Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq
Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments Gao ID: GAO-08-568T March 11, 2008Since 2001, Congress has appropriated nearly $700 billion for the global war on terrorism. The majority of these funds have supported U.S. efforts in Iraq. Congressional oversight is crucial to improve performance, ensure accountability, and protect U.S. programs from fraud, waste, and abuse. Since 2003, GAO has issued nearly 130 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. This testimony addresses (1) factors contributing to poor contracting outcomes and accountability, (2) long-standing issues in the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces, and (3) efforts to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government. GAO reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed officials from State, DOD, and other agencies; the United Nations (UN); and the Iraqi government. We also made multiple trips to Iraq.
U.S. efforts in Iraq have relied extensively on contractors to undertake reconstruction projects and provide support to U.S. forces. However, a lack of well-defined requirements, poor business arrangements, and inadequate oversight and accountability have negatively affected reconstruction and support efforts. For example, in a July 2007 report, GAO found that DOD completed negotiation for task orders on an oil contract more than 6 months after the work commenced and most costs were incurred. DOD paid nearly all of the $221 million in costs questioned by auditors. Also in July 2007, GAO found that unclear DOD guidance, inadequate staff, and insufficient technology resulted in poor accountability over more than 190,000 weapons provided to Iraqi forces. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation to determine what DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply to the program. However, as of March 2008, DOD had not made a determination. The need to effectively manage and oversee contractors supporting deployed forces is equally important. DOD pays billions of dollars each year for contracted goods and services in locations such as Iraq and elsewhere. However, several long-standing and systemic problems continue to hinder DOD's management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations, including the failure to follow planning guidance, provide an adequate number of contract oversight personnel, systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and provide predeployment training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the use and role of contractors. GAO's work has identified instances where poor oversight and management of contractors led to negative financial and operational impacts. GAO has made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD's management and oversight of contractor support at deployed locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of those recommendations. However, GAO has found that DOD has made limited progress in implementing some key recommendations. The United States has made available nearly $6 billion to rebuild Iraq's energy sector and $300 million to develop its government ministries but lacks integrated strategic plans for both efforts. Building the capacity of the ministries is critical to ensure that Iraq can effectively govern, rebuild, and stabilize the country. Rebuilding Iraq's energy sector is necessary to ensure that Iraq can pay for these tasks and provide essential services to the Iraqi people. However, in the absence of a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan, U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Iraqi government have been hindered by multiple U.S. agencies pursuing individual efforts without overarching direction. The creation of a plan for the energy sector is also essential for Iraq to meet energy production and export goals. GAO recommended that State work with Iraqi ministries to develop an integrated energy plan. State commented that the Iraqi government, not the U.S. government, should act on GAO's recommendations. Given the billions of dollars provided to rebuild Iraq's energy sector and the limited capacity of Iraqi ministries, GAO believes that its recommendations are still valid.
GAO-08-568T, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Appropriations U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, March 11, 2008:
Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq:
Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts
and Investments:
Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States:
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq:
GAO-08-568T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-568T, a testimony before the Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated nearly $700 billion for the
global war on terrorism. The majority of these funds have supported
U.S. efforts in Iraq. Congressional oversight is crucial to improve
performance, ensure accountability, and protect U.S. programs from
fraud, waste, and abuse. Since 2003, GAO has issued nearly 130 Iraq-
related reports and testimonies.
This testimony addresses (1) factors contributing to poor contracting
outcomes and accountability, (2) long-standing issues in the Department
of Defense‘s (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting
deployed forces, and (3) efforts to improve the capacity of the Iraqi
government. GAO reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed
officials from State, DOD, and other agencies; the United Nations (UN);
and the Iraqi government. We also made multiple trips to Iraq.
What GAO Found:
U.S. efforts in Iraq have relied extensively on contractors to
undertake reconstruction projects and provide support to U.S. forces.
However, a lack of well-defined requirements, poor business
arrangements, and inadequate oversight and accountability have
negatively affected reconstruction and support efforts. For example, in
a July 2007 report, GAO found that DOD completed negotiation for task
orders on an oil contract more than 6 months after the work commenced
and most costs were incurred. DOD paid nearly all of the $221 million
in costs questioned by auditors. Also in July 2007, GAO found that
unclear DOD guidance, inadequate staff, and insufficient technology
resulted in poor accountability over more than 190,000 weapons provided
to Iraqi forces. DOD concurred with GAO‘s recommendation to determine
what DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply to the
program. However, as of March 2008, DOD had not made a determination.
The need to effectively manage and oversee contractors supporting
deployed forces is equally important. DOD pays billions of dollars each
year for contracted goods and services in locations such as Iraq and
elsewhere. However, several long-standing and systemic problems
continue to hinder DOD‘s management and oversight of contractors at
deployed locations, including the failure to follow planning guidance,
provide an adequate number of contract oversight personnel,
systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and provide
predeployment training for military commanders and contract oversight
personnel on the use and role of contractors. GAO‘s work has identified
instances where poor oversight and management of contractors led to
negative financial and operational impacts. GAO has made a number of
recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD‘s management and oversight
of contractor support at deployed locations, and the department has
agreed to implement many of those recommendations. However, GAO has
found that DOD has made limited progress in implementing some key
recommendations.
The United States has made available nearly $6 billion to rebuild
Iraq‘s energy sector and $300 million to develop its government
ministries but lacks integrated strategic plans for both efforts.
Building the capacity of the ministries is critical to ensure that Iraq
can effectively govern, rebuild, and stabilize the country. Rebuilding
Iraq‘s energy sector is necessary to ensure that Iraq can pay for these
tasks and provide essential services to the Iraqi people. However, in
the absence of a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan, U.S.
efforts to build the capacity of the Iraqi government have been
hindered by multiple U.S. agencies pursuing individual efforts without
overarching direction. The creation of a plan for the energy sector is
also essential for Iraq to meet energy production and export goals. GAO
recommended that State work with Iraqi ministries to develop an
integrated energy plan. State commented that the Iraqi government, not
the U.S. government, should act on GAO‘s recommendations. Given the
billions of dollars provided to rebuild Iraq‘s energy sector and the
limited capacity of Iraqi ministries, GAO believes that its
recommendations are still valid.
What GAO Recommends:
To improve accountability and minimize opportunities for fraud, waste,
and abuse, GAO has previously recommended that DOD adopt sound business
processes and improve management and oversight of contractors. GAO has
recommended that U.S. agencies work with the Iraqi government to
develop strategic plans for key sectors. DOD and State have taken
actions to address some, but not all, of GAO‘s recommendations.
To view the full product, click on [hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-568T].
For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges the United
States must address to successfully improve performance and ensure
accountability over U.S. efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq. In
my statement today, I will discuss (1) factors contributing to poor
contracting outcomes and accountability, (2) long-standing issues in
the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of
contractors supporting deployed forces, and (3) efforts to improve the
capacity of the Iraqi government.
Between fiscal years 2001 to 2008, Congress appropriated nearly $700
billion for the global war on terrorism.[Footnote 1] The majority of
this amount has been provided to DOD for military operations in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the cost of equipping,
maintaining, and supporting our deployed forces. About $45 billion was
provided for reconstruction efforts, including rebuilding Iraq's oil
and electricity sectors, improving its security forces, and enhancing
Iraq's capacity to govern. Prudence with taxpayer funds and growing
long-range fiscal challenges demand that the United States maximize its
return on the billions of dollars invested in Iraq. Further,
strengthening Iraq's fragile government institutions, which have thus
far failed to adequately deter corruption, stimulate employment, or
deliver essential services, is critical to establishing a peaceful,
stable, and secure Iraq.
My statement today is based upon GAO's extensive work spanning several
years. Since 2003, we have issued nearly 130 Iraq-related reports and
testimonies.[Footnote 2] Our work in Iraq largely has been performed
under my authority as Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on my
own initiative since it is a matter of broad interest to the entire
Congress. We performed this work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
I am pleased to appear with the DOD Inspector General and the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. As you know, GAO and the
inspectors general have different, but complementary, roles and
responsibilities. GAO's broad audit authority allows it to support
Congress through strategic analyses of issues that cut across multiple
federal agencies and sources of funding, while the inspectors general
focus primarily on preventing and exposing fraud, waste, and abuse in
individual federal agency programs. The abilities of the inspectors
general to provide in-country oversight of specific projects and
reconstruction challenges have enabled GAO to focus on national,
sector, and interagency issues. We and the other accountability
organizations coordinate our oversight efforts to avoid duplication and
leverage our resources.
I would like to note that several of my colleagues in the
accountability community and I have developed a definition of waste. As
we see it, waste occurs when taxpayers do not receive reasonable value
for their money in connection with any government-funded activity due
to inappropriate acts or omissions by officials with control over or
access to government resources. Most waste does not involve a violation
of law, but it does involve mismanagement resulting from poor
leadership or guidance; inappropriate actions or omissions, including
the use of poor business arrangements; or inadequate oversight, often
caused by having too-few skilled people. Our reports and testimonies
have provided specific examples where such issues resulted in higher
costs, schedule delays, and unmet goals. I highlight some of these in
my testimony. Nevertheless, estimating or quantifying the financial
impact of fraudulent, wasteful, or abusive practices is not always
feasible or practicable. However, the inability to do so should not
detract from the need to improve management and accountability over our
efforts in Iraq.
Summary:
The United States is entering its fifth year of efforts to rebuild and
stabilize Iraq, but these efforts have neither consistently achieved
their desired outcomes nor done so in an economic and efficient manner.
While the specific facts and circumstances differed, a lack of well-
defined requirements, poor business arrangements, and inadequate
oversight and accountability have affected reconstruction,
stabilization, and support efforts alike. Two GAO reports issued in
July 2007 illustrate some of these problems. In one report, we found
that DOD completed negotiations for task orders on an oil contract more
than 6 months after the work commenced. As a result, the contractor
incurred almost all of its costs at the time of negotiations, which
influenced DOD's decision to pay nearly all of the $221 million in
costs questioned by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). In a
second report, we found that unclear DOD guidance, inadequate staff,
and insufficient technology resulted in poor accountability over
190,000 weapons provided to the Iraqi security forces. DOD concurred
with our recommendation to identify accountability procedures for the
program to train and equip the Iraqi security forces. However, as of
March 2008, DOD had not developed the necessary procedures.
Several long-standing and systemic problems continue to hinder DOD's
management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations,
including the failure to follow planning guidance, provide adequate
numbers of contract oversight personnel, systematically collect and
distribute lessons learned, and ensure predeployment training for
military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the use and
role of contractors. The scale of contractor support DOD relies on
today in locations such as Iraq and elsewhere amounts to billions of
dollars worth of goods and services each year, underscoring the need to
effectively manage and oversee contractor efforts. The magnitude of
this support demands that DOD ensure that military personnel have the
guidance, resources, and training to effectively monitor contractor
performance at deployed locations. However, our work has identified
instances where poor oversight and management of contractors led to
negative financial and operational impacts. We have made a number of
recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD's management and oversight
of contractor support at deployed locations, and the department has
agreed to implement many of those recommendations. However, we have
found that DOD has made limited progress implementing some key
recommendations.
The United States has made available nearly $6 billion to rebuild
Iraq's energy sector and $300 million to develop its government
ministries but lacks integrated strategic plans for both efforts.
Building the capacity of the ministries is critical to ensure that Iraq
can effectively assume responsibility for delivering government
services and sustain the effort to rebuild and stabilize the country.
Rebuilding Iraq's energy sector is necessary to ensure that Iraq can
pay for these tasks and provide essential services to the Iraqi people.
However, in the absence of a comprehensive and integrated strategic
plan, U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Iraqi government have
been hindered by multiple U.S. agencies pursuing individual efforts
without overarching direction. The creation of a comprehensive and
integrated strategic plan for the energy sector is also essential for
Iraq to identify the most pressing needs and address challenges
affecting future development prospects. We recommended that the State
Department work with Iraqi ministries to develop an integrated energy
plan. State commented that the Iraqi government, not the U.S.
government, should act on our recommendations. Given the billions of
dollars provided to rebuild Iraq's energy sector and the limited
capacity of Iraqi ministries, I believe that our recommendations to
State are still valid.
DOD and State have taken action to implement some, but not all, of our
recommendations, increasing the risk that past mistakes or lapses in
accountability will be repeated and undermining efforts to enable Iraq
to assume greater responsibility for rebuilding its nation. In doing
so, DOD and State miss opportunities to improve outcomes and enhance
accountability.
Background:
Several entities and U.S. agencies have played important roles in U.S.
efforts to rebuild and stabilize Iraq. From May 2003 through June 2004,
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)[Footnote 3] was responsible
for overseeing, directing, and coordinating rebuilding efforts. After
its dissolution, the Secretary of State assumed responsibilities for
the supervision and general direction of reconstruction efforts in
Iraq. DOD, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) have had
responsibility for managing and overseeing specific reconstruction
projects.
Contractors have largely carried out reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
For example, in early 2004, the CPA, through various military
organizations, awarded seven contracts to help provide overall
direction, coordination, and oversight of 12 large design-build
contractors. In turn, these 12 design-build contractors were
responsible for the design and execution of construction activities in
various sectors such as electricity, oil, and public works and water.
In addition, DOD has made extensive use of contractors to support its
deployed forces. The scale of contractor support DOD relies on today in
locations such Iraq and elsewhere amounts to billions of dollars worth
of goods and services each year, underscoring the need to effectively
manage and oversee contractor efforts. Contractors provide
interpretation, intelligence analysis, and security services, as well
as weapon systems maintenance and base operations support. The
significance of such contracts is illustrated by the fact that the Army
reported obligations of over $4.5 billion in fiscal year 2007 on its
single-largest support contract, the Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program (LOGCAP).
The collective effort of military, civilian, and contractor personnel
in Iraq has been complicated by the country's security environment. The
CPA's original reconstruction plan was premised on the assumption that
a permissive security environment would enable the United States to
restore Iraq's essential services to prewar levels. The CPA also
assumed that the Iraqi government and the international community would
help finance Iraq's development and that Iraqi oil revenues could help
pay for reconstruction costs. None of these assumptions has
materialized.
In February 2007, we reported that the security situation was
continuing to deteriorate, impeding the management and execution of
reconstruction efforts. As shown in figure 1, the security situation
generally deteriorated through the summer of 2007, with the number of
attacks increasing to about 180 per day in June 2007.
Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks against the Coalition and Its Iraqi
Partners:
This figure is a bar graph showing enemy-initiated attacks against the
coalition and its Iraqi partners. The X axis represents the year, and
the Y axis represents the number of attacks. The graph is representing
attack(s) on Iraqi security forces, attack(s) on civilians, and
attack(s) on coalition.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DIA-supported Multi-National Force-Iraq data,
January 2008.
[End of figure]
However, since then, the number of enemy-initiated attacks has
decreased by about two-thirds, to the levels of early 2005.
Specifically, the average number of daily attacks decreased from about
180 in June 2007 to about 60 in January 2008--a nearly 70 percent
decrease--as the number of attacks against coalition forces in
particular fell considerably. The number of attacks on Iraqi security
forces and civilians also declined from June 2007 levels. While
security has improved in Iraq, a permissive security environment has
yet to be achieved.
Poor Contracting Outcomes and Accountability Hinder U.S. Efforts in
Iraq:
Our work over the past 5 years has shown that one or more of the
elements essential for achieving good acquisition outcomes--well-
defined requirements matched with adequate resources, sound business
arrangements, and the capacity to properly manage and oversee
contractor performance--were often missing during specific
reconstruction efforts, in contracts to support deployed forces, and in
our efforts to equip Iraqi security forces. The absence of these
elements often contributed to unmet expectations, schedule delays, or
higher-than-necessary costs, underscoring both the need to hold
agencies and contractors accountable for outcomes, and the challenges
of doing so. Such issues are not unique to Iraq but reflect some of the
long-standing and systemic issues confronting DOD. They are, however,
magnified in a contingency situation such as Iraq or Katrina. Further,
we found that unclear DOD guidance resulted in poor accountability over
190,000 weapons provided to the Iraqi security forces.
Mismatch between Requirements and Resources:
A prerequisite to good outcomes is a match between well-defined
requirements and available resources. Shifts in overall priorities and
funding, even those made for good reasons, invariably have a cascading
effect on individual contracts, making it more difficult to manage
individual projects to successful outcomes and complicating efforts to
hold agencies and contractors accountable. After the State Department
assumed responsibility for U.S. reconstruction efforts in 2004, it re-
examined the priorities and programs initiated by the CPA, with the
objective of reprioritizing funding to key, high-impact projects. State
increased support for security, law enforcement efforts, and oil
infrastructure enhancements. These reallocations, affecting billions of
dollars of planned work, led to the cancellation of some projects in
the electricity and water sector.
At the contract level, the lack of well-defined requirements resulted
in schedule delays and the United States potentially paying more than
necessary. For example, in September 2005, we reported that
difficulties in defining the cost, schedule, and work to be performed
on projects in Iraq's water and sanitation sector contributed to
project delays and reduced scopes of work.[Footnote 4] We found that
agreement between the U.S. government and contractors on the final
cost, schedule, and scope of 18 of the 24 task orders valued at $873
million had been delayed. These delays occurred, in part, because Iraqi
authorities, U.S. agencies, and contractors could not agree on scopes
of work and construction details.
Previously, in July 2004, we reported that a disagreement between the
LOGCAP contractor and the DCAA on how to bill for services to feed
soldiers in Iraq involved at least $88 million in questioned
costs.[Footnote 5] The disagreement regarded whether the government
should be billed on the camp populations specified in the statement of
work or on the actual head count. A clearer statement of work, coupled
with better DOD oversight of the contract, could have prevented the
disagreement and mitigated the government's risk of paying for more
services than needed.
Business Arrangements that Increased Risk:
To award contracts and begin reconstruction efforts quickly, DOD used
business arrangements that often increased DOD's risk of paying higher
costs than it might have otherwise. Such arrangements often allowed
contractors to begin work before key contract terms and conditions,
such as the scope of the work and its price, were fully defined. For
example, in a September 2006 report, we found that DOD contracting
officials were less likely to remove the costs questioned by auditors
if the contractor had already incurred these costs before the contract
action was definitized.[Footnote 6] In contrast, in the few instances
in which the government negotiated the terms before starting work, the
portion of questioned costs removed from the proposal was substantial.
For example, in three audits related to a logistics support contract,
DCAA questioned $204 million. Since the government and the contractor
negotiated the terms prior to the onset of the work, the contractor had
not incurred any costs at the time of negotiations. DCAA calculated
that $120 million of the $204 million in questioned costs were removed
as a result of its findings.
We subsequently issued a report in July 2007 that focused on the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers' $2.5 billion contract to Kellogg Brown & Root
to restore Iraq's oil infrastructure and ensure an adequate fuel supply
within Iraq.[Footnote 7] DCAA reviewed the contract's 10 task orders
and questioned $221 million in contractor costs. While DOD considered
DCAA's audit findings and performed additional analysis, the lack of
timely negotiations contributed significantly to DOD's decision on how
to address the questioned costs. In this case, all 10 task orders were
negotiated more than 180 days after the work commenced and the
contractor had incurred almost all its costs at the time of
negotiations. These circumstances influenced DOD's decision to pay
nearly all of the $221 million in questioned costs.
Poor Management and Oversight of Contractor Performance:
Managing contractors in an unstable contracting environment means
greater attention to oversight, which relies on having a capable
government workforce. Having personnel who are trained to conduct
oversight and who are held accountable for their responsibilities is
essential for effective oversight of contractors. If oversight is not
conducted, not sufficient, or not well documented, DOD is at risk of
being unable to identify and correct poor contractor performance. On
multiple occasions, we and others have reported on deficiencies in
DOD's oversight; for example:
* In December 2006, we reported that DOD did not have sufficient
numbers of contractor oversight personnel at deployed locations, which
limited its ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors
were meeting contract requirements efficiently and
effectively.[Footnote 8]
* In October 2007, the report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations stated that the Army
lacked the leadership and military and civilian personnel to provide
sufficient contracting support to either expeditionary or peacetime
missions. According to the Commission, Army contracting personnel
experienced a 600-percent increase in their workload and were
performing more complex tasks, while the number of Army civilians and
military in the contracting workforce had remained stagnant or
declined. As a result, the Commission found that the vital task of
postaward contract management was rarely being done. It recommended
that the Army increase the number of civilian and military personnel in
its contracting workforce by 1,400 individuals.
* Our recent analysis of five types of vehicles presented to the Army
as ready for acceptance from July 2006 through May 2007 found that 18
to 31 percent of the vehicles failed government inspection.[Footnote 9]
Some equipment presented to the Army failed inspection multiple times,
sometimes for the same deficiency. Rework on equipment that failed
inspections since May 2005 wasted $4.2 million.
Such issues are not unique to Iraq but often reflect the long-standing
and systemic issues DOD faces. Since 1992, we have identified DOD
contract management to be high risk due to its vulnerabilities to
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In a report issued in July
2006, we concluded that, because awards to contractors were large and
growing, DOD would continue to be vulnerable to contracting fraud,
waste or misuse of taxpayer dollars, and abuse.[Footnote 10]
Insufficient Accountability over U.S.-Funded Equipment Provided to
Iraqi Security Forces:
In July 2007, we reported that DOD could not fully account for Iraqi
security forces' receipt of U.S.-provided equipment.[Footnote 11] Three
factors contributed to this lapse in accountability. First, DOD had not
specified which DOD equipment accountability[Footnote 12] procedures,
if any, applied to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress
funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional
security assistance programs, which, according to DOD officials,
allowed DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program.
These officials stated that, since the funding did not go through
traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability
requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. For
example, under traditional security assistance programs, DOD
regulations specify accountability procedures for storing, protecting,
transporting, and registering small arms and other sensitive items
transferred to foreign governments.
Second, DOD did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment
distributed to the Iraqi security forces from June 2004 until December
2005. At that time, DOD established a consolidated property book system
to track the issuance of equipment to the Iraqi security forces and was
attempting to recover past records. Our analysis found a discrepancy of
at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former
Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) commander and
the property books (see figure 2). Former DOD officials stated that
this lapse was due to an insufficient number of staff and the lack of a
fully operational network to distribute equipment, among other reasons.
Figure 2: Discrepancies of MNSTC-I Reports of Selected Equipment Issued
to Iraqi Security Forces, June 2004 through September 2005:
This figure is a bar graph representing discrepancies of MNSTC-I
reports of selected equipment issued to Iraqi security forces, June
2004 through September 2005. The X axis represents the type of
equipment, and the Y axis represents the number of times. One bar
represents "reported by former MNSTC-I commander," and the other
represents "reported by MNSTC-I property book."
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander
and MNSTC-I property book records.
[End of figure]
Third, since the beginning of the program, DOD has not consistently
collected supporting documents that confirm when the equipment was
received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units
receiving the equipment. Since June 2006, the command has placed
greater emphasis on collecting this documentation. However, our review
of the 2007 property books found continuing problems with missing and
incomplete records. Further, the property books consist of extensive
electronic spreadsheets, which are an inefficient data management tool
given the large amount of data and limited personnel available to
maintain the system.
In our July 2007 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense
(1) determine which DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply
to the program, and (2) after defining the required accountability
procedures, ensure that sufficient staff, functioning distribution
networks, standard operating procedures, and proper technology are
available to meet the new requirements. DOD concurred with our
recommendations but, as of March 3, 2008, had not determined which
accountability procedures apply to the program.
Long-standing Problems Hinder DOD's Management and Oversight of
Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces:
Several long-standing and systemic problems continue to hinder DOD's
management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations,
including the failure to follow planning guidance, an inadequate number
of military and civilian contract oversight personnel, failure to
systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and the lack of
comprehensive training for military commanders and contract oversight
personnel. The recurring nature of these issues underscores the need
for DOD leadership to ensure implementation of and compliance with
existing guidance within the department. In prior reports, we made a
number of recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD's management and
oversight of contractor support at deployed locations, and the
department has agreed to implement many of those recommendations.
However, our prior work has found that DOD has made limited progress
implementing some key recommendations. Our work on contracts to support
deployed forces in Iraq has identified instances where poor oversight
and management of contractors led to negative financial and operational
impacts.
DOD Has Not Followed Long-standing Planning Guidance Regarding the Use
of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces:
Our work has shown that DOD has not followed long-standing planning
guidance, particularly by not adequately factoring the use and role of
contractors into its planning. For example, DOD guidance stresses the
importance of fully integrating into logistics plans and orders the
logistics functions performed by contractors along with those performed
by military and government personnel. However, we noted in our 2003
report that the operations plan for the war in Iraq contained limited
information on contractor support.[Footnote 13] Similarly, DOD policy
requires planning for contractor-provided services during crisis
situations to provide a reasonable assurance of the continuation of
services and to prepare a contingency plan for obtaining services from
alternate sources if needed. Our review found that essential contractor
services for deployed troops had not been identified and backup
planning was not being done. Without firm plans, there is no assurance
that the personnel needed to provide essential services will be
available when needed.
In addition, we reported in 2004 that the Army did not follow its
planning guidance when deciding to use the Army's LOGCAP
contract.[Footnote 14] Army guidance stresses the need for the clear
identification of requirements and the development of a comprehensive
statement of work early in the contingency planning process. Because
this Army guidance was not followed, the plan to support the troops in
Iraq was not comprehensive and was revised seven times in less than 1
year, generating a significant amount of rework that would have been
avoided had the planning guidance been followed.
We have also found that DOD has not reviewed contractor support to
identify the essential services provided and the department lacked
visibility over the totality of contractor support to deployed forces.
This information is essential in incorporating contractor support into
planning efforts. For example, senior military commanders in Iraq
stated that, when they began to develop a base consolidation plan for
Iraq, they had no source to draw upon to determine how many contractors
were on each installation.
DOD has taken some actions to address this challenge. For example, DOD
is developing a database of contractors who deploy with U.S. forces.
According to senior DOD officials familiar with the database, as of
February 2008, the database had about 80,000 records. DOD is working
with State to include new DOD contractors, including private security
contractors, in the database. This effort responds to recommendations
we made in 2003 and 2006 to enhance the department's visibility over
contractors in locations such as Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 15]
In addition, Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan has created the
Theater Business Clearance process that reviews and approves all
contracts for work in Iraq or Afghanistan. Joint Contracting Command
Iraq/Afghanistan officials stated that this has helped military
commanders know ahead of time when contractors are coming to work on
their bases and to ensure sufficient facilities are available for them.
According to senior DOD officials, DOD is also developing a cadre of
contracting planners to ensure that contractor support is included in
combatant commanders' planning.
DOD Lacks Adequate Numbers of Trained Contract Oversight Personnel:
Having the right people with the right skills to oversee contractor
performance is crucial to ensuring that DOD receives the best value for
the billions of dollars spent each year on contractor-provided services
to support deployed forces. However, several reviews by GAO and other
organizations have consistently found deficiencies in DOD's oversight
of contractors due to an inadequate number of trained military and
civilian personnel to carry out these duties.
Such concerns are not new, and we continue to find that poor oversight
contributes to poor outcomes and wasted resources. For example, we
reported in 2004 that DOD did not always have enough contract oversight
personnel in place to manage and oversee its logistics support
contracts such as LOGCAP and the Air Force Contract Augmentation
Program (AFCAP). As a result, the Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA) was unable to account for $2 million worth of tools that had
been purchased using the AFCAP contract. In 2006, a LOGCAP Program
Office official stated that the office did not prepare to hire
additional contract oversight personnel in anticipation of an increased
use of LOGCAP services due to Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to the
official, if adequate staffing had been in place early, the Army could
have realized substantial savings through more effective reviews of the
increasing volume of LOGCAP requirements.
In January 2008, we reported that the Army was inadequately staffed to
conduct oversight of an equipment maintenance contract in Kuwait, a
contract with cumulative obligations of more than $500
million.[Footnote 16] Vacant oversight personnel positions included a
quality assurance specialist, a property administrator, and two quality
assurance inspectors. According to Army officials, such shortfalls
meant that surveillance was not being performed sufficiently, and the
Army was less able to identify trends in contractor performance and
begin corrective action. For example, a review of property
accountability reports found that the contractor reported a total of
$2.4 million in government-furnished property; however, two of the
eight property listings alone totaled more than $2 million. Without
adequate oversight of government property, the Army cannot be certain
that duplicate supplies have not been ordered and that government
property is not misplaced or misused.
DOD has taken some actions to address the challenge of a less-than-
adequate number of contract oversight personnel. For example, in
February 2007, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and
Procurement) issued guidance that required, among other actions,
contracting officers to ensure that a quality assurance surveillance
plan be prepared and implemented for service contracts exceeding
$2,500. Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan officials stated
that they are in the process of adding about 39 personnel to provide
additional contractor oversight. Similarly, DCMA has deployed 100 more
personnel and plans to deploy another 150 to provide contract oversight
and administration to both ongoing and future contracts in Iraq. DCMA
is providing oversight for DOD's private security contracts and other
theater-wide contracts. Additionally, senior DOD officials stated that
the department has created a task force to address the recommendations
of the October 2007 report by the Commission on Army Acquisition and
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations.
DOD Does Not Systematically Collect and Distribute Lessons Learned:
DOD does not systematically ensure that lessons learned regarding the
use of contractors to support deployed forces are shared with military
personnel at deployed locations. Although DOD has a policy requiring
the collection and distribution of lessons learned to the maximum
extent possible, we found in our previous work that, with regard to
contractor support to deployed forces, no procedures were in place to
ensure lessons learned were being collected and distributed. For
example, the Army regulation that establishes policies,
responsibilities, and procedures for the implementation of the LOGCAP
program makes customers that receive services under the LOGCAP contract
responsible for collecting lessons learned. However, we have repeatedly
found that DOD is not systematically collecting and sharing lessons
learned on the use of contractors to support the deployed forces. We
have made several recommendations in the past that DOD implement a
department-wide lessons learned program for contractor support to
deployed forces. However, we have previously reported that DOD has not
established any procedures to systematically do this. We also found a
failure to share best practices and lessons learned between units as
one redeploys and the other deploys to replace it. As a result, new
units essentially start at ground zero, having to resolve a number of
difficulties until they understand contractor roles and
responsibilities.
DOD Does Not Adequately Train Military Commanders and Contract
Oversight Personnel:
DOD does not routinely incorporate information about contractor support
for deployed forces in its predeployment training of military
personnel, despite the long-standing recognition of the need to provide
such information. Our work has shown the need for better predeployment
training of military commanders since the mid-1990s. DOD policy states
that personnel should receive timely and effective training to ensure
they have the knowledge and tools necessary to accomplish their
missions.
We have made several recommendations that DOD improve its contractor
support-related training. In each instance, DOD concurred with our
recommendation. However, our previous work has found limited evidence
that improvements have been made in terms of how DOD trains military
commanders and contract oversight personnel on the use of contractors
to support forces prior to deployment. We have found that limited or no
predeployment training on the use of contractor support has caused a
variety of problems for military commanders in deployed locations.
* As we reported in 2006, several military commanders with limited or
no predeployment training stated that they were not able to adequately
plan for the use of those contractors.[Footnote 17] According to the
commanders, their predeployment training provided them with
insufficient information on how much support contractors would be
providing in Iraq. The commanders were therefore surprised by the
substantial number of personnel they had to use to perform missions
such as on-base escorts for third-country and host-country nationals,
convoy security, and other force protection support to contractors.
* We have found instances in which limited or no predeployment training
for military commanders on the use of contractor support to deployed
forces resulted in confusion about their roles and responsibilities in
managing contractors. In some cases, concerns rose over the potential
for military commanders to direct contractors to perform work outside
the scope of the contract, which they lack the authority to do. As Army
guidance makes clear, this can result in modifications to the contract
that would involve additional costs and, in some cases, be in violation
of competition requirements. For example, in 2006, a contractor stated
that he was instructed by a military commander to release equipment the
contractor was maintaining even though this action was not within the
scope of the contract. The issue ultimately had to be resolved by the
contracting officer.
* In a 2005 report on the use of private security contractors in
Iraq,[Footnote 18] we found that commanders received no training or
guidance on how to work with private security providers in Iraq. To
highlight the lack of training and guidance, representatives from one
unit stated they did not know private security providers were in their
battle space until the providers called for assistance.[Footnote 19]
We also found that contract oversight personnel such as contracting
officers' representatives continue to receive limited or no
predeployment training regarding their roles and responsibilities in
monitoring contractor performance. Contracting officers'
representatives are typically drawn from units receiving contractor-
provided services and are not normally contracting specialists.
However, DOD's acquisition regulations require that contracting
officer's representatives be qualified through training and experience
commensurate with their delegated responsibilities.
We have found that limited or no predeployment training of contract
oversight personnel has caused a variety of problems in deployed
locations.
* The lack of training can affect the quality of service that
contractors are providing at deployed locations. In a December 2006
report, officials from a corps support group in Iraq stated that, until
they were able to get a properly trained contracting officer's
representative in place, they experienced numerous problems regarding
the quality of food service LOGCAP provided.
* The lack of sufficient training also can lead to the inefficient use
of military personnel. In the 2006 report, officials with a Stryker
brigade stated that a lack of training hindered their ability to
resolve staffing issues with a contractor conducting background
screenings of third-country and host-country nationals. In this case,
shortages of contractor-provided screeners forced the brigade to use
its own intelligence personnel to conduct screenings. As a result,
those personnel were not available for their primary intelligence-
gathering responsibilities.
DOD and its components have made some improvements in providing
training to military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the
use of contractors to support deployed forces prior to their
deployment. In DOD's response to our 2006 report, the Director of
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy stated that the Army is
making changes to its logistics training programs that would
incorporate contracting officers' representatives training into its
basic and advanced training for its ordnance, transportation, and
quartermaster corps.[Footnote 20]
In addition, the Defense Acquisition University has updated its
contingency contracting course to include a lesson on contractors
accompanying the force. DCMA is adding personnel to assist in the
training and managing of contracting officers' representatives.
However, training of military commanders and contract oversight
personnel remains a challenge. For example, the 2007 report of the
Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary
Operations found that combatant commands do not recognize the
significance of contracts and contractors in expeditionary operations.
The report concluded that the Army needs to educate and train
commanders on the important operational role of contracting.
Lack of Adequate Strategic Planning Impedes U.S. Efforts to Develop
Capacity in Iraqi Ministries and Improve Outcomes in Iraq's Energy
Sector:
U.S. efforts to increase the Iraqi government's capacity to invest in
its own rebuilding are undermined by strategic planning shortfalls in
two critical areas--developing the capacity of the Iraqi ministries to
effectively execute their responsibilities and integrating oil and
electricity development into a unified plan. In the energy sector,
developing a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan is essential
to meeting energy production and export goals, which in turn will help
Iraq meet its future financial needs. In both cases, U.S. assistance in
developing these plans will help ensure that future U.S. expenditures
in rebuilding Iraq will result in long-term benefits.
Department of State Has Not Developed a Comprehensive and Integrated
Strategy to Develop Transparent and Accountable Iraqi Ministries:
U.S. efforts to strengthen Iraqi ministries lack a strategic plan to
integrate efforts, address challenges within the ministries, and set
clear priorities.[Footnote 21] Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to
help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government have been
characterized by multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts,
without overarching direction from a lead entity that integrates their
efforts, and shifting time frames and priorities in response to
deteriorating security and the reorganization of the U.S. mission in
Iraq. Consequently, U.S. efforts to date have not resulted in key Iraqi
ministries having the capacity to effectively govern and assume
increasing responsibility for operating, maintaining, and further
investing in reconstruction projects.
The Iraqi ministries also face several challenges that pose a risk to
their success and long-term sustainability.[Footnote 22] First, our
October 2007 report found that Iraqi ministries lack personnel with key
skills, such as budgeting and procurement. Second, sectarian influence
over ministry leadership and staff complicated efforts to build a
professional and nonaligned civil service. Third, pervasive corruption
in the Iraqi ministries impeded the effectiveness of U.S. efforts.
Fourth, poor security limited U.S. advisors' access to their Iraqi
counterparts, preventing ministry staff from attending planned training
sessions and contributing to the exodus of skilled professionals to
other countries.
While recognizing these challenges, U.S. efforts to help build the
capacity of the Iraqi ministry suffered from the lack of coordination
and shifting priorities. First, no single agency was in charge of
leading U.S. ministry capacity development efforts. State, DOD, and
USAID have led separate efforts at Iraqi ministries, investing about
$169 million in funds in 2005 and 2006 for these efforts. As of mid-
2007, State and USAID were providing 169 capacity development advisors
to 10 key civilian ministries; DOD was providing 215 to the Ministries
of Defense and Interior. Although State took steps to improve
coordination in early 2007, coordination between the agencies remains
problematic. For example, although State, USAID, and DOD tried to
develop a common set of metrics to measure ministry capacity in 2005,
the agencies have now developed separate sets of metrics.
Second, the focus of U.S. capacity development efforts had shifted from
long-term institution-building projects, such as helping the Iraqi
government develop its own capacity development strategy, to an
immediate effort to help Iraqi ministries overcome their inability to
spend their capital budgets and deliver essential services to the Iraqi
people. However, as we reported in January 2008, it is unclear if Iraq
is spending its $10.1 billion capital budget since U.S. and Iraqi
reports show widely disparate rates for Iraqi government spending in
2007.[Footnote 23] Citing unofficial Ministry of Finance data, the
administration's September 2007 Benchmark Assessment Report stated that
the Iraqi ministries had spent 24 percent of their capital projects
budgets, as of July 15, 2007. The report concluded that, compared with
2006, the government of Iraq was becoming more effective in spending
its capital projects budget. However, the administration's report is
not consistent with Iraq's official expenditure reports, which show
that the central ministries had spent only 4.4 percent of their
investment budget, as of August 2007. The lack of consistent and timely
expenditure data limits transparency over Iraq's execution of $10.1
billion 2007 budget for capital projects and reconstruction. The most
recent expenditure data show a capital expenditure rate of 7 percent
for the central ministries, as of November 2007.
The U.S. government is beginning to develop a comprehensive and
integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development efforts in Iraq,
although agencies have been implementing separate programs since 2003.
GAO's previous analyses of U.S. multiagency national strategies
demonstrate that such a strategy should integrate the efforts of the
involved agencies with the priorities of the Iraqi government, and
include a clear purpose and scope; a delineation of U.S. roles,
responsibilities, and coordination with other donors, including the
United Nations; desired goals and objectives; performance measures; and
a description of benefits and costs. U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi
ministry capacity have included some but not all of these components.
For example, agencies are working to clarify roles and
responsibilities. However, U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi-
identified priorities at all ministries and information on how
resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state.
In October 2007, we recommended that State, in consultation with the
Iraqi government, complete a comprehensive and integrated strategy for
U.S. capacity development efforts. State recognized the value of an
integrated strategy but stated that it may hinder efforts to tailor
capacity development efforts to the priorities of each ministry. GAO's
recommendation does not preclude tailoring capacity development efforts
to meet each ministry's unique needs. A strategy ensures that a U.S.-
funded program has consistent overall goals, clear leadership and
roles, and risks that are assessed.
Similarly, in January 2008, we recommended that to help ensure more
accurate reporting of the government of Iraq's spending of its capital
projects budget, the Secretary of the Treasury work with the government
of Iraq to ensure the reporting of accurate and reliable expenditure
data. The Department of the Treasury agreed with our recommendation to
ensure accurate and reliable reporting of Iraqi expenditure data and is
working to implement it.
Lack of Adequate Strategic Planning Impedes U.S. and Iraqi Efforts to
Restore Iraq's Energy Sectors:
Despite the United States' investment of about $6 billion to rebuild
Iraq's oil and electricity sectors, production in both sectors has
consistently fallen below U.S. program goals of 3 million barrels per
day and 6,000 megawatts of electrical peak generation capacity. As we
reported in May 2007, it is difficult to identify the most pressing
future funding needs, key rebuilding priorities, and existing
vulnerabilities and risks within the sectors given the absence of an
overarching strategic plan that comprehensively assesses the
requirements of the energy sector as a whole.[Footnote 24] While the
Iraqi government has crafted a multiyear strategic plan for Iraq's
electricity sector, no such plan exists for the oil sector. Given the
highly interdependent nature of the oil and electricity sectors, such a
plan would help identify the most pressing needs for the entire energy
sector and help overcome the daunting challenges affecting future
development prospects.
As shown in figure 3, Iraq's oil production and exports, despite recent
improvements, continue to fall below U.S. goals. As of December 2007,
Iraq produced about 2.5 million barrels of oil per day and exported
nearly 2.0 million barrels per day, compared with the U.S. goals of 3.0
million barrels and 2.2 million barrels, respectively.[Footnote 25]
Figure 3: Oil Production, Exports, and U.S. Goals, June 2003 to
December 2007:
This figure is a combination bar and line graph showing oil production,
exports, and U.S. goals, June 2003 through December 2007. The X axis
represents the year and month, and the Y axis represents the millions
of barrels per day. The lines represent the production capacity goal
and export goal. The bars represent the production for domestic use,
and the production exported.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Iraq Ministry of Oil data collected by State
Department.
Note: Production capacity differs from actual production. Production
capacity is the maximum amount of production a country can maintain
over a period of time. Since Iraq has been trying to increase its
production of crude oil, we use actual production as an indicator of
Iraq's production capacity.
[End of figure]
In addition, U.S. goals for electricity remain unmet. The problem is
compounded by increasing demand that outstrips supply. As of February
2008, demand for electricity was twice as high as the supply. In
addition, available power in Baghdad was 9 hours per day, compared with
17 hours per day in Basra. As we previously reported in May 2007, one
of the challenges in developing the electricity sector was the U.S.
government's decision to install natural gas turbine engines despite
the absence of a natural gas distribution network. Of the 35 engines
installed, 16 were using diesel or crude oil rather than natural gas.
As a result, maintenance was three times as costly and electricity
generated decreased by 50 percent.
Billions of dollars are still needed to rebuild, maintain, and secure
Iraq's oil and electricity infrastructure, underscoring the need for
sound strategic planning. The Ministry of Electricity's 2006-2015
Electricity Master Plan estimates that $27 billion will be needed to
reach its goal of providing reliable electricity across Iraq by 2015.
According to DOD, investment in Iraq's oil sector is "woefully short"
of the absolute minimum required to sustain current production, and
additional foreign and private investment is needed. Moreover, U.S.
officials and industry experts estimate that Iraq would need $20
billion to $30 billion over the next several years to reach and sustain
a crude oil production capacity of 5 million barrels per day.
We recommended that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with
relevant U.S. agencies and international donors, work with Iraqi
ministries to develop an integrated energy strategy. State commented,
however, that the Iraqi government, not the U.S. government, is
responsible for taking action on GAO's recommendations. We believe that
the recommendations are still valid given the billions of dollars made
available for Iraq's energy sector, the limited capacity of the Iraqi
ministries, and the U.S. government's influence in overseeing Iraq's
rebuilding efforts.
Conclusion:
U.S. efforts in Iraq are expansive: combating insurgents, training
local security forces, shaping government institutions, reconstructing
infrastructure, and enhancing public services. These efforts
demonstrate a substantial commitment to most aspects of nation
building. However, nation building is costly, particularly in the
absence of a permissive security environment. Since 2001, Congress has
appropriated about $700 billion for military and diplomatic activities
in support of the global war on terrorism; the majority of this amount
has supported U.S. actions in Iraq. This large expenditure of resources
and the enormous task at hand heightens the levels of risk and offers
the potential for fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption.
But, as GAO's audits point out, these risks are further heightened when
U.S. programs lack sound strategic planning, well-defined requirements,
adequate oversight and accountability, and sufficient training for
personnel. Future investments in Iraq will require decision makers not
only to assess the outcomes achieved thus far but also the outcomes
that could have been achieved with more efficient and effective use of
appropriated dollars. It will also require decision makers to consider
difficult trade-offs as the nation faces increasing fiscal challenges
on the home front. Nonetheless, continuing oversight by Congress and
the accountability organizations is needed to ensure that opportunities
for waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption are minimized.
In prior reports, GAO recommended that, to improve accountability and
minimize opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse of U.S. funds, (1)
DOD adopt sound business processes in its acquisition strategies, such
as definitizing contracts in a timely fashion and strengthening
accountability procedures; (2) DOD leadership ensure implementation of
and compliance with existing guidance to improve its management and
oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces; and (3) U.S.
agencies work with Iraq to develop strategic plans for key sectors.
DOD and State have taken action to implement some, but not all, of our
recommendations. Given the billions of dollars that the United States
has spent in Iraq to help rebuild its infrastructure, improve security,
support our forces, and improve the capacity of the ministries, I
believe our recommendations, if fully implemented, would improve
accountability and outcomes. Whether they are fully implemented,
however, will depend on the leadership at each agency to set the
appropriate tone, ensure that existing guidance is effectively
implemented, take actions to prevent mistakes from being repeated, and
seize opportunities to ensure that the efforts to help rebuild and
stabilize Iraq achieve their intended results.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
questions that you or other Members have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony please call Joseph A. Christoff,
Director, International Affairs and Trade, on (202) 512-8979. Other key
contributors to this statement include David Bruno, Carole Coffey, Lynn
Cothern, Howard Cott, Timothy DiNapoli, Matthew E. Helm, Bruce Kutnick,
Tetsuo Miyabara, Judith McCloskey, Kathleen Monahan, and James
Reynolds.
Footnotes:
[1] This figure includes military appropriations for Operation Noble
Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well
as stabilization and reconstruction appropriations for Iraq and
Afghanistan.
[2] To see GAO reports on Iraq, click on [hyperlink,
http://GAO.gov/docsearch/featured/oif.html].
[3] Established in May 2003 and led by the United States and the United
Kingdom, the CPA was the United Nations-recognized coalition authority
responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq.
[4] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need
Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for
Maintaining Facilities, GAO-05-872 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005).
[5] GAO, Military Operations: DOD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support
Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight, GAO-04-854 (Washington,
D.C.: July 19, 2004).
[6] GAO, Iraq Contract Costs: DOD Consideration of Defense Contract
Audit Agency's Findings, GAO-06-1132 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2006).
[7] GAO, Defense Contract Management: DOD's Lack of Adherence to Key
Contracting Principles on Iraq Oil Contract Put Government Interests at
Risk, GAO-07-839 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
[8] GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors
Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO-07-145 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2006).
[9] GAO, Defense Logistics: The Army Needs to Implement an Effective
Management and Oversight Plan for the Equipment Maintenance Contract in
Kuwait, GAO-08-316R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2008).
[10] GAO, Contract Management: DOD Vulnerabilities to Contracting
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, GAO-06-838R (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2006).
[11] GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded
Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces, GAO-07-711 (Washington,
D.C.: July 31, 2007).
[12] DOD defines accountability as the obligation imposed by law,
lawful order, or regulation accepted by an organization or person for
keeping accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents, or
funds, with or without physical possession.
[13] GAO, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to
Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-
695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003).
[14] GAO-04-854.
[15] GAO-07-145.
[16] GAO-08-316R.
[17] GAO-07-145.
[18] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed To Improve Use of Private
Security Providers, GAO-05-737 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005).
[19] In response to an incident in September 2007 in which 17 Iraqis
died, the Department of State and DOD signed a memorandum of agreement
in December 2007 outlining actions needed to improve oversight of
private security contractors. GAO is currently reviewing U.S. agencies'
use of private security contractors in Iraq.
[20] GAO-07-145.
[21] To help Iraq develop the capability of its ministries, the United
States has provided about $300 million between fiscal years 2005 to
2007.
[22] GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity
Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide
Efforts and Manage Risk, GAO-08-117 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2007).
[23] GAO, Iraq Reconstruction: Better Data Needed to Assess Iraq's
Budget Execution, GAO-08-153 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 15, 2008).
[24] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help
Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors, GAO-07-677 (Washington,
D.C.: May 15, 2007).
[25] According to State, revenues generated from Iraqi oil exports
increased from $31 billion in 2006 to $41 billion in 2007 (Iraq Weekly
Status Report, Feb. 6, 2008).
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