Homeland Security
Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend on DOD's Implementation of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act Gao ID: GAO-08-311 April 16, 2008The high use of National Guard (Guard) forces for overseas missions has raised questions about its ability to support civil authorities in the event of a catastrophic incident. GAO was asked to assess two alternatives for providing funding and authority specifically for the Guard's civil support missions. Congress subsequently enacted a new approach for the Guard's civil support needs, which GAO also included in this assessment. GAO determined: (1) the extent to which planning to identify the Guard's civil support requirements has been undertaken, (2) the current funding approach for the Guard's civil support capabilities and how three approaches--modeled after the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the Coast Guard, and that in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act--could be applied to the Guard; (3) guiding principles to consider when developing and implementing funding alternatives, and (4) the extent to which the existing and alternative approaches are consistent with these principles. GAO synthesized guiding principles for military and civil support effectiveness from the literature and discussed alternatives with defense and homeland security analysts.
Comprehensive planning has not been undertaken, by the states or federal agencies, to identify the Guard's requirements for responding to large-scale, multistate civil support missions, such as Hurricane Katrina, because responsibilities for conducting this planning have been unclear. While such events are likely to be state-led, federal funds are likely to be used to fund the Guard's response. The efficiency and effectiveness of response efforts can be facilitated by planning that assigns responsibilities, develops requirements, identifies gaps, and prioritizes investments. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act addresses planning responsibilities to some extent by directing the Department of Defense (DOD) to (1) plan for the Guard's response to natural disasters and acts of terrorism and (2) plan for and fund the unique capabilities DOD needs to provide during civil support missions. Most of the Guard's capabilities have been funded through DOD appropriations to equip, staff, and train for its warfighting missions. The states rely on these capabilities for civil support missions when available. However, alternative funding approaches could provide specific funding for the Guard's civil support role. Under a SOCOM-like approach, the National Guard Bureau could be given funding and authority to provide Guard forces with unique civil support capabilities not already funded by DOD. Under a Coast Guard-like approach, DOD would fund the Guard's warfighting needs, but the Department of Homeland Security could identify needs for and fund the Guard's civil support-unique capabilities. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act directed DOD to develop a funding request for certain capabilities DOD needs to provide civil support. GAO identified seven guiding principles that can be used in assessing the extent to which funding alternatives would support the Guard's dual roles. These include (1) maintain warfighting capability; (2) maintain civilian control; (3) involve key stakeholders; (4) promote interagency planning; (5) promote economy and efficiency; (6) support coherent budget formulation; and (7) provide accountability and transparency. The current approach and two of the alternatives address some of the principles, but none incorporates all of them. For example, the current approach maintains warfighting integration; but it does not provide specific funding for civil support needs or encourage integration of Guard forces with stakeholders outside DOD. The SOCOM and Coast Guard-like models would provide processes for identifying and funding civil support requirements, but neither would promote interagency planning and collaboration. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act addresses all of the principles, at least in part, but it is unclear the extent to which DOD's implementation will yield results that are fully consistent with the guiding principles until implemented. For example, it is unclear the extent to which DOD will consider the input of the external stakeholders or fund civil support capabilities the Guard needs for state-led but federally funded missions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-311, Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend on DOD's Implementation of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act
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Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2008:
Homeland Security:
Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend
on DOD's Implementation of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act:
GAO-08-311:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-311, a report to the Ranking Member, Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The high use of National Guard (Guard) forces for overseas missions has
raised questions about its ability to support civil authorities in the
event of a catastrophic incident. GAO was asked to assess two
alternatives for providing funding and authority specifically for the
Guard‘s civil support missions. Congress subsequently enacted a new
approach for the Guard‘s civil support needs, which GAO also included
in this assessment. GAO determined: (1) the extent to which planning to
identify the Guard‘s civil support requirements has been undertaken,
(2) the current funding approach for the Guard‘s civil support
capabilities and how three approaches”modeled after the U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM), the Coast Guard, and that in the 2008
National Defense Authorization Act”could be applied to the Guard; (3)
guiding principles to consider when developing and implementing funding
alternatives, and (4) the extent to which the existing and alternative
approaches are consistent with these principles. GAO synthesized
guiding principles for military and civil support effectiveness from
the literature and discussed alternatives with defense and homeland
security analysts.
What GAO Found:
Comprehensive planning has not been undertaken, by the states or
federal agencies, to identify the Guard‘s requirements for responding
to large-scale, multistate civil support missions, such as Hurricane
Katrina, because responsibilities for conducting this planning have
been unclear. While such events are likely to be state-led, federal
funds are likely to be used to fund the Guard‘s response. The
efficiency and effectiveness of response efforts can be facilitated by
planning that assigns responsibilities, develops requirements,
identifies gaps, and prioritizes investments. The 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act addresses planning responsibilities to some extent by
directing the Department of Defense (DOD) to (1) plan for the Guard‘s
response to natural disasters and acts of terrorism and (2) plan for
and fund the unique capabilities DOD needs to provide during civil
support missions.
Most of the Guard‘s capabilities have been funded through DOD
appropriations to equip, staff, and train for its warfighting missions.
The states rely on these capabilities for civil support missions when
available. However, alternative funding approaches could provide
specific funding for the Guard‘s civil support role. Under a SOCOM-like
approach, the National Guard Bureau could be given funding and
authority to provide Guard forces with unique civil support
capabilities not already funded by DOD. Under a Coast Guard–like
approach, DOD would fund the Guard‘s warfighting needs, but the
Department of Homeland Security could identify needs for and fund the
Guard‘s civil support–unique capabilities. The 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act directed DOD to develop a funding request for certain
capabilities DOD needs to provide civil support.
GAO identified seven guiding principles that can be used in assessing
the extent to which funding alternatives would support the Guard‘s dual
roles. These include (1) maintain warfighting capability; (2) maintain
civilian control; (3) involve key stakeholders; (4) promote interagency
planning; (5) promote economy and efficiency; (6) support coherent
budget formulation; and (7) provide accountability and transparency.
The current approach and two of the alternatives address some of the
principles, but none incorporates all of them. For example, the current
approach maintains warfighting integration; but it does not provide
specific funding for civil support needs or encourage integration of
Guard forces with stakeholders outside DOD. The SOCOM and Coast
Guard–like models would provide processes for identifying and funding
civil support requirements, but neither would promote interagency
planning and collaboration. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act
addresses all of the principles, at least in part, but it is unclear
the extent to which DOD‘s implementation will yield results that are
fully consistent with the guiding principles until implemented. For
example, it is unclear the extent to which DOD will consider the input
of the external stakeholders or fund civil support capabilities the
Guard needs for state-led but federally funded missions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD report to Congress on the steps taken to
include the guiding principles in its implementation of the 2008 NDAA.
DOD generally agreed with GAO‘s recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-311]. For more
information, contact Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or
stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Key Stakeholders Have Not Undertaken Comprehensive Planning to Identify
the National Guard's Requirements for State-Led but Federally Funded
Civil Support Missions:
Current National Guard Funding Approach Emphasizes Warfighting Needs,
but Alternative Approaches Could Also Address Civil Support Needs:
Guiding Principles Form a Basis for Assessing Funding Alternatives for
the National Guard's Civil Support Capabilities:
Current Approach and Two Alternatives Do Not Fully Incorporate the
Guiding Principles, while the 2008 NDAA Partially Addresses All the
Principles:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles:
Table 2: Comparison of Key Roles and Responsibilities under the Current
Approach, Alternative Approaches, and Provisions of the 2008 NDAA for
Funding the National Guard's Civil Support Capabilities:
Figures:
Figure 1: GAO's Assessment of Extent to Which the Current Approach,
Alternative Approaches, and the Provisions of the 2008 NDAA Include
Guiding Principles:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
Goldwater-Nichols: Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act
Reorganization Act of 1986:
2008 NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal:
Year 2008:
SOCOM: Special Operations Command:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 16, 2008:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Davis:
The National Guard holds a unique dual status in that it performs
federal missions under the command of the President and state missions
under the command of the state's Governor. The continuing high pace of
overseas deployment of National Guard units combined with the
challenging nature of domestic missions for which it must be prepared
has led to questions about whether the National Guard has the
capabilities--the personnel, training, and equipment--it will need to
respond to large-scale, multistate events and how any capabilities
required solely for its domestic missions should be funded. Currently,
the vast majority of the National Guard's personnel, training, and
equipment is provided for its federal warfighting mission with funding
appropriated to the Department of Defense (DOD). State National Guards
can use the capabilities provided by DOD--such as transportation,
engineering, medical, and communications units and equipment--when
available to respond to domestic emergencies while operating under the
command of the Governors and generally paid for with state funding.
However, under certain circumstances such as large-scale, multistate
events, homeland security-related activities, or federally declared
disasters, federal funding has been provided for missions carried out
by the state National Guards.
We have previously reported that the continued heavy use of the
National Guard for overseas missions has decreased the National Guard's
capabilities that are available for domestic missions in support of
civilian authorities (also known as civil support). In 2004, we
recommended that DOD define the full range of the National Guard's
homeland missions, including those led by DOD and those conducted in
support of civilian authorities; and identify the National Guard's
capabilities to perform these missions; any shortfalls in personnel,
training, and equipment; and the required funding to address the
shortfall.[Footnote 1] We also noted in our 2007 report that without a
process to identify requirements for the capabilities the National
Guard would need to respond effectively to these types of events, it
was not possible to determine whether the National Guard had the
capabilities it needed and how efforts could be coordinated most
effectively with local, state, and federal organizations that share
responsibility for emergency response.[Footnote 2] We further reported
the concerns of state officials that although the National Guard units
in their states could respond to routine incidents, such as forest
fires and hurricanes, the states might not have the National Guard
capabilities needed to respond to large-scale multistate events. Also
in our 2007 report on the National Guard's equipment requirements and
readiness, we noted that the National Guard Bureau, which acts as the
channel of communication between the Secretaries of the Army and the
Air Force and the state Governors on National Guard issues, is
positioned to facilitate planning for multistate events. However, DOD
disagreed with our recommendation that the National Guard Bureau should
have this role, stating that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense has this responsibility. In our report on the
military's response to the consequences of Hurricane Katrina, we noted
that a significant shortfall in DOD's pre-Katrina planning was that it
did not fully address the division of tasks between National Guard
resources under the Governors' control and federal resources under
presidential control. In addition, we have also performed a body of
work examining U.S. Northern Command's planning for homeland defense
and civil support missions. A list of related GAO products is included
at the end of this report.
You asked us to assess whether the current approach[Footnote 3] to
funding the National Guard's capabilities adequately addresses its
expected civil support role in the post-September 11, 2001, security
environment and examine two funding alternatives modeled after those
used to fund the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the U.S.
Coast Guard. In January 2008, Congress enacted legislation--the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008[Footnote 4]
(2008 NDAA)--that established a funding approach for certain civil
support needs and that may address some of the problems we have
previously identified with planning and funding for the National
Guard's civil support role. As a result, we also examined the
provisions in the 2008 NDAA. Specifically, our objectives were to
determine: (1) the extent to which planning to identify requirements
for the National Guard's role in civil support missions has been
undertaken; (2) the funding approach currently used for the National
Guard's civil support capabilities and how the two alternative funding
approaches--modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard--and the new
approach established in the 2008 NDAA could be applied to the National
Guard; (3) guiding principles that should be considered when
developing, assessing, and implementing funding alternatives, and (4)
the extent to which the current, alternative, and newly established
approaches are consistent with these principles.
To determine the extent to which planning to identify requirements for
the National Guard's civil support missions has been undertaken and how
the current funding approach is structured, we reviewed prior GAO work
and DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy documents, and
interviewed DOD, National Guard, and DHS officials. To determine how
alternative funding approaches could be applied to the National Guard,
we reviewed documents and met with officials responsible for
identifying requirements, allocating resources, and acquiring
capabilities for SOCOM and the Coast Guard. Additionally, we developed
approaches for how similar roles and responsibilities could be applied
to the National Guard to fund its civil support capabilities, and
refined the alternative approaches through discussions with government
officials and defense and homeland security analysts. Furthermore, we
reviewed the 2008 NDAA and the conference report that accompanied it to
identify the roles and responsibilities set forth in the act for
planning for and funding the National Guard's civil support
capabilities. To determine the principles that should guide efforts to
develop, assess, and implement funding alternatives, we performed
content analysis on prior GAO work examining the National Guard,
emergency preparedness, and best practices for creating a focus on
results, and reviewed principles synthesized from these reports with
government officials and defense and homeland security analysts. To
determine the extent to which the current and alternative approaches
are consistent with the guiding principles, we assessed the current
National Guard funding approach and the alternatives modeled after
SOCOM and Coast Guard against the guiding principles, and reviewed our
assessment with government officials and defense and homeland security
analysts. In addition, we used professional judgment to assess the
provisions in the 2008 NDAA for planning for and funding the National
Guard's civil support capabilities against the guiding principles.
Because the act was passed late in our review, we did not discuss its
provisions with the government officials and defense and homeland
security analysts. We determined that the data used were sufficiently
reliable for our objectives. We conducted our review from February 2007
to April 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. The scope and methodology used in our review are described
in further detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Federal agencies with homeland security and civil support
responsibilities have not undertaken comprehensive planning to identify
the National Guard's requirements for responding to large-scale,
multistate missions. Planning that assigns responsibilities, develops
requirements, identifies capability gaps, and prioritizes investments
can facilitate effective and efficient response to unexpected events.
Planning for natural and man-made large-scale incidents is a shared
state and federal responsibility, according to the 2007 National
Strategy for Homeland Security. Despite the importance of this
planning, prior to the 2008 NDAA, federal statutes had not clearly
assigned responsibilities for conducting this comprehensive planning.
In the absence of explicit statutory direction, this comprehensive
planning has not been included as part of the other planning conducted
by the states, DHS, and DOD, for several reasons. First, DHS, as the
lead federal agency for homeland security, works with states,
localities, and other federal agencies to conduct national emergency
planning at a broad, strategic level, but it does not conduct detailed
operational planning to identify the National Guard's requirements
because it assumes that such planning is the responsibility of either
the states or DOD. Second, states plan for smaller-scale emergencies
involving the National Guard's activities likely to take place within
their borders, but not for large-scale, multistate events. Third, DOD
does not engage in planning to identify the resources required for the
National Guard's civil support missions because it assumes most of
those needs can be met with its warfighting capabilities and that
planning to identify requirements for state-led missions is the states'
responsibility. The 2008 NDAA addresses planning for natural disasters
and terrorist events to some extent. This new law directs the Secretary
of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and
others, to prepare two versions of a plan for coordinating the use of
the National Guard and active duty forces when responding to natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters identified
in the national planning scenarios. One version is required to set out
a response using only members of the National Guard and the other
version is required to set out a response using both the National Guard
and the regular components of the armed forces. In addition, the plans
are to include an identification of the training and equipment needed
by both the National Guard and active duty forces to provide military
assistance to civil authorities and for other domestic operations to
respond to hazards identified in the national planning scenarios.
The current funding approach for the National Guard's civil support
capabilities assumes its warfighting capabilities will be adequate for
its civil support missions while the two alternative funding approaches
modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard, and the approach established
by the 2008 NDAA, focus on providing specific funding for the unique
capabilities needed for the National Guard's civil support missions.
Under the current approach, DOD funds only the National Guard's
warfighting capabilities, which are available to the states for civil
support missions when they are not in use for federal warfighting
missions. In contrast, under an alternative approach modeled after
SOCOM, the National Guard Bureau could be provided authority to
organize, train, equip and fund National Guard forces for unique
personnel, training, and equipment requirements needed for the National
Guard's civil support missions while the Departments of the Army and
Air Force would continue to fund the National Guard's warfighting
requirements. Under a second alternative modeled after the Coast Guard,
DOD would continue to provide funding to the National Guard to support
its warfighting capabilities, but the National Guard Bureau would
receive direct funding transfers from DHS for unique personnel,
training, and equipment requirements DHS identifies as needed for the
National Guard's federally funded civil support missions. Finally, the
2008 NDAA established a third approach for funding certain civil
support capabilities. The act directs the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to determine the
"military-unique capabilities" DOD needs to provide to support civil
authorities in an incident of national significance or a catastrophic
incident and to develop and implement a plan to fund these capabilities
as well as any additional capabilities determined by the Secretary to
be necessary to support the use of the active and reserve components--
which includes the National Guard--for homeland defense missions,
domestic emergency responses, and providing military support to civil
authorities. The act defines "military-unique capabilities" as those
capabilities identified by the Secretary of Defense that cannot be
provided by other federal, state, or local civilian agencies and that
are essential to provide support to civil authorities in an incident of
national significance or a catastrophic incident. In addition, the act
requires DOD to provide quarterly reporting on the readiness of the
National Guard to perform tasks required to support the national
response plan for support to civil authorities.[Footnote 5]
We identified seven guiding principles that can be used to develop,
assess, and implement alternatives for funding the National Guard so it
can be prepared to effectively fulfill both its civil support and
warfighting roles. We synthesized these principles based on our
previous work examining National Guard and emergency preparedness
issues, principles for creating a focus on results and enhancing and
sustaining collaboration among federal agencies, and policies and
practices contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act).[Footnote 6] Our
discussions with government officials and defense and homeland security
analysts confirmed that these principles are important to the National
Guard's effectiveness and can be used in assessing alternative funding
approaches. Specifically, these guiding principles are:
1. maintaining the National Guard's warfighting capability, readiness,
and integration with DOD for its role as a federal reserve of the Army
and Air Force;
2. maintaining or strengthening civilian control of the military, which
is a foundational principle of American democracy;
3. involving responsible stakeholders and aligning with national plans
and strategies affecting the National Guard's civil support mission so
that stakeholders have clear missions, reach agreement on their goals,
and can measure performance;
4. promoting interagency planning, collaboration, and coordination with
the National Guard's federal, state, and local partners in the civil
support role to strengthen emergency preparedness and response;
5. supporting the formulation of coherent budgets for the National
Guard that are supported by a rigorous analytical process to assess
requirements, identify gaps, and set investment priorities for the
civil support role;
6. providing accountability and transparency to Congress for federal
investments in the National Guard's civil support capabilities, which
are essential for holding agencies accountable for results and for
targeting resources to the highest priorities; and:
7. promoting economy and efficiency, which are essential elements of
good government, particularly as the nation faces long-term fiscal
challenges.
These guiding principles can be used in assessing the extent to which
funding alternatives and their implementation would support the
National Guard's dual roles.
Neither the current approach to funding the National Guard's civil
support capabilities nor alternatives modeled after SOCOM or the Coast
Guard systematically include all of the guiding principles. However,
the 2008 NDAA approach addresses all the principles to some extent. Our
assessment shows that the current approach is not consistent with the
principles because it does not involve key stakeholders so as to
encourage alignment with national plans and strategies, encourage
interagency planning to identify requirements, or formulate budgets for
the National Guard's civil support roles. Similarly, although both of
the alternatives modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard would maintain
the National Guard's warfighting capability, readiness, and integration
with DOD, neither is fully consistent with some of the other guiding
principles. For example, the approach modeled after SOCOM would not
explicitly require involvement of key stakeholders outside DOD, such as
DHS, to ensure alignment with national plans and strategies for
homeland security or promote integration and interoperability with
civilian partners. Likewise, while the approach modeled after the Coast
Guard's relationship with the Navy would involve both DHS and DOD
stakeholders, DHS would not necessarily have to consult with DOD or
National Guard stakeholders to identify the most economical or
efficient way to meet requirements. The approach contained in the 2008
NDAA includes provisions requiring the involvement of key stakeholders,
the formulation of budget requests for some civil support needs, and
readiness reporting that partially address all of the guiding
principles, but until DOD implements the act's provisions, it is too
early to assess whether it will result in an approach that is fully
consistent with the guiding principles. For example, it is not clear to
what extent DOD will decide to fund additional capabilities and how
that will affect the National Guard's readiness for providing civil
support during large-scale incidents. Until DOD begins to implement the
new authorities and reports to Congress on the steps it has taken to
include the guiding principles, Congress may not have complete
information to use in its oversight of the National Guard's
preparedness for its dual roles.
To assist Congress in its oversight efforts, we are recommending that
the Secretary of Defense include information in materials accompanying
its fiscal year 2010 budget request on the steps the department has
taken to incorporate the guiding principles in its implementation of
the provisions contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008. Specifically, we are recommending that DOD include
information on (1) the analytical process used to formulate the
department's funding request for the capabilities needed to support
civil authorities in an incident of national significance or a
catastrophic incident and (2) its assessment of the extent to which
DOD's civil support investment priorities are consistent with DHS's
risk-management framework and DHS efforts to promote standards for
integration and interoperability among emergency responders. DOD
generally agreed with our recommendations. DOD agreed to provide
information on the analytical process used to formulate DOD's civil
support funding request with the 2010 budget submission. However, in
its comments DOD noted that an assessment of how DOD civil support
investment priorities are consistent with DHS's risk-management
framework can be provided to the extent that DHS has articulated its
risk-management framework and DOD agrees with that framework.
Background:
In its civil support roles, the National Guard works with multiple
state and federal agencies that have responsibilities for different
aspects of homeland security. DOD is responsible for planning for the
National Guard's federal missions conducted under the command and
control of the President. The Army and Air Force are responsible for
organizing, training, and equipping the Army National Guard and the Air
National Guard, respectively, for federal missions. Within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs supervises DOD's
homeland activities, including the execution of domestic military
missions and military support to U.S. civil authorities, and develops
policies, conducts analysis, provides advice, and makes recommendations
for these activities to the Under Secretary for Policy and the
Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Americas Security Affairs is also responsible for
coordinating with DHS. The U.S. Northern Command is the unified
military command responsible for planning, organizing, and executing
DOD's homeland defense and federal military support to civil
authorities' missions within the continental United States, Alaska, and
territorial waters.
The National Guard is unique in that it performs federal missions under
the command and control of the President and state missions under the
command and control of the Governors. In some circumstances, National
Guard activities that are under state control can be federally
funded.[Footnote 7] Since September 11, 2001, the President has
authorized federal funding for several National Guard missions
conducted under the command of the Governors, such as providing
security at the nation's airports in the immediate aftermath of the
September 11 terrorist attacks, assisting the Gulf Coast in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and providing security along the
southwest border in 2006. Table 1 compares the command
responsibilities, authorities under which the National Guard may
undertake activities, and missions of the National Guard's state and
federal roles.
Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles:
Command and control entity:
State role: State-funded: Governor;
State role: Federally-funded: Governor;
Federal role: Federally-funded: President.
Mobilization authorities used:
State role: State-funded: In accordance with state law;
State role: Federally-funded: Title 32 (32 U.S.C 502(f));
Federal role: Federally-funded: Various Title 10 authorities.
Where deployed:
State role: State-funded: In accordance with state law;
State role: Federally-funded: United States;
Federal role: Federally-funded: Worldwide.
Mission types:
State role: State-funded: In accordance with state law;
State role: Federally-funded: Training and other federally authorized
missions;
Federal role: Federally-funded: Overseas training and as assigned after
mobilization.
Examples of missions conducted in the United States:
State role: State-funded: Forest fires, floods, civil disturbances;
State role: Federally-funded: Post-9/11 airport security, Hurricane
Katrina, southwest border security;
Federal role: Federally-funded: Air sovereignty, missile defense,
guarding DOD infrastructure.
Support law enforcement activities:
State role: State-funded: Yes;
State role: Federally-funded: Yes;
Federal role: Federally-funded: As limited by Posse Comitatus[A].
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385, as applied by DOD,
prohibits the direct use of federal military troops for domestic
civilian law enforcement except where authorized by the Constitution or
an act of Congress. This act applies to the Army National Guard of the
United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, which
are reserve components of the armed forces under 10 U.S.C. §10101.
[End of table]
The 2008 NDAA enhanced the functions of the National Guard Bureau.
[Footnote 8] Under the act, the bureau, which had previously been a
joint bureau of the Army and the Air Force, became a joint activity of
DOD, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau became a principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on matters involving nonfederalized National Guard
forces. In addition the act specifies that the bureau will assist the
Secretary of Defense in facilitating and coordinating with other
federal agencies, the Adjutants General of the states, the U.S. Joint
Forces Command and the U.S. Northern Command for the use of National
Guard personnel and resources for operations conducted under Title 32
or in support of state missions. In addition to these enhanced
functions, the National Guard Bureau also remains responsible for the
administration of the National Guard, including participating with Army
and Air Force staff in developing and coordinating policies, programs,
and plans affecting Army National Guard and Air National Guard
personnel, and it serves as the channel of communication on all matters
pertaining to the National Guard between the Army and the Air Force and
the states. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau has overall
responsibility for the National Guard's military support to civil
authorities programs. During civil support missions, the National Guard
Bureau provides policy guidance and facilitates National Guard
assistance to the Adjutants General who lead National Guard forces
within the states.
At the federal level, the President's Homeland Security Council and DHS
both have responsibilities that could affect the National Guard's civil
support role. To assist in integrating state and federal responses to
domestic emergencies, the Homeland Security Council developed 15
national planning scenarios in 2004 whose purpose was to form the basis
for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of
emergencies. The scenarios focus on the consequences that federal,
state, and local first responders may have to address and are intended
to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic
emergencies for which the nation needs to be prepared and include a
wide range of terrorist attacks involving nuclear, biological, and
chemical agents, as well as catastrophic natural disasters, such as an
earthquake or hurricane. DHS, which was established in 2002[Footnote 9]
to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, is the lead federal
agency responsible for preventing, preparing for, and responding to a
wide range of major domestic disasters and other emergencies. The
President has designated DHS and its Secretary as the lead federal
representative responsible for domestic incident management and
coordination of all-hazards preparedness. In 2008, DHS issued its
National Response Framework, which provides a framework for federal,
state, and local agencies to use in planning for emergencies and
establishes standardized doctrine, terminology, processes, and an
integrated system for federal response activities.
DHS is also responsible for developing a risk-management framework to
guide investments in emergency response capabilities as well as
improving interoperable public safety communications and identifying
requirements and allocating resources to promote integration and
interoperability among responders. For example, DHS, through its state
grants program, provides funding to states to support and improve their
state and local emergency response capabilities. States may use DHS
federal grants to purchase equipment for the National Guard's use in
civil support missions conducted in state status.
States are responsible for preparing and maintaining emergency plans
for the employment of the National Guard in response to civil
disturbances; natural, man-made, or technological disasters; and other
potential emergencies within their borders, such as wildfires and
floods. In responding to such events, states generally have relied on
the personnel, training, and equipment that DOD has provided to their
National Guard units for their federal missions. The response to large-
scale, multistate events may involve a combination of state and local
civilian authorities; National Guard forces from across the nation
responding under mutual assistance agreements[Footnote 10] operating in
state status; federal civilian agencies, and federal military forces
operating under the command of the President.
Key Stakeholders Have Not Undertaken Comprehensive Planning to Identify
the National Guard's Requirements for State-Led but Federally Funded
Civil Support Missions:
Key stakeholders with homeland security or civil support missions,
including DOD, DHS, and the states, have not undertaken comprehensive
planning to identify the National Guard's requirements for responding
efficiently and effectively to large-scale, multistate civil support
missions, which are likely to be state-led but federally funded.
Planning has not been undertaken because key stakeholders have assumed
that the National Guard's civil support needs could be met with the
equipment DOD provides for its federal missions and that planning for
state-led missions is the states' responsibility--even for missions
that are likely to be federally funded. Since our last report, DHS, the
National Guard Bureau, and the Homeland Security Council, have taken
steps to facilitate planning for some of the events in the national
planning scenarios, but these efforts do not include the detailed
operational planning needed to identify the specific capabilities the
National Guard requires and they are not part of DOD processes to
develop budgets and direct funding to identified needs. The 2008 NDAA
addresses the need for planning to some extent by directing the
Secretary of Defense to (1) identify the training and equipment needed
for both the National Guard and active duty forces to provide military
assistance to civil authorities and respond to hazards identified in
the national planning scenarios as part of the Secretary's plan for
coordinating the use of the National Guard and active duty forces when
responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made
disasters, and (2) identify, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the military-unique capabilities DOD needs to
provide when supporting civil authorities during a catastrophic
incident or incident of national significance.
Neither the States nor the Federal Government Have Conducted Planning
to Identify the National Guard's Requirements for State-Led but
Federally Funded Civil Support Missions:
Neither the states nor the federal government have conducted the
comprehensive planning needed to identify the National Guard's
requirements for responding to large-scale, multistate civil support
missions, which are likely to be state-led but federally funded. DOD,
DHS, and National Guard documents, as well as our prior work on
Hurricane Katrina, indicate that comprehensive pre-event planning that
is coordinated and integrated to take into account the roles of federal
and state responders, including the National Guard, is a key step in
facilitating an effective, efficient, and well-coordinated response to
unexpected domestic emergencies. In addition, planning that assigns
responsibilities, develops requirements, identifies capability gaps,
and prioritizes investments is consistent with the policy for enhancing
military effectiveness as well as other practices contained in the
Goldwater-Nichols reforms.[Footnote 11] Furthermore, according to the
2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, planning for natural and
manmade catastrophic incidents is a shared state and federal
responsibility. Moreover, use of federal funding for National Guard
activities that are state-led creates a federal interest in ensuring
that National Guard forces are prepared to respond efficiently and
effectively.
Despite its importance to an effective and efficient response to civil
support missions, the comprehensive planning needed to determine the
personnel, equipment, and training that the National Guard would need
has not been undertaken. Previously, federal statutes have not assigned
clear responsibility for conducting the planning to identify these
requirements. Under federal law, the Secretaries of the Army and Air
Force are responsible for training and equipping the National Guard for
its federal missions conducted under the command and control of the
President.[Footnote 12] However, DOD is not required to specifically
plan for the National Guard's use in state-led civil support missions
that are in the federal interest. Similarly, the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 states that DHS's primary mission includes acting as a focal
point regarding natural and man-made crises and emergency planning;
[Footnote 13] however, DHS is not explicitly directed to conduct
detailed operational-level planning to identify the National Guard's
requirements for civil support missions that are in the federal
interest.
In the absence of explicit statutory direction, states, DHS, and DOD
have not conducted comprehensive planning for a variety of reasons.
First, although states routinely undertake planning for the National
Guard's role in responding to emergencies within their borders, such as
hurricanes and forest fires, they do not plan for the National Guard's
role in large-scale, multistate events because, as previously
reported,[Footnote 14] they have limited planning resources and lack a
formal mechanism to facilitate planning across state borders. Second,
while DHS, as the lead federal agency for homeland security, works with
federal agencies, states, and localities to conduct national emergency
planning, it does not conduct detailed operational planning that
identifies specific requirements for the National Guard because it
considers this planning to be the responsibility of either the states
or DOD. Finally, DOD does not specifically plan to identify the
resources required for the National Guard's civil support missions
because DOD assumes that most of those needs can be met with the
National Guard's warfighting capabilities and that planning to identify
requirements for state-led missions is the states' responsibility--even
when missions are federally funded.
The Homeland Security Council, DHS, and the National Guard Bureau Have
Taken Steps to Facilitate Planning, but Efforts Do Not Include the
Detailed Planning Needed:
Since the time of our last report, the Homeland Security Council, DHS,
and the National Guard Bureau, have taken steps to facilitate planning
for some of the events in the national planning scenarios but these
efforts do not include the detailed operational planning needed to
identify the specific capabilities the National Guard requires and are
not part of DOD's process to develop budgets and direct funding towards
identified needs.[Footnote 15] For example, the National Guard Bureau
has a liaison assigned to DHS that provides advice on the National
Guard's emergency response capabilities. In addition, the Homeland
Security Council directed the establishment of a planning team[Footnote
16] comprised of stakeholders from various federal agencies, including
DOD and the National Guard Bureau, to provide national strategy
guidance and develop concept plans on how to respond to each of the 15
national planning scenarios.[Footnote 17] However, according to DHS and
planning team officials, this team does not conduct detailed
operational level planning to identify specific capabilities needed for
the type of nationwide National Guard effort such as occurred during
the response to Hurricane Katrina or that might occur in response to
the types of large-scale, multistate events contained in the national
planning scenarios. DHS and planning team officials explained that DHS
coordination plans consider National Guard forces to be either a part
of the state response effort or the federal DOD response effort and
that the states or DOD would conduct this detailed planning. DHS's role
is to provide guidance and recommendations for states and federal
agencies to consider and it does not have authority to direct the
states or other federal agencies to perform specific emergency response
duties.[Footnote 18] In addition in December 2007, the Homeland
Security Council issued Annex I to Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8. This annex is intended to further enhance the preparedness
of the United States by formally establishing a standard and
comprehensive approach to national planning among federal agencies with
a role in homeland security. However, until federal agencies with
homeland security responsibilities implement this approach, it is not
clear the extent to which this guidance will result in detailed
planning to identify the specific capabilities the National Guard would
need to respond to large-scale, multistate events contained in the
national planning scenarios.
According to National Guard Bureau officials, the bureau has also
initiated some efforts to facilitate planning. For example, the bureau
has developed sample plans for some of the events in the national
planning scenarios that the bureau considers to be the most likely to
occur or the most dangerous. The National Guard Bureau plans to provide
the sample plans to the states, which can tailor them to fit their
particular needs. However, National Guard Bureau officials explained
that the sample plans do not cover all 15 scenarios or identify
specific requirements for personnel, training, and equipment the
National Guard would need for a nationwide response, and they are not
considered as needs that must be included in DOD's process for
formulating its budget.
2008 NDAA Assigns DOD Responsibility for Planning to Identify Certain
National Guard Civil Support Needs:
The 2008 NDAA directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau, and other DOD officials to prepare two versions of a plan for
coordinating the use of the members of the National Guard and active
duty forces when responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism,
and man-made disasters identified in the national planning
scenarios.[Footnote 19] One version is required to set forth a response
using only members of the National Guard and the other version is to
set out a response using both members of the National Guard and active
duty forces. In addition, to assist the Secretary of Defense in
preparing the plan, the National Guard Bureau is directed to provide
the Secretary with information gathered from Governors, Adjutants
General of the states, and other state civil authorities responsible
for homeland preparation and response to natural disasters. This plan
is to include an identification of the training and equipment needed
for both the National Guard and active duty forces to provide military
assistance to civil authorities and for other domestic operations when
responding to hazards identified in the national planning scenarios.
However, until DOD implements the provisions of the 2008 NDAA, it is
unclear the extent to which DOD will plan and identify requirements for
the National Guard's capabilities needed to respond efficiently and
effectively to the large-scale, multistate events that are state-led
but federally funded.
Current National Guard Funding Approach Emphasizes Warfighting Needs,
but Alternative Approaches Could Also Address Civil Support Needs:
Under the current approach, DOD generally uses its appropriations to
fund the National Guard's warfighting capabilities, although the
equipment may be used for civil support missions when it is available.
Alternatives to the current funding approach modeled after the special
authorities and funding provided to SOCOM and to the Coast Guard would
provide funding to prepare the National Guard for large-scale civil
support missions without altering DOD's approach to funding its
warfighting needs. Finally, the 2008 NDAA established a new approach
for planning for and funding some of DOD's--which includes the National
Guard's--unique civil support needs while retaining DOD's approach to
funding warfighting needs. Table 2 below shows how the key roles and
responsibilities for building civil support-unique capabilities in the
federal interest would differ among the National Guard's current
approach, the approaches modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard, and
the approach in the 2008 NDAA.
Table 2: Comparison of Key Roles and Responsibilities under the Current
Approach, Alternative Approaches, and Provisions of the 2008 NDAA for
Funding the National Guard's Civil Support Capabilities:
Role/responsibility: Civilian oversight;
Current approach: DOD;
Approach modeled after SOCOM: DOD;
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: DHS;
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: DOD.
Role/responsibility: Identify civil support-unique requirements;
Current approach: Civil support requirements not identified;
Approach modeled after SOCOM: National Guard Bureau;
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: DHS;
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: DOD in consultation with DHS[A].
Role/responsibility: Formulate budget and allocate resources for civil
support-unique requirements;
Current approach: No budget for civil support; resources for
warfighting missions/capabilities only[B];
Approach modeled after SOCOM: National Guard Bureau;
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: DHS;
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: DOD[C].
Role/responsibility: Acquisition of civil support-unique capabilities;
Current approach: Prohibited unless authorized by the Secretary of
Defense;
Approach modeled after SOCOM: National Guard Bureau;
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: DHS;
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: DOD.
Source: GAO.
Note: Under all the alternatives, DOD would continue to develop
requirements, formulate and allocate budgets, and have acquisition
authority for warfighting needs.
[A] The act requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, to determine military unique
capabilities. The act defines "military-unique capabilities" as those
capabilities that, in the view of the Secretary of Defense, cannot be
provided by other federal, state, or local civilian agencies and that
are essential to provide support to civil authorities in an incident of
national significance or a catastrophic incident.
[B] Except for civil support missions specifically authorized by
statute such as counterdrug and civil support teams.
[C] The Secretary of Defense shall include in the plan for funding
capabilities, any additional capabilities determined by the Secretary
to be necessary to support the use of the active and reserve components
for homeland defense missions, domestic emergency responses, and
providing military support to civil authorities.
[End of table]
DOD Appropriations Fund the National Guard's Capabilities for
Warfighting Missions, but the Current Approach Does Not Fund Unique
Capabilities for Civil Support Missions:
Under the current approach, Congress funds the National Guard through
DOD's annual appropriation to provide the capabilities--such as
personnel, training, and equipment--required for the National Guard's
federal warfighting mission; however, federal funds have not typically
been provided to DOD specifically for the National Guard's civil
support missions unless directed by statute. Instead, DOD planning has
generally assumed that if the National Guard is prepared for its
warfighting role it is prepared to respond to a disaster or emergency
at home. Federal funding through DOD comprises more than 90 percent of
the National Guard's total funding, although states fund state-unique
equipment requirements--such as vehicles or radios--for their state
National Guard missions. Moreover, with the exception of two
statutorily established missions--the weapons of mass destruction civil
support teams and the counterdrug program[Footnote 20]--DOD does not
generally identify requirements for, formulate budgets and allocate
resources for, or acquire the personnel, training, and equipment needed
to support the National Guard's civil support missions that are likely
to be federally funded. Consistent with this strategy, DOD's current
policy[Footnote 21] prohibits, unless specifically authorized by the
Secretary of Defense, procuring or maintaining any supplies, materiel,
or equipment exclusively for providing military support to civil
authorities.
SOCOM Receives Funding from DOD Appropriations and Has Authority to
Identify Requirements, Allocate Resources, and Acquire Capabilities for
Its Missions:
SOCOM is a unified combatant command within DOD that receives funding
from DOD appropriations and has statutory authority[Footnote 22] to
validate and prioritize its unique requirements, allocate resources,
and acquire unique capabilities for its missions.[Footnote 23] SOCOM
organizes, trains, equips, and deploys combat-ready special operations
forces to regional combatant commands, subject to DOD approval and
civilian oversight.[Footnote 24] SOCOM's funding goes toward ongoing
operational activities; force enhancements; training; general support;
advanced research, development, test, and evaluation planning and
design; and headquarters management. However, the Services provide
SOCOM with military personnel, base operating support, and equipment
not unique to the special operations mission. Furthermore, SOCOM has
statutory authority to develop and acquire special operations-peculiar
equipment and to acquire material, supplies, and services for its
unique needs. To execute its authorities, SOCOM has developed a
strategic planning process for identifying and validating its
requirements for special operations-peculiar items, assigning
priorities, and allocating resources among its requirements. SOCOM
formulates its budget documentation, which identifies the items
required for its missions and allocates resources that remain within
its overall funding limits, and submits its budget to DOD for approval.
Additionally, any significant issues related to SOCOM's readiness
measures and status of its resources are reported to Congress on a
quarterly basis. While SOCOM's acquisition workforce manages and
acquires items for many small programs, it seeks to leverage existing
service acquisition processes whenever possible by relying on the
services to help manage larger programs. This approach provides SOCOM
the means to leverage resources and expertise that may not reside at
SOCOM, such as program management, engineering and technical services,
testing and evaluation support, and logistical support. For example, a
large program such as the Advanced SEAL Delivery System is funded by
SOCOM and executed by the Navy Acquisition Decision Authority.
An Alternative Approach to Funding the National Guard's Civil Support-
Unique Capabilities Modeled after SOCOM:
We examined the special authorities and funding approach used by SOCOM
to organize, train, equip, and deploy special operations forces to
develop an alternative funding approach that could be used to fund
National Guard unique requirements for civil support missions. Under
this approach the National Guard Bureau, although not a combatant
command like SOCOM, could be provided authority and funding to
organize, train, and equip National Guard forces with the unique
capabilities for large-scale, multistate civil support missions that
are expected to be federally funded--such as the events depicted in the
national planning scenarios. In this alternative approach, the National
Guard Bureau could also be provided the statutory authority to identify
requirements, formulate budgets, allocate resources, and acquire
capabilities for civil support missions, subject to DOD civilian
oversight and approval. Furthermore, to provide civilian oversight on
the National Guard Bureau's civil support role, an Office of the
Secretary of Defense-level office could be assigned responsibility for
oversight similar to the oversight role the Office of the Secretary of
Defense performs for SOCOM. The National Guard would maintain its
existing command and control relationships for civil support
operations.
Under this approach, the National Guard Bureau would receive funding
directly from DOD defensewide appropriations for civil support
capabilities--such as equipment, materiel, supplies, training, and
services--that are unique to the National Guard's federally funded
civil support missions. Current funding arrangements for the National
Guard's warfighting mission would remain the same, and DOD would
continue to pay for warfighting capabilities, including dual-use
capabilities required for the National Guard's civil support mission.
Furthermore, the National Guard Bureau would need to establish
memorandums of understanding with the Army and the Air Force to clearly
define what dual-use warfighting capabilities would be provided to the
National Guard by the Army and Air Force, and what capabilities are
unique to the civil support mission, similar to the agreements SOCOM
has with the services.
Under this approach, the National Guard Bureau would be required to
develop a rigorous analytical process to develop, identify, and
prioritize the National Guard's civil support-unique requirements,
similar to the strategic planning process developed by SOCOM. The
National Guard Bureau would also be required to develop a resource
allocation process to address its civil support-unique requirements
that includes planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes
designed to develop a budget request for civil support-unique
capabilities. Additionally, the National Guard Bureau would be required
to begin tracking and reporting on its performance through the
collection and reporting of readiness data that provides information on
the status of its personnel, training, and equipment for its civil
support missions that are likely to be federally funded and its
readiness to carry out these missions. Furthermore, the National Guard
Bureau would develop an acquisition workforce to develop, acquire, and
manage its civil support-unique capabilities while retaining the
ability to leverage existing service acquisition capabilities when it
is appropriate to do so.
The Coast Guard Receives Funding from DHS and DOD Appropriations and
Has Authority to Identify Requirements, Allocate Resources, and Acquire
Capabilities for Its DHS-Funded Missions:
The Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service within DHS
that receives funding from DHS and DOD, and has authority to identify
its unique requirements, allocate resources, and acquire unique
capabilities for its missions funded by DHS. The Coast Guard performs a
range of missions to meet multiple national goals, including law
enforcement, national defense, mobility, maritime safety, environmental
protection, and humanitarian response.[Footnote 25] Moreover, the Coast
Guard is also part of the armed forces and can operate as a specialized
service under the Navy in time of war or when directed by the
President.[Footnote 26] The Coast Guard and Navy have entered into
formal agreements to further define specific mission sets and clarify
the roles the Coast Guard is expected to perform when working for or
with the Navy.[Footnote 27]
The Coast Guard's statutory role as both a federal maritime agency and
a branch of the military allows the agency to receive funding from both
DHS and DOD. The Coast Guard receives more than 98 percent of its
funding through the annual DHS appropriation. Because of the Coast
Guard's need to work closely with the Navy and the possibility that it
may be brought under the military's control as part of the armed
forces, the Navy also provides equipment and funding to the Coast Guard
to keep it prepared and integrated with the Navy for national and
maritime defense missions such as maritime intercept operations, and
deployed port operations security and defense. Although the Navy is not
expressly required by law to provide funding to the Coast Guard, the
Navy provides funding from its appropriations because it is in the
Navy's interest that the Coast Guard's systems are compatible with the
Navy's systems when the Coast Guard is performing national defense
missions in support of the Navy. For example, the Coast Guard receives
funding from the Navy to purchase and maintain equipment, such as self-
defense systems or communication systems, needed to ensure the Coast
Guard is prepared to carry out assigned naval warfare tasks and
missions alongside Navy units.
For the Coast Guard, the source of the funding, either DHS or the Navy,
determines which agency conducts the planning, requirements
identification, and resource allocation for its missions. In accordance
with DHS planning, programming, and budgeting guidance and approval,
the Coast Guard is responsible for identifying and prioritizing
requirements for its maritime defense missions and for formulating
budgets and allocating resources using the funds provided through the
DHS appropriation. The Navy is responsible for identifying and
prioritizing requirements for the Coast Guard's national defense
missions, and the Navy is also responsible for formulating budgets and
allocating resources for the capabilities it provides to the Coast
Guard. While DHS has oversight authority over Coast Guard acquisitions
funded out of DHS's appropriations, the Navy has oversight authority
over the acquisition programs it funds and provides to the Coast Guard.
An Alternative Approach to Funding the National Guard's Civil Support-
Unique Capabilities Modeled after the Coast Guard:
We adapted the special authorities and funding approach used by the
Coast Guard to develop an alternative approach that could provide
funding to prepare the National Guard for large-scale civil support
missions. Under an alternative approach modeled after the Coast Guard,
DHS would have authority and would provide funding to the National
Guard Bureau to organize, train, and equip the National Guard with
unique capabilities for civil support missions. The National Guard
would maintain its existing command and control relationship for civil
support operations. The National Guard's dual status as a federal
military reserve under the command and control of the President and as
a state militia under the command and control of the state Governors
would not change. Under this approach, DHS would be responsible for
identifying unique requirements for the National Guard's civil support
missions that are expected to be federally funded. DHS also would be
responsible for formulating budgets for, allocating resources for, and
acquiring any related civil support-unique capabilities--such as
personnel, training, maintenance, and equipment items. In addition, DHS
would provide civilian oversight for these civil support policy and
resource decisions. Similar to the Navy's relationship with the Coast
Guard, DHS would not be required by law to provide funding to the
National Guard for its civil support missions, but rather would do so
under Secretary-level agreements between DOD and DHS, if and when it is
determined that it would be mutually beneficial to do so. Moreover, DHS
would be tasked to work with the National Guard and DOD to establish
standards for federal interagency integration and interoperability for
civil support missions, similar to current agreements between the Coast
Guard and Navy for warfighting missions.
Under this approach, DHS would provide the National Guard with funding
for its civil support-unique capabilities directly from the DHS
appropriation. DOD would continue to provide funding for the National
Guard's warfighting missions through its annual appropriation,
including dual-use capabilities required for the National Guard's civil
support mission. For example, the National Guard would still receive
DOD appropriations for military personnel, operation and maintenance,
and military construction. Furthermore, DOD, through the Army and Air
Force, would remain responsible for continuing to develop, identify,
and prioritize requirements for and organizing, training, and equipping
the National Guard for the federal warfighting mission. DOD also would
maintain responsibility for formulating budgets, allocating resources,
acquiring capabilities, and exercising civilian oversight over
capabilities needed for the National Guard's warfighting mission.
The 2008 NDAA Approach to Funding the National Guard's Civil Support-
Unique Capabilities:
The 2008 NDAA includes provisions that may fund certain National Guard
civil support capabilities, depending on how it is implemented by
DOD.[Footnote 28] This approach requires the Secretary of Defense to
(1) prepare and submit to Congress a plan for coordinating the use of
National Guard and active duty forces when responding to natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters as
identified in the national planning scenarios; (2) develop in the plan
two versions of the response to the scenarios--one using only members
of the National Guard and the other using both members of the National
Guard and members of the regular components of the armed forces; and
(3) to include in the plan, among other things, an identification of
the training and equipment needed for both National Guard personnel and
active duty forces to provide military assistance to civil authorities
and for other domestic operations to respond to hazards identified in
the national planning scenarios. While preparing this plan, DOD is to
consult with, among others, DHS and the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau and receive information the National Guard Bureau gathers from
Governors, Adjutants General, and other state civil authorities
responsible for preparing for and responding to disasters.
Additionally, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau will serve as a
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving the nonfederalized
National Guard forces.
The 2008 NDAA also requires the Secretary of Defense to determine
certain necessary civil support capabilities and develop and implement
a plan to fund them.[Footnote 29] Specifically, the Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, is to
identify the military-unique capabilities that DOD needs to provide to
support civil authorities during catastrophic incidents or incidents of
national significance.[Footnote 30] In addition, the 2008 NDAA directs
DOD to plan, over at least a 5-year time frame, how to fund and
resource these military-unique capabilities as well as any other
capabilities the Secretary of Defense determines to be necessary to
support the use of the active components and the reserve components of
the armed forces for homeland defense missions, domestic emergency
responses, and providing military support to civil authorities, and
request the funds in its budget materials to implement this
plan.[Footnote 31] The 2008 NDAA does not change DOD's civilian
oversight over policy or resource decisions affecting the National
Guard.
Another provision in the 2008 NDAA addresses reporting on the National
Guard's readiness for emergencies and major disasters.[Footnote 32]
First, the Secretary of Defense is to include in the annual report on
National Guard and reserve component equipment an assessment of the
extent to which the National Guard has the equipment required[Footnote
33] to respond to an emergency or major disaster. The assessment is to
identify shortfalls, if any, in equipment provided to the National
Guard by DOD that is likely to affect the ability of the National Guard
to carry out these responsibilities as well as an evaluation of the
effect of any such shortfalls; and an identification of the
requirements and investment strategies needed to reduce or eliminate
equipment shortfalls--if any exist. Second, the Secretary of Defense is
to begin including an assessment of the National Guard's readiness to
perform tasks required to support the National Response Plan for
support to civil authorities to Congress in its quarterly reports on
personnel and unit readiness. The Secretary is also required to make
any information from this assessment that is relevant to the National
Guard of a particular state available to that state's Governor and to
ensure that each Governor has the opportunity to provide an independent
evaluation of that state's National Guard to be included with the
Secretary's assessment. Finally, the Secretary of Defense is required
to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on actions
taken to implement the amendments in this section as part of the budget
justification materials for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. This report is
required to include a description of the mechanisms to be used by the
Secretary for assessing the personnel, equipment, and training
readiness of the National Guard, including standards and measures that
will be applied and mechanisms for sharing information on such matters
with the Governors of the states.
Guiding Principles Form a Basis for Assessing Funding Alternatives for
the National Guard's Civil Support Capabilities:
Guiding principles for creating a focus on results can form a basis for
efforts to develop, assess, and implement funding alternatives for the
National Guard's civil support capabilities. We identified seven
guiding principles to use in assessing whether funding alternatives
include the principles essential for the National Guard to be prepared
to effectively fulfill its dual roles in the new security environment.
We synthesized these principles from a review of GAO's prior work
examining key principles for creating a focus on results, National
Guard management challenges, and emergency preparedness issues. In
addition, we also examined policies and practices contained in the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.
Specifically, funding alternatives can be examined to determine whether
they: (1) maintain warfighting capability, readiness, and integration
with DOD; (2) maintain or strengthen civilian control of the military;
(3) involve responsible stakeholders; (4) promote improved interagency
planning; (5) support the formulation of coherent budgets; (6) provide
accountability and transparency; and (7) promote economy and
efficiency. We also held discussions with government officials and
defense and homeland security analysts to confirm that we identified
the principles that are important to use in evaluating funding
alternatives.
Maintain Warfighting Capability, Readiness, and Integration with DOD:
The first key principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess,
and implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil
support capabilities is to maintain the National Guard's warfighting
capabilities, readiness, and integration with DOD for its federal
warfighting role.[Footnote 34] The continuing importance of the
National Guard's federal warfighting missions makes it important that
alternatives for funding the National Guard's civil support
capabilities not detract from the National Guard's federal warfighting
capabilities, readiness, or its ability to integrate with its active
component counterparts when performing a federal mission. Since 2001,
more than 213,000 National Guard members, representing almost 46
percent of the National Guard, have been mobilized to support the
federal mission, with more than 55,000 mobilized more than once.
[Footnote 35] In addition to maintaining the National Guard's ability
to perform its statutorily required role as a federal reserve, this
principle is also consistent with creating a focus on results.
Specifically, we have previously reported that leading organizations
are able to respond effectively to multiple priorities[Footnote 36] and
that agencies often face a variety of interests whose competing demands
continually force policymakers and managers to balance quality, cost,
stakeholder concerns, and other principles. Similarly, the National
Guard needs to maintain readiness for its warfighting mission, which
competes with its need to maintain readiness for its domestic civil
support mission. Alternative funding approaches for the National
Guard's domestic civil support needs can be examined for the degree to
which they strike a balance in maintaining readiness for both its
federal warfighting mission and its domestic civil support mission.
Maintain or Strengthen Civilian Control of the Military:
The second key principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess,
and implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil
support capabilities is to maintain or strengthen civilian control of
the military. Maintaining or strengthening civilian control of the
military is a foundational principle of American democracy reflected in
the constitution and is also a policy stated in the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act. There are two general
categories of civilian control: (1) command and control of forces for
military operations, and (2) control over administrative matters such
as the allocation of resources. The potential for sizable National
Guard forces to conduct military operations in the United States
highlights the need for civilian leadership to be in control of such
military forces. In addition, the potential cost of building and
maintaining civil support capabilities could be significant and should
be subject to civilian oversight to ensure effective and efficient use
of resources. Alternative funding approaches for the National Guard's
civil support capabilities can be examined to determine whether they
will maintain or strengthen civilian control over military operations
as well as resource allocation decisions.
Involve Responsible Stakeholders to Ensure Alignment with National
Plans and Strategies:
A third key principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess, and
implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil support
capabilities is to involve responsible stakeholders to ensure alignment
with national plans and strategies. In performing its civil support
missions, the National Guard works with multiple federal and state
stakeholders that have responsibilities for different aspects of
emergency preparedness, such as the DHS, which has responsibility for
developing national plans and strategies. Substantive involvement of
these stakeholders in identifying requirements and operational
responsibilities is needed to ensure a coordinated response and
facilitate targeting of resources to meet critical needs. In our prior
work, we have found that successful organizations base their strategic
planning, to a large extent, on the interest and expectations of their
stakeholders.[Footnote 37] Stakeholder involvement is important to help
agencies ensure that their efforts and resources are targeted at the
highest priorities. At the federal level, stakeholders in the National
Guard's civil support missions include DHS--which is responsible for
developing national guidance for emergency preparedness, identifying
required capabilities for the national planning scenarios, and
developing a risk-management framework to guide investments--and DOD,
which executes domestic military missions and military support to U.S.
civil authorities. Funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil
support needs can be examined to determine whether they involve
stakeholders with responsibility for developing plans and strategies
affecting the National Guard's civil support missions, such as the
states, DHS, and DOD.
Promote Improved Interagency Planning for Emergency Preparedness and
Response:
A fourth key principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess,
and implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil
support capabilities is to promote improved interagency planning for
emergency preparedness and response. Interagency planning to identify
what capabilities the National Guard will be expected to provide is
critical to providing an efficient and effective response because the
National Guard's response to large-scale, multistate events may involve
a combination of state and local civilian authorities, National Guard
forces from across the nation operating in state status with federal
funding, federal civilian agencies such as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and federal military forces operating under the
command of DOD and the President. To identify the National Guard's
required capabilities for civil support missions, its plans must be
integrated with other responders' plans and account for the
contributions expected to be made by civil authorities as well as
federal military forces. Specifically, funding alternatives can be
evaluated to determine to what extent they will promote interagency
planning to define the following planning elements:
* the National Guard's role in the interagency division of labor for
emergency preparedness and response;
* the tasks the National Guard will be expected to lead or provide to
support other agencies;
* the risk-management framework that will guide strategies and
investments in the National Guard's civil support capabilities;
* who will establish standards for the National Guard's equipment,
skills, and capabilities for the civil support mission;
* how will readiness for the National Guard's civil support role be
measured;
* what costs for building and maintaining the National Guard's civil
support capabilities should be borne by federal, state, and local
governments or the private sector; and:
* the role of the National Guard Bureau and other multistate entities
likely to be involved in identifying requirements and funding
capabilities.
Support the Formulation of Coherent Budgets Based on Rigorous
Requirements Analysis, Identified Capability Gaps, and Investment
Priorities:
A fifth principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess, and
implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil support
capabilities is to support the formulation of coherent budgets that are
based on rigorous requirements analysis, identified capability gaps,
and investment priorities for the National Guard's civil support
mission. Having coherent budgets that are based on a rigorous analysis
of requirements that identifies gaps and investment and readiness
priorities for the National Guard's civil support capabilities would
provide assurance that resources are aligned with priorities and
capabilities are sustainable and affordable. The formulation of budgets
that are linked to strategic plans, identification of capability gaps,
and prioritization of investments are practices consistent with the
policy of creating a more efficient use of resources as stated in the
Goldwater-Nichols Act.[Footnote 38] The funding alternatives can be
examined to determine whether they support the formulation of a
coherent budget for the National Guard's civil support-unique needs
that are in the federal interest. Specifically, alternatives can be
evaluated to determine whether they will produce fully justified
budgets that program resources to meet identified requirements for the
National Guard's civil support mission that were developed using a
rigorous analytical process to assess requirements, identify gaps, and
set investment and readiness priorities for the National Guard's civil
support capabilities.
Provide Accountability and Transparency to Congress for Investments and
Performance:
A sixth principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess, and
implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil support
capabilities is to provide accountability and transparency to Congress
for investments in the National Guard's civil support capabilities and
the performance achieved in the form of civil support readiness. An
important aspect of accountability is to report program cost
information for investments in the National Guard's civil support-
unique capabilities and information about the performance achieved in
the form of civil support readiness. This reporting would provide the
transparency needed for Congressional oversight by enabling decision
makers to link expenditures of resources to outcomes and investments
made in the National Guard's civil support capabilities--such as its
personnel, training, and equipment--and the outcomes achieved from the
funding provided, such as the civil support readiness levels. Funding
alternatives can be evaluated to determine whether they require
reporting to Congress on investments made in the National Guard's civil
support capabilities--such as its personnel, training, and equipment--
and the outcomes achieved from the funding provided, such as the
National Guard's civil support readiness levels.
Promote Economy and Efficiency:
The seventh principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess, and
implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil support
capabilities is to promote economy and efficiency in building and
maintaining the National Guard's civil support capabilities. A funding
approach should emphasize increasing interoperability; pursuing joint
solutions; eliminating unnecessary duplication in other federal, state,
and local programs; promoting economies of scale; and ensuring that
capabilities are only situated in the National Guard if that is the
best federal solution to a requirement. This principle is consistent
with one of the stated policies of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which is
to provide for a more efficient use of defense resources. The funding
alternatives for the National Guard's civil support missions can be
evaluated to determine the extent to which they incorporate these
principles for achieving economy and efficiency.
Current Approach and Two Alternatives Do Not Fully Incorporate the
Guiding Principles, while the 2008 NDAA Partially Addresses All the
Principles:
The current approach to funding the National Guard's civil support
capabilities and the SOCOM and Coast Guard alternatives do not
incorporate all of the guiding principles we identified; the 2008 NDAA
approach partially addresses all the principles but how DOD implements
the provisions will determine whether the new approach will yield
results that are fully consistent with the principles. Our assessment
shows that while the current approach promotes economy and efficiency
by relying on existing warfighting equipment, it does not (1) involve
responsible stakeholders to align with national plans and strategies,
(2) promote integration and interoperability with civilian emergency
responders, or (3) formulate a coherent budget for the National Guard's
civil support needs that is based on a rigorous requirements analysis,
identified capability gaps, and established investment priorities. The
alternatives modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard would maintain the
National Guard's warfighting capability, readiness, and integration
with DOD, but neither is fully consistent with the guiding principles
and each could pose implementation issues. While the approach contained
in the 2008 NDAA has elements that address each of the principles, it
is unclear whether DOD will implement the approach in a manner that is
fully consistent with the principles.
The extent to which the current approach and the three funding
alternatives incorporate the guiding principles varies. Figure 1
summarizes our assessment of the extent to which the current approach,
the alternatives modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard, and the
provisions of the 2008 NDAA include the guiding principles we
identified as essential for the National Guard to fulfill both its
federal warfighting and civil support roles effectively.
Figure 1: GAO's Assessment of Extent to Which the Current Approach,
Alternative Approaches, and the Provisions of the 2008 NDAA Include
Guiding Principles:
[See PDF for image]
The following data is depicted in the figure:
Guiding principle (approach promotes): Warfighting readiness, and
integration with DOD;
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a large extent;
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a large
extent;
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Incorporates the principle to a
large extent;
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to a large
extent.
Guiding principle (approach promotes): Civilian control of the
military;
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a large extent;
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a large
extent;
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Incorporates the principle to a
large extent;
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to a large
extent.
Guiding principle (approach promotes): Federal stakeholder involvement
to encourage alignment with national plans and strategies;
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a little or no extent;
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a little or
no extent;
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Incorporates the principle to a
large extent;
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to a large
extent.
Guiding principle (approach promotes): Interagency planning,
collaboration and coordination with federal, state, and local partners;
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a little or no extent;
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a little or
no extent;
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Incorporates the principle to
some extent;
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to some extent.
Guiding principle (approach promotes): Formulation of coherent budgets
for the National Guard‘s civil support requirements;
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a little or no extent;
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a large
extent.
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Unclear;
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to some extent.
Guiding principle (approach promotes): Accountability and transparency
to Congress;
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a little or no extent;
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a large
extent.
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Unclear;
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to some extent.
Guiding principle (approach promotes): Economy and efficiency:
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to some extent;
Approach modeled after SOCOM:Incorporates the principle to some extent;
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Incorporates the principle to
some extent;
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to a large
extent.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
Current Funding Approach Does Not Fully Include All Guiding Principles:
The current approach addresses the guiding principles of maintaining
warfighting readiness and civilian control, but it does not fully
include the other five principles that are necessary for the National
Guard to be effective in its civil support role. The current approach
maintains the National Guard's warfighting capabilities, readiness, and
integration with DOD for the National Guard's federal warfighting
mission within available resources. DOD's planning assumption that if
the National Guard is prepared for its warfighting role, it is prepared
to respond to a disaster or emergency at home, focuses the department's
resources on its top priority--the federal warfighting mission. Because
it focuses on its warfighting missions, DOD has not developed
requirements for the National Guard's civil support roles and DOD
policy prohibits, unless specifically authorized by the Secretary of
Defense, procuring items solely for the military assistance to civil
authorities role. Furthermore, the current approach addresses the
guiding principle of maintaining civilian command and control over
military operations, which are provided by either Governors or the
President, and over resource decisions, which are provided by the
Secretaries of Defense, of the Army, and of the Air Force. These
officials are charged with overseeing matters related to the National
Guard, such as generating warfighting requirements, allocating
resources, and managing acquisition processes for the federal
warfighting mission.
However, the current approach does not incorporate five guiding
principles that are important to providing the National Guard with
capabilities it needs for its civil support missions. First, the
current approach does not involve key stakeholders to promote alignment
with national plans and strategies because its does not involve DHS,
which has lead responsibility for developing the National Response
Framework as well as setting investment priorities to build response
capabilities, and promoting standards for integration and
interoperability among emergency responders for the types of domestic
missions to which the National Guard will be responding and providing
support. Second, the current approach does not promote interagency
planning for the National Guard's role in state-led but federally
funded civil support missions. Neither DOD, DHS, nor the states are
comprehensively planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale,
multistate missions such as Hurricane Katrina that are likely to be
federally funded. Under the current approach, interagency planning for
the National Guard's role in state-led but federally funded civil
support missions does not take place because the legal authorities did
not assign clear responsibility for conducting planning for those
missions in which there is a shared state and federal interest. As a
result, important planning considerations remain undefined such as (1)
how tasks will be divided among interagency partners; (2) which tasks
the National Guard will lead and support; and (3) what level of risk
should guide strategic investments. Additionally, there is no explicit
requirement that the National Guard's civil support capabilities be
consistent with DHS efforts to promote integration and interoperability
standards among emergency responders. Third, under the current
approach, the formulation of coherent budgets that are supported by a
rigorous requirements analysis, identified capability gaps, and
investment priorities for the National Guard's federally funded civil
support role does not take place. DOD's approach is for National Guard
forces to respond to civil support missions with the warfighting
capabilities they have on hand and not to specifically allocate
resources to build and maintain capabilities for the civil support
mission. Fourth, the current approach does not provide accountability
and transparency to Congress for investments in the National Guard's
civil support capability and outcomes resulting from that investment.
As we reported in January 2007, DOD has taken some steps to measure the
National Guard's domestic preparedness, but currently there are no
readiness standards and measures for the National Guard's domestic
civil support missions.[Footnote 39] As a result, the extent to which
National Guard units are prepared to undertake potentially challenging
and important civil support missions, such as those contained in the
national planning scenarios, remains unknown. Finally, while the
current approach promotes economy by relying on existing warfighting
equipment, it may not promote efficiency or effectiveness in civil
support operations because it does not systematically generate
requirements, identify capability gaps, or set investment priorities
for civil support missions that are likely to be federally funded.
Approach Modeled after SOCOM Includes Some but Not All Guiding
Principles and Could Pose Implementation Issues:
The alternative approach modeled after SOCOM for funding the National
Guard's civil support capabilities includes four of the seven guiding
principles, but it is not fully consistent with the other three guiding
principles and could pose implementation issues. First, the SOCOM
approach would maintain the National Guard's warfighting capability,
readiness, and integration with DOD within available resources because
DOD and the services would retain responsibility for these tasks.
Second, the approach would provide civilian oversight over the National
Guard's efforts to establish requirements, allocate resources, and
acquire civil support-peculiar capabilities through oversight by the
Secretary of Defense similar to the oversight the Secretary provides
for SOCOM. Third, the approach would support the formulation of
coherent budgets because the National Guard would implement a strategic
planning process to generate requirements for its civil support
missions that is similar to the strategic planning process SOCOM uses
to generate budgets for its unique capabilities. This process would
enable the National Guard to assesses its civil support requirements,
identify any gaps, and set readiness and investment priorities. Fourth,
the approach modeled after SOCOM would provide accountability and
transparency to Congress for investments in the National Guard's unique
civil support capabilities and the resulting readiness produced with
this investment because it would produce fully justified budget
exhibits and readiness reports to Congress.
However, the approach modeled after SOCOM did not fully include three
of the guiding principles. While the approach modeled after SOCOM
promotes economy and efficiency through the use of the strategic
planning and acquisition processes, it does not include provisions to
prevent duplicating civil support capabilities in the National Guard
that can or should be provided by other federal or state responders.
While the approach would seek to balance the National Guard's resources
between short-and long-term needs and look for procurement solutions
that are joint, standardized, and interoperable with the DOD, it would
not systematically promote economy and efficiency because it does not
involve civilian stakeholders, such as DHS, in identifying
requirements. The involvement of these stakeholders could prevent
duplicating capabilities provided by other state and local responders
in the National Guard and ensure that situating the capability in the
National Guard is the most efficient and effective solution. In
addition, the approach modeled after SOCOM also is not consistent with
the principle of involving responsible stakeholders in that it would
not systematically involve non-DOD stakeholders, such as DHS and the
states, to ensure the National Guard's efforts are consistent with
national plans and strategies, its capabilities are integrated and
interoperable with civilian responders, or that it is consistent with
national investment priorities for homeland security.
Government officials and defense and homeland security analysts with
whom we spoke pointed out several lessons learned from implementing
SOCOM's authorities that could be useful when considering such a model
for the National Guard's civil support requirements:
* The SOCOM experience demonstrated that the responsibility for
providing resources for dual-use capabilities needs to be clearly
defined. Officials stated that agreements between SOCOM and the
services have been invaluable in ensuring service support for common
items especially during times when the services are facing budget
pressures. The National Guard would need to establish similar
memorandums of understanding with the Army and the Air Force in order
to clearly define what dual use equipment and training the services
intend to provide to the National Guard.
* Developing a strategic planning process to produce fully justified
budgets takes time. Although SOCOM was established in 1987, the command
did not submit fully supported budget documents until 1991.
* Determining the correct size of the acquisition workforce is
important. If the National Guard Bureau is assigned responsibilities
similar to those of SOCOM, it may need more personnel or personnel with
different skills. The National Guard would need to conduct a manpower
study similar to the study currently being conducted by SOCOM to
determine the appropriate number and mix of personnel for its
workforce.
* To promote economy and efficiency, the National Guard should leverage
the personnel and expertise that the services can provide wherever
feasible. For example, the National Guard could avoid costs by relying
on the services, which have existing expertise in areas such as program
management, engineering and technical services, testing and evaluation
support, and logistical support that could be useful for building the
National Guard's civil support capabilities.
The approach modeled after SOCOM could be modified to incorporate more
of the guiding principles. In particular, the approach could be
constructed to promote alignment with national plans and strategies--
such as the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National
Response Framework--interagency planning, and integration and
interoperability among civilian responders by requiring systematic
involvement of stakeholders such as DHS and the states.
Approach Modeled after the Coast Guard Includes Some but Not All
Guiding Principles and Could Pose Implementation Issues:
The funding approach for the National Guard's civil support
capabilities modeled after the Coast Guard's relationship with the Navy
includes three of the seven guiding principles, but it only partially
addresses the other four guiding principles and could pose
implementation issues. First, this approach would maintain the National
Guard's warfighting capability, readiness, and integration with DOD
within available resources because DOD and the services would retain
responsibility for these tasks. Second, the approach would also
maintain or strengthen civilian control over the National Guard because
it would not change the operational command and control of the National
Guard or DOD's civilian oversight over administrative resource
decisions to develop its warfighting capabilities. In addition, under
this alternative approach, DHS would be able to provide civilian
oversight for efforts to establish requirements, allocate resources,
and acquire civil support-unique capabilities for the National Guard.
Third, the approach would involve responsible stakeholders and align
with national plans and strategies because DHS would be responsible for
identifying civil support requirements for the National Guard that are
in the federal interest. Since DHS has the responsibility for working
with federal, state, and local responders to identify needs and gaps,
DHS would be able to identify roles and responsibilities for the
National Guard that are needed to respond to the national planning
scenarios that are also consistent with the National Strategy for
Homeland Security and the National Response Framework. Additionally,
the Coast Guard approach would promote integration and interoperability
with civilian responders because DHS has responsibility for promoting
standards for integration and interoperability for organizations with
homeland security missions. Under this approach, DHS's funding
transfers to the National Guard could address the personnel, training,
and equipment needs of state National Guard units to better communicate
with other federal, state, and local emergency response authorities
across jurisdictional lines during a large-scale, multistate event.
[Footnote 40]
However, this approach modeled after the Coast Guard does not fully
include four of the guiding principles. First, this approach would
partially address the guiding principle of promoting interagency
planning, collaboration and coordination. Although DOD and DHS would
engage in strategic planning for catastrophic natural disasters and
terrorist events with states and federal agencies, the approach would
not require DOD or DHS to conduct operational planning to identify
specific capabilities the National Guard would need to fulfill its
civil support missions. Second, it is not clear whether the approach
would support the formulation of coherent budgets for the National
Guard that use rigorous, analytical processes to assess requirements,
identify gaps, and set investment priorities for the civil support role
because the approach does not require DHS to develop a specific budget
for the National Guard's civil support-unique needs. Third, it is
unclear whether the approach would provide accountability and
transparency to Congress for investments DHS makes in the National
Guard's civil support-unique needs because the approach would rely on
voluntary reporting and may not produce budget justification reports
for Congress explaining how the funds would be used towards the
National Guard's civil support mission or report on domestic readiness
levels achieved with the provided funds. In addition, DOD has yet to
fully define its process and measures for assessing the National
Guard's domestic readiness, and DHS is still in the process of
developing its own agencywide readiness system. As a result, it is
unclear how DOD's efforts to measure the National Guard's readiness for
its domestic civil support missions would be integrated into DHS's
larger effort to measure national preparedness. Finally, the approach
modeled after the Coast Guard does not fully incorporate the principle
of promoting economy and efficiency. The approach encourages economy by
creating an incentive for DHS to provide funding to situate
capabilities in the National Guard only if they determine it is the
most effective and efficient solution to a civil support capability gap
that is in the federal interest. However, the approach does not fully
promote efficiency because it does not require DHS to consult with DOD
or the National Guard Bureau or obtain their advice and expertise on
how to best leverage existing DOD and National Guard capabilities that
could be used for civil support missions and make the best use of
existing federal investments in the National Guard.
Government officials and defense and homeland security analysts with
whom we spoke pointed out some potential issues that could arise in
implementing the funding approach modeled after the Coast Guard:
* DHS's existing processes to determine requirements are not yet fully
developed and may not be able to fully perform the type of detailed
planning needed to identify specific personnel, training, and equipment
requirements for the National Guard for several years.
* This approach would establish the National Guard as a new competitor
for DHS's emergency preparedness funds, and this competition would have
an effect on both the National Guard and other DHS agencies. For
example, under this approach DHS might reallocate resources intended
for the National Guard to other departmental priorities, such as border
security, transportation security, and immigration and customs
enforcement.[Footnote 41] Conversely, DHS funding for the National
Guard could reduce funds available for other DHS agencies and for the
DHS grant program to build state and local preparedness.
The funding alternative modeled after the Coast Guard could be modified
to include more of the guiding principles by requiring the National
Guard Bureau to be involved in generating the National Guard's civil
support requirements. The National Guard Bureau could advise DHS on how
to leverage the existing federal investment in the National Guard's
warfighting capability to achieve greater economy as well as to improve
interagency planning for the National Guard's role in domestic
missions. In addition, involving the National Guard Bureau in
determining its civil support requirements could also provide valuable
military planning expertise to DHS as it begins to develop a
requirements process for the domestic emergency preparedness mission.
Furthermore, although the approach modeled after the Coast Guard
assumes that DHS would not be required by law to fund the National
Guard, the Congress could modify the approach to require DHS to fund
the National Guard's civil support capabilities and produce fully
justified budgets for the National Guard's civil support mission
requirements.
Approach in the 2008 NDAA Addresses All of the Guiding Principles in
Part, but Cannot Be Fully Assessed Until DOD Implements Its Provisions:
The approach established by the provisions in the 2008 NDAA addresses,
at least in part, all the guiding principles we identified as essential
for the National Guard to be prepared to effectively fulfill its dual
roles, but it is unclear whether DOD's implementation of the act's
provisions will yield results that are fully consistent with the
guiding principles.[Footnote 42] First, this approach maintains
civilian control over the National Guard because it does not include
any changes to operational command and control of National Guard forces
during domestic civil support missions. In addition, the approach
maintains civilian administrative control over resource decisions
because it gives the Secretary of Defense responsibility for generating
requirements and allocating resources for DOD's--which includes the
National Guard's--civil support requirements.
Second, the approach promotes the involvement of responsible
stakeholders by including provisions to involve state, National Guard
Bureau, and DHS officials in planning to identify the capabilities the
National Guard will need for its civil support missions. According to
the 2008 NDAA provisions, the President shall establish a Council of
Governors to advise the Secretary of Defense on matters related the
National Guard and civil support missions.[Footnote 43] The act also
directs the Secretary to consult with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and others as DOD
plans for coordinating both the National Guard and members of the armed
forces when responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism and
other man-made disasters as identified in the national planning
scenarios. In addition, DOD is directed to consult with DHS as it
determines its civil support requirements, and develop and implement a
plan and budget request for the military-unique capabilities DOD--which
includes the National Guard--needs to support civil authorities in an
incident of national significance or a catastrophic incident. However,
it is unclear whether DOD's implementation of the act's provisions will
yield results that are fully consistent with the guiding principles.
For example, it is unclear whether DOD's consultations with DHS will
result in the alignment of DOD's planned investment priorities for the
National Guard's civil support capabilities, if any, with DHS's risk-
management framework for emergency preparedness and response.
Similarly, it is unclear whether the extent of coordination and
consultation between DOD and DHS will be sufficient to promote the goal
of integration and interoperability within the civilian responder
community.
Third, the 2008 NDAA includes provisions that partially promote
accountability and transparency over investments in the National
Guard's civil support needs because it directs DOD to include, in its
annual budget submission, funding requests for military-unique
capabilities DOD needs to be able to provide to support civil
authorities. The approach also includes additional reporting
requirements that will aid Congress in its oversight role.
Specifically, DOD is to report annually[Footnote 44] on: whether the
National Guard has any equipment shortfalls likely to affect its
ability to perform its responsibilities[Footnote 45] in an emergency or
major disaster, the effect of any shortfalls on the National Guard's
capacity to respond, and DOD's requirements and investment strategies
to reduce or eliminate shortfalls. In addition, DOD is required to
include reports on the National Guard's readiness to perform tasks
required to support civil authorities during events envisioned by the
National Response Plan in its quarterly reports on personnel and unit
readiness.[Footnote 46] However, until DOD implements these provisions,
it is not clear to what extent DOD's readiness reporting will address
the National Guard's readiness for large-scale, multistate missions
that are state-led but federally funded.
Fourth, the approach creates incentives to promote economy and
efficiency in several ways. The approach seeks to avoid duplicating
capabilities of other responders by requiring DOD to identify military-
unique capabilities that cannot be provided by other federal, state, or
local civilian agencies. Additionally, the approach seeks to ensure
these requirements are in the federal interest by requiring DOD to
determine whether they are essential for providing civil support in an
incident of national significance or catastrophic incident--support
that is likely to be federally funded. Furthermore, the approach
creates an incentive for DOD to rely on dual-use solutions that
maximize the use of warfighting capabilities because it requires DOD to
fund military-unique capabilities out of its budget. Lastly, by making
DOD responsible for determining requirements, the approach would
promote economy and efficiency overall by leveraging DOD's existing
processes that seek to evaluate options for providing needed
capabilities, such as implementing changes to its organization or
training or considering the need to acquire new items.
However, DOD's implementation will determine the extent to which the
approach yields results that are consistent with the guiding
principles. First, until DOD's implementation occurs, it is not clear
the extent to which the National Guard's warfighting capability,
readiness, and integration with DOD will be maintained. DOD, which has
primary responsibility for the warfighting mission, is in charge of
implementing the new provisions to identify requirements and fund
DOD's--which includes the National Guard's--military-unique
capabilities for civil support. However, at this time, it is unclear
what the nature and extent of the military unique requirements will be
and the extent to which DOD will be able to rely on dual-use forces and
equipment to fulfill them. To the extent that DOD identifies
requirements for military-unique capabilities that can not be filled
with its existing warfighting capabilities, there is potential for
these new civil support-unique requirements to compete with DOD's
warfighting priorities, and it is unclear how DOD will balance these
priorities while maintaining the National Guard's preparedness for both
missions. Second, until DOD implements the new approach, it is not
clear whether the approach in the 2008 NDAA will result in the
formulation of coherent budgets for the National Guard's civil support
requirements. While the NDAA directs DOD to include funding requests
for certain civil support capabilities in the annual budget submission,
it does not require DOD to develop a specific budget for the National
Guard's civil support requirements in state-led but federally funded
missions. In addition, it is not clear how DOD will involve the
National Guard, even though the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has
been designated as a principal advisor on matters involving
nonfederalized National Guard forces, in determining military-unique
civil support requirements and funding priorities. Third, several
provisions of the approach promote interagency planning, collaboration,
and coordination by requiring DOD to consult with DHS and by providing
a mechanism through the Council of Governors to provide advice to the
federal stakeholders about the National Guard and its civil support
missions. However, until DOD implements these provisions, the extent to
which DOD will consider the input its interagency partners provide and
align its efforts to build the National Guard's capabilities with
national plans, strategies, and integration standards for the National
Guard's civil support missions will remain unclear.
Conclusions:
Planning and funding for the National Guard's civil support missions
has traditionally been considered a state responsibility, although the
states have relied on the warfighting capabilities provided to the
National Guard by DOD to perform these missions. However, since
September 11, 2001, the National Guard has played a key role in
responding to catastrophic natural disasters and homeland security-
related events of national significance, demonstrating the shared
interest of the states and federal government in preparing the National
Guard to conduct these civil support missions as efficiently and
effectively as possible. The absence of rigorous planning to determine
the personnel, training, and equipment the National Guard would need to
respond to events that are likely to be state-led but federally funded
means that the nation does not know the extent to which the National
Guard is adequately prepared for its crucial role. Until DOD completes
the planning and develops a funding request for civil support
capabilities as required by the 2008 NDAA, it is not clear to what
extent its plan and funding request will provide the National Guard
with the capabilities it requires for its role in state-led but
federally funded missions. This could place the nation at risk of
having a key part of its safety net less prepared than it should be in
the event of a terrorist attack or catastrophe affecting the American
people at home.
While the funding approach for the National Guard's civil support needs
contained in the 2008 NDAA addresses to some extent all of the guiding
principles we identified as important to preparing the National Guard
for its dual roles, it is not clear how DOD will implement some of its
provisions. Specifically, until the Secretary of Defense assesses DOD's
civil support requirements, determines the capabilities it needs to
provide, if any, and develops and implements a plan to provide these
capabilities, the National Guard may not be adequately prepared for its
critical civil support role. An effective and efficient National Guard
that is fully prepared to respond to civil support missions may reduce
the demand for federal forces, which are currently in high demand for
overseas missions. Furthermore, in the absence of an assessment of how
DOD's planned investment priorities for its civil support capabilities
align with DHS's risk-management framework for emergency preparedness
and response and its standards for integration and interoperability,
DOD may be unable to make the best use of existing federal investments
in the National Guard. Integration of the National Guard's capabilities
with those of civil authorities as well as federal military forces is
critical to providing an efficient and effective response. Finally,
without input, advice, and expertise from state and federal
stakeholders such as DHS and the National Guard Bureau, DOD may be
unable to leverage existing DOD and National Guard capabilities that
could be used for civil support missions efficiently and effectively.
DOD's involvement of these stakeholders can help DOD ensure that its
efforts and resources are targeted at the highest priorities, while
helping the department balance its competing demands against available
resources. Since DOD has not yet begun implementing the 2008 NDAA, it
is too early to determine whether the 2008 NDAA will yield results
fully consistent with the guiding principles. Until an approach is
implemented that is consistent with the guiding principles, the
National Guard may not be prepared to effectively and efficiently
fulfill its dual state and federal roles.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To assist congressional oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense include information in materials accompanying its fiscal year
2010 budget submission on the steps the department has taken to
incorporate the guiding principles in its implementation of the
provisions contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008. Specifically, DOD should include information on:
(1) the analytical process used to formulate the department's funding
request for the capabilities needed to support civil authorities in an
incident of national significance or a catastrophic incident including
how it identified requirements, assessed capability gaps, and set
investment priorities; and:
(2) its assessment of the extent to which DOD's civil support
investment priorities are consistent with DHS's risk-management
framework for emergency preparedness and response and DHS efforts to
promote standards for integration and interoperability among civilian
responders.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written
comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in their
entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments which we
have included as appropriate. In general, DOD agreed with our
recommendations. It agreed to provide information on the analytical
process used to formulate DOD's civil support funding request with the
2010 budget submission. However, in its comments, DOD noted that an
assessment of how DOD civil support investment priorities are
consistent with DHS's risk-management framework can be provided to the
extent that DHS has articulated its risk-management framework and DOD
agrees with that framework. DHS reviewed the draft and did not provide
comments.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from its date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-4402. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To conduct our work, we analyzed data, reviewed documentation, and
interviewed officials from the Department of Defense's (DOD) Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas
Security Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM), the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard,
the Air National Guard, and the State Adjutants General of Oregon and
Washington. In addition we analyzed data, reviewed documentation and
interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Military Advisor's Office, Office of Operations Coordination, and
Office of the Chief Financial Officer and the Coast Guard's Office of
Cutter Forces and the Directorate for Planning, Resources, and
Procurement. We also consulted with defense and homeland security
analysts at the Center for American Progress, the Center for a New
American Security, the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
the Heritage Foundation, the National Emergency Management Association,
and the National Governors Association.
To identify the extent to which key federal stakeholders have
undertaken planning to determine the capabilities the National Guard
needs for its state-led but federally funded civil support role, we
reviewed our prior work examining National Guard domestic equipment
requirements and readiness, catastrophic disaster response, and the
military response to Hurricane Katrina. To determine the extent of DOD
planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale multistate events
that are state-led but federally funded, we reviewed DOD strategy,
policy, and planning documents including DOD's Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support; DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to
Civil Authorities; and The Illustrative Homeland Defense and Civil
Support Multi-Service Force Deployment, Civil Support Annex, Volume I.
In addition, we reviewed reports and hearing transcripts of the
Commission on National Guard and Reserves. To determine the extent of
DHS planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale multistate
events that are federally funded, we reviewed key strategy and planning
documents including the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security,
the DHS National Response Framework, the Homeland Security Council's
National Planning Scenarios, and the DHS Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2
Report. To determine the extent of state planning for the National
Guard's role in large-scale multistate events that are federally
funded, we reviewed our prior work examining National Guard domestic
equipment requirements and readiness, National Guard Regulations, such
as NGR 500-1 Military Support to Civil Authorities, and interviewed
officials responsible for reviewing state National Guard plans at the
National Guard Bureau. In addition, we reviewed laws and legislative
histories governing the National Guard and its civil support role and
discussed these with the DOD General Counsel and the National Guard
Bureau Office of the Judge Advocate.
To determine the funding approach currently used for the National
Guard's civil support capabilities and how the alternative funding
approaches--modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard--could be applied
to the National Guard, we reviewed documents, interviewed government
officials and defense and homeland security analysts listed above, and
analyzed information on National Guard, SOCOM, and Coast Guard roles
and responsibilities for identifying capability requirements,
allocating resources, and acquiring capabilities. We analyzed
information on the two SOCOM and Coast Guard models and developed
proposals for how similar roles and responsibilities for identifying
requirements, allocating resources, and acquiring capabilities could be
applied to the National Guard to build the National Guard's civil
support capabilities that are in the federal interest. In addition, we
reviewed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 to
identify the roles and responsibilities set forth in the act for
planning and funding for the National Guard's civil support
capabilities.
To determine what guiding principles should be considered when
developing, assessing, and implementing alternatives for the National
Guard's capabilities for its state-led but federally funded civil
support missions, we consulted internal GAO stakeholders, performed
content analysis of GAO guidance and prior work examining best
practices in enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal
agencies, achieving results-oriented government, and internal controls.
In addition, we reviewed key findings from our recent work examining
National Guard and emergency preparedness issues. We then synthesized
the findings of these reports and guidance to develop seven guiding
principles relevant to the audit objectives. We discussed and refined
these guiding principles based on our discussions with government
officials and defense and homeland security analysts. We used
professional judgment and audit liaison assistance to identify
government officials from DOD and DHS with knowledge of National Guard
civil support issues. We identified the government officials and
defense and homeland security analysts with expertise on the National
Guard, Coast Guard, Special Operations, and homeland security by
researching defense and homeland security databases, conducting Web
searches, and reviewing published writings to identify individuals with
background relevant to the audit objectives. We used a standard set of
questions to interview each of the government officials and defense and
homeland security analysts to ensure we consistently discussed the
seven guiding principles, the current National Guard funding approach,
and the alternatives modeled after those used by SOCOM and the Coast
Guard.
We then assessed the current National Guard funding approach, the two
alternatives modeled after the SOCOM and the Coast Guard, and the
provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 against the guiding principles we developed. To refine our
analysis, we consulted with the government officials and defense and
homeland security analysts identified above using a standard set of
questions to obtain their opinions on the extent to which the current
approach and the proposed alternatives are consistent with the guiding
principles for creating a focus on results. Because the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 became public law late
in our review, we used our professional judgment to assess the act's
provisions and did not consult with government officials and defense
and homeland security analysts on our assessment.
We conducted our review from February 2007 to April 2008 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Reserve Affairs:
1500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-1500:
April 2, 2008:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-08-311, "Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard
Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend on DoD's Implementation
of the Provisions of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act,"
dated March 4, 2008 (GAO Code 350938).
DoD appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the draft
report. The Department partially concurs with the recommendation.
Detailed comments are attached. For further questions please contact
the primary action officer within DoD for this report, LTC John
Fortune. He can be reached at (703) 693-2229.
Sincerely,
Signed by: [Illegible] for:
T. F. Hall:
Attachment: As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated March 4, 2008:
GAO Code 350938/GAO-08-311:
"Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support
Missions May Depend on DoD's Implementation of the Provisions of the
2008 National Defense Authorization Act"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendation:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
include information in materials accompanying its FY 2010 budget
submission on the steps the Department has taken to incorporate the
guiding principles in its implementation of the provisions contained in
the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2008. Specifically, DoD
should include information on:
(1) the analytical process used to formulate the Department's funding
request for the capabilities needed to support civil authorities in an
incident of national significance or catastrophic incidents including
how it identified requirements, assessed capability gaps, and set
investment priorities; and;
(2) its assessment of the extent to which DoD's civil support
investment priorities are consistent with Department of Homeland
Security's risk management framework for emergency preparedness and
response and Department of Homeland Security efforts to promote
standards for integration and interoperability among civilian
responders.
DOD Response: Overall, the Department partially concurs with the
recommendation.
Concur with Part 1. The information can be provided with the 2010
budget submission to describe formulation of the budget request for
civil support.
Partially Concur with Part 2. An assessment of how DoD Civil Support
investment priorities are consistent with the Department of Homeland
Security's risk management can be provided to the extent that the
Department of Homeland Security has articulated their risk management
framework, and to the extent DoD agrees with that framework.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant
Director; Renee Brown; Eugene Gray; Nicole Harms; Shvetal Khanna;
Stephanie Moriarty; Jay Smale; John Van Schaik; and Suzanne Wren made
major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern
Command's Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, But
Gaps Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-252].
Washington, D.C.: forthcoming.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to
Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]. Washington,
D.C.: forthcoming.
Defense Acquisitions: An Analysis of the Special Operations Command's
Management of Weapon System Programs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-620]. Washington, D.C.: June
28, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
386T]. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
301]. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-235R]. Washington, D.C.:
November 17, 2006.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic
Equipment Requirements and Readiness. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60]. Washington, D.C.: January
26, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st
Century Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
06-1109T]. Washington D.C.: September 21, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618]. Washington, D.C.:
September 6, 2006.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but
Accountability, Funding, and Communications Need to be Clearer and
Focused Departmentwide. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1042]. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2006.
Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support
Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-498]. Washington, D.C.: May
31, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-643]. Washington, D.C.: May
15, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-467T]. Washington, D.C.:
February 23, 2006.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment
Need to be Reexamined. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-170T]. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment
Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation
Initiatives. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-111].
Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2005.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15]. Washington, D.C: October
21, 2005.
Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Risk-
Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-13]. Washington, D.C.:
November 15, 2005.
Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-652]. Washington, D.C.: July
11, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for
Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-21]. Washington, D.C.:
November 10, 2004.
Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas
and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-670T]. Washington, D.C.: April
29, 2004.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for
Domestic Military Missions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-03-670]. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. Washington,
D.C.: November 1999.
Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance
and Results Act. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-
96-118]. Washington, D.C.: June 1996.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National
Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-21] (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
10, 2004), 30.
[2] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60] (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
26, 2007).
[3] For the purposes of this report, the term "current approach" refers
to the funding approach DOD used before the enactment of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.
[4] Pub. L. No. 110-181 (2008).
[5] Section 351 of the 2008 NDAA amended 10 U.S.C. § 482 by adding this
requirement.
[6] Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-433, §3 (1986).
[7] National Guard members train for their federal missions under state
control with federal funding. Federal laws also authorize federal
funding for some other state-controlled missions, such as the National
Guard's counterdrug support operations and weapons of mass destruction
civil support teams.
[8] Pub. L. No. 110-181, §§1811, 1812, and 1813 (2008).
[9] The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101
(2002).
[10] The states have entered into mutual assistance agreements, such as
the Emergency Management Assistance Compact to provide cross-border
assistance, including National Guard forces, when an event exceeds a
state's capacity to respond.
[11] Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, §3 (1986).
[12] 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 3062, 8013 and 8062.
[13] Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101 (2002).
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60].
[15] The national planning scenarios are: Nuclear detonation,
biological attack, biological disease outbreak/pandemic flu, the
plague, chemical attack--blister agent, chemical attack--toxic
industrial chemicals, chemical attack--nerve agent, chemical attack--
chlorine tank explosion, major hurricane, major earthquake,
radiological attack--radiological dispersal device, explosives attack-
-bombing using improvised explosive device, biological attack--food
contamination, biological attack--foreign animal disease, and cyber
attack.
[16] This Incident Management Planning Team, established in 2006 in
response to recommendations made in The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina Lessons Learned report, provides contingency and crisis-action
incident-management planning in support of the DHS national-level
domestic incident-management responsibilities.
[17] According to DHS's National Preparedness Guidance, the planning
scenarios illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale,
catastrophic emergency events for which the nation needs to be
prepared.
[18] Responsibilities for implementing the national preparedness goals
fall to each federal, state, and local entity with a role in homeland
security preparedness.
[19] Pub. L. No. 110-181, §1814 (2008).
[20] The weapons of mass destruction civil support teams involve
members of the National Guard serving full-time and performing duties
in support of emergency preparedness programs to prepare for or to
respond to any emergency involving the use of a weapon of mass
destruction or a threatened or actual terrorist attack in the United
States that results, or could result in a catastrophic loss of life or
property. 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c). The counterdrug program involves using
National Guard personnel in drug interdiction and counter-drug law
enforcement activities, including drug demand reduction activities,
authorized by the law of states and requested by state Governors. (32
U.S.C. § 112.)
[21] DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (Jan.
15, 1993).
[22] 10 U.S.C. § 167.
[23] SOCOM's special operations forces perform several tasks, which
include strategic reconnaissance, direct action, unconventional
warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, humanitarian
assistance, theater search and rescue, psychological operations, and
civil affairs operations.
[24] The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict provides "the overall supervision, including
oversight of policy and resources, of special operations activities and
low intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense," and is
the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on these
activities.
[25] The Coast Guard has 11 mission areas: Search and Rescue; Marine
Safety; Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Illegal Drug
Interdiction; Undocumented Migrant Interdiction; Defense Readiness;
Other Law Enforcement; Marine Environmental Protection; Living Marine
Resources; Aids to Navigation; and Ice Operations. For purposes of
congressional oversight, Congress has designated five of these areas--
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Drug Interdiction; Migrant
Interdiction; Defense Readiness; and Other Law Enforcement--as homeland
security missions in 6 U.S.C. §468.
[26] 14 U.S.C. § 1, 3.
[27] The formal agreements include, for example, the 2004 memorandum of
agreement between DOD and DHS for the inclusion of the U.S. Coast Guard
in support of maritime homeland defense and the 2006 memorandum of
agreement between DOD and DHS for DOD support to the United States
Coast Guard for maritime homeland security.
[28] Pub. L. No. 110-181 §1814 (2008).
[29] Pub. L. No. 110-181 §1815 (2008).
[30] The act defines "military-unique capabilities" as those
capabilities that, in the view of the Secretary of Defense, cannot be
provided by other federal, state, or local civilian agencies and that
are essential to provide support to civil authorities in an incident of
national significance or a catastrophic incident.
[31] Pub. L. No. 110-181 §1815 (2008).
[33] Pub. L. No. 110-181 §351 (2008), which amends 10 U.S.C. §10541(b)
and 10 U.S.C. §482.
[34] The Secretary is to assess the extent to which the National Guard
possesses the equipment to perform the responsibilities under 10 U.S.C.
§§331, 332, 333, 12304(b) and 12406 in response to an emergency or
major disaster as such terms are defined in 42 U.S.C. §5122, the Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Act.
[34] Capabilities are defined as trained personnel and their associated
equipment that are capable of achieving a desired military outcome.
Readiness is achieved through the application of resources such as
personnel, training, and equipment over time. Integration refers to the
ability of forces to effectively operate together.
[35] Defense Science Board, Final Report of the Defense Science Board
Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve
in the Global War on Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
September 2007), p. 8.
[36] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 1996), p. 25.
[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118], p.
14.
[38] Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, §§ 3,153 (1986).
[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60].
[40] In a catastrophic event, effective interoperable communications
among responders is vastly more complicated than an event that is
limited to a single jurisdiction or immediately adjacent jurisdictions
because, as happened after Hurricane Katrina, the response involves
civilian and military responders from the federal government as well as
responders from various state and local governments who provide help
under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact among states.
[41] DHS funding could be directed to other departmental priorities
among the components, such as: the Directorate of Science and
Technology, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the Transportation
Security Administration, United States Customs and Border Protection,
and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
[42] We did not consult with government officials and defense and
homeland security analysts about our assessment of its provisions
because the 2008 NDAA became a public law late in our review.
[43] Pub. L. No. 110-181 §1822 (2008).
[44] Section 351 of the 2008 NDAA amended 10 U.S.C. §10541(b) by adding
these reporting requirements to the requirements for DOD's annual
report on the National Guard and reserve component.
[45] The Secretary is to assess the extent to which the National Guard
possesses the equipment to perform the responsibilities under 10 U.S.C.
§§331, 332, 333, 12304(b) and 12406 in response to an emergency or
major disaster as such terms are defined in 42 U.S.C. §5122, the Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Act.
[46] Section 351 of the 2008 NDAA amended 10 U.S.C. § 482 by adding
this requirement. Since the act was written, DHS has published a new
National Response Framework which replaces the National Response Plan.
[End of section]
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