Internet Sales
Undercover Purchases on eBay and Craigslist Reveal a Market for Sensitive and Stolen U.S. Military Items
Gao ID: GAO-08-644T April 10, 2008
Unauthorized individuals, companies, terrorist organizations, and other countries continue their attempts to obtain sensitive items related to the defense of the United States. The Internet is one place that defense-related items can be purchased, raising the possibility that some sensitive items are available to those who can afford them. In addition to the risk that sensitive defense-related items could be used to directly harm U.S. service members or allies on the battlefield, these items could be disassembled and analyzed (i.e., reverse engineered) to develop countermeasures or equivalent technology. Given the risks posed by the sale of sensitive defense-related items to the public, and the Internet's international reach and high volume of commerce, the Subcommittee asked GAO to conduct undercover testing to determine whether the general public can easily purchase these items on the Internet, including on the Web sites eBay and Craigslist. To perform this work, GAO investigators used undercover identities to pose as members of the general public, meaning that they conducted their work with names, credit cards, and contact information that could not be traced to GAO. Investigators interviewed sellers where possible and referred cases to the appropriate law enforcement entities for further investigation.
GAO found numerous defense-related items for sale to the highest bidder on eBay and Craigslist. A review of policies and procedures for these Web sites determined that there are few safeguards to prevent the sale of sensitive and stolen defense-related items using the sites. During the period of investigation, GAO undercover investigators purchased a dozen sensitive items on eBay and Craigslist to demonstrate how easy it was to obtain them. Many of these items were stolen from the U.S. military. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), it considers the sensitive items GAO purchased to be on the U.S. Munitions List, meaning that there are restrictions on their overseas sales. However, if investigators had been members of the general public, there is a risk that they could have illegally resold these items to an international broker or transferred them overseas. GAO investigators also identified examples of U.S. government property that was stolen and sold for a profit rather than being utilized by DOD. For example, GAO found two civilian store owners who acted as conduits for defense-related property that was likely stolen from the military. The store owners told GAO they purchased gear from service members--including Kevlar vests, flak jackets, and gas masks--and sold it through eBay to the general public. GAO also purchased stolen military meals, ready-to-eat (MRE) and found a robust market for stolen military MREs on eBay and Craigslist. Advertisements for the sensitive defense-related items GAO purchased were not removed by Web site administrators, allowing investigators to buy the items. Both Web sites maintain lists of items that are prohibited from sale, including stolen items, but only eBay contains warnings related to overseas sales and the improper sale of sensitive defense-related items.
GAO-08-644T, Internet Sales: Undercover Purchases on eBay and Craigslist Reveal a Market for Sensitive and Stolen U.S. Military Items
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 10, 2008:
Internet Sales:
Undercover Purchases on eBay and Craigslist Reveal a Market for
Sensitive and Stolen U.S. Military Items:
Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director:
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
GAO-08-644T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-644T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Unauthorized individuals, companies, terrorist organizations, and other
countries continue their attempts to obtain sensitive items related to
the defense of the United States. The Internet is one place that
defense-related items can be purchased, raising the possibility that
some sensitive items are available to those who can afford them. In
addition to the risk that sensitive defense-related items could be used
to directly harm U.S. service members or allies on the battlefield,
these items could be disassembled and analyzed (i.e., reverse
engineered) to develop countermeasures or equivalent technology.
Given the risks posed by the sale of sensitive defense-related items to
the public, and the Internet‘s international reach and high volume of
commerce, the Subcommittee asked GAO to conduct undercover testing to
determine whether the general public can easily purchase these items on
the Internet, including on the Web sites eBay and Craigslist.
To perform this work, GAO investigators used undercover identities to
pose as members of the general public, meaning that they conducted
their work with names, credit cards, and contact information that could
not be traced to GAO. Investigators interviewed sellers where possible
and referred cases to the appropriate law enforcement entities for
further investigation.
What GAO Found:
GAO found numerous defense-related items for sale to the highest bidder
on eBay and Craigslist. A review of policies and procedures for these
Web sites determined that there are few safeguards to prevent the sale
of sensitive and stolen defense-related items using the sites. During
the period of investigation, GAO undercover investigators purchased a
dozen sensitive items on eBay and Craigslist to demonstrate how easy it
was to obtain them. Many of these items were stolen from the U.S.
military. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), it considers
the sensitive items GAO purchased to be on the U.S. Munitions List,
meaning that there are restrictions on their overseas sales. However,
if investigators had been members of the general public, there is a
risk that they could have illegally resold these items to an
international broker or transferred them overseas.
Table: Examples of Sensitive Items Purchased by Undercover
Investigators:
No. 1:
Item: F-14 antenna;
Web site: eBay;
Notes: F-14 components are in demand by Iran, the only country with
operating F-14s; Winning bidders on other auctions held by the seller
were located in countries such as Bulgaria, China (Hong Kong), and
Russia.
No. 2:
Item: Nuclear biological chemical gear; Web site: Craigslist;
Notes: Could be reverse engineered to develop countermeasures or
produce equivalent technology; Stolen military property.
No. 3:
Item: Enhanced small arms protective inserts; Web site: eBay;
Notes: Body armor plates manufactured in June 2007 and currently in use
by troops in Afghanistan and Iraq; Winning eBay bidders on other body
armor items offered by this seller included individuals in China (Hong
Kong), Taiwan, and Singapore; Stolen from U.S. military or
manufacturer.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
GAO investigators also identified examples of U.S. government property
that was stolen and sold for a profit rather than being utilized by
DOD. For example, GAO found two civilian store owners who acted as
conduits for defense-related property that was likely stolen from the
military. The store owners told GAO they purchased gear from service
members”including Kevlar vests, flak jackets, and gas masks”and sold it
through eBay to the general public. GAO also purchased stolen military
meals, ready-to-eat (MRE) and found a robust market for stolen military
MREs on eBay and Craigslist.
Advertisements for the sensitive defense-related items GAO purchased
were not removed by Web site administrators, allowing investigators to
buy the items. Both Web sites maintain lists of items that are
prohibited from sale, including stolen items, but only eBay contains
warnings related to overseas sales and the improper sale of sensitive
defense-related items.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-644T]. For more
information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or
kutzg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Unauthorized individuals, companies, organizations, and other countries
continue their attempts to obtain sensitive items related to the
defense of the United States. For example, a 2003 undercover
investigation by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) revealed
that an individual in Florida attempted to purchase and illegally
export roughly $750,000 worth of U.S. F-14 fighter jet components to
the Iranian military. According to the indictment, the individual
planned to ship these components through other countries, including
Italy, to conceal Iran as the ultimate destination. As we have reported
before, Iran's acquisition of F-14 components could threaten national
security. In another example, ICE agents arrested a Columbian national
in 2005 for attempting to illegally export 80 AK-47 assault rifles, an
M-60 machine gun, and an M-16 machine gun to the Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.
Although it is not illegal to buy and sell some defense-related items
domestically, many sensitive items are manufactured strictly for
military purposes and were never meant to be a part of everyday
American life. The Department of Defense (DOD) assigns demilitarization
codes (demil codes) to some items so that, when they are no longer
needed by the military, the items can be recognized and rendered
useless for their intended purpose prior to leaving government control.
We are defining sensitive defense-related items as those items that, if
acquired by DOD, would have to be demilitarized before disposal--a
process that could involve everything from removing a sensitive
component to destroying the item entirely. Our prior reports found that
control breakdowns at DOD allowed members of the general public to
acquire sensitive defense-related items, including F-14 components,
from the Government Liquidation Web site; these items had not been
demilitarized properly.[Footnote 1] Although DOD has made improvements
in the management of its excess property system, saving millions of
dollars and reducing the likelihood that sensitive items are improperly
sold, concerns remain that members of the general public can acquire
sensitive defense-related items through additional weaknesses involving
the government's acquisition, use, storage, and sale of these items.
The Internet is one place that defense-related items can be purchased,
raising the possibility that some sensitive items are available to
those who can afford them. In addition to the Government Liquidation
Web site, many military surplus stores across the United States have
Web pages with online ordering capability. Furthermore, Web sites such
as eBay and Craigslist are popular because they allow sellers to
advertise individual items and appear to provide some element of
anonymity. For the most part, these Web sites have an international
reach--meaning that it is possible for sellers to identify buyers in
foreign countries and quickly export purchased items. Sellers use eBay
to auction goods or services, receive bids from prospective buyers, and
finalize a sale. eBay also features "store fronts" in which property is
listed and bought without going through a bidding process. In contrast,
Craigslist functions as an automated version of the newspaper
classifieds, listing jobs, housing, goods, services, personals,
activities, advice, and just about anything users wish to sell,
advertise, or promote. The service is community-based and moderated,
operating in 450 cities worldwide, and is largely free of charge.
While potential buyers for some sensitive items certainly include
hobbyists, military enthusiasts, and emergency response or law
enforcement units, the ICE cases clearly show the real risk that
illegal weapons brokers, terrorists, and unauthorized agents of foreign
governments also number among potential buyers. In addition to the risk
that sensitive defense-related items could be used directly against
U.S. interests, some items could be disassembled and analyzed to
determine how they work. This technique, known as reverse engineering,
could allow the creation of (1) countermeasures to defeat or minimize
the military significance of the item or (2) the development of an
equivalent item that could be used against U.S. interests.
Given the risks posed by the sale of sensitive defense-related items to
the public, and the Internet's international reach and high volume of
commerce, you asked us to conduct undercover testing to determine
whether the general public can easily purchase these items on the
Internet, including on the Web sites eBay and Craigslist.
To perform this investigation, we searched for certain target items on
eBay and Craigslist. When these items were identified, investigators
attempted to purchase them--either through bidding or a direct purchase
(eBay) or by contacting the seller and arranging an in-person meeting
or sale via U.S. mail (Craigslist). Investigators used undercover
identities to pose as members of the general public when purchasing
these items, meaning that they conducted their work with names, credit
cards, and contact information that could not be traced back to GAO. In
the case of eBay purchases, investigators worked with eBay's Fraud
Investigations Team to obtain information regarding the identity and
account history of the sellers. We also searched the DOD Employee
Interactive Data System (DEIDS) database to determine whether sellers
were active members of the U.S. military. Where applicable and
feasible, investigators interviewed the sellers and performed
additional follow-up investigative work or, in some instances, made
immediate referrals of the cases to field agents of the appropriate law
enforcement entities.
After purchasing a questionable item, our investigators matched the
National Stock Number (NSN) on the item to those listed in DOD's
Federal Logistics System (FedLog) to validate that it met our
definition of a sensitive defense-related item.[Footnote 2] We also
spoke with officials from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service
(DCIS), Demilitarization Coding Management Office (DCMO), the Air Force
Office of Special Investigations (Air Force OSI), and the Army Criminal
Investigation Division (Army CID) regarding the sale of U.S. military
property. We referred pertinent information to DCIS, Army CID, and Air
Force OSI for further investigation. We also spoke with officials from
eBay and Craigslist about the policies and procedures governing
commerce on their Web sites and performed legal research.
We conducted our investigation from January 2007 through March 2008 in
accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by
the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. It is important to
note that our investigation does not represent a comprehensive
assessment of all sensitive defense-related items sold through these
Web sites during this period. Rather, our report provides only a
"snapshot" of some items that investigators identified and purchased.
Further, we did not attempt to perform a comprehensive audit or
analysis to determine whether systemic property-management problems at
DOD ultimately resulted in the sale of these items on the Internet
during this period. As a result, our investigation of sellers was
limited, in most cases, to their claims regarding how they obtained the
items. We also did not test the government's enforcement of export
controls by attempting to transfer what we purchased overseas, or
validate whether eBay and Craigslist sellers we identified actually
exported items to other countries.
Summary of Investigation:
We found numerous defense-related items for sale to the highest bidder
on eBay and Craigslist from January 2007 through March 2008. A review
of eBay and Craigslist policies and procedures determined that,
although these Web sites have taken steps to regulate their user
communities and define items that are prohibited from sale, there are
few safeguards to prevent sensitive and stolen defense-related items
from being sold to either domestic or foreign users of these sites.
During the period of our investigation, undercover investigators
purchased a dozen sensitive items to demonstrate how easy it was to
obtain them. The items were shipped to us "no questions asked." Many of
these items were stolen from the U.S. military. According to DOD, it
considers the sensitive items we purchased to be on the U.S. Munitions
List, meaning that there are restrictions on their overseas sales.
However, if investigators had been members of the general public, there
is a risk that they could have illegally resold these items to an
international broker or transferred them overseas. Many of the
sensitive items we purchased could have been used directly against our
troops and allies, or reverse-engineered to develop countermeasures or
equivalent technology. For example, we purchased:
* Two F-14 components from separate buyers on eBay. F-14 components are
in demand by Iran. Given that the United States has retired its fleet
of F-14s, these components could only be used by the Iranian military.
By making these components available to the general public, the eBay
sellers provided an opportunity for these components to be purchased by
an individual who could then transfer them to Iran. The continued
ability of Iran to use its F-14s could put U.S. troops and allies at
risk. We were unable to determine where the sellers obtained the F-14
components, and we found that ICE had an open investigation of one of
the sellers.
* Night vision goggles containing an image intensifier tube made to
military specifications (milspec) that is an important component in the
U.S. military's night-fighting system. Although night vision goggles
are commercially available to the public, the milspec tube in the pair
of goggles we purchased on eBay is a sensitive component that allows
U.S. service members on the battlefield to identify friendly fighters
wearing infrared (IR) tabs. We also purchased IR tabs from a different
Internet seller. These IR tabs work with the goggles we purchased,
giving us access to night-fighting technology that could be used
against U.S. troops on the battlefield.
* An Army Combat Uniform (ACU) and uniform accessories that could be
used by a terrorist to pose as a U.S. service member. After a January
2007 incident in which Iraqi insurgents, dressed in U.S. military
uniforms, entered a compound in Karbala and killed five U.S. service
members, DOD issued a bulletin declaring that all ACUs should be
released only "to Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and their Guard or
Reserve components." We purchased the ACU on eBay in April 2007, after
DOD's bulletin had been issued. The ACU we purchased also came with IR
tabs, which could have allowed an enemy fighter to pose as a "friendly"
during night combat. The seller represented to us that he obtained the
ACU at a flea market near Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This ACU appears
to be stolen military property.
* Body armor vests and Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI), including
advanced Enhanced SAPI (E-SAPI) plates that are currently used by our
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unauthorized individuals, companies,
terrorist organizations, or other countries could use reverse
engineering on this body armor to develop countermeasures, equivalent
technology, or both. Body armor could also be used domestically by a
violent felon to commit crime. The body armor vests, SAPIs, and E-
SAPIs, which we purchased from eBay and Craigslist sellers, appear to
have been stolen from DOD.
In addition to the above case studies, our investigators identified
examples of U.S. government property that was likely stolen and sold
for personal profit rather than being utilized by DOD (i.e., conversion
of government property). According to DOD officials, U.S. military
personnel are not authorized to sell certain items that have been
issued to them, such as body armor; doing so is considered theft of
government property. Although not all of the stolen property items
available on eBay and Craigslist were sensitive, each item was
purchased with taxpayer money and represents a waste of resources
because it was not used as intended. For example, we found two civilian
store owners who acted as conduits for defense-related property that
was likely stolen from the military. The store owners told us they
purchased gear from service members--including Kevlar helmets, flak
jackets, gas masks, and ACUs--and sold it through eBay to the general
public. We also investigated sales of military meals, ready-to-eat
(MRE) and found a robust market for stolen military MREs on eBay and
Craigslist. Both civilians and service members sold us numerous cases
of new/unused military MREs despite the fact that they were marked
"U.S. Government Property, Commercial Resale Is Unlawful." Because the
military MREs we bought had been originally purchased by the government
for use by U.S. troops, we conclude that these MREs were stolen from
DOD. For example, we found that an active duty Army Private First Class
stationed in South Korea stole military MREs from a warehouse and sold
them to us on eBay. After our referral, Army CID executed a search
warrant of the seller's residence and discovered a substantial amount
of stolen U.S. military property, as well as nearly $2,000 in cash. The
seller was subsequently linked to a string of larcenies on the base and
is currently serving over 3 years in prison.
Advertisements for the sensitive defense-related items we purchased
were not removed by the administrators of these Web sites, allowing us
to complete the transactions. Both Web sites maintain published lists
of items that are prohibited from sale, including stolen items, but
only eBay contains warnings related to the improper sale of sensitive
defense-related items. Furthermore, only eBay contains warnings related
to export control issues and overseas sales, even though both Web sites
have an international reach. While eBay has an administrative staff and
investigative teams that look into fraud and prohibited sales occurring
on the site, Craigslist has a smaller staff and largely relies on its
user community for identifying inappropriate advertisements or
postings. For example, when we asked a Craigslist manager about whether
his company had a Fraud Investigations Team (FIT), he said, "I am the
FIT for Craigslist." Generally, neither eBay nor Craigslist can incur
criminal liability for being the conduit through which stolen or
sensitive defense-related items are sold, even if the items are sold
overseas.
Background:
DOD assigns demil codes to all military property to identify their
required disposition when no longer needed. Demil codes are contained
in the Defense Demilitarization Manual, which implements DOD policy to
apply appropriate controls and prevent improper use or release of these
items outside of DOD. Demil codes indicate whether property is
available for public use without restriction or whether specific
restrictions apply, such as removal of classified components,
destruction, or trade security controls. For example, if an item is
designated as demil D, DOD requires this item to be totally destroyed
"so as to preclude restoration or repair to a usable condition" rather
than allowing a member of the general public to purchase the item.
According to DOD's Defense Logistics Information Service, it considers
sensitive defense-related items to be U.S. Munitions List items. This
list, which is maintained by the State Department, identifies defense-
related items that require government approval prior to export or
temporary import. There are 20 categories of items on the U.S.
Munitions List, including firearms and ammunition; aircraft and
associated components; protective personnel equipment (such as body
armor); nuclear weapons and related items; and directed energy weapons.
Some of these items are also defined as significant military equipment,
which are items for which special export controls are warranted because
of their capacity for substantial military utility or capability. Any
person or company in the United States that engages in either
manufacturing or exporting U.S. Munitions List items must register with
the State Department. Prior to exporting these items, a State
Department-issued license is generally required.
The table below defines the DOD demil codes, their associated
designation as U.S. Munitions List items or Significant Military
equipment, and DOD's approach to disposing of the item under each code.
Table 1: DOD Demil Codes:
Demil code: A;
U.S. Munitions List item[A]: No;
Significant Military Equipment: No;
Required disposal action: Demilitarization not required.
Demil code: B;
U.S. Munitions List item[A]: Yes;
Significant Military Equipment: No;
Required disposal action: Demilitarization not required; trade security
controls required at disposition.
Demil code: C;
U.S. Munitions List item[A]: Yes;
Significant Military Equipment: Yes;
Required disposal action: Remove and/or demilitarize installed key
point(s) as prescribed (e.g., partial destruction).
Demil code: D;
U.S. Munitions List item[A]: Yes;
Significant Military Equipment: Yes;
Required disposal action: Total destruction of item and components so
as to preclude restoration or repair to a usable condition by melting,
cutting, tearing, scratching, crushing, breaking, punching,
neutralizing, etc.
Demil code: E;
U.S. Munitions List item[A]: Yes;
Significant Military Equipment: No;
Required disposal action: Remove and/or demilitarize installed key
point(s) as prescribed (e.g., partial destruction)[B].
Demil code: F;
U.S. Munitions List item[A]: Yes;
Significant Military Equipment: Yes;
Required disposal action: Demilitarization instructions furnished by
DOD item specialist.
Demil code: G;
U.S. Munitions List item[A]: Yes;
Significant Military Equipment: Yes;
Required disposal action: Demilitarization required and, if necessary,
declassification and/or removal of sensitive marking or information.
Demil code: P;
U.S. Munitions List item[A]: Yes;
Significant Military Equipment: Yes;
Required disposal action: Declassification, and any other required
demilitarization and removal of sensitive markings or information.
Demil code: Q;
U.S. Munitions List item[A]: No;
Significant Military Equipment: No;
Required disposal action: Demilitarization not required; dual use items
under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Source: Defense Logistics Information Service.
[A] These designations as U.S. Munitions List items are according to
DOD rather than the State Department, which maintains the U.S.
Munitions List.
[B] This demil code is now obsolete according to the Defense Logistics
Information Service.
[End of table]
Despite the use of demil codes and other safeguards, our prior reports
show that DOD faces significant challenges in properly disposing of
sensitive military property. For example, in our May 2005 report on
excess property, we found that some sensitive defense-related items in
the DOD excess property system were lost, stolen, or damaged before DOD
could decide what to do with them. Losses included nearly 150 chemical
and biological protective suits, over 70 units of body armor, and 5
guided missile warheads. Because 43 percent of the reported losses
involved military and commercial technology requiring demilitarization,
we reported that these losses posed a security risk. In follow-up work
reported in July 2006, we found that the Government Liquidation Web
site sold over 2,500 sensitive-defense related items to nearly 80
individuals between November 2005 and June 2006. We also reported that
our undercover investigators purchased items from the Government
Liquidation Web site that should not have been sold to the public,
including SAPIs (which were in demand by U.S. service members in Iraq
and Afghanistan); a time-selector unit used to ensure the accuracy of
computer-based equipment, such as global positioning systems and system-
level clocks; digital microcircuits used in F-14 fighter aircraft; and
numerous other items. In our most recent July 2007 report, we found
that DOD has made significant improvements in preventing the sale of
sensitive defense-related items through the Government Liquidation Web
site. Throughout our investigation, we detected items that were
potentially sensitive, but DOD or Web site employees regularly
identified the same property items and removed them from the site
before they were sold.
In addition to the improper sale of sensitive defense-related items, we
have also reported that the sale of demil code A and other nonsensitive
military items can result in waste and reduces the efficiency of DOD
operations. For example, in our May 2005 report, we found that DOD sold
new and unused items to the general public for pennies on the dollar
through the Government Liquidation Web site at the same time other DOD
agencies requested these items. Rather than allocate its resources
effectively, DOD simply paid the full acquisition cost again to
purchase the same new and unused items. We determined that, from fiscal
years 2002 through 2004, $3.5 billion in new, unused, and excellent
condition items were being transferred or donated outside of DOD, sold
on the Internet for pennies on the dollar, or destroyed rather than
being reutilized. DOD has made progress in this area, with improved
utilization of property resulting in millions of dollars in recent
savings. Another area involving waste where we have performed
investigative work involves the sale of military MREs. Although
military MREs are nonsensitive items and are not on the U.S. Munitions
List, we have identified civilians and service members selling military
MREs on eBay for commercial gain.[Footnote 3] We concluded that
military MREs are procured by government entities using taxpayer
dollars, and consequently, if they are sold to the general public on
eBay, they are clearly not reaching their intended recipients.
Sensitive and Stolen Defense-Related Items Available on the Internet to
the Highest Bidder:
We found numerous defense-related items for sale to the highest bidder
on eBay and Craigslist from January 2007 through March 2008. Undercover
investigators purchased a dozen sensitive items to demonstrate how easy
it was to obtain them. The items were shipped to us "no questions
asked." Many of these items were stolen from the U.S. military.
According to DOD, it considers the sensitive items we purchased to be
on the U.S. Munitions List, meaning that there are restrictions on
their overseas sales. However, if investigators had been members of the
general public, there is a risk that they could have illegally resold
these items to an international broker or transferred them overseas.
Some items we purchased were assigned demil code D, meaning that, if
the items were in DOD's possession, the item should be destroyed rather
than made available to members of the general public. Our investigators
also identified examples of U.S. government property--both sensitive
and nonsensitive items--being stolen and sold for personal profit
rather than being utilized by DOD (i.e., conversion of government
property). In addition to being cases of probable theft, these examples
represent a waste of resources because DOD is effectively purchasing
items that are subsequently not used for their intended purpose.
While some sellers were active-duty members of the military, other
sellers included retired or reserve status military members and
civilians. Our investigation of the sellers found that they obtained
the sensitive defense-related items in various ways, though in many
cases theft from DOD was involved. According to DOD officials, U.S.
military personnel are not authorized to sell certain items that have
been issued to them, such as body armor; doing so is considered theft
of government property. Moreover, if a civilian (such a surplus store
owner) receives military property that they know has been stolen from
the government, they are in violation of the law.[Footnote 4] See
figure 1 for a photograph of the defense-related items we purchased
from eBay and Craigslist sellers during our investigation.
Figure 1: Defense-Related Items Purchased from eBay and Craigslist
Sellers:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a photograph of defense-related items purchased from
eBay and Craigslist sellers.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
The sale of sensitive defense-related items over the Internet can have
serious consequences, both abroad and here in the United States. In
addition to the threat that sensitive items could be used directly
against U.S. troops or allies, criminals could take advantage of some
sensitive items to commit domestic crime. Sensitive defense-related
items could also be reverse-engineered to develop countermeasures or
equivalent technologies.
Sensitive and Stolen Defense-Related Items Purchased on the Internet:
Our investigators purchased a dozen sensitive defense-related items
from Internet sellers during the period of our review. According to
DOD, these items are on the U.S. Munitions List, meaning that there are
restrictions on their overseas sales. Table 2 summarizes the majority
of the items we purchased, followed by detailed case-study narratives.
Table 2: Sensitive and Stolen Defense-Related Items Purchased on the
Internet:
Case: 1;
Item: F-14 antenna;
Seller location: Loveland, Colo.;
Web site: eBay;
Case details:
* Item in demand by Iran, the only country with operating F-14s;
* Winning bidders on other auctions held by the seller were located in
countries such as Bulgaria, China (Hong Kong), Malaysia, Russia, and
Thailand;
* The seller told us that he obtained the part, along with other
aircraft components, from an individual in the Denver area whose name
and address he could not remember;
* We could not determine how this part became available to the general
public.
Case: 2;
Item: Helicopter antenna;
Seller location: The Colony, Tex.;
Web site: eBay; Case details:
* Item currently used in the Blackhawk, Apache, and Chinook
helicopters;
* Components that can be used in the Chinook helicopter are in demand
by Iran;
* Winning bidders on other auctions held by the seller were located in
countries such as Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Malaysia, and Slovenia;
* We could not determine how this part became available to the general
public.
Case: 3;
Item: Night vision goggles;
Seller location: Tequesta, Fla.;
Web site: eBay;
Case details:
* These night vision goggles contain a milspec image intensifier tube,
making them demil F when owned by DOD;
* In combination with IR tabs (see cases 4 and 5 below), these goggles
are components in a night-fighting system that allows U.S. service
members to identify friendly warfighters;
* These goggles could be used to identify U.S. troops on the
battlefield.
Case: 4;
Item: IR tabs;
Seller location: Marlboro, N.Y.;
Web site: Internet storefront;
Case details:
* Enemies could use IR tabs to pose as a friendly fighter during night
combat, creating confusion on the battlefield and putting troops at
risk;
* Seller claimed that he always verifies the identification of IR tab
buyers to ensure that only military and law enforcement officials
obtain the tabs;
* Our undercover investigators ordered tabs using the seller's online
store front and obtained the tabs without any type of verification
check.
Case: 5;
Item: ACU and accessories;
Seller location: Fayetteville, N.C. and other locations;
Web site: eBay; Case details:
* In combination with accessories purchased from other sellers (e.g.,
patches, boots, a beret), item could allow anyone to look like a U.S.
service member;
* ACU came with IR tabs, meaning that the enemy could also use this ACU
to pose as a friendly fighter during night combat, creating confusion
on the battlefield and putting troops at risk;
* Seller is a civilian who claimed to obtain the ACU at a flea market
near Fort Bragg, N.C.;
* Property appears to be stolen.
Case: 6;
Item: Kevlar helmet;
Seller location: Bloomingdale, Ill.;
Web site: eBay;
Case details:
* Demil B item that cannot be exported without a license from the State
Department, which the seller said he did not have;
* According to eBay records, winning eBay bidders for other Kevlar
helmets included buyers in countries such as Costa Rica, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Thailand;
* Seller represented to us that he canceled transactions when auctions
were won by overseas bidders;
* Seller is a civilian who said he legitimately obtained the helmets
from the Government Liquidation Web site.
Case: 7;
Item: Nuclear biological chemical gear;
Seller location: Oxnard, Calif.;
Web site: Craigslist;
Case details:
* Item that could be reverse engineered to develop countermeasures or
produce equivalent technology;
* Craigslist ad identified the seller as a Marine who was selling gear
he had been issued;
* When we interviewed the seller, he stated that, contrary to what he
wrote in his advertisement, an acquaintance gave him the gear;
* Stolen government property.
Case: 8;
Item: E-SAPIs;
Seller location: Arlington, Tex.;
Web site: eBay;
Case details:
* Item that could be reverse engineered to develop countermeasures or
produce equivalent technology;
* According to eBay records, winning eBay bidders on body armor offered
by this seller included individuals in China (Hong Kong), Poland,
Taiwan, and Singapore;
* Stolen from government or manufacturer.
Case: 9;
Item: Body armor/SAPIs;
Seller location: Fayetteville, N.C.;
Web site: Craigslist;
Case details:
* Items that could be reverse engineered to develop countermeasures or
produce equivalent technology;
* Seller is an Army Special Forces Staff Sergeant assigned to Fort
Bragg, N.C.;
* The seller stated that he purchased these items at a yard sale and
paid cash;
* He said that he thought it was "OK" to sell the body armor on
Craigslist because he had seen other body armor for sale there;
* Stolen government property.
Case: 10;
Item: Body armor/SAPIs;
Seller location: Minot, N.D.;
Web site: eBay;
Case details:
* Items that could be reverse engineered to develop countermeasures or
produce equivalent technology;
* Seller was a Senior Airman with the Air Force Reserve at the time of
our investigation;
* Minot Air Force Base security police and the county sheriff's office
investigated the matter and determined that the body armor was stolen
from the base;
* Seller knew he was selling government property.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
In addition to the items in the above table, we also purchased other
items including an F-14 radio receiver and a body armor vest with SAPI
plate. According to DOD, these are U.S. Munitions List items. We also
purchased nonsensitive defense-related items such as boots, berets,
patches, and an ACU chest rig.
Case 1: F-14 Antenna:
On October 10, 2007, we purchased a new antenna for the F-14 Tomcat
from an eBay seller located in Loveland, Colorado. The seller lives
about 60 miles from Buckley Air Force Base in Colorado. The antenna has
a demil code of D, which requires DOD to destroy it when no longer
needed. Our past work identified the control of excess F-14 components
as a major challenge for DOD. The only country with operational F-14s,
Iran, is known to be seeking such components. We interviewed the
seller, who told us that he sells industrial electronic surplus items.
He said he purchases these items from individuals, Internet sales
sites, other eBay sellers, manufacturers, and occasionally the
Government Liquidation Web site. The seller told us that he obtained
this antenna from an individual located in the Denver, Colorado, area,
whose name and address he could not remember. We were unable to
determine how this part became available to the general public. We
referred the seller to DCIS for criminal investigation. See figure 2
for a picture of the antenna.
Figure 2: F-14 Antenna Purchased from eBay Seller:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of F-14 Antenna.
[End of figure]
Case 2: Helicopter Antenna:
On September 19, 2007, we purchased a used flush-mount antenna, which
is currently in use by the military in the Blackhawk, Apache, and
Chinook helicopters, from an eBay seller located in The Colony, Texas.
This city is located about 130 miles from Sheppard Air Force Base. The
antenna is assigned demil code D, which requires DOD to destroy it when
no longer needed. Chinook components are reportedly in demand by Iran,
making this a national security issue. We interviewed the seller, who
told us that he buys aircraft components from auctions and companies
that are going out of business (not from Government Liquidation). He
explained that he targets specific aircraft components that can be used
in both military and commercial aircraft because he can better market
these items to collectors. For example, he said that if he buys a
Boeing 707 part he will resell it and advertise the part as belonging
to a KC-135 Stratotanker (a midair refueling aircraft) because it would
better pique the interest of a collector. According to eBay records,
winning eBay bidders for other auctions held by this seller were
located in Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Malaysia, and Slovenia. The
seller said he did not recall the sale of this particular part, and it
is unclear how it became available to the general public. We referred
the seller to DCIS for criminal investigation.
Cases 3 and 4: Night Vision Equipment:
We obtained both milspec night vision goggles and IR tabs on the
Internet. Although night vision goggles are commercially available to
the public, the milspec tube in the goggles we purchased is a sensitive
component that allows U.S. service members on the battlefield to
identify friendly fighters wearing infrared (IR) tabs. These tabs are
known as an IFF (identification friend or foe) element and can be
detected at night by both ground troops and airborne combat pilots
equipped with night vision equipment. Obtaining either of these two
items could give enemies an undue advantage in night combat situations,
either by using the night vision goggles to detect U.S. troops or by
posing as U.S. troops (or friendly forces) with the IR tabs. We
purchased these items directly from distributors who could sell these
products domestically without violating any laws. However, officials
representing the manufacturer of the night vision goggles told us that
the goggles should not be sold on eBay and that, consequently, a
violation of its distribution policies had occurred at some point in
the distribution process. Officials told us they would conduct an
investigation into where the violation of policy occurred and would
remove the offending distributor from its list of authorized
distributors.
Case #3: Night Vision Goggles. On March 29, 2007, we purchased new/
unused milspec night vision goggles from an eBay seller located in
Tequesta, Florida. The fully operational goggles have a
demilitarization code of F, meaning that, if the goggles are part of
DOD inventory, they cannot be sold to the general public unless the
milspec image intensifier tube has been removed. The image intensifier
tube was included in the goggles we purchased. See figure 3 for a
picture of the night vision goggles.
Figure 3: Night Vision Goggles Purchased on eBay:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of Night Vision Goggles.
[End of figure]
Our investigators determined that the seller is a retired U.S. Marine
Corps Colonel. The seller is the manager of business development for a
General Services Administration scheduled business that distributes
tactical, surveillance, and force protection equipment. According to
the retired Colonel, he originally obtained 28 night vision goggles
from an authorized distributor and sold most of them to active-duty
military units, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, and a number of
municipal and state law enforcement agencies. The retired Colonel told
us that, when he was unable to sell all 28 goggles, he used his
personal eBay account to sell the remaining goggles to 10 individuals
across the United States. He represented to us that he asked all
potential clients for the goggles whether they were U.S. citizens as
part of the eBay sales process. However, he did not ask our undercover
investigator this question. Based on interviews with the goggle
manufacturer and our legal research, we determined that the seller did
not violate the law by selling these goggles domestically to members of
the general public. However, it does appear the sale and distribution
of these goggles violated the manufacturer's policy. Officials
representing the goggle manufacturer told us they would conduct an
investigation into where the violation of policy occurred and would
remove the offending distributor from its list of authorized
distributors. We referred this matter to DCIS for investigation.
Case #4: IR tabs. We purchased new/unused IR tabs from an Internet
store front (not eBay or Craigslist) maintained by a business owner in
Marlboro, New York. We were alerted to this seller through his eBay
advertisements and located the associated online store front. An enemy
fighter wearing these IR tabs could pass as a friendly service member
during a night combat situation, putting U.S. troops at risk. Prior to
this purchase, our investigators had visited the physical store
location, which is near the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. The
physical store sells a variety of military items ranging from parachute
cords to military patches. Our investigators identified themselves as
GAO investigators and asked the store owner, a former Army Captain,
whether he sells IR tabs to the general public. The store owner stated
that he only sells the tabs to U.S. military personnel and that he
always obtains proof of employment before completing an order. Several
days after the interview, our investigator ordered and received several
tabs from the seller's online store front. The validity of the order
was never questioned, and the owner did not attempt to verify the
employment of our investigator, as he stated during the interview.
According to the manufacturer, these tabs have the same properties as
the IR tabs affixed to ACUs and are a comparable product. Our own in-
house tests confirmed that the tabs had IR properties and appeared to
function the same way. We referred this matter to DCIS for
investigation.
Case 5: ACU and Accessories:
During the course of this investigation, we purchased all the items
necessary to build a complete, current U.S. military uniform--from
boots to beret--using only the Internet Web sites eBay and Craigslist.
Our intent was to demonstrate that the general public can purchase,
over the Internet, all the gear necessary to dress and look like a U.S.
service member. DOD has recognized the security risk associated with a
member of the general public being able to acquire a full uniform. In
January 2007, Iraqi insurgents dressed in U.S. military uniforms were
allowed to pass through a police checkpoint in Karbala, Iraq. They
subsequently broke into a secure compound using percussion bombs and
killed five U.S. service members. After this incident, DOD issued a
Demil Bulletin noting that ACUs "—will only be released to Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marines and their Guard or Reserve components."
On April 17, 2007--after the Demil Bulletin had been issued by DOD--we
purchased a new/unused ACU with IR tabs from an eBay seller located in
Fayetteville, North Carolina. As discussed above, IR tabs allow U.S.
service members to identify friendly fighters during night combat. In
addition to the risk that an enemy could pose as a U.S. service member
in this ACU, the readily available IR tabs would also allow an enemy
fighter to pose as a friendly fighter during night combat. The DOD-
issued IR tabs are demil code D, which requires DOD to destroy them
when no longer needed. According to the Defense Logistics Agency, the
ACU that we purchased from this seller is ineligible for resale or
release to the general public. The seller told us that he purchased the
ACU at a flea market near Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and added that,
on many occasions, he has observed flea market vendors purchasing
military items from individuals who arrive at the flea market. The
vendors then sell the items to the general public at the flea market.
After concluding the interview, our investigators visited the flea
market and observed several vendors selling used ACUs (none contained
IR tabs). The flea market vendors told our undercover investigators
that they obtain the ACUs at yard sales in the area and from soldiers.
This ACU appears to have been stolen from DOD. We referred this matter
to DCIS for criminal investigation. See figure 4 for a picture of the
ACU.
Figure 4: ACU Purchased on eBay:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of ACU.
[End of figure]
Case 6: Kevlar Helmet:
On April 21, 2007, we purchased a used Kevlar helmet from a civilian
eBay seller located in Bloomingdale, Illinois. Even though the eBay
seller's ad indicated that the helmet could not be exported, our
investigation of his eBay history indicated that buyers in countries
such as Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Thailand had won
eBay auctions for the helmets. When we interviewed the seller, he told
us that he had never shipped Kevlar helmets overseas and he canceled
sales when overseas buyers won these auctions. He said he originally
obtained the helmets from the Government Liquidation Web site, which
required him to sign an end use certificate stating, among other
things, that the helmets would not be exported without a license from
the State Department. Further review of the seller's eBay records
reveals that he had completed auctions for $21,000 worth of Kevlar
helmets from February 2007 to July 2007. We referred this matter to
DCIS for criminal investigation.
Case 7: Nuclear Biological Chemical Gear:
On August 23, 2007, we purchased a used Nuclear Biological Chemical
(NBC) protective suit, used gas mask, used gloves and boots, and unused
chemical-biological canister (containing the gas mask filter that is
used to protect against chemical and biological warfare agents) from a
Craigslist seller located in Oxnard, California. Although the NBC suit
was removed from packaging and therefore not usable to protect against
an attack, according to a DOD Product Specialist with whom we spoke,
the NBC suit is susceptible to reverse engineering and should not be
sold to the public. The Craigslist advertisement stated that the seller
was a former member of the military and that he was selling the gear
because he needed money. When we interviewed the seller, he claimed
that, despite what he wrote in the Craigslist advertisement, the gear
was not his. He said that he left the Marines in 2002 and that the suit
was given to him by an acquaintance who was also a Marine. Upon further
questioning about the origin of the gear, the seller stated that (1) he
did not remember his acquaintance's first name; (2) his acquaintance
had not been issued the gear either, obtaining it at what he called a
"swap meet" and; (3) his acquaintance had recently died in a motorcycle
accident. This property was likely stolen from DOD. We referred this
matter to DCIS for criminal investigation. See figure 5 for a picture
of the NBC gear (worn by a GAO investigator).
Figure 5: NBC Gear Purchased on eBay:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of NBC Gear.
[End of figure]
Cases 8 through 10: Body Armor and SAPIs:
Our May 2005 and July 2006 work identified two types of body armor that
DOD's excess property system did not manage adequately--body armor
vests and SAPIs. SAPIs are ceramic plates designed to slide into
pockets sewn into the front and back of body armor vests in order to
protect the warfighter's chest and back from small arms fire. They are
currently used by service members in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to
DCIS, service members are not authorized to sell body armor vests or
SAPIs, and selling these items is considered theft of government
property. Moreover, body armor vests and SAPIs are designated demil
code D, meaning that DOD should destroy them when no longer needed. We
purchased three body armor vests and seven SAPIs, including two current-
issue E-SAPIs, on eBay and Craigslist. Because service members are not
authorized to sell these items, we concluded that they were stolen from
the military. See figure 6 for a picture of some of the stolen SAPIs
and body armor vests we purchased.
Figure 6: Body Armor Vests with SAPIs Purchased on eBay and Craigslist:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of Body Armor Vests with SAPIs.
[End of figure]
The availability of body armor and SAPIs to the general public has both
national security and domestic safety implications. Regarding national
security, reverse engineering could allow the creation of equivalent
technology or the discovery of countermeasures based on potential
weaknesses in the armor. On the domestic front, it is prohibited for
violent felons to purchase, own, or possess body armor. Although
sellers do not have a responsibility to determine whether they are
selling body armor to a violent felon, and it is not illegal to do so,
the wide availability of body armor online makes it easier for violent
felons to break the law by obtaining body armor. The following case
studies describe three of the four investigations we conducted into
body armor we purchased online.
Case #8: E-SAPI. On September 13, 2007, we purchased two new/unused
body armor inserts identified as E-SAPIs from an eBay seller located in
Arlington, Texas. This city is about 120 miles from Sheppard Air Force
Base. The E-SAPI plates were manufactured in June 2007 and are
currently used by U.S. service members in Iraq and Afghanistan. We
determined that, from September 2006 to February 2008, the seller, who
did not appear to be affiliated with the U.S. military, had completed
eBay auctions of over 600 body-armor-related items totaling
approximately $60,000. Much of the body armor appears to have been
stolen from the military. In addition to domestic sales in the United
States, the seller's eBay history indicates that the highest bidders on
auctions for other body armor items were located overseas in such
countries as China (Hong Kong), Poland, Taiwan, and Thailand. We
referred this matter to DCIS for criminal investigation:
Case #9: Body Armor and SAPIs. On September 22, 2007, we purchased a
used body armor vest and two SAPIs from a Craigslist seller located in
Fayetteville, North Carolina. Our investigation determined that the
seller is an active-duty Staff Sergeant in the U.S. Army stationed at
Fort Bragg. We interviewed the Staff Sergeant about the purchase. He
claimed that he purchased the body armor at a garage sale while he was
stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia. He could not recall the specific
location of the sale or the name of the seller and said that he paid
cash. He stated that he thought it was "OK" to sell body armor on
Craigslist because he had seen other advertisements for it. This is
another case of theft of government property, which we referred to DCIS
for criminal investigation.
Case #10: Body Armor and SAPIs. On March 30, 2007, we purchased a used
body armor vest and two SAPIs from an eBay seller located in Minot,
North Dakota. The seller lives near Minot Air Force Base. Our
investigation determined that the seller was a Senior Airman with the
Air Force Reserve. Further, we determined that the individual had
completed eBay auctions for 18 body armor vests and SAPIs from June
2006 to April 2007 for a total of over $3,300. According to eBay
records, an individual in Japan was the highest bidder in one of the
auction rounds. After we referred this matter to Air Force OSI, we
learned that the Minot Air Force Base security police and the county
sheriff's office had investigated the matter and determined that the
body armor was stolen from the base. According to Air Force OSI, this
individual knew that the items were government property when he sold
them on eBay.
Other Defense-Related Items:
Our investigators also identified examples of U.S. government property-
-both sensitive and nonsensitive--that was likely stolen and sold for
personal profit rather than being utilized by DOD (i.e., conversion of
government property). In addition to being cases of probable theft,
these examples represent a waste of resources because DOD is
effectively purchasing items that are subsequently not used for their
intended purpose.
Civilian Sellers of Stolen Property:
We identified two civilian sellers with eBay store fronts who bought
defense-related items from service members and sold these items to the
general public on eBay. These items could have been stolen from the
military. If these sellers knew the property they bought from the
service members was stolen, they too would be violating the law.
[Footnote 5]
Gun-Store Owner. This eBay seller owns a gun store in Barstow,
California. He lists U.S. military items on his eBay store front,
including sensitive defense-related items such as Kevlar helmets and
NBC gear. When we asked the seller to identify the source of the items
listed on his eBay store front, he told us that military personnel
frequently arrive at his shop with the items for sale. He gave us a
record of the military items he had purchased from military personnel.
For each sale, the gun-store owner obtained the signature of the seller
and photocopied their identification card--in some cases, sellers
provided him with their military IDs. We cross-matched the names of the
individuals who sold items to the gun-store owner with the DEIDS
database to determine whether any of the sellers were currently serving
in the military. Table 3 contains details about selected service
members who sold items to the gun-store owner and the nature of the
items.
Table 3: Service Members Who Sold U.S. Military Property to a Gun-Store
Owner in Barstow, California:
Number: 1;
Rank: Staff Sergeant (E-6);
Branch: Army (active);
Current assignment: U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ariz.;
Items sold to gun shop owner: 3 helmets and miscellaneous gear.
Number: 2;
Rank: Sergeant (E-5);
Branch: Army (active);
Current assignment: Fort Dix, N.J.;
Items sold to gun shop owner: Flak vest and miscellaneous gear.
Number: 3;
Rank: Specialist (E-4);
Branch: Not serving;
Current assignment: N/A;
Items sold to gun shop owner: 2 Kevlar helmets, distress markers, and
weapons-related gear.
Number: 4;
Rank: Specialist (E-4);
Branch: Army (active);
Current assignment: Fort Irwin, Calif.;
Items sold to gun shop owner: Flak vest and gas mask.
Number: 5;
Rank: Specialist (E-4);
Branch: Army (reserve);
Current assignment: Portsmouth, Va.;
Items sold to gun shop owner: Helmet and miscellaneous gear.
Number: 6;
Rank: Private First Class (E-2);
Branch: Marine Corps (active);
Current assignment: Twenty-nine Palms, Calif.;
Items sold to gun shop owner: 27 head mounts (possibly for night vision
goggles).
Number: 7;
Rank: Private (E-1);
Branch: Not serving;
Current assignment: N/A;
Items sold to gun shop owner: Flak vest.
Source: Barstow, California, gun-store owner; DEIDS.
[End of table]
We investigated this seller in 2005 in our report related to stolen
MREs sold over eBay and referred him to the DOD Inspector General (IG)
for review and criminal investigation.[Footnote 6] We have not received
specific information from the DOD IG regarding their actions on this
referral. We continue to believe this matter requires investigation and
have made an additional referral to Army CID for criminal
investigation.
Military Surplus Store Owner. This eBay seller owns a military surplus
store in Abilene, Texas. Our investigators visited the physical store
location associated with the eBay store and observed a number of new
ACUs with IR tabs affixed to them. As discussed above, IR tabs are an
IFF element that can be detected at night by both ground troops and
airborne combat pilots equipped with night vision equipment and
represent one part of the military's night-fighting system. IR tabs on
ACUs are demil code D. When our investigators pointed this out to the
store owner, he said he was unaware of the restriction and removed the
ACUs from the sales rack. The store owner said he purchased the ACUs
from service members. He added that many of the items in his store were
acquired from local military personnel who arrive, unannounced, at his
shop with items for sale. He said that he maintains a record of
transactions and provided a copy to our investigators. We cross-matched
information on these individuals with the DEIDS database to determine
whether any of the sellers were currently serving in the military.
Table 4 contains details about selected service members who sold items
to the store owner and the nature of the items.
Table 4: Service Members Who Sold U.S. Military Property to a Military
Surplus Store Owner in Abilene, Texas:
Number: 1;
Rank: Master Sergeant (E-7);
Branch: Not serving;
Current assignment: N/A;
Items sold to store owner: 8 flight suits, 2 flight jackets, 15 battle
dress uniforms (BDU).
Number: 2;
Rank: Staff Sergeant (E-5)[A];
Branch: Air Force (active);
Current assignment: Dyess Air Force Base, Tex.;
Items sold to store owner: 5 Kevlar vests.
Number: 3;
Rank: Staff Sergeant (E-5);
Branch: Air Force (active);
Current assignment: Kunsan Air Force Base, South Korea;
Items sold to store owner: Helmets.
Number: 4;
Rank: Senior Airman (E-4)[A];
Branch: Air Force (active);
Current assignment: Dyess Air Force Base, Tex.;
Items sold to store owner: 9 BDUs.
Number: 5;
Rank: Senior Airman (E-4);
Branch: Air Force (active);
Current assignment: Dyess Air Force Base, Tex.;
Items sold to store owner: Gas mask and filters, BDUs.
Source: Abilene, Texas, military surplus store owner; DEIDS.
[A] The records provided by the store owner listed the name of the
service member's spouse. DEIDS includes the names of spouses.
[End of table]
We referred this matter to Air Force OSI for criminal investigation.
MREs:
Military MREs are designed to sustain an individual engaged in
strenuous activity, such as military training or actual military
operations, when normal food service facilities are not available. In
general, military MREs are boxed in cases of 12. Each MRE contains a
full meal packet in a flexible bag. The cases and bags for military
MREs are marked with the words "U.S. Government Property, Commercial
Resale Is Unlawful." Although we do not consider MREs to be sensitive
property, military MREs are procured by government entities using
taxpayer dollars and are intended to be consumed by individuals from
authorized organizations and activities. Consequently, if military MREs
are sold to the general public on the Internet, they are clearly not
reaching their intended recipients and represent a waste of taxpayer
dollars. Since service members are not authorized to take MREs and sell
them for personal gain, the vast majority of the military MREs for sale
on the Internet represent stolen military property.
During our investigation, we purchased numerous cases of MREs from eBay
and Craigslist sellers. The sellers were mostly civilians. Three
examples of our investigative work related to military MREs follows:
* One civilian seller in Louisiana[Footnote 7] indicated that she has
been selling military MREs on eBay for a number of years. She said that
she acquires the MREs from service members assigned to a nearby
military base, and that they arrive at her home unannounced. She added
that most of the service members have 2 or 3 MRE cases but that others
have had as many as 10 to 12 cases. She told us that she does not know
any of the service members or where they get the MREs, but suggested
they are "left over" from field exercises. She said that she usually
pays service members about $20 per case in cash and that she can sell
the cases on eBay for about $55 per case. We reviewed eBay records and
learned that, from September 2006 through February 2008, she completed
eBay auctions totaling about $55,000 for MREs. These MREs were likely
stolen from the nearby military base. We referred this case to Army CID
for criminal investigation.
* A second seller living in Phenix City, Alabama, is employed as a
civilian aircraft mechanic at Fort Benning, Georgia. She told us that
she obtains military MREs from dumpsters at Fort Benning. She stated
that she visits the dumpsters several times a week, removing unopened
MREs from the dumpsters and cleaning, packaging, and mailing them to
her eBay customers. According to sales data provided by eBay, from July
30, 2006, to February 6, 2008, this individual had completed
approximately $54,000 in MRE auctions. Because of the volume of sales
activity we referred this case to Army CID for criminal investigation.
* A third seller was a Private First Class in the U.S. Army stationed
in Camp Casey, South Korea. Based on our referral, Army CID executed a
search warrant at the seller's residence and discovered a substantial
amount of stolen U.S. military property, as well as nearly $2,000 in
cash. According to Army officials, the seller was charged with drug
possession and use in the summer of 2006. He was demoted and placed in
a supply clerk position in charge of MRE inventories while awaiting
discharge from the military, which gave him the opportunity to steal
MREs and sell them over eBay. Army CID linked the seller to a series of
unsolved larcenies on base. The seller was sentenced to over 3 years in
prison.
eBay and Craigslist Have Few Safeguards to Prevent the Sale of Stolen
and Sensitive U.S. Military Items:
Advertisements for the sensitive defense-related items we purchased
were not removed by eBay and Craigslist Web site administrators,
allowing us to complete the transactions. Both Web sites maintain
published lists of items that are prohibited from sale, including
stolen items, but only eBay contains warnings related to sensitive
defense-related or export-controlled items even though both Web sites
have an international reach. eBay employs administrative staff and
investigative teams intended to deter fraud and prohibited sales from
occurring on the site. Meanwhile, Craigslist has a smaller staff and
largely relies on its user community for identifying inappropriate
advertisements or postings. Officials with both Web sites told us they
cooperate with law enforcement agencies to stop the sale of illegal,
counterfeit, or stolen items, and identify and deter individuals from
using these Internet services for a fraudulent or improper purpose.
Generally, neither eBay nor Craigslist can incur criminal liability for
being the conduit through which stolen or export-controlled items are
sold, even if the items are sold overseas. Because the Web sites never
take possession of the goods, do not set the price of transactions, and
do not actually deliver the items, no relevant federal criminal statute
applies to their activities. Table 5 summarizes the policies, proactive
enforcement efforts, and penalties that each of these Internet
companies maintain to deter the sale of prohibited items.
Table 5: eBay and Craigslist Policies and Procedures:
Policy or procedure: Prohibited items list includes stolen items?;
eBay: Yes;
Craigslist: Yes.
Policy or procedure: Prohibited items list includes items that have not
been demilitarized (i.e., sensitive defense-related items)?;
eBay: Yes, but is listed only under the "Firearms, Weapons, and Knives"
category related to ordnance;
Craigslist: Not explicitly mentioned.
Policy or procedure: Prohibited items list includes export-controlled
items?;
eBay: Yes; contains information on international sales and provides a
ink to [hyperlink, http://www.export.gov];
Craigslist: No; provides a link to Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control.
Policy or procedure: Prevents the sale of property on its prohibited
lists?;
eBay: Prohibited Item Team attempts to detect prohibited items and
delete prohibited postings. Additionally, users can report prohibited
items being sold or other violations of policies;
Craigslist: Relies on users to detect and report advertisements for
prohibited items.
Policy or procedure: Works with law enforcement agencies?;
eBay: Fraud Investigations Team cooperates with law enforcement to
report information about sellers and makes proactive referrals; does
not require subpoena to disclose seller information;
Craigslist: One individual at Craigslist is tasked to work with law
enforcement and requires subpoena to disclose seller information.
Policy or procedure: Have penalties for non-compliance with policies?;
eBay: Penalties for violating policies include property listing
cancellation, limits on account privileges, elimination of "Power
Seller" status, and suspension of accounts;
Craigslist: Penalties include deletion of user's account and other
attempts to prevent the user from accessing the site.
Source: GAO analysis of eBay and Craigslist policies and procedures,
and information provided by respective Web site officials.
[End of table]
eBay:
Advertisements for the sensitive defense-related items we purchased
were not removed by eBay administrators, allowing us to complete the
transactions. According to its prohibited items list, eBay prohibits
stolen property from being sold. eBay also provides extensive
information about international trading on its prohibited items list,
including a link to a government Web site on export controls. There are
no explicit references to the sale of military MREs and other stolen
military property on the prohibited items list. However, eBay does
discuss a prohibition on defense-related items that have not been
disposed in accordance with DOD demilitarization policies. According to
an eBay official with whom we spoke, his company has created two teams
that inspect user sales--the Fraud Investigations Team and the
Prohibited Items Team. The Fraud Investigations Team deals directly
with law enforcement organizations and provides information on sales or
seller activity. We received invaluable assistance from the Fraud
Investigations Team during our investigation. The official stated that
the Fraud Investigations Team also proactively refers cases to relevant
law enforcement agencies for further investigation and prosecution.
Meanwhile, the Prohibited Items Team has an automatic filtering system
to identify potentially prohibited sales and responds to reports on
prohibited activity. If the Prohibited Items Team discovers a
prohibited item, its mandate is to remove the advertisement for the
item, educate the seller, and suspend the seller's account if the
activity continues. When we asked the eBay official about the sale of
military body armor on eBay, he admitted that it was a difficult issue
for eBay because some body armor can be sold legally. He said that the
Fraud Investigations Team does not scan eBay sales to try to identify
what body armor is illegal to sell, e.g., body armor that has been
stolen from the military. Regarding the sale of military MREs, the
official stated that "nobody has indicated to us that it's illegal to
sell MREs." To penalize users who violate eBay policies, eBay officials
can cancel listings, limit account privileges, eliminate users' "Power
Seller" status, and suspend accounts.
Craigslist:
Advertisements for the sensitive defense-related items we purchased
were not removed by Craigslist administrators, allowing us to complete
the transactions. Craigslist policies and procedures prohibit the sale
of stolen property. However, its prohibited items list does not mention
sensitive defense-related items, export controls, or international
trading despite the fact that the Web site serves cities around the
world. Further, there are no explicit references to the sale of
military MREs and other stolen military property on the prohibited
items list. Because these items are not included on the list,
Craigslist officials and users are unlikely to prohibit these sales.
Craigslist maintains a much smaller staff than eBay (25 people
according to its Web site). When we asked a Craigslist manager about
whether his company had a Fraud Investigations Team (FIT), he said, "I
am the FIT for Craigslist." This official added that Craigslist relies
primarily on its user community to identify suspicious advertisements
and report prohibited item sales. We observed this in several cases
during our investigation, when questionable advertisements for weapons
and other obviously prohibited sales we identified were also apparently
noticed by Craigslist users, leading to removal of the items from the
Web site. The Craigslist official with whom we spoke indicated that
Craigslist works with law enforcement agencies but does not proactively
call issues to their attention. The official said that Craigslist
deletes advertisements for questionable items, such as body armor and
night vision goggles, when contacted by law enforcement. However,
unlike eBay, Craigslist will not provide seller information to a law
enforcement agency without a subpoena. To penalize users who do not
comply with Craigslist policies, company officials can delete the
user's account or otherwise attempt to prevent the user from accessing
the site.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D.
Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. Major contributors to this
testimony include Mario Artesiano, Johana Ayers, Nabajyoti Barkakati,
Norman Burrell, Shafee Carnegie, Bruce Causseaux, Thomas Denomme,
Dennis Fauber, Richard Guthrie, Kenneth Hill, Jason Kelly, Barbara
Lewis, Andrew McIntosh, James Murphy, Gertrude Moreland, and Richard
Newbold.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Government Liquidation Web site, which is run by a DOD
contractor, is the mechanism the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) uses to
sell items from its excess property system to the general public. See
GAO, Sales of Sensitive Military Property to the Public, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-929R] (Washington, D.C.: July
6, 2007); GAO, DOD Excess Property: Control Breakdowns Present
Significant Security Risk and Continuing Waste and Inefficiency,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-943] (Washington,
D.C.: July 25, 2006); GAO, DOD Excess Property: Management Control
Breakdowns Result in Substantial Waste and Inefficiency, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-277] (Washington, D.C.: May
13, 2005); and GAO, DOD Excess Property: Risk Assessment Needed on
Public Sales of Equipment That Could Be Used to Make Biological Agents,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-15NI] (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003).
[2] An NSN is a 13-digit number that identifies standard use inventory
items. The first 4 digits of the NSN represent the Federal Supply
Classification, such as 8430 for men's footwear, followed by a 2-digit
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) code and a 7-digit
designation for a specific type of boot, such as cold weather boot.
FedLog is the logistics information system published by the Defense
Logistics Information Service (DLIS). FedLog lists the demil code
associated with each item in the system.
[3] See GAO, Military Meals, Ready-to-Eat sold on eBay, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-410R] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
13, 2006).
[4] An individual may be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 if he or she
"receives, conceals, or retains [property of the United States] with
intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been
embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted."
[5] 18 U.S.C. § 641.
[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-410R].
[7] We have removed detailed information about the location of this
seller because of an ongoing investigation by Army CID, which was based
on our referral.
[End of section]
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