Defense Space Activities
National Security Space Strategy Needed to Guide Future DOD Space Efforts Gao ID: GAO-08-431R March 27, 2008The United States depends on space assets to support national security activities as well as civil and commercial activities. The Department of Defense (DOD) depends on space assets to support a wide range of military missions to include intelligence collection; battlefield surveillance and management; global command, control, and communications; and navigation assistance. This operational dependence on space has placed new and increasing demands on current space systems and organizations to meet Joint Force Commanders' needs. Moreover, concerns have increased regarding emerging threats that could affect the United States' and other countries' access to the free use of space. GAO plans to issue a report regarding ORS acquisition issues by April 2008, and by July 2008 we will issue a report regarding how ORS is being developed to satisfy warfighter needs. However, GAO is providing Congress this letter because during the course of our work on how Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) is being developed to satisfy warfighter needs, GAO learned that the National Security Space Office developed a National Security Space Strategy in 2004, but it has not been issued. GAO is bringing this matter to Congress' attention because without a strategy in place to link the defense and intelligence communities, future space programs, plans, and new space concepts, such as ORS, will be developed without the overarching strategic guidance that a national strategy could provide. Moreover, in April 2003, GAO recommended and DOD agreed that space activities needed to include a national security space strategy tied to overall department-level space goals, timelines, and performance measures to assess space activities' progress in achieving national security space goals.
DOD and the intelligence community have not developed, agreed upon, or issued a National Security Space Strategy. The National Security Space Office developed a draft strategy in 2004, but it was never issued. The Director of the National Security Space Office and the Director of Space Policy in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provided examples of reasons why a strategy has never been issued. One reason was that the National Security Council requested that the strategy not be issued until the revised National Space Policy was released in October 2006. However, once the policy was released, changes in leadership in the National Reconnaissance Office and the Air Force delayed the issuance of the strategy. In addition, differences of opinion between the defense and intelligence communities over the implementation of the strategy and cultural differences between the two communities further delayed the issuance. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) officials told GAO they are uncertain as to what specific problems exist that caused the delay in the issuance of the national security space strategy, yet they have not been approached by the National Security Space Office to review any current drafts. Regardless of the reasons for not issuing the strategy, DOD officials agree a strategy should be issued and ODNI officials also see the benefit in having a strategy. GAO previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy that lays out goals and objectives, suggests actions for addressing those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and responsibilities, and integrates relevant parties. In the case of space, a national security space strategy would assist DOD and the intelligence community to establish national space goals and priorities and ensure effective strategic coordination between DOD and the intelligence community. A national strategy may help ensure that the 1999 DOD Space Policy, which is being updated, and the National Military Strategy for Space Operations, which is being developed, support national security space goals and priorities. Until a national security space strategy is issued, the defense and intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions and use resources that are not necessarily based on national priorities, which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations and redundancies in others.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-431R, Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed to Guide Future DOD Space Efforts
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United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 27, 2008:
The Honorable Bill Nelson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Sessions:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
Subject: Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy
Needed to Guide Future DOD Space Efforts:
The United States depends on space assets to support national security
activities as well as civil and commercial activities. The Department
of Defense (DOD) depends on space assets to support a wide range of
military missions to include intelligence collection; battlefield
surveillance and management; global command, control, and
communications; and navigation assistance. This operational dependence
on space has placed new and increasing demands on current space systems
and organizations to meet Joint Force Commanders' needs. Moreover,
concerns have increased regarding emerging threats that could affect
the United States' and other countries' access to the free use of
space.
At your request, we are currently reviewing the acquisition and
requirements processes of the DOD's Operationally Responsive Space
[Footnote 1] (ORS) concept. In response to this request, we plan
to issue a report regarding ORS acquisition issues by April 2008, and
by July 2008 we will issue a report regarding how ORS is being
developed to satisfy warfighter needs. However, we are providing you
this letter because during the course of our work on how ORS is being
developed to satisfy warfighter needs, we learned that the National
Security Space Office developed a National Security Space Strategy in
2004, but it has not been issued. We are bringing this matter to your
attention because without a strategy in place to link the defense and
intelligence communities, future space programs, plans, and new space
concepts, such as ORS, will be developed without the overarching
strategic guidance that a national strategy could provide. Moreover, in
April 2003, GAO recommended and DOD agreed that space activities needed
to include a national security space strategy tied to overall
department-level space goals, timelines, and performance measures to
assess space activities' progress in achieving national security space
goals.[Footnote 2]
A national security space strategy would address the national security
space sector, which consists of all services and components of DOD and
all agencies within the intelligence community[Footnote 3] that provide
or use space capabilities. The use of commercial satellites to support
military operations has grown substantially particularly for
communications; however, the national security space sector consists of
DOD and intelligence community space assets. For the military, the U.S.
Strategic Command is responsible for establishing overall operational
requirements while the services are responsible for meeting these
requirements. The Air Force is DOD's primary procurer and operator of
space systems. The Army controls a defense satellite communications
system and operates ground mobile terminals. The Navy procures DOD
narrowband satellite communications capability and operates several
space systems that contribute to surveillance, meteorology and warning.
The National Reconnaissance Office designs, procures, and operates
space systems dedicated to intelligence activities. The National
Security Space Office, working with the DOD Executive Agent for Space
supporting Combatant Commanders, DOD services, and components, assists
in facilitating the integration and coordination of National Security
Space strategies, planning, and architectures that include defense and
intelligence space activities and those civil, commercial, and allied
space activities that contribute to National Security Space. The
Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the
intelligence community and acts as the principal advisor to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security
Council for intelligence matters related to national security.
For the purposes of this letter, our objective was to determine the
extent to which DOD and the intelligence community have developed,
agreed upon, and issued a National Security Space Strategy. To address
this objective, we interviewed officials and reviewed relevant
documentation in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, the National Security Space Office, the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the U.S. Strategic Command. We
conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through March 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
DOD and the intelligence community have not developed, agreed upon, or
issued a National Security Space Strategy. The National Security Space
Office developed a draft strategy in 2004, but it was never issued. The
Director of the National Security Space Office and the Director of
Space Policy in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
provided examples of reasons why a strategy has never been issued. One
reason was that the National Security Council requested that the
strategy not be issued until the revised National Space Policy was
released in October 2006.[Footnote 4] However, once the policy was
released, changes in leadership in the National Reconnaissance Office
and the Air Force delayed the issuance of the strategy. In addition,
differences of opinion between the defense and intelligence communities
over the implementation of the strategy and cultural differences
between the two communities further delayed the issuance. ODNI
officials told us they are uncertain as to what specific problems exist
that caused the delay in the issuance of the national security space
strategy, yet they have not been approached by the National Security
Space Office to review any current drafts. Regardless of the reasons
for not issuing the strategy, DOD officials agree a strategy should be
issued and ODNI officials also see the benefit in having a strategy. We
previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy
that lays out goals and objectives, suggests actions for addressing
those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and
responsibilities, and integrates relevant parties.[Footnote 5] In the
case of space, a national security space strategy would assist DOD and
the intelligence community to establish national space goals and
priorities and ensure effective strategic coordination between DOD and
the intelligence community. A national strategy may help ensure that
the 1999 DOD Space Policy, which is being updated, and the National
Military Strategy for Space Operations, which is being developed,
support national security space goals and priorities.[Footnote 6] Until
a national security space strategy is issued, the defense and
intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions and
use resources that are not necessarily based on national priorities,
which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations and
redundancies in others.
Because our previous recommendation regarding the need for a national
security space strategy has not been implemented, we believe Congress
should consider requiring the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
National Intelligence to identify and resolve any remaining differences
of opinion and issue a National Security Space Strategy. In its
comments, DOD agreed that a National Security Space Strategy, approved
by both the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence, would assist DOD and the intelligence community in
establishing national space goals and priorities and enabling strategic
coordination. DOD also provided technical comments which we
incorporated as appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in enclosure
I. ODNI provided technical comments on our draft report, but did not
take a position on our Matter for Congressional Consideration.
Background:
In January 2001, the report of the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization (Space Commission)
suggested that explicit national security guidance and defense policy
were needed to direct development of doctrine, concepts of operations,
and capabilities for space.[Footnote 7] Higher policy generally sets
the boundaries of a strategy, while a strategy provides guidance to a
corresponding plan. According to the Director of Space Policy in the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in the case of
space issues, a national security space strategy would originate from
the National Space Policy and the National Security Strategy. The
National Security Strategy, which covers both defense and intelligence
activities, provides guidance to the National Defense Strategy and the
National Intelligence Strategy. In addition, higher policy such as the
National Space Policy guides the creation of more specific policies,
such as the DOD Space Policy. According to the Director of the National
Security Space Office, which coordinates the National Security Space
Strategy, both the defense and intelligence communities must coordinate
and agree on the content of this national strategy for it to be
considered a legitimate and official document. Such coordination and
agreement is important to avoid fragmentation in DOD and intelligence
community efforts in space.
Pursuant to a DOD directive, the Secretary of Defense designated the
Secretary of the Air Force as the DOD Executive Agent for Space. The
DOD Executive Agent for Space is responsible for the development,
coordination, and integration of plans and programs for space systems
and the acquisition of major DOD space defense programs. The Secretary
of the Air Force is permitted to redelegate its executive agent
responsibilities only to the Under Secretary of the Air Force.[Footnote
8] At the time of this report, the position of the Under Secretary of
the Air Force is vacant; therefore, the Secretary of the Air Force
retains the duties of the Executive Agent for Space.
The Director of National Intelligence, a position established in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, serves as the
head of the intelligence community. In this capacity, the Director
oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence
Program and acts as the principal advisor to the President, the
National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for
intelligence matters related to national security. The Director must
consult with the Secretary of Defense on the development and
implementation of plans for the acquisition of a major system for a DOD
element of the intelligence community. As previously mentioned, the
national security space sector is composed of the defense and
intelligence communities.
DOD and the Intelligence Community Have Not Issued a National Security
Space Strategy:
DOD and the intelligence community have not issued a National Security
Space Strategy. The draft National Security Space Strategy, developed
in 2004, describes current national security challenges and America's
decisive asymmetric advantage in space, while recognizing that our
space superiority depends on unity of effort among the defense,
intelligence, and civil government communities in collaboration with
the U.S. private sector. The draft strategy presents four broad
strategic objectives for space but also mentions that detailed
implementation and specific planning objectives will be contained in
the National Security Space Plan. According to the National Security
Space Office Director, the National Security Council requested that the
National Security Space Strategy not be issued until the revised
National Space Policy (NSPD-49) was released in October 2006. However,
once the policy was issued, changes in leadership in the National
Reconnaissance Office and the Air Force delayed the issuance of the
strategy. In addition, differences of opinion between the defense and
intelligence communities along with cultural differences have further
delayed the issuance. In addition to different organizational
constructs, the defense and intelligence communities may also be faced
with other impediments such as different and sometimes competing
funding arrangements and requirements processes as it relates to
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, such as
space activities.
Reports have long recognized that the national security space community
needed a strategy to guide its efforts in space and better integrate
the space activities of DOD and the intelligence community. In its
January 2001 report, the Space Commission stated that explicit national
security guidance and defense policy were needed to direct development
of doctrine, concepts of operations, and capabilities for space. In
2003, we recommended that space activities should include a national
security space strategy tied to overall department-level space goals,
timelines, and performance measures to assess space activities'
progress in achieving national security space goals. Moreover, we
reported that it is standard practice to lay out goals and objectives
in a national strategy to define the objectives, suggest actions for
addressing those objectives, allocate appropriate resources, identify
roles and responsibilities, and integrate relevant parties. In 2004, we
identified a set of six desirable characteristics to aid responsible
parties in developing and implementing national strategies to enhance
their usefulness as guidance for resource and policy decision makers
and to better ensure accountability. These characteristics include: (1)
a statement of purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition
and risk assessment; (3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and
performance measures; (4) resources, investments, and risk management;
(5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6)
integration and implementation.[Footnote 9] We reviewed the 2004 draft
strategy and concluded that most of the desired characteristics had at
least been partially addressed in that document.
In the meantime, the National Security Space Office, in coordination
with the defense and intelligence communities, developed and issued a
National Security Space Plan to provide national security space
planners and programmers with a common point of reference.
Specifically, the plan's intent is to prioritize space capabilities
through balancing top-down national strategic guidance in combination
with a bottom-up assessment of agency and combatant command priorities.
It is to be updated every 2 years. As previously mentioned, however, a
strategy generally provides guidance to its implementation in the form
of a plan. The National Security Space Plan is based on the overarching
goals of the draft national security space strategy but this strategy
has never been officially issued. We believe it is important to base
detailed plans on an overarching strategy. Our 2003 report noted that
without a plan that is linked to high-level strategies, the services
would not have clearly defined space objectives and milestones to guide
their initiatives, nor would DOD have a mechanism to ensure successful
accomplishment of integrated efforts between the defense and
intelligence communities without gaps and duplication.
According to the National Security Space Office Director, a signed
plan, such as the National Security Space Plan, that is not based on an
official national security space strategy lacks legitimacy in the eyes
of participants. The Director of Space Policy in the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that current investment
decisions regarding U.S. national security in space are being made
based on guidance from a plan, without the analysis that higher
strategic guidance could provide. Moreover, strategies force decisions
to be made at a higher level to ensure overall strategic goals are met.
Strategies also serve to guide investments that achieve goals and
objectives and prevent investment in programs that are not consistent
with higher level goals. For these reasons, both officials believe a
strategy is needed.
Congress found in the past that DOD and the national intelligence
communities may not be well-positioned to coordinate certain
intelligence activities and programs in order to ensure unity of effort
and avoid duplication of effort. The 2001 Space Commission report
stated that the relationship between the defense and intelligence
communities is critical to the development and deployment of space
capabilities. The commission advised the two communities to work in
partnership to set and maintain the course for national security space
programs and to resolve the differences between their respective
bureaucracies. Moreover, according to ODNI, since the events of
September 11, 2001, the traditional distinction between the
intelligence missions of DOD and the national intelligence community
have become blurred, with DOD increasingly engaging in more strategic
missions and the national intelligence community engaging in more
tactical missions. Because of this trend, government decision makers
have recognized the increased importance of ensuring effective
coordination and integration between DOD and the national intelligence
community in order to successfully address today's security threats.
According to its Director, the National Security Space Office continues
to work on issuing the national security space strategy. However, the
Director noted that a strategy is unlikely to be issued before the
upcoming November 2008 presidential election, because it will be
difficult to get all relevant parties to agree on a strategy before
that time. ODNI officials told us they are uncertain as to what
problems caused the delay in the issuance of the strategy and that the
intelligence community has not been approached by the National Security
Space Office to review any current drafts of a national security space
strategy. However, ODNI officials see the benefit in having a strategy.
In the absence of an official national security space strategy, the
U.S. Strategic Command is drafting a National Military Strategy for
Space Operations. The National Military Strategy for Space Operations
is exclusively a military document that does not flow from a finalized
national security space strategy between DOD and the intelligence
community. The fact that a military strategy for space is currently
being drafted demonstrates that the defense community recognizes a gap
in higher strategic guidance in space that needs to be filled and
revised to counter emerging threats. Moreover, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy is updating the July 1999 DOD Space Policy based on
the 2006 release of the National Space Policy and recognition of
changes in the operational environment. These activities demonstrate
DOD's recognition of the need to move forward to implement the 2006
National Space Policy, even in the absence of an agreed upon national
security space strategy.
If directed to work together on a national security space strategy, the
defense and intelligence communities may have to overcome cultural
differences that have hindered collaboration and development in the
field of national security space. A national security space strategy
would assist DOD and the intelligence community to establish national
space goals and priorities, and ensure effective strategic coordination
between DOD and the intelligence community. Moreover, a national
strategy may help ensure that the DOD Space Policy and the National
Military Strategy for Space Operations support national security space
goals and priorities. Until a national strategy is issued, the defense
and intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions
and use resources that are not necessarily based on national
priorities, which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations
and redundancies in others. This is particularly important in light of
emerging threats to critical U.S. space assets.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Because our previous recommendation regarding the need for a national
security space strategy was not implemented, Congress should consider
requiring the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence to identify and resolve remaining differences of opinion
and issue a National Security Space Strategy.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed that a
National Security Space Strategy, approved by both the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, would assist DOD and
the intelligence community in establishing national space goals and
priorities, and enabling strategic coordination. DOD, however,
disagreed with the report's assertion that in the absence of such a
strategy, decisions with respect to space capabilities are not being
made based on national priorities. Our report did not state that
decisions with respect to space capabilities are not being made based
on national priorities. Rather, our draft report stated that the
defense and intelligence communities may continue to make independent
decisions and use resources that are not necessarily based on national
priorities, which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations
and redundancies in others.
DOD also stated in its written comments that we incorrectly
characterized DOD's efforts to update the 1999 DOD Space Policy. DOD
stated that the efforts to update the 1999 policy were not due to a
recognition of a gap in higher strategic guidance as we stated in our
report. Rather, they stated their efforts were due to the issuance of
the 2006 National Space Policy and the changes in the operational
environment. We changed the report to reflect this statement.
DOD also stated that our report characterized only one aspect of the
ORS program--its quick launch and reconstitution aspect--and that our
report should reflect the broader aspect of ORS, which includes a 3-
tiered concept to exploit existing capabilities, replenish and augment
with existing technologies and capabilities, and develop and employ new
technologies and capabilities. We changed the report to include these
broader aspects. DOD's comments are reprinted in enclosure I.
In addition to written comments, DOD provided technical comments which
we incorporated as appropriate.
ODNI provided technical comments on the draft report, but did not take
a position on our Matter for Congressional Consideration.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence. Copies will be made available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on our
Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Major contributors to this report are Lorelei St James, Assistant
Director; Grace Coleman; Amy Higgins; Enemencio Sanchez; Kimberly Seay;
and Amy Ward-Meier. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. If you or your staff have any questions about this report,
please contact me at 202-512-5431 or DAgostinoD@gao.gov.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosure:
Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent
Capabilities:
2500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500:
March 24, 2008:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This letter is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO
draft report, GAO-08-431R "Defense Space Activities: National Security
Space Strategy Needed to Guide Future DoD Space Efforts," dated March
10, 2008 (GAO Code 351134).
In general, DoD agrees that a National Security Space Strategy,
approved by both the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence, would assist DoD and the intelligence community in
establishing national space goals and priorities, and enabling
strategic coordination. However, DoD disagrees with the report's
assertion that in the absence of such a strategy, decisions with
respect to space capabilities are not being made based on national
priorities.
The report identifies current efforts within DoD intended to provide
goals and priorities for military space capabilities. In this regard,
the Commander of United States Strategic Command is developing a
National Military Strategy for Space Operations, which will provide
strategic context for the development and employment of space
capabilities. However, the current efforts to update the 1999 DoD Space
Policy are incorrectly characterized as resulting from recognition of a
gap in higher strategic guidance. The revision of DoD Space Policy is
based on the 2006 release of National Space Policy and recognition of
changes in the operational environment.
Since the GAO report was initiated based upon an investigation related
to Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), it is important to accurately
characterize ORS. The report describes only one aspect of ORS, that is
quick launch of small satellites to support warfighters' needs and, if
lost, reconstitution of certain space capabilities. Implementation of
ORS is actually based on a three-tier concept: tier-1 is the rapid
exploitation of existing capabilities; tier-2 is the ability to
replenish, augment or reconstitute with existing
technologies/capabilities; and tier-3 is the ability to rapidly develop
and employ new technologies/capabilities. Concepts such as ORS are
captured in the National Military Strategy for Space Operations and DoD
Space Policy documents. Enclosed are additional specific comments and
corrections to the information contained in the report.
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report. Questions should be directed to DoD's primary action officer,
COL Patrick Frakes, Director, Space Policy & Information Operations,
(703) 697-6364.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Brian Green:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
(Strategic Capabilities):
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of correspondence]
GAO Draft Report ” Dated March 10, 2008:
GAO CODE 351134/GAO-08-431R:
"Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed to
Guide Future DoD Space Efforts"
Technical Comments:
p. 2, para. 2. Reword sentence: "The Navy procures DoD narrowband
satellite communications capability and operates several space systems
that contribute to surveillance, meteorology and warning."
p. 2, para. 2. Reword sentence: "The National Security Space Office,
working with the DOD EA for space supporting COCOMs, DOD services and
components, assists in facilitating the integration and coordination of
National Security Space strategies, planning and architectures that
include defense and intelligence space activities and those civil,
commercial, and allied space activities that contribute to National
Security Space."
p. 3. para. 3. Correction: The NSSO developed a draft strategy in 2004,
(vice 2003).
p. 3. para. 3. Recommended addition: after, "2003," add "and while the
draft National Security Space Strategy has been used as a reference for
the development of the National Security Space Plan," it was never
issued.
p. 4. line 2. Correction: changes in NSSO leadership did not cause
delay in issuance of NSSS.
p. 4. line 4. Recommended change: recommend changing "disagreements" to
"differences between"
p. 4. line 18. Correction throughout the report: correct title is
"National Military Strategy for Space Operations"
p. 6. footnote 8. Recommended addition: Note that DODD 5101.2 is
currently under revision.
p. 6. para. 3. Correction: a draft National Security Space Strategy was
developed, but not issued on instructions of the National Security
Council, as described earlier.
p. 7. line 4. Correction: Change NSSO to DoD.
p. 8. para. 3. Reword last sentence: "Strategies will serve to guide
investments that achieve goals and objectives and prevent investment in
programs that are not consistent with higher level goals."
p. 10. para. 1. Recommended change: change "an agreed upon" to "a
finalized"
p. 10. para. 2. Recommended change: change "if required" to "if
directed"
[End of enclosure]
Footnotes:
[1] ORS is a DOD concept designed to satisfy Joint Force Commanders'
needs for readily available information and intelligence during ongoing
operations. The concept is based on three tiers: Tier 1 is the rapid
exploitation of existing capabilities; Tier 2 is the ability to
replenish, augment, or reconstitute with existing technologies/
capabilities; and Tier 3 is the ability to rapidly develop and employ
new technologies/capabilities.
[2] GAO, Defense Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated,
but Further Management Actions Needed, GAO-03-379 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 18, 2003).
[3] The intelligence community includes organizations and offices from
both DOD and the national intelligence community. In addition to the
intelligence branches of the military services, there are four major
intelligence agencies within DOD: the Defense Intelligence Agency; the
National Security Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
and the National Reconnaissance Office. The national intelligence
community includes agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency as
well as the intelligence-related components of other federal agencies.
[4] As part of its advisory function, the National Security Council
coordinates national security and foreign policies among various
government agencies for the President. The National Space Policy
establishes overarching national policy that governs the conduct of
U.S. space activities. It was authorized by the President in August of
2006.
[5] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).
[6] The National Space Policy establishes the framework within which
DOD Space Policy is created. DOD Space Policy was issued in July 1999
and is currently being revised. The National Military Strategy for
Space is solely a military document, which does not require the
approval of the intelligence community. The National Military Strategy
for Space should be based on higher strategic guidance, such as the
National Security Space Strategy, in order to guide investment
priorities for space capabilities.
[7] Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization (Washington, D.C., Jan. 11, 2001).
The Space Commission was created pursuant to the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 to assess the organization and
management of space activities that support U.S. national security
interests.
[8] Department of Defense Directive 5101.2, DOD Executive Agent for
Space (June 3, 2003). This directive is currently under revision.
[9] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).
[End of section]
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