Military Transformation
DOD Needs to Strengthen Implementation of Its Global Strike Concept and Provide a Comprehensive Investment Approach for Acquiring Needed Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-08-325 April 30, 2008To increase the range of options available to the President, the Department of Defense (DOD) is taking steps to develop a portfolio of capabilities, referred to as global strike, to rapidly plan and deliver limited duration and extended range precision strikes against highly valued assets. GAO was asked to assess (1) whether DOD has clearly defined and instilled a common understanding and approach for global strike throughout the department, (2) the extent to which DOD has developed capabilities needed for global strike, and (3) the extent to which DOD has identified the funding requirements and developed an investment strategy for acquiring new global strike capabilities. GAO reviewed and analyzed plans and studies within DOD, the services, and several commands on global strike implementation and capabilities development.
DOD has taken a number of steps to implement its global strike concept and has generally assigned responsibilities for the planning, execution, and support of global strike operations. However, key stakeholders, particularly the geographic combatant commanders, have different interpretations of the concept, scope, range, and potential use of capabilities needed to implement global strike. Several factors affect the understanding and communication of DOD's global strike concept among key stakeholders, including the extent to which DOD has (1) defined global strike, (2) incorporated global strike into joint doctrine, (3) conducted outreach and communication activities with key stakeholders, and (4) involved stakeholders in joint exercises and other training involving global strike. GAO's prior work examining successful organizational transformations shows the necessity to communicate to stakeholders often and early with clear and specific objectives on what is to be achieved and what roles are assigned. Without a complete and clearly articulated concept that is well communicated and practiced with key stakeholders, DOD could encounter difficulties in fully implementing its concept and building the necessary relationships for carrying out global strike operations. DOD has underway or completed several global strike assessments to identify potential conventional offensive strike weapons systems, particularly those for prompt global strike, which would provide capabilities sometime after 2018. However, DOD has not fully assessed the requirements or coordinated improvements for related enabling capabilities that are critical to the planning and execution of successful global strike operations. These critical enabling capabilities include intelligence collection and dissemination, surveillance and reconnaissance, and command and control, communications, and battlefield damage assessment. Furthermore, DOD has not coordinated its efforts to improve these capabilities with potential offensive systems it intends to develop. Without fully assessing the enabling capabilities required or coordinating with other DOD studies, DOD might not make the best decision of which enabling capability to pursue in meeting global strike requirements. DOD has not yet established a prioritized investment strategy that integrates its efforts to assess global strike options and makes choices among alternatives given the department's long-term fiscal challenges. GAO's prior work has shown that a long-term and comprehensive investment approach is an important tool in an organization's decision-making process to define direction, establish priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions needed to achieve goals. While DOD studies and officials recognize a need for a broad, holistic view of global strike development, DOD has not identified and assessed all global-strike-related capabilities and technologies and has not explained how its plans to link long-term studies to identify potential weapons systems will result in a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-325, Military Transformation: DOD Needs to Strengthen Implementation of Its Global Strike Concept and Provide a Comprehensive Investment Approach for Acquiring Needed Capabilities
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2008:
Military transformation:
DOD Needs to Strengthen Implementation of Its Global Strike Concept and
Provide a Comprehensive Investment Approach for Acquiring Needed
Capabilities:
GAO-08-325:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-325, a report to Congressional Requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
To increase the range of options available to the President, the
Department of Defense (DOD) is taking steps to develop a portfolio of
capabilities, referred to as global strike, to rapidly plan and deliver
limited duration and extended range precision strikes against highly
valued assets. GAO was asked to assess (1) whether DOD has clearly
defined and instilled a common understanding and approach for global
strike throughout the department, (2) the extent to which DOD has
developed capabilities needed for global strike, and (3) the extent to
which DOD has identified the funding requirements and developed an
investment strategy for acquiring new global strike capabilities. GAO
reviewed and analyzed plans and studies within DOD, the services, and
several commands on global strike implementation and capabilities
development.
What GAO Found:
DOD has taken a number of steps to implement its global strike concept
and has generally assigned responsibilities for the planning,
execution, and support of global strike operations. However, key
stakeholders, particularly the geographic combatant commanders, have
different interpretations of the concept, scope, range, and potential
use of capabilities needed to implement global strike. Several factors
affect the understanding and communication of DOD‘s global strike
concept among key stakeholders, including the extent to which DOD has
(1) defined global strike, (2) incorporated global strike into joint
doctrine, (3) conducted outreach and communication activities with key
stakeholders, and (4) involved stakeholders in joint exercises and
other training involving global strike. GAO‘s prior work examining
successful organizational transformations shows the necessity to
communicate to stakeholders often and early with clear and specific
objectives on what is to be achieved and what roles are assigned.
Without a complete and clearly articulated concept that is well
communicated and practiced with key stakeholders, DOD could encounter
difficulties in fully implementing its concept and building the
necessary relationships for carrying out global strike operations.
DOD has underway or completed several global strike assessments to
identify potential conventional offensive strike weapons systems,
particularly those for prompt global strike, which would provide
capabilities sometime after 2018. However, DOD has not fully assessed
the requirements or coordinated improvements for related enabling
capabilities that are critical to the planning and execution of
successful global strike operations. These critical enabling
capabilities include intelligence collection and dissemination,
surveillance and reconnaissance, and command and control,
communications, and battlefield damage assessment. Furthermore, DOD has
not coordinated its efforts to improve these capabilities with
potential offensive systems it intends to develop. Without fully
assessing the enabling capabilities required or coordinating with other
DOD studies, DOD might not make the best decision of which enabling
capability to pursue in meeting global strike requirements.
DOD has not yet established a prioritized investment strategy that
integrates its efforts to assess global strike options and makes
choices among alternatives given the department‘s long-term fiscal
challenges. GAO‘s prior work has shown that a long-term and
comprehensive investment approach is an important tool in an
organization‘s decision-making process to define direction, establish
priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the
actions needed to achieve goals. While DOD studies and officials
recognize a need for a broad, holistic view of global strike
development, DOD has not identified and assessed all global-strike-
related capabilities and technologies and has not explained how its
plans to link long-term studies to identify potential weapons systems
will result in a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for
global strike.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends several actions to strengthen DOD implementation of its
global strike concept by improving communications and mutual
understanding among stakeholders; providing a complete assessment of
supporting capabilities needed to conduct global strike; assessing the
full breadth of global-strike-related capabilities and technologies;
and ensuring that the results of related studies are integrated into a
prioritized investment strategy for global strike. DOD agreed with the
report and with GAO‘s eight recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, chick on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-325]. For more
information, contact Janet St. Laurent, 202-512-4402,
stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Taken Steps to Implement Global Strike, but Its Concept Is
Interpreted Differently by Key Stakeholders:
DOD Is Assessing Several Potential Offensive Strike Weapons Systems for
Global Strike but Has Not Fully Assessed Related Enabling Capabilities:
DOD Has Identified and Tracked Some Investments Related to Global
Strike but Has Not Developed a Prioritized Global Strike Investment
Strategy:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: GAO's Analysis of DOD's Research and Development Efforts
for Global Strike in Its Future Years Defense Program:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Examples of Definitions Used by DOD to Describe Global Strike:
Table 2: DOD Long-term Global Strike Studies to Identify Potential
Offensive Strike Systems:
Table 3: Organizations and Offices Contacted During Our Review:
Table 4: Global Strike and Related Global Strike Research and
Development Efforts in DOD's FYDP for Fiscal Years 2007 through 2009
Identified by GAO:
Figures:
Figure 1: Support Provided by Enabling Capabilities in the Conduct of
Global Strike Operations:
Figure 2: Number of Global Strike and Related Research and Development
Programs, Projects, and Activities by DOD Organization:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FYDP: Future Years Defense Program:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 30, 2008:
The Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Terry Everett:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD), in its December 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review,[Footnote 1] provided a conceptual framework for transforming
U.S. strategic capabilities to address the new security risks the
United States faces. The review proposed a New Triad that would bring
together the capabilities of nuclear and conventional (nonnuclear)
offensive strike forces, active and passive defenses, a revitalized
defense infrastructure, and enhanced command and control, planning, and
intelligence capabilities. The synergy realized with the integration of
these capabilities, according to DOD officials, would provide the
President and other senior decision makers with a wider range of
military options against emerging threats while reducing U.S. reliance
on the use of nuclear weapons.[Footnote 2]
In transforming offensive strike capabilities for the New Triad, DOD
plans to develop a portfolio of capabilities, referred to as global
strike, that would provide the United States with an ability to rapidly
plan and deliver limited duration and extended range precision strikes
against highly valued assets, such as weapons of mass destruction
production, storage, and delivery systems and adversary leadership
power bases. To provide a joint focus for global strike, the President,
in January 2003, assigned the U.S. Strategic Command with
responsibility for providing integrated planning and command and
control support to deliver rapid, extended range, precision effects for
global strike missions conducted by the geographic combatant
commanders, or in some scenarios, its own global strike missions. While
nuclear systems would be part of the portfolio, DOD has placed
significant emphasis on the role that kinetic and nonkinetic[Footnote
3] conventional capabilities would provide in generating the desired
strategic effects. DOD envisions that global strike missions could use
existing U.S. conventional military capabilities, depending on the
desired effect to be achieved and the operational scenario.
However, DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the lack of
a prompt, precise, long-range conventional strike capability for some
time-critical situations as an important gap in U.S. global strike
capabilities. In a September 2007 classified report, we discussed DOD
efforts to develop a near-term solution to convert some of its Trident
submarine-launched missiles as a means to deliver an intercontinental
prompt conventional strike capability. DOD is also undertaking or has
completed several analytical efforts to assess mid-and long-term
options for prompt, long-range global strike and examining other
conventional strike capability options, such as a new long-range bomber
that would be available for global strike missions in less time-
sensitive situations. In the conference report for the defense fiscal
year 2008 appropriation's bill,[Footnote 4] the conferees agreed to
provide $100 million for a new prompt global strike program element
within the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide
appropriation for development of promising conventional prompt global
strike technologies.
As DOD seeks to transform its forces and organization to better meet
the demands of the new security environment, we have reported[Footnote
5] that the department is faced with identifying new warfighting
capabilities it needs, including critical technologies, while at the
same time striking an affordable and sustainable balance in its
spending for current and future investments. Furthermore, to
successfully transform itself, DOD also must reshape its policies and
practices and the cultural perspectives of various organizations that
have responsibilities for implementing the required changes.
At your request, we reviewed DOD's actions to implement its global
strike concept and increase U.S. conventional global strike
capabilities. Specifically, you asked us to determine (1) whether DOD
has clearly defined and instilled a common understanding and approach
to its global strike concept throughout the department, (2) the extent
to which DOD has assessed and developed capabilities needed for global
strike, and (3) the extent to which DOD has identified the funding
requirements and developed an investment strategy for acquiring new
global strike capabilities.
To identify whether DOD has clearly defined and instilled a common
understanding and approach to its global strike mission, we reviewed
DOD guidance, concepts, studies and assessments, directives, briefings,
status reports, and other pertinent documentation. We also interviewed
and discussed this information with officials at the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, Departments of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Pacific Command,
U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic
Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Air Combat Command, and Air Force
Space Command. We also reviewed documentation on the department's
efforts to develop capabilities for global strike, as well as, the
results of studies and other assessments to determine the capabilities
needed and potential solutions for improving global strike operations.
To determine the extent to which DOD has identified the funding
requirements and developed an investment strategy for acquiring new
global strike capabilities, we reviewed documentation and interviewed
DOD officials on the department's use of its Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) database[Footnote 6] and related supporting
documentation to identify and manage possible programs that may
contribute to global strike capabilities. We conducted an analysis of
the FYDP and related supporting budget documentation for the
President's fiscal year 2008 budget submission to Congress to determine
the range of possible programs with global strike application. We
conducted this performance audit from November 2006 through February
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based for our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
DOD has taken a number of steps to implement its global strike concept
and has generally assigned responsibilities for the planning,
execution, and support of global strike operations. However, key
stakeholders, particularly the geographic combatant commanders, do not
interpret the concept uniformly, such as the differences between global
strike and other strike operations that are conducted by the geographic
combatant commands. This disparity in stakeholder interpretation
affects their ability to clearly distinguish the scope, range, and
potential use of capabilities needed to implement global strike and
under what conditions global strike would be used in U.S. military
operations. Our prior work examining successful organizational
transformations shows the necessity to communicate to stakeholders
often and early with clear and specific objectives on what is to be
achieved and what roles are assigned. The U.S. Strategic Command has
played a major role in DOD's implementation of global strike, but
several factors continue to affect other key stakeholders'
interpretation and communication of the global strike concept. First,
DOD has not provided a universally accepted definition, which,
according to DOD officials, can lead to different interpretations of
the term among the combatant commands, services, and DOD organizations.
Second, DOD has not included a detailed discussion of global strike in
any existing or proposed joint doctrine publications. Third, geographic
combatant command and service officials believe that the Strategic
Command should conduct more outreach to mitigate any misconceptions
commands may have about global strike, particularly in light of
frequent staff turnover. Fourth, stakeholders have not widely
participated in joint exercises and other training, which can increase
their understanding of global strike. Without a complete and clearly
articulated concept that is well communicated and practiced with key
stakeholders, DOD could encounter difficulties in fully implementing
its concept and building the necessary relationships for carrying out
global strike operations. To strengthen DOD's efforts to implement its
global strike concept and improve communications and mutual
understanding within DOD, we are recommending that DOD develop a
universally accepted joint definition of global strike, incorporate
global strike more fully in joint doctrine, establish a communications
and outreach approach for global strike to help foster acceptance of
the concept among stakeholders, and integrate global strike into more
joint exercises and other training activities.
DOD has underway or completed several global strike studies to identify
potential conventional offensive strike weapons systems, particularly
those for prompt global strike, which would provide global strike
capabilities sometime after 2018. However, it has not fully assessed
the requirements or coordinated improvements for related enabling
capabilities that are critical to the planning and execution of
successful global strike operations with the potential offensive
systems it intends to develop. Critical enabling capabilities include
intelligence collection and dissemination, surveillance and
reconnaissance, and command and control, communications, and
battlefield damage assessment. Although DOD has studies underway to
develop prompt global strike capabilities and to examine potential
offensive strike systems, these studies are limited to a particular
focus of global strike or a particular weapon system and do not provide
a complete assessment of enabling capabilities needed to support global
strike operations. In addition, several DOD officials involved in
assessing potential new global strike capabilities believe that
enabling capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, are not being fully considered in global strike weapons
studies because of assumptions that the capabilities will be available
when any future system is fielded or because study staff do not have
the clearances needed to access information on all DOD efforts for
improving enabling capabilities. Furthermore, DOD has not coordinated
all of its efforts to improve enabling capabilities with its
assessments for new offensive global strike systems to better
understand the range of enabling capabilities being developed and their
estimated availability. Unless it fully assesses the enabling
capabilities required or coordinates with other DOD studies, DOD might
not make the best decision of which enabling capability to pursue to
meet global strike requirements. As a result, we are recommending that
DOD conduct a comprehensive assessment of enabling capabilities to
identify any specific global strike operational requirements and
priorities and when these capabilities are needed to support future
offensive strike systems, in addition to linking its efforts with other
department efforts examining potential strike systems for global
strike.
While DOD plans investments in a range of global-strike-related
capabilities, it has not yet begun to develop a prioritized investment
strategy that integrates its efforts to assess global strike options
and makes choices among alternatives in light of the department's long-
term fiscal challenges. Such a strategy could initially capture
currently planned investments and be refined and updated as DOD further
develops its global strike concept and identifies additional
capabilities that may be needed. Our prior work has shown that a long-
term and comprehensive investment approach is an important tool in an
organization's decision-making process to define direction, establish
priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the
actions needed to achieve goals. DOD long-term studies to identify
potential offensive weapons systems for global strike, however, provide
only limited investment information, and DOD officials have not clearly
explained how the department plans to link these studies in developing
a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike. In
addition, DOD has not fully assessed its Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), a tool DOD uses to project resources and proposed
appropriations to support its programs, projects, and activities, to
determine the extent that current development programs, projects, and
activities could contribute to global strike operations. Our own
analysis of the FYDP identified 94 program elements that would provide
funding for 135 programs, projects, and activities having possible
application for global strike. DOD organizations have identified and
tracked some of these efforts, but without performing a comprehensive
assessment of the FYDP to identify the full extent of potential global
strike capabilities being developed, DOD does not have a complete
understanding of actions being taken that could increase those
capabilities and would have difficulty developing a prioritized long-
term investment strategy. DOD is examining portfolio management
approaches as a means to collectively align investments with its
strategic goals and performance measures and provide a sound basis to
justify the commitment of resources. According to the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Report, this approach enables decision makers to make informed
choices about how to reallocate resources to deliver needed
capabilities to the joint force more rapidly and efficiently. We are
recommending that DOD perform a comprehensive review of all
capabilities being developed within DOD's FYDP to determine the extent
to which these capabilities contribute or can be leveraged for global
strike and ensure that the results of the various studies to identify
potential strike systems for global strike are evaluated and integrated
into a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all eight
of our recommendations. DOD's comments are discussed in detail later in
this report and reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided two
technical comments, which we incorporated in this report.
Background:
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review envisioned that the New Triad would
include the majority of current and planned conventional strike
capabilities, as well as a family of unique global strike capabilities,
to address the new security risks faced by the United States. Current
global strike assets could include long-range precision attacks
delivered from aircraft or naval platforms, such as B-52H bombers
equipped with conventional air-launched cruise missiles and surface
ships and submarines outfitted with sea-based Tomahawk land attack
missiles. Use of nonkinetic capabilities, such as information
operations, may also be needed to defeat an adversary's capability to
deny U.S. forces access to areas or to achieve the surprise necessary
to defeat high-value/high-payoff targets such as weapons of mass
destruction, leadership, or command and control capabilities in more
difficult environments. Successful conduct of global strike operations
also is likely to require several enabling capabilities such as
intelligence collection and dissemination, surveillance and
reconnaissance, command and control, communications, and battlefield
damage assessment to support all aspects of the planning and conduct of
missions. Most of the platforms, weapons, nonkinetic assets and
supporting command, control, communications, and computers and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities used to
support the global strike mission are not unique to global strike.
These assets also provide general purpose capabilities used to support
a variety of other missions conducted by the geographic combatant
commands. However, DOD is studying several new capabilities to address
shortfalls in prompt and global range conventional capabilities.
Many DOD organizations, including the Joint Staff, military services,
combatant commands, and defense agencies, have responsibilities for
developing and implementing the global strike concept, identifying and
acquiring needed capabilities, and conducting global strike missions.
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, two organizations have
key responsibilities for overseeing and managing global strike related
activities:
* The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is
responsible for developing the policy and guidance for global strike.
The office is also responsible for preparing DOD's annual report to
Congress on global strike, which includes information on the purpose,
mission, assets, potential target, desired capabilities, and conditions
for execution.[Footnote 7]
* The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics is responsible for providing oversight for
the development and fielding of global strike capabilities. The office
also has responsibilities for various DOD initiatives to improve the
department's acquisition processes and management of investments.
Additionally, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for assembling and
distributing the FYDP, which is an automated database that DOD uses to
report the estimated projected resources and proposed appropriations to
support DOD programs, projects, and activities, including those related
to global strike capabilities. The FYDP includes cost estimates for the
fiscal year reflected in the current budget request and at least 4
subsequent years.
The Joint Staff is responsible for providing oversight of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System process to identify improvements to existing
capabilities and guide development of new capabilities from a joint
perspective that recognizes the need for trade-off analysis. The
various global strike analyses conducted as part of this process are
intended to result in a set of potential solutions, including
additional resources or changes to doctrine and training designed to
correct capability shortcomings. The Joint Staff, along with the
Commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, have responsibilities for
overseeing development of joint doctrine and managing and providing
support for joint exercises of the combatant commands. Additionally,
the military services and defense agencies also have important roles in
identifying and acquiring potential technologies and weapons systems
development programs that could provide global strike capabilities.
The U.S. Strategic Command has a significant role in implementing the
global strike concept and supporting global strike operations. For its
global strike mission, the command is responsible for providing
integrated planning and command and control support to deliver rapid,
extended range, and precision kinetic and nonkinetic effects in support
of theater and national objectives, and in some situations, executing
command and control of selected global strike missions. The command
also advocates for global strike capabilities on behalf of the
combatant commands, services, and defense agencies through such means
as preparing and reviewing global-strike-related documentation and
analyzing needed capabilities. The command supports other combatant
commands during day-to-day operations by integrating their capabilities
for potential global strike missions through training, exercises, and
planning activities. During a crisis, the command, in close
coordination with other combatant commands, would develop plans and
courses of action for executing global strike missions on very tight
timelines for the Secretary of Defense or the President. The command
also has responsibilities for other mission areas that support global
strike, including oversight of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, and global command and control; DOD information
operations; space operations; and integrating and synchronizing DOD's
efforts in combating weapons of mass destruction.[Footnote 8]
DOD Has Taken Steps to Implement Global Strike, but Its Concept Is
Interpreted Differently by Key Stakeholders:
DOD has taken a number of steps to implement its global strike concept
and has generally assigned responsibilities for the planning,
execution, and support of global strike operations. However, key
stakeholders, particularly the geographic combatant commanders, have
different interpretations of the scope, range, and potential use of
capabilities needed to implement global strike and under what
conditions global strike would be used in U.S. military operations.
Several factors affect understanding and communication of the global
strike concept among key stakeholders, including the extent to which
DOD has (1) defined global strike, (2) incorporated global strike into
joint doctrine, (3) conducted outreach and communication activities
with key stakeholders, and (4) involved stakeholders in joint exercises
and other training involving global strike. Without a complete and
clearly articulated concept that is well communicated and practiced
with key stakeholders, DOD could encounter difficulties in fully
implementing its concept and building the necessary relationships for
carrying out global strike operations.
DOD Has Taken a Number of Steps to Implement Its Global Strike Concept:
DOD has taken a number of steps to implement its global strike concept
since completing its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which provided the
rationale for global strike. Specifically, the U.S. Strategic Command
has played a major role in DOD's implementation of global strike by
helping to shape the concept, developing new processes and procedures,
and providing inputs in identifying and developing new capabilities.
Since issuing its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD has conducted
several analyses to evaluate desired capabilities and identify
capability gaps. In January 2005, DOD completed the Global Strike Joint
Integrating Concept, which describes how a global strike joint task
force would operate, the time frame and environment in which it must
operate, its required capabilities, and its defining physical and
operating characteristics. The concept was used as input for analyses
conducted under the Joint Staff's Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System requirements process to identify the desired
capabilities and shortfalls in current global strike capabilities. The
first two of the three analyses, the functional area analysis and
functional needs analysis, were completed in 2005. The functional area
analysis synthesized existing guidance to specify the military problem
to be studied. The analysis identified the specific military tasks the
force is expected to perform, the conditions under which these tasks
are to be performed, and the required standards of performance. The
functional needs analysis examined that problem; assessed how well DOD
can address the problem given its current program; identified
capability gaps and shortfalls, risk areas, and redundancies; and
identified the capabilities DOD should develop. The last of the
analyses, Global Strike Raid Evaluation of Alternatives,[Footnote 9]
will make recommendations on potential approaches to overcome
capability gaps by way of doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership, personnel, and facilities actions. The Joint Staff plans to
complete this analysis in May 2008. DOD also has several similar
analytical efforts underway or completed, such as the Air Force-led
Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives, to identify potential
weapons systems solutions for global strike.
Moreover, the U.S. Strategic Command has been implementing its assigned
planning and command and control support responsibilities for the
global strike mission. In addition to the support its headquarters
provides for DOD efforts to implement and develop global strike
capabilities, the command established a joint functional component
command for global strike and integration to provide day-to-day
management for its global strike mission. The command has also
initiated several activities including improving processes and
procedures for command and control, communications, and decision making
and the management of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets, and incorporating global strike operations into its concept
plan. For example, development of adaptive planning systems such as the
theater integrated planning subsystem and the integrated strategic
planning and analysis network will allow Strategic Command planners to
collaborate with and support the geographic combatant commands.
Global Strike Is Interpreted Differently among Combatant Command and
Service Stakeholders:
While key stakeholders have been involved in various global strike
development efforts, global strike is interpreted differently among
combatant command and service officials, who have significant roles and
responsibilities in planning, coordinating, and executing global strike
operations. DOD, Joint Staff, combatant command, and service officials
we spoke with generally believe that global strike is a broad and
unbounded concept that could include a wide range of forces and other
capabilities and involve different scenarios. As a result, the concept
can be difficult to understand and creates different interpretations
among stakeholders. For example, officials from the services offered a
range of different interpretations of global strike operations:
* At a roundtable discussion we held with a number of officials at the
U.S. Pacific Air Force Command, which supports the U.S. Pacific
Command, the consensus reached was that global strike was a mission
associated with the U.S. Strategic Command and the strikes conducted
would originate from the continental United States. Some of the
officials said that global strike was a special capability reserved
only for the President, Secretary of Defense, and a Joint Force
Commander.
* U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters representatives told us that global
strike implied that the capability would originate from outside the
geographic command's region and would not include maritime-based
targets.
* Air Force Air Combat Command representatives told us that they viewed
global strike as encompassing a mission that was an autonomous event;
had a global element; occurred in days rather than months; and involved
no build-up of forces in the area of the strike prior to the mission.
Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command officials
we spoke with had difficulty distinguishing the differences between
global strike and theater strike operations, which are strike
operations conducted by a geographic command against potential targets
within its area of responsibility. U.S. Pacific Command headquarters
officials told us that they did not see a clear distinction between the
characteristics and objectives of global strike and a theater strike.
The officials said that operations in theater conducted by their
command would address all potential targets, including high-value ones
that are also identified as potential targets for global strike. Some
Pacific Command officials viewed global strike as a unique capability
that is requested by the theater commander when it is considered a
better option. Other Pacific Command officials said the only difference
between the two types of strike operations is whether the U.S.
Strategic Command or the affected combatant command is assigned lead
responsibility for the planning and/or execution of the operation. U.S.
Central Command officials also agreed that global strike is currently a
broad and unbounded concept that can, depending upon interpretation,
take in much of current theater operations.
Different Stakeholder Interpretation of Global Strike Exists Due to
Several Factors:
We identified four factors that have led to stakeholders' varying
perceptions of the global strike concept. These factors include the
extent to which DOD has (1) defined global strike, (2) incorporated
global strike into joint doctrine, (3) conducted outreach and
communication activities with key stakeholders, and (4) involved
stakeholders in joint exercises and other training involving global
strike. However, while DOD has taken some actions to address each of
these factors, further management actions are needed to foster better
understanding and communication with key stakeholders for global
strike.
DOD Has Not Clearly Defined Global Strike:
DOD uses several definitions to describe global strike in its key
studies, reports, and other documents. However, various officials from
a number of DOD organizations do not believe these definitions provide
a clear and consistent description of global strike. According to
officials in DOD's Program Analysis and Evaluation Office, global
strike is not well-defined and the term can mean different things among
the combatant commands, services, and DOD organizations. DOD Program
Analysis and Evaluation Office officials said that while a Senior
Warfighter Forum[Footnote 10] in August 2006, which was led by the U.S.
Strategic Command and included participants from the services,
combatant commands, and defense agencies, was able to reach a consensus
on a list of attributes for global strike capabilities, the forum was
unable to agree on a common definition for global strike. A senior
official in DOD's Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics said that DOD does not have a
common definition for global strike or for prompt global strike.
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics officials told us, however, that
DOD intends to reach agreement with stakeholders on a common global
strike definition through the series of ongoing studies on potential
global strike weapons systems that are nearing completion. Table 1
provides some examples of the definitions used within DOD to describe
global strike.
Table 1: Examples of Definitions Used by DOD to Describe Global Strike:
Definition of global strike: "...the capability for accelerated
planning and execution using the full range of kinetic and non-kinetic
effects, special operations force capabilities in support of national
or theater commanders' objectives.";
Document: Report to Congress: Global Strike Plan, The Office of the
Secretary of Defense, June 2004.
Definition of global strike: "...responsive joint operations that
strike enemy high value/payoff targets, as an integral part of joint
force operations conducted to gain and maintain battlespace access,
achieve other desired effects and set conditions to achieve strategic
and operational objectives.";
Document: Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept, Department of
Defense, January 2005.
Definition of global strike: "...the ability to rapidly plan and
deliver limited-duration and extended-range attacks to achieve
precision effects against highly valued adversary assets.";
Document: Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Department of
Defense, July 2006.
Definition of global strike: "The capability to rapidly attack fleeting
or emerging high-value targets without warning, anywhere on the globe
to meet national objectives. Global strike is also the capability to
neutralize the adversary's anti-access systems, paving the way for
follow-on forces.";
Document: Air Force Concepts of Operations, Department of the Air
Force, December 27, 2006.
Definition of global strike: "...as rapidly planned, limited-duration,
extended-range precision attacks that are conducted to achieve
strategic objectives. They may be executed against highly valued
adversary assets using lethal and nonlethal methods."[A];
Document: Homeland Security, Joint Publication 3-26, August 1, 2005,
and Homeland Defense, Joint Publication 3-27, July 12, 2007, Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Source: Multiple DOD sources.
[A] Joint Publication 3-27 states that the global strike term and its
definition are applicable only in the context of that publication and
cannot be referenced outside of the publication.
[End of table]
The lack of a universally accepted definition has hindered some of the
services from incorporating global strike into their documents. U.S.
Pacific Fleet representatives told us that because DOD has not provided
a common definition or bounded the global strike concept and mission
very well, the Pacific Fleet has not incorporated global strike into
its planning and training activities and documents. Additionally,
Department of the Army headquarters officials told us that, due to the
lack of an approved joint definition of global strike, the Army has yet
to incorporate global strike into its documents and publications. The
officials also said the role and responsibilities and contributions of
the Army for global strike operations have not been clearly defined in
global strike documents. The Army would likely play a role in global
strike operations by deploying follow-on forces after a global strike
attack to assess battle damage and provide security and civil
operations, according to the officials.
Officials at the U.S. Special Operations Command told us that the lack
of a universally accepted common definition would not affect the
successful planning and execution of a global strike operation. The
officials said that should a decision be made to conduct a global
strike operation, the specific details will be provided in various
orders prior to the operation. However, the officials stated that an
agreed upon definition that gave a specific description of the global
strike would provide everyone with a common point of departure and
clearer understanding of the term. U.S. Central Command officials
similarly agreed that a clear, accepted joint definition would help to
promote a more consistent interpretation of global strike and what it
entails. According to Air Force headquarters officials, while the Air
Force has developed a definition that focuses on its own forces'
contributions and support for global strike, a joint definition that is
generally accepted and used throughout DOD would provide common ground
among the services and DOD organizations for discussing and
interpreting global strike. Officials in the Joint Staff's Force
Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate likewise agreed that a
universally accepted global strike definition would promote greater
acceptance and understanding among DOD organizations.
Global Strike Has Not Been Widely Included in Joint Doctrine:
While the Joint Chiefs of Staff has included a short description of
global strike and the responsibilities of the U.S. Strategic Command
for the global strike mission in two joint doctrine publications for
homeland security and homeland defense,[Footnote 11] it has not
included a more detailed discussion of global strike operations in any
other existing or proposed doctrine publication. Joint doctrine
consists of the fundamental principles that guide the employment of
military forces in a coordinated action toward a common objective and
is meant to enhance the operational effectiveness of U.S. forces.
According to officials in the Joint Doctrine Group at the U.S. Joint
Forces Command, global strike and the mission responsibilities of the
U.S. Strategic Command were included in the homeland security and
homeland defense joint publications to cite an example of a possible
preemptive and/or offensive action that could be taken in defense of
the United States. The officials said the publications were not
intended to provide a comprehensive and specific discussion of global
strike operations but rather to discuss how global strike would
contribute to homeland security and defense objectives.
Although a proposed joint publication on strategic attack was to
include a more detailed discussion of global strike, the publication
was cancelled and there have been no other proposals for incorporating
such a discussion in any new or existing joint publication. Officials
in the Joint Forces Command's Joint Doctrine Group said that a detailed
discussion of global strike was to be included in a proposed joint
publication on strategic attack, which would have focused on the
strategic effects achieved at the theater operational and/or tactical
levels of war. In June 2005, U.S. Strategic Command, the lead sponsor
for the new publication, submitted a draft publication for review but
the publication was subsequently cancelled after it was determined to
be inconsistent with the approved Joint Staff guidance for preparing
the publication. According to Joint Doctrine Group officials, the
proposed publication on strategic attack would have overlapped with
other publications and did not provide any unique doctrinal
fundamentals that were not already covered in existing doctrine.
According to officials in Joint Forces Command's Joint Doctrine Group,
a proposal to include a more comprehensive discussion of global strike
in joint publications could be made to the Joint Staff and their group
would be responsible for conducting an analysis to determine the
proposal's validity. However, the officials said they were not aware of
any action by the U.S. Strategic Command or another organization to
propose that global strike be considered for a new joint publication or
incorporated into an existing one. The Joint Doctrine Group officials
told us they believe that a proposal has not been made because the
joint community may not consider global strike to be mature enough and
therefore be reluctant to incorporate it into joint doctrine until the
concept is better defined and demonstrated in joint exercises and
actual crises. U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that their
command had no current plans to resurrect the strategic attack
publication or propose one for global strike.
Although some officials in the joint community say that incorporating
global strike into joint doctrine is premature, several DOD officials
said that developing joint doctrine would promote understanding and
implementation of the concept. The Air Force's Air Combat Command and
U.S. Central Command officials told us that there is sufficient reason
to begin developing or incorporating global strike into existing
doctrine for those forces and capabilities that are currently available
to conduct a global strike operation. The Air Combat Command officials
said that because of the 2-year process to develop doctrine, it makes
sense to begin creating joint doctrine now for current capabilities.
The officials added that the resulting doctrine would be revised as
additional global strike capabilities, such as advanced prompt global
strike systems, become available. Additionally, a U.S. Central Command
official stated that the development of joint doctrine would help
clarify the global strike concept because it could assist operational
planners in explaining the situations where global strike would be a
good option and the responsibilities and expectations of the U.S.
Strategic Command and the geographic commands. Central Command
officials said that doctrine also could distinguish global strike from
other types of strike operations conducted by geographic combatant
commands. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's instruction on the
development of joint doctrine, joint doctrine standardizes the
terminology, training, relationships, responsibilities, and processes
among all U.S. forces to free joint force commanders and their staffs
to focus efforts on solving the strategic, operational, and tactical
problems confronting them.[Footnote 12] Without a more comprehensive
inclusion of global strike within joint doctrine for current
capabilities, the combatant commands and services will not have
complete guidance to further their understanding and effectively plan,
prepare, and deploy forces for global strike operations.
Opportunities Exist to Enhance U.S. Strategic Command's Outreach
Approach for Global Strike:
Although the U.S. Strategic Command has taken steps to explain and
promote understanding of global strike operations and its mission
responsibilities, various geographic combatant command and service
officials we spoke with generally said that the Strategic Command
should increase its global strike outreach activities (e.g., visits,
briefings, and education) to reach more staff throughout the commands
and services. These officials also said that these activities should be
provided on a continuous and consistent basis to reach command and
service staffs that experience frequent turnover. As part of its
responsibilities for the global strike mission, the Strategic Command
supports other combatant commanders and integrates the capabilities of
all affected combatant commands through training, exercises, and
planning for both theater interests and potential global strike
missions. In our prior work in identifying key practices adopted by
organizations undergoing successful transformations, we found that it
is essential for organizations to adopt a communication strategy that
provides a common framework for conducting consistent and coordinated
outreach within and outside its organization and seeks to genuinely
engage all stakeholders in the organization's transformation.
U.S. Strategic Command officials have conducted visits, provided
briefings, and assigned liaison staff to the geographic combatant
commands to promote understanding of its global strike mission and
responsibilities. The Strategic Command, according the command's
liaison to U.S. Central Command, initiated a visit to the Central
Command in October 2006 to provide a briefing on all of the command's
missions and activities, including global strike. The liaison said that
the visit provided an opportunity for Central Command's staff to gain
perspectives on global strike and the Strategic Command's mission
responsibilities. Similarly, U.S. Special Operations Command officials
told us that the Strategic Command's joint functional component command
for global strike and integration commander provided a global strike
mission briefing to U.S. Special Operations Command's senior leadership
in August 2006.
However, while Strategic Command officials are generally satisfied with
the existing communications, a number of other combatant commands are
looking for additional support. U.S. Pacific Command officials told us
that while the Pacific Command has established a close relationship
with the Strategic Command over the past few years, the command is
still learning about Strategic Command's mission responsibilities,
particularly for global strike. According to Pacific Command officials,
the U.S. Strategic Command's liaison officer provided an outreach
briefing in early 2007 to their organization which included information
on the global strike concept. The officials said that similar briefings
should be given regularly throughout the command because of the
constant turnover of staff. According to the U.S. Strategic Command's
liaison at the U.S. Pacific Command, it does not appear that
information on global strike is getting out to all of the Pacific
Command staff. The liaison based his statement on comments made by
Pacific Command staff to GAO during a March 2007 visit to the command.
This indicates, according to the liaison, that the Strategic Command
should provide briefings and hold discussion sessions with more of the
Pacific Command organizations, particularly on how global strike
operations fit into the theater commander's plans and differ from other
types of theater operations. Air Force Space Command officials told us
that the Strategic Command should provide thorough and updated
education and communication of its prompt global strike mission with
the geographic combatant commands to increase understanding and
mitigate any misconceptions the commands may have about the conduct of
global strike operations in their regions. The officials said that it
is important for the Strategic Command and other combatant commands to
establish a consistent dialogue on their roles and responsibilities and
the use of global strike weapons before any new prompt global strike
weapon is deployed. Similarly, a U.S. Central Command official said
that the Strategic Command should conduct more outreach activities for
global strike with combatant command staffs to explain the global
strike concept and the relationships with other commands. Additionally,
U.S. Special Operations Command officials told us that while they found
the Strategic Command's Web site beneficial, it was not widely known
among the command's staff.
While the U.S. Strategic Command has taken several positive actions to
promote global strike and its mission, without a consistent and
comprehensive outreach strategy the command may not reach the combatant
commands and services to the extent needed to foster acceptance and
understanding of global strike. As a result, the command may encounter
difficulty in future global strike implementation efforts.
Global Strike Has Not Been Widely Practiced in Exercises and Training:
Joint exercises and other training activities can provide opportunities
for service and combatant command staffs to practice operational
procedures and processes to increase their understanding of global
strike. However, global strike has only been included in a few major
joint exercises, largely those sponsored by the U.S. Strategic Command,
over the past 2 years. The U.S. Strategic Command has incorporated
global strike and its other missions into its annual joint command
exercises. Beginning with the command's Global Lightning exercise in
November 2005, the Strategic Command has included global strike
objectives in its annual Global Lightning, Global Storm, and Global
Thunder exercises. According to Strategic Command officials,
representatives from some of the other combatant commands have
participated in portions of these exercises, while other combatant
commands, such as the U.S. Central Command, may not always participate
because of other commitments. A Strategic Command joint exercise
division official said, however, that some global strike objectives
have been incorporated into recent exercises sponsored by U.S. Pacific,
European, and Special Operations Commands. For instance, global strike
time-sensitive planning has been included in Special Operations
Command's Able Warrior exercises.
U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that while global strike needs
to be incorporated to a greater extent in joint exercises, it is often
difficult because of differing exercise objectives. For example, a
senior official in the Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component
Command for Global Strike and Integration said that including global
strike objectives in joint exercises other than those of Strategic
Command can be challenging because it is often difficult to create
scenarios that make sense for executing a global strike mission
considering other primary exercise objectives. U.S. Central Command,
for example, has not included global strike in the joint exercises it
sponsors. Additionally, officials in U.S. Strategic Command's exercise
branch told us that other combatant commands are hesitant to add
objectives that could lessen the focus on the primary exercise
objectives. As a result, Strategic Command officials said that it can
also be difficult to overlap its exercises with those of another
command. For example, U.S. Strategic Command proposed linking its
Global Lightning 2007 exercise, which had a global strike focus, with
U.S. Pacific Command's Terminal Fury 2007 exercise. Both were scheduled
for late 2006. Global Lightning and Terminal Fury are annual command
post exercises sponsored by U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Pacific
Command, respectively, and involve the commanders and their staffs in
testing and validating the communications within and between
headquarters and simulated forces in deterring a military attack and
employing forces as directed. Terminal Fury is partly intended to train
the command's staff in exercising its theater warfighting concept plan
and is considered by the commander of the Pacific Command to be the
command's number one priority exercise. The Pacific Command agreed to
overlap the two exercises after the command determined there would be
only minimal impact on its objectives. However, U.S. Pacific Fleet
officials told us that Pacific Command, reluctant to have another
command operate forces in its theater, insisted on having control of
the forces executing the global strike operation in the exercise.
U.S. Strategic Command makes some training on global strike available
to its staff and those of other commands and organizations. An official
in U.S. Strategic Command's joint exercise division, who was designated
to speak for the command, told us that staffs from U.S. Special
Operations, Pacific, and European Commands have attended basic courses
on global strike during visits to Strategic Command. The official said
that the global strike courses are also available on its Web site on
DOD's classified computer network. Additionally, during the preparation
for joint exercises, participating staffs are made aware and encouraged
to take the online courses to come up to speed on various areas.
However, the command is considering sending staff to other combatant
commands to help provide more consistent training.
DOD Is Assessing Several Potential Offensive Strike Weapons Systems for
Global Strike but Has Not Fully Assessed Related Enabling Capabilities:
DOD has underway or completed several global strike assessments to
identify potential conventional offensive strike weapons systems it may
need in the near, mid, and long term,[Footnote 13] particularly those
for prompt global strike. However, DOD has not fully assessed the
requirements for various enabling capabilities it needs for global
strike or coordinated its efforts to improve these capabilities with
potential offensive systems it intends to develop. Enabling
capabilities DOD considers critical include intelligence collection and
dissemination, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control,
communications, and battlefield damage assessment. Without a full
assessment of enabling capabilities, DOD may not make the best decision
regarding which enabling capability improvements to pursue to meet
global strike operational requirements.
DOD Efforts Largely Focus on Evaluating Potential Near-, Mid-, and Long-
term Offensive Global Strike Capabilities:
While DOD has several analyses underway to determine desired
capabilities and identify capability gaps and shortcomings, recent
efforts for global strike have largely focused on developing new
offensive strike systems that provide improved prompt and long-distance
response capabilities. DOD has two major efforts underway to develop
potential offensive systems that provide a sea-and land-based prompt
global strike capability in the near-and midterm time frames. For the
long term, DOD has four key studies underway or completed that are
examining potential offensive strike systems to provide global strike
capabilities beginning sometime after 2018.
To provide a near-term prompt global strike capability, DOD has
requested funds to develop the Navy's conventional Trident modification
proposal, which would place conventional warheads on some Trident II
ballistic missiles aboard strategic Trident submarines. However, while
Navy plans could have the modified missile available around 2011, the
proposal has not been fully funded in recent budgets because of
congressional concerns over placing conventional missiles on submarines
that would also carry missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. Because
of these concerns, Congress has also mandated a study by the National
Academy of Sciences[Footnote 14] to review alternative prompt global
strike options. The Academy provided the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense with an interim report in May 2007, which
concluded that a single system for prompt global strike was not the
best way to proceed in the long term given the uncertainties in the
strategic environment and a range of systems that need to developed.
The report also concluded that while the conventional Trident missile
is not the optimal solution, it offers the only viable prompt global
strike capability within the next 6 years. The Academy plans to issue a
final report in the spring of 2008. Additionally, in the conference
report for the defense fiscal year 2008 appropriations bill, the
conferees agreed to provide no funding for testing, fabrication, or
deployment of the new conventional Trident missile.
The Air Force Space Command is examining a midterm land-based ballistic
missile system that would provide a prompt global strike capability and
could be available as early as 2015. The proposed conventional strike
missile would carry off-the-shelf conventional weapons and may
incorporate a new maneuverable weapons delivery system. The Air Force's
preliminary plans would station the conventional strike missile first
at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, which has some preexisting
infrastructure that can support the system, and possibly later at Cape
Canaveral, Florida. However, several technical, security, and policy
issues would need to be resolved before the missile could be fielded,
including technological advances in thermal protection systems and
resolution of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty implications. Beginning
in fiscal year 2008, the Air Force transferred its funding for prompt
global strike to a defensewide account to fund a consolidated,
multiservice approach, managed by the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
To provide global strike capabilities sometime after 2018, DOD has
conducted four global strike capability assessment studies: (1) Next
Generation Long-Range Strike Analysis of Alternatives, (2) Nuclear and
Conventional Global Strike Missile Study, (3) Prompt Global Strike
Analysis of Alternatives, and (4) Global Strike Raid Evaluation of
Alternatives. Each is shown in table 2.
Table 2: DOD Long-term Global Strike Studies to Identify Potential
Offensive Strike Systems:
Study: Next Generation Long-Range Strike Analysis of Alternatives;
Lead organization responsible for conducting study: Air Combat Command;
Purpose: Recommend the most cost-effective weapon system capable of
penetrating and persisting in antiaccess environments by 2018 to
achieve desired effects;
Actual/ planned study completion date: April 2007.
Study: Nuclear and Conventional Global Strike Missile Study;
Lead organization responsible for conducting study: U.S. Strategic
Command and U.S. Air Force;
Purpose: Assess the mission requirements for a successor to the
Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile and the technical
characteristics associated with those requirements;
Assess the mission requirements for a prompt global strike missile and
the technical characteristics associated with those requirements;
Assess the potential for adapting a conventional prompt global strike
missile into a Minuteman III successor;
Actual/ planned study completion date: August 2007.
Study: Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives;
Lead organization responsible for conducting study: Air Force Space
Command;
Purpose: Evaluate a range of system concepts to deliver precision
weapons with global reach, in minutes to hours, to provide
effectiveness and cost information necessary to justify initiation of
an acquisition program;
Actual/ planned study completion date: Spring 2008.
Study: Global Strike Raid Evaluation of Alternatives;
Lead organization responsible for conducting study: Joint Staff;
Purpose: Recommend investment alternatives for global strike to address
identified capability gaps;
Actual/ planned study completion date: May 2008.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD global strike studies.
[End of table]
DOD has completed two of its four long-term studies examining potential
offensive strike systems to provide global strike capabilities sometime
after 2018. Three of the four studies assess possible offensive strike
weapons systems that would provide a prompt and long-range capability
for global strike, while the fourth study, the Next Generation Long
Range Strike Analysis of Alternatives, examines potential strike
systems that could potentially travel great distances to penetrate and
loiter deep within an enemy's territory to deliver high-volume strikes
against time-critical targets.[Footnote 15]
DOD Considers Enabling Capabilities as Critical for Conducting
Successful Global Strike Operations:
Enabling capabilities that DOD considers critical in supporting global
strike operations include intelligence collection and dissemination,
surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, communications,
and battlefield damage assessment. Planning, executing, and assessing
the success of global strike operations may place greater demands on
enabling capabilities as new offensive capabilities are acquired.
Although the successful conduct of all strike operations depends on
enabling capabilities, the nature of global strike operations--such as
the potentially long distances over which strike systems may be
required to operate, compressed time frames for execution, improved
accuracy, the fleeting nature of some global strike targets, and the
high-level decision authority required--creates potential operational
challenges for these capabilities. Figure 1 shows the role of enabling
capabilities in supporting sequential key events in the conduct of
strike operations from prior monitoring of the area; initially finding,
locating, and identifying a target; executing a strike; to conducting
of battlefield damage assessment to determine the success of the strike
and whether further actions are required.
Figure 1: Support Provided by Enabling Capabilities in the Conduct of
Global Strike Operations:
This figure is a flowchart of support provided by enabling capabilities
in the conduct of global strike operations.
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
According to the Defense Science Board's Report on Future Strategic
Strike Forces,[Footnote 16] current enabling capabilities are not
sufficient to fully support the requirements for global strike
operations. Current intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and
command and control capabilities generally do not provide the
persistent coverage, processing and sharing of information, and rapid
planning required for compressed global strike time frames, according
to U.S. Strategic Command officials. Additionally, Air Force Space
Command officials told us that they are concerned about whether current
capabilities of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets
would be able to recognize and assess the damage caused by future
global strike systems. For example, future systems may use flechette
warheads, which would disperse metal darts upon impact that do not
create large craters like traditional explosive devices; therefore, the
damage may not be readily visible to intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets. Further, according to U.S. Air Force officials,
current enabling capabilities lack the ability to reliably produce up-
to-date accurate and responsive information to strike fleeting targets
that can change locations unexpectedly, particularly in areas where
U.S. forces may be denied access. Fleeting targets may be difficult to
detect or identify with current intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance sensors because of the adversary's use of techniques
such as mobility and/or camouflage, concealment, and deception.
Therefore, the target must be rapidly engaged before the adversary can
employ these techniques and disrupt effective targeting efforts.
According to Air Force, Defense Intelligence Agency, and RAND
Corporation[Footnote 17] officials we spoke with, striking mobile and
fleeting targets--the most difficult types of targets to strike--
requires greater intelligence capabilities than many other types of
strike operations to positively identify the target and provide
persistent surveillance to track and engage the target.
DOD is pursuing several independent efforts to assess and improve
enabling capabilities that are critical elements in the pre-and
poststrike phases of global strike operations. For example, U.S.
Strategic Command has a number of initiatives underway to improve
command and control with the goal of providing military planners with a
clear understanding of the threat, fast and accurate planning, and
tools for timely and efficient decision making. Additionally, U.S.
Strategic Command and defense agencies, such as the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, are
exploring initiatives to reduce the time needed to gather information
for strike planning and assessments by increasing available
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. For
example, to be able to quickly assess battle damage, the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency are
exploring the idea of dispensing intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance sensors from future prompt global strike platforms, such
as the proposed conventional strike missile, around target areas
shortly before the release of its weapon.
DOD's Recent Studies Have Not Comprehensively Included Assessments of
Critical Enabling Capabilities:
Recent DOD studies to identify potential offensive strike systems for
global strike provide only limited assessments of the enabling
capabilities needed for a particular focus of global strike or a
particular weapons system and do not collectively provide a complete
assessment of enabling capabilities needed to support global strike
operations. Joint Staff officials who are conducting the Global Strike
Raid Evaluation of Alternatives study said they plan to assess the
enabling capabilities as an important step in understanding all of the
capabilities needed to support global strike operations. However, the
global strike raid study will only analyze the use of global strike as
a limited strike capability against time-critical targets and will not
examine its use in all aspects of major combat operations. Similarly,
the Nuclear and Conventional Global Strike Missile Study only examined
enabling capabilities needed for the future conventional and nuclear
land-based ballistic missile options considered in its assessment.
However, the National Academy of Sciences, recognizing the importance
and greater demand that global strike would place on enabling
capabilities, plans to include an assessment of global strike
capabilities in its congressionally mandated spring 2008 final report
on conventional prompt global strike.
Global strike operations can increase the demand for enabling
capabilities depending on the threat and the target to be attacked. For
example, conducting strikes against mobile delivery systems for weapons
of mass destruction poses one of the most dangerous and elusive threats
for global strike operations. Defense Threat Reduction Agency officials
told us that they rely on enabling capabilities to provide the
information needed to locate the target and guide the weapons system to
strike with accuracy within compressed time frames, while minimizing
any potential collateral effects. Moreover, the intelligence needed for
planning and executing strikes against mobile delivery systems for
weapons of mass destruction is currently limited or incomplete,
according to Defense Threat Reduction Agency officials.
Several DOD and Air Force officials we spoke with said that enabling
capabilities were not being fully considered to the extent needed in
global strike system studies. According to a DOD Program Analysis and
Evaluation official, who has responsibility for global strike issues,
both of the Air Force's analyses of alternatives studies--i.e., prompt
global strike and next generation long-range strike--had methodological
weaknesses because neither assessed the enabling capabilities required
for conducting global strike operations. Instead, the teams conducting
the two studies assumed that certain needed improvements in enabling
capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
would be available when any future system is fielded. The scope and
range of enabling capabilities that could be assessed in the studies
were limited because of the need to obtain special security clearances,
according to U.S. Strategic Command and Air Force Space Command
officials. Similarly, the Global Strike Raid Evaluation of Alternatives
study was delayed for several months because of difficulties obtaining
special access clearances needed to review enabling capability
development efforts across DOD. Air Force officials responsible for
conducting the Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives stated
that an assessment of needed enabling capabilities should be done to
complement their study. However, the officials did not know of any such
assessment of enabling capabilities being conducted. The Air Force
officials said that their analysis does not completely address enabling
capabilities because (1) an assessment of enabling capabilities was not
the focus of their analysis, (2) the analysis work required to assess
offensive systems for their study alone is expected to take 2 years,
(3) the study staff lacks the special access clearances required to
obtain information on all DOD efforts for improving enabling
capabilities, and (4) the services submitting proposals for potential
prompt global strike systems wanted to limit their cost estimates to
the weapon system only.
Furthermore, the analyses conducted for the conventional Trident
missile and conventional strike missile proposals have not fully
included assessments of required enabling capabilities. According to
Joint Staff officials we spoke with, the analyses conducted for the
Navy's conventional Trident missile proposal did not fully consider
intelligence capabilities and requirements. As a result, the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities needed to
support this potential global strike system, which are currently in
limited availability, may not be in place since an analysis of enabling
capabilities has not yet been performed for it. Air Force Space Command
officials developing the conventional strike missile told us that they
have yet to perform an analysis of the enabling capabilities that
potential strike systems would require.
Additionally, DOD has not coordinated all of its efforts to improve
enabling capabilities with its assessments for new offensive global
strike systems. Because DOD has not fully assessed the enabling
capabilities required or coordinated various department efforts to
improve enabling capabilities alongside its plans for future strike
systems, it may not have all of the key enabling capabilities in place
when needed to support new offensive capabilities if and when they are
funded. For example, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
officials told us that the agency recognizes that such efforts as its
Rapid Eye program, which is examining concepts for an aircraft that
would arrive within hours in an emerging area of interest to provide a
limited persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capability, could potentially fill gaps in enabling capabilities needed
for global strike. Nevertheless, the officials said that DOD has not
yet recognized the importance of coordinating these efforts with
ongoing offensive global strike system assessments to better understand
the range of enabling capabilities being developed and their estimated
availability. DOD has taken some important first steps to formulate a
strategy for improving the integration of future intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements through the development
of its Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Integration
Roadmap. However, as we previously reported in 2007, the roadmap does
not define requirements for global persistent surveillance; clarify
what intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements are
already filled; identify critical gaps as areas for future focus; or
otherwise represent an enterprise-level architecture of what the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enterprise is to be for
future operations, such as global strike.[Footnote 18]
Since DOD has not fully assessed the required enabling capabilities or
coordinated various department efforts to improve enabling
capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
and command and control, for future strike systems, DOD might not make
the best decisions regarding which enabling capabilities to pursue. As
a result, the effectiveness of these new offensive capabilities against
critical high-value targets may be limited when initially fielded.
DOD Has Identified and Tracked Some Investments Related to Global
Strike but Has Not Developed a Prioritized Global Strike Investment
Strategy:
While DOD plans investments in a range of global-strike-related
capabilities, it has not yet begun to develop a prioritized investment
strategy that considers the breadth of current efforts and future plans
to develop capabilities for global strike, integrates these efforts to
assess global strike options, and makes choices among alternatives in
light of the department's long-term fiscal challenges. Such a strategy
would initially capture currently planned investments and would be
refined and updated as DOD further develops its concept and identifies
additional capabilities. Our prior work has shown that a long-term and
comprehensive investment approach is an important tool in an
organization's decision-making process to define direction, establish
priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the
actions needed to achieve goals. DOD studies and officials have
identified a need for a broad, holistic view of global strike
development that captures and gives visibility to all its efforts--
proposed or underway--for increasing both offensive and enabling global
strike capabilities. However, DOD has not fully assessed its FYDP to
determine the extent to which current development programs, projects,
and activities could contribute to global strike capabilities or
explained how it plans to link its long-term studies to identify
potential offensive weapons systems for global strike that will result
in a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy. Ongoing DOD
initiatives examining portfolio management approaches to manage
selected groupings of investments could help DOD in developing a
comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike.
Comprehensive Investment Strategies Are an Important Tool in an
Organization's Decision-making Process:
Our prior work has shown that developing a long-term, comprehensive
investment strategy provides an organization with an important tool in
its decision-making process to define direction, establish priorities,
assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions needed to
achieve goals. This strategy is intended to be a dynamic document,
which would be refined and updated to adapt to changing circumstances.
Such a strategy addresses needs, capabilities gaps, alternatives, and
affordability, and includes information on future investment
requirements, projected resources, investment priorities and trade-
offs, milestones, and funding timelines. It allows an organization to
address requirements on an enterprisewide, or departmentwide, basis and
provides a means to evaluate the efficacy and severity of capability
gaps or, alternatively, areas of redundancy. Without a long-term,
comprehensive prioritized investment strategy, it is difficult to fully
account for and assess real and potential contributions from other
current and future weapons and supporting systems providing similar
capabilities, mitigate capability shortfalls and eliminate duplication,
and allocate scare funds among a range of priorities.
DOD Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive Assessment of Global-strike-
related Efforts in Its FYDP:
Various DOD officials we spoke with recognize the need for DOD to have
a broad, holistic view of global strike development that captures and
gives visibility to all its efforts--proposed or underway--for
increasing both offensive and enabling global strike capabilities. DOD,
however, has yet to perform a comprehensive assessment to identify and
track all potential global-strike-related efforts in its FYDP. An
official in DOD's Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, who has
responsibility for global strike issues, told us that his office tracks
several significant FYDP programs that have specific global strike
application, such as the Conventional Trident Modification, Common Aero
Vehicle, and Falcon programs.[Footnote 19] The U.S. Strategic Command,
according to command officials, informally tracks global-strike-
related programs through DOD-wide conferences and periodic meetings
with various contractors that are working on global-strike-related
technology efforts. Additionally, in February 2007, the U.S. Strategic
Command sponsored a prompt global strike technology conference to
identify ongoing research, development, test, and evaluation efforts
being conducted by the services, DOD laboratories, and defense agencies
that would support development of prompt global strike capabilities.
While DOD organizations have conducted some assessments of global
strike capabilities in the FYDP, they have not conducted a
comprehensive assessment of the FYDP to manage and track DOD's global-
strike-related investments in conventional offensive and enabling
capabilities. For example, according to an office official who has
responsibility for global strike issues, DOD's Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation has not determined the full range and status of
science and technology development efforts with potential global strike
application in the FYDP. As we reported in 2005, DOD's Program Analysis
and Evaluation office conducted a limited analysis of the FYDP and
related budget documents and internal reviews to identify the range of
New Triad spending, including spending for global strike.[Footnote 20]
However, Program Analysis and Evaluation officials told us that their
analysis, which has not been updated, did not attempt to capture all of
the potential global-strike-related development efforts in the FYDP.
One Program Analysis and Evaluation official said that if a
comprehensive assessment of all global-strike-related development
efforts was conducted, it might show that existing systems could
provide the high volume and compressed time required for prompt global
strike with only limited investments in enabling and offensive
capabilities. This lack of complete knowledge about how existing
systems could be adapted to meet global strike requirements underscores
the need for a more holistic assessment of DOD's efforts related to
global strike.
The U.S. Strategic Command also has not conducted a comprehensive
assessment of global strike investments that included DOD's FYDP. For
example, the Strategic Command's 2007 prompt global strike technology
summit did not fully capture development of offensive global strike
technology or enabling capabilities, such as command and control,
intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance. One of the summit's
purposes was to inform and raise the awareness of prompt global strike
technology development at the service laboratories and defense
agencies. According to a Strategic Command official, however, the
summit focused only on those efforts that could improve offensive
kinetic global strike capabilities.
Our Analysis Identified 135 Global Strike and Related FYDP Programs,
Projects, and Activities:
Given that DOD has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of its FYDP
for global-strike-related investments, we performed an analysis of FYDP
program elements[Footnote 21] in the President's fiscal year 2008
budget submission to Congress to identify the range of potential global-
strike-related research and development efforts. We established
criteria and a list of key terms to use in our assessment from a review
of descriptions, terms, and characteristics used by DOD in its
principal global strike documents, including the Global Strike Joint
Capabilities Document and Deterrence Operations Joint Operating
Concept, and information obtained in discussions with DOD officials.
Such an analysis would need to be conducted in developing a
comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike. Other
global strike assessments of the FYDP programs, projects, and
activities may determine different criteria and methodologies to use
and thus, may yield different results.
In our analysis, we identified 94 FYDP program elements in the fiscal
year 2008 budget request that would provide funding for 135 programs,
projects, and activities to develop conventional offensive and enabling
capabilities having possible application for global strike. Of the 135
programs, projects, and activities we identified in our analysis:
* 85 would improve offensive capabilities, including efforts to improve
kinetic weapons, nonkinetic weapons, and propulsion systems;
* 41 would improve enabling capabilities such as command, control,
communications and computers and surveillance and reconnaissance
systems; and:
* 9 would improve both offensive and enabling capabilities such as
predator development.
Also, we determined that 13 of the 135 programs, projects and
activities, such as the Air Force's Common Aero Vehicle program, were
exclusively for research and development of global strike capabilities.
The remaining 122 programs, projects, and activities support research
and development of offensive and enabling capabilities with potential
application for global strike operations.
While the programs, projects, and activities we identified in our
analysis are largely directed at developing capabilities for a wide
range of military needs other than just global strike, these efforts
reflect substantial near-term investments of several billions dollars
in capabilities that could potentially be used in conducting future
global strike operations. Appendix II summarizes the results of our
analysis to identify global strike and related development in DOD's
FYDP.
DOD Has Not Explained How Results of Its Global Strike Studies Will Be
Integrated into a Prioritized Investment Strategy:
DOD officials also have not clearly explained whether DOD plans to
integrate the results of its four global strike studies to identify
potential weapons systems into a comprehensive prioritized investment
strategy. Additionally, none of the four studies would provide a
roadmap that shows DOD's plans and schedules for developing and
acquiring the full range of strike and enabling capabilities identified
for global strike. For example, both of the Air Force's analyses of
alternatives for prompt global strike and next generation long-range
strike will provide investment information as a part of their final
products, but that information will be limited to life-cycle costs for
the preferred weapons system solution and will not address any needed
investments required for enabling capabilities. Similarly, DOD also
plans to provide investment information in its Nuclear and Conventional
Global Strike Missile Study and the Global Strike Raid Evaluation of
Alternatives. However, DOD intends to prepare cost estimates only for
capabilities required for the future ballistic missile solutions
identified in the Nuclear and Conventional Global Strike Missile Study.
Additionally, while DOD plans to review the full range of global-
strike-related offensive and enabling capabilities in its Global Strike
Raid Evaluation of Alternatives study, it only intends to provide
possible investment options for offensive strike capabilities.
Portfolio Management Initiatives Could Help DOD Develop an Investment
Strategy for Global Strike:
The use of portfolio management, a best business practice, could help
DOD in developing a prioritized investment strategy for global strike.
Portfolio management is used to manage selected groupings of
investments, or portfolios, at the enterprise level to collectively
align investments with strategic goals and performance measures and
provide a sound basis to justify the commitment of resources. In our
March 2007 report examining the use of the portfolio management
approach to improve DOD's ability to make weapon system investment
decisions, we determined that although the military services fight
together on the battlefield as a joint force, they identify needs and
allocate resources separately, using fragmented decision-making
processes that do not allow for an integrated portfolio management
approach like that used by successful commercial companies.[Footnote
22] Through portfolio management, an organization can explicitly assess
the trade-offs among competing investment opportunities in terms of
their benefit, costs, and risks. Investment decisions can then be made
based on a better understanding of what will be gained or lost through
the inclusion or exclusion of certain investments. Use of portfolios in
investment planning, according to DOD, could improve its efforts to
increase interoperability, minimize redundancies and gaps, and maximize
capability effectiveness.
As part of its Defense acquisition transformation,[Footnote 23] DOD is
examining the use of portfolio management and has begun two
initiatives--concept decision and capability portfolio management--
within the past year that focus on the use of portfolio management
approaches to manage capability investments in a mission area. If
either is successful, these approaches could benefit DOD's management
and tracking of its global strike investments. The concept decision
initiative is using four pilot studies that apply portfolio management
techniques and other tools to merge information on requirements,
technology maturity, and available resources to improve the range of
choices for strategic investment decision making.[Footnote 24] If
successful, the pilots would ensure that DOD is making investment
choices that balance operational and programmatic risks, are
affordable, and can be successfully developed, produced, fielded, and
maintained within planned funding levels. DOD plans to complete each of
the four pilots by May 2008. The other initiative--capability portfolio
management--is to investigate approaches to consider investment trades
across previously stove-piped areas, and to better understand the
implications of investment decisions across competing priorities. For
example, senior decision makers, if the approach is successful, would
be able to determine the implications of additional investments in
prompt global strike with investments for joint command and control.
Viewing capabilities across the entire portfolio of assets, according
to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, enables decision makers
to make informed choices about how to reallocate resources among
previously stove-piped programs and hence to deliver needed
capabilities to the joint force more rapidly and efficiently. DOD and
U.S. Strategic Command officials involved with the Global Strike Raid
Evaluation of Alternatives said that formulating portfolio options and
making investment trade-offs for global strike will be difficult,
because few of the capabilities are uniquely for global strike.
However, DOD officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense we
spoke with stated that managing future global strike development as a
portfolio of capabilities could result in more effective development of
this mission area. Officials who are involved with the DOD concept
decision pilot studies stated that a broader look at all related
capabilities would likely increase the extent of improvements that
could be made for the mission area when compared with a more limited
look at solutions available from a single service or functional area.
Conclusions:
While DOD has taken a number of steps to advance its global strike
concept and assign responsibilities, its ability to implement the
concept will be limited among key stakeholders until it more clearly
defines global strike, begins incorporating global strike into joint
doctrine, increases outreach and communication activities, and involves
stakeholders to a greater extent in joint exercises and other training.
Without a complete and clearly articulated concept that is well
communicated and practiced with key stakeholders, DOD could encounter
difficulties in fully implementing its concept and building the
necessary relationships for carrying out global strike operations.
DOD has begun to identify a range of potential conventional offensive
weapons systems to provide global strike capabilities. However, without
fully assessing the requirements for various enabling capabilities that
DOD considers critical to the success of global strike operations and
coordinating its efforts to improve these capabilities with potential
offensive systems it intends to develop, DOD may not have the enabling
capabilities it needs to support new offensive capabilities, if and
when they are funded. Similarly, without fully assessing the breadth of
capabilities and technologies being developed within its FYDP that
potentially contribute to global strike, DOD does not have the complete
information it needs to track and manage its capability development
efforts and develop a prioritized long-term investment strategy for
global strike.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four
actions to strengthen DOD's efforts to implement its global strike
concept and improve communications and mutual understanding within DOD
of the scope, range and use of capabilities, and the incidence of
global strike operations:
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in consultation
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop and approve a common,
universally accepted joint definition for "global strike," and
consistently incorporate this definition in global strike documents and
joint doctrine.
* Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander,
U.S. Joint Forces Command, in consultation with the Under Secretaries
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and Policy and
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to determine possible changes to
existing joint doctrine or development of new joint doctrine that may
be required to incorporate global strike operations, including the
terminology and discussion of training, relationships,
responsibilities, and processes for these operations, and initiate any
subsequent doctrine development activities.
* Direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in consultation with
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretaries of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and Policy, to
establish an ongoing communications and outreach approach for global
strike to help guide DOD's efforts to promote, educate, and foster
acceptance of the concept among the combatant commands, military
services, and other DOD organizations.
* Direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in consultation with
the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, to identify additional
opportunities where global strike can be integrated into major joint
exercises and other training activities.
We further recommend that the Secretary take the following four actions
to provide the most complete information on the range of capabilities
needed for global strike and to determine an affordable and sustainable
balance in its spending for current and future global strike
investments.
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, in consultation with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and the Secretaries of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to conduct a comprehensive assessment of
enabling capabilities to identify (1) any specific global strike
operational requirements and priorities, (2) when these capabilities
are needed to support future offensive strike systems, and (3) what
plans DOD has for developing and acquiring these capabilities. DOD
should link this assessment with other assessments examining potential
strike systems for global strike and those being conducted for any
specific supporting capability area to ensure that it has the most
complete information available when making decisions on future global
strike investments.
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, in consultation with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force, to provide guidance on how the results of DOD studies to
identify potential strike systems for global strike will be integrated
into a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike,
including a roadmap that shows the department's plans and schedules for
developing and acquiring offensive strike and enabling capabilities.
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, in consultation with the Director, Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
to perform a comprehensive review of all capabilities being developed
within DOD's Future Years Defense Program to determine the extent to
which these capabilities contribute or can be leveraged for global
strike and incorporate the results of this review into the development
of a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike.
The investment strategy should be updated, as needed, to adapt to
changing circumstances.
* Direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Deputy's Advisory Working Group, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and Director for Program,
Analysis, and Evaluation, to determine the appropriateness of using a
portfolio management approach for global strike to align its
investments with strategic goals and performance measures and provide a
sound basis to justify the commitment of resources, develop a
prioritized investment strategy, and manage development and acquisition
of global strike capabilities.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, signed by the Director,
Joint Advanced Concepts, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), DOD agreed with the report
and with all of its eight recommendations. The department's comments
are discussed below and are reprinted in appendix III.
DOD concurred with our four recommendations intended to strengthen the
department's efforts to implement its global strike concept and improve
communications and mutual understanding within DOD of the scope, range,
and use of capabilities, and the incidence of global strike operations.
Specifically, DOD concurred with our recommendations to (1) develop and
approve a common, universally accepted joint definition for "global
strike," and consistently incorporate this definition in global strike
documents and joint doctrine; (2) determine possible changes to
existing joint doctrine or development of new joint doctrine that may
be required to incorporate global strike operations; (3) establish an
ongoing communications and outreach approach for global strike; and (4)
identify additional opportunities where global strike can be integrated
into major joint exercises and other training activities. DOD stated
that the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in consultation with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, would develop a common, universally accepted concept
and definition for "global strike." DOD also stated that global strike,
as a validated and executable concept, had not matured to the point
that it is an extant executable capability, which DOD considers a
prerequisite for incorporating global strike into joint doctrine.
According to the department, when the concept is fully developed and
validated, the U.S. Joint Forces Command will prepare the appropriate
doctrine or determine possible changes in existing doctrine. While
these are positive steps, we continue to believe that DOD can and
should take additional steps now to facilitate the development of joint
doctrine. For example, DOD should establish a time soon for completing
development and reaching approval of its global strike concept and
definition and incorporating the approved concept and definition in
department documents. Reaching agreement on the concept and definition
is also important as DOD moves ahead with its decisions on new
investments in weapons systems and other capabilities for global strike
and continues implementation of the concept among key stakeholders. In
regard to our recommendations that U.S. Strategic Command establish an
ongoing communications and outreach approach for global strike and
identify additional opportunities where global strike can be integrated
into major joint exercises and other training activities, DOD stated
that the socialization of evolving concepts contributes to their
maturing and validation and that it is U.S. Strategic Command's
responsibility, with support and assistance from the U.S. Joint Forces
Command, to establish its training requirements and objectives for
global strike. Considering the different interpretations of global
strike we found among combatant command and service officials, we
continue to believe that our recommendations, when fully implemented,
would strengthen the positive actions currently being taken by the U.S.
Strategic Command to conduct outreach and include global strike in
major exercises and other training activities; promote greater
understanding, involvement, and experience among these key
stakeholders; and further DOD's efforts to implement the global strike
concept. In taking actions to implement our recommendations, for
example, we believe that the Strategic Command could begin by
consulting with combatant command and service stakeholders to identify
opportunities to increase and enhance the command's current outreach
activities (e.g., visits, briefings, and education) and include
additional global strike segments in major exercises and other training
activities.
DOD also concurred with our four recommendations intended to provide
more complete information on the range of capabilities needed for
global strike and to determine an affordable and sustainable balance in
its spending for current and future global strike investments.
Specifically, DOD concurred with our recommendations to (1) conduct a
comprehensive assessment of enabling capabilities (intelligence
collection and dissemination, surveillance and reconnaissance, command
and control, communications, and battlefield damage assessment); (2)
provide guidance on how the results of its studies to identify
potential strike systems for global strike would be integrated into a
comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike; (3)
perform a comprehensive review of all capabilities being developed
within DOD's FYDP to determine the extent to which these capabilities
contribute or can be leveraged for global strike; and (4) determine the
appropriateness of using a portfolio management approach for global
strike. DOD's responses to our recommendations largely focus on
conventional prompt global strike, which is a subset of the broader
global strike mission area. In regard to enabling capabilities, DOD
stated that its departmentwide capability portfolio management provides
the means to optimize capabilities through the integration,
coordination, and synchronization of department investments. Managers
of the individual capability portfolios are responsible for identifying
those aspects of their portfolios that are connected to more than one
portfolio because of the breadth and depth of mission areas such as
prompt global strike. According to DOD, as part of its comprehensive
assessment for conventional prompt global strike, it intends to include
ongoing and follow-on studies, such as the Air Force-led prompt global
strike analysis of alternatives, in identifying operational
requirements and priorities to determine when they are needed to
support development of future offensive strike systems. DOD also stated
that it plans to use its fiscal year 2008 Defense-wide Research,
Development, Testing, and Evaluation account for prompt global strike
to provide limited funding for mission-enabling capabilities. In regard
to guidance for integrating the results of its long-term global strike
studies, DOD stated that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will provide guidance for
developing a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy and roadmap.
It stated that for conventional prompt global strike in fiscal year
2008 the department will pursue an integrated approach in crafting this
investment strategy, which will emphasize the application of ongoing
and follow-on studies, including the Air Force-led prompt global strike
analysis of alternatives and the congressionally-mandated National
Research Council's Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike
Capability report provided by the National Academy of Sciences, and
reference the evolving operational requirements and constraints
described by U.S. Strategic Command and validated by the Joint Staff.
DOD stated that its effort will also emphasize full utilization and
collaboration with separately funded programs throughout DOD and the
Department of Energy that potentially support conventional prompt
global strike and cross-service and agency transparency and
collaboration of all technology and experimentation matters. Concerning
our recommendation to identify FYDP capabilities that could contribute
or be leveraged for global strike, DOD stated that the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would lead a
comprehensive, capability-based review and prioritization of the global
strike investment strategy within the FYDP. According to DOD, the goal
of the FYDP for fiscal years 2008 through 2013 is to apply, advance,
and demonstrate engineering for the selection and development of
material solutions for the conventional prompt global strike mission
area so that individual service acquisition programs can be funded and
executed. DOD stated that it plans to submit a conventional prompt
global strike research and development testing plan to Congress in
April 2008, as required by the fiscal year 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act. This plan will describe the strategy and investment
needed over the next 5 years to develop and field full-mission
prototypes. And lastly, in regard to our recommendation on portfolio
management, DOD stated that with the creation of the Defense-wide
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation program element for prompt
global strike in the President's 2009 budget, a portfolio management
approach is being initiated. DOD further stated that the department
fully supports using a portfolio management approach for conventional
prompt global strike to align its investments with strategic goals and
performance measures and provide a sound basis to justify the
commitment of resources. The specific actions that DOD described in its
comments for these four recommendations are positive steps in providing
greater focus, transparency, and accountability for the department's
efforts to increase global strike capabilities.
We are sending electronic copies of this report to interested
congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff; and the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. We will
also make electronic copies available to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions, please contact me at (202)
512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Other major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Managing Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify whether the Department of Defense (DOD) has clearly defined
and instilled a common understanding and approach to its global strike
mission, we reviewed relevant global strike concept documents, studies,
reports, briefings, and other pertinent documents to determine the
scope, capabilities, range of operations, types of targets, doctrine,
and other factors that make up the global strike concept and identify
the definitions that are used throughout DOD to define the term "global
strike." For example, we reviewed the April 2006 Global Strike Joint
Capabilities Document, a key document that identifies the set of
capabilities required across all functional areas to accomplish the
global strike mission, to obtain information on current global strike
capabilities and shortfalls. Additionally, we reviewed various DOD
guidance documents to identify assigned roles and responsibilities for
global strike, including concept development, implementation, and
operations. We reviewed, for instance, the most recent 2006 Unified
Command Plan, which establishes the missions and responsibilities,
geographic areas of responsibilities, and functions for the commanders
of the combatant commands, to identify the roles and responsibilities
for the U.S. Strategic Command and the respective geographic combatant
commands related to the global strike operations. We also met with
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; U.S. Joint
Forces Command; U.S. Central Command; U.S. Special Operations Command;
U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Strategic Command; the Air Force, Army, and
Navy headquarters and commands; and Defense Threat Reduction Agency to
obtain information on various global strike areas such as roles and
responsibilities, the global strike concept and its implementation, and
joint doctrine. With these officials, particularly the geographic
combatant commands, we also discussed their participation and inputs
into relevant global strike exercises, training, and relative
educational activities and with communication strategy used by the U.S.
Strategic Command to explain and promote understanding of global strike
operations and its mission responsibilities. Additionally, we met with
officials from the U.S. Strategic Command to discuss challenges faced
by the command and DOD in developing and implementing the global strike
concept and communicating the concept to the combatant commands and
other relevant entities within DOD.
To assess the extent to which DOD has assessed and developed
capabilities needed for global strike, we reviewed the study plans,
supporting and relevant documentation, and final reports, if available,
for DOD's four principal global strike assessments--Next Generation
Long-Range Strike Analysis of Alternatives; Nuclear and Conventional
Global Strike Missile Study; Prompt Global Strike Analysis of
Alternatives; and Global Strike Raid Evaluation of Alternatives--to
identify potential conventional offensive strike weapons systems it may
need in the near, mid, and long term. We discussed these assessments
with officials at the Air Combat Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S.
Air Force headquarters, Air Force Space Command, Joint Staff, and other
lead and supporting organizations that were participants or had
knowledge about the assessments. In discussing the ongoing Prompt
Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives, for example, with officials at
the Air Force Space Command at Colorado Springs, Colorado, we obtained
documentation of the assessment, including its methodology, scope,
assumptions, and schedule, as well as the organizations involved and
the status of work to date. For each of the four major studies, we also
examined the extent to which DOD has considered the requirements for
enabling capabilities, such as intelligence and command and control,
and their importance in achieving desired mission effectiveness. We
reviewed studies and assessments on enabling capabilities from various
organizations such as RAND Corporation, the Air Force, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and U.S.
Strategic Command, and discussed the information with officials from
each of these organizations. We also reviewed our prior work, including
our recent report on DOD's approach to managing requirements for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, to
determine how DOD has coordinated and integrated its efforts to improve
enabling capabilities. Additionally, we reviewed the Defense Science
Board's 2004 report on Future Strategic Strike Forces[Footnote 25] to
obtain their assessment of enabling capabilities requirements and
recommendations for future strategic strike systems. In our discussions
with officials at various combatant commands--such as U.S. Strategic
Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and military services--we obtained
information on the roles and requirements for enabling capabilities in
support of global strike systems and availability and shortfalls for
these capabilities.
To assess the extent to which DOD has identified the funding
requirements and developed an investment strategy for acquiring new
global strike capabilities, we obtained and analyzed information and
interviewed officials within the Office of Secretary of Defense,
including the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Defense
Science Board, the Hypersonics Joint Technology Office, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U.S. Strategic Command. We documented DOD's
research and development efforts with possible application to global
strike and investment information provided in ongoing and completed
studies on potential global strike weapons systems. Additionally, we
reviewed reports and studies and interviewed officials at the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Science Board, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and GAO to
determine how DOD initiatives, particularly for portfolio management,
could be used to manage global strike investments. We also obtained
information on DOD's efforts to identify funding requirements and
develop an investment strategy for global strike. We conducted an
analysis of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) that supports the
President's fiscal year 2008 budget submission to Congress to determine
the range of programs, projects, and activities within various research
and development program elements in the FYDP that could have potential
application for improved conventional global-strike-related
capabilities.[Footnote 26] To establish criteria and create a list of
key terms to use in conducting our assessment, we reviewed the
descriptions, terms, and characteristics used by DOD in its principal
documents describing global strike characteristics, including the
Global Strike Joint Capabilities Document, Global Strike Joint
Integrating Concept, and Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept,
and information obtained in discussions with knowledgeable DOD,
combatant command, defense agency, and service officials. We then
reviewed supporting research and development budget submission
documents from all the military services, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, two defense agencies, and Special Operations Command. We
also discussed our analysis with an official from DOD's Office of
Program Analysis and Evaluation, who generally concurred that our
methodology and results were sound and reasonable. Other global strike
assessments of the FYDP programs, projects, and activities may
determine different criteria and methodologies to use and, hence, may
yield different results. Our assessment also does not include those
programs, projects, and activities in any classified program elements
or data from nuclear systems development. It also includes some, but
not all, nonkinetic capabilities that could contribute to improving
global strike.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2006 to February 2008
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In
conducting our work, we contacted officials at several DOD
organizations and agencies; joint combatant and service commands; and
think-tank organizations. Table 3 shows the organizations and offices
we contacted during our review.
Table 3: Organizations and Offices Contacted During Our Review:
Department of Defense:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense,;
- Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Directorate;
- Policy Directorate, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategic Capabilities;
- Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation;
- Defense Science Board.
Department of Defense:
* Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- J-3 (Space and Nuclear Operations);
- J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy);
- J-8 (Sea/Air Branch).
* Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency;
* Defense Intelligence Agency;
* Defense Threat Reduction Agency;
* Hypersonics Joint Technology Office;
Combatant commands:
* U.S. Strategic Command;
- Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike and Integration.
* U.S. Central Command;
* U.S. Joint Forces Command;
* U.S. Pacific Command;
- Pacific Air Force;
- Pacific Fleet.
* U.S. Special Operations Command;
Services:
Department of Defense:
* Department of the Air Force;
- Headquarters, Air Staff;
- U.S. Air Force Combat Command;
- U.S. Air Force Space Command;
- Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center.
* Department of the Army;
- Headquarters, Army Staff;
- U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.
* Department of the Navy;
- U.S. Fleet Forces Command.
Other organizations:
* RAND Corporation.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO's Analysis of DOD's Research and Development Efforts
for Global Strike in Its Future Years Defense Program:
We conducted an analysis of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
that supports the President's fiscal year 2008 budget submission to
Congress to determine the range of programs, projects, and activities
within various research and development program elements in the FYDP
that could have potential application for improved conventional global-
strike-related capabilities. We established criteria and a list of key
terms to use in our assessment from a review of descriptions, terms,
and characteristics used by the Department of Defense (DOD) in its
principal global strike documents, including the Global Strike Joint
Capabilities Document and Deterrence Operations Joint Operating
Concept, and information obtained in discussions with DOD officials.
While our methodology and results were discussed with a DOD Office of
Program Analysis and Evaluation official and were determined to be
reasonable and relevant, other global strike assessments of the FYDP
programs, projects, and activities may determine different criteria and
methodologies to use and therefore, may yield different results.
Additionally, our assessment does not include those programs, projects,
and activities in any classified program elements or data from nuclear
systems development. It also includes some, but not all, nonkinetic
capabilities that could contribute to improving global strike.
Our analysis of research and development budget submission documents
from a number of DOD organizations identified 94 FYDP program elements
in the fiscal year 2008 budget request related to global strike. The 94
FYDP program elements provide funding for 135 programs, projects, and
activities that are developing conventional offensive strike and
enabling capabilities that could contribute to improved global strike
capabilities. Of the 135 programs, projects, and activities identified
in our analysis:
* 85 would improve offensive capabilities, including efforts to improve
kinetic weapons, nonkinetic weapons, and propulsion systems;
* 41 would improve enabling capabilities such as (1) command, control,
communications, and computers and (2) surveillance and reconnaissance
systems; and:
* 9 would improve both offensive and enabling capabilities such as
Predator development.
Table 3 summarizes the results of our analysis to identify global
strike and related development by category and type of offensive,
enabling, or multiple capabilities in DOD's FYDP.
Table 4: Global Strike and Related Global Strike Research and
Development Efforts in DOD's FYDP for Fiscal Years 2007 through 2009
Identified by GAO:
Capabilities category: Offensive capabilities: Kinetic weapons;
Examples of global strike and related programs, projects, or activities
in each category: * Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile;
* Small Diameter Bomb;
* Tomahawk Weapons System;
Number of programs, projects, or activities identified: 23.
Capabilities category: Offensive capabilities: Nonkinetic weapons;
Examples of global strike and related programs, projects, or activities
in each category: * Directed Energy Technology;
* Special Operations Technology Development;
* Airborne Electronic Attack;
Number of programs, projects, or activities identified: 21.
Capabilities category: Offensive capabilities: Weapon platforms;
Examples of global strike and related programs, projects, or activities
in each category: * Next Generation Bomber aircraft,;
* MQ-9 Reaper UAV;
* Space Launch Vehicle technology;
Number of programs, projects, or activities identified: 30.
Capabilities category: Offensive capabilities: Propulsion systems;
Examples of global strike and related programs, projects, or activities
in each category: * Air Force, Army, and Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency hypersonics propulsion development efforts;
Number of programs, projects, or activities identified: 14.
Capabilities category: Offensive capabilities: Subtotal;
Examples of global strike and related programs, projects, or activities
in each category: [Empty];
Number of programs, projects, or activities identified: 85.
Capabilities category: Enabling capabilities: Command, control,
communications and computers;
Examples of global strike and related programs, projects, or activities
in each category: * Common Operational Picture;
* Interoperable Data Links;
* Large Data;
Number of programs, projects, or activities identified: 22.
Capabilities category: Enabling capabilities: Intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, information operations, and planning;
Examples of global strike and related programs, projects, or activities
in each category: * Persistent Surveillance Technologies;
* Strategic War Planning System;
* Networked Bionic Sensors for Language/Speaker Detection;
Number of programs, projects, or activities identified: 19.
Capabilities category: Enabling capabilities: Subtotal;
Examples of global strike and related programs, projects, or activities
in each category: [Empty];
Number of programs, projects, or activities identified: 41.
Capabilities category: Multiple capabilities[A];
* Predator Development;
* Counterforce;
* Weapons of Mass Destruction Battle Management;
Number of programs, projects, or activities identified: 9.
Capabilities category: Multiple capabilities[A]: Subtotal;
Examples of global strike and related programs, projects, or activities
in each category: [Empty];
Number of programs, projects, or activities identified: 9.
Capabilities category: Total;
Examples of global strike and related programs, projects, or activities
in each category: [Empty];
Number of programs, projects, or activities identified: 135.
Source: GAO analysis of programs, projects, and activities in the
President's Fiscal Year 2008 budget submission to Congress based on
derived criteria.
[A] Program elements that include programs, projects, and activities
that are developing both offensive and enabling capabilities.
[End of table]
Of the 135 programs, projects, and activities, we determined that 13,
such as the Air Force's common aero vehicle, were exclusively for
research and development of global strike capabilities. The remaining
122 programs, projects, and activities support research and development
of offensive and enabling capabilities that were not specifically for
global strike but had potential application for global strike
operations.
In conducting our analysis, we reviewed the research and development
budget submissions from the Departments of the Air Force, Navy, and
Army; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency; Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and U.S. Special
Operations Command. Figure 2 shows that the majority (88) of the 135
research and development programs, projects, and activities we
identified were in the budgets of the services, with the Department of
the Air Force budget having the largest number (48) among the three
services. The remaining 47 programs, projects, and activities were in
the budgets of the Defense Threat ReductionAgency (5); Special
Operations Command (6); Office of the Secretary of Defense (17); and
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (19).
Figure 2: Number of Global Strike and Related Research and Development
Programs, Projects, and Activities by DOD Organization:
This figure is a pie chart of the number of global strike and related
research and development programs, projects, and activities by DOD
organization.
Military service departments: Army: 10;
Military service departments: Airforce: 48;
Military service departments: Navy: 30;
Other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations: 47: Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, 5, Special Operations Command, 6, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 17, Defense Advances Research Projects Agency,
19.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis based on fiscal year 2008 DOD budget
documentation.
[End of figure]
The programs, projects, and activities we identified in our analysis
are largely directed at developing capabilities for a wide range of
military needs other than just global strike and their associated
funding, and therefore should not be considered when determining DOD's
total spending for global strike. However, these efforts reflect
substantial near-term investments of several billions of dollars in
capabilities that could potentially be used for future global strike
operations. For example, DOD plans to spend about $4.8 billion then-
year dollars in fiscal years 2007 through 2009 for the 29 weapon
platforms programs, projects, and activities we identified, and about
$2.6 billion for other offensive capabilities including kinetic
weapons, nonkinetic weapons, and propulsion system programs, projects,
and activities over the same period. Additionally, DOD plans to spend
about $3.0 billion then-year dollars in fiscal years 2007 through 2009
for the 41 programs, projects, and activities we identified to improve
enabling capabilities. And lastly, DOD plans to spend about $0.7
billion then-year dollars for the 9 programs, projects, and activities
included in our analysis for multiple capabilities over the period.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, Dc 20301-3000:
March, 28, 2008:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-08-325, `Military Transformation: DoD Needs to Strengthen
Implementation of Its Global Strike Concept and Provide a Comprehensive
Investment Approach for Acquiring Needed Capabilities,' dated February
25, 2008 (GAO Code 350899).
On the whole, the Department agrees with the report and the included
recommendations. Detailed comments to each recommendation are enclosed.
DoD technical inputs and the results of the security review were
provided separately.
Signed by:
James M. Durham:
Director:
Joint Advanced Concepts:
Enclosure:
As stated:
Joint Advanced Concepts
GAO Draft Report – Dated February 25, 2008 GAO Code 350899 /GAO-08-325
"MILITARY TRANSFORMATION: DoD Needs to Strengthen Implementation of Its
Global Strike Concept and Provide a Comprehensive Investment Approach
for Acquiring Needed Capabilities"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in consultation with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop and approve a common,
universally accepted joint definition for "global strike," and
consistently incorporate this definition in global strike documents and
joint doctrine.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. Commander, United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will develop
a common, universally accepted concept and definition for "global
strike."
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander,
United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), in consultation with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Commander,
USSTRATCOM, to determine possible changes to existing joint doctrine or
development of new joint doctrine that may be required to incorporate
global strike operations, including the terminology and discussion of
training, relationships, responsibilities, and processes for these
operations, and initiate any subsequent doctrine development
activities.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. USJFCOM assists the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in the development of joint doctrine in accordance with
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02A and in conjunction
with the Joint Doctrine Development Community. Currently, global
strike, as a validated and executable concept, has not matured to the
point that it is an extant executable capability, a prerequisite for
incorporation into joint doctrine. Current joint doctrine, as it is
already written (Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 Joint Operations and JP 5-0
Joint Operations Planning), addresses the planning, preparation,
execution, and assessment of joint operations, including strikes. When
the concept of global strike is fully developed and validated, USJFCOM
will write the appropriate doctrine. USJFCOM will determine possible
changes to existing joint doctrine when development of new joint
doctrine that may be required to incorporate global strike operations
is required.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, USSTRATCOM, in consultation with the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, to establish an ongoing communications and outreach
approach for global strike to help guide DoD's efforts to promote,
educate, and foster acceptance of the concept among the combatant
commands, military services, and other DoD organizations.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. Socialization of evolving concepts
contributes to their maturing and validation leading to timely
incorporation into joint doctrine as extant capability.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, USSTRATCOM, in consultation with the Commander,
USJFCOM, to identify additional opportunities where global strike can
be integrated into major joint exercises and other training activities.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. Each Combatant Commander establishes
training requirements and objectives. USJFCOM supports and assists the
Combatant Commander in accomplishing identified training requirements
and objectives.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, in consultation with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Commander, USSTRATCOM and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air
Force, to conduct a comprehensive assessment of enabling capabilities
to identify: (1) any specific global strike operational requirements
and priorities; (2) when these capabilities are needed to support
future offensive strike systems; and (3) what plans DoD has for
developing and acquiring these capabilities. DoD should link this
assessment with other assessments examining potential strike systems
for global strike and those being conducted for any specific supporting
capability area to ensure that it has the most complete information
available when making decisions on future global strike investments.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. The Deputy Secretary of Defense initiated
Capability Portfolio Management (CPM) that applies Department-wide. CPM
is designed to manage capability optimization through the integration,
coordination and synchronization of Department investments through
Capability Portfolios in order to improve: (1) strategic force
management and force development decision making; (2) the level of
joint warfighter outcomes; and (3) mission effects of all known
operational requirements, including those emerging operational
requirements such as Prompt Global Strike (PGS). The CPM managers were
designated to ensure portfolio balance and optimization within their
respective portfolios. Additionally, the managers are responsible to
identify those aspects of their portfolios that are connected to more
than one portfolio because of the breadth and depth of the mission
area, such as PGS, overseen by the Force Application CPM manager. For
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), the Department intends to
include as part of this comprehensive assessment ongoing/follow-on
studies, including the Air Force-led PGS Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)
in March 2008, the Congressionally-mandated National Research Council
Committee on CPGS Report provided by the National Academy of Sciences,
as well as reference to evolving operational requirements and
constraints as set forth by USSTRATCOM and validated by the Joint
Staff. This effort will be essential in identifying PGS operational
requirements and priorities, and when these are needed to support
development of future offensive strike systems. In addition, in Fiscal
Year (FY) 2008, using the Defense-wide Research, Development, Testing
and Evaluation (RDT&E) account on PGS, the Department intends to
provide limited funding towards full mission planning techniques,
command and control provisions, strategic requirements and policy
compliance, alternative intermediate missile range concepts, advanced
non-nuclear warheads, and other mission enabling capabilities.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, in consultation with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and
Air Force, to provide guidance on how the results of DoD studies to
identify potential strike systems for global strike will be integrated
into a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike,
including a roadmap that shows the Department's plans and schedules for
developing and acquiring offensive strike and enabling capabilities.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. As noted in the response to Recommendation
5, the Force Application CPM is the cognizant CPM for global strike. As
the civilian co-lead for the Force Application CPM, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, will provide
guidance to develop a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy and
roadmap for global strike. Specifically, for CPGS, in FY08, utilizing
the Defense-wide RDT&E account on PGS, the Department will pursue an
integrated approach to craft a comprehensive prioritized investment
strategy. In particular, this effort will emphasize: (1) application of
ongoing/follow-on studies, including the Air Force-led PGS AOA in March
2008, the Congressionally-mandated National Research Council Committee
on CPGS Report provided by the National Academy of Sciences, as well as
reference to evolving operational requirements and constraints as set
forth by USSTRATCOM and validated by the Joint Staff; (2) full
utilization and collaboration with separately funded programs
throughout DoD and Department of Energy (DoE), to include other
technology development efforts (e.g., warheads, guidance, targeting,
etc.) and other science and technology activities potentially
supporting CPGS; and (3) cross-service and Agency transparency and
collaboration, organized and overseen by the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, on all technology and
experimentation matters, with overlap or duplication only in those
areas where the technology challenges compel "competitive" efforts,
Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, in consultation with the Director, Program Analysis and
Evaluation, and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to perform a
comprehensive review of all capabilities being developed within DoD's
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to determine the extent to which
these capabilities contribute, or can be leveraged for global strike
and incorporate the results of this review into the development of a
comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike. The
investment strategy should be updated, as needed, to adapt to changing
circumstances.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. As the civilian co-lead for the Force
Application CPM, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, will lead a comprehensive, capability-based
review and prioritization of the global strike investment strategy
within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Specifically, for CPGS,
the FY08- 13 FYDP goal is to apply, advance, and demonstrate
engineering for the selection and development of material solutions to
the CPGS mission area in order that individual service acquisition
programs may be funded and executed. FY08 and FY09 Research and
Development (R&D) will be directed at technical capabilities for
precision guidance and control, payload delivery vehicle (PDV)
construction and performance, warhead effectiveness, test-range
development, and alternative booster rocket assessments. An R&D and
testing plan will describe the strategy and investment needed over the
next five years to develop and field full-mission prototypes. The CPGS
R&D testing plan will be submitted to Congress in April 2008 as
required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY08.
Additionally, the Department recently formed a Joint Analysis Team for
PGS that will address these exact issues.
Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Deputy's Advisory Working Group, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the Director, Program
Analysis and Evaluation, to determine the appropriateness of using a
portfolio management approach for global strike to align its
investments with strategic goals and performance measures and provide a
sound basis to justify the commitment of resources, develop a
prioritized investment strategy, and manage development and acquisition
of global strike capabilities.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. With the creation of the President's Budget-
09 Defense- wide Research, Development, Test and Evaluation program
element for PGS, a portfolio management approach is already underway.
For CPGS, the Department fully supports using a portfolio management
approach to align its investments with strategic goals and performance
measures and provide a sound basis to justify the commitment of
resources, develop a prioritized investment strategy, and manage
development and acquisition of conventional prompt global strike
capabilities. Additionally, the Department recently formed a Defense-
Wide Account, managed by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, that will address these exact
issues.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe,
Assistant Director; Lisa M. Canini; Grace A. Coleman; David G. Hubbell;
Jason E. Porter, Sr; and Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Analyst-in-Charge, made
key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Congress directed the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
the Secretary of Energy, to "conduct a comprehensive review of the
nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years", in
section 1041 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub. L. No. 106-398). The 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review was the second post-Cold War review of U.S. strategic nuclear
forces. The first one was conducted in 1994.
[2] We issued a report discussing the progress made by DOD in
determining and allocating resources needed to implement the New Triad-
-a conceptual framework proposed to bring together the capabilities of
nuclear and conventional offensive strike forces (including global
strike); active and passive defenses; and a revitalized defense
infrastructure. See GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD
to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term
Investment Approach, GAO-05-540 and GAO-05-962R (Washington, D.C.: June
30, 2005, and Aug. 4, 2005).
[3] Kinetic capabilities are those capabilities that produce effects
through the direct use of the force or energy of moving objects, such
as bombs, while nonkinetic capabilities create operational effects that
do not rely upon explosives or physical momentum, including such
capabilities as information operations, space operations, computer
network attack, and directed energy weapons.
[4] H.R. Rep. No. 110-434, at 240 (2007) (Conf. Rep.)
[5] We have reported on the fiscal challenges facing DOD in
transforming its force on several occasions. See: GAO, 21st Century
Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, GAO-05-
325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005); DOD Transformation: Challenges
and Opportunities, GAO-07-435CG and GAO-07-500CG (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 24, 2007, and Feb. 12, 2007); and Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs, GAO-06-391 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
[6] The FYDP is a report that resides in an automated database and
provides projections of DOD's near and midterm funding needs and
reflects the total resources programmed by DOD, by fiscal year. The
FYDP includes data on estimates for the fiscal year reflected in the
current budget request and at least 4 subsequent years. Both detailed
data and a summary report are generally provided to Congress with DOD's
annual budget submission.
[7] Section 1032 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-136) provides that the Secretary of Defense
shall establish an integrated plan for developing, deploying, and
sustaining a prompt global strike capability in the Armed Forces, to be
updated annually through 2006. The Secretary issued three reports to
Congress on global strike in June 2004, October 2005, and February
2007, respectively.
[8] We issued a report on the progress made by the U.S. Strategic
Command in developing and integrating its missions, including global
strike, to provide new capabilities and expand U.S. options for
responding to global threats. GAO, Military Transformation: Additional
Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen Implementation
of Its Many Missions and New Organization, GAO-06-847 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 8, 2006).
[9] The Joint Staff is conducting an evaluation of alternatives for
global strike in lieu of the functional solutions analysis--the last of
the three analyses normally conducted within the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System for assessing capabilities and
recommending solutions. The evaluation of alternatives is a pilot
program to bring together selected aspects of the current functional
solutions analysis and analysis of alternatives activities, which until
now had been conducted separately and sequentially, into a single,
integrated analytic effort.
[10] A Senior Warfighter Forum is a mechanism by which a combatant
commander can engage with his senior warfighting counterparts to
identify the issues and capabilities associated with a particular
mission or function of one or more combatant commands.
[11] Homeland Security, Joint Publication 3-26, Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Aug. 2, 2005) and Homeland Defense, Joint Publication 3-27, Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Jul. 12, 2007).
[12] Joint Doctrine Development System, Instruction 5120.02A, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Mar. 31, 2007).
[13] According to DOD, near term is defined as now to 7 years in the
future (2007-2013); midterm is from 2013-2020; and long term is 2020
and beyond.
[14] The private, nonprofit National Academy of Sciences is a society
of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering
research that serves as an adviser to the federal government. The
conference report accompanying the 2007 DOD appropriations bill (H.R.
Rep. No. 109-676, at 228 (2006) (Conf. Rep.)) contained a request for
the academy to conduct a study to analyze the mission requirement for
using existing Trident II missiles with conventional payloads to
provide a prompt global strike capability, and where appropriate,
consider and recommend alternatives that meet the prompt global strike
mission in the near, mid, and long terms. The National Academies,
Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability: Letter Report
(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2007).
[15] Time-critical targets are of high value, require immediate
response, or have a limited window of vulnerability such as mobile
theater missiles, surface-to-air missile launchers, and cruise missile
batteries.
[16] Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces (Washington,
D.C.: February 2004).
[17] The RAND Corporation operates three DOD federally funded research
and development centers that conduct a broad array of national security
research for the Departments of the Air Force and Army, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies, the Unified Commands, and
the Joint Staff. RAND has conducted a number of studies related to
global strike issues, such as research on concepts for long-range
strikes.
[18] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary
Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New
Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development, GAO-07-596T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2007).
[19] For the Conventional Trident Modification proposal, the Navy has
sought funds to develop a conventional version of the Trident submarine-
launched ballistic missile. The Common Aero Vehicle program is
developing a maneuverable, global range, delivery vehicle carrying
conventional warheads. Beginning in fiscal year 2008, the Air Force
transferred the funding for this program to a defensewide account as
part of a consolidated, multiservice effort, managed by the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. The Falcon program intends to develop and demonstrate in
flight hypersonic technologies that will enable prompt global reach
missions.
[20] GAO-05-540 and GAO-05-962R.
[21] Program elements are the primary data elements in the FYDP that
generally represent organizational entities and their related
resources. They represent descriptions of the various missions of DOD
and are the building blocks of the FYDP, and they may be aggregated in
different ways, including to show total resources assigned to a
specific program, or to identify selected functional groupings of
resources. Each program element can be made up of programs, projects,
and activities.
[22] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes,
GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007). Our report
recommendations included that DOD should establish an integrated,
portfolio-based approach to investments that incorporates best
practices of successful commercial companies and establish a single
point of accountability at the department level with the
responsibility, authority, and accountability for ensuring that
portfolio management for weapon system investments is effectively
implemented across the department.
[23] See DOD reports: Defense Acquisition Transformation Report to
Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,
February 2007 and July 2007.
[24] The concept decision pilots are (1) the Joint Lightweight Tactical
Mobility program, (2) the Integrated Air and Missile Defense program,
(3) the Global Strike Raid Scenario, and (4) the Joint Rapid Scenario
Generation program.
[25] Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces (Washington,
D.C.: February 2004).
[26] The Future Years Defense Program is a DOD centralized report that
provides information on DOD's current and planned out-year budget
requests.
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