Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
DOD Can Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR Requirements Gao ID: GAO-08-374 March 24, 2008The Department of Defense's (DOD) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities-such as satellites and unmanned aircraft systems-are crucial to military operations, and demand for ISR capabilities has increased. For example, DOD plans to invest $28 billion over the next 7 years in 20 airborne ISR systems alone. Congress directed DOD to fully integrate its ISR capabilities, also known as the ISR enterprise, as it works to meet current and future ISR needs. GAO was asked to (1) describe the challenges, if any, that DOD faces in integrating its ISR enterprise, (2) assess DOD's management approach for improving integration of its future ISR investments, and (3) evaluate the extent to which DOD has implemented key activities to ensure proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not duplicative, and use a joint approach to meeting warfighters' needs. GAO assessed DOD's integration initiatives and 19 proposals for new ISR capabilities. We supplemented this analysis with discussions with DOD officials.
DOD faces a complex and challenging environment in supporting defense requirements for ISR capabilities as well as national intelligence efforts. Past efforts to improve integration across DOD and national intelligence agencies have been hampered by the diverse missions and different institutional cultures of the many intelligence agencies that DOD supports. For example, DOD had difficulty obtaining complete information on national ISR assets that could support military operations because of security classifications of other agency documents. Further, different funding arrangements for defense and national intelligence activities complicate integration of interagency activities. While DOD develops the defense intelligence budget, some DOD activities also receive funding through the national intelligence budget to provide support for national intelligence efforts. Disagreements about equitable funding from each budget have led to program delays. Separate military and intelligence requirements identification processes also complicate efforts to integrate future ISR investments. DOD does not have a clearly defined vision of a future ISR enterprise to guide its ISR investments. DOD has taken a significant step toward integrating its ISR activities by developing an ISR Integration Roadmap that includes existing and currently planned ISR systems. However, the Roadmap does not provide a long-term view of what capabilities are required to achieve strategic goals or provide detailed information that would make it useful as a basis for deciding among alternative investments. Without a clear vision of the desired ISR end state and sufficient detail on existing and planned systems, DOD decision makers lack a basis for determining where additional capabilities are required, prioritizing investments, or assessing progress in achieving strategic goals, as well as identifying areas where further investment may not be warranted. DOD policy calls for the services and agencies that sponsor proposals for new ISR capabilities to conduct comprehensive assessments of current and planned ISR systems, but GAO's review of 19 proposals showed that 12 sponsors did not complete assessments, and the completeness of the remaining 7 sponsors' assessments varied. GAO found that the DOD board charged with reviewing ISR proposals did not consistently coordinate with sponsors to ensure the quality of the assessments supporting their proposals or review the completed assessments. There were three key reasons for this. First, the board did not have a comprehensive, readily available source of information about existing and developmental ISR capabilities that could help identify alternatives to new systems. Second, the board has no monitoring mechanism to ensure that key activities are fully implemented. Third, DOD board officials said that the board lacks adequate numbers of dedicated, skilled personnel to engage in early coordination with sponsors and to review sponsors' assessments. Without more complete information on alternatives and a monitoring mechanism to ensure these key activities are fully implemented, DOD is not in the best position to ensure that investment decisions are consistent with departmentwide priorities.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-374, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR Requirements
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Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2008:
Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance:
DOD Can Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee
Development of Future ISR Requirements:
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
GAO-08-374:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-374, a report to Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities–such as satellites and unmanned
aircraft systems–are crucial to military operations, and demand for ISR
capabilities has increased. For example, DOD plans to invest $28
billion over the next 7 years in 20 airborne ISR systems alone.
Congress directed DOD to fully integrate its ISR capabilities, also
known as the ISR enterprise, as it works to meet current and future ISR
needs. GAO was asked to (1) describe the challenges, if any, that DOD
faces in integrating its ISR enterprise, (2) assess DOD‘s management
approach for improving integration of its future ISR investments, and
(3) evaluate the extent to which DOD has implemented key activities to
ensure proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not duplicative,
and use a joint approach to meeting warfighters‘ needs. GAO assessed
DOD‘s integration initiatives and 19 proposals for new ISR
capabilities. We supplemented this analysis with discussions with DOD
officials.
What GAO Found:
DOD faces a complex and challenging environment in supporting defense
requirements for ISR capabilities as well as national intelligence
efforts. Past efforts to improve integration across DOD and national
intelligence agencies have been hampered by the diverse missions and
different institutional cultures of the many intelligence agencies that
DOD supports. For example, DOD had difficulty obtaining complete
information on national ISR assets that could support military
operations because of security classifications of other agency
documents. Further, different funding arrangements for defense and
national intelligence activities complicate integration of interagency
activities. While DOD develops the defense intelligence budget, some
DOD activities also receive funding through the national intelligence
budget to provide support for national intelligence efforts.
Disagreements about equitable funding from each budget have led to
program delays. Separate military and intelligence requirements
identification processes also complicate efforts to integrate future
ISR investments.
DOD does not have a clearly defined vision of a future ISR enterprise
to guide its ISR investments. DOD has taken a significant step toward
integrating its ISR activities by developing an ISR Integration Roadmap
that includes existing and currently planned ISR systems. However, the
Roadmap does not provide a long-term view of what capabilities are
required to achieve strategic goals or provide detailed information
that would make it useful as a basis for deciding among alternative
investments. Without a clear vision of the desired ISR end state and
sufficient detail on existing and planned systems, DOD decision makers
lack a basis for determining where additional capabilities are
required, prioritizing investments, or assessing progress in achieving
strategic goals, as well as identifying areas where further investment
may not be warranted.
DOD policy calls for the services and agencies that sponsor proposals
for new ISR capabilities to conduct comprehensive assessments of
current and planned ISR systems, but GAO‘s review of 19 proposals
showed that 12 sponsors did not complete assessments, and the
completeness of the remaining 7 sponsors‘ assessments varied. GAO found
that the DOD board charged with reviewing ISR proposals did not
consistently coordinate with sponsors to ensure the quality of the
assessments supporting their proposals or review the completed
assessments. There were three key reasons for this. First, the board
did not have a comprehensive, readily available source of information
about existing and developmental ISR capabilities that could help
identify alternatives to new systems. Second, the board has no
monitoring mechanism to ensure that key activities are fully
implemented. Third, DOD board officials said that the board lacks
adequate numbers of dedicated, skilled personnel to engage in early
coordination with sponsors and to review sponsors‘ assessments. Without
more complete information on alternatives and a monitoring mechanism to
ensure these key activities are fully implemented, DOD is not in the
best position to ensure that investment decisions are consistent with
departmentwide priorities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD develop a future ISR enterprise vision and that
DOD take steps to improve its process for identifying future ISR
capabilities. DOD agreed or partially agreed with some recommendations
but disagreed with the recommendation to review staffing levels needed
for key oversight activities.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-374]. For more
information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Wide Range of DOD ISR Enterprise Commitments across the U.S.
Intelligence Community Presents a Challenging Environment for Greater
DOD ISR Integration:
DOD Has Initiatives to Improve the Integration of Its Future ISR
Investments, but the Initiatives Do Not Provide Key Management Tools
Needed to Effectively Guide ISR Investments:
DOD Has Not Fully Implemented Its Process to Develop, Integrate, and
Approve Future ISR Capabilities:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: ISR Capability Proposals Submitted to the Joint Staff Since
the Implementation of JCIDS in 2003 and for Which the Battlespace
Awareness Functional Capabilities Board was Designated the Lead:
Figures:
Figure 1: The JCIDS Analysis Process for Proposals for New
Capabilities:
Figure 2: DOD ISR Enterprise Relationship to the U.S. Intelligence
Community:
Figure 3: Application of Enterprise Architecture Principles to the DOD
ISR Enterprise:
Figure 4: List of Proposals with and without Assessments, and Those
with Highest Expected Cost Since 2003:
Figure 5: Extent to Which Seven ISR Capability Proposals Since 2003
Included a Capabilities-Based Assessment That Incorporated Key Elements
of Joint Staff Policy and Guidance:
Abbreviations:
BA FCB: Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FAA: Functional Area Analysis:
FNA: Functional Needs Analysis:
FSA: Functional Solution Analysis:
ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System:
MIP: Military Intelligence Program:
NIP: National Intelligence Program:
USD(I): Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 24, 2008:
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jim Saxton:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense's (DOD) intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems--including manned and unmanned airborne,
space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems--play critical roles in
supporting military operations and national security missions. ISR
encompasses multiple activities related to the planning and operation
of systems that collect, process, and disseminate data in support of
current and future military operations. Examples of these ISR systems
include surveillance and reconnaissance systems ranging from
satellites, to manned aircraft such as the U-2, to unmanned aircraft
systems such as the Air Force's Global Hawk and Predator and the Army's
Hunter, to other ground-, air-, sea-, or space-based equipment, and to
human intelligence teams. The intelligence data provided by these ISR
systems can take many forms, including optical, radar, or infrared
images or electronic signals. Effective ISR data can provide early
warning of enemy threats as well as enable U.S. military forces to
increase effectiveness, coordination, and lethality, and demand for ISR
capabilities to support ongoing military operations has increased. To
meet this growing demand, DOD is planning to make sizeable investments
in ISR systems, which provide ISR capabilities. For example, over the
next 7 years, DOD plans to invest over $28 billion to develop, procure,
and modify 20 major airborne ISR systems alone, and maintain existing
systems until new ones are fielded. These investments are planned at a
time when, as we have previously reported, the nation is facing
significant fiscal challenges in the future, due primarily to
demographic changes and rising health care costs, which are expected to
increase downward pressure on all federal spending, including defense
spending. [Footnote 1] In this environment, it will be increasingly
important for DOD decision makers to evaluate competing priorities and
alternatives to determine the most cost-effective solutions for
providing needed capabilities, including ISR capabilities. The Senate
Armed Services Committee has stated concerns that the effectiveness of
United States ISR capabilities has been hampered by capability gaps as
well as parallel systems across the services and intelligence agencies
that do not fully complement one another and may duplicate some
capabilities. For this reason, the Committee has expressed a question
about whether enough has been done, in a comprehensive, defensewide
enterprise manner, to require that new intelligence capabilities being
developed by the military services and the defense intelligence
agencies be conceived as part of a larger system of systems.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 states that
it shall be a goal of DOD to fully integrate the ISR capabilities and
coordinate the developmental activities of the services, DOD
intelligence agencies, and combatant commands as they work to meet
current and future ISR needs.[Footnote 2] Moreover, the position of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) was established to
facilitate resolution of the challenges to achieving an integrated DOD
ISR structure. Within DOD, USD(I) exercises policy and strategic
oversight over all defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and
security plans and programs, including ISR. As part of this
responsibility, USD(I) manages ISR capabilities across the department,
as well as DOD's intelligence budget, which includes DOD spending on
ISR. USD(I) carries out these responsibilities within the context of
the department's resource allocation process, known as the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. DOD's ISR capabilities
are often referred to as DOD's ISR enterprise, which consists of DOD
intelligence organizations that operate ISR systems that collect,
process, and disseminate ISR data in order to meet defense intelligence
needs, as well as to meet a significant set of U.S. governmentwide
intelligence needs, as tasked by the Director of National
Intelligence.[Footnote 3]
DOD implemented the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) in 2003 as the department's principal process for
identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military
capabilities.[Footnote 4] JCIDS supports the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, who is responsible for advising the Secretary of
Defense on the priorities of military requirements in support of the
national military strategy. The Joint Requirements Oversight
Council[Footnote 5] assists the Chairman in this role by reviewing and
approving proposals for new military capabilities, among other
responsibilities.[Footnote 6] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council
is supported by eight Functional Capabilities Boards that review and
analyze initial proposals for new military capabilities. The Functional
Capabilities Board responsible for reviewing proposals for new ISR
capabilities is known as the Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board (BA FCB).[Footnote 7] Proposals for new military
capabilities may be developed by any of the military services, defense
agencies, or combatant commands, who are referred to as sponsors. To
support these proposals and to facilitate the development of
capabilities that are as joint and efficient as possible, Joint Staff
policy calls for the sponsors to conduct capabilities-based assessments
that identify gaps in military capabilities and potential solutions for
filling those gaps. Specifically, the capabilities-based assessment
identifies the capabilities required to successfully execute missions,
the shortfalls in existing systems to deliver those capabilities, and
the possible solutions for the capability shortfalls.
We conducted several reviews in 2007 related to DOD's management of its
ISR capabilities. In April 2007, we testified that, although DOD is
undertaking some initiatives to set strategic goals and improve
integration of ISR assets, it has not comprehensively identified future
ISR requirements, set funding priorities, or established mechanisms to
measure progress.[Footnote 8] We also testified that DOD did not have
efficient processes for maximizing the capabilities of its current and
planned unmanned aircraft systems or measuring their effectiveness.
Furthermore, we reported that acquisition of ISR systems continued to
suffer from cost increases or schedule delays, and we noted
opportunities to improve ISR acquisition outcomes through greater
synergies among various ISR platforms. In May 2007, we reported on
DOD's acquisition of ISR systems and made recommendations to improve
acquisition outcomes by developing and implementing an integrated,
enterprise-level investment strategy approach based on a joint
assessment of warfighting needs and a full set of potential and viable
alternative solutions, considering cross-service solutions including
new acquisitions and modifications to legacy systems within realistic
and affordable budget projections.[Footnote 9] In July 2007, we issued
a report on DOD's processes for using unmanned aircraft systems that
made recommendations to improve visibility over and the coordination of
those assets and to measure their effectiveness.[Footnote 10] In
addition, we are currently conducting a separate review of the JCIDS
process that addresses the extent to which the process has improved
outcomes in weapons system acquisition programs. We expect our report
based on this review to be issued later in 2008.
In response to your request, our objectives for this report were to (1)
describe the challenges, if any, that DOD faces in achieving an
integrated ISR enterprise; (2) assess DOD's management approach for
improving integration of its future ISR investments; and (3) evaluate
the extent to which DOD has implemented key activities within the JCIDS
process to ensure that proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not
duplicative, and use a joint approach to filling warfighters' needs.
To describe the challenges DOD faces in integrating its ISR enterprise,
we reviewed documents on the operation of DOD's ISR enterprise and the
national intelligence community. To assess DOD's management approach
for improving integration of future ISR investments, we reviewed and
analyzed DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap and other DOD ISR integration
efforts and evaluated them against best practices for enterprise
architecture and portfolio management. To assess the extent to which
DOD has implemented key activities within the JCIDS process, we
reviewed policies and procedures related to the review and approval of
proposals for new ISR capabilities through DOD's JCIDS. We reviewed 19
of the 20 proposals for new ISR capabilities that were submitted to the
Joint Staff since the implementation of JCIDS in 2003 and for which the
BA FCB was designated as the primary Functional Capabilities
Board.[Footnote 11] We focused our efforts on the capabilities-based
assessments that underpin these proposals by evaluating the extent to
which the capabilities-based assessments incorporated key elements of
Joint Staff policy and guidance. We discussed ISR-related efforts and
challenges concerning these objectives with officials from such offices
as the Office of the USD(I); Joint Staff; National Security Space
Office; Air Force; Army; Navy; Marine Corps; U.S. Strategic Command's
Joint Functional Component Command for ISR; U.S. Special Operations
Command; U.S. Joint Forces Command; Defense Intelligence Agency;
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; and
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. We did not review
other processes within DOD that may be used for rapidly identifying ISR
capability needs, such as Joint Urgent Operational Needs, the Joint
Rapid Acquisition Cell, and Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization initiatives.
We conducted our review from April 2007 through March 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More
detailed information on our scope and methodology is provided in
appendix I.
Results in Brief:
As DOD works to achieve an integrated ISR enterprise, the department
faces a complex and challenging environment in supporting a wide range
of defense and non-defense agencies across the U.S. intelligence
community. DOD is presented with different and sometimes competing
organizational cultures, funding arrangements, and requirements
processes, reflecting diverse missions across the many U.S.
intelligence community agencies that DOD supports. For example, the
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management
and Organization noted in 2001 that understanding the different
organizational cultures of the defense and national space communities
is important for achieving long-term integration of defense and non-
defense national security space activities--which are subset of ISR
activities. In response to a commission recommendation, DOD established
the National Security Space Office in 2003, which received funding and
personnel from both DOD and the National Reconnaissance Office, a
defense intelligence agency that develops overhead reconnaissance
satellites for both DOD and the national intelligence community.
However, in 2005, the National Reconnaissance Office withdrew its
personnel, funding, and full access to a classified information-sharing
network from the office, inhibiting efforts to integrate defense and
national space activities, including ISR activities. Further, different
funding arrangements for defense and national intelligence activities
may complicate DOD's efforts to integrate ISR activities across the
enterprise. While DOD develops the defense intelligence budget, some
DOD organizations also receive funding through the national
intelligence budget, which is developed by the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, to provide support for national intelligence
efforts. However, statutorily required guidelines on how the Director
of National Intelligence is to implement his authorities, including
budgetary authority over defense intelligence agencies, have not yet
been established. Disagreement about equitable funding from each budget
may have led to at least one program delay until agreement could be
reached. In addition, DOD and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence maintain separate processes for identifying future ISR
requirements. This may complicate DOD efforts to develop future ISR
systems that provide capabilities across the defense and national
intelligence communities.
DOD has initiatives underway to improve the integration of its ISR
investments; however, DOD lacks key management tools needed to ensure
that ISR investments reflect enterprisewide priorities and strategic
goals. DOD's two primary ISR integration initiatives--the ISR
Integration Roadmap and a test case for managing ISR investments as a
departmentwide portfolio--are positive steps toward managing ISR
investments from an enterprise-level perspective rather than from a
service or agency perspective. However, our previous work has shown
that large organizations such as the DOD ISR enterprise are most
successful when they employ the following key tools: (1) a clearly
defined vision of a future enterprise that lays out what investments
are needed to achieve strategic goals, and (2) a unified investment
management approach in which decision makers weigh the relative costs,
benefits, and risks of proposed investments using established criteria
and methods. DOD and federal guidance on enterprise architecture also
state that a framework for achieving an integrated enterprise should
include these key tools. Although Congress tasked DOD to develop an ISR
Integration Roadmap to guide the development and integration of DOD ISR
capabilities from 2004 through 2018, USD(I) limited the Roadmap to
articulating ISR programs already in DOD's 5-year ISR budget due to
difficulty in predicting longer-term threats and mission requirements.
As a result, the Roadmap does not provide a longer-term, comprehensive
vision of what ISR capabilities are required to achieve strategic
goals. Moreover, the Roadmap does not provide a sufficient level of
detail to allow ISR decision makers to prioritize different needs and
assess progress in achieving strategic goals. This lack of detail in
the Roadmap limits its usefulness to ISR portfolio managers because it
cannot serve as a basis for establishing criteria and a methodology
that ISR decision makers can use to assess different ISR investments to
identify the best return on investment in light of strategic goals.
Without these two key tools, senior DOD leaders are not well-positioned
to exert discipline over ISR spending. We are therefore recommending
that the Secretary of Defense direct the USD(I) to develop and document
a long-term, comprehensive vision of a future ISR enterprise that can
serve as basis for prioritizing ISR needs and assessing how different
investments contribute to achieving strategic goals.
DOD has not implemented key activities within the JCIDS process to
ensure that proposed new ISR capabilities are filling gaps, are not
duplicative, and use a joint approach to addressing warfighters' needs.
Our review of the 19 proposals for new ISR capabilities submitted to
the BA FCB by the military services and DOD agencies, also known as
sponsors, since 2003 showed that sponsors did not consistently conduct
comprehensive capabilities-based assessments as called for by Joint
Staff policy, and the BA FCB did not fully conduct key oversight
activities. Specifically, 12 sponsors did not complete the assessments,
and the assessments conducted by the remaining 7 sponsors varied in
completeness and rigor. Moreover, we found that the BA FCB did not
systematically coordinate with the sponsors during their assessment
process to help ensure the quality of the assessments, and did not
generally review the assessments once they were completed. As a result,
DOD lacks assurance that ISR capabilities approved through the JCIDS
process provide joint solutions to DOD's ISR capability needs and are
the solutions that best minimize inefficiency and redundancy. The BA
FCB did not fully implement oversight activities for three key reasons.
First, the BA FCB does not have a readily available source of
information that identifies the full range of existing and
developmental ISR capabilities, which would serve as a tool for
reviewing the jointness and efficiency of the sponsors' assessments.
Second, the BA FCB lacks a monitoring mechanism to ensure that key
oversight activities are fully implemented as described in existing
guidance. Third, BA FCB officials said that the BA FCB does not have
adequate numbers of dedicated, skilled personnel to engage in early
coordination with sponsors and review the sponsors' capabilities-based
assessments. Since the BA FCB did not fully implement its oversight
activities, neither the BA FCB nor the sponsors can be assured that the
sponsors considered the full range of potential solutions when
conducting their assessments and identified a joint approach to
addressing warfighters' needs. To enable effective Joint Staff
oversight over ISR capability development, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the USD(I) to collaborate in developing a comprehensive source of
information on all ISR capabilities for use in informing capabilities-
based assessments. We are also recommending that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a
supervisory review or other monitoring mechanism to ensure that (1) the
BA FCB and sponsors engage in early coordination to facilitate
sponsors' consideration of existing and developmental ISR capabilities
in developing their capabilities-based assessments, (2) capabilities-
based assessments are completed, and (3) the BA FCB uses systematic
procedures for reviewing the assessments. We are also recommending that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to review the BA FCB's staffing levels and expertise and workload
to engage in early coordination with sponsors and review their
assessments, and, if shortfalls of personnel, resources, or training
are identified, develop a plan for addressing them.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed or partially
agreed with our recommendations to develop a vision of a future ISR
architecture, to develop a comprehensive source of information on all
ISR capabilities, and to ensure that key activities--such as early
coordination between the BA FCB and sponsors, and completion and review
of assessments--are fully implemented. However, DOD stated that changes
in guidance were not needed. DOD disagreed with our recommendation that
it review the BA FCB's staffing levels and expertise and workload to
engage in early coordination with sponsors and review their
assessments, and, if shortfalls of personnel, resources, or training
are identified, develop a plan for addressing them. In its comments,
DOD noted that it had conducted a review of Functional Capabilities
Board personnel and resources in fiscal year 2007 which did not
identify deficiencies. However, workload issues and lack of technical
skills among staff were mentioned to us by defense officials as reasons
why early coordination and reviews of capabilities-based assessments
were not being systematically performed as part of the BA FCB's
oversight function. Therefore, in light of our finding that the BA FCB
did not fully implement these key oversight activities as called for in
Joint Staff policy, we believe that the department should reconsider
whether the BA FCB has the appropriate number of staff with the
appropriate skills to fully implement these oversight activities. In
addition, based on DOD's comments, we modified one of our
recommendations to clarify that the Secretary of Defense could assign
leadership to either the Joint Staff or the USD(I), in consultation
with the other, to develop the comprehensive source of information that
the sponsors and the BA FCB need. In making this modification, we also
moved two actions that were originally part of this recommendation and
included them in another, thereby consolidating actions that the Joint
Staff needs to take into one recommendation. Also in response to DOD's
comments, we modified our recommendation related to ensuring that early
coordination and completion and review of sponsors' assessments are
conducted by clarifying that a monitoring mechanism is needed to ensure
that DOD fully implement these key activities in accordance with
existing guidance. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II.
Background:
In 2001, DOD shifted from a threat-based planning process focused on
preparing the department for a set of threat scenarios to a
capabilities-based process focused on identifying what capabilities DOD
would need to counter expected adversaries. The expectation was that a
capabilities-based process would prevent DOD from over-optimizing for a
limited set of scenarios. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review continued
this shift in order to emphasize the needs of the combatant commanders
by implementing portfolio management principles for cross-sections of
DOD's capabilities. Portfolio management principles are commonly used
by large commercial companies to prioritize needs and allocate
resources. In September 2006, DOD initiated a test case of the
portfolio management concept, which included DOD's management of its
ISR capabilities. The USD(I) is the lead office for this ISR portfolio,
and the ISR Integration Council, a group of senior DOD intelligence
officers created as a forum for the services to discuss ISR integration
efforts, acts as the governance body for the ISR portfolio management
effort. In February 2008, DOD announced its plans to formalize the test
cases, including the ISR portfolio, as standing capability portfolio
management efforts.
DOD established JCIDS as part of its capabilities-based planning
process and to be a replacement for DOD's previous requirements
identification process, which, according to DOD, frequently resulted in
systems that were service-focused rather than joint, programs that
duplicated each other, and systems that were not interoperable. Under
this previous process, requirements were often developed by the
services as stand-alone solutions to counter specific threats and
scenarios. In contrast, the JCIDS process is designed to identify the
broad set of capabilities that may be required to address the security
environment of the twenty-first century. In addition, requirements
under the JCIDS process are intended to be developed from the "top-
down," that is, starting with the national military strategy, whereas
the former process was "bottom-up," with requirements growing out of
the individual services' unique strategic visions and lacking clear
linkages to the national military strategy.
The BA FCB has responsibilities that include both JCIDS and non-JCIDS
activities. The BA FCB provides input on the ISR capability portfolio
management test case to the USD(I), who leads the test case and who, in
turn, often provides inputs to the BA FCB deliberations on ISR
capability needs. The BA FCB also generally provides analytic support
for Joint Staff discussions and decisions on joint concepts and
programmatic issues. In addition, the BA FCB has responsibilities for
helping to oversee materiel and non-materiel capabilities development
within JCIDS.[Footnote 12] To do this, the BA FCB reviews proposals for
new ISR capabilities, as well as proposals for non-materiel ISR
capabilities and for ISR capabilities already in development, and
submits recommendations to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on
whether or not to approve them.[Footnote 13] To support their proposals
for new ISR capabilities, the sponsors are expected to conduct a
robust, three-part capabilities-based assessment that identifies (1)
warfighter skills and attributes for a desired capability (Functional
Area Analysis), (2) the gaps to achieving this capability based on an
assessment of all existing systems (Functional Needs Analysis), and (3)
possible solutions for filling these gaps (Functional Solution
Analysis). According to Joint Staff guidance, the latter assessment
should consider the development of new systems, non-materiel solutions
that do not require the development of new systems, modifications to
existing systems, or a combination of these, as possible solutions to
filling identified capability gaps. Figure 1 provides an overview of
the JCIDS analysis process as it relates to proposals for new
capabilities, showing that these proposals are supposed to flow from
top-level defense guidance, including DOD strategic guidance, Joint
Operations Concepts, and Concepts of Operations.[Footnote 14] This
guidance is to provide the conceptual basis for the sponsor's
capabilities-based assessment, which ultimately results in the
sponsor's proposal for a new capability.
Figure 1: The JCIDS Analysis Process for Proposals for New
Capabilities:
This figure is a flowchart showing the JCDIS analysis process for
proposals for new capabilities.
[See PDF for image]
Source: Joint Staff guidance.
[End of figure]
The Wide Range of DOD ISR Enterprise Commitments across the U.S.
Intelligence Community Presents a Challenging Environment for Greater
DOD ISR Integration:
DOD provides ISR capabilities in support of a wide range of defense and
non-defense agencies across the intelligence community, creating a
complex environment for DOD as it tries to integrate defense and
national ISR capabilities. As DOD works to define its ISR capability
requirements and improve integration of enterprisewide ISR
capabilities, the department is faced with different and sometimes
competing organizational cultures, funding arrangements, and
requirements processes, reflecting the diverse missions of the many
intelligence community agencies that DOD supports. This wide range of
DOD ISR enterprise commitments across the U.S. intelligence community
presents challenges for DOD as it works to increase ISR effectiveness
and avoid unnecessary investments in ISR capabilities.
DOD's ISR Enterprise Supports a Wide Array of Intelligence
Organizations, Making Greater Integration Complex:
DOD's ISR enterprise is comprised of many organizations and offices
from both the defense intelligence community and the national
intelligence community. DOD relies on both its own ISR assets and
national ISR assets to provide comprehensive intelligence in support of
its joint warfighting force. For example, the National Reconnaissance
Office, a DOD agency, provides overhead reconnaissance satellites which
may be used by national intelligence community members such as the
Central Intelligence Agency. Figure 2 demonstrates that DOD's ISR
enterprise supports a wide range of intelligence community
organizations.
Figure 2: DOD ISR Enterprise Relationship to the U.S. Intelligence
Community:
This figure is a chart showing DOD ISR enterprise relationship to the
U.S. community with the following information:
Director of National Intelligence:
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:
designated as:
Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence:
Defense Intelligence Community:
Members:
* Defense Intelligence Agency;
* National Security Agency;
* National Reconnaissance Office;
* Military Service Intelligence Branches;
(Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps)
National Intelligence Community:
Members:
* Central Intelligence Agency;
* Department of Homeland Security;
* Department of Energy;
* Department of the Treasury;
* Department of State;
* Federal Bureau of Investigation;
* Drug Enforcement Agency;
* Coast Guard;
DOD IST Enterprise: Provides capabilities in support of missions across
the defense and national intelligence communities.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
DOD organizations are involved in providing intelligence information to
both the defense and national intelligence communities, using their
respective or joint ISR assets. In addition to the intelligence
branches of the military services, there are four major intelligence
agencies within DOD: the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National
Security Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and the
National Reconnaissance Office. The Defense Intelligence Agency is
charged with providing all-source intelligence data to policy makers
and U.S. armed forces around the world. The Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, a three-star military officer, serves as the
principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Security Agency is
responsible for signals intelligence and has collection sites
throughout the world. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
prepares the geospatial data, including maps and computerized databases
necessary for targeting in an era dependent upon precision-guided
weapons. The National Reconnaissance Office develops and operates
reconnaissance satellites. Although these are DOD intelligence
agencies, all of these organizations nevertheless provide intelligence
information to meet the needs of the national intelligence community as
well as DOD. The National Reconnaissance Office, in particular, is a
joint organization where ultimate management and operational
responsibility resides with the Secretary of Defense in concert with
the Director of National Intelligence. In addition, the national
intelligence community includes agencies such as the Central
Intelligence Agency, whose responsibilities include providing foreign
intelligence on national security issues to senior policymakers, as
well as the intelligence-related components of other federal agencies,
all of which have different missions and priorities. For example, the
intelligence component of the Department of State is concerned with
using intelligence information, among other things, to support U.S.
diplomatic efforts, while the intelligence component of the Department
of Energy may use intelligence to gauge the threat of nuclear terrorism
and counter the spread of nuclear technologies and material.
Different Organizational Cultures, Funding Arrangements, and
Requirements Processes Present a Challenging Environment in Which to
Coordinate DOD and National Intelligence Activities:
The complex context of different organizational cultures, funding
arrangements, requirements processes, and diverse missions of other
members of the intelligence community that DOD supports presents a
challenge for DOD in integrating its ISR enterprise, as highlighted by
previous efforts to achieve greater ISR integration within DOD.
Observers have noted in the past that cultural differences between the
defense and national intelligence agencies and their different
organizational constructs often impede close coordination. For example,
Congress found in the past that DOD and the national intelligence
community may not be well-positioned to coordinate their intelligence
activities and programs, including ISR investments, in order to ensure
unity of effort and avoid duplication of effort, and a congressionally
chartered commission that reviewed the management and organization of
national security space activities--known as the Space Commission--
noted that understanding the different organizational cultures of the
defense and national space communities is important for achieving long-
term integration. Subsequently, in 2003 and 2004, a joint task force of
the Defense Science Board observed that there was no procedural
mechanism for resolving differences between DOD and the national
intelligence community over requirements and funding for national
security space programs.[Footnote 15] In 2005, a private sector
organization indicated that DOD and the intelligence community should
improve their efforts to enhance information sharing and collaboration
among the national security agencies of the U.S. government.[Footnote
16] In addition, according to the ODNI, the traditional distinction
between the intelligence missions of DOD and the national intelligence
community have become increasingly blurred since the events of
September 11, 2001, with DOD engaging in more strategic missions and
the national intelligence community engaging in more tactical missions.
Because of this trend, government decision makers have recognized the
increased importance of ensuring effective coordination and integration
between DOD and the national intelligence community in order to
successfully address today's security threats. Two areas within DOD's
ISR enterprise where coordination between DOD and the national
intelligence community are important are: (1) managing funding and
budget decisions for ISR capabilities, and (2) developing requirements
for new ISR capabilities. DOD has two decision-support processes in
place to conduct these functions: its Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution process, and its Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System. However, DOD also coordinates with the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, which uses separate budgeting
and requirements identification processes to manage the national
intelligence budget.
Previous Efforts toward ISR Integration Highlight Organizational
Challenges:
Past DOD efforts to integrate its own ISR activities with those of the
national intelligence community have shown the difficulty of
implementing organizational changes that may appear counter to
institutional culture and prerogatives. For example, in its January
2001 report, the Space Commission made recommendations to DOD to
improve coordination, execution, and oversight of the department's
space activities.[Footnote 17] Among other things, the Space Commission
stated that the heads of the defense and national space communities
should work closely and effectively together to set and maintain the
course for national security space programs--a subset of ISR
capabilities--and to resolve differences that arise between their
respective bureaucracies. To accomplish this, the Space Commission
called for the designation of a senior-level advocate for the defense
and national space communities, with the aim of coordinating defense
and intelligence space requirements. In response to this
recommendation, in 2003 the department assigned to the DOD Executive
Agent for Space the role of the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office, and the National Security Space Office was established to serve
as the action agency of the DOD Executive Agent for Space. The National
Security Space Office received both DOD and National Reconnaissance
Office funding and was staffed by both DOD and National Reconnaissance
Office personnel. However, in July 2005, the Secretary of Defense split
the positions of the National Reconnaissance Office Director and the
Executive Agent for Space by appointing an official to once again serve
exclusively as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office,
citing the need for dedicated leadership at that agency. The National
Reconnaissance Office Director subsequently removed National
Reconnaissance Office personnel and funding from the National Security
Space Office, and restricted the National Security Space Office's
access to a classified information-sharing network, thereby inhibiting
efforts to further integrate defense and national space activities--
including ISR activities--as recommended by the Space Commission. In
another case, DOD officials stated that, when developing the ISR
Integration Roadmap, they had difficulty gaining information to include
in the Roadmap on national-level ISR capabilities that were funded by
the national intelligence budget.
Funding of ISR Assets across DOD and National Intelligence Budgets
Presents a Challenge for ISR Integration Efforts:
Spending on most ISR programs is divided between the national
intelligence budget, known as the National Intelligence Program (NIP),
and the defense intelligence budget, known as the Military Intelligence
Program (MIP).
* The NIP consists of intelligence programs that support national
decision makers, especially the President, the National Security
Council, and the heads of cabinet departments, to include the
Department of Defense. The Director of National Intelligence is
responsible for developing and determining the annual NIP budget,
which, according to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, amounted to $43.5 billion appropriated for fiscal year
2007.[Footnote 18] To assist in this task, officials from the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence stated that they currently use a
framework known as the Intelligence Community Architecture, the focus
of which is to facilitate the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence's intelligence budget deliberations by providing a set of
repeatable processes and tools for decision makers to make informed
investment decisions about what intelligence systems, including ISR
systems, to buy. According to officials from the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, they are working with DOD to finalize
guidance related to the Intelligence Community Architecture as of
January 2008.
* The MIP encompasses DOD-wide intelligence programs and most
intelligence programs supporting the operating units of the military
services. The USD(I) is responsible for compiling and developing the
MIP budget. To assist in informing its investment decisions for MIP-
funded activities, the USD(I) is currently employing an investment
approach that is intended to develop and manage ISR capabilities across
the entire department, rather than by military service or individual
program, in order to enable interoperability of future ISR capabilities
and reduce redundancies and gaps. The total amount of the annual MIP
budget is classified.
Given that DOD provides ISR capabilities to the national intelligence
community, some defense organizations within DOD's ISR enterprise are
funded through the NIP as well as the MIP. For example, three DOD
intelligence agencies--the National Security Agency, the National
Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency--
are included in the NIP. While the Director of National Intelligence is
responsible for preparing a NIP budget that incorporates input from NIP-
funded defense agencies, such as the National Security Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
USD(I) has responsibility for overseeing defense ISR capabilities
within the NIP as well as within the MIP. The statutorily required
guidelines to ensure the effective implementation of the Director of
National Intelligence's authorities, including budgetary authority over
defense intelligence agencies, had not been established as of January
2008.[Footnote 19] In recognition of the importance of coordinated
intelligence efforts, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
National Intelligence signed a memorandum of agreement in May 2007 that
assigned the USD(I) the role of Director of Defense Intelligence within
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, reinforcing the
USD(I)'s responsibility for ensuring that the investments of both the
defense and national intelligence communities are mutually supportive
of each other's roles and missions. The specific responsibilities of
this position were defined by a January 2008 agreement signed by the
Director of National Intelligence, after consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, but it is too early to know whether this new
position will increase coordination between the defense and national
intelligence communities with regard to planning for current and future
spending on ISR capabilities.
Although DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
have begun working together to coordinate funding mechanisms for joint
programs, DOD efforts to ensure funding for major ISR programs that
also support national intelligence missions can be complicated when
funding for those systems is shared between the separate MIP and NIP
budgets. For example, as the program executive for the DOD intelligence
budget, the USD(I) is charged with coordinating DOD's ISR investments
with those of the non-DOD intelligence community. A DOD official stated
that, as part of the fiscal year 2008 ISR budget deliberations, the
USD(I) and the Air Force argued that funding for the Space Based
Infrared Radar System and Space Radar satellite systems, which are
managed jointly by the Air Force and National Reconnaissance Office,
should be shared between the DOD ISR budget and the national
intelligence community ISR budget to better reflect that these programs
support both DOD and national intelligence priorities. As a result,
according to a DOD official, USD(I) negotiated a cost-sharing
arrangement with the Director of National Intelligence, and, although
the Air Force believed that its funding contribution under the cost-
sharing agreement was too high, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
ultimately decided that the Air Force would assume the higher funding
level. A DOD official stated that the delay in funding for the Space
Radar system caused its initial operational capability date to be
pushed back by approximately one year.
Separate Defense and Non-Defense ISR Requirements Processes Add to
Complexity of ISR Integration:
In addition to having separate intelligence budgets, DOD and the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence also conduct separate
processes to identify future requirements.
* In DOD, proposals for new ISR capabilities are often developed by the
individual services, which identify their respective military needs in
accordance with their Title 10 responsibilities to train and equip
their forces.[Footnote 20] Proposals for new ISR capabilities may also
be developed by defense agencies or combatant commands. Proposals for
new ISR capabilities that support defense intelligence requirements may
be submitted through DOD's JCIDS process, at which time the department
is to review the proposals to ensure that they meet the full range of
challenges that the services may face when operating together as a
joint force.
* The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has its own
separate process, carried out by the Mission Requirements Board, which
is intended to serve as the approval mechanism for future national
intelligence requirements as well as to provide input on future
intelligence capabilities being acquired by DOD that may also support
national intelligence community missions. According to officials from
both the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and DOD, the
process carried out by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence is evolving and is less formalized than DOD's JCIDS
process.
These separate ISR requirements identification processes for DOD and
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may present
challenges for DOD since there are not yet any standard procedures for
ensuring that ISR capability proposals affecting both the defense and
national intelligence communities are reviewed in a timely manner by
both processes. Although there is coordination between the two
processes, DOD officials related that the nature of the relationship
between JCIDS and the Mission Requirements Board process is still
unclear. Officials from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence confirmed that the structure of their office is still
evolving, and therefore no standard process currently exists for
determining what DOD capability proposals the Mission Requirements
Board will review, or what criteria will be used to conduct such
reviews. Officials from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence stated that Mission Requirements Board members exercise
their professional judgment on which DOD systems need to be reviewed
and whether enough of the capability is already being delivered by
existing systems. Although there is a 2001 Director of Central
Intelligence directive that establishes the Mission Requirements Board
and calls upon it to oversee, in consultation with DOD's Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, the development of requirements
documents that are common to both national and joint military
operational users, this directive contains no specific criteria for
doing so. Officials from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence stated that they are planning to update this 2001
directive on the Mission Requirements Board. Moreover, coordinating the
separate requirements processes to ensure that an ISR capability
proposal receives timely input on requirements from both DOD and the
national intelligence community can be challenging. DOD and the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence have not determined systematic
procedures or clear guidance for handling situations in which they have
different opinions on ISR capability proposals. For example, the
Mission Requirements Board did not approve a proposal for a new ISR
capability to ensure that the proposal incorporated certain changes,
even though DOD had already given its approval to the proposal through
the JCIDS process. The unclear nature of the relationship between DOD's
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's ISR
requirements identification processes may complicate DOD efforts to
develop future ISR systems that provide capabilities across the defense
and national intelligence communities.
DOD Has Initiatives to Improve the Integration of Its Future ISR
Investments, but the Initiatives Do Not Provide Key Management Tools
Needed to Effectively Guide ISR Investments:
To improve the integration of its ISR investments, DOD has developed
two initiatives--the ISR Integration Roadmap and a test case for
managing ISR investments as part of a departmentwide portfolio of
capabilities. [Footnote 21] These initiatives are positive steps toward
managing ISR investments from an enterprise-level perspective rather
than from a service or agency perspective. However, our review has
shown that these initiatives do not provide ISR decision makers with
two key management tools: (1) a clearly defined vision of a future ISR
enterprise that lays out what investments are needed to achieve
strategic goals, and (2) a unified investment management approach with
a framework that ISR decision makers can use to weigh the relative
costs, benefits, and risks of proposed investments using established
criteria and methods. Without these key tools, ISR decision makers lack
a robust ISR analytical framework they can use to assess different ISR
investments in order to identify the best return on investment in light
of strategic goals. As a result, senior DOD leaders are not well-
positioned to exert discipline over ISR spending to ensure ISR
investments reflect enterprisewide priorities and strategic goals.
The ISR Roadmap Does Not Provide a Clear Vision of a Future ISR
Enterprise That Lays Out What Capabilities Are Required to Achieve
DOD's Strategic Goals:
Based on our review and analysis, DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap does
not yet provide (1) a clear vision of a future integrated ISR
enterprise that identifies what ISR capabilities are needed to achieve
DOD's strategic goals, or (2) a framework for evaluating tradeoffs
between competing ISR capability needs and assessing how ISR capability
investments contribute toward achieving those goals. DOD issued the ISR
Integration Roadmap in May 2005 in response to a statutory requirement
that directed USD(I) to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the
development and integration of DOD ISR capabilities. DOD updated the
Roadmap in January 2007. As we testified in April 2007, the Roadmap
comprises a catalogue of detailed information on all the ISR assets
being used and developed across DOD, including ISR capabilities related
to collection, communication, exploitation, and analysis. Given the
vast scope of ISR capabilities, which operate in a variety of media and
encompass a range of intelligence disciplines, the ISR Integration
Roadmap represents a significant effort on the part of DOD to bring
together information needed to assess the strengths and weaknesses of
current ISR capabilities. DOD officials have acknowledged that the
Roadmap has limitations and stated that those limitations will be
addressed in future revisions.
As DOD develops future revisions of the ISR Integration Roadmap,
enterprise architecture is a valuable management tool that the
department could use to develop a clear vision of a future ISR
enterprise and a framework for evaluating tradeoffs between competing
ISR needs and assessing how future ISR investments contribute to
achieving strategic goals. Our previous work has shown that effective
use of enterprise architecture is a hallmark of successful public and
private organizations.[Footnote 22] An enterprise architecture provides
a clear and comprehensive picture of that organization, consisting of
snapshots of its current (As-Is) state and its target (To-Be) state,
and a transition plan for moving between the two states, and
incorporates considerations such as technology opportunities, fiscal
and budgetary constraints, legacy and new system dependencies and life
expectancies, and the projected value of competing investments. DOD and
federal guidance on enterprise architecture state that a framework for
achieving an integrated enterprise should be based on a clearly defined
target architecture, or vision, for a future enterprise derived from an
analysis of the organization's future requirements and strategic
goals.[Footnote 23] A target architecture for the DOD ISR enterprise
would (1) describe the structure of the future ISR enterprise and its
desired capabilities in a way that is closely aligned with DOD ISR
enterprise strategic goals, and (2) include metrics that facilitate
evaluating tradeoffs between different investments and periodic
assessment of progress toward achieving strategic goals. [Footnote 24]
Since it is likely that the architecture will evolve over time and be
revised, it may also include an exploration of alternative investment
options, and an acknowledgment of unknown factors. A clearly defined
target architecture that depicts what ISR capabilities are required to
achieve strategic goals would provide DOD with a framework for
assessing its ISR capability gaps and overlaps by comparing its
existing ISR capabilities to those laid out in the target architecture.
Identified capability gaps and overlaps would be the basis for guiding
future ISR capability investments in order to transition the ISR
enterprise from its current state toward the desired target
architecture. Furthermore, as our previous work has emphasized,
resources for investments such as those in ISR capabilities are likely
to be constrained by fiscal challenges in the federal budget.[Footnote
25] By clearly defining what ISR capabilities are required to achieve
strategic goals over time, with metrics for assessing progress, an ISR
target architecture would provide DOD with a framework for prioritizing
its ISR investments when programs are affected by fiscal or
technological constraints and an understanding of how changes to
investment decisions in response to those constraints affect progress
toward achieving strategic goals.
The ISR Integration Roadmap does not provide a clearly defined target
architecture--or vision--of a future ISR enterprise or a framework for
assessing progress toward achieving this vision because, in developing
the Roadmap, USD(I) chose to take an incremental approach that limited
it to articulating how capabilities already in DOD's existing ISR
budget support strategic goals, rather than developing a longer term,
more comprehensive target architecture based on an analysis of ISR
capability needs beyond those defined in the existing DOD budget. In
doing so, DOD did not fully address the time frame and subject areas
listed in the statute. Congress tasked USD(I) to develop a plan to
guide the development and integration of DOD ISR capabilities from 2004
through 2018, and to provide a report with information about six
different management aspects of the ISR enterprise. However, USD(I)
limited the Roadmap to the 5-year period covered by the existing ISR
budget, and did not address three of the six areas the statute
listed.[Footnote 26] The three areas listed in the statute that USD(I)
did not cover were (1) how DOD intelligence information could enhance
DOD's role in homeland security, (2) how counterintelligence activities
of the armed forces and DOD intelligence agencies could be better
integrated, and (3) how funding authorizations and appropriations could
be optimally structured to best support development of a fully
integrated ISR architecture. USD(I) officials stated that due to the
difficulty of projecting future operational requirements given ever-
changing threats and missions, developing a detailed future ISR
architecture beyond the scope of the capabilities already included in
the 5-year ISR budget is very challenging. As such, the initial
versions of the ISR Integration Roadmap were limited to the existing
ISR budget.
Due to the limited scope of the ISR Integration Roadmap, it does not
present a clear vision of what ISR capabilities are required to achieve
strategic goals. In relying on DOD's existing ISR budget rather than
developing a target architecture that details what ISR capabilities are
required to achieve strategic goals, the Roadmap does not provide ISR
decision makers with a point of reference against which to compare
existing DOD ISR assets with those needed to achieve strategic goals. A
clearly defined point of reference is needed to comprehensively
identify capability gaps or overlaps. This limits the utility of the
Roadmap as a basis of an ISR investment strategy linked to achieving
strategic goals. For example, the most recent revision of the ISR
Integration Roadmap lists global persistent surveillance as an ISR
strategic goal but does not define the requirements for global
persistent surveillance or how DOD will use current and future ISR
assets to attain that goal. [Footnote 27] The Roadmap states that the
department will conduct a study to define DOD's complete requirements
for achieving global persistent surveillance. The study was launched in
2006 but was limited to the planning and direction of ISR assets, which
constitutes only one of the six intelligence activities, collectively
known as the intelligence process, that would interact to achieve the
global persistent surveillance goal.[Footnote 28] Because the study is
limited to only the planning and direction intelligence activity, it
will not examine whether there are capability gaps or overlaps in other
areas, such as collection systems that include unmanned aircraft
systems and satellites, or its intelligence information-sharing
systems, and therefore is unlikely to define complete requirements for
achieving this strategic goal. While DOD has other analytical efforts
that could be used in assessing global persistent surveillance
capability needs, these efforts are generally limited in scope to
addressing the immediate needs of their respective sponsors. For
example, U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component Command
for ISR conducts assessments of ISR asset utilization and needs.
However, these assessments are primarily intended to inform that
organization's ISR asset allocation process, rather than to identify
enterprisewide capability gaps with respect to strategic goals.
Further, lacking a target architecture, the Roadmap does not provide
ISR decision makers a framework for evaluating tradeoffs between
competing needs and assessing progress in achieving goals. As figure 3
illustrates, a clearly defined ISR target architecture would serve as a
point of reference for ISR decision makers to develop a transition
plan, or investment strategy for future ISR capability investments,
based on an analysis that identifies capability gaps and overlaps
against the ISR capabilities needed to achieve the target architecture,
which would be based on DOD ISR strategic goals. Such an analysis would
provide ISR decision makers with an underlying analytical framework to
(1) quantify the extent of shortfalls, (2) evaluate tradeoffs between
competing needs, and (3) derive a set of metrics to assess how future
ISR investments contribute to addressing capability shortfalls. With
this analytical framework, ISR decision makers at all levels of DOD
would have a common set of analytical tools to understand how changing
investment levels in different ISR capabilities would affect progress
toward achieving goals. This same set of tools could be used by
different ISR stakeholders evaluating how proposed ISR capabilities
contribute to addressing different gaps or to possibly saturating a
given capability area. For example, such a framework would allow ISR
decision makers to identify areas where ISR collection capabilities are
sufficiently robust or even saturated--areas where further investment
may not be warranted given priority needs in other less robust
collection areas.
Figure 3: Application of Enterprise Architecture Principles to the DOD
ISR Enterprise:
This figure is a flowchart showing the application of enterprise
architecture principles to the DOD ISR enterprise.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of federal enterprise architecture guidance.
[End of figure]
Moreover, lacking a target architecture that depicts what capabilities
are required to achieve DOD's strategic goals for the ISR enterprise,
the Roadmap does not serve as a guide for the development of future ISR
capabilities. A comprehensive source of information on how different
ISR capabilities support strategic goals, and relate to other ISR
capabilities, would be useful not only to ISR decision makers
evaluating tradeoffs between competing needs, but also to program
managers developing proposals for new ISR capabilities. Officials
responsible for reviewing proposals for new ISR capabilities stated
that a long-term vision of a future end state for the ISR enterprise
would help sponsors to see what future ISR capabilities DOD needs and
how their needs align with DOD's strategic goals. For example,
officials from DOD's National Signatures Program said that, although
they had a clear program goal in mind when developing their proposal
for this new ISR capability, they experienced difficulty in developing
an architecture because they lacked a comprehensive source of
information to assess the full range of DOD and non-DOD databases and
ISR assets that their proposed program would need to support.[Footnote
29] Instead, these officials had to conduct an ad hoc survey of the ISR
community, primarily in the form of meetings with other groups that
maintained signatures databases, to ensure their program would be
sufficiently interoperable with other information-sharing networks and
ISR sensors. Without a clearly defined target architecture for the ISR
enterprise, DOD lacks an analytical framework for conducting a
comprehensive assessment of what investments are required to achieve
ISR strategic goals, or for prioritizing investments in different areas
when faced with competing needs.
Instead of providing an underlying analytical framework, the ISR
Integration Roadmap simply lists capability gaps that exist with
respect to DOD ISR strategic objectives, and depicts ISR capability
investments already in the DOD ISR budget as fully meeting those
capability shortfalls. For example, the Roadmap lists as an ISR
strategic goal the achievement of "horizontal integration of
intelligence information," which is broadly defined as making
intelligence information within the defense intelligence enterprise
more accessible, understandable, and retrievable. The Roadmap then
lists a variety of ISR investments in DOD's 5-year ISR budget as the
means of achieving this strategic goal. For example, one of these
investments is the Distributed Common Ground System, a major DOD
intelligence information-sharing network that spans the entire DOD
intelligence community. However, the Roadmap does not present an
analysis to facilitate evaluation of tradeoffs in that it does not
quantify how the Distributed Common Ground System and other DOD
information-sharing networks fall short of meeting the "horizontal
integration of intelligence information" strategic goal, nor does it
examine the extent to which some aspects of that capability area may in
fact be saturated. Furthermore, the Roadmap does not prioritize
investments in the Distributed Common Ground System with other major
investments intended to achieve this strategic goal, or define their
interrelationships. Finally, the Roadmap does not provide metrics to
allow decision makers to assess how these investments contribute to
achieving the "horizontal integration of intelligence information"
strategic goal. For example, if the Distributed Common Ground System
were to face fiscal or technological constraints, ISR decision makers
would not have the information needed to assess what the impact would
be on ISR strategic goals if it should not achieve those capability
milestones as envisioned in the Roadmap. As a result, ISR decision
makers cannot assess how new ISR capabilities would contribute to
elimination of whatever capability gaps exist in that area, determine
the most important gaps to fill, or make tough go/no-go decisions if
those capabilities do not meet expectations.
The ISR Portfolio Management Effort Does Not Facilitate a Unified
Investment Approach Needed to Guide DOD's ISR Investments:
While DOD's ISR portfolio management effort is intended to enable the
department to better integrate its ISR capabilities, it does not
provide a framework for effectively evaluating different ISR investment
options or clearly empower the ISR portfolio manager to direct ISR
spending. As a result, DOD is not well-positioned to implement a
unified investment approach that exerts discipline over ISR investments
to ensure they reflect enterprisewide priorities and achieve strategic
goals. In September 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense decided to
bring ISR systems across the DOD together into a capability portfolio
as part of a test case for the joint capability portfolio management
concept. Under this concept, a group of military capabilities, such as
ISR capabilities, is managed as a joint portfolio, in order to enable
DOD to develop and manage ISR capabilities across the entire
department--rather than by military service or individual program--and
by doing so, to improve the interoperability of future capabilities,
minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability
effectiveness. The USD(I) was assigned as the lead office for this ISR
portfolio, which is known as the battlespace awareness
portfolio.[Footnote 30] As the portfolio manager for ISR investments,
the role and authorities of the USD(I) are limited to two primarily
advisory functions: (1) USD(I) is given access to, and may participate
in, service and DOD agency budget deliberations on proposed ISR
capability investments, and (2) USD(I) may recommend that service and
DOD agency ISR spending be altered as part of the established DOD
budget review process.[Footnote 31] Under this arrangement, USD(I)'s
recommendations represent one of many points of view that are
considered by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and other DOD offices
involved in reviewing and issuing budget guidance, and therefore USD(I)
lacks the ability to ensure ISR spending reflects enterprisewide
priorities to achieve strategic goals.
Our previous work on portfolio management best practices has shown that
large organizations, such as DOD's ISR enterprise, are most successful
in managing investments through a single enterprisewide
approach.[Footnote 32] Further, to be effective, portfolio management
is enabled by strong governance with committed leadership, clearly
aligned organizational roles and responsibilities, and portfolio
managers empowered to determine the best way to invest resources. To
achieve a balanced mix of programs and ensure a good return on their
investments, successful large commercial companies that we have
reviewed take a unified, enterprise-level approach to assessing new
investments, rather than employing multiple, independent initiatives.
They weigh the relative costs, benefits, and risks for proposed
investments using established criteria and methods, and select those
investments that can best move the company toward meeting its strategic
goals and objectives. Their investment decisions are frequently
revisited to ensure products are still of high value, and if a product
falls short of expectations, they make tough go/no-go decisions.
We have previously recommended that DOD establish portfolio managers
who are empowered to prioritize needs, make early go/no-go decisions
about alternative solutions, and allocate resources within fiscal
constraints.[Footnote 33] However, since DOD is still developing the
capability portfolio management effort, it has not fully defined the
role of the portfolio managers or their authority over spending. DOD's
September 2006 guidance on the implementation of the portfolio
management test case discusses options for increased authority over
spending for the portfolio managers.[Footnote 34] Nevertheless, USD(I)
and DOD officials involved in the implementation of the portfolio
management effort stated that DOD views the role of the portfolio
managers primarily as providing an assessment of spending in their
respective portfolio areas independent of the analysis offered by the
military services in support of their ISR spending proposals. If
USD(I)'s portfolio management role is limited to an advisory function
as DOD moves forward in implementing its portfolio management effort,
situations where senior DOD officials must evaluate the merits of
alternate analyses that advocate different solutions to ISR capability
needs are likely to continue to arise. A robust ISR analytical
framework based on a well-defined ISR target architecture would
establish a common methodology and criteria, as called for by portfolio
management best practices, that is agreed upon by the various ISR
stakeholders and that can be used for conducting a data-driven
assessment of different ISR capability solutions. For example, as part
of fiscal year 2008 ISR budget deliberations, USD(I) conducted an
analysis of planned increases in fiscal year 2008 funding to procure
more Predator unmanned aircraft systems in order to meet U.S. Central
Command's need for increased surveillance capability.[Footnote 35] U.S.
Central Command and the Air Force conducted an analysis that was based
on validating the requirement for more aircraft, rather than on
examining potential efficiencies in other aspects of employing them. As
the ISR portfolio manager, USD(I)'s analysis focused on identifying
opportunities for increased efficiencies in how existing Predators were
being employed in surveillance missions. USD(I) determined, among other
things, that Predator support to deployed forces was not being
maximized because each ground control station could only operate one
Predator aircraft at a time, resulting in gaps in the coverage of a
target as Predator aircraft rotated to and from the launch area. On the
basis of this analysis, USD(I) concluded that planned increases in
fiscal year 2008 Predator spending may not be the best, or only,
solution to U.S. Central Command's need for more surveillance
capability; instead, the solution should include additional Predator
ground control stations, or the tasking of other ISR assets in
situations where a Predator would have longer transit times to and from
the target area. The ISR Integration Council agreed with the USD(I)'s
recommendation. Ultimately, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who makes
final decisions on changes advocated by the ISR portfolio manager,
included the increase in Predator aircraft spending in the fiscal year
2008 budget. However, lacking a single, agreed-upon framework within
the ISR enterprise for evaluating the merits of the alternate analyses
advocating different capability solutions, DOD officials did not have
the benefit of a single, authoritative analysis that identified the
best return on investment of these different ISR investment options in
light of strategic goals and validated requirements. Given USD(I)'s
limited authority as the ISR capability portfolio manager, and the lack
of a framework for effectively evaluating alternate investment plans,
DOD is constrained in its ability to implement an enterprise-level,
unified investment approach that employs a single set of established
criteria to ensure its ISR investments reflect enterprisewide
priorities and strategic goals.
DOD Has Not Fully Implemented Its Process to Develop, Integrate, and
Approve Future ISR Capabilities:
DOD has not implemented key activities within the JCIDS process to
ensure that proposed new ISR capabilities are filling gaps, are not
duplicative, and use a joint approach to addressing warfighters' needs.
The services and DOD organizations that sponsored most of the JCIDS
proposals for new ISR capabilities since 2003 have not conducted
comprehensive assessments, and the BA FCB has not fully conducted key
oversight activities. Specifically, our review of 19 proposals for new
ISR capabilities that sponsors submitted to the BA FCB since 2003
showed that 12 sponsors did not complete the capabilities-based
assessment of current and planned ISR systems called for by Joint Staff
policy in order to identify possible solutions to meet warfighters'
needs. We also found that, for the 7 sponsors who did conduct these
assessments, the assessments varied in completeness and rigor.
Moreover, we found that the BA FCB did not systematically coordinate
with the sponsors during the sponsors' assessment process to help
ensure the quality of the assessments, and did not generally review the
assessments once they were completed. As a result, DOD lacks assurance
that ISR capabilities approved through JCIDS provide joint solutions to
DOD's ISR capability needs and are the solutions that best minimize
inefficiency and redundancy.
Lack of Complete and Rigorous Analysis Hampers DOD's Process That
Informs the Development of Its ISR Capabilities:
Joint Staff policy and guidance implementing the JCIDS process, as well
as a significant DOD study on defense capabilities,[Footnote 36]
indicate the importance of analyzing capability needs from a
crosscutting, department-level perspective to enable a consistent view
of priorities and acceptable risks. Specifically, Joint Staff
policy[Footnote 37] on the JCIDS process calls for sponsors to use a
robust analytical process to ensure that the proposed ways to fill
capability gaps are joint and efficient to the maximum extent
possible.[Footnote 38] This analytical process is known as a
capabilities-based assessment, and Joint Staff policy and guidance
specify that a capabilities-based assessment should include an analysis
of the full range of existing and developmental ISR capabilities to
confirm whether a shortcoming in mission performance exists, and of
possible ways to fix those shortcomings, such as modifications to
existing systems and the use of national-level systems. Nonetheless,
Joint Staff guidance also notes that the breadth and depth of a
capabilities-based assessment must be tailored to suit the issue, due
to the wide array of issues considered as part of the capabilities-
based assessment process.[Footnote 39]
The Majority of ISR Capability Proposals Lacked Assessments Called for
under the JCIDS Process:
Despite Joint Staff policy that calls for capabilities-based
assessments, we found that 12 sponsors--almost two-thirds--did not
carry out capabilities-based assessments to identify the ISR
capabilities that they proposed to the Joint Staff as ways to meet
warfighters' needs. Figure 4 lists the 19 ISR capability proposals we
reviewed and specifies which proposals were supported by capabilities-
based assessments. [Footnote 40] Figure 4 also shows that three of the
proposals that lacked capabilities-based assessments were ones that DOD
expected to cost more than $365 million for research, development, test
and evaluation, or more than $2.190 billion for procurement, using
fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.[Footnote 41]
Figure 4: List of Proposals with and without Assessments, and Those
with Highest Expected Cost Since 2003:
This figure is a timeline list of proposals with and without
assessments, and those with highest expected cost since 2003.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents.
Note: Line spacing indicating date of ISR capability proposals is
sequential but not proportional. Also, the chronology reflects the date
listed on each ISR capability proposal, which may not be the same as
the date on which the proposal was reviewed by the BA FCB.
[End of figure]
The 12 sponsors that did not conduct capabilities-based assessments, as
called for under the JCIDS process, cited the following reasons for not
doing them:
* Sponsors decided to use pre-existing analysis as an alternative to
the capabilities-based assessment. Many of the sponsors that did not
conduct formal capabilities-based assessments nevertheless based their
proposals for new ISR capabilities on other forms of analysis or pre-
existing mission needs statements. For example, Air Force sponsors
stated that they supported their ISR capability proposal with analysis
conducted in 1998 and 1999 and a mission needs statement from 2002,
before JCIDS was implemented, while National Security Agency sponsors
used the results of a substantial analytical effort they had completed
just prior to the implementation of JCIDS in 2003. We did not evaluate
these alternative types of analysis because they were not required to
take the form of capabilities-based assessments as called for by Joint
Staff policy and guidance on JCIDS.
* Sponsors had developed the capabilities prior to the implementation
of JCIDS. Two Air Force proposals, both submitted to the Joint Staff in
2004, lacked capabilities-based assessments and, according to the
sponsors of each, the Air Force had previously developed ISR systems
that were similar to those described in their proposals prior to the
implementation of JCIDS. Once JCIDS was implemented, the sponsor sought
to obtain Joint Staff approval through the new process; since their ISR
systems were already in development and pre-JCIDS analysis may have
been conducted, the sponsors did not conduct the capabilities-based
assessments. Other sponsors that had developed ISR systems prior to
JCIDS being implemented nevertheless conducted capabilities-based
assessments when they submitted their proposals. For example, one
sponsor developed its proposal and performed its assessment at least 2
years after its organization officially established the program, and
another sponsor's proposal was for a capability to be delivered through
an upgrade of an aircraft developed in the late 1960s. These sponsors
also sought approval for their ISR systems through the new JCIDS
process, but since their systems were already in development, our
review showed that these sponsors' capabilities-based assessments
indicated they had the solution already in mind when conducting the
assessments.
* Sponsors developed the capabilities through DOD processes other than
JCIDS. Joint Staff policy allows for sponsors to develop a new
capability through processes other than JCIDS and then later submit it
to the Joint Staff for approval through JCIDS. For example, one sponsor
said that it did not perform an assessment prior to developing its
proposal because the service originally developed and validated the
proposed capability through a technology demonstration process separate
from the JCIDS process.[Footnote 42]
* Sponsors lacked clear guidance on the JCIDS process, including how to
conduct a capabilities-based assessment. One Air Force sponsor that
submitted an ISR capability proposal in 2005 said that the Joint Staff
policy implementing the JCIDS process was relatively new at the time,
and did not contain clear guidance about how to conduct a capabilities-
based assessment. Another sponsor did not conduct an assessment because
the ISR capability it sought to develop was not a system, but rather a
way of carrying out ISR-related activities, and it believed that, in
such cases, a capabilities-based assessment was not expected.
* Sponsors had limited time and resources in which to carry out a
capabilities-based assessment. Two sponsors cited lack of resources,
including time, as a reason for not conducting a capabilities-based
assessment. In one of these cases, the sponsor noted that conducting a
capabilities-based assessment would not likely have resulted in a
different type of capability being proposed to the Joint Staff.
One-Third of ISR Capability Proposals Included Assessments, but
Assessments Varied in Rigor and Completeness:
Our review found that 7 of the 19 sponsors conducted capabilities-based
assessments, but these assessments varied in rigor and completeness.
For example, 4 of these 7 sponsors did not include the cost information
called for by Joint Staff guidance and 1 sponsor completed only one
phase of the capabilities-based assessment. Figure 5 shows the 7
sponsors that did conduct capabilities-based assessments in support of
their proposals and the extent to which these assessments contained
elements called for by Joint Staff policy and guidance. We assessed
these proposals as lacking an element called for by Joint Staff policy
and guidance when our document review of the sponsor's capabilities-
based assessment found no evidence of the element. Additional
information about our methodology for conducting this analysis is
contained in appendix I.
Figure 5: Extent to Which Seven ISR Capability Proposals Since 2003
Included a Capabilities-Based Assessment That Incorporated Key Elements
of Joint Staff Policy and Guidance[A]:
Sponsoring organization: Air Force;
ISR capability: Expeditionary Delivery of Airborne Full Motion Video;
Completeness of analytical support: Full review conducted: Partially;
Completeness of analytical support: Cost information provided: Yes;
Rigor of analytical support: Full range of existing and developmental
ISR capabilities considered: No;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential modifications considered:
Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential redundancies considered: No.
Sponsoring organization: Army;
ISR capability: Sequoyah Foreign Language Translation System;
Completeness of analytical support: Full review conducted: Partially;
Completeness of analytical support: Cost information provided: No;
Rigor of analytical support: Full range of existing and developmental
ISR capabilities considered: Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential modifications considered:
Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential redundancies considered: No.
Sponsoring organization: Defense Intelligence Agency;
ISR capability: National Signatures Program;
Completeness of analytical support: Full review conducted: Partially;
Completeness of analytical support: Cost information provided: No;
Rigor of analytical support: Full range of existing and developmental
ISR capabilities considered: Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential modifications considered:
Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential redundancies considered: Yes.
Sponsoring organization: Marine Corps;
ISR capability: Joint Tier II Unmanned Aircraft System;
Completeness of analytical support: Full review conducted: Yes;
Completeness of analytical support: Cost information provided:
Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Full range of existing and developmental
ISR capabilities considered: Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential modifications considered:
Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential redundancies considered:
Partially.
Sponsoring organization: Marine Corps;
ISR capability: Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle;
Completeness of analytical support: Full review conducted: Yes;
Completeness of analytical support: Cost information provided: Yes;
Rigor of analytical support: Full range of existing and developmental
ISR capabilities considered: Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential modifications considered:
Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential redundancies considered:
Partially.
Sponsoring organization: Navy;
ISR capability: Full Spectrum Intelligence;
Completeness of analytical support: Full review conducted: Yes;
Completeness of analytical support: Cost information provided: Yes;
Rigor of analytical support: Full range of existing and developmental
ISR capabilities considered: Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential modifications considered: Yes;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential redundancies considered: No.
Sponsoring organization: Navy;
ISR capability: Littoral Battlespace Sensing, Fusion, and Integration;
Completeness of analytical support: Full review conducted: Partially;
Completeness of analytical support: Cost information provided: No;
Rigor of analytical support: Full range of existing and developmental
ISR capabilities considered: No;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential modifications considered:
Partially;
Rigor of analytical support: Potential redundancies considered: No.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents.
[A] Joint Staff policy and guidance with regard to figure 5 refers to
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals 3170.01(2003), 3170.01A
(2004), 3170.01B (2005), and 3170.01C (2007), and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01F (2007).
[End of figure]
The majority of the seven capabilities-based assessments that we
reviewed did not consider the full range of existing ISR capabilities,
including the use of national systems, such as satellites, as potential
ways to fill identified shortcomings. For example, only one assessment
documented that the sponsor had considered the use of national systems.
Specifically, one Air Force sponsor's capabilities-based assessment
showed consideration of the use of satellites to assist in quickly
sending intelligence information gathered by unmanned aircraft systems
to the warfighter in theater. The remaining six sponsors did not
demonstrate in their capabilities-based assessments that they had fully
assessed the use of national systems, although two of the assessments
addressed capabilities that were unlikely to utilize national systems
as potential solutions, such as a foreign language translation
capability and an intelligence database. The sponsors who did not fully
assess the potential for national systems to fill gaps gave a number of
reasons for this. Navy sponsors of a manned platform told us that
satellites were not included among the ways that they considered to
fill capability gaps because the personnel conducting the assessment
did not possess the appropriate security clearances needed to evaluate
national systems and because of lack of time. Moreover, Marine Corps
sponsors reported that neither of their two unmanned aircraft system
capability proposals fully evaluated the use of satellites as potential
ways to meet ISR needs because they assumed that satellites could not
be quickly re-tasked to support the tactical user and lacked the
imagery quality needed. In one of their assessments, they noted that
satellite data, when available, are not responsive enough to the
tactical user due to the long processing time, and that tactical users
of satellite data also face challenges resulting from lack of
connectivity between the systems that provide these data. In the other
assessment, Marine Corps sponsors stated that one of their assumptions
in conducting the analysis was that satellites, as well as theater-
level unmanned aircraft systems, would not be available to support
Marine Corps tactical operations.
All seven sponsors that conducted capabilities-based assessments
considered the capacity of some existing and developing systems to meet
capability gaps, but none documented in their assessments whether and
how these systems could be modified to fill capability gaps--a
potentially less expensive and less time-consuming solution than
developing a new system. In some cases, DOD achieved efficiencies by
combining related acquisition programs, although these actions were not
the result of sponsors proactively seeking reduced overlap and
duplication. For example, in the capabilities-based assessment for one
of its two unmanned aircraft systems, Marine Corps sponsors identified
several solutions with the potential to provide an ISR capability using
existing or planned assets. Identified solutions included relying on or
adopting systems provided by other services. In this case, the sponsors
did not propose modifications to any existing systems as potential
solutions or demonstrate that they considered leveraging the
capabilities resident in a similar Navy unmanned aircraft system. The
Joint Staff approved this proposal and Marine Corps officials plan to
develop a new system that addresses Marine Corps warfighting
requirements for vertical takeoff and landing capability for use on
ships. In contrast, in another case involving a proposed capability
sponsored by the Marine Corps, at the direction of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, the
Marine Corps combined its unmanned aircraft system program with a
different Navy effort to form a single acquisition program, with the
goal of producing an integrated and interoperable solution, reducing
costs, and eliminating overlap and duplication of development efforts.
In this case, the JCIDS process did not help to identify the potential
for collaboration on similar ISR capabilities.
The majority of sponsors' capabilities-based assessments that we
reviewed did not mention redundancies that existed or might result from
the development of their proposed new ISR capabilities. Specifically,
only three of the seven sponsors demonstrated that they had considered
potential redundancies in ISR capabilities when conducting their
assessments. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency sponsor of a
proposal to develop a database cited the need to reduce redundant data
systems as a reason for its proposed capability. In addition, a Marine
Corps sponsor noted in its capabilities-based assessment that existing
ISR systems are experiencing overlaps in five capability areas related
to identification, monitoring, and tracking. Despite these examples of
identified redundancies in existing ISR capabilities, all of the
sponsors concluded that important capability gaps still existed and
submitted proposals that supported the development of a new ISR
capability.
The seven sponsors of the capabilities-based assessments that were not
thorough and complete provided similar reasons as those provided by the
sponsors that did not conduct capabilities-based assessments at all--
for example, a shortage of time and resources and confusion about what
was required under the JCIDS process. In addition, some sponsors had
already developed a capability, or had the intended solution in mind,
when conducting their capabilities-based assessments. Moreover,
sponsors that conducted the assessments were hindered by a lack of
comprehensive information on existing and developmental ISR
capabilities that might potentially be used to fill the identified
capability gap, and so could not use this information to fully inform
their assessments. Several sponsors that conducted assessments told us
that they faced challenges in identifying the full range of existing
and developmental-stage ISR systems, in part because no centralized
source of information existed. For example, Army sponsors of a language
translation capability said that, despite use of personal connections
and outreach to identify existing and developmental technologies, it
was only after they had finished their capabilities-based assessment
that they learned of a particular ISR technology that could have
informed their assessment. Sponsors agreed that a source of readily
available information on existing and developmental ISR capabilities
would be useful.
DOD Has Not Fully Implemented Key Oversight Activities in the Process
for Developing Future ISR Capabilities:
Although the BA FCB's mission includes engaging in coordination during
the sponsors' assessment process and providing oversight[Footnote 43]
of potential solutions to achieve optimum effectiveness and efficiency
in ISR capability development, the BA FCB did not systematically
coordinate with the sponsors to help ensure the quality of their
capabilities-based assessments, nor did it routinely review those
assessments once they were completed. The BA FCB did not implement
these activities because it lacks a readily available source of
information that identifies all ISR capabilities that would serve as a
tool for reviewing the efficiency of sponsors' assessments, and because
the BA FCB does not have a monitoring mechanism, which could ensure
that key oversight activities are fully implemented, as described in
Joint Staff policy. In addition, BA FCB officials said that they lack
adequate numbers of dedicated, skilled personnel to engage in early
coordination with the sponsors and review the sponsors' capabilities-
based assessments. As a result, DOD cannot be assured that ISR
capabilities approved through JCIDS provide joint solutions to DOD's
ISR capability needs and are the solutions that best minimize
inefficiency and redundancy.
DOD Did Not Ensure Quality of Sponsors' Assessments through
Coordination with Sponsors or Review of Assessments:
As described in Joint Staff policy, each Functional Capabilities
Board's mission is to provide assessments and recommendations to
enhance capabilities integration, examine joint priorities among
existing and future programs, minimize duplication of effort throughout
the services, and provide oversight of potential solutions to achieve
optimum effectiveness and efficiency. Moreover, Joint Staff policy
states that each Functional Capabilities Board's functions include
assisting in overseeing capabilities development within JCIDS through
assessment of proposals for new or improved capabilities.[Footnote 44]
The BA FCB is the Functional Capabilities Board that holds
responsibility for the ISR functional area and, as such, is responsible
for seeking to ensure that the joint force is best served throughout
the JCIDS process.[Footnote 45] Additionally, Joint Staff policy calls
on each Functional Capabilities Board and its working group[Footnote
46] to perform coordination functions within its respective capability
area, to include (1) engaging in coordination throughout the sponsors'
assessment process in order to promote cross-service efficiencies, and
(2) coordinating and integrating departmentwide participation to ensure
that sponsors' assessments adequately leverage the expertise of the DOD
components to identify promising solutions. Through these assessment
and coordination functions, as well as other feedback avenues, the BA
FCB provides the analytical underpinnings in support of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Requirements Oversight Council. After
assessing proposals and coordinating departmentwide participation, the
BA FCB then makes recommendations on ISR capability proposals to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to assist in the
Chairman's task of identifying and assessing the priority of joint
capabilities, considering alternatives to acquisition programs, and
ensuring that the priority of joint capabilities reflects resource
levels projected by the Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 47]
Despite its coordination role, the BA FCB did not routinely engage in
early coordination with sponsors to communicate information necessary
to ensure comprehensive and rigorous analysis and to ensure that
sponsors were aware of other organizations' and services' existing and
developmental ISR capabilities. Our review showed that the BA FCB did
not coordinate with five of the seven sponsors while they were
conducting their capabilities-based assessments, although Joint Staff
policy calls upon the BA FCB to do so in order to promote efficiencies
in ISR capability development and to ensure that sponsors' assessments
adequately leverage the expertise of the DOD components to identify
promising solutions. The five sponsors told us that they coordinated
with the BA FCB only after they had submitted their completed ISR
capability proposals to the BA FCB. Of the remaining two sponsors, one
had minimal interaction with the BA FCB, while the other was in contact
with a member of the BA FCB working group while conducting the
capabilities-based assessment. Once the BA FCB received copies of these
ISR capability proposals, it did facilitate departmentwide
participation by serving as a forum where DOD components formally
commented on ISR capability proposals. Sponsors are nevertheless
responsible for addressing and resolving these comments. For example,
during the commenting process for an Army proposal for a language
translation capability, the National Security Agency expressed
disagreement, commenting that the Army proposal omitted practical
descriptions of how the technology would be achieved and did not
address policy and programming issues that it believed were the
underlying cause of the capability gap. Thus, although the BA FCB
oversaw the commenting process and provided the forum in which this
discussion took place, the Army and the National Security Agency
resolved their disagreement by revising the proposal with limited Joint
Staff involvement.
Furthermore, the BA FCB did not systematically review the quality of
the sponsors' capabilities-based assessments. Although the BA FCB is
not required by Joint Staff policy and guidance to review the sponsors'
capabilities-based assessments, such a review would serve as a means of
providing oversight of potential solutions to achieve optimum
effectiveness and efficiency--a key BA FCB task. Moreover, the lack of
early coordination to ensure the quality of the sponsors' assessments
makes the review of the completed assessments an important tool for
enhancing capabilities integration and minimizing redundancies. BA FCB
members noted that sponsors' analysis can and does take a variety of
forms, including studies that were done on related topics but were not
initially intended to support the ISR capability proposal. Members of
the BA FCB stated that they look for evidence of analysis underpinning
the ISR capability proposal, and if analysis has been conducted, they
generally consider it sufficient. However, BA FCB officials also told
us that they generally do not review sponsors' capabilities-based
assessments when evaluating proposals for new ISR capabilities. We
found that, of the seven capabilities-based assessments that the
sponsors conducted, the BA FCB obtained copies of six, which were
proactively provided to them by the sponsors. For the one remaining
capabilities-based assessment, the sponsor reported that it did not
provide copies of its assessment and the BA FCB did not request them.
In addition, the BA FCB did not obtain or systematically review any
alternative types of analysis that were used in place of a capabilities-
based assessment by the other sponsors that did not conduct
capabilities-based assessments. In all of these cases, the BA FCB
neither requested copies of the analysis, nor did the sponsor
proactively provide its alternative type of analysis.
DOD's Limited Oversight of the Process for Developing Future ISR
Capabilities Is Attributable to Several Factors:
The BA FCB did not effectively oversee the process for developing
future ISR capabilities by ensuring the implementation of existing
guidance related to oversight activities, such as coordination with
sponsors and reviews of assessments, for three key reasons. First, the
BA FCB has not developed tools to enable systematic review of sponsors'
capabilities-based assessments. Specifically, the BA FCB lacks a
comprehensive source of information, augmenting the ISR Integration
Roadmap, that would identify the full range of existing and
developmental ISR capabilities within the ISR enterprise and serve as a
tool for assessing the jointness and efficiency of the sponsors'
proposed ISR solutions. Although BA FCB officials agreed that knowing
the full range of existing and developmental ISR capabilities would be
useful in reviewing sponsors' ISR capability proposals, no such
complete and up-to-date source of information currently exists. Without
readily available information about existing and developmental ISR
capabilities, the BA FCB is limited in its ability to systematically
review sponsors' capabilities-based assessments to promote cross-
service efficiencies in ISR capability development and to conduct
oversight of potential solutions to achieve optimum effectiveness and
efficiency. Moreover, the majority of the sponsors that conducted
assessments said they could not be certain that they had gathered all
relevant information to inform their respective assessments, stating
that their efforts to obtain information on existing and developmental
ISR capabilities were not systematic and often dependent on the use of
personal contacts. Some sponsors did take steps to identify existing
DOD ISR capabilities when conducting their assessments, such as
reviewing a JCIDS database containing other ISR capability proposals
and contacting others, both within and outside of their organizations,
about potentially related ISR capabilities. Nonetheless, the JCIDS
database only contains information on proposals submitted to the Joint
Staff, not on existing and developmental ISR capabilities that have
been developed and fielded through DOD processes other than JCIDS. In
the absence of a comprehensive source of information and early
coordination to facilitate the sharing of such information from the BA
FCB to the sponsors, sponsors drew from incomplete informational
sources when conducting their capabilities-based assessments and
sponsors became aware of shortfalls late in the review process. For
example, one sponsor said its proposal passed through two levels of
Joint Staff review before the sponsor was asked, at the final level of
review, whether leveraging a particular technology had been considered
as a potential way to fill an identified capability gap; the technology
had not been considered because the sponsor was not aware of it. In
another case, a request from a high-level Joint Staff official later in
the review process resulted in a Navy sponsor and the BA FCB conducting
an ad hoc effort, after the development of the proposal, to research
and develop a list of all DOD's ISR capabilities and demonstrate that a
relevant capability gap existed.
Second, the BA FCB does not have the ability to effectively oversee the
process for developing future ISR capabilities because there is no
monitoring mechanism to ensure that key activities--such as early
coordination between sponsors and the BA FCB to facilitate the sharing
of information relevant to the sponsors' assessments, and BA FCB review
of the assessments--are fully implemented. Standards for internal
control in the federal government provide a framework for agencies to
achieve effective and efficient operations and ultimately to improve
accountability.[Footnote 48] One of these standards requires that
monitoring, such as supervisory activities, should assess the quality
of performance over time. Specifically, managers should (1) identify
performance gaps by comparing actual performance and achievements to
planned results, and (2) determine appropriate adjustments to program
management, accountability, and resource allocation in order to improve
overall mission accomplishment. To this end, managers should use both
ongoing monitoring activities as well as separate evaluations to
identify gaps, if any, in performance. Without the development of a
monitoring mechanism to ensure implementation of key activities, the BA
FCB may not be well-positioned to carry out its oversight of new ISR
capabilities as called for by existing Joint Staff guidance.
Third, BA FCB staff said that they lack adequate numbers of dedicated
personnel with engineering expertise to engage in early coordination
with sponsors and review the capabilities-based assessments that
support the ISR capability proposals. For example, BA FCB officials
related that they have 12 authorized positions to carry out the BA
FCB's responsibilities, but, as of early December 2007, they had 7
assigned personnel--representing a fill rate of 58 percent--with only 4
or 5 of these devoted full-time to BA FCB duties. BA FCB officials also
stated that representatives from DOD components who attend BA FCB
meetings in order to provide comments on new ISR capability proposals
generally do so as a collateral duty, while other components may not
send a regularly attending representative. Because the representatives
who attend sometimes vary from meeting to meeting and are attending
only as a collateral duty, BA FCB officials expressed concern about the
ability of the BA FCB to most effectively review proposals for new ISR
capabilities. Moreover, in addition to reviewing proposals for new ISR
capabilities, BA FCB officials have additional responsibilities, such
as reviewing other JCIDS documents for ISR capabilities that are in
more advanced stages of development[Footnote 49] and in obtaining
feedback from combatant commanders on warfighter needs. Determining the
necessary workforce skills and competencies for achieving current and
future needs is a key function of workforce planning. Without an
assessment of the BA FCB's capabilities to perform its oversight
activities related to the review of new ISR capability proposals and
coordination with the sponsors, the BA FCB may not be well-positioned
to fully carry out the task of promoting efficiencies in ISR capability
development.
Furthermore, Joint Staff officials stated that although the BA FCB has
coordination and oversight responsibilities, it lacks the ability to
correct stovepiped efforts that it identifies through the JCIDS
process. For example, BA FCB officials described a recent case in which
two proposals for similar environmental capabilities were submitted to
the BA FCB by different sponsors. However, the BA FCB does not have the
ability to require these two sponsors to work together on their
respective capability proposals or to combine them, according to Joint
Staff officials. Despite this, a Joint Staff official said the BA FCB
is currently coordinating with these sponsors to try to increase
efficiencies. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved both
proposals, while directing the sponsors of each to work with a
designated board to examine ways to make the programs more efficient,
such as combining them. In addition, the sponsors have preliminarily
agreed to merge their respective ISR programs during the next phase of
the acquisition process. We are currently conducting a separate review
of the JCIDS process that focuses on the extent to which the process
has improved outcomes in weapons system acquisition programs, including
structural factors, if any, that affect DOD's ability to prioritize and
balance capability needs. We expect our report based on this review to
be issued later in 2008.
Since the BA FCB did not conduct key oversight activities, including
early coordination with sponsors and review of their assessments,
neither the BA FCB nor the sponsors can be assured that the sponsors'
assessments have considered the full range of potential joint solutions
to minimize inefficiency and redundancy in ISR capability development-
-a key aim of the JCIDS process. Moreover, without a readily available
source of information about all existing and developmental ISR
capabilities that might potentially fill a gap, the BA FCB and the
sponsors lack a tool to facilitate departmentwide efficiencies when
reviewing proposed ISR capabilities. Accordingly, the process for
developing future ISR capabilities may not ensure identification of
joint solutions for requirements. The BA FCB recommendations inform
which ISR capability proposals are ultimately approved by the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being essential to DOD's ability to
fight and win future wars. After the Chairman approves ISR capability
proposals, the military services and DOD organizations may begin the
process of developing and acquiring the systems that deliver the
validated capability. The systems, once acquired, will likely deliver
capabilities not only to the warfighter, but also to the broader
national intelligence community. Without effective oversight of ISR
capability development, efficient solutions are likely to go
unidentified, while new programs continue to move through development
without sufficient knowledge, potentially resulting in unnecessary
investment or cost increases and schedule delays further in the
acquisition process that affect the entire ISR enterprise. As sponsors
of proposed ISR capabilities each currently plan unique solutions to
their similar needs, oversight is key to achieving efficiencies among
proposed ISR capabilities at the outset of the capability development
process.
Conclusions:
Congress and DOD have consistently emphasized the importance of DOD
integrating its ISR activities across the defense and national
intelligence components of the ISR enterprise. Increased integration of
the ISR enterprise would help minimize capability redundancies and gaps
and maximize capability effectiveness by improving communication across
the defense and intelligence communities to leverage common investments
for common missions. Although DOD has taken steps to improve the
integration of ISR investments--such as by issuing the ISR Integration
Roadmap and managing a departmentwide portfolio of ISR capabilities--
these initiatives do not provide ISR decision makers with a clear
vision of a future ISR enterprise and a unified investment approach to
achieve that vision. Without a clear vision and a unified investment
approach, ISR decision makers lack the key management tools they need
to comprehensively identify what ISR investments DOD needs to make to
achieve its strategic goals, evaluate tradeoffs between competing
needs, and assess progress in achieving strategic goals. Thus, USD(I)
and other senior DOD officials are not well-positioned to meet future
ISR needs in a more integrated manner by exerting discipline over ISR
spending to ensure progress toward strategic goals. Moreover, a long-
term vision of a future ISR enterprise, consisting of a well-defined
target architecture that depicts what ISR capabilities are needed to
support strategic goals, would be useful not only to ISR decision
makers evaluating tradeoffs between competing needs but also to
sponsors developing proposals for new ISR capabilities. Without readily
available information on existing and developmental ISR capabilities to
assist the sponsors in developing the assessments and the BA FCB in
reviewing them, neither the sponsors nor the BA FCB can be assured that
these assessments have considered the full range of potential joint
solutions to minimize inefficiency and redundancy in ISR capability
development. Further, without a monitoring mechanism to ensure
implementation of Joint Staff policy calling for early coordination
between the BA FCB and the sponsors and for completion of capabilities-
based assessments, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council may not
receive complete assessments to support its decisions about the most
efficient and effective proposed ISR capabilities to meet defense and
national intelligence needs. Additionally, without consistent early
coordination and thorough reviews of assessments, sponsors
participating in DOD's requirements identification process may not have
an incentive to conduct thorough assessments and may focus their
proposals on their individual needs without fully ensuring
identification of joint solutions for requirements. Finally, without a
needs assessment that reviews the BA FCB's staffing levels, expertise,
and workload to engage in early coordination with sponsors and review
capabilities-based assessments and a plan, if needed, that addresses
any identified shortfalls, the BA FCB may not be well-positioned to
conduct oversight of potential ISR solutions to achieve optimum
effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, DOD cannot be assured that it is
developing the optimal mix of ISR capabilities to achieve its goals of
better integrating the ISR enterprise.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions:
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to develop a
vision of a future ISR architecture that addresses a longer period of
time than the 5-year ISR budget and is based on an independent analysis
of expected future requirements and strategic goals. This architecture
should be sufficiently detailed to inform a comprehensive assessment
and prioritization of capability gaps and overlaps, to allow decision
makers to evaluate tradeoffs between competing needs, and to assess
progress in addressing capability gaps and overlaps in order to achieve
ISR strategic goals.
* Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to collaborate, with one of these
organizations assigned as the lead, in developing a comprehensive
source of information, which augments the ISR Integration Roadmap, on
all existing and developmental ISR capabilities throughout the ISR
enterprise for sponsors to use in conducting capabilities-based
assessments and for the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities
Board to use in evaluating them.
* Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a
supervisory review or other monitoring mechanism to ensure that (1) the
Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board and the sponsors
engage in early coordination to facilitate sponsors' consideration of
existing and developmental ISR capabilities in developing their
capabilities-based assessments, (2) capabilities-based assessments are
completed, and (3) the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities
Board uses systematic procedures for reviewing the assessments.
* Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to (1) review the
Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board's staffing levels
and expertise and workload to engage in early coordination with
sponsors and review capabilities-based assessments, and (2) if
shortfalls are identified, develop a plan that addresses any identified
shortfalls of personnel, resources, or training, assigns responsibility
for actions, and establishes time frames for implementing the plan.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOD and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence. DOD provided written comments, in
which it agreed or partially agreed with three recommendations and
disagreed with one recommendation. DOD's comments are reprinted in
their entirety in appendix II.[Footnote 50] In addition, both DOD and
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence provided technical
comments, which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop a vision of a future ISR
architecture that addresses a longer period of time than the 5-year ISR
budget and is based on an independent analysis of expected future
requirements and strategic goals. The department stated that work is
underway to develop a future ISR architecture, including a plan of
action and milestones.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to develop a comprehensive
source of information on existing and developmental ISR capabilities.
In its written comments, DOD agreed that such a source of information
is needed to augment the ISR Integration Roadmap. However, DOD stated
that the task of developing this comprehensive source of information to
facilitate the identification of all capabilities throughout the ISR
enterprise should be assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, as the Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio
Manager, rather than the Joint Staff as we recommended. We originally
recommended that this task be directed to the Joint Staff because the
need for such a comprehensive source of information was most evident in
the difficulties in developing and reviewing ISR capability proposals
as called for under the JCIDS review process, which is managed by the
Joint Staff. We agree with DOD that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, who is responsible for both developing the ISR
Integration Roadmap and leading the Battlespace Awareness capability
portfolio management effort, is a key player in efforts to improve
integration of future joint ISR capabilities and could be logically
assigned leadership responsibilities for this task. We have modified
this recommendation in the final report to clarify that the Secretary
of Defense could assign leadership to either organization, in
consultation with the other, to develop the comprehensive source of
information that sponsors and the BA FCB need. In the draft report, we
had included in this recommendation two actions that the Joint Staff
could take to improve the process for identifying future ISR
capabilities. In modifying this recommendation to reflect DOD's comment
that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence could have the
lead role in developing the information source, we moved these two
actions to our third recommendation, thereby consolidating actions that
the Joint Staff needs to take into one recommendation that considers
key responsibilities within the JCIDS process.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation related to the need to
ensure that (1) the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board
and the sponsors engage in early coordination to facilitate sponsors'
consideration of existing and developmental ISR capabilities in
developing their capabilities-based assessments, (2) capabilities-
based assessments are completed, and (3) the Battlespace Awareness
Functional Capabilities Board uses systematic procedures for reviewing
the assessments. In its written comments, DOD agreed that all three
elements of this recommendation are needed but stated that changes in
guidance were not needed. Our recommendation did not specifically call
for additional guidance but was focused on the need to execute existing
guidance. For example, as the report describes, Joint Staff policy
calls for the sponsors and Functional Capabilities Board to work
together during the analysis process, but the sponsors of the proposals
we reviewed and the BA FCB did not consistently engage in this
coordination. In addition, although Joint Staff policy gives the BA FCB
responsibility for providing oversight of potential solutions to
achieve optimum effectiveness and efficiency in ISR capability
development, we found that the BA FCB did not systematically review
capabilities-based assessments as a means of providing such oversight.
In response to DOD's comments, we modified this recommendation to
clarify that DOD should ensure compliance with its existing guidance by
developing a monitoring mechanism that would ensure that early
coordination takes place and that capabilities-based assessments are
completed and reviewed. In its comments, the department also stated
that our report is misleading because we evaluated some programs
initiated prior to the genesis of JCIDS. As our report describes, the
scope of our review included 19 ISR capability proposals that were
introduced only after the implementation of JCIDS in 2003. We noted
that some of these proposals used analysis conducted prior to the
implementation of JCIDS as a substitute for the capabilities-based
assessment that is required by the JCIDS process. However, we were
unable to apply JCIDS criteria to evaluate them because these proposals
did not have capabilities-based assessments. In addition, our
recommendation to ensure that capabilities-based assessments are
completed was based on our observations of all 19 ISR capability
proposals, including not only the 12 proposals that lacked capabilities-
based assessments but also the 7 proposals whose assessments varied in
rigor and completeness.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the department (1) review
the BA FCB's staffing levels and expertise and workload to engage in
early coordination with sponsors and review capabilities-based
assessments, and (2) if shortfalls of personnel, resources, or training
needed are identified, develop a plan to address them, including
assigning responsibility for actions and establishing time frames for
implementing the plan. In its written comments, the department stated
that Joint Staff policy clearly defines the roles and responsibilities
of the sponsors and Functional Capabilities Boards. We agree that Joint
Staff policy defines roles and responsibilities of these groups, and we
note that this policy assigns responsibility to both the sponsors and
the Functional Capabilities Board to coordinate with each other. We did
not recommend that further policy direction was needed, as DOD stated
in its comments. DOD also noted that it had conducted a review of
Functional Capabilities Board personnel and resources in fiscal year
2007, which did not identify deficiencies. However, workload issues and
lack of technical skills among staff were mentioned to us by defense
officials as reasons why early coordination and reviews were not being
systematically performed as part of the BA FCB's oversight function--a
key function called for in Joint Staff policy. Therefore, in light of
our finding that the BA FCB did not fully implement these key oversight
activities, we continue to believe that the department should
reconsider whether the BA FCB has the appropriate number of staff with
the appropriate skills to fully implement these oversight activities.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from its date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the
Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
this report is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To describe the challenges, if any, that the Department of Defense
(DOD) faces in working to achieve an integrated ISR enterprise, we
reviewed documents on the operation of DOD's ISR enterprise and the
national intelligence community and discussed the ISR enterprise and
its complexities with a variety of defense-related intelligence
organizations, as well as with the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence. Specifically, we discussed coordination challenges faced
by components of DOD's ISR enterprise with officials from the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Arlington, VA; the
Joint Staff, Arlington, Va; the National Security Space Office,
Fairfax, Va; U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component
Command for ISR, Washington, D.C; the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Reston,
Va; and the National Security Agency, Annapolis Junction, Md; and the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
To assess DOD's management approach for improving integration of future
ISR investments, we reviewed DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap and other
ISR integration efforts within DOD. We compared DOD's ISR Integration
Roadmap to key elements of an enterprise architecture to determine
whether the Roadmap, in whole or in part, met these key elements. We
identified these key elements by reviewing DOD and federal guidance on
enterprise architecture best practices, specifically the Department of
Defense Architecture Framework and the Chief Information Officer
Council's Practical Guide to Federal Enterprise Architecture. In
addition, we reviewed the implementation of the Battlespace Awareness
capability portfolio management test case led by the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. We compared these efforts
to portfolio management best practices we identified by reviewing our
past work on this subject. We also obtained information from and
discussed DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap and DOD ISR integration efforts
and challenges with senior officials from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, Arlington, Va; the Joint Staff, Arlington, Va; the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Arlington, Va; the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration, Arlington, Va; the National Security Space
Office, Fairfax, Va; U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Functional
Component Command for ISR, Washington, D.C; the Defense Intelligence
Agency, Washington, D.C; and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD has implemented key activities
within the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS) to ensure that proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not
duplicative, and use a joint approach to filling warfighters' needs
based on a thorough analysis of existing capabilities, we identified 19
ISR capability proposals, described in table 1, that were submitted to
the Joint Staff since the implementation of JCIDS in 2003 and for which
the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board was designated
the lead Functional Capabilities Board. In total, there were 20 ISR
capability proposals that met these criteria; however, 1 of the 20
proposals, along with its underlying capabilities-based assessment, was
highly classified and, since we did not have the appropriate security
clearances, we did not review this proposal. For the remaining 19 ISR
capability proposals, we evaluated the extent to which they were
generated and validated in accordance with Joint Staff policies and
procedures.
Table 1: ISR Capability Proposals Submitted to the Joint Staff Since
the Implementation of JCIDS in 2003 and for Which the Battlespace
Awareness Functional Capabilities Board was Designated the Lead:
Capability title: Advanced Distributed Aperture Sensor System;
Sponsor: U.S. Special Operations Command.
Capability title: Airborne Overhead Cooperative Operations;
Sponsor: U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Capability title: Expeditionary Delivery of Airborne Full Motion Video;
Sponsor: Air Force.
Capability title: Full Spectrum Intelligence;
Sponsor: Navy.
Capability title: Joint Spectral;
Sponsor: National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency.
Capability title: Joint Tier II Unmanned Aircraft System;
Sponsor: Marine Corps.
Capability title: Littoral Battlespace Sensing, Fusion, and
Integration;
Sponsor: Navy.
Capability title: Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance Enterprise;
Sponsor: Marine Corps.
Capability title: National Signatures Program;
Sponsor: Defense Intelligence Agency.
Capability title: Rapid Attack Identification, Detection, and Reporting
System;
Sponsor: Air Force.
Capability title: Sequoyah Foreign Language Translation System;
Sponsor: Army.
Capability title: Small Unmanned Solutions;
Sponsor: U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command.
Capability title: Space Based Space Surveillance;
Sponsor: Air Force.
Capability title: Space Fence;
Sponsor: Air Force.
Capability title: Space Radar Program;
Sponsor: Air Force.
Capability title: Space Test and Training Range;
Sponsor: Air Force.
Capability title: Universal Phase History Data;
Sponsor: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
Capability title: Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle;
Sponsor: Marine Corps.
Capability title: Weapons and Space FIS Modernization;
Sponsor: National Security Agency.
Source: GAO analysis of sponsor data accessed via the Joint Staff's
Knowledge Management/Decision Support system.
[End of table]
Specifically, for each of the 19 capability proposals, we obtained
capabilities-based assessments or other JCIDS analysis documents that
were produced by sponsors of these ISR capability proposals, and we
performed a dependent document review of the 7 ISR capability proposals
that included a capabilities-based assessment, using a data collection
instrument based on applicable versions of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System. In conducting this document review, we considered
whether these JCIDS analysis documents showed evidence of the following
elements: (1) a full review conducted, (2) cost information included,
(3) consideration of the full range of existing and developmental stage
ISR assets, (4) consideration of modifications as potential solutions,
and (5) consideration of potential redundancies. The results of this
analysis are shown in figure 5 of this report. Our specific methodology
for this analysis is as follows:
* To determine whether a full review had been conducted, we determined
whether a Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) and Functional Solution
Analysis (FSA) existed and whether they flowed from a Functional Area
Analysis (FAA) and FNA, respectively. As generally described in Joint
Staff guidance, an FAA identifies the operational tasks, conditions,
and standards needed to achieve military objectives. An FNA assesses
the ability of current and planned systems to deliver the capabilities
and tasks identified in the FAA in order to produce a list of
capability gaps and identify redundancies. An FSA will identify joint
approaches to fill the identified capability gaps.
* To determine whether cost information was included, we reviewed
whether the FSA considered costs of the proposed solutions. As
generally described in Joint Staff guidance, the FSA analysis must
evaluate the cost to develop and procure materiel approaches compared
to the cost of sustaining an existing capability.
* To determine whether the full range of existing and developmental-
stage ISR assets was considered, we reviewed whether the FSA considered
interagency or foreign materiel solutions and whether the FNA or FSA
considered the full range of joint solutions. We defined the full range
of joint solutions as including strategic, operational, and tactical
ISR assets as well as developing or recently developed ISR systems. As
generally described in Joint Staff policy, the FNA assesses the entire
range of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics,
personnel, and facilities and policy as an inherent part of defining
capability needs, and the FSA assesses all potential materiel and non-
materiel ways to fill capability gaps as identified by the FNA,
including changes that leverage existing materiel capabilities, product
improvements, and adoption of interagency or foreign materiel
solutions.
* To determine whether modifications were considered as potential
solutions, we reviewed whether the FSA considered using existing
systems differently or modifying policies and processes. As generally
described in Joint Staff guidance, the FSA is to identify combinations
of materiel and non-materiel approaches and examine additional
approaches by conducting market research to determine whether
commercial or non-developmental items are available or could be
modified to meet the desired capability.
* To determine whether potential redundancies were considered, we
reviewed whether either the FNA or the FSA identified potentially
redundant ISR capabilities. As generally described in Joint Staff
guidance, an FNA should describe a capability overlap by comparing
desired functions with current capabilities. However, we considered the
capabilities-based assessment as having identified potential
redundancies if such redundancies were included in either the FNA or
FSA.
We identified the above elements by analyzing current and superseded
versions of the Joint Staff instruction on the JCIDS process--
specifically, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System--to
determine the changes over time and the criteria common to all
versions. Further, we reviewed the following policies and procedures
related to the validation of ISR capabilities through JCIDS: Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5123.01, Charter of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3137.01, The Functional Capabilities Board Process;
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01, Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System; and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01, Operation of the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System. In order to conduct
this review of JCIDS policies and procedures, we included in our scope
the current and superseded versions of these guidance documents;
accordingly, we reviewed all instructions and manuals relevant to DOD's
JCIDS process that were in effect at some point between the publication
of the initial JCIDS instruction (Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
3170.01A, dated June 24, 2003) and the conclusion of our review (March
2008).[Footnote 51] In addition, we obtained insight into the
procedures and challenges associated with validating proposals for new
ISR capabilities through discussions with officials from the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Arlington, Va; the
Joint Staff, Arlington, Va; the Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board, Arlington, Va; and the sponsors of the 19 ISR
capability proposals that we reviewed. The sponsors with whom we spoke
were officials from the Air Force; Army; Navy; Marine Corps; U.S.
Special Operations Command; U.S. Joint Forces Command; Defense
Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
National Security Agency.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Intelligence:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
5000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-5000:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report, GAO-
08- 374, "Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance: DoD Can
Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of
Future ISR Capabilities," dated January 17, 2008, (GAO Code 351027).
DoD appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the draft
report. Detailed comments on the GAO recommendations and technical
comments are enclosed. For further questions concerning this report
please contact my action officer, Colonel Cordell DeLaPena, Director,
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, (703) 607-0427.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Betty J. Sapp:
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Acquisition, Resources,
and Technology):
Enclosures:
1. DoD Response to Recommendations:
2. DoD Technical Comments:
February 15, 2008:
GAO Draft Report - Dated January 17, 2008 GAO Code 351027 /GAO-08-374:
"Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance: DoD Can Better Assess
and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR
Capabilities"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to develop a
vision of a future intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
architecture that addresses a longer period of time than the 5-year ISR
budget and is based on an independent analysis of expected future
requirements and strategic goals. This architecture should be
sufficiently detailed to inform a comprehensive assessment and
prioritization of capability gaps and overlaps, to allow decision
makers to evaluate competing needs, and to assess progress in
addressing capability gaps and overlaps in order to achieve ISR
strategic goals.
DOD Response: Concur. Work is underway to develop a vision of a future
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) architecture that
addresses a longer period of time than the 5-year ISR budget and is
based on an independent analysis of expected future requirements and
strategic goals. The plan of action and milestones for this effort are
being developed now and should be finalized by the end of February
2008.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, to develop a
comprehensive source of information that augments the Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Integration Roadmap to
facilitate the identification of all capabilities throughout the ISR
enterprise-including all existing and developmental ISR capabilities-in
order to assist the sponsors in conducting capabilities-based
assessments and the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board
in evaluating them.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. We concur with the need to develop a
comprehensive source of information to augment the intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) Integration Roadmap. However,
this task is directly related to the development of the future ISR
architecture and is more appropriately tasked to the Battlespace
Awareness Capability Portfolio Manager rather than the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, to ensure that
capabilities-based assessments are completed.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. The Department agrees that Capability
Based Assessments (CBA) should be completed; however, the Joint Staff
disagrees with the assertion that additional direction is required.
CJCSM 3170.O1C "Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS)" provides clear guidance on the necessity
and process for completing capability-based assessments. The GAO's
review is misleading. The review evaluated many programs initiated
prior to the genesis of JCIDS. Five of the ten programs identified as
not having a formal CBA are considered as having been based on pre-
JCIDS analysis. In these specific cases, prior analysis was reviewed
and accepted as sufficient if it was deemed to meet the needs of the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). This exemption was
structured to avoid forcing programs to reaccomplish previously
completed analysis unless there was a compelling need to do so.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, to develop systematic
procedures for reviewing the capabilities-based assessments.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department agrees with the need for
systematic procedures for reviewing capabilities-based assessments;
however, we disagree with the assertion that additional direction is
required. CJCSM 3170.O1C already contains a checklist for reviewing
capabilities based assessment. Each element, Functional Area Analysis,
Functional Needs Analysis and Functional Solutions Analysis has a
defined set of go/no go criteria (see pages A-10 through A-17)
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to clarify the
expectation for the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board
to engage in early coordination with sponsors to ensure sponsors'
ability to access a comprehensive source of information on existing and
developmental Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
capabilities.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department agrees that there is
benefit to sponsors engaging in early coordination with the appropriate
Functional Capabilities Boards (FCBs); however, the Department
disagrees with the assertion that additional direction is required.
CJCSI 3170.O1F states it is the sponsor's responsibility as part of the
Capability Based Assessments process to "work closely with the
appropriate FCBs during the analysis process." (see page C-4)
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify the
Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board's capabilities to
engage in early coordination with sponsors and review capabilities-
based assessments, including any shortfalls in personnel, resources,
and training needed to perform its mission successfully.
DOD Response: Non-concur. As previously stated, CJCSI 3170.O1F and
CJCSI 3170.O1C clearly define the sponsors and the Functional
Capabilities Boards (FCBs) roles and responsibilities in the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process.
Further direction is not required. With regards to shortfalls in
personnel, resources and training, the Joint Staff conducted an FY07
review of FCB personnel and resources and did not identify any
deficiencies. In the area of training, the Joint Staff has already
established a new, mandatory training course for all `Requirements
Managers' that will certify them in the writing, reviewing,
development, and approval of requirements for Major Defense Acquisition
Programs.
Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a plan that
addresses any identified shortfalls of personnel, resources, and
training; assigns responsibility for actions; and establishes time
frames for implementing the plan.
DOD Response: Non-concur. This recommendation presupposes shortfalls
exist in the FCB's personnel, resources, and training. As previously
stated, the Joint Staff conducted an FY07 review of functional
capabilities board personnel and resources and did not identify any
deficiencies. In the area of training, the Joint Staff has already
established a new, mandatory training course for all `Requirements
Managers' that will certify them in the writing, reviewing,
development, and approval of requirements for Major Defense Acquisition
Programs.
GAO Draft Report - Dated January 17, 2008 GAO Code 351027/GAO-08-374:
"Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance: DoD Can Better Assess
and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR
Capabilities"
Department Of Defense Technical Comments On The Draft Report:
Page 36, Figure 4.
Recommendation: Add a note to the timeline figure stating that the
chronology reflects the date on the latest version of the Initial
Capabilities Document (ICD) available to the authors, as earlier
versions of some of the documents were staffed at earlier dates when
approved, and required Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) analysis steps had not been fully defined. Rationale:
The timeline reflects a mid-2006 entry for the Small Unmanned Solutions
ICD, yet the ICD actually entered the Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System (JCIDS) in mid-2005, before JCIDS required
analysis steps had been fully defined.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Margaret G. Morgan, Assistant
Director; Catherine H. Brown; Gabrielle A. Carrington; Frank
Cristinzio; Grace Coleman; Jay Smale; and Karen Thornton made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Federal Financial Management: Critical Accountability and
Fiscal Stewardship Challenges Facing Our Nation, GAO-07-542T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2007); and Fiscal and Retirement Challenges,
GAO-07-1263CG (New York: Sep. 19, 2007).
[2] Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 923(b), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 426 note.
[3] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-458) created a Director of National Intelligence to head the U.S.
intelligence community, serve as the principal intelligence adviser to
the President, and oversee and direct the acquisition of major
collections systems. The U.S. intelligence community is a federation of
16 different defense and non-defense intelligence agencies that carries
out intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign
relations and the protection of national security.
[4] JCIDS is a deliberate process designed for addressing future needs,
but DOD has other sources for identifying capability needs, including
Joint Urgent Operational Needs for immediate needs, combatant
commanders' integrated priority lists, lessons learned, and
transitioning improvised explosive device initiatives. However,
complying with the JCIDS process is required for the long-term
solution, sustainment activities, or to transition the solution into a
program of record.
[5] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council consists of the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a four-star officer
designated by each of the military services.
[6] Joint Staff policy describes the documentation developed during the
JCIDS process as including an Initial Capabilities Document, which
documents the results of a capabilities-based assessment. For the
purposes of this report, we use the phrase "proposals for new military
capabilities" to refer to Initial Capabilities Documents. More
specifically, we use the phrase "proposals for new ISR capabilities" to
refer to ISR-related Initial Capabilities Documents.
[7] The other Functional Capabilities Boards are Command and Control,
Focused Logistics, Force Management, Force Protection, Force
Application, Net-Centric, and Joint Training.
[8] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary
Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New
Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development, GAO-07-596T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2007).
[9] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems, GAO-07-578
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007).
[10] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advanced Coordination and
Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities, GAO-07-836
(Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2007).
[11] We were unable to review one proposal for a new ISR capability
because of the high classification level of this document.
[12] Joint Staff policy defines materiel capability solutions as
resulting in the development, acquisition, procurement, or fielding of
a new item, and defines non-materiel capability solutions as changes in
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, facilities, or policy to satisfy identified functional
capabilities. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
3170.01F, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 1,
2007).
[13] For the purposes of this report, we use "proposals for non-
materiel capabilities" to refer to Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities Change
Requests, and "proposals for capabilities already in development" to
refer to Capability Development Documents and Capability Production
Documents.
[14] Joint Operations Concepts present a visualization of future
operations, describing how future operations may be conducted and
providing the conceptual basis for joint experimentation and
capabilities-based assessments. A Concept of Operations is a statement
of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or
series of operations, and is frequently embodied in campaign plans and
operation plans. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
3170.01F, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 1,
2007).
[15] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board/Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of
National Security Space Programs (Washington, D.C.: May 2003); Task
Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, Summary of
Findings: One Year Review (July 27, 2004).
[16] Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-
Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era,
Phase 2 Report (Washington, D.C.: July 2005).
[17] Department of Defense, Report of the Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 11, 2001).
[18] Section 601(a) of Pub. L. No. 110-53 requires the Director of
National Intelligence to disclose to the public after the end of each
fiscal year the aggregate amount of funds appropriated by Congress for
the NIP for such fiscal year. In October 2007, the Director of National
Intelligence disclosed the amount appropriated to the NIP for fiscal
year 2007.
[19] Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, § 1018.
[20] Title 10 of the United States Code authorizes the secretaries of
the military departments to conduct functions related to their
personnel, including recruiting, organizing, training, and maintaining.
10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 5013, 8013 (2007).
[21] These two initiatives operate within the context of DOD's three
decision-support processes: (1) the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System, (2) the Defense Acquisition System, and (3) the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system.
[22] GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Important Progress Made
in Establishing Foundational Architecture Products and Investment
Management Practices, but Much Work Remains, GAO-06-219 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 23, 2005).
[23] Chief Information Officer Council, A Practical Guide to Federal
Enterprise Architecture, Version 1.0 (February 2001); Department of
Defense, Department of Defense Architecture Framework, Version 1.5
(April 2007).
[24] The term architecture refers to a description of the structure of
an organization, the structure of its components, their
interrelationships, and the principles and guidelines which govern
their design and evolution over time.
[25] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
[26] The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136) amended
Title 10 of the U.S. Code by adding section 426, which directed the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to develop the ISR
Integration Roadmap and to produce a report that addressed six
management aspects of the ISR enterprise. DOD chose to provide
information about these management aspects in the ISR Integration
Roadmap. However, DOD covered only the first three of the six
management areas specified in the statute: (1) the fundamental goals
established in the Roadmap, (2) an overview of the ISR integration
activities of the military departments and intelligence agencies of
DOD, and (3) an investment strategy for achieving an integration of DOD
ISR capabilities that ensures sustainment of needed tactical and
operational efforts and efficient investment in new ISR capabilities.
[27] DOD defines persistent surveillance as the integrated management
of a diverse set of collection and processing capabilities, operated to
detect and understand the activity of interest with sufficient sensor
dwell, revisit rate, and required quality to expeditiously assess
adversary actions, predict adversary plans, deny sanctuary to an
adversary, and assess results of U.S. or coalition actions.
[28] Planning and Direction is one of six activities collectively used
to describe the intelligence process, which describes how the various
types of interrelated intelligence activities interact to meet military
commanders' needs. The other five areas are Collection, Processing and
Exploitation, Analysis and Production, Dissemination and Integration,
and Evaluation and Feedback.
[29] The goal of the National Signatures Program is to develop a
comprehensive enterprisewide database for cataloguing and sharing
measurement and signals intelligence data, which uses the unique
characteristics of physical objects, known as their signatures, to
detect, track, and identify those objects.
[30] The other test cases are Joint Command and Control, Joint Net-
Centric Operations, and Joint Logistics. In February 2008, DOD
announced its plans to formalize these test cases, including the ISR
portfolio, as standing capability portfolio management efforts, and to
experiment with five additional portfolios, namely, Building
Partnerships, Force Protection, Force Support, Force Application, and
Corporate Management and Support.
[31] Based on the results of the budget and program review, final
budget change decisions by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense
are reflected in periodic guidance documents issued to instruct the
military services or DOD agencies and direct them to make changes to
their budgets.
[32] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach
to Weapons System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes,
GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007).
[33] GAO-07-388.
[34] The Deputy Secretary of Defense defined the portfolio manager's
role in a September 2006 memorandum. The memorandum outlines two
different levels of increased authority over spending that portfolio
managers may request to fulfill their responsibilities. A subsequent
Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, issued in March 2007, discussed
the portfolio manager's role in the fiscal year 2009 and 2010 budget
deliberations, but did not enhance their authority over spending. In
February 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued another
memorandum, which stated that portfolio managers make recommendations
on capability development issues within their portfolio but do not have
independent decision-making authority.
[35] The Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance, remotely-
piloted aircraft used primarily for conducting armed reconnaissance
against critical targets.
[36] The Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team, Joint Defense
Capabilities Study: Improving DOD Strategic Planning, Resourcing, and
Execution to Satisfy Joint Capabilities, Final Report (January 2004),
alternatively known as the Aldridge Report.
[37] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01F, Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 1, 2007) and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3137.01C, The
Functional Capabilities Board Process (Nov. 12, 2004).
[38] Ways to fill capability gaps are called solutions and may be
either materiel or non-materiel.
[39] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01C, Operation
of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 1,
2007).
[40] Since implementing JCIDS in 2003, the Joint Staff updated its
JCIDS policy and guidance three times, in 2004, 2005, and 2007. The
most recent JCIDS guidance contains a list of questions to serve as
procedural guidance for sponsors in conducting their capabilities-based
assessments, although Joint Staff officials said it is not mandatory
for sponsors to use this list. In addition, the Joint Staff issued
separate guidance on conducting capabilities-based assessments in
January 2006, updating it in December 2006. However, our review
demonstrated that this guidance did not contribute greatly to the
execution of more rigorous capabilities-based assessments.
[41] These are proposals that DOD designated as Acquisition Category I,
the category assigned to DOD's highest cost programs. For more
information about this and DOD's other acquisition programs, see DOD
Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (May
12, 2003).
[42] DOD has an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program that
is aimed at getting new technologies that meet critical military needs
into the hands of users faster and for less cost.
[43] We define oversight to include review of capabilities-based
assessments, as well as coordination activities. Through these
assessment and coordination activities, the BA FCB serves an internal
control function, providing oversight to help ensure that DOD's
objectives for its ISR enterprise are met through the JCIDS process.
[44] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3137.01C, The
Functional Capabilities Board Process (Nov. 12, 2004) provides a
complete list of Functional Capabilities Board functions.
[45] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01F, Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 1, 2007) also
describes the responsibilities of the Functional Capabilities Boards.
[46] Functional Capabilities Boards may establish one or more working
groups to serve as their operational arms in addressing JCIDS and other
activities. For more information about working group membership, see
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3137.01C, The
Functional Capabilities Board Process (Nov. 12, 2004).
[47] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5123.01C,
Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (Nov. 9, 2006).
[48] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[49] For example, as of December 2007, the BA FCB was the primary
Functional Capabilities Board for 47 proposals for capabilities already
in development, and was the secondary Functional Capabilities Board for
63 proposals for capabilities already in development.
[50] In its written comments, DOD divided our four recommendations into
seven recommendations, commenting upon each separately. In our
evaluation, we discuss DOD's comments in the context of our four final
recommendations.
[51] Specifically, we reviewed the following: Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5123.01A, Charter of the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (Mar. 8, 2001); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 5123.01B, Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (Apr. 15, 2004); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 5123.01C, Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (Nov. 9, 2006); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3137.01B, The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
Process (Apr. 15, 2002); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3137.01C, The Functional Capabilities Board Process (Nov.
12, 2004); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01C,
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (June 24, 2003);
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01D, Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (Mar. 12, 2004);
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 11, 2005);
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01F, Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 1, 2007); Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01A, Operation of the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (Mar. 12, 2004);
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 11, 2005);
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01C, Operation of
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 1,
2007).
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