that addresses short-term cost sharing
responsibilities. However, as we reported in August 2007, SR lacks a
long-term funding agreement beyond fiscal year 2013, adding uncertainty
to the ability of DOD and the intelligence community to afford
expensive programs such as SR. Additionally, recent changes have
occurred in the location of the SR budget--shifting from unclassified
Air Force accounts to a DOD classified program account. Specifically,
from the inception of the SR program, its budget and funding resided in
unclassified Air Force accounts. However, starting in fiscal year 2008,
the SR budget and funding were moved to the Defense Reconnaissance
Support Activities budget, and are now classified. The SR program
office estimates the cost of developing, producing, and operating the
system through 2027 to range from $20 billion to $25 billion, although
the cost is subject to change based on evolving program requirements.
While the program office continues to remain focused on developing a
single space radar system to meet user needs, other challenges remain.
The program office told us that it is adjusting its acquisition
approach to better balance capability, affordability, and risk through
incrementally evolving the SR capability. For fiscal year 2008, the
program office will focus on risk reduction and technology maturity
activities as well as continuing with requirements definition, modeling
and simulation, and joint systems engineering to ensure affordability
and achievability of the first SR satellites. The program office is
continuing its progress toward fully defining program requirements by
June 2009. However, the program has experienced some schedule delays,
and as we reported in August 2007, the SR program may not have planned
enough time for design, integration, and production activities, which
could result in further schedule delays. Our analysis showed that the
planned acquisition time frame from program start to initial launch
capability is shorter than what DOD has achieved or estimated for other
complex satellite systems.
At the time of this printing, we obtained an official statement from
the National Reconnaissance Office of Strategic Communications/Office
of Corporate Communication that DOD and the Intelligence Community have
decided not to pursue the Space Radar Program of Record, citing that
this program is not affordable and will be restructured immediately.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Air Force stated that the
SR Integrated Program Office is currently adjusting SR's acquisition
approach and is moving toward a progressive capabilities acquisition
strategy that better balances affordability with incremental capability
evolution. This new approach is expected to affect the current fiscal
year 2008 and beyond program plan. The 2008 Defense Appropriations
Conference report anticipates a revised plan in early calendar year
2008, and the SR Integrated Program Office is working toward that goal.
The Air Force also provided technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate.
[End of section]
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS).
Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation.
[End of figure]
MDA's STSS element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks designed to track enemy missiles throughout their flight. The
initial increment is composed of two demonstration satellites built
under the Space Based Infrared System Low program. MDA plans to launch
these satellites in 2008 to assess how well they work within the
context of the missile defense system. The agency is also studying
improvements to the STSS program, and it will be building next
generation satellites. We assessed the two demonstration satellites.
Timeline: Technology/system development to initial capability:
SBIRS-low program start: (1995);
Transition to MDA: (10/00);
STSS program start: (2002);
GAO review: (1/08);
Demonstrator satellite launch: (8/08-10/08);
Software upgrades: (2008).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $3,002.7 million;
* Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $3,002.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: $6,591.2;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: $6,591.2;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: 2;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 02/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include known costs and quantities from the program's inception
through fiscal year 2013.
[End of table]
All of the STSS program's five critical technologies are mature. The
STSS design appears otherwise stable, with all drawings released to
manufacturing. However, a thermal vacuum test on the first space
vehicle to assess the ability of the satellite to operate in the cold
vacuum of space took twice as long as scheduled, problems with STSS
integration caused the contractor to overrun its fiscal 2007 budget,
and higher priorities at the United Launch Alliance site moved the
program down on the launch priority list. These factors have delayed
the STSS launch until possibly as late as October 2008. However, this
date is dependent upon the successful integration of the sensor
payloads with the satellite platforms, sufficient fiscal year 2008
funding to support the new launch date, and launch site availability.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
STSS Program:
Technology Maturity:
All five critical technologies--satellite communication cross-links,
onboard processor, acquisition sensor, track sensor, and the single-
stage cryocooler--are mature. The last two technologies--track sensor
and the single-stage cryocooler--reached maturity when the thermal
vacuum testing on the first satellite's payload was completed in
February 2006.
Design Stability:
The STSS program's design is stable, with all drawings released to
manufacturing. When the STSS program started in 2002, design drawings
and the satellite components for the partially built satellites from
the Space Based Infrared System Low effort were released to
manufacturing. By the time STSS went through its design review in
November 2003, the program office had released all subsequent design
drawings.
Other Program Issues:
The launch of the demonstration satellites was delayed from 2007 to
2008 for several reasons. Since the satellites are legacy hardware
built under the former Space Based Infrared System Low program, there
are no spares available for testing, and the need to handle parts
carefully to avoid damage caused schedule delays. In addition, a number
of interface issues arose during thermal vacuum testing, causing the
test to take twice as long as scheduled. Further delays occurred when
problems with component hardware were recognized and when the launch
site encountered schedule conflicts.
The STSS contractor overran its fiscal year 2007 budget, and as such,
fiscal year 2007 funds were not available to launch the satellites. The
program office subsequently planned to launch the satellites during the
early part of fiscal year 2008, but the launch pad was already
occupied. Program officials did not want to commit to a new launch date
until the thermal vacuum testing for the second space vehicle was
completed. The program office is planning to have the satellites ready
to launch in July 2008, in time for a launch window in August 2008, but
a GPS satellite launch is scheduled for that time and the United Launch
Alliance site has announced it cannot support two simultaneous Delta II
missions. If the low STSS launch priority status is not upgraded, the
new launch date may be as late as October 2008. However, as currently
programmed, the fiscal year 2008 budget does not have sufficient funds
to support the launch.
Despite delays in hardware and software testing and integration, other
parts of the STSS program have proceeded according to schedule. Lessons
learned from the thermal vacuum test for the first satellite in these
areas facilitated the completion of the second satellite's thermal
vacuum test, which was complete in November 2007. In addition,
procedures for ground, flight, maintenance, and contingency, testing
have been developed and certified. The operations crew is moving toward
Final Readiness Certification and plans a March 2008 mission "dress
rehearsal" that will certify that the crew is ready to operate STSS.
Finally, the second part of the acceptance test for the STSS ground
component was completed in September 2007, and the command and control
capabilities of the ground segment will be demonstrated in a system
operability demonstration.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA concurred with the
information provided in this report.
[End of section]
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).
Source: THAAD Project Office.
[End of figure]
MDA's THAAD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks to provide a ground-based missile defense system able to defend
against short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD will
include missiles, a launcher, an X-band radar, and a fire control and
communications system. We assessed the design for the Block 2008
initial capability of one fire unit that MDA plans to deliver to the
Army in fiscal year 2009 for limited operational use.
Timeline: Technology/system development to initial capacity:
Program start: (1/92);
Transition to MDA: (10/01);
Block 2006 start: (1/06);
1st successful intercept: (7/06);
Contract award for fire units #1 and #2: (12/06);
Integrated BMDS test: (4/07);
Block 2006 completion: (12/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Partial capability date: (3rd Q/2009).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $4,136.7 million;
* Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $4,136.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 0;
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $15,561.4;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 0;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $15,561.4;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include known costs and quantities from the program's inception
through fiscal year 2013.
[End of table]
THAAD's technologies are mature and its design is generally stable,
with 94 percent of its design drawings released. During Block 2006, the
program continued to mature THAAD's design and expects to deliver a
limited operational capability during Block 2008. In fiscal year 2007,
the program successfully conducted three of four scheduled tests. Two
tests resulted in intercepts of unitary targets at different levels of
the atmosphere. A third test verified the interceptor's components
inside the atmosphere. According to program officials, the fourth test
was delayed until fiscal year 2008 due to quality assurance issues,
along with target and range availability. Additionally, the THAAD
program is overrunning its fiscal year 2007 cost budget by $91.1
million dollars. Rework and design complexities are the primary reasons
for the cost increase.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
THAAD Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials assessed all of THAAD's critical technologies as
mature. All of these technologies are included in four major
components: the fire control and communications component, the
interceptor, the launcher, and the radar.
Design Stability:
Approximately 94 percent of THAAD's 12,282 drawings have been released,
indicating that THAAD's design is stable. The number of drawings
increased from a 2003 design review because previously excluded
drawings were added for radar components, as well as for the missile
component.
The THAAD program rebaselined flight plans in fiscal year 2007 when MDA
directed the program to eliminate three flight tests from the test plan
because of budget pressures and limited target and range availability.
According to program officials, key objectives from the deleted flight
tests will be incorporated into other flight tests.
THAAD officials originally expected to complete four flight tests prior
to the end of fiscal year 2007 but instead were only able to conduct
three. Two tests resulted in successful intercepts of "Scud"-type
targets at different levels of the atmosphere, while the third test
successfully demonstrated component capability in a high-pressure
environment. The third test was the lowest altitude fly-out of a THAAD
interceptor to date. The fourth flight test has been delayed due to a
quality control issue with the interceptor and range and target
availability.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess THAAD's production maturity because the program is
only delivering test units until fiscal year 2009. MDA has purchased
two fire units while simultaneously conducting developmental
activities. The first will be delivered in fiscal year 2009, with the
second expected to become available during fiscal year 2010. Prior to a
production decision, the program office plans to assess production
maturity using risk assessments and verification reviews to ensure that
the contractor's processes are repeatable and of high quality.
Other Program Issues:
In fiscal year 2007, THAAD completed the transition of its test
facilities from the White Sands Missile Range to the Pacific Missile
Range Facility. This allows tests of the THAAD interceptor that were
previously constrained by space limitations at the White Sands Range.
Additionally, the transition enables other MDA elements to participate
in flight tests. For example, one test in fiscal year 2007 utilized
communications with the Aegis system as well as the communication link
with the Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications system.
Hardware issues and technical problems are causing the program's prime
contractor to experience negative cost variances. The variances can
primarily be attributed to the missile, launcher, and system test
components associated with the design and fabrication of the launch and
test support equipment. As of September 2007, the THAAD program was
overrunning its fiscal year 2007 cost budget by $91.1 million.
Agency Comments:
MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated where
appropriate.
[End of section]
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT)
logo.
Source: TSAT Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's TSAT system will provide high-data-rate military
satellite communications services to DOD users worldwide, including
mobile tactical warfighting elements. The system will provide
survivable, jam-resistant, global, secure, and general-purpose radio
frequency and laser cross-links with other air and space systems. The
TSAT system will consist of a constellation of five satellites, plus a
spare, a network management architecture, and a ground control system.
We assessed the satellites and the ground system.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
GAO review: (1/08);
Development start: (2nd Q/FY 2008);
Design review/production decision: (1st Q/FY 2012);
First satellite launch: (12/15).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems Solutions (TMOS);
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: TBD;
* Procurement: TBD;
Total funding: TBD;
Procurement quantity: 4.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $11,778.8;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $194.9;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $12,035.3;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: $2,005.888;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 6;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 08/2007: 99;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include costs and quantities budgeted as of fiscal year 2008.
[End of table]
According to the program office, all seven critical technologies are
mature. In April 2007, the TSAT program completed the systems design
review. Also, the maturity of the critical technologies was validated
by an independent technology readiness assessment in June 2007. A
Defense Space Acquisition Board is scheduled to convene in the second
quarter of fiscal year 2008 to determine if the overall TSAT program is
ready to enter the development phase. The first satellite launch has
been delayed by over 12 months due to a DOD decision that includes a
budget reduction to the TSAT program over concerns about an optimistic
schedule and synchronization with other programs in the Global
Information Grid.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
TSAT Program:
Technology Maturity:
On the basis of subsystem-level tests conducted in 2007 by the
contractors competing for the space segment contract, and verified by
an independent contractor, the Air Force determined that all of the
TSAT program's seven critical technologies are mature. Since our last
assessment, dynamic bandwidth and resource allocation, protected
bandwidth efficient modulation waveforms, and single-access laser
communication have reached maturity.
Other Program Issues:
According to program officials, the TSAT program had invested over $2
billion by the end of fiscal year 2007 for research, development, and
risk reduction activities. However, information on cost, design
stability, production maturity, or satellite software development
metrics will not be available until the TSAT program formally enters
the development phase and awards the space segment contract. At that
time, the program should also have an approved Acquisition Program
Baseline that includes validated requirements, total cost estimates for
the first block of satellites, and key milestone dates.
In December 2006, DOD issued a program decision memorandum that reduced
the TSAT program budget by $232 million for fiscal year 2008. According
to DOD officials, the budget reduction was due to concerns about an
overly optimistic TMOS (TSAT Mission Operations System--the ground
control system that will provide network management and the overall
network architecture), software development schedule, and the long-term
synchronization of TSAT with the terrestrial portion of the Global
Information Grid, including terminals and teleports. As a result, all
TSAT satellite launches were delayed by at least one year. The first
launch was delayed from October 2014 to late 2015.
The Air Force's fiscal year 2008 TSAT budget request included $481.9
million to award a contract to begin satellite development in the third
quarter of fiscal year 2008. According to DOD officials, the program is
scheduled to undergo a program review approximately 8 months after
space segment contract award to synchronize the space segment with TMOS
and systems engineering and integration efforts in order to establish a
TSAT-wide baseline.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
since the last assessment, the TSAT program Key Decision Point B (KDP-
B) Defense Space Acquisition Board has been postponed into the second
quarter of fiscal year 2008. The postponement will result in the delay
to the space segment contract award to no earlier than the third
quarter of fiscal year 2008.
According to Air Force officials, during the past year, TSAT has
successfully matured the key technologies and completed the TSAT system
design review. In accordance with National Security Space Acquisition
Policy 03-01, the independent technology readiness assessment,
Independent Program Assessment, and Independent Cost Estimate required
prior to KDP-B were completed in mid-2007.
[End of section]
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft.
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
The V-22 is a tilt rotor aircraft developed for Marine Corps, Air
Force, and Navy use. The MV-22 will replace Marine Corps CH-46E
helicopters. The MV-22 Block B variant addresses reliability and
maintenance concerns of earlier variants. The Block B variant was
deployed to Iraq in September 2007. The Special Operations CV-22
variant is undergoing its first operational tests and is scheduled for
fielding in 2009. Our assessment focuses on the MV-22 Block B but
relates to the CV-22 due to common design and manufacturing processes.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: (12/82);
Development start: (4/86);
Development restart: (9/94);
Full-rate decision: (9/05);
Initial capability: (6/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Last procurement: (2018).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Bell-Boeing;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $546.9 million;
* Procurement: $27,593.4 million;
Total funding: $28,203.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 345.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/1986: $4,033.2;
Latest, 12/2006: $12,473.9;
Percent change: 209.3.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/1986: $33,822.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $42,087.5;
Percent change: 24.4.
Total program cost;
As of 04/1986: $38,080.5;
Latest, 12/2006: $54,767.3;
Percent change: 43.8.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/1986: $41.709;
Latest, 12/2006: $119.579;
Percent change: 186.9.
Total quantities;
As of 04/1986: 913;
Latest, 12/2006: 458;
Percent change: -49.8.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/1986: 117;
Latest, 12/2006: 295;
Percent change: 152.1.
[End of table]
A number of design changes to the MV-22 Block B are under review,
including a fix for hydraulic fluid leaks that have contributed to
engine fires; a new troop seat design; reliability improvements for
desert or icy environment operations; and cost reduction initiatives.
The program office believes these design changes will address safety,
reliability, and performance concerns. The proposed multiyear
production contract would increase annual production rates but include
fewer aircraft than expected. Aircraft continue to be accepted with
deviations and waivers, and the contractor's ability to produce
aircraft at the higher rates is a concern, but it is being managed
closely by the program office. Earlier Block A aircraft continue to be
upgraded to the Block B design at a cost of $15 million to $20 million
per aircraft, according to program officials.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
V-22 Program:
Technology and Design Maturity:
The V-22 is being produced in blocks. Program officials state that,
based on DOD criteria, Block A technologies are considered mature. Some
Block A variants are being upgraded to the Block B configuration, which
is the deployable configuration There are a number of design changes
under review that could address safety, reliability, performance, and
cost issues with the Block B design. For example, a newly designed
crashworthy troop seat addresses deficiencies identified during testing
in 2000. The new troop seats, which will be installed on new production
aircraft, provide higher G-force load capabilities consistent with
current G-force load requirements. Program officials state, however,
that the aircraft structure was not designed to meet these new
increased G-force load requirements and it is possible that the
airframe's structural capability could be exceeded in certain crash
scenarios. The exact difference between the seat loading and the
airframe capability is being assessed to determine ways to strengthen
the airframe to better match the higher G-force load capabilities of
the troop seats now being installed.
Fires have recently occurred in the engine compartment due to leaking
hydraulic fluid coming into contact with hot engine parts, forcing the
program office to make design changes to components and couplings in
that area. Program officials are investigating whether the contractor
could make changes to the engine compartment drainage system or if all
hydraulic lines could be removed completely from the engine
compartments to keep this from occurring. In the near term, frequent
inspections are being conducted to check for hydraulic leaks.
Program officials are also concerned that aircraft reliability and
mission capability rates could be reduced when operating in desert
environments such as Iraq, where it is now deployed, and in icy
environments, such as Afghanistan. The effects of sand and dust on the
aircraft systems and ice protection system maturity may affect mission
capability rates. The program office states that both of these issues
are being tracked and could result in design changes, especially as
more maintenance experience is gained from deployment of the aircraft.
A number of engineering change proposals have been made that would
lower unit recurring flyaway cost to a level the contractor believes is
needed to generate foreign military sales. The program continues to
investigate ways to reduce the procurement cost of the aircraft.
Production Maturity:
In the Defense Appropriations and Authorization Acts for fiscal year
2007, Congress authorized and appropriated funds for the Navy to enter
into a multiyear contract for the V-22, beginning with the fiscal year
2008 program year. Negotiations for a multiyear procurement contract
are still under way. Original plans called for quickly increasing
annual production to 42 aircraft per year--a rate that is substantially
higher than the 11 aircraft per year the program was held to through
fiscal year 2006. The highest annual production rate planned for the
multiyear contract has since been decreased to 36 aircraft, and the
total quantities were reduced from 185 to 167 aircraft. The V-22
program recognizes the challenges with increasing the annual production
rate under the multiyear procurement contract, specifically the
inherent challenge of producing the fuselage and wing at separate
locations and then assembling them at a third site.
As reported in our last assessment, production aircraft continue to be
conditionally accepted with deviation and waiver issues. These included
erratic behavior of multifunction displays and anomalies during engine
start. The multifunction display behavior was addressed with a mission
computer software update that provided an alternative solution, but did
not determine the root cause, as it could not be replicated in the lab.
The engine start anomaly was addressed by design corrections. Also, new
government-furnished troops seats, which meet current G-force load
requirements, were not available for installation on all recently
delivered aircraft.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the V-22 program office
provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: VH-71 Presidential Helicopter.
Source: Presidential Helicopters Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Navy's VH-71 will be a dual-piloted, multi-engine helicopter
employed by Marine Helicopter Squadron One to provide safe, reliable,
and timely transportation for the President and Vice President of the
United States, heads of state, and others. When the President is
aboard, it will serve as the Commander in Chief's primary command and
control platform. The VH-71 will replace the VH-3D and VH-60N, and will
be developed in two increments. We assessed Increment I and made
observations on Increment II.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start/production decision: (1/05);
GAO review: (1/08);
Initial capability: (3/10).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Systems Integration;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,069.3 million;
* Procurement: $2,342.1 million;
Total funding: $3,411.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 20.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 02/2006: $3,825.4;
Latest, 09/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of 02/2006: $2,409.3;
Latest, 09/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 02/2006: $6,415.1;
Latest, 09/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of 02/2006: $278.916;
Latest, 09/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities; 23;
As of 02/2006: 23;
Latest, 09/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 02/2006: 57;
Latest, 09/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Increment I and II development and Increment I production are funded
with R&D funding. The program is being restructured and cost and cycle
time are expected to grow.
[End of table]
The VH-71 program began system development and committed to production
without fully maturing technologies, achieving design stability, or
demonstrating production maturity due to a high-risk schedule driven by
White House needs. The program is approaching full technology maturity
and design stability for Increment I. However, concurrency in design,
testing, and production continues to put the program at risk for cost
growth and schedule delays. Some Increment I performance requirements
have been deferred to Increment II, and weight issues continue to drive
performance risks. In 2006, the program office determined that the
Increment II program was not executable. It is reassessing this
increment and will be making cost, schedule, and performance trade-
offs; further cost growth and schedule delays are expected. This graph
depicts product knowledge for Increment I.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
VH-71 Program:
Technology Maturity:
The VH-71 program's two Increment I critical technologies, the
Communication and Subsystem Processing Embedded Resource Communication
Controller (CASPER) and Cockpit Control Display (CCD), were approaching
maturity when the program began development and committed to production
in January 2005. The program office now states the designation of these
technologies as critical was erroneous because these systems presented
integration, not maturity, risks. The CCD is now mature. However, the
CASPER has not been demonstrated in a realistic environment. According
to a program official, the CASPER has only been tested in a lab and has
not been subjected to the movements and vibrations it will experience
during flight. Our assessment does not include classified portions of
this program.
The VH-71 program does not expect to identify any critical technologies
for Increment II. However, the program office is tracking three items-
-an advanced blade design, voice-over Internet protocol security, and
the automatic flight computer system--because of potential technology
maturity concerns. According to the program office, these items are
still in the early stages of development but are based on existing
technologies or systems. For example, the basic technology of the
advanced blade design is fielded on another helicopter, but the rotor
disc is being increased in size from 45 feet to 64 feet, a change that
could pose potential technology issues.
Design Stability and Production Maturity:
In January 2005, the VH-71 program committed to the production of five
aircraft without a final design or fully defined production processes.
The program's August 2006 design review was held 10 months later than
planned and did not meet the Navy's criteria for a successful system-
level review. An additional design review took place in February 2007.
Currently, 86 percent of the Increment I drawings are releasable to
manufacturing. However, according to Defense Contract Management Agency
officials, there are still changes being made to the design that affect
the basic aircraft. There are approximately 30 to 40 new specification
change notices per month, and that trend is not abating. While DCMA
does not see this as a high number, it does point to continuing design
changes, which may result in retrofitting of the five pilot production
aircraft. Weight growth has negatively affected the projected
performance of the Increment I aircraft and could affect the program's
ability to meet the range requirement for Increment II. Concurrency in
design, testing, and production, also continues to drive the risk of
cost growth and schedule delays on the program.
Other Program Issues:
The VH-71 program is currently in the midst of restructuring Increment
II. Changes to this portion of the program could entail significant
cost and schedule increases. Even before these changes, the cost of the
VH-71 prime contract was projected to increase by over $1 billion.
Earned value data from July 2007 showed that the estimated price of the
contract increased almost $741 million dollars. According to the
program office, there is an additional $300 million in out-of-scope
work that has not yet been put on contract. The effect of these
contract cost increases on the overall cost of the program will likely
not be known until after the program has a new acquisition strategy.
DOD officials have also stated that a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach is
imminent for this program. However, a stop work order has been issued
for Increment II development efforts, leaving future program direction
and costs unknown at this time.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
VH-71 Increment I program is executing an accelerated schedule driven
by an urgent White House need to replace existing aging assets.
Concurrency in development, design, and production to meet the
accelerated schedule is acknowledged as high risk and is part of the
program's approved acquisition strategy. As noted in our assessment,
the Navy said that program mitigation plans include conducting
performance trade-offs by deferring Increment I requirements to
Increment II with customer agreement. Performance trade-offs have been
made, and an assessment of these trades along with program impacts on
Increment II cost and schedule is ongoing. According to the Navy, the
concurrency described in our assessment of Increment I design, testing,
and production will be significantly reduced and/or removed in the
revised Increment II program, which will follow a more typical
acquisition approach.
[End of section]
Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN 774):
[See PDF for image]
Photograph: Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN 774).
Source: General Dynamics Electric Boat.
[End of figure]
The Virginia-class attack submarine is designed to combat enemy
submarines and surface ships, fire cruise missiles, and provide
improved surveillance and special operation support to enhance littoral
warfare. The Navy is working to reduce construction costs by about $400
million per ship by fiscal year 2012. The Technology Insertion Program
(TIP) consists of three technologies designed to improve performance
and lower construction costs of these ships. We assessed the status of
the Navy's cost reduction efforts and progress of the TIP.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start: (6/95);
Development start–cost reduction: (12/05);
Development start–TIP technology: (10/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Production decision–AESR: (5/10);
Cost reduction target: (2012);
Production decision–CAVES WAA: (10/14).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Electric Boat;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,228.2 million;
* Procurement: $49,611.9 million;
Total funding: $50,840.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 21.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 06/1995: $4,283.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $6,119.1;
Percent change: 42.8.
Procurement cost;
As of 06/1995: $53,123.9;
Latest, 12/2006: $75,132.2;
Percent change: 41.4.
Total program cost;
As of 06/1995: $57,407.3;
Latest, 12/2006: $81,251.4;
Percent change: 41.5.
Program unit cost;
As of 06/1995: $1,913.578;
Latest, 12/2006: $2,708.378;
Percent change: 41.5.
Total quantities; 30;
As of 06/1995: 30;
Latest, 12/2006: 30;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 06/1995: 134;
Latest, 12/2006: 148;
Percent change: 10.4.
[End of table]
The program's near term efforts are focused on cost reduction, with a
goal of ordering and building two submarines per year at a cost of $2
billion each (in 2005 dollars) in 2012. The Navy seeks to reduce
construction costs by introducing more efficient production processes,
developing cost effective design changes, and leveraging economies of
scale. According to the Navy, about 79 percent of the necessary savings
for construction and design have been achieved. However, a recent cost
analysis indicated that the Navy may have difficulty achieving its cost
target. The Technology Insertion Program was delayed to reduce cost and
schedule risk, and further evaluate technologies. The TIP consists of
three systems: Advanced Electromagnetic Signature Reduction, Advanced
Sail, and Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sensor Wide Aperture Array, the
first of which is scheduled for insertion in 2010.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Virginia Class Submarine Program:
Technology Maturity:
The Advanced Electromagnetic Signature Reduction (AESR) is a software
package that uses improved algorithms to continuously monitor and
recalibrate the submarine's signature. Similar software has been
demonstrated in British submarines, but the technology is considered
immature because modifications to the software will require additional
testing. Software modification is expected to begin in October 2008,
and insertion is scheduled for fiscal year 2010. Once development is
complete, AESR will be retrofitted on all Virginia-class submarines.
The Advanced Sail is a redesign of the structure that sits atop the
main body of the submarine. The new design provides expanded space to
carry weapons, anti-submarine systems, and communications systems
external to the hull. Development began in June 2006, and the composite
material used to construct the sail has been demonstrated under a
separate program. However, insertion of the Advanced Sail has been
delayed because related costs may exceed budget limits. A new bow
design that also adds payload space for weapons and systems will be
used on submarines starting in fiscal year 2009. The Navy will await
testing of the new bow before completing a new sail design.
The Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sensor Wide Aperture Array (CAVES WAA)
is intended to be a more cost-effective sensor array. CAVES WAA
consists of two developmental technologies--fiber optic sensors and
integrated panels that house them and manage their signature--that will
be integrated together. Both technologies are still immature. To save
costs, the insertion schedule has been deferred 2 years, to fiscal year
2014. In fiscal year 2009, the Navy will conduct at-sea testing of a
CAVES WAA integrated panel being used as part of another application,
but not in the form necessary for the Virginia-class submarine.
Design Stability:
The Navy is attempting to lower the cost of each submarine by $100
million through design changes without affecting ship capabilities.
Eleven changes will be introduced on SSN 783, which begins construction
in fiscal year 2008. Most changes consist of simplifying the design of
minor systems such as the direct feed and brine overboard discharge
system. Some major systems, such as the large aperture bow array, are
also being redesigned. The new bow design, incorporating payload tubes
and a large aperture bow array, is at an early stage and is scheduled
for introduction on SSN 784 in fiscal year 2009. The design is less
complex to build, has fewer components, and can be tested during
earlier phases of construction.
Other Program Issues:
The Navy is attempting to save another $100 million per submarine
through capital improvements at the shipyards and implementing a more
efficient construction sequence. According to the Navy, about $61
million has been invested in capital expenditures. For example, the
shipyards upgraded their facilities to be able to reduce the number of
sections used to build submarines from 13 to 4. Using fewer and larger
sections lowers cost and allows for increased work during module
outfitting.
The Navy hopes to reduce construction time from more than 80 months to
just 60 months. While SSN 778 and SSN 779 are expected to be delivered
in 72 and 68 months, respectively, construction time must be reduced by
another 17 and 12 percent, respectively, in order to meet the 60 month
target. Historically, construction efficiencies tend to be captured in
the early part of a production run, but SSN 778 and SSN 779 are the
fifth and sixth ships being built. Additionally, a recent Navy estimate
indicates that construction for the SSN 784 may take 6 months longer
than target.
The Navy expects to save $200 million per submarine by using a
multiyear procurement contract to increase the production rate, improve
construction efficiency, and lower overhead and support costs. Bulk
purchases of materials could also lower costs. Past programs have
benefited from such contracts.
According to program officials, about 79 percent of the program's
target savings for construction and design has already been achieved
(approximately $158 million). However, a recent cost analysis of the
program indicated that the Navy may have difficulty achieving target
costs in fiscal year 2012.
Agency Comments:
The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS):
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS).
Source: WGS Program Office.
[End of figure]
WGS is a joint Air Force and Army program intended to provide essential
communications services to U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition
partners during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war. It is the
next-generation wideband component in DOD's future Military Satellite
Communications architecture and is composed of the following principal
segments: space segment (satellites), terminal segment (users), and
control segment (operators). We assessed the space segment.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Development start/production decision: (11/00);
First satellite launch: (10/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Initial capability: (1/09);
Full capability: (6/13).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Satellite Development Center;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $0.0 million;
* Procurement: $468.5 million;
Total funding: $468.5 million;
Procurement quantity: 1.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2000: $203.1;
Latest, 12/2006: $331.9;
Percent change: 63.4.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2000: $929.4;
Latest, 12/2006: $1,698.9;
Percent change: 82.9.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2000: $1,132.5;
Latest, 12/2006: $2,030.7;
Percent change: 79.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2000: $377.498;
Latest, 12/2006: $406.145;
Percent change: 7.9.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2000: 3;
Latest, 12/2006: 5;
Percent change: 66.9.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2000: 50;
Latest, 12/2006: 94;
Percent change: 88.0.
[End of table]
The WGS program's technology and design are mature. We did not review
production maturity data because of the commercial nature of the WGS
Block 1 acquisition, but unit-level manufacturing for WGS is complete.
The Air Force is considering acquiring WGS in a three-block approach.
Block 1 includes the first three satellites, the first of which was
launched in October 2007. The second and third satellites are scheduled
to launch in August 2008 and December 2008 respectively. Block 2
includes two satellites and an option for a third. The United States
and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding in November 2007
allowing Australia to join the WGS program and provide funding to
expand the WGS program to six satellites. The Air Force is continuing
to study the possibility of a Block 3.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
WGS Program:
Technology Maturity:
WGS has two critical technologies: the digital channelizer and the
phased array antenna. According to program officials, both technologies
were mature when the program made a production decision in November
2000.
Design Stability:
The design for WGS is mature and the program office has released all
the expected drawings to manufacturing. The first satellite has been
launched and the second and third are in testing. According to the
program office, the satellite design and configuration will not change
for Block 2 except for an upgrade that will allow ground controllers to
direct two antennas to bypass the onboard channelizer for added
airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support.
Bypassing the channelizer will double the data transfer rate for those
two channels. The WGS acquisition strategy indicates that the upgrade
is low risk because the design and modification are within existing
technology and contractor capabilities.
Production Maturity:
The commercial nature of the WGS Block 1 acquisition precludes the
program office from having access to production control data.
Manufacturing processes for these satellites are complete, and the Air
Force does not anticipate any new manufacturing processes will be
necessary for Block 2. The majority of the 1.5 million satellite parts
are expected to remain the same for Block 2, but due to a 3-year break
in production between Blocks 1 and 2, some parts are now obsolete.
However, according to the program office, all of the new parts can be
incorporated into satellite assembly without changing design or
manufacturing processes.
WGS Block 1 consists of three satellites. The first satellite was
originally scheduled for launch in June 2007, but due to delays with
both the satellite and the launch vehicle, the satellite was launched
in October 2007. Specifically, a test failure on the second WGS
satellite and performance issues with other Boeing satellites prompted
the WGS program to reevaluate the first satellite. After further
analysis, the satellite was cleared to launch. Additionally, readiness
of the launch vehicle was delayed to identify and address a fuel valve
problem during a recent launch. The second and third satellites are in
testing and were scheduled to launch in March 2008 and July 2008
respectively. However, due to issues identified during testing, which
have to date been resolved, the program delayed the launch dates for
these two satellites until August 2008 and December 2008 respectively.
Furthermore, the program has pushed back the expected initial
operational capability date to January 2009 due to the delay in
launching the first satellite. Since achieving initial operational
capability only requires one satellite, the program office does not
expect further delays due to schedule changes on the second and third
satellites.
Other Program Issues:
Following commercial item acquisition procedures, the Air Force awarded
a firm-fixed price contract for the Block 1 satellites. However, the
satellite's two critical technologies--the X-band phased array antenna
system and digital channelizer--are no longer considered commercial
items even though their design and configuration will not change for
Block 2. Therefore, in February 2006, the Air Force did not use
commercial item procedures when it negotiated and awarded a $1.07
billion fixed price incentive fee contract for the Block 2 satellites
that includes more reporting requirements such as earned value
management data. The program office did not have access to this type of
information under the Block 1 contract.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 1:
[See PDF for image]
Photographs: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment
1.
Source: PM, WIN-T.
[End of figure]
WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels of
command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global
Information Grid. WIN-T is being restructured following a Nunn-McCurdy
unit cost breach, and will be fielded in four increments. The first
increment absorbs the former Joint Network Node-Network (JNN-N) program
and provides the Army an initial battlefield networking capability down
to the Army's battalion level. We assessed the first increment.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/development start: (2/04);
Design review: (3/04);
Low-rate decision: (6/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Initial capability–increment 1a: (1/09);
Full-rate decision: (6/09);
Operational test increment 1b completed: (8/10).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems;
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $16.2 million;
* Procurement: $1,789.3 million;
Total funding: $1,805.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 607.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $23.9;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $3,865.5;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $3,889.0;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $2.319;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: 1,677;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: 19;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
Because its precursor, the JNN-N program, was based on mature
commercial networking and satellite communications technologies, the
Army had not initially identified any critical technologies for WIN-T
Increment 1. Therefore we did not assess its technology maturity. The
Army completed a technology readiness assessment for WIN-T Increment 1
in early 2008. While design stability is evaluated during design
reviews, it cannot be assessed using our methodology because the
program office does not produce releasable drawings for the design,
which is based upon mature commercial hardware and software products.
In October 2007, DOD approved an acquisition program baseline for
Increment 1. The WIN-T overarching acquisition strategy was approved in
early January; the Increment 1 annex to this strategy is in final
processing.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
WIN-T Incr. I Program:
Technology Maturity:
Technology maturity for WIN-T Increment 1 could not be assessed because
the Army had not identified any critical technologies for JNN-N, the
precursor to WIN-T Increment 1. However, the June 2007 acquisition
decision memorandum that approved the restructuring of the WIN-T
program requires the Army to conduct a technology readiness assessment
of the winning proposal for WIN-T Increment 1 within 120 days of
contract award, and to submit this assessment to the department's
Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) for approval. As
contract award took place in late September 2007, this technology
readiness assessment was due to DDR&E by late January 2008. In February
2008, a DDR&E representative confirmed that her office had received the
Army's assessment and was reviewing it. If the Army decides to insert
technologies from future WIN-T increments into Increment 1, DDR&E must
agree that those technologies are mature prior to insertion.
Design Stability:
Design stability for WIN-T Increment 1 could not be assessed using our
methodology because, according to a program office representative, the
development program integrates mature hardware and software products
and does not produce drawings for these commercial products. Rather,
according to this representative, design stability is assessed during
design reviews and subsequent testing of those designs. The program
office also noted that it does not redesign the system from one
production lot to another; rather, newer, more capable commercial
components replace outdated components as they become available.
Other Program Issues:
Previously, the Army fielded JNN-N as a separate beyond-line-of-sight
communications network to units deployed in Iraq. JNN-N began the
transitioning of the Army's communications systems to Internet protocol-
based systems, and provided an interface to DOD communications
services, such as the Defense Information Systems Network, with
multiple levels of security. However, JNN-N was only established as a
formal program when it was designated as the first increment of the
restructured WIN-T program in June 2007. Prior to WIN-T restructuring,
the Army had already procured 759 JNN-N nodes and proposed moving
forward with the acquisition of low-rate initial production (LRIP)
quantities of JNN-N equipment needed to conduct initial operational
testing, and to equip deploying units. As of March 2007, shortly before
the WIN-T restructuring, the Army had planned to acquire additional
quantities of JNN-N to field to the rest of the Army once initial
operational testing had been completed, a beyond-LRIP report had been
submitted to Congress, and a full-rate production decision had been
made. As a result of the WIN-T restructuring, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics approved the Army
moving forward with the acquisition of the full complement of needed
JNN-N capabilities as the first increment of WIN-T. Initial operational
tests will still be conducted in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009.
Army representatives stated that recent statutory changes made by
Section 231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007 grant the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the
flexibility to deliver the beyond-LRIP report "as soon as practicable,"
and allow the Army to acquire Increment 1 assets in lots sized to meet
its operational needs. The Army interprets this new statutory language
to permit it to contract for quantities of WIN-T Increment 1 nodes in
fiscal year 2008 to support operational needs, even if prior to the
completion of initial operational testing required for a beyond-LRIP
report. In September 2007, the Army contracted for 336 more Increment 1
nodes, 25 more than the 311 nodes identified as the LRIP quantities in
the September 2007 WIN-T Increment 1 Selected Acquisition Report, which
was submitted to Congress on November 14, 2007. This will be clarified
in future SAR submissions.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 2:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T),
Increment 2.
Source: PM, WIN-T.
[End of figure]
WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels of
command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global
Information Grid. WIN-T is being restructured following a Nunn-McCurdy
unit cost breach, and will be fielded in four increments. The second
increment will provide the Army with an initial networking on-the-move
capability, while the third will provide a full networking on-the-move
capability and fully support the Army's Future Combat Systems.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/development start: (6/07);
GAO review: (1/08);
Design review: (2/08);
Low-rate decision: (4/09);
Full-rate decision: (11/10);
Initial capability: (8/11).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems;
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $218.8 million;
* Procurement: $3,301.4 million;
Total funding: $3,520.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 1,837.
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $227.0;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $3,301.4;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $3,528.4;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: $1.864;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: 1,893;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of NA: NA;
Latest, 10/2007: 50;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The original WIN-T program entered system development in August 2003
with 3 of its 12 critical technologies nearing maturity. Insufficient
technical readiness was cited as one of the key factors leading to the
Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach. Subsequently, DOD decided to field WIN-
T incrementally using only mature technologies. However, on the basis
of what was determined to be an insufficient body of evidence for
assessing technology readiness, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the Army have agreed that additional information will be provided
in order to prove the critical technologies. While design stability
will be evaluated during WIN-T design reviews, it cannot be assessed
using our methodology because the program office does not track the
number of releasable drawings.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
WIN-T Incr. 2 Program:
Technology Maturity:
Technology maturity for WIN-T Increment 2 could not be assessed because
it was only recently separated from the original WIN-T system
development effort, and the required technology readiness assessment
for this increment has not yet been approved by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense's Director of Defense Research and Engineering. In
June 2007, the WIN-T program was restructured to field in four
increments using technologies for each increment that DDR&E assesses as
approaching maturity prior to establishment of the increment's baseline
and fully mature prior to the start of production for the increment.
Increment 2 will provide the Army with initial networking on-the-move
capabilities, while future increments will provide full networking on-
the-move capabilities, will fully support FCS, and will provide the
Army protected satellite communication on-the-move.
The original WIN-T program entered system development with only 3 of
its original 12 critical technologies approaching full maturity.
Insufficient technical readiness was cited as one of the key factors
leading to the March 2007 Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the original
WIN-T program. Moreover, while the Army had prepared a revised
technology readiness assessment for the original WIN-T program in 2006,
DDR&E did not concur with the Army's assessment for two of the five
critical technology areas identified in this revised assessment--
network operations and high-mobility networking. The Army was required
to submit a new technology readiness assessment for WIN-T Increment 2
to DDR&E by early November 2007. DDR&E must agree that each critical
technology assessed is approaching maturity--a prototype tested in a
relevant environment--to be considered part of the system development
baseline for this increment. While the Army and DDR&E were unable to
reach consensus in 2006 on the maturity of the WIN-T's critical
technologies, an agreement in principle has now been reached regarding
how to measure such maturity. As agreed, the Army submitted an initial
Increment 2 technology readiness assessment in November 2007; this
assessment was updated with results from tests of Increment 2
capabilities that were held in October and November 2007. In February
2008, a DDR&E representative confirmed that her office had received the
Army's updated assessment and is reviewing it.
Other Program Issues:
In March 2007, the WIN-T program reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost
breach to the congressional defense committees. In June 2007, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics provided
formal certification of the restructured WIN-T program to Congress. The
restructured program now consists of four increments, each governed by
an overarching acquisition strategy for providing networking and
communications capability to operational and tactical ground forces.
Acquisition program baselines for Increments 1 and 2 were approved in
October 2007. Establishment of an acquisition program baseline for WIN-
T Increment 3, intended to field full networking on-the-move
capabilities and to fully support the needs of the Army's Future Combat
System, will take place once FCS requirements for WIN-T have been
firmly established. A formal agreement between the WIN-T and FCS
program managers was expected to be completed later this year, in time
for the Increment 3 preliminary design review currently scheduled for
August 2008.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Agency Comments:
DOD was provided a draft of this report and had no comments on the
overall report, but did provide technical comments on the individual
assessments. These comments, along with the agency comments received on
the individual assessments, are included as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Air
Force, and Navy; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any question on this report, please contact me at (202) 512-
4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I Scope and Methodology:
In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and risk data from
each of the programs included in this report. We summarized our
assessments of each individual program in two components--a system
profile and a product knowledge assessment. We did not validate the
data provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). However, we took
several steps to address data quality. Specifically, we reviewed the
data and performed various quality checks, which revealed some
discrepancies in the data. We discussed the underlying data and these
discrepancies with program officials and adjusted the data accordingly.
We determined that the data provided by DOD were sufficiently reliable
for our engagement purposes after reviewing DOD's management controls
for assessing data reliability.
Macro Analysis:
We analyzed data from the National Defense Budget Estimates for 2008 to
determine the trends in research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E) and procurement actual and planned obligation authority for the
period 1978 to 2012. All dollar amounts in this report are fiscal year
2008 dollars except where noted. We also analyzed budget information
from the Office of Management and Budget to determine trends in
discretionary spending, including defense spending, and
nondiscretionary funding since 1978.
To determine the planned RDT&E and procurement funding for major
defense acquisition programs from 2008 to 2012, we obtained information
from the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval system,
referred to as DAMIRs. We retrieved data that showed annual funding
requirements for RDT&E and procurement for all major defense
acquisition programs with DOD Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) dated
December 2006. We converted the data into fiscal year 2008 dollars.
This information was summarized and then sorted by the top 10 programs
with the highest funding requirements during the period fiscal year
2008 to 2012. We also used the Selected Acquisition Report Summary
tables to identify the number of major defense acquisition programs
submitting SARs as of December 1999, December 2004, and December 2006.
Data for the total planned investment of major defense acquisition
programs was obtained from funding stream data included in the SARs or,
in a few cases, directly from program offices and then aggregated
across all program in fiscal year 2008 dollars for each selected
portfolio (fiscal years 2000, 2005, and 2007). We refer to programs
with SARs dated December 1999 as the fiscal year 2000 portfolio,
programs with SARs dated December 2004 as the fiscal year 2005
portfolio, and programs with SARs dated December 2006 as the 2007
portfolio. The commitments outstanding represent the difference between
the total planned commitment and what has been expended through the
fiscal year the SARs were issued. Also, the data do not include the
full costs of acquiring Missile Defense Agency programs. To assess the
cost and schedule performance of selected portfolios, we obtained data
primarily from the SARs or, in a few cases, directly from program
offices. In our analysis we have broken some SAR programs (such as
Missile Defense Agency systems) into smaller elements or programs. We
compared cost and schedule data from the first full estimate, generally
system development start, with the current estimate. For the few
programs that did not have development or a full estimate, we compared
the current estimate to the planning estimate to measure changes in
development costs and schedule delays but excluded these programs from
our analysis of total acquisition costs and program acquisition unit
costs. Where comparative cost and schedule data were not available for
programs, these programs were excluded from the analysis when
appropriate. We did not adjust the cost data to reflect changes in
quantities that may have occurred over the life of the programs. Also,
data do not include full costs of developing Missile Defense Agency
programs, and in most cases these programs were left out of the
comparative analysis.
To assess the performance and outcomes of the 72 weapon system programs
in our assessment, we collected information contained in program SARs
or data provided by program offices as of January 15, 2008. To assess
the overall outcomes to date for the 72 programs, it was necessary to
identify those programs with the requisite cost, schedule, and quantity
data at the first full estimate, generally Milestone B, and the latest
estimate. Of the 72 programs in our assessment, 47 programs had
relevant data on RDT&E costs, 45 had data on program acquisition unit
cost,[Footnote 16] and 41 had data on schedules for delivering initial
capabilities. The remaining programs not included in this analysis had
not yet entered system development and/or did not have comparative
data. We summed the first full estimate and latest estimate of RDT&E
costs for the programs with relevant data and calculated the percentage
change between the two estimates. The unit cost growth assessment
reflects the share of the 45 programs with relevant data that have
experienced program acquisition unit cost growth greater than 25
percent. The schedule assessment is the simple average of the change in
months of the planned or actual delivery of initial operational
capability between first and latest estimates.
To assess the knowledge attainment of programs at critical decision
points, we identified programs that had actually proceeded through each
juncture (system development start, DOD design review, and production
start) and obtained their assessed knowledge levels at those points.
The knowledge level information was drawn from data provided by the
program offices as of January 15, 2008. (For more information, see the
product knowledge assessment section in this appendix.) Programs in our
assessment were in various stages of the acquisition life cycle, and
not all programs provided all knowledge information for each point.
Programs were not included in our analysis if relevant decision and/or
knowledge point data were not available. For each decision point, we
then summarize knowledge attainment of the programs as the percentage
of programs with data that achieved the relevant knowledge point. The
technology maturity for programs at various decision points includes 41
programs at system development start, 37 programs at design review, and
22 programs at production. Design maturity data for various decision
points include 31 programs at design review and 17 programs at
production. We then compared the results of this year's analysis with
our 2005, 2006, and 2007 assessments. We also assessed the cumulative
knowledge attainment at program decision points of programs that we had
information on. For system development start, that is the percentage of
programs that had mature technologies. At design review, we assessed
what percentage of programs had stable designs and mature technologies
at development start. And, at the production decision, we assessed what
percentage of programs had their processes in statistical control and a
stable design at the design review, and mature technologies at system
development start.
The maturity levels of the 356 critical technologies at system
development start was collected from program officials as described in
further detail in the product knowledge data section in this appendix.
We included only programs, and their technologies, that have actually
entered system development. To compare differences in RDT&E cost growth
between programs with mature technologies at system development start
and programs with immature technologies, we examined 33 programs that
have actually passed through development start with relevant first and
latest cost estimates. We then calculated the total RDT&E cost growth
of all programs with mature technologies and compared it to total RDT&E
cost growth of all programs with immature technologies.
We collected data from program offices on the date each program has or
plans to conduct key development tests of (1) an early system prototype
and (2) a production representative prototype, and then compared these
dates to scheduled or actual system design review and production
decision dates. These comparisons are based on information from 35
programs for early system prototypes and 40 programs for production
representative prototypes--both actual and future scheduled dates are
included. We also collected information from program offices on
software size, usually expressed in terms of lines of code. We compared
software size over time for 28 programs to determine software growth
for these programs.
We submitted an additional data collection instrument this year and
collected programmatic data from 53 of the programs in our assessment,
largely those that have entered system development.[Footnote 17] We did
not validate the data provided by the program offices but reviewed the
data and performed various checks, which revealed some discrepancies in
the data. We clarified the data accordingly. The information included
key schedule dates, program office staffing, program baselines, and
requirements changes. We analyzed the data to determine the frequency
of program rebaselines and requirements changes and to assess the
timing of key technical events such as the preliminary design review.
Where relevant, this information was compared to respective program
outcome and schedule data. The assessment of programs having completed
preliminary design review prior to system development start is based on
responses from 39 programs. The assessment of the average time between
development start and scheduled or actual preliminary design review is
based on responses from 35 programs.
We summarized information provided by 52 programs on staffing by
function (program management, administrative support, business
functions, engineering and technical, other, and overall total) and
type (i.e., military, civilian, support contractor, federally funded
research development center, or university and affiliates). Data from
the 52 programs were summed together to obtain total staffing levels by
function and by type. We then summarized the data to present the
distribution of total staff in each function by type of staff. We also
analyzed information provided by 43 programs on the number of program
baselines. We did not include in our analysis baselines resulting from
passing through development or production milestones. Finally, we
summarized information provided by 46 programs regarding the number of
programs experiencing requirements changes after system development
start. We did not attempt to understand the degree or complexity of the
requirement changes. We then compared the development cost outcomes for
programs that have experienced requirement changes to development
outcomes to date for programs that had not.
Finally, we relied on GAO's body of work over the past years that has
examined DOD acquisition issues. In recent years, we have issued
reports that have identified systemic problems and made recommendations
to DOD for improvements in how it acquires its major weapon systems.
These reports cover topics such as contracting, program management,
acquisition policy, and cost estimating. We have also issued many
detailed reports that have evaluated specific weapon systems such as
aircraft programs, ships, communication systems, satellites, missile
defense system, and future combat systems. Finally, we used information
from numerous GAO products that examine how commercial best practices
can improve outcomes for various DOD programs. During the past 10
years, we have gathered information based on discussions with more than
25 major commercial companies. Our work has shown that valuable lessons
can be learned from the commercial sector and can be applied to the
development of weapon systems.
System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment:
Over the past several years, DOD has revised its policies governing
weapon system acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major
acquisition events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more
consistent across the 72 program assessments, we standardized the
terminology for key program events. For most individual programs in our
assessment, "development start" refers to the initiation of an
acquisition program as well as the start of system development. This
coincides with DOD's Milestone B. For a few programs in our assessment
(mostly programs that began before 2001), they have a separate "program
start" date which begins a pre-system development phase for program
definition and risk reduction activities, this "program start" date
generally coincides with DOD's old milestone terminology for Milestone
I, followed by a "development start" date, either DOD's old Milestone
II or new Milestone B, depending on when the program began system
development. The "production decision" generally refers to the decision
to enter the production and deployment phase, typically with low-rate
initial production. The "initial capability" refers to the initial
operational capability--sometimes also called first unit equipped or
required asset availability. For shipbuilding programs, the schedule of
key program events in relation to milestones varies for each individual
program. Our assessments of shipbuilding programs report key program
events as determined by each program's individual strategy. For the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) programs that do not follow the standard
Department of Defense acquisition model, but instead develop systems in
incremental capability-based blocks, we identified the key technology
development efforts that lead to an initial capability for the block
assessed.
The information presented on the funding needed to complete from fiscal
year 2008 through completion, unless otherwise noted, draws on
information from SARs or on data from the program office. In some
instances the data were not yet available, and we annotate this by the
term "to be determined" (TBD), or "not applicable," annotated (NA). The
quantities listed refer only to procurement quantities. Satellite
programs, in particular, produce a large percentage of their total
operational units as development quantities, which are not included in
the quantity figure.
To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we
reviewed DOD's SARs or obtained data directly from the program offices.
In general, we compared the latest available SAR information with a
baseline for each program. For programs that have started product
development--those that are beyond Milestone II or B--we compared the
latest available SAR to the development estimate from the first SAR
issued after the program was approved to enter development. For systems
that have not yet started system development, we compared the latest
available data to the planning estimate issued after Milestone I or A.
For systems not included in SARs, we attempted to obtain comparable
baseline and current data from the individual program offices. For MDA
systems for which a baseline was not available, we compared the latest
available cost information to the amount reported last year.
All cost information is presented in fiscal year 2008 dollars using
Office of the Secretary of Defense-approved deflators to eliminate the
effects of inflation. We have depicted only the programs' main elements
of acquisition cost--research and development and procurement. However,
the total program costs also include military construction and
acquisition operation and maintenance costs. Because of rounding and
these additional costs, in some situations the total cost may not match
the exact sum of the research and development and procurement costs.
The program unit costs are calculated by dividing the total program
cost by the total quantities planned. These costs are often referred to
as program acquisition unit costs. In some instances, the data were not
applicable, and we annotate this by using the term "NA." In other
instances, the current absence of data on procurement funding and
quantities precludes calculation of a meaningful program acquisition
unit cost, and we annotate this by using the term "TBD." The quantities
listed refer to total quantities, including both procurement and
development quantities.
The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, defined as
the number of months between the program start and the achievement of
initial operational capability or an equivalent fielding date. In some
instances, the data were not yet available, and we annotate this by
using the term "TBD," or saying that they are classified.
The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate or overall
picture of a program's history. These assessments represent the sum
total of the federal government's actions on a program, not just those
of the program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of
detailed analyses of changes that attempt to link specific changes with
triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such
detailed distinctions.
Product Knowledge Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment:
To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key
points in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to
each program office. The results are graphically depicted in each two-
page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program documentation, such
as the operational requirements document, the acquisition program
baseline, test reports, and major program reviews.
To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a
tool, referred to as technology readiness levels (TRL), for our
analysis. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally
developed technology readiness levels, and the Army and Air Force
science and technology research organizations use them to determine
when technologies are ready to be handed off from science and
technology managers to product developers. Technology readiness levels
are measured on a scale of 1 to 9, beginning with paper studies of a
technology's feasibility and culminating with a technology fully
integrated into a completed product. (See app. II for the definitions
of technology readiness levels.) Our best practices work has shown that
a technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a technology in a
realistic environment--is the level of technology maturity that
constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program. In
our assessment, the technologies that have reached technology readiness
level 7, a prototype demonstrated in a realistic environment, are
referred to as mature or fully mature and those that have reached
technology readiness level 6, a prototype demonstrated in a relevant
environment, are referred to as approaching or nearing maturity and are
assessed as attaining 50 percent of the desired level of knowledge.
Satellite technologies that have achieved technology readiness level 6
are assessed as fully mature due to the difficulty of demonstrating
maturity in an operational environment--space.
In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of
maturity. We sought to clarify the technology readiness levels in those
cases where information existed that raised concerns. If we were to
conduct a detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies
assessed, the readiness level demonstrated, or both. It was not always
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system
at key decision points after the passage of many years.
To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of our
current assessment. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the
percentage of engineering drawings provided by the program office. We
sought to clarify the percentage of drawings completed in those cases
where information that raised concerns existed. Completed engineering
drawings were defined as the number of drawings released or deemed
releasable to manufacturing that can be considered the "build-to"
drawings.
To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those
processes. In most cases, we did not verify or validate this
information provided by the program office. We sought to clarify the
number of critical manufacturing processes and percentage of
statistical process control where information existed that raised
concerns. We used a standard called the Process Capability Index, which
is a process performance measurement that quantifies how closely a
process is running to its specification limits. The index can be
translated into an expected product defect rate, and we have found it
to be a best practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and rework
trends, in those cases where quantifiable statistical control data were
unavailable. Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators
of potential risks, by themselves, they do not cover all elements of
risk that a program encounters during development, such as funding
instability. Our detailed reviews on individual systems normally
provide for a fuller treatment of risk elements.
[End of section]
Appendix II Technology Readiness Levels:
Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported;
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties;
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application
formulated;
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption.
Examples are still limited to paper studies;
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical
function and/or characteristic proof of concept;
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative;
Hardware/software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale
individual components (pieces of subsystem);
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard validation
in laboratory environment;
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity"
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad
hoc" hardware in a laboratory;
Hardware/software: Low-fidelity breadboard; Integration of nonscale
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach
suitable for flight articles;
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation
in relevant environment;
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory
integration of components;
Hardware/software: High-fidelity breadboard; Functionally equivalent
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc).
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of
several components with reasonably realistic support
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality;
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.
Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype
demonstration in a relevant environment;
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated realistic environment;
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be very close to form, fit and
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full
functionality of the subsystem;
Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or limited/
restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. Integration
of technology is well defined.
Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in a
realistic environment;
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in an
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a
test bed aircraft;
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate
full functionality of subsystem;
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative
realistic environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator aircraft;
Technology is well substantiated with test data.
Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight
qualified" through test and demonstration;
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if
it meets design specifications;
Hardware/software: Flight-qualified hardware;
Demonstration environment: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in
the actual system application.
Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through
successful mission operations;
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the
system under operational mission conditions;
Hardware/software: Actual system in final form;
Demonstration environment: Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in
operational mission conditions.
Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space
Administration data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Michael J. Sullivan (202) 512-4841:
Acknowledgments:
Principal contributors to this report were Brian Mullins, Assistant
Director; Ridge C. Bowman; Quindi C. Franco; and Matthew B. Lea. Other
key contributors included David B. Best, Thomas J. Denomme, Bruce
Fairbairn, Arthur Gallegos, William R. Graveline, Barbara H. Haynes,
Michael J. Hesse, Richard Horiuchi, J. Kristopher Keener, John E.
Oppenheim, Kenneth E. Patton, Charles W. Perdue, Robert S. Swierczek,
Wendy P. Smythe, Alyssa B. Weir, Paul G. Williams, and Karen S.
Zuckerstein.
The following staff were responsible for individual programs:
System: Airborne Laser (ABL);
Primary Staff: LaTonya D. Miller.
System: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD);
Primary Staff: Michele R. Williamson.
System: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF);
Primary Staff: Bradley L. Terry.
System: Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS);
Primary Staff: Guisseli Reyes-Turnell/Paul G. Williams.
System: Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program (LHA 6);
Primary Staff: Gwyneth B. Woolwine.
System: Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH);
Primary Staff: Michael J. Hesse/Wendy P. Smythe.
System: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning
System (ATIRCM/CMWS);
Primary Staff: Danny G. Owens.
System: B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency SatCom Capability
(B-2 EHF SATCOM);
Primary Staff: Elizabeth DeVan/Andrew H. Redd.
System: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP);
Primary Staff: Don M. Springman/Sean C. Seales.
System: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System
(BAMS);
Primary Staff: W. William Russell IV.
System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP);
Primary Staff: Sean D. Merrill /Erin L. Stockdale.
System: C-130J Hercules;
Primary Staff: Matthew T. Drerup.
System: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP);
Primary Staff: Brian T. Smith/Cheryl K. Andrew.
System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP);
Primary Staff: Cheryl K. Andrew/Brian T. Smith.
System: CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR);
Primary Staff: Kevin J. Heinz.
System: Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X);
Primary Staff: Travis J. Masters/Julie C. Hadley.
System: CVN-21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier;
Primary Staff: Diana L. Moldafsky/Erin E. Carson.
System: Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A);
Primary Staff: Justin M. Jaynes/Guisseli Reyes-Turnell.
System: DDG 1000 Destroyer;
Primary Staff: Diana L. Moldafsky/Raj C. Chitikila.
System: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE);
Primary Staff: Lauren M. Heft.
System: EA-18G;
Primary Staff: Jerry W. Clark/Bonita P. Oden.
System: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle-Atlas V, Delta IV (EELV);
Primary Staff: Maria A. Durant.
System: Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS);
Primary Staff: Bonita P. Oden/Laura T. Holliday.
System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV);
Primary Staff: Quindi C. Franco/Alan R. Frazier.
System: Extended Range Munition (ERM);
Primary Staff: Christopher R. Durbin.
System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile;
Primary Staff: Richard A. Cederholm.
System: F-22A Modernization;
Primary Staff: Marvin E. Bonner/Robert K. Miller.
System: Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T);
Primary Staff: Alexandra K. Dew/Winnie Tsen.
System: Future Combat Systems (FCS);
Primary Staff: Marcus C. Ferguson/John M. Ortiz.
System: Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System;
Primary Staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/Charlie Shivers.
System: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD);
Primary Staff: Steven B. Stern.
System: H-1 Upgrades;
Primary Staff: Ian N. Jefferies.
System: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM);
Primary Staff: William C. Allbritton/Carrie R. Wilson.
System: Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA);
Primary Staff: Letisha T. Watson/Beverly A. Breen.
System: Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV);
Primary Staff: Moshe Schwartz.
System: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System (JLENS);
Primary Staff: Alan R. Frazier/Wendy P. Smythe.
System: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF);
Primary Staff: Simon J. Hirschfeld/Matthew B. Lea.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station
(JTRS AMF);
Primary Staff: Paul G. Williams/Guisseli Reyes-Turnell.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR);
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/Paul G. Williams.
System: JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS);
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/Guisseli Reyes-Turnell.
System: KC-X Program (KC-X);
Primary Staff: Mary Jo Lewnard/Wendell K. Hudson.
System: Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI);
Primary Staff: Michael J. Hesse.
System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS);
Primary Staff: Christopher R. Durbin.
System: Littoral Combat Ship: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW);
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Daniel Chen.
System: Littoral Combat Ship: Mine Countermeasures (MCM);
Primary Staff: Gwyneth B. Woolwine.
System: Littoral Combat Ship: Surface Warfare (SuW);
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Daniel Chen.
System: Light Utility Helicopter (LUH);
Primary Staff: Beverly A. Breen.
System: Longbow Apache Block III;
Primary Staff: Wendy P. Smythe.
System: Multi-Functional Information Distribution System (MIDS);
Primary Staff: Jeffrey V. Rose/Paul G. Williams.
System: Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV);
Primary Staff: Meredith M. Kimmett.
System: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP);
Primary Staff: Anne McDonough-Hughes/Kathryn I. O'Dea.
System: Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform
(MPF(F)/MLP);
Primary Staff: Raj C. Chitikila/Lisa L. Berardi.
System: Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System (MQ-9);
Primary Staff: Rae Ann H. Sapp/Charlie Shivers.
System: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle;
Primary Staff: Dayna L. Foster/J. Kristopher Keener/Michael W.
Aiken/Charlie Shivers/Erin L. Stockdale.
System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS);
Primary Staff: Richard Y. Horiuchi.
System: NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control;
Primary Staff: Josie H. Sigl.
System: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS);
Primary Staff: Suzanne Sterling.
System: P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A MMA);
Primary Staff: Heather L. Barker Miller/Kathryn M. Edelman.
System: PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit;
Primary Staff: Ronald N. Dains/Tana M. Davis.
System: Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High);
Primary Staff: Claire A. Cyrnak.
System: Small Diameter Bomb, Increment II (SDB II);
Primary Staff: Carrie R. Wilson.
System: Sky Warrior UAS (UAS);
Primary Staff: Tana M. Davis.
System: Space Radar (SR);
Primary Staff: Lisa P. Gardner.
System: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS);
Primary Staff: Sigrid L. McGinty/Angela Pleasants.
System: Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD);
Primary Staff: Steven B. Stern/LaTonya D. Miller.
System: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT);
Primary Staff: Arturo Holguin Jr.
System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft;
Primary Staff: Jerry W. Clark/Bonita P. Oden.
System: VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program;
Primary Staff: Ronald E. Schwenn/David Schilling.
System: Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774);
Primary Staff: Moshe Schwartz.
System: Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS);
Primary Staff: E. Brandon Booth.
System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical-Increment 1 (WIN-T
Incr. 1);
Primary Staff: James P. Tallon/Guisseli Reyes-Turnell.
System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical-Increment 2 (WIN-T
Incr. 2);
Primary Staff: James P. Tallon/Guisseli Reyes-Turnell.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
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[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-294]. Washington,
D.C.: February 1, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-406SP].
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[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) are those identified by
DOD that require eventual total research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures of more than $365 million or $2.19
billion for procurement in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.
[2] Not all programs provided information for every knowledge point or
had proceeded through system development. Details of our scope and
methodology can be found in appendix I.
[3] Our analysis in this area reflects comparisons of performance for
programs meeting DOD's criteria for being major defense acquisition
programs in fiscal year 2007 and programs meeting the same criteria in
fiscal years 2005 and 2000. The analysis does not include all the same
systems in all 3 years.
[4] These figures represent cost and quantity estimates based on
Presidents' budgets and supplemental requests for fiscal years 2006
through 2008 but do not include recent orders for more vehicles.
[5] The start of system development as used here indicates the point at
which significant financial commitment is made to design, integrate,
and demonstrate that the product will meet the user's requirements and
can be manufactured on time, with high quality, and at a cost that
provides an acceptable return on investment. System development follows
concept refinement and technology development which is intended to
mature technologies and deliver a preliminary design of the proposed
solution.
[6] While the programs we assessed were not chosen to be representative
of the broader defense acquisition portfolio, the outcomes of the
programs in our assessment closely mirror those of the 2007 portfolio
of major defense acquisition programs discussed earlier in this report.
[7] We have excluded two programs from this calculation, Light Utility
Helicopter and Joint Cargo Aircraft. While we have assessed these
programs as having mature manufacturing processes, this is because they
are commercial acquisitions, not because processes were demonstrated to
be in statistical control. Also, the Multifunctional Information
Distribution System (MIDS) program indicates that its two critical
processes are in statistical control but it has not formally entered
the production phase.
[8] GAO, Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight
Needed to Improve DOD's Acquisition Environment and Weapon System
Quality, GAO-08-294 (Washington D.C.: Feb. 1, 2008).
[9] In contrast, a firm-fixed price contract provides for a pre-
established price, and places more risk and responsibility for costs
and resulting profit or loss on the contractor and provides more
incentive for efficient and economical performance. With either a cost
reimbursement or a firm-fixed price type contract, if the government
changes the requirements after performance has begun, which then causes
a price or cost increase to the contractor, the government must pay for
these changes.
[10] This average does not include the C-130 J program because of its
extreme RDT&E cost growth. The average including C-130 J is 210
percent.
[11] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Department of Defense Actions on
Program Manager Empowerment and Accountability, GAO-08-62R (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 9, 2007).
[12] Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy and the United States Congress (January 2007).
[13] GAO, DOD Transformation: Challenges and Opportunities, GAO-08-
323CG (Washington D.C.: Nov. 29, 2007).
[14] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices are
Needed to Improve DOD's Software-intensive Weapon Acquisitions, GAO-04-
393 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2004).
[15] Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, Defense Acquisition
Transformation: Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: February 2007).
[16] We excluded programs that had planning estimates as their first
full estimate for the unit cost analysis.
[17] We requested data from 4 additional programs but did not receive
requested information in time from the H-1 Upgrades, DDG 1000
Destroyer, CVN 21, and Wideband Global SATCOM programs.
[End of section]
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