Force Structure
Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would Benefit from Top-Level Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance, Comprehensive Analysis, and Improved Lessons-Learned Sharing Gao ID: GAO-08-418 May 29, 2008The Navy faces affordability challenges as it supports a high pace of operations and increasing ship procurement costs. The Navy has used multiple crews on some submarines and surface ships and has shown it to increase a ship's operational availability. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which the Navy, for ship rotational crewing, has (1) employed a comprehensive management approach, (2) developed and implemented guidance, (3) systematically collected, analyzed data, and reported findings, and (4) systematically collected and used lessons learned. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy documentation and best practices for transformation, conducted focus groups, and interviewed DOD and Navy officials.
Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for the Navy. While the Navy has provided leadership in some rotational crewing programs, the Navy has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing efforts across the department and among various types of ships. GAO's prior work showed that sound management practices for implementing transformational programs include ensuring top leadership drives the change and dedicating an implementation team. The Navy has not assigned clear leadership and accountability for rotational crewing or designated an implementation team to ensure that rotational crewing receives the attention necessary to be effective. Without a comprehensive management approach, the Navy may not be able to lead a successful transformation of its crewing culture. The Navy has promulgated crew exchange instructions for some types of ships that have provided some specific guidance and increased accountability. However, the Navy has not developed an overarching instruction that provides high-level guidance for rotational crewing initiatives and it has not consistently addressed rotational crewing in individual ship-class concepts of operations. Defense best practices hold that key aspects of a concept of operations include how a set of capabilities may be employed to achieve objectives and identifies by whom, where, and how it is to be accomplished. The Navy has conducted some analyses of rotational crewing; however, it has not developed a systematic method for analyzing, assessing and reporting findings on the potential for rotational crewing on current and future ships. Despite using a comprehensive data-collection and analysis plan in the Atlantic Fleet Guided Missile Destroyer Sea Swap, the Navy has not developed a standardized data-collection plan that would be used to analyze all types of rotational crewing, and life-cycle costs of rotational crewing alternatives have not been evaluated. The Navy has also not adequately assessed rotational crewing options for future ships. As new ships are in development, DOD guidance requires that an analysis of alternatives be completed. These analyses generally include an evaluation of the operational effectiveness and estimated costs of alternatives. In recent surface ship acquisitions, the Navy has not consistently assessed rotational crewing options. In the absence of this, cost-effective force structure assessments are incomplete and the Navy does not have a complete picture of the number of ships it needs to acquire. The Navy has collected and disseminated lessons learned from some rotational crewing experiences; however, some ship communities have relied on informal processes. The Atlantic Sea Swap initiative used a systematic process to capture lessons learned. However, in other ship communities the actions were not systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System. By not systematically recording and sharing lessons learned from rotational crewing efforts, the Navy risks repeating mistakes and could miss opportunities to more effectively implement crew rotations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-418, Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would Benefit from Top-Level Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance, Comprehensive Analysis, and Improved Lessons-Learned Sharing
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-418
entitled 'Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would
Benefit from Top-Level Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance, Comprehensive
Analysis, and Improved Lessons-Learned Sharing' which was released on
May 30, 2008.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2008:
Force Structure:
Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would Benefit from Top-Level
Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance, Comprehensive Analysis, and Improved
Lessons-Learned Sharing:
Force Structure:
GAO-08-418:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-418, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Navy faces affordability challenges as it supports a high pace of
operations and increasing ship procurement costs. The Navy has used
multiple crews on some submarines and surface ships and has shown it to
increase a ship‘s operational availability. GAO was asked to evaluate
the extent to which the Navy, for ship rotational crewing, has (1)
employed a comprehensive management approach, (2) developed and
implemented guidance, (3) systematically collected, analyzed data, and
reported findings, and (4) systematically collected and used lessons
learned. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed Department of Defense (DOD)
and Navy documentation and best practices for transformation, conducted
focus groups, and interviewed DOD and Navy officials.
What GAO Found:
Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for
the Navy. While the Navy has provided leadership in some rotational
crewing programs, the Navy has not fully established a comprehensive
management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing
efforts across the department and among various types of ships. GAO‘s
prior work showed that sound management practices for implementing
transformational programs include ensuring top leadership drives the
change and dedicating an implementation team. The Navy has not assigned
clear leadership and accountability for rotational crewing or
designated an implementation team to ensure that rotational crewing
receives the attention necessary to be effective. Without a
comprehensive management approach, the Navy may not be able to lead a
successful transformation of its crewing culture.
The Navy has promulgated crew exchange instructions for some types of
ships that have provided some specific guidance and increased
accountability. However, the Navy has not developed an overarching
instruction that provides high-level guidance for rotational crewing
initiatives and it has not consistently addressed rotational crewing in
individual ship-class concepts of operations. Defense best practices
hold that key aspects of a concept of operations include how a set of
capabilities may be employed to achieve objectives and identifies by
whom, where, and how it is to be accomplished.
The Navy has conducted some analyses of rotational crewing; however, it
has not developed a systematic method for analyzing, assessing and
reporting findings on the potential for rotational crewing on current
and future ships. Despite using a comprehensive data-collection and
analysis plan in the Atlantic Fleet Guided Missile Destroyer Sea Swap,
the Navy has not developed a standardized data-collection plan that
would be used to analyze all types of rotational crewing, and life-
cycle costs of rotational crewing alternatives have not been evaluated.
The Navy has also not adequately assessed rotational crewing options
for future ships. As new ships are in development, DOD guidance
requires that an analysis of alternatives be completed. These analyses
generally include an evaluation of the operational effectiveness and
estimated costs of alternatives. In recent surface ship acquisitions,
the Navy has not consistently assessed rotational crewing options. In
the absence of this, cost-effective force structure assessments are
incomplete and the Navy does not have a complete picture of the number
of ships it needs to acquire.
The Navy has collected and disseminated lessons learned from some
rotational crewing experiences; however, some ship communities have
relied on informal processes. The Atlantic Sea Swap initiative used a
systematic process to capture lessons learned. However, in other ship
communities the actions were not systematic and did not use the Navy
Lessons Learned System. By not systematically recording and sharing
lessons learned from rotational crewing efforts, the Navy risks
repeating mistakes and could miss opportunities to more effectively
implement crew rotations.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD take several actions, including assigning
leadership; establishing an implementation team; promulgating guidance;
developing a systematic data-collection and analysis plan; assessing
crewing options in analyses of alternatives; and developing guidance
for rotational crewing lessons learned. DOD partially agreed with three
recommendations but disagreed with five others. To facilitate
transformation of the Navy‘s ship crewing culture, GAO included a
matter for congressional consideration that would require DOD to
establish clear leadership; an implementation team; and overarching
guidance.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-418]. For more information,
contact Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Navy Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach
to Coordinate and Integrate Rotational Crewing Efforts:
Navy's Development, Dissemination, and Implementation of Rotational
Crewing Guidance Has Been Inconsistent:
The Navy Has Not Implemented a Systematic Approach for Analyzing
Rotational Crewing on Current and Future Ships:
Some Actions Have Been Taken to Collect and Use Lessons Learned from
Rotational Crewing Experiences:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Navy's Rotational Crewing Alternatives and Initiatives:
Table 2: Examples of Actions Taken, outside of the Navy Lessons Learned
System, to Collect and Leverage Lessons Learned between Ship
Communities:
Table 3: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform:
Figures:
Figure 1: Life-Cycle Costs Are Determined Early in a System's
Development:
Figure 2: The Defense Acquisition Management Framework:
Figure 3: The Littoral Combat Ship Community Implementation Team:
Figure 4: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Submarine:
Figure 5: U.S.S. Ohio, an Ohio-class Guided Missile Submarine, with a
Drydeck Shelter, Arrives at Naval Station Pearl Harbor before
Continuing on Its Maiden Deployment to the Western Pacific:
Figure 6: The U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-class Guided Missile
Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Passing in the Foreground:
Figure 7: The Cyclone-class Coastal Patrol Craft U.S.S. Whirlwind (PC
11) Protects Iraq's Oil Terminals in the Northern Persian Gulf:
Figure 8: The U.S.S. Pioneer, a Mine Countermeasure Ship:
Figure 9: The HSV-2 Swift:
Figure 10: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat Ship:
Figure 11: Design Depiction of the Navy's Next Generation Destroyer,
DDG-1000:
Abbreviations:
CG(X)guided missile cruiser, new design or class:
DDG: guided missile destroyer:
DOD: Department of Defense:
HSV: high speed vessel:
LCS: littoral combat ship:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 29, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
At a time when the federal government is facing a large and growing
fiscal imbalance, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress will be
asked to make important program and investment decisions on Navy
surface ships. At costs ranging from $500 million to $5 billion
each,[Footnote 1] the Navy's surface combatants represent a significant
capital investment. The Navy consistently faces affordability
challenges as it attempts to provide necessary forward presence while
supporting a high pace of operations, rising personnel costs, and cost
growth in new ship classes. The Navy has traditionally maintained
overseas presence by using standard deployments whereby individual
ships and their permanently assigned crews are deployed for
approximately 6 months out of a 27-month cycle that includes time for
training and ship maintenance. To maximize its return on investment
while maintaining forward presence, the Navy is examining different
means for employing its surface ships. Rotational crewing is one of
many alternatives the Navy is pursuing to increase the utilization and
operational availability of Navy ships. Recently, the Chief of Naval
Operations cited rotational crewing as a cost-effective means of
increasing forward presence while maintaining current force structure
levels.[Footnote 2]
Rotational crewing has been and is a part of today's Navy; however,
this practice is not widespread and is still evolving. Since the 1960s,
the Navy has used "Blue-Gold" rotational crewing on its ballistic
missile submarines, whereby two complete crews are assigned to a single
ship, and they rotate deployments. The Navy also uses this "Blue-Gold"
rotational crewing alternative on its high speed vessel (HSV)
experimental ship, the HSV-2 Swift, and plans on using this crewing
alternative for its four newly converted guided missile submarines. In
recent years, the United States Pacific and Atlantic Fleets have both
completed "Sea Swap" efforts that demonstrated the ability to rotate
the crews of destroyers. The "Sea Swap" crewing alternative uses one
deploying ship but multiple sequentially deploying crews. Newly
deploying crews swap ships with the crew on the forward-deployed ship
and nondeployed crews train and perform maintenance on a ship in the
home port. Currently, the Navy uses similar rotational crews to employ
mine warfare and patrol coastal ships in the Persian Gulf. The Navy
also plans to rotationally crew its new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
class, implementing a "Blue-Gold" alternative on the first two ships
and additional approaches in the future. Appendix I provides a
description of all the ships included in our evaluation.
In a November 2004 report, we examined the Navy's implementation of
rotational crewing in the U.S. Pacific Fleet Destroyer Sea Swap effort,
as well as the Navy's other ongoing rotational crewing
programs.[Footnote 3] Our report found that the Navy had not (1)
established an analytical framework for evaluating rotational crewing
efforts, (2) provided effective guidance, (3) systematically leveraged
lessons learned to support rotational crewing implementation, and (4)
fully assessed the effect on ship maintenance on ships with extended
deployments with rotating crews. Recognizing the Navy's need to explore
ways to improve the use of its surface ships and its plan to employ
rotational crews on several types of surface ships in the current and
planned force, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007[Footnote 4] directed us to report on the Navy's
Atlantic guided missile destroyer (DDG) Sea Swap initiative as well as
lessons learned from recent ship rotational crew experiments and the
extent to which these lessons are systematically collected and shared.
The mandate refers specifically to the Atlantic Fleet Sea Swap
demonstrations, but at times collectively refers to other rotational
crewing efforts, current or planned. We provided a briefing to the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed
Services of the House of Representatives to meet the mandate on March
4, 2008. In this report we assess the extent to which the Navy has: (1)
employed a comprehensive management approach to coordinate and
integrate rotational crewing efforts; (2) developed and implemented
guidance and concepts of operations for rotational crewing; (3)
systematically collected and analyzed data on rotational crewing
efforts for current and future ships; and (4) collected and used
lessons learned.
To assess the extent to which the Navy employed a comprehensive
management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing
efforts, we compared the Navy's approach with our prior work on best
practices for organizational transformations; reviewed relevant Navy
practices; and interviewed DOD, Navy, and fleet headquarters officials.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has developed, disseminated, and
implemented guidance and concepts of operations for rotational crewing
on surface ships, we obtained and analyzed relevant documentation
including, but not limited to, concepts of operations,[Footnote 5]
directives, instructions, and procedures from the Navy, and we
interviewed fleet and Navy headquarters officials. To assess the extent
to which the Navy has analyzed, evaluated, and assessed potential
rotational crewing efforts for current and future ships, we reviewed
and analyzed the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap data-collection and
analysis plan and final report;[Footnote 6] collected and analyzed
recent ship-class acquisition documents, including analyses of
alternatives; interviewed fleet and Navy headquarters officials; and
conducted 19 focus groups with rotational crews. To assess the extent
to which the Navy has systematically collected, disseminated, and
capitalized on lessons learned from past and current rotational crewing
experiences, we obtained and reviewed Navy Lessons Learned System
instructions, queried the Navy Lessons Learned System, and interviewed
Navy officials. We assessed the Navy Lessons Learned System data and
determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We
conducted this performance audit from February 2007 to May 2008, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. The scope and methodology
used in our review are described in further detail in appendix II.
Results in Brief:
While the Navy has taken action to provide leadership in some specific
rotational crewing programs, it has not fully established a
comprehensive management approach to coordinate and integrate
rotational crewing efforts--from ship concept design through
employment--throughout the department. We have identified several key
management practices at the center of implementing transformational
programs. These key management practices include ensuring that top
leadership drives the change and dedicating an implementation team that
will be responsible for the day-to-day management and coordination of
the transformation.[Footnote 7] The Navy has provided leadership in
some specific rotational crewing efforts. For example, Commander, Naval
Surface Forces, has provided effective leadership to the LCS community
by setting the direction, pace, and tone for the transformation of the
ship-crewing culture, while institutionalizing accountability. However,
there is not a designated leader to manage all rotational crewing
efforts in the Department of the Navy. Additionally, the Navy has not
designated an implementation team to ensure that rotational crewing
efforts throughout the department receive the focused attention
necessary to be sustained and effective by keeping efforts coordinated,
and integrating and applying their results to the fleet. As a result,
numerous separate rotational crewing efforts continue with little, if
any, top-down leadership and coordination, and no team or steering
group exists within the Navy to manage the transformation of the Navy's
ship-crewing culture. Without a comprehensive management approach, the
Navy may not be able to effectively coordinate and integrate rotational
crewing efforts or develop rotational crewing in an efficient manner.
As a result, the Navy can not be assured that it will lead a successful
transformation of its crewing culture.
Although the Navy has developed guidance for some rotational crewing
efforts, the development, dissemination, and implementation of
rotational crewing guidance has been inconsistent, which could hinder
rotational crewing efforts. The Navy has developed and promulgated crew
exchange instructions that have provided some specific guidance and
increased accountability; however, the Navy has not developed
overarching guidance that provides high-level policy and guidance for
rotational crewing initiatives and has been inconsistent in addressing
rotational crewing in individual ship-class concepts of operations.
According to defense best practices, key aspects of a concept of
operations include a description of how a set of capabilities may be
employed to achieve desired objectives or a particular end state and
identifies who, where, and--most importantly--how it is to be
accomplished, employed, and executed. Some existing instructions and
concepts of operations have improved management of and accountability
for ship operations during crew rotations and provided a plan for
implementing rotational crewing on some existing and future surface
ship classes. However, ship squadron commands have not consistently
addressed rotational crewing initiatives in individual ship-class
concepts of operations because no one has taken the lead in
coordinating rotational crewing efforts and no guidance requires such
efforts. Without overarching guidance and consistent treatment of
rotational crewing in individual ship-class concepts of operations to
ensure effective management, execution, and evaluation of rotational
crewing efforts, the Navy may not efficiently and effectively implement
current and future surface-ship rotational crewing initiatives.
The Navy has completed some analyses of rotational crewing for its
surface ships; however, it has not developed a systematic method for
data collection and analysis of rotational crewing on current surface
ships, including the cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing options.
Additionally, the Navy has not fully analyzed or systematically
assessed rotational crewing options in the analysis of alternatives for
surface ships in development, including life-cycle costs. The Navy's
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative included a data-collection and
analysis plan that identified much of the information needed to assess
a rotational crewing initiative. However, the plan did not include a
comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that included an evaluation
of life-cycle costs. In addition, the Navy has collected some data from
its other rotational crewing efforts but has not established a
standardized data-collection and analysis plan to guide data collection
and analysis, assessment, and reporting of findings for each of the
different types of rotational crewing efforts. Furthermore, the Navy
has not fully and systematically evaluated rotational crewing options
for future ship classes. DOD and Navy guidance requires an analysis of
alternatives during the acquisition process of weapon systems, and
these analyses generally contain an evaluation of the performance,
operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and estimated costs
of alternatives that satisfy established capability needs. However, the
guidance does not specifically require consideration of rotational
crewing alternatives as part of this analysis even though the use of
rotational crewing may affect the life-cycle cost or mission
effectiveness of the various alternatives. Without a systematic
approach for collecting relevant rotational crewing-related data and
analyzing, evaluating, and assessing rotational crewing for current and
future ships, Navy decisionmakers will not have the ability to compare
rotational crewing concepts with the traditional crewing concept of one
crew for one ship. Consequently, the Navy may not be able to determine
if particular rotational crewing alternatives have the potential for
fulfilling operational needs and maximizing return on investment. In
the absence of this knowledge the Navy's force structure assessments
may be incomplete and the Navy may not have a complete picture of the
number of ships it needs to acquire.
The Navy has made progress in systematically collecting and
disseminating lessons learned from rotational crewing experiences.
However, some ship communities have relied on informal processes. The
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative used a systematic process to
capture lessons learned and enter them into Navy Lessons Learned
System. Other ship communities, such as the LCS, have also taken
actions to collect and leverage lessons learned from rotational crewing
experiences, both within and across individual commands. However, most
ship communities did not submit or use the Navy Lessons Learned System
to enhance knowledge sharing or learn from others' experiences. The
Navy lacks overarching systematic processes and requirements for the
collection and dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically
to rotational crewing. By not systematically collecting, recording, and
disseminating lessons learned from all rotational crewing experiences,
the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating mistakes and could miss
opportunities to more effectively plan and conduct crew rotations.
To facilitate increased ship utilization in an effective and efficient
manner, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Navy to take the following actions with respect to ship
rotational crewing: assign clear leadership and establish an
overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day management
oversight; develop and promulgate overarching rotational crewing
guidance; develop a systematic data-collection and analysis plan with
assessments and reporting of findings, including life-cycle costs;
assess rotational crewing options in analysis of alternatives; develop
and implement concepts of operations for all rotational crewing
initiatives; and institutionalize lessons learned collection and
dissemination.
DOD, in its comments on a draft of this report, partially agreed with
our three recommendations regarding concepts of operations, data
collection and analysis, and rotational crewing assessments during
surface-ship analysis of alternatives. DOD disagreed with our five
other recommendations that would assign clear leadership and
accountability for managing rotational crewing efforts; establish an
overarching implementation team; develop and promulgate overarching
guidance to provide the high-level vision and guidance needed to
consistently and effectively manage, implement, and evaluate all
rotational crewing efforts; ensure the systematic collection and
dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational
crewing; and incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach
outlined in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations. In
its comments, DOD stated that measures are already in place that
address the issues raised by the report. We disagree that the actions
taken by the Navy to date fulfill the intent of our recommendations and
are complete. While the Navy has taken some positive actions on these
issues, we do not believe that the Navy's actions go far enough in
providing leadership, management, and guidance in transforming the
Navy's surface-ship-crewing culture; in collecting and analyzing data,
including cost-effectiveness and full life-cycle cost; nor in
documenting and acting on lessons it has learned during implementation
of different rotational crewing alternatives. For example, the Navy
does not have a designated leader to manage all rotational crewing
efforts or a Navy-wide implementation team to ensure that rotational
crewing efforts throughout the department receive the focused attention
necessary to be sustained and effective by keeping efforts coordinated,
and integrating and applying their results to the fleet. Additionally,
although some ship communities involved in rotational crewing have
developed policies and procedures specific to their communities, the
Navy does not have an overarching directive that would designate a
clear leader and an implementation team; assign responsibilities;
establish procedures, guides, functions, and reporting requirements,
such as concepts of operations and data collection, analysis and
reporting; and develop guidance on collecting and using lessons
learned. As such, the Navy may be missing opportunities to improve its
transformational capabilities and cost-effectively increase surface-
ship operational availability. Therefore, we are suggesting that
Congress consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to direct the
Secretary of the Navy to implement our recommendations and report to
Congress on its progress when the President's budget for fiscal year
2010 is submitted to Congress. The department's comments and our
evaluation of them are discussed on pages 45-50. DOD's comments are
reprinted in their entirety in appendix III.
Background:
Rotational Crewing Proven to Provide Greater Forward Presence:
Maintaining an overseas military presence that is prepared to deter
threats and engage enemies remains an enduring tenet of U.S. national
military strategy and priorities. For example, the National Military
Strategy notes that an overseas presence supports the ability of the
United States to project power against threats and support
establishment of an environment that reduces the conditions that foster
extremist ideologies. By being forward-deployed, maritime forces can
enable familiarity with the environment and behavior patterns of
regional actors. The Navy has traditionally maintained overseas
presence by using standard deployments whereby individual ships and
their permanently assigned crews are deployed for approximately 6
months out of a 27-month cycle. However, the amount of time a ship
ultimately spends forward-deployed in a theater of operations is
affected by several factors in its employment cycle. These factors
include length of deployment, transit speeds to and from operating
areas, port calls, crew training and certification, ship maintenance
requirements, and maintaining sufficient readiness for surging forces
during nondeployed periods. The result is that a ship homeported in the
United States and deploying to the Persian Gulf area for 6 months will
normally spend less than 20 percent of its 27 month cycle in-theater
and that the Navy would need about six ships to maintain a continuous
presence in the region over a 2-year period.
Rotational crewing has been proven to provide greater forward presence
for Navy ships by eliminating ship transits and maintaining more on-
station time in distant operating areas. Specifically, the 2004 Pacific
Fleet Destroyer Sea Swap initiative demonstrated that rotational
crewing provides more forward presence with fewer ships. For example,
one Pacific Fleet destroyer, rotationally crewed with three
sequentially-deployed crews, produced an additional 16 days of forward
presence compared with a standard four-ship/four-crew deployment. The
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative produced similar results. For
example, one Atlantic Fleet destroyer, rotationally crewed with three
crews, produced 25 days more of forward presence than a standard four-
ship/four-crew deployment. Assessments completed by the Center for
Naval Analyses and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
confirmed the results of the Pacific and Atlantic Sea Swap initiatives.
Using the Blue-Gold alternative, the HSV-2 Swift has achieved an
operations tempo of more than 80 percent and the four newly converted
guided missile submarines expect to spend two-thirds of their
operational cycles forward-deployed in the operations area.
Pressure on Shipbuilding Procurement:
At costs ranging from $500 million to $5 billion each, the Navy's
surface combatants represent a significant capital investment. Facing
cost growth in new ship classes[Footnote 8] and federal fiscal
challenges,[Footnote 9] rotational crewing may be one alternative the
Navy could utilize to meet mission requirements and mitigate the
effects of cost growth on ship requirements as embodied in the Navy's
long-range shipbuilding plan and maritime strategy. The Congressional
Budget Office and Center for Naval Analysis have also noted the
procurement savings achieved as a result of using rotational crewing on
ships.[Footnote 10] In 2007, the Chief of Naval Operations recognized
the challenge of accomplishing the Navy's missions within its budget.
The Chief of Naval Operations explained that there is extraordinary
pressure to balance the Navy's personnel, operations, and procurement
accounts in today's fiscal environment. Meanwhile, the Navy has faced
increased criticism for rising shipbuilding costs. The increasing cost
of surface ships has led the Navy to reduce procurements, and the
resulting loss of economies of scale has driven costs of individual
surface ships even higher. We have reported that significant cost
growth and long schedule delays are persistent problems in both new and
follow-on ships.[Footnote 11] We also reported that the Navy has
developed and implemented several initiatives to increase the
operational availability of Navy and Marine Corps fleet forces,
including the Fleet Response Plan and rotational crewing.[Footnote 12]
Navy officials have cited these initiatives as ways to increase
readiness and reduce the numbers of ships needed in the Navy's force
structure, thereby freeing funding for other priorities.
Life-Cycle Costs Are Determined Early in a System's Development:
Decisions made in setting requirements very early in a ship's
development have enormous effect on the cost of the system over its
life.[Footnote 13] Life-cycle costs include the costs to research,
develop, acquire, own, operate, maintain, and dispose of weapon and
support systems. These costs include the facilities and training
equipment, such as simulators, unique to the system. Navy analyses show
that by the second acquisition milestone (which assesses whether a
system is ready to advance to the system development and demonstration
phase), roughly 85 percent of a ship's life-cycle cost has been "locked
in" by design, production quantity, and schedule decisions while less
than 10 percent of its total costs has actually been expended. (See
fig. 1.)
Figure 1: Life-Cycle Costs Are Determined Early in a System's
Development:
This figure is an illustration showing that life-cycle costs are
determined early in a system's development.
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
Figure 1 depicts the relative apportionment of research and
development, procurement, and operating and support costs over the
typical life cycle of a ship program (the complete life cycle of a
ship, from concept development through disposal, typically ranges from
40 to 60 years). Research and development funds are spent at program
initiation and generally constitute only a small fraction of a new
ship's costs. Then, in the next acquisition phase, procurement funds
are spent to acquire the new ship. The vast majority of the life-cycle
costs is comprised of operating and support costs and is incurred over
the life of the ship.
Defense Acquisition Policy Requires Setting Goals to Optimize
Performance and Minimize Cost:
Recognizing that fiscal constraints pose a long-term challenge, DOD
policy states that life-cycle costs of new military systems should be
identified and that all participants shall plan programs based on
realistic projections of the dollars and manpower likely to be
available in future years.[Footnote 14] This approach, referred to as
treating cost as an independent variable, requires program managers to
consider cost-performance trade-offs in setting program goals. During
the acquisition process, program managers are held accountable for
making progress toward meeting established goals and requirements at
checkpoints, or milestones, over a program's life cycle. These goals
and requirements are contained in several key documents, including the
initial capabilities document and the analysis of alternatives. An
initial capabilities document describes an operational gap or
deficiency, or opportunity to provide new capabilities, in operational
terms and identifies possible material and nonmaterial solutions,
including approaches involving, among other things, personnel and
training, that may be used to satisfy the need. These capabilities and
constraints are examined during a study called the analysis of
alternatives.
The DOD instruction outlining the process on how to acquire major
weapons systems establishes the requirement for developing an analysis
of alternatives to support major acquisition milestones and decision
reviews.[Footnote 15] An analysis of alternatives is a documented
analytical evaluation of the performance, operational effectiveness,
operational suitability, and estimated costs (including full life-cycle
costs) of alternative systems to meet a mission capability that has
been identified through the department's capabilities and requirements
process.[Footnote 16] Preparation of an analysis of alternatives is
generally required during the Concept Refinement Phase, which is early
in the defense acquisition process--even prior to formal initiation of
a program--as shown in figure 2. An analysis of alternatives is
required at an early stage to ensure that all potential alternative
means of satisfying the stated capability are considered. The analysis
of alternatives assesses the advantages and disadvantages of various
alternatives being considered to satisfy the needed capability,
including the sensitivity of each alternative to possible changes to
key assumptions (e.g., threat) or variables (e.g., performance
capabilities). The analysis is intended to aid decision makers in
judging whether or not any of the proposed alternatives to an existing
system offer sufficient military or economic benefit, or both, to be
worth the cost. In preparation for subsequent milestones, the analysis
is updated, or a new one conducted, depending on then-existing
circumstances. Additionally, the Department of the Navy has issued
guidance containing mandatory procedures for implementation of DOD's
acquisition instruction and process.[Footnote 17] The Navy's guidance
requires an analysis of alternatives to include an analysis of
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, management, leadership,
personnel, and facilities as well as joint implications.
Figure 2: The Defense Acquisition Management Framework:
This figure is a flowchart showing Defense acquisition management
framework.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Ship-Crewing Alternatives:
In addition to the standard ship and crew employment cycle, the range
of Navy crewing alternatives falls into three major categories: (1) Sea
Swap, (2) Horizon, and (3) Blue-Gold. Each of these alternatives can be
implemented in varying ways and may have different advantages and
disadvantages and effects on life-cycle costs, but the Navy's actual
experience with nonstandard crewing alternatives on surface ships is
limited. Sea Swap is the only crewing alternative that has been used on
ships as large as surface combatants.
Standard Crew:
Standard crews use one crew per ship. Most of the crewmembers are
assigned to the ship for 4 years, and it is common for crewmembers to
deploy overseas on the same ship more than once. Ships deploy to
forward operating areas for periods of 6 or more months on average. On
a 6 month deployment to the Arabian Gulf ships spend 3 to 4 months of
that deployment actually on station depending on whether the ship
deploys from the east or west coast of the United States.[Footnote 18]
When not deployed, the ships fulfill surge deployment requirements,
undergo maintenance availabilities and conduct training and
certifications to maintain mission capability. Most Navy ships and
their crews employ the standard crew deployment option.
Sea Swap:
The Sea Swap option uses one deploying ship but multiple sequentially
deploying crews. Newly deploying crews swap ships with the crew on the
forward-deployed ship. Nondeployed crews train and perform maintenance
on a ship in the home port. Sea Swap normally operates in a multiple of
two, three, or four ships and crews. The crews rotate through the ships
in the assigned group. Notionally under this option, one of the ships
deploys two, three, or four times longer than the standard time by
rotating crews every 6 months at an overseas location. Ideally, all of
the Sea Swap ships share an identical configuration, so crew
performance and capability are not degraded because of ship
differences.[Footnote 19] Because crews do not return to the ships on
which they trained, under a four-ship Sea Swap option, some crews could
serve on three different ships in just over 6 months and be expected to
demonstrate combat proficiency on each one. A limited number of
destroyers have employed the Sea Swap option in recent years.
Horizon:
The Horizon option involves one or two more crews than ships, such as
four crews for three ships or five crews for three ships. Crews serve
for no more than 6 months on ships that are deployed for 18 months or
more. Under a three-ship Horizon option, crews could serve on at least
two ships in just over 6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat
proficiency on each one. In addition, each crew would be without a ship
for a period of time and stay ashore at a readiness, or training,
center. This crewing option was employed on mine countermeasure and
patrol coastal ships in recent years.
Blue-Gold:
The Blue-Gold option assigns two complete crews, designated "Blue" and
"Gold," to a single ship. Most of the crewmembers are assigned to a
ship for several years, and it is common for them to deploy overseas on
the same ship more than once. Crew deployments would not exceed 6
months and are often of much shorter duration. An advantage with this
option includes the crews' familiarity with the ship. However, a
disadvantage is that the proficiency can degrade since crews sometimes
do not have a ship on which to train when not deployed and must rely on
mock-ups and simulators at a training facility. The strategic and
guided missile submarine forces and the HSV-2 Swift have employed the
Blue-Gold alternative.
History of Rotational Crewing Initiatives:
Rotational crewing has been a part of the Navy for over 40 years, but
the Navy's experience with this crewing concept on its surface fleet
has been more recent and limited to a small number of ships and ship
types. The Navy has used the Blue-Gold crewing approach on its
ballistic missile submarines since the 1960s; however, until the mid-
1990s, rotational crewing was not practiced on surface ships. In the
mid-1990s, the Navy was in search of a new operational approach that
allowed the Navy to meet forward-presence requirements and surge
capability. The Navy developed the Horizon approach that sustained
readiness by maintaining people and platforms in a continually ready
state. This concept was originally used on Mine Countermeasure ships in
the mid-1990s, and was later adopted by coastal minehunter and patrol
coastal ships in 2003. In the same year, the Navy employed the Blue-
Gold rotational crewing approach on the HSV-2 Swift. Beginning in 2007
with the U.S.S. Ohio's deployment as a guided missile submarine, the
Navy has implemented the Blue-Gold rotational crewing alternative on
the four Ohio-class strategic missile submarines converted to guided
missile submarines. Rotational crewing experiments have also been
conducted on Navy destroyers in the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets.
Beginning in 2002, seven Pacific Fleet destroyers and their crews
participated in the Sea Swap rotational crewing demonstration. This
rotational crewing approach was tested again in 2005, this time using
three of its 22 Atlantic Fleet destroyers in what is known as the
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative. Rotational crewing has not been
used on the Navy's cruisers, amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, or
support ships (other than the HSV-2 Swift). Table 1 shows the
rotational crewing alternatives employed by the Navy during the 1990s
and through the present.
Table 1: Navy's Rotational Crewing Alternatives and Initiatives:
Rotational crewing alternative and ratio of crews to ships: Sea Swap
(2:2, 3:3, 4:4);
Navy rotational crewing initiatives: * 2002-2004 Pacific Sea Swap:
Spruance-class destroyers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers;
* 2005-2007 Atlantic Sea Swap: Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
Rotational crewing alternative and ratio of crews to ships: Horizon
(3:2, 4:3, 5:3 or a similar ratio);
Navy rotational crewing initiatives: * 1990s: Mine countermeasure ships
in Japan and Persian Gulf;
* 2003-2006: Mine countermeasure ships and coastal minehunter ships in
North Arabian and Persian Gulfs;
* 2003-Present: Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships in North Arabian and
Persian Gulfs;
* Future: Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) plan to transition from Blue-Gold
to Horizon.
Rotational crewing alternative and ratio of crews to ships: Blue-Gold
(2:1);
Navy rotational crewing initiatives: * 1960s-Present: Ballistic missile
submarines (multiple classes);
* 2003-Present: HSV-2 Swift;
* 2007-Present: Ohio-class guided missile submarines;
* 2006-Present: Mine countermeasure ships in North Arabian and Persian
Gulfs[A];
* Future: Crews are in place for the first two LCSs.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[A] The mine countermeasure ships are using a variation of "Blue-Gold"
that includes a "Silver" crew that acts as the training crew for the
ships homeported in Texas.
[End of table]
The Navy Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach
to Coordinate and Integrate Rotational Crewing Efforts:
Although the Navy has taken action to provide leadership in specific
rotational crewing programs and transform its ship-crewing culture, the
Navy has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to
coordinate and integrate rotational crewing efforts throughout the
department. Specifically, the Navy has not fully incorporated key
management practices to manage the transformation of the Navy's ship-
crewing culture--such as providing top-down leadership and dedicating
an overarching implementation team--that our prior work has shown
critical to successful transformations.[Footnote 20]
Rotational Crewing Is a Transformational Cultural Change:
Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for
the Navy. An organization's culture encompasses the values and
behaviors that characterize its work environment. The Navy has a long
history devoted to the one crew, one ship model whereby individual
ships and their permanently assigned crews are deployed approximately 6
months out of a 27-month cycle. Rotational crewing on surface ships is
a relatively new concept for the Navy, with only one use before 2002.
Sailors in several focus groups told us that rotational crewing stands
in stark contrast to the normal deployment cycle of the Navy. They
added that, in order to be successful, the Navy's crewing culture would
have to be transformed. Then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern
Clark echoed this message in 2005, stating that rotational crewing has
changed the face of the Navy, and that in any organizational
transformation, people are almost always not in favor of change. If
rotational crewing efforts are not properly managed, rotational crewing
can have a negative effect on mission performance and retention. For
example, we reported in 2004 that the Pacific Sea Swap experiments
lacked proper management, including effective guidance and oversight.
Focus groups with Pacific Sea Swap sailors reported training
deficiencies, increased maintenance tasks, and a degraded quality of
life. Further, lower reenlistments rates were found for sailors with
less than 6 years of service. Successful rotational crewing efforts
require management practices that lead a transformation of the Navy's
ship-crewing culture.
Navy Has Not Assigned Responsibility for Overall Management of
Rotational Crewing:
While the Navy has provided leadership in some specific rotational
crewing programs, the Navy has not provided top-down leadership to
manage and integrate all rotational crewing efforts throughout the
Department of the Navy. We reported in 2003 that key practices and
implementation steps for successful transformations include ensuring
top leadership drives the transformation.[Footnote 21] The Commander,
Naval Surface Forces, has been clearly and personally involved in
leading the transformation of the Navy's ship-crewing culture in the
implementation of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) rotational crewing. The
Commander has set the direction, pace, and tone for the transformation,
while institutionalizing accountability. For example, the Commander has
instituted a set of cardinal rules that emphasize seizing the
opportunity and embracing change as part of the transformation. One of
these cardinal rules is not to compare the LCS to legacy platforms
because the LCS cannot be manned, trained, equipped, maintained, or
tactically employed in the same way. Further, the Commander has
presented a clear and compelling picture of what the LCS community
needs to achieve, helping to build morale and commitment to the
rotational crewing concept. For example, the Commander has articulated
a succinct and compelling reason for adopting rotational crewing,
demonstrating conviction to making the change. Command officials
explained that this has helped sailors and personnel throughout the LCS
and Surface Forces command understand and share the Commander's
expectations, engendering both their cooperation and ownership of these
outcomes. In addition, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations provided top-
down leadership in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative,
recognizing shortcomings in the Pacific Sea Swap initiative. Citing
recommended actions in our 2004 report on the Pacific Sea
Swap,[Footnote 22] the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed Naval
Surface Forces Atlantic to develop goals, standardized guidance,
metrics, and a comprehensive strategy for future rotational crewing
initiatives.
This transformational leadership, however, has been limited to the
implementation of the LCS and Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap rotational
crewing efforts. The Navy has not provided top-down, sustained
leadership to manage and integrate all rotational crewing efforts. The
Chief of Naval Operations has noted the success of rotational crewing
programs and their potential to increase forward presence without
buying more ships. However, with six rotational crewing efforts
currently underway, Navy leadership has not assigned clear leadership
and accountability for managing rotational crewing efforts, including
designating responsibility for integrating and applying program results
to the fleet, an action necessary to guide the transformation of the
Navy's ship-crewing culture. For example, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea
Swap initiative successfully increased forward presence and generated
total operational cost savings of nearly $10 million. However, Fleet
Forces Command,[Footnote 23] in its final report on the Atlantic Fleet
DDG Sea Swap initiative, stated that no future Sea Swaps are planned.
The report states that only if an expansion of missions and roles for
the destroyer class (such as the addition of a missile defense
capability) decreased the total number of destroyers available, would
rotational crewing be considered. According to Navy sailors and
officials, Navy leadership also has not identified incentives for
rotational crewing necessary to lead the transformation. Several
sailors in focus groups with rotational crews reported that port calls
and defined employment periods were critical to successful rotational
crewing programs. To date, Navy leadership has not consistently managed
these incentives and implemented them in each rotational crewing
program. For example, mine warfare ship sailors in focus groups
reported that their deployment schedules were unpredictable, resulting
in poor quality of life. The Navy does not have top-down leadership
because the Navy does not have overarching guidance for rotational
crewing that assigns leadership within the Chief of Naval Operations.
Without top-down, sustained Navy leadership, including assigning
responsibility for managing rotational crewing efforts, the Navy cannot
be assured that rotational crewing is developed in an efficient or
sustainable manner.
Navy Has Not Established an Implementation Team for Rotational Crewing:
Although the Navy has established implementation teams for selected
rotational crewing initiatives, it has not established an
implementation team for managing all rotational crewing programs. We
reported in 2003 that key practices for successful transformations
include that an implementation team should be responsible for the day-
to-day management of transformation to ensure various initiatives are
integrated.[Footnote 24] Such a team would ensure that rotational
crewing receives the focused, full-time attention necessary to be
sustained and effective by keeping efforts coordinated, and integrating
and applying implementation results to the fleet. The LCS community
demonstrates the structure of an implementation team. The LCS team is
led by an Oversight Board, chaired by the Commander, Naval Surface
Forces, with executive-level representatives from program executive
offices, program sponsors, and other major stakeholders. Two cross-
functional teams report directly to the Oversight Board: one addresses
manning and training issues, and the other addresses logistics and
maintenance issues. Additional LCS team members include representatives
from the LCS community, Naval Surface Forces Pacific, other appropriate
functional disciplines, and a senior level executive working group, the
Council of Captains (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: The Littoral Combat Ship Community Implementation Team:
This figure is a circular flow chart showing Littoral combat ship
community implementation team.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Naval Surface Forces officials explained that, together, the
implementation team groups review issues and barriers associated with
the LCS program and jointly develop solutions. The process is
documented in detailed Plans of Action and Milestones[Footnote 25] that
list barriers, solutions, and planning goals.
Other rotational crewing initiatives have benefited from implementation
teams. For example, Naval Surface Forces established an implementation
team to coordinate all involved activities and organizations in the
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative. The team included Naval Surface
Forces Atlantic staff from multiple directorates, regional support
organization representatives, ship commanding and executive officers,
Board of Inspection and Survey[Footnote 26] members, a public affairs
officer, and others. The team ensured that the execution of the
initiative ran smoothly and provided a communications structure to
facilitate coordination among all participants and support
organizations. Submarine Group Trident[Footnote 27] command officials
also benefited from implementation teams in preparing for swapping Blue
and Gold crews overseas to support newly converted guided missile
submarines. Submarine Group Trident command officials explained that
they conducted multiple tabletop exercises to address maintenance
support teams, overseas repairs, and travel logistics. Command
officials further noted that working groups were formed to address
specific challenges associated with forward-deployed crew swaps, such
as selecting the type of aircraft to move the crews and procedures for
storing spare parts, and to develop a preexercise plan. Drawing on the
tabletop exercises, working group preparation, and the preexercise
plan, the guided missile submarine U.S.S. Ohio completed the first
forward-deployed submarine crew swap in over 15 years, successfully
transporting supplies, paperwork, and the crew.
Implementation teams, however, have not been utilized in all rotational
crewing initiatives.[Footnote 28] Navy officials explained that no
implementation team exists to manage the patrol coastal or mine warfare
ship rotational crewing efforts. In focus groups, patrol coastal and
mine warfare ship sailors reported poor quality of life, insufficient
training and professional development time, inconsistent accountability
during ship turnovers, and little, if any, support for the crewing
transformation. Without an implementation team to devote focused
attention, provide a communication structure, and apply lessons from
other rotational crewing efforts, the Navy may not effectively resolve
these issues on patrol coastal and mine warfare ships.
There are several groups within the Navy with key roles in rotational
crewing programs; however, none of these groups has the overall
authority, responsibility, and accountability to coordinate and
integrate all rotational crewing efforts. For example, Fleet Forces
Command serves as the single voice for fleet requirements and
coordinates standardized policy for manning, training, and maintaining
fleet operating forces. A key strategic priority for Fleet Forces
Command is delivering optimal readiness and operational availability of
forces at best cost, managed through best practices and shared
information supporting informed decisions by Commanders. The Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and
Resources directorate, is responsible for optimizing Navy investments
through centralized coordination of Navy warfighting and warfighting
support analysis and assessments, Navy capability development and
integration, joint and Navy requirements development, and resource
programming. Naval Sea Systems Command builds, buys, and maintains the
Navy's ships and submarines and their combat systems, as well as
directs resources from program sponsors into the proper mix of manpower
and resources to properly equip the fleet. Recently established Class
Squadrons are functional command organizations specific to particular
ship classes (e.g., Patrol Coastal, LCS) and are responsible for the
manning, training, equipping and maintaining processes. Class Squadrons
use metric-based analysis to assess readiness, examine class trends,
establish lessons learned, and provide recommendations and solutions.
Other groups with critical involvement in the implementation of
rotational crewing efforts include Naval Surface Forces, Naval
Submarine Forces, and many others. However, none of these groups has
the overall authority, responsibility, and accountability to coordinate
and integrate all rotational crewing efforts because the Navy has not
specified how this will be accomplished in an overarching guidance
document for rotational crewing. Without formally designating an
overarching implementation team with diverse representation to provide
day-to-day management oversight of rotational crewing efforts, the Navy
can not be assured that rotational crewing programs will be coordinated
and integrated, and their results applied to the rest of the fleet. As
a result, the Navy may fail to lead a successful transformation of its
ship-crewing culture.
Navy's Development, Dissemination, and Implementation of Rotational
Crewing Guidance Has Been Inconsistent:
The Navy's development, dissemination, and implementation of rotational
crewing guidance has been inconsistent, which could hinder rotational
crewing efforts. The Navy has not developed an overarching directive
that provides high-level vision and guidance for rotational crewing
initiatives and has been inconsistent in addressing rotational crewing
in individual ship-class concepts of operations. However, the Navy has
developed and promulgated crew-exchange instructions that have provided
some specific guidance for crew turnovers and increased accountability.
The Navy Lacks an Overarching Directive to Guide All Rotational Crewing
Efforts:
The Navy has not developed and promulgated an overarching directive
that provides the high-level vision and guidance needed to ensure that
all rotational crewing efforts are effectively managed, thoroughly
evaluated, and successfully implemented. Some communities involved in
rotational crewing efforts have developed policies and procedures
specific to their community; whereas others have implemented rotational
crewing without the benefit of these instructions. For example, the
Navy established specific policies and procedures for the execution of
the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative. However, as discussed
throughout this report, there is no Navy-wide vision or policy on when
and why to consider rotational crewing as an alternative; how to
develop implementation plans; and how to share and use lessons learned.
As a result, rotational crewing has been inconsistently implemented and
assessed across the Navy. According to DOD guidance on
directives,[Footnote 29] an overarching directive for rotational
crewing should provide essential policy and guidance to achieve the
desired outcome and should delegate authority and assign
responsibilities. According to Navy guidance,[Footnote 30] a directive
could be used to do a number of things including: assign a mission,
function, or task; initiate or govern a course of action or conduct;
establish a procedure, technique, standard, guide, or method of
performing a duty, function, or operation; and establish a reporting
requirement. Without this overarching directive, the Navy may not have
the high-level guidance to effectively manage, implement, and evaluate
rotational crewing as a means of increasing capabilities and reducing
costs.
Inconsistent Development and Implementation of Concept of Operations
Could Hinder Rotational Crewing Efforts:
The Navy has inconsistently addressed rotational crewing in concepts of
operations for ship classes employing rotational crewing. A concept of
operations is an important leadership and management tool because it
provides critical high-level information that describes how a set of
capabilities may be employed to achieve desired objectives or a
particular end state for a specific scenario and identifies with whom,
where, and most importantly, how an activity or function should be
accomplished, employed, and executed. In addition, determination of
these details enables the development of metrics that support rigorous
assessment of the real or proposed capabilities.[Footnote 31] While the
guided missile submarine, LCS, and DDG communities relied on a concept
of operations,[Footnote 32] other commands supporting operations
conducted by rotationally crewed surface ships have not developed or
used a concept of operations. The guided missile submarine community
relied on a concept of operations that addressed the platform's
operational capabilities and challenges while indicating the importance
of leveraging the existing maintenance and training infrastructure.
This concept of operations also described how operational availability
would be increased by using two alternating crews and the special
factors that need to be considered in a ship's employment. The Atlantic
Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations provided stakeholders[Footnote
33] with a high-level description of the rotational crewing alternative
it employed, the principles that drove its execution, the rationale
behind key decisions, and the roles and responsibilities of individual
decision makers, managers, and leaders involved in its execution.
Although the guided missile submarine, LCS, and DDG communities
utilized concept of operations, the Patrol Coastal and Mine
Countermeasures ship communities lacked the benefit of a concept of
operations. While these communities relied on existing policies and
procedures to address some aspects of rotational crewing, such as the
exchange of command guidance, they did not have a concept of operations
that articulated the vision, purpose, and plan for rotationally crewed
surface ships and their crews. They also did not benefit from access to
the high-level information and guidance needed specifically for
rotational crewing to address critical personnel, supply, maintenance,
and training issues. During focus group discussions with crewmembers
representing both surface-ship communities, discontent was voiced about
the lack of training, particularly the lack of advanced schools needed
to increase technical proficiency; personnel shortages that affected
crew cohesiveness; minimal maintenance support provided by teams
overseas; and inadequate supply support that was to deliver critical
equipment when it was needed.
These inconsistencies in developing concepts of operations that address
rotational crewing have occurred because the Navy does not have
overarching guidance for rotational crewing and because it has not
developed concepts of operations to guide individual rotational crewing
initiatives. Without Navy-wide overarching guidance on rotational
crewing and individual ship-class concepts of operations to ensure
effective management, execution, and evaluation of rotational crewing
efforts, current and potential surface ship rotational crewing
initiatives may not be efficiently and effectively implemented. As a
result, the Navy increases the risk that it will be unable to
effectively communicate its vision of this transformational effort, and
will be unable to effectively implement, manage, and institutionalize
rotational crewing.
Crew Exchange Instructions Promulgated for Increased Guidance and
Accountability:
In February 2005, the Commander of Naval Surface Forces promulgated
specific guidance detailing how the crew exchange process should be
conducted to ensure accountability during crew exchanges and for
individual ship communities to use as a model for developing
instructions tailored to their specific needs.[Footnote 34] By
developing, disseminating, and implementing an exchange of command
instruction, the Navy recognized that effective guidance is a key
management tool needed to overcome challenges associated with change
such as rotational crewing on surface ships and to facilitate efficient
operations while establishing and maintaining oversight and
accountability. The guidance stipulated that (1) the crew exchange
process should nominally take 4 days; (2) the crews involved in the
transition process should familiarize themselves with turnover guidance
well in advance of the actual transition; and (3) when possible, an
advance team should complete as much of the turnover process as
possible before the crew exchange begins. Additionally, to promote
accountability and to ensure that individuals assuming duties on a new
ship are properly prepared to discharge their responsibilities, the
guidance requires the commanding officer transitioning off the ship to
initiate an exchange of command letter that addresses specific issues,
including the material condition of the ship; equipment issues and
deficiencies noted in casualty reports; inspection results; logistical
issues, including the status of shipboard equipment identified in the
ship's consolidated shipboard allowance list; classified material
inventories; and supply and budgetary issues affecting the ship's
financial posture.
Furthermore, individual commands involved in or preparing to engage in
rotational crewing on surface ships also have developed or are in the
process of developing guidance, similar in format and content to the
Naval Surface Forces crew exchange guidance, but tailored to their
specific needs (for example, their unique missions, operations, or
equipment). For example, the Mine Warfare Command issued an instruction
addressing crew swap checklists to be used during crew rotations
conducted aboard HSV-2 Swift.[Footnote 35] Likewise, Mine
Countermeasures Squadron Two issued detailed guidance to address crew
rotations occurring aboard Mine Countermeasures Ships,[Footnote 36] and
the Patrol Coastal Class Squadron issued guidance to provide procedures
covering crew rotations.[Footnote 37] These instructions addressed the
unique requirements associated with rotationally crewed surface ships
by discussing multicrew training, advance correspondence between crews,
and training exercises needed to prepare crews to effectively conduct
operations within a specific operational area. In addition, LCS
squadron officials are overseeing the creation of a combined directives
manual[Footnote 38] containing directives, procedures, and policies
that address issues such as the rotational crewing turnover process,
training, maintenance, and logistical requirements. The LCS guidance
intends to divide responsibilities for those stationed ashore and
afloat, define daily operations, promote teamwork, and support
continuity of command. These crew exchange instructions have addressed
some of the unique requirements associated with rotational crewing, but
without overarching guidance and individual ship-class concepts of
operations to ensure effective management, execution, and evaluation of
rotational crewing efforts, the Navy increases the risk that it will
not effectively implement current and future surface-ship rotational
crewing initiatives.
The Navy Has Not Implemented a Systematic Approach for Analyzing
Rotational Crewing on Current and Future Ships:
The Navy has completed some analyses of rotational crewing for its
surface ships; however, unlike the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap
initiative, the Navy has not developed a systematic method for data
collection and analysis, assessment, and reporting of rotational
crewing on current surface ships, including the cost-effectiveness of
rotational crewing options. Additionally, the Navy has not fully
analyzed or systematically assessed rotational crewing options in the
analysis of alternatives for surface ships in development, including
life-cycle costs.
The Navy Has Not Developed a Systematic Method for Data Collection,
Analysis, and Reporting of Rotational Crewing on Current Surface Ships:
The Atlantic DDG Sea Swap initiative used a comprehensive data-
collection and analysis plan for collecting, analyzing, and evaluating
data and for reporting results. However, other Navy rotational crewing
initiatives have not developed data-collection and analysis plans,
collected and analyzed that data, and reported their findings.
According to military best practices, developing a data-collection and
analysis plan is essential to any experimental initiative by
determining what needs to measured, what data will be necessary to
collect, and how the data are to be analyzed. A data-collection and
analysis plan consists of all data to be collected, the content of the
data (type, periodicity, and format), the collection mechanism
(automated or nonautomated processes, time frame, location, and
method), the data handling procedures, and relationships of the data to
the initiative itself. Additionally, data-collection and analysis plans
are important to transformational initiatives because they ensure valid
and reliable data are captured and understood, and that the analysis
undertaken addresses the key issues in the initiative. If properly
prepared and implemented, the data-collection and analysis plan aids
subsequent analysis efforts and helps analysts maintain the focus
needed to transform data collected into information that supports
future decisions. In accordance with military best practices, the
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan[Footnote 39]
identified areas that needed to be measured (for example, morale and
retention, training proficiency, operational performance, operational
performance for supporting the Fleet Response Plan, long-term effect on
ships' material condition, cost of implementation, and cost-performance
trade offs), specific areas from which to collect the data (Navy
reports, messages, and survey data), and how the data were to be
analyzed (issues and subissues). Additionally, the Atlantic Fleet DDG
Sea Swap plan identified overarching goals and key analysis issues;
developed an experimental design; and defined measures and metrics. As
a result, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap final report[Footnote 40] was
well organized, thoughtfully designed, and provided the reader relevant
information based on the original data-collection and analysis plan. By
clearly identifying the areas needed for measurement, determining
specific issues and subissues to be analyzed for each area, and
systematically collecting data in accordance with the original analysis
approach, the plan provided analysts and decision makers most of the
data needed to conduct comparative analyses and support future
decisions.
Although the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan was
nearly comprehensive it did not include a thorough cost-effectiveness
analysis of the Sea Swap alternative, or any forms of rotational
crewing. The plan included a marginal-cost analysis that examined
shorter-term trade-offs between the Sea Swap concept and more
traditional crewing concepts; however, it did not specify a
comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that would determine the
least costly crewing method to satisfy Navy requirements. According to
best practices, cost-effectiveness is a method used by organizations
seeking to gain the best value for their money and to achieve
operational requirements while balancing costs, schedules, performance,
and risks. The best value is often not readily apparent and requires an
analysis to maximize value. A cost-effectiveness analysis is used where
benefits cannot be expressed in monetary terms but, rather, in "units
of benefit," for example, days of forward presence. According to Office
of Management and Budget guidance,[Footnote 41] a comprehensive cost-
effectiveness analysis would include a comparison of alternatives, in
this case, crewing options, based on a life-cycle cost analysis of each
alternative. The plan called for a cost analysis using categories based
on the major issues it identified in the plan; however, the plan
acknowledges that these costs are limited, and a more detailed cost
model is needed so costs that differ between crewing options can be
identified and broken out for comparison. Additionally, the plan did
not call for an analysis of full life-cycle cost data, although it
stated that future rotational crewing concept analyses should consider
life-cycle or total ownership costs as a part of examining future force
structure options.
While the Navy is collecting and compiling some data for the current
surface ships involved in rotational crewing initiatives (patrol
coastal ships, mine countermeasure ships, and HSV-2 Swift), there are
no systematic metrics or methods for collecting and evaluating
rotational crewing specific data similar to the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea
Swap Experiment Analysis Plan. According to Navy officials, the Navy
routinely collects retention, morale, material condition, training,
cost, operational performance, and Fleet Response Plan-related data for
all surface ships. Data collection and analysis for surface ships falls
under the direction of the Surface Warfare Enterprise,[Footnote 42] an
arm of the Commander, Naval Surface Forces. One of the major tenets of
the Surface Warfare Enterprise and its cross-functional teams is to
help recapitalize the future Navy by managing with metrics, and
reducing the total cost of doing business. To that end, high-ranking
Navy officials led by the Commander, Naval Surface Forces, meet monthly
to review and discuss the effectiveness of various manning, training,
equipping, and maintaining processes. Although much of these data are
similar to those collected in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap plan, the
data are not as comprehensive and are not consistent from initiative to
initiative. Additionally, the Surface Warfare Enterprise data
collection and analyses did not link to the effectiveness of different
crewing alternatives. Currently, there are no standard metrics or
systematic methods for collecting rotational crewing-related data from
surface ships because the Navy has not developed and promulgated
overarching guidance that requires a systematic data-collection,
analysis, and reporting methodology. Consequently, the potential value
of rotational crewing is unknown and the Navy is hindering its ability
to determine optimal crewing concepts for ship classes.
The Navy Has Not Fully Analyzed or Systematically Assessed Rotational
Crewing Options in the Analysis of Alternatives for Surface Ships in
Development, Including Life-Cycle Costs:
Navy surface-ship classes currently under development, the LCS, Joint
High Speed Vessel, and the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class guided missile
destroyer,[Footnote 43] have not fully analyzed or systematically
assessed rotational crewing in their analysis of alternatives.[Footnote
44] Early in the development of a new weapons system, DOD and the Navy
require that an analysis of alternatives be completed that identifies
the most promising alternatives. The analysis of alternatives process
is intended to refine the initial weapon systems concept and requires
an evaluation of the performance, operational effectiveness,
operational suitability, and estimated costs, including full life-cycle
costs, of alternatives that satisfy established capability needs. The
analysis of alternatives assesses the advantages and disadvantages of
alternatives being considered to satisfy capabilities, including the
sensitivity of each alternative to possible changes in key assumptions
or variables. In at least three recent surface-ship acquisitions, the
Navy has not consistently applied these principles because it did not
thoroughly analyze and evaluate rotational crewing options and because
the Navy's acquisition instruction does not explicitly require
evaluating rotational crewing in the Navy's ship analysis of
alternatives.[Footnote 45] However, according to the Navy's acquisition
instruction, all analysis of alternatives should include analysis of
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, management, leadership,
personnel, and facilities as well as joint implications. An evaluation
of rotational crewing alternatives could affect all of these things,
including force-structure requirements. A comprehensive evaluation
could also show whether rotational crewing meets forward presence
requirements with fewer ships and lower life-cycle costs. Additionally,
the Navy did not have specific overarching rotational crewing guidance
that would require such analysis and assessments. As a result, Navy
officials will not have sufficient information to make informed
investment decisions affecting future obligations of billions of
dollars.
The Navy identified rotational crewing as a crewing option for the LCS
early in the acquisition process; however, the Navy did not complete
any comprehensive analyses of rotational crewing alternatives in the
ship's analysis of alternatives.[Footnote 46] The LCS analysis of
alternatives included assumptions that rotational crewing would be used
on the ship; however, the analysis did not identify and assess a range
of rotational crewing alternatives. Because the analysis did not
identify a range of alternative crewing options the Navy was not in
position to assess the relative operational effectiveness, suitability,
and life-cycle costs of the rotational crewing alternatives. For
example, the Navy did not evaluate and compare the relative forward
presence and warfighting capabilities for standard and rotational
crewing alternatives and the potential effects on manpower, training,
and facilities. Without adequately analyzing and systematically
assessing different rotational crewing alternatives in the analysis of
alternatives, the Navy was not able to determine the optimal crewing
alternative for fulfilling its operational needs and maximizing returns
on investment. Additionally, without considering rotational crewing
options as part of the analysis of alternatives, cost-effective force
structure assessments are incomplete.
The Joint High Speed Vessel, a ship based on the operational successes
of other high-speed surface ships, including the HSV-2 Swift, did not
include rotational crewing in its analysis of alternatives despite
highly successful experiences with rotational crews on the Swift, an
explicit need for forward presence, and its classification as a high-
demand, low-density asset. The Swift has employed Blue-Gold rotational
crewing while conducting a range of missions, including
experimentation, humanitarian operations, and Global Fleet Station
deployments.[Footnote 47] According to focus groups, HSV-2 Swift
sailors praised the predictability of the operating cycle and Blue-Gold
rotational crewing. Additionally, Fleet Commanders and the commanding
officers of the HSV-2 Swift Blue and Gold crews provided positive
feedback on the Swift mission performance. High demand for the ship and
its capabilities has been met because rotational crewing enabled the
ship to maintain a high operational availability and a sustained
forward presence. The Joint High Speed Vessel analysis of alternatives
considered some data and specifications from the Swift design and
operational experiences. However, the Joint High Speed Vessel analysis
of alternatives does not include any discussion of the Swift's
rotational crewing experiences, despite their successes with
maintaining a very high operational availability. In the analysis of
alternatives, the Joint High Speed Vessel force structure requirements
and basing options are driven by forward presence and the need for
critical response time, but rotational crewing was not included as an
option that may increase Joint High Speed Vessel forward presence.
During the analysis of alternatives for the DDG-1000 guided missile
destroyer, rotational crewing was not thoroughly analyzed despite
statements by Navy officials early in the acquisition process and in
the original operational requirements document[Footnote 48] that linked
rotational crewing to the ship. The analysis of alternatives for the
DDG-1000 compared the effects of rotational crewing and traditional
crewing on the number of ships required to generate forward presence
requirements. The evaluation showed that using rotational crewing
alternatives, in place of the traditional single crew approach,
produces a higher forward presence with fewer ships. Although the
analysis of alternatives acknowledged that rotational crewing met
forward presence requirements, while requiring fewer ships, the
analysis of alternatives omitted further analyses of rotational crewing
for DDG-1000. Furthermore, the analysis of alternatives addressed the
rotational crewing concept, but did not analyze the effect of different
rotational crewing schemes on force structure, training, materiel, and
other aspects that would affect overall life-cycle costs. With a total
of seven planned ships, the DDG-1000 destroyer meets the high-demand,
low-density benchmark for rotational crewing recommended by Naval
Surface Forces in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap report.[Footnote 49]
According to Navy officials, the Navy has no plans to utilize
rotational crewing on the DDG-1000, despite a lack of thorough analyses
and the acknowledgement that rotational crewing meets operational
requirements with the use of fewer ships. Without analyzing the costs
and benefits of rotational crewing alternatives, as compared to the
traditional single crewing approach, the Navy will not be able to make
informed decisions about DDG-1000 procurements and future force
structure.
Lastly, the analysis of alternatives for the next generation guided
missile cruiser, CG(X), is currently in the review process and had not
been released as of April 2008.[Footnote 50] Navy officials have
identified the CG(X) ship as a good candidate to be rotationally
crewed. According to DOD documentation, the analysis of alternatives
for the CG(X) ship will analyze and document major sustainment
alternatives including variations in service life, reliability,
operating profiles, maintenance concepts, manpower and crewing concepts
(including crew rotation and Sea Swap), and other relevant sustainment
factors to fully characterize the range of sustainment options.
Although it is planned that the analysis of alternatives for CG(X) will
analyze different crewing options, a Naval Sea Systems Command official
could not provide us any information as to the content of the study
until it is completed.
Some Actions Have Been Taken to Collect and Use Lessons Learned from
Rotational Crewing Experiences:
The Navy has taken some actions to collect and use lessons-learned from
rotational crewing experiences. For example, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea
Swap initiative developed and implemented a robust lessons-learned
plan. Despite some progress in collecting and sharing lessons learned
within individual ship communities, the Navy's efforts in many cases
were not systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System.
Additionally, the Navy has not developed overarching processes for the
systematic collection and dissemination of lessons learned pertaining
specifically to rotational crewing.
The Navy Has Taken Actions to Collect, Disseminate, and Capitalize on
Lessons Learned from Rotational Crewing Experiences:
The Navy has taken actions to collect, disseminate, and capitalize on
lessons learned pertaining to rotational crewing within individual
commands, using methods both formal and informal. For example, as part
of the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative, the Navy implemented a
robust lessons learned plan to actively collect feedback from destroyer
crews. The plan outlined a formal lessons learned process and
established a team to collect, review, and analyze lessons learned and
ensure that they were incorporated into policies and procedures. The
team systematically collected lessons learned from destroyer rotational
crews by, among other things, conducting interviews with crew members,
reviewing ship message traffic, and examining turnover observation
reports. According to the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative
report, draft lessons-learned submissions underwent a well-defined
review process to ensure quality, completeness, and consistency.
Lessons learned that were of immediate utility were disseminated to Sea
Swap initiative crews. Those relating to management and oversight were
vetted with the goal of supporting future rotational crewing decision
making and policy development. In addition, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea
Swap initiative leveraged lessons learned from the 2002-2004 Pacific
Fleet Destroyer Sea Swap effort, incorporating them into the
development of operational plans.
Other ship communities, using less systematic processes, have also
captured and shared lessons learned within their communities. For
example, the mine warfare community compiled lessons learned following
a crew turnover in February 2007, when this community began using a
"Blue-Gold" rotational crewing alternative. The guided missile
submarine community, in planning for its implementation of rotational
crewing, developed lessons learned from a crew rotation exercise in
Hawaii. These lessons learned were disseminated to command officials
and other ships within this community and also can be accessed from an
internal submarine forces Web site's lessons-learned page. In addition,
LCS officials stated that the LCS community shares lessons learned
within the command through direct feedback from crew members and in
class squadron, cross-functional team, and Oversight Board meetings.
These meetings provide a forum to identify potential barriers and
propose actions to resolve them, resulting in the development of
lessons learned. The LCS community also has conducted a series of crew
swap exercises to collect lessons learned regarding logistical support
requirements in forward-deployed locations. Officials stated that the
lessons learned would be incorporated into LCS standard operating
procedures.
Lessons learned were shared between individual ship communities through
direct interaction and, on a more limited basis, the Navy Lessons
Learned System. Individual ship communities collected and shared
lessons learned primarily through direct interaction, such as meetings
and site visits. Table 2 highlights examples of direct actions taken to
collect and leverage lessons learned from rotational crewing
experiences between ship communities. In addition, lessons learned were
collected and disseminated through the Navy Lessons Learned System,
which is a central repository for the collection and dissemination of
lessons learned and a means to correct problems identified from fleet
operations.[Footnote 51] The Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative
lessons-learned plan explicitly incorporated into its goals the
submission of lessons learned into this system. Twenty-six lessons
learned were recorded in the system, which can be accessed by Navy
personnel ashore and at sea through a classified Internet site.
Table 2: Examples of Actions Taken, outside of the Navy Lessons Learned
System, to Collect and Leverage Lessons Learned between Ship
Communities:
Ship community: Patrol Coastal;
Actions taken to collect and leverage lessons learned: Patrol coastal
community officials visited the mine warfare community to discuss
lessons learned from rotational crewing experiences.
Ship community: Mine Warfare;
Actions taken to collect and leverage lessons learned: Mine warfare
community officials stated that the decision to implement a "Blue-Gold"
alternative with a Silver training ship was based on lessons learned
from the rotational crewing experiences of the HSV-2 Swift and Trident
submarines, which demonstrated the advantages--such as an increased
sense of ownership and greater training opportunities--of the
alternative. According to officials, the training ship maintained by
the Silver crew is intended to be the mine warfare community's lower-
cost version of the Trident Training Facility.
Ship community: Guided Missile Submarine;
Actions taken to collect and leverage lessons learned: The guided
missile submarine community, according to officials, based its
implementation of the "Blue-Gold" alternative on the best practices of
the ballistic missile submarine community, thereby capitalizing upon
lessons learned from over 40 years of rotational crewing. For instance,
this community is heavily leveraging off existing ballistic missile
submarine shore infrastructure and, according to officials, will adopt
applicable rotational crewing policies and procedures from the
Ballistic Missile Submarine Combined Directives Manual.
Ship community: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS);
Actions taken to collect and leverage lessons learned: LCS community
officials collected lessons learned in rotational crewing across ship
communities by visiting the submarine and mine warfare communities and
observing a crew turnover on the HSV-2 Swift;
* According to LCS officials, the Trident submarine base site visit
highlighted the importance of configuration control and the need for
shore infrastructure and training simulators for the on- shore crew;
* One of the primary purposes of the HSV-2 Swift was to validate and
develop lessons learned for the LCS program. Although the focus was
primarily on testing mission module operations, lessons learned on
rotational crewing were captured by LCS crewmembers when they observed
a crew turnover. According to the LCS Concept of Operations, the HSV-2
Swift validated elements of the LCS rotational crewing model, such as
the use of small crews and a 4-month rotation policy;
Lessons learned, according to LCS officials, are also shared through
the LCS Council of Captains meetings. The council is comprised of
officers from numerous ship communities, including representatives from
the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class. Officials stated that the council provides
a forum to share lessons learned on rotational crewing and other LCS
issues. The LCS command also obtained lessons learned from the Atlantic
Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative;
Lessons learned from other ship communities were explicitly
incorporated into the LCS Concept of Operations and, according to
officials, should be incorporated into a combined directives manual,
modeled after the one used by the submarine community. In addition,
officials stated that LCS standard operating procedures, which are
currently in development, would be based on patrol coastal, mine
warfare, and HSV-2 Swift crew instructions.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[End of table]
Despite Progress in Collecting and Sharing Lessons Learned, the Navy's
Efforts in Many Cases Were Not Systematic and Did Not Use the Navy
Lessons Learned System:
Despite the Navy's progress in collecting and sharing lessons learned
within ship communities, its efforts in many cases were not systematic
and did not use the Navy's Lessons Learned System. Instead, the
development and sharing of lessons learned relied on informal processes
that are left to individual ship commands, and thus were not done
consistently across all ship communities that use rotational crewing.
For example, the mine warfare and patrol coastal communities lack
formal written processes to collect lessons learned related
specifically to rotational crewing, according to command officials.
Focus group responses from both these communities indicate that efforts
to gather lessons learned from crewmembers and communicate them up the
chain of command have been inconsistent. A mine warfare community
official stated that the collection of lessons learned is largely
dependent on the commanding officer and is typically shared by word of
mouth or e-mail. Furthermore, while the LCS and guided missile
submarine communities have taken steps to collect and capitalize upon
lessons learned before they operationally deploy, officials stated that
these communities have yet to develop formal processes--such as written
procedures or data-collection plans--to gather and share lessons
learned specifically related to rotational crewing within their ship
communities. LCS officials stated that their community is small at
present, allowing lessons learned to be effectively shared informally,
but acknowledged the need for formal processes in the future. Without
formal processes, the LCS and guided missile submarine communities may
be less likely to systematically collect lessons learned--similar to
the mine warfare and patrol coastal communities--and therefore, miss
opportunities to improve rotational crewing implementation.
While ship communities have collected lessons learned among individual
commands through direct interaction, such as meetings and site visits,
they have not fully used the Navy Lessons Learned System to enhance
knowledge sharing. As of October 30, 2007, lessons learned directly
related to rotational crewing have yet to be recorded in the Navy
Lessons Learned System by the mine warfare, patrol coastal, HSV-2
Swift, guided missile submarine, and LCS communities. In addition, ship
command officials from the mine warfare, patrol coastal, and LCS
commands have indicated that they have not used the Navy Lessons
Learned System to access lessons learned pertaining to rotational
crewing. The following are examples where difficulties experienced by
current rotational crewing efforts may have been addressed in previous
lessons learned:
* Issues such as personnel gaps and training deficiencies, lack of
accountable inventory control measures during the crew turnovers,
mitigating ship configuration differences, and the effect of limited
port visits on crew morale were identified as problem areas in focus
group discussions with mine warfare, patrol coastal, and guided missile
submarine rotational crews. However, lessons learned recorded by the
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative in the Navy Lessons Learned
System had already addressed these issues.
* As previously mentioned in this report, rotational crewing efforts
have been implemented in separate, disjointed efforts across ship
communities without top-down leadership because the Navy has not
established a management team to oversee and integrate rotational
crewing efforts. However, lessons learned from the Atlantic Fleet DDG
Sea Swap initiative recommended the creation of a management team to,
among other things, help define performance measures for rotational
crewing efforts and ensure that lessons learned are documented and
incorporated into existing policies and procedures.
* The LCS community is trying to resolve barriers in transportation
logistics that are addressed by lessons learned from the guided missile
submarine community's exercise to help solve transportation logistics
issues for forward-deployed crew turnovers. However, guided missile
submarine community officials stated that they have not entered lessons
learned from their rotational crewing experiences into the Navy Lessons
Learned System. Consequently, the LCS community has not been able to
capitalize on these lessons learned in its efforts to address
transportation logistics issues. Officials from both the guided missile
submarine and LCS communities stated that their experiences are likely
to be pertinent to current and future ship classes and recognized the
importance of recording lessons learned in the system to benefit the
rest of the Navy.
As the above examples demonstrate, by not fully utilizing the Navy
Lessons Learned System, the Navy may continue to experience
difficulties similar to those that previously recorded lessons learned
sought to correct. Until the system is used to leverage past lessons
learned, ship communities may miss opportunities to more effectively
plan and conduct crew rotations, and may be unable to potentially
prevent problems that were addressed in past rotational crewing
experiences.
The Navy Has Not Developed Overarching Processes for the Systematic
Collection and Dissemination of Lessons Learned Pertaining Specifically
to Rotational Crewing:
Lessons learned are not developed and shared consistently across all
ship communities that use rotational crewing because the Navy has not
developed overarching processes to help ensure that ship commands
systematically collect and disseminate lessons learned from their
rotational crewing experiences. While the Chief of Naval Operations
instruction for the Navy Lessons Learned System[Footnote 52]
establishes a process for the collection, validation, and distribution
of unit feedback, Navy Lessons Learned Program officials stated that
the collection and sharing of lessons learned is not required and,
instead, is left to the discretion of individual ship commands.
Nonetheless, the Navy Warfare Development Command, which is responsible
for administering the Navy's system, has launched an initiative to
actively collect lessons learned for major exercise and events, using,
for example, a lessons learned team and data-collection plan to collect
information. Navy Warfare Development Command officials stated that,
with the proper resources, it would be possible to employ similar
active collection methods specifically for rotational crewing efforts.
However, aside from the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative, the
Navy has not developed processes to guide the active and systematic
collection of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational
crewing. The initiative's concept of operations stressed the importance
of high-quality lessons learned in implementing new crewing concepts.
It also expressly incorporated the Navy Lessons Learned System into
lessons learned processes. However, these processes applied only to the
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative and were not used in other ship
communities. According to the concept of operations, the risks of not
taking a proactive approach to lessons learned include failing to
document policy changes and preserve process improvements, which is
important given the high turnover of personnel during the time frame of
the initiative. Similar turnover issues may apply to other ship
communities that employ rotational crewing. Without overarching
guidance to promote the systematic collection and dissemination of
lessons learned across all ship communities, knowledge about rotational
crewing may be lost and crews will be unable to benefit from the Navy's
collective experiences.
Conclusions:
Given the fiscal environment facing the Navy and the rest of the
federal government, decision makers must make investment decisions that
maximize return on investment at the best value for the taxpayer.
Rotational crewing can be a viable alternative to mitigate
affordability challenges in the Navy while supporting a high pace of
operations and an array of mission requirements. As a result, the Navy
must be in a better position to make informed decisions about the
potential for applying rotational crewing to current and future ships.
As new ships become increasingly expensive it is imperative that
rotational crewing alternatives are fully considered early in the
acquisition process when the department conducts analysis of
alternatives. Without comprehensive analysis of alternatives, cost-
effective force structure assessments are incomplete and the Navy does
not have a complete picture of the number of ships it needs to acquire.
While the Navy has made progress in refining rotational crewing
concepts, the Navy has not taken all of the steps that would be helpful
to effectively manage rotational crewing efforts and assess crewing
options for current and future ships. The Navy has made significant
progress since our November 2004 report on rotational crewing. For
example, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap benefited from an
implementation team that developed and implemented a nearly
comprehensive experiment analysis plan, promulgated a detailed concept
of operations, and recorded and disseminated lessons learned. Further,
several ship commands have promulgated their own crew-exchange
instructions and concepts of operations.
Progress has been limited, however, to specific rotational crewing
efforts and has not been systematically integrated across the Navy.
Without a comprehensive management approach that includes top-level
leadership and an implementation team to guide and assess rotational
crewing, the Navy can not be assured that rotational crewing efforts
are coordinated and integrated as it attempts to lead a successful
transformation of its ship-crewing culture. Further, without an
overarching instruction to guide rotational crewing initiatives, the
Navy may limit the potential for successfully managing, implementing,
and evaluating rotational crewing as a transformational means of
increasing capabilities in a cost-effective manner.
The Navy has also not developed a systematic approach to analyzing
rotational crewing alternatives or collecting and sharing related
lessons learned. Without a systematic approach to analyzing rotational
crewing alternatives on current and future ships, the Navy may not be
able to determine if particular alternatives are successful in, or have
the potential for, fulfilling operational needs and maximizing return
on investment. As a result, the Navy may not develop and procure the
most cost-effective mix of ships to meet operational needs.
Additionally, by not systematically collecting and using lessons
learned from rotational crewing experiences, the Navy risks repeating
mistakes and could miss opportunities to more effectively plan and
conduct crew rotations.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To facilitate the successful transformation of the Navy's ship-crewing
culture, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Navy to take the following three actions:
* assign clear leadership and accountability for managing rotational
crewing efforts;
* establish an overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day
management oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and
integrate efforts, and apply their results to the fleet; and:
* develop and promulgate overarching guidance to provide the high-level
vision and guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage,
implement, and evaluate all rotational crewing efforts.
To ensure effective management, implementation, and evaluation of
rotational crewing efforts, we recommend that the Commander, U.S. Fleet
Forces, direct the development and promulgation of concepts of
operations by all ship communities using or planning to use rotational
crewing, that include a description of how rotational crewing may be
employed and the details of by whom, where, and how it is to be
accomplished, employed, and executed.
To ensure that the Navy assesses the potential of different rotational
crewing alternatives for improving performance and reducing costs for
ship classes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Navy, under the purview of the implementation team, to
take the following two actions:
* develop a standardized, systematic method for data collection and
analysis, assessment, and reporting on the results of rotational
crewing efforts, including a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis
that includes life-cycle costs, for all rotational crewing efforts;
and:
* require, as part of the mandatory analysis of alternatives in the
concept refinement phase of the defense acquisition process,
assessments of potential rotational crewing options for each class of
surface ship in development, including full life-cycle costs of each
crewing option.
To ensure that the Navy effectively leverages lessons learned, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Navy to take the following two actions:
* develop overarching guidance to ensure the systematic collection and
dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational
crewing; and:
* incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach outlined in
the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations, including, among
other things, establishing a lessons-learned team, developing a data-
collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned System.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Because DOD disagreed with our recommendations dealing with assigning
clear leadership, establishing an implementation team, developing and
promulgating overarching guidance, and improving the use of lessons
learned, we are suggesting that Congress consider requiring the
Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Navy to:
* assign clear leadership and accountability for managing rotational
crewing efforts;
* establish an overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day
management oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and
integrate efforts, and apply their results to the fleet;
* develop and promulgate overarching guidance to provide the high-level
vision and guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage,
implement, and evaluate all rotational crewing efforts;
* develop overarching guidance to ensure the systematic collection and
dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational
crewing; and:
* incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach outlined in
the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations, including, among
other things, establishing a lessons-learned team, developing a data-
collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned System.
Congress should also consider requiring Secretary of Defense to direct
the Secretary of the Navy to report to Congress on its progress when
the President's budget for fiscal year 2010 is submitted to Congress.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD, in its comments on a draft of this report, partially agreed with
our three recommendations regarding concepts of operations, data
collection and analysis, and rotational crewing assessments during
surface-ship analysis of alternatives. DOD disagreed with our five
other recommendations that would assign clear leadership and
accountability for managing rotational crewing efforts; establish an
overarching implementation team; develop and promulgate overarching
guidance to provide the high-level vision and guidance needed to
consistently and effectively manage, implement, and evaluate all
rotational crewing efforts; ensure the systematic collection and
dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational
crewing; and incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach
outlined in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations. DOD
stated that measures are already in place to manage ship and submarine
manning, training, and equipping. However, as discussed below, we do
not believe that the Navy's actions go far enough in providing
leadership, management, and guidance in transforming the Navy's surface-
ship-crewing culture; collecting data, analyzing, reporting, and
integrating the results of different rotational crewing efforts; and in
documenting and acting on lessons it has learned during implementation
of different rotational crewing alternatives. As such, the Navy may be
missing opportunities to improve its transformational capabilities and
cost-effectively increase surface-ship operational availability.
Therefore, we are suggesting that Congress consider requiring the
Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Navy to implement
our recommendations and report to Congress on its progress when the
President's budget for fiscal year 2010 is submitted to Congress. The
department also provided technical comments which were incorporated as
appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix
III. Our specific comments follow.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy facilitate the
successful transformation of its ship-crewing culture by assigning
clear leadership and accountability for managing rotational crewing
efforts. DOD stated that the Department of the Navy has existing clear
leadership and accountability for the manning of ships and submarines
and that this management structure includes oversight and leadership
within both operational and administrative chains of command. It
further noted that additional organizational structure dedicated to
rotational crewing is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. We
have identified several key management practices at the center of
implementing transformational programs, which include ensuring that top
leadership drives the transformation. While the Navy has administrative
and operational management structures, there is not a designated leader
to manage all rotational crewing efforts in the Department of the Navy.
As a result, numerous separate rotational crewing efforts continue with
little, if any, top-down leadership and coordination, and no team or
steering group exists within the Navy to manage the transformation of
the Navy's ship-crewing culture. We continue to believe that our
recommendation merits further action and have included this issue in a
matter for congressional consideration.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy should establish an
overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day management
oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and integrate
efforts, and apply their results to the Fleet. DOD stated that the Navy
already exercises day-to-day management to support ship and submarine
manning and training and that an implementation team dedicated to
rotational crewing is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. We
reported in 2003 that key practices for successful transformations
include that an implementation team should be responsible for the day-
to-day management of transformation to ensure various initiatives are
integrated. Although the Navy has established implementation teams for
selected rotational crewing initiatives and has other existing
management structures, it has not established an implementation team
for managing all rotational crewing programs to ensure successful
transformation of the Navy's ship-crewing culture. As a result, the
Navy does not have a dedicated team or steering group that can devote
focused attention, provide a communication structure, apply lessons
learned, and execute other key practices that would build on its
successful efforts and ensure consistent management of rotational
crewing across the fleet. We continue to believe that our
recommendation merits further action and have included this issue in a
matter for congressional consideration.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy should develop and
promulgate overarching guidance to provide the high-level vision and
guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage, implement, and
evaluate all rotational crewing efforts. DOD stated that the Navy has
sufficient guidance in place to provide the high-level vision necessary
to manage ship and submarine manning. As discussed in the report, the
Navy has developed guidance for some rotational crewing efforts.
However, the development, dissemination, and implementation of
rotational crewing guidance has been inconsistent and fragmented. As
noted in this report, an overarching directive for rotational crewing
would provide essential and consistent Navy-wide policy and guidance on
rotational crewing efforts; establish leadership, delegate authority,
and assign responsibilities; assign missions, functions, or tasks; and
establish a reporting requirement. DOD also stated that, although
rotational crewing includes some unique crew considerations and support
requirements, the training and support of sailors involved in
rotational crewing are little different than those for sailors in the
standard crewing process. We agree that the goals and objectives of
ship and crew training and support are little different between
rotational and standard crews. However, as shown in some of the
concepts of operations and in the Navy Lessons Learned System, crew
exchange guidance for rotational crewing and the execution of training
and support for rotational crewing efforts can provide many unique
challenges for sailors, in addition to the challenge of adapting
sailors to a change in ship-crewing culture. We continue to believe
that our recommendation merits further action and have included this
issue in a matter for congressional consideration.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Commander, U.S.
Fleet Forces, direct the development and promulgation of concepts of
operations by all ship communities using or planning to use rotational
crewing. DOD stated that the Navy already uses appropriate concepts for
fleet operations and, when or if additional rotational crewing is
warranted, the Navy will issue specific guidance, instructions, and
concepts of operations. While we strongly support the Navy's efforts to
develop concepts of operations that guide fleet rotational crewing
efforts, its efforts have been inconsistent. For example, ship
communities, such as patrol coastal and mine warfare, have experienced
implementation challenges because they lacked key information such as
the roles and responsibilities of individual decision makers, managers,
and leaders involved in rotational crewing execution. For these
reasons, we continue to believe that our recommendation merits further
action and that the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces, should direct the
development and promulgation of concepts of operations by all ship
communities using or planning to use rotational crewing, using the
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations as a model for other
rotational crewing initiatives.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy develop a
standardized, systematic method for data collection and analysis,
assessment, and reporting on the results of rotational crewing efforts,
including a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that includes
life-cycle costs, for all rotational crewing efforts. DOD stated that
the Navy has no plans for broad general application of rotational
crewing to all ship classes, and a standing implementation team and
data collection is unnecessary. DOD also stated that the Navy will
conduct appropriate studies to determine if and when additional
rotational crewing is appropriate based on cost effectiveness. While we
support DOD's efforts to proactively conduct studies, based on cost
effectiveness, to determine if and when rotational crewing is
appropriate to use on surface ships, we urge the Navy to take steps to
develop a standardized, systematic method for collecting data and
analyzing, assessing, and reporting results, including cost-
effectiveness analysis, on all rotational crewing efforts, including
those currently underway. As discussed in the report, the Surface
Warfare Enterprise is collecting data from surface ships, including
those participating in rotational crewing initiatives; however, the
data they collect is not consistent from initiative to initiative, and
none of the data are tied to the effectiveness of different crewing
schemes or rotational versus traditional crewing schemes. DOD also
stated that the LCS is the only new ship class that currently plans on
implementing rotational crewing. While we agree that the LCS is the
only new ship class with definitive plans to rotationally crew its
ships, several other future ship classes, including the Joint High
Speed Vessel, DDG-1000, and CG(X), still fit the requirements of
potential rotationally crewed ships, as described by Fleet Forces
Command. Therefore, we continue to believe, as we have recommended,
that DOD should direct the Navy to develop a standardized, systematic
method for data collection and analysis, assessment, and reporting on
the results of rotational crewing efforts, including a comprehensive
cost-effectiveness analysis that includes life-cycle costs, so that the
potential value of rotational crewing will be known and the Navy will
be able to determine optimal crewing concepts for current and future
ship classes.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy require, as
part of the mandatory analysis of alternatives in the concept
refinement phase of the defense acquisition process, assessments of
potential rotational crewing options for each class of surface ship in
development, including full life-cycle costs of each crewing option.
DOD agreed that all feasible crewing options should be considered
during the concept refinement phase of the defense acquisition process.
Ships determined to have a potential advantageous rotational crewing
application will assess and include this option among the various
crewing alternatives reported by the analysis of alternatives. We
support DOD's assessment that all feasible rotational crewing options
should be considered during the concept refinement phase in the
analysis of alternatives.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy develop overarching
guidance to ensure the systematic collection and dissemination of
lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational crewing. DOD
stated that the Navy already uses "lessons learned" tools as part of
the rotational crewing and that further guidance to use these tools is
not needed. We support the progress the Navy has made in collecting
lessons learned and documenting these lessons in the Navy Lessons
Learned System. However, as discussed in the report, most ship
communities did not submit or draw on lessons in the Navy Lessons
Learned System to enhance knowledge sharing or learn from others'
experiences. For example, the mine warfare, patrol coastal, LCS, and
guided missile submarine communities lack formal written processes to
collect lessons learned related specifically to rotational crewing.
Without guidance to ensure collection and dissemination of lessons
learned, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating past mistakes and could
miss opportunities to more effectively plan and conduct crew rotations.
Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation merits
further action and have included this issue in a matter for
congressional consideration.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy incorporate
components of the lessons-learned approach outlined in the Atlantic
Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations, including, among other
things, establishing a lessons-learned team, developing a data-
collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned System.
DOD stated that the Navy already relies on data collection and analysis
from ships and that requiring already implemented rotational crewing
efforts to adopt experimental data collection procedures is
unnecessary. DOD further stated that procedures are already in place
for crews, rotational or standard, to provide data to the chain of
command to identify improvements. As discussed in the report, the Navy
has taken some actions to collect, disseminate, and capitalize on
lessons learned from its crew rotation experiences. However, despite
some progress in collecting and sharing lessons learned within
individual ship communities, the Navy's efforts in many cases were not
systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System. Instead,
the development and sharing of lessons learned relied on informal
processes that are left to individual ship commands, and thus were not
done consistently across all ship communities that use rotational
crewing. The initiative ensured documentation of lessons learned by
outlining a requirement and a process in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea
Swap Concept of Operations. The concept of operations also noted that
the risks of not taking a proactive approach to lessons learned include
failing to document policy changes and preserve process improvements,
which is important given the high turnover of personnel during the time
frame of the initiative. We believe that our recommendation merits
further action and have included this issue in a matter for
congressional consideration.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Navy; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to other congressional committees and interested parties on
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Janet St. Laurent:
Managing Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation:
Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Submarine:
Nuclear-powered Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, also known as
Trident submarines, provide the sea-based leg of the triad of U.S.
strategic deterrent forces and the most survivable nuclear strike
capability. The ballistic missile submarine force consists of 14
submarines--6 homeported in Kings Bay, Georgia, and 8 in Bangor,
Washington. Each submarine has about 15 officers and 140 enlisted
personnel.
To maintain a constant at-sea presence, a Blue-Gold rotational crewing
concept is employed on these submarines. Each ship has a "Blue" Crew
and a "Gold" Crew, each with its own respective ship command. The ship
deploys with one of these crews for 77 days, followed by a 2-to 3-day
crew turnover and a 35-day maintenance period. For example, after a
Blue Crew deployment, the Gold Crew takes command of the boat following
a 3-day turnover process. The Blue Crew assists the Gold Crew in
conducting maintenance repairs. During the Gold Crew's patrol, the Blue
Crew stands down and enters a training cycle in its homeport.
Figure 4: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Submarine:
This figure is a photograph of the U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-class
ballistic missile submarine.
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
Ohio-class Guided Missile Submarine:
The first four of the Ohio-class Trident fleet ballistic missile
submarines are being converted to nuclear-powered guided missile and
special-operations submarines. Two submarines will be homeported in
Kings Bay, Georgia, and two will be homeported in Bangor, Washington.
Each submarine has about 15 officers and 144 enlisted personnel and can
carry up to 66 Special Operations Forces personnel.
According to Navy officials, in order to provide greater operational
availability, Blue-Gold rotational crewing is employed on these
submarines. Each submarine has a "Blue" crew and a "Gold" crew and each
crew has its own respective command. The operating cycle consists of
four alternating Blue and Gold crew deployments averaging about 73 days
followed by a homeport maintenance period of 100 days. Two-to 3-day
crew turnovers will take place overseas at sites such as Guam and Diego
Garcia and coincide with a 23-day voyage-repair period.
Figure 5: U.S.S. Ohio, an Ohio-class Guided Missile Submarine, with a
Drydeck Shelter, Arrives at Naval Station Pearl Harbor before
Continuing on Its Maiden Deployment to the Western Pacific:
This figure is a photograph of the U.S.S. Ohio, an Ohio-class guided
missile submarine, with a drydeck shelter, arriving at Naval station
Pearl Harbor before continuing on its maiden deployment to the Western
Pacific.
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
Arleigh Burke-class Guided Missile Destroyer:
The Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers provide multimission
offensive and defensive capabilities, operating independently or as
part of other naval formations. The guided missile destroyer force
consists of 52 ships--with primary homeports in San Diego, California,
and Norfolk, Virginia. Each destroyer has about 24 officers and 250
enlisted personnel.
The Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, conducted a
Sea Swap initiative during 2005-2007, as a follow-on to the 2002-2004
proof-of-concept demonstration conducted by the Commander, Naval
Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Both Sea Swap experiments involved
three guided missile destroyers and three crews, with crews rotating
every 6 months to the forward-deployed ship.
Figure 6: The U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-class Guided Missile
Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Passing in the Foreground:
This figure is a photograph of the U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-
class guided missile destroyer, with a rigid hull inflatable boat
passing in the foreground.
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
Cyclone-class Patrol Coastal:
The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships are small Navy vessels used to
conduct surveillance and shallow-water interdiction operations in
support of maritime homeland security operations and coastal patrol of
foreign shores. The patrol coastal force consists of eight ships--five
homeported in Bahrain and three in Little Creek, Virginia. Five
additional ships will be returned from loan to the U.S. Coast Guard
over the next 3 years. Each patrol coastal has about 4 officers and 26
enlisted personnel.
According to Navy officials, the Navy is using a Horizon rotational
crewing model on patrol coastal ships in which 13 crews rotate among
the eight ships in order to increase operation days in the Arabian
Gulf. Each crew spends 6 months deployed to Bahrain and then 10 months
training in homeport in Virginia.
Figure 7: The Cyclone-class Coastal Patrol Craft U.S.S. Whirlwind (PC
11) Protects Iraq's Oil Terminals in the Northern Persian Gulf:
This figure is a photograph of the Cyclone-class Coast Patrol Craft
U.S.S. Whirlwind (PC 11) protecting Iraq's oil terminals in the
Northern Persian Gulf.
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
Avenger-class Mine Countermeasure:
The Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships are mine hunter-killers
capable of finding, classifying, and destroying moored and bottom
mines. The mine countermeasure ship force consists of 14 ships--8
homeported in Ingleside, Texas, 4 homeported in Bahrain, and 2
homeported in Sasebo, Japan. Each mine countermeasure ship has about 8
officers and 76 enlisted personnel.
According to Navy officials, in order to increase operation days in the
Arabian Gulf, the Navy utilizes a Blue-Gold-Silver rotational crewing
model on mine countermeasure ships. A "Blue" crew and a "Gold" crew are
assigned to each of the four ships in Bahrain and four of the eight
ships in Texas. The "Blue" and "Gold" crews rotate by spending 4 months
deployed in Bahrain and then 4 months back in Texas. Four remaining
crews in Texas make up "Silver" crews assigned to the other four ships
in Texas.
Figure 8: The U.S.S. Pioneer, a Mine Countermeasure Ship:
This figure is a photograph of the U.S.S. Pioneer, a mine
countermeasure ship.
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
High Speed Vessel (HSV) 2 Swift:
The HSV-2 Swift is a high-speed wave-piercing aluminum-hulled catamaran
that was acquired as an interim mine warfare command and support ship
and a platform for conducting joint experimentation, including Littoral
Combat Ship program development. The Swift has about 45 crew members
(officer and enlisted). The Navy leased and accepted delivery of the
Swift from the builder, Bollinger/Incat, in August 2003.
The Swift utilizes Blue-Gold crewing to maximize operational
availability. The "Blue" crew is based in Ingleside, Texas, and the
"Gold" crew in Little Creek, Virginia. Each crew operates the ship for
about 117 days, with 3-4 day crew exchanges occurring wherever the ship
happens to be at the end of that period whether homeport or at overseas
locations.
Figure 9: The HSV-2 Swift:
This figure is a photograph of the HSV-2 Swift.
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
Littoral Combat Ship:
The Littoral Combat Ship is a new class of Navy surface combatants that
is intended to be fast, agile, and tailorable to the specific missions
of antisurface warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and mine warfare in
heavily contested littoral and near-shore waters. Interchangeable
mission packages will be used to assure access to the littorals for
Navy forces in the face of threats from surface craft, submarines, and
mines. The Navy plans to build 55 of these ships over the life of the
program, as well as 24 mine-warfare mission packages, 24 surface-
warfare mission packages, and 16 anti-submarine-warfare mission
packages. The Littoral Combat Ship core crew, which will man the
seaframe, will have 40 crewmembers while each mission package will have
a maximum of 15 personnel onboard, and the aviation detachment will
have 23.
In order to increase operational availability, the Navy is exploring
various rotational crewing options. The first two ships now under
construction will utilize the Blue-Gold rotational crewing model. As
more ships are commissioned, the Navy plans to use a rotational crewing
concept similar to the one employed on mine warfare ships.
Specifically, the Navy envisions using four crews to operate three
ships based in the continental United States, of which one ship would
be forward-deployed at any given time.
Figure 10: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat Ship:
This figure is a combination of design depictions of the Littoral
Combat ship.
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class Multimission Destroyer:
Developed under the DD(X) destroyer program, the DDG-1000 Zumwalt is
the lead ship of a class of next-generation multimission destroyers
tailored for land attack and littoral dominance. The Zumwalt-class will
provide forward presence and deterrence, and operate as an integral
part of joint and combined expeditionary forces. The ship has not been
built, but the first ship is planned for delivery to the Navy in 2013.
The planned procurement of the DDG-1000 will be completed by fiscal
year 2013 with a total of seven ships. Current DDG-1000 plans
anticipate a crew size of 148 people including a 28 person aviation
detachment.
The Navy currently plans to utilize the standard one-ship, one-crew
model on the DDG-1000. However, in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap
report, Fleet Forces Command notes that rotational crewing models are
being considered for the DDG-1000, likely due to their role as a high-
demand, low-density asset.
Figure 11: Design Depiction of the Navy's Next Generation Destroyer,
DDG-1000:
This figure is a design depiction of the Navy's next generation
destroyer, DDG-1000.
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
Joint High Speed Vessel:
The Joint High Speed Vessel will provide combatant commanders high-
speed intratheater sealift mobility with inherent cargo handling and
the capability of transporting personnel, equipment, and supplies over
operational distances in support of maneuver and sustainment
operations. The ship has not been built, but the first ship is planned
for delivery to the Navy in 2011. According to Navy officials, there
are eight ships in the current program of record--3 Navy and 5 Army.
Current Navy plans anticipate a crew size of about 40 persons. Naval
Sea Systems Command officials explained that crewing alternatives for
the Joint High Speed Vessel are still under development. Officials also
explained that the Navy has not selected a material solution for the
Joint High Speed Vessel and is in source selection for multiple concept
designs.
CG(X)-class Cruiser:
The Navy is currently developing technologies and studying design
options for a planned new air-and missile-defense surface combatant,
the CG(X) cruiser. The Navy is currently reviewing an analysis of
alternatives to determine what capabilities and design the CG(X) will
have, including nuclear power options. The Navy intends to begin buying
the CG(X) cruiser in 2011 and amass a total ship force of 19 ships.
Crew size has not been determined. Naval Sea Systems Command officials
explained that crewing alternatives for the CG(X) are still under
development. Officials also explained that the Navy has not selected a
material solution for CG(X), as it is premilestone A and the Analysis
of Alternatives is in review within the Navy.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which the Navy employed a comprehensive
management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing
efforts and transform its ship-crewing culture, we interviewed
officials from the Department of the Navy, Fleet headquarters, and the
private sector; reviewed relevant Navy practices and speeches by Navy
leadership; received briefings from relevant officials; and compared
the Navy's approach with our prior work on best practices for managing
and implementing organizational transformations. To identify these best
practices, we reviewed our prior work including GAO, Results-Oriented
Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational
Transformations. We reviewed key documents including the Littoral
Combat Ship Platform Wholeness Concept of Operations and the U.S. Fleet
Forces DDG Sea Swap Initiative Final Report. We also conducted focus
groups with crews participating in rotational crewing initiatives to
obtain views, insights, and feelings of Navy submarine and ship
officers and enlisted personnel, as well as to determine the extent to
which the Navy had transformed its ship-crewing culture. In addition,
we examined key documents from the Navy's Fleet Training area to
demonstrate the architecture of an overarching implementation team.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has developed, disseminated, and
implemented guidance for rotational crewing on surface ships, we
interviewed officials from the U.S. Fleet Forces Command; Commander,
Naval Surface Forces; and Commander, Naval Submarine Forces. We also
interviewed officials from the Patrol Coastal Class Squadron; Mine
Countermeasures Squadrons One, Two, and Three; Submarine Group Trident;
HSV-2 Swift; and the Littoral Combat Ship Class Squadron. In addition,
we obtained and reviewed exchange of command guidance issued by
Commander, Naval Surface Forces, and its subordinate commands,
including the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, Commander Mine
Countermeasures Squadron Two, Patrol Coastal Class Squadron, and
Regional Support Organization Norfolk that provided oversight of the
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap ships and crews. We also obtained and
reviewed concept of operations for the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap, the
Littoral Combat Ship, and guided missile submarine program. To assess
the potential usefulness and application of concepts of operations we
reviewed best practices guidance in the Navy, Department of Defense,
and the Department of Transportation.[Footnote 53]
To assess the extent to which the Navy has analyzed, evaluated, and
assessed potential rotational crewing efforts for current and future
ships, we interviewed officials from the Department of the Navy, Fleet
headquarters, and the private sector; and received briefings from
relevant officials. We reviewed and analyzed the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea
Swap Experiment Analysis Plan and the U.S. Fleet Forces DDG Sea Swap
Initiative Final Report. We also reviewed the analysis of alternatives
guidance contained in DOD and Navy acquisition instructions[Footnote
54] and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook.[Footnote 55] We also
obtained and analyzed the analysis of alternatives for several ships in
development, including the DDG-1000, Littoral Combat Ship, and Joint
High Speed Vessel. To determine military best practices for data
collection and evaluation, we reviewed several key documents including
the Guide for Understanding and Implementing Defense Experimentation
and the Navy Warfare Development Command's Analysis in Sea Trial
Experimentation, and prior GAO reports.[Footnote 56] In addition, we
conducted focus groups with crews participating in rotational crewing
initiatives to obtain views, insights, and feelings of Navy submarine
and surface-ship officers and enlisted personnel, as well as to
determine the extent to which the Navy collects, analyzes, and
evaluates rotational crewing data.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has systematically collected,
disseminated, and capitalized on lessons learned from past and current
rotational crewing experiences, we interviewed officials from the
following Navy commands: Navy Warfare Development Command, Naval
Surface Forces Command, Mine Countermeasure Class Squadron, Patrol
Coastal Class Squadron; from the guided missile submarine, HSV-2 Swift,
and LCS communities; and we conducted 19 focus group meetings with
rotational crews. We also obtained and reviewed the Atlantic Fleet DDG
Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap
Concept of Operations, the U.S. Fleet Forces DDG Sea Swap Initiative
Final Report, the Littoral Combat Ship Platform Wholeness Concept of
Operations, and documentation of lessons learned from the guided
missile destroyer (DDG), mine warfare, and guided missile submarine
communities. In addition, we queried the Navy Lessons Learned System
for lessons learned pertaining directly to rotational crewing and
reviewed Navy Lessons Learned System guidance. We assessed the Navy
Lessons Learned System by interviewing program officials, requesting
data queries by these officials and comparing the results of these
queries with our own data queries, and determined the data were
sufficiently reliable for our analysis.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2007 to May 2008, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We conducted our review at
the following locations:
Washington, D.C.
* Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Integration of Capabilities & Resources):
- Director, Assessments:
- Director, Expeditionary Warfare:
- Director, Surface Warfare:
- Director, Submarine Warfare:
* Naval Sea Systems Command:
- PEO Ships-Combatants:
- PEO Ships-Amphibious, Auxiliary and Sealift:
* Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard:
* Center for Naval Analyses:
Norfolk, Virginia:
* U.S. Fleet Forces Command:
* Commander, Naval Submarine Forces:
* Deputy Commander, Naval Surface Forces:
* Navy Warfare Development Command:
- Navy Lessons Learned System Program Office:
* U.S.S. Bainbridge (DDG-96):
* U.S. Coast Guard, Atlantic Area Command, Portsmouth, Virginia:
* Board of Inspection and Survey:
Little Creek, Virginia:
* Patrol Coastal Class Squadron:
* U.S.S. Squall (PC-7):
* HSV-2 Swift Blue and Gold:
San Diego, California:
* Commander, Naval Surface Forces, San Diego, California:
- Offices of the Naval Surface Forces Command:
- Littoral Combat Ship Class Squadron:
- Littoral Combat Support Facility:
- Littoral Combat Ship Training Facility:
* Commander, U.S. Third Fleet:
* Naval Base San Diego:
* Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command:
Ingleside, Texas:
* Commander, Mine Countermeasure Class Squadron:
- Squadron One, Squadron Two, and Squadron Three:
- U.S.S. Chief (MCM-14):
Bangor, Washington:
* Commander, Submarine Group Trident:
- Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Pacific Northwest (formerly
Trident Refit Facility):
- Trident Training Facility:
- U.S.S. Ohio (SSGN-726):
We held group discussions with selected personnel such as commanding
officers, executive officers, department heads, and crew members from
the following units, in the locations noted above:
* Patrol Coastal Crew Kilo:
* Patrol Coastal Crew Lima:
* Mine Countermeasure officers and crews from Constant, Conflict,
Impervious, and Implicit crews:
* Ballistic Missile Submarine officers and crews from multiple crews:
* Guided Missile Submarine officers and crews from Ohio and Michigan
crews:
* HSV-2 Swift Blue and Gold Crew commanding officers and executive
officers and Gold Crew officers and enlisted crews:
Focus Groups with Crews on Rotational Crewing Ships:
We conducted focus group meetings with Navy submarine and ship officers
and enlisted personnel who were involved in crew rotations. Focus
groups involve structured small group discussions designed to gain more
in-depth information about specific issues that cannot easily be
obtained from single or serial interviews. As with typical focus group
methodologies, our design included multiple groups with varying group
characteristics but some homogeneity--such as rank and responsibility-
-within groups. Most groups involved 7 to 10 participants. Discussions
were held in a structured manner, guided by a moderator who used a
standardized list of questions to encourage participants to share their
thoughts and experiences. Our overall objective in using a focus group
approach was to obtain views, insights, and feelings of Navy submarine
and ship officers and enlisted personnel involved in crew rotations.
Scope of Our Focus Groups:
To gain broad perspectives, we conducted 19 separate focus group
sessions with multiple groups of Navy ship officers and enlisted
personnel involved in crew rotations on a broad range of ship types,
from small focused mission ships such as patrol coastals to larger,
more complex ships such as nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed strategic
missile submarines. Table 3 identifies the composition of the focus
groups on each of the vessels. Across focus groups, participants were
selected to ensure a wide distribution of officers, enlisted personnel,
seniority, and ship departments. GAO analysts traveled to three naval
stations to conduct the focus groups.
Table 3: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform:
Personnel groups: Junior enlisted personnel;
Strategic submarines: 1;
Guided missile submarines: 1;
Patrol coastal ships: 2;
HSV-2 Swift: 1;
Mine countermeasure ships: 3;
Total groups: 8.
Personnel groups: Chief petty officers/lead petty officers;
Strategic submarines: 1;
Guided missile submarines: 2;
Patrol coastal ships: 1[A];
HSV-2 Swift: -;
Mine countermeasure ships: 1;
Total groups: 5.
Personnel groups: Senior enlisted personnel;
Strategic submarines: -;
Guided missile submarines: -;
Patrol coastal ships: 1;
HSV-2 Swift: 1;
Mine countermeasure ships: 1;
Total groups: 3.
Personnel groups: Officers;
Strategic submarines: 2;
Guided missile submarines: 1;
Patrol coastal ships: 1[A];
HSV-2 Swift: -;
Mine countermeasure ships: -;
Total groups: 3.
Personnel groups: Total;
Strategic submarines: 4;
Guided missile submarines: 4;
Patrol coastal ships: 4;
HSV-2 Swift: 2;
Mine countermeasure ships: 5;
Total groups: 19.
Source: GAO.
[A] One Patrol Coastal focus group contained both chief petty officers
and officers.
[End of table]
Methodology for Our Focus Groups:
We conducted focus groups with all ship communities currently
participating in rotational crewing. The number of focus groups we
conducted varied by ship community depending upon ship crew sizes, the
types of crew member responsibilities (e.g., command, engineering, and
maintenance) and the experience level of the crew members. We developed
a guide to assist the moderator in leading the discussions. The guide
helped the moderator address several topics related to crew rotations:
training, maintenance, infrastructure and operations, management and
oversight, readiness, crew characteristics, quality of life, lessons
learned, and overall satisfaction with the rotational crewing
experience. We assured participants anonymity of their responses, in
that names would not be directly linked to their responses.
Limitations of Focus Groups:
Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the
extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population,
(2) develop a consensus to arrive at an agreed-upon plan or make
decisions about what actions to take, or (3) provide statistically
representative samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead,
they are intended to generate in-depth information about the focus
group participants' reasons for the attitudes held toward specific
topics and to offer insights into the range of concerns and support for
an issue.
The projectability of the information produced by our focus groups is
limited for several reasons. First, they represent the responses of
Navy ship officers and enlisted personnel from the 19 selected groups.
Second, while the composition of the groups was designed to assure a
distribution of Navy officers, enlisted personnel, seniority, and ship
departments, the groups were not randomly sampled. Third, participants
were asked questions about their specific experiences with crew
rotations. The experiences of other Navy ship officers and personnel
involved in crew rotations, who did not participate in our focus group,
may have varied.
Because of these limitations, we did not rely entirely on focus groups,
but rather used several different methodologies to corroborate and
support our conclusions.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington. DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-08-418. "Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing
Initiatives Would Benefit From Top Level Leadership, Navywide Guidance,
Comprehensive Analysis and Improved Lessons Learned Sharing," dated
April 8, 2008 (GAO Code 350966).
DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Detailed comments on the GAO recommendations are enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Joseph J. Angello:
Acting:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness):
Enclosure:
As Stated:
GAO Draft Report – Dated April 8, 2008 GAO Code 350966/GAO-08-418:
"Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would Benefit
From Top Level Leadership, Navywide Guidance, Comprehensive Analysis
and Improved Lessons Learned Sharing"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to assign clear leadership and
accountability for managing rotational crewing efforts.
DOD Response: Non-concur. The Department of the Navy has clear
leadership and accountability for the manning of ships and submarines.
This management structure includes oversight and leadership within both
operational and administrative chains of command. These organizational
structures provide for manning, training and equipping all Navy ships
and submarines regardless of crewing concept. Additional organizational
structure dedicated to rotational crewing is unnecessary and
potentially counterproductive.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to establish an overarching
implementation team to provide day-to-day management oversight of
rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and integrate efforts, and apply
their results to the Fleet.
DOD Response: Non-concur. The Navy already exercises day-to-day
management to support ship and submarine manning and training. An
implementation team dedicated to rotational crewing is unnecessary and
potentially counterproductive.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop and promulgate overarching
guidance to provide the high-level vision and guidance needed to
consistently and effectively manage, implement, and evaluate all
rotational crewing efforts.
DoD Response: Non-concur. The Navy has sufficient guidance in place to
provide the high-level vision necessary to manage ship and submarine
manning. Although rotational crewing includes some unique crew
considerations and support requirements, the training and support of
Sailors involved in rotational crewing are little different than those
for Sailors in the standard crewing process.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Commander, U.S. Fleet
Forces direct the development and promulgation of concepts of
operations by all ship communities, using or planning to use rotational
crewing, that include a description of how rotational crewing may be
employed and the details of by whom, where, and how it is to be
accomplished, employed, and executed.
DoD Response: Partial concur. The Navy already uses appropriate
concepts for Fleet operations. When or if additional rotational crewing
is warranted, the Navy will issue specific guidance, instructions,
and/or concepts of operations.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy, under the purview of the
implementation team, to develop a standardized, systematic method for
data collection and analysis, assessment and reporting on the results
of rotational crewing efforts, including a comprehensive cost-
effectiveness analysis that includes life cycle costs, for all
rotational crewing efforts.
DoD Response: Partial concur. The Littoral Combat Ship is the only new
ship class that currently plans on implementing rotational crewing. The
Navy has no plans for broad general application of rotational crewing
to all ship classes, and a standing implementation team and data
collection is unnecessary. The Navy will conduct appropriate studies to
determine if and when additional rotational crewing is appropriate
based on cost effectiveness.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy, under the purview of the
implementation team, to require as part of the mandatory analysis of
alternatives in the concept refinement phase of the defense acquisition
process, assessments of potential rotational crewing options for each
class of surface ship in development, including full life cycle costs
of each crewing option.
DoD Response: Partial concur. The Department of Defense agrees that all
feasible crewing options should be considered during the concept
refinement phase of the defense acquisition process. Ships determined
to have a potential advantageous rotational crewing application will
assess and include this option among the various crewing alternatives
reported by the Analysis of Alternatives.
Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop overarching guidance to
ensure the systematic collection and dissemination of lessons learned
pertaining specifically to rotational crewing.
DoD Response: Non-concur. The Navy already uses ’lessons learned“ tools
as part of the rotational crewing. Further guidance to use these tools
is not needed.
Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to incorporate components of the
lessons learned approach outlined in the Atlantic Fleet [guided missile
destroyer] DDG Sea Swap initiative concept of operations, including,
among other things, establishing a lessons learned team, developing a
data collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned
System.
DoD Response: Non-concur. The Department of the Navy already relies on
data collection and analysis from ships. Requiring already implemented
rotational crewing efforts to adopt experimental data collection
procedures is unnecessary. Procedures are already in place for crews,
rotational or standard, to provide data to the chain of command to
identify improvements.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Patricia Lentini, Assistant
Director; James R. Bancroft; Renee S. Brown; Karen (Nicole) Harms;
Jeffrey R. Hubbard; Roderick W. Rodgers; Rebecca Shea; Christopher T.
Watson; and Johanna Wong made significant contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See Congressional Budget Office Testimony, The Navy's 2008
Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs (Washington, D.C., July 24,
2007) and Congressional Budget Office Testimony, Current and Projected
Navy Shipbuilding Programs (Washington, D.C., Mar. 14, 2008).
[2] Testimony of Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval
Operations, during a Hearing of the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Armed Services on Navy Force Structure Requirements, May
3, 2007.
[3] See GAO, Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and
Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational
Crewing, GAO-05-10 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004).
[4] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 342 (2006).
[5] A concept of operations provides an overview of the vision,
purpose, and plan required to develop and implement a specific
initiative such as rotational crewing on surface ships. By design, the
concept of operations provides the information and high-level guidance
needed to enable managers and decision makers to perform their duties
consistent with and in support of the initiative being implemented.
[6] Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Atlantic Fleet
DDG Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan (Norfolk, Va., Mar. 3, 2005) and
U.S. Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Fleet Forces DDG Sea Swap Initiative
Final Report (Norfolk, Va., June 21, 2007).
[7] See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[8] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Realistic Business Cases Needed to
Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-07-943T (Washington, D.C.: July
24, 2007).
[9] See GAO, A Call For Stewardship: Enhancing the Federal Government's
Ability to Address Key Fiscal and Other 21st Century Challenges, GAO-08-
93SP (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2007); GAO, Fiscal Stewardship: A
Critical Challenge Facing Our Nation, GAO-07-362SP (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007); and Steven M. Kosiak, Analysis of the FY 2009 Defense
Budget Request (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, 2008).
[10] See Congressional Budget Office, Crew Rotation in the Navy: The
Long-Term Effect on Forward Presence (Washington, D.C., October 2007)
and Center for Naval Analyses, Cost Implications of Sea Swap
(Alexandria, Va., November 2005).
[11] GAO-07-943T.
[12] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the
Navy's Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan, GAO-06-587T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 30, 2006).
[13] In another report we recommended that DOD treat total ownership
costs as a performance requirement equal in priority to any other
performance requirement prior to beginning the acquisition program. See
GAO, Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce
Weapon Systems' Total Ownership Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 11, 2003).
[14] Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition
System (May 12, 2003, and certified current as of Nov. 20, 2007).
[15] Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System (May 12, 2003). Additionally, the Department of the
Navy issues mandatory procedures to implement DOD's acquisition
instruction and process including requirements for completing an
analysis of alternatives in the Secretary of the Navy Instruction
5000.2C, Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System
and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Nov. 19,
2004).
[16] This process is called the Joint Capabilities Integration
Development System. This formal DOD process defines acquisition
requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs.
[17] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2C.
[18] A ship based on the west coast of the United States would spend a
greater portion of its deployment in transit to the Persian Gulf
operating area than a ship based on the east coast, because of the
distance. For example, a ship based on the west coast uses about 90
days of its deployment in transit to and from the Persian Gulf area
compared to a ship based on the east coast that would spend about 56
days in-transit.
[19] Surface ships are continuously having their combat and other
systems upgraded or replaced so maintaining "identical" configurations
can be a challenge if not managed and documented through a careful
configuration control and change order process. Also, despite surface
ships with the same "design" being built within a few years of each
other, no two ships are exactly alike and even more differences are
likely when these ships are built in different shipyards.
[20] See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[21] GAO-03-669.
[22] GAO-05-10.
[23] U.S. Fleet Forces Command was established in 2001 to serve as the
single voice for Fleet requirements and to coordinate standardized
policy for manning, training, and maintaining Atlantic and Pacific
Fleet operating forces.
[24] GAO-03-669.
[25] Both cross-functional teams in the LCS Community have a Plan of
Action and Milestones. There is a Manning and Training Plan of Action
and Milestones and a Maintenance and Logistics Plan of Action and
Milestones.
[26] The Board of Inspection and Survey's mission is to develop and
establish Chief of Naval Operations policy and procedures for trials,
material inspections, and surveys of ships and service craft, examine
Naval vessels periodically by a board of Naval officers to determine
fitness for further service, conduct material inspections and surveys
of ships and service craft and provide assessment of the material
readiness of these vessels, provide independent verification of a newly
constructed ship's readiness for acceptance/delivery, conduct
environmental protection and Navy Safety and Occupational Health
oversight and inspection of Naval ships to include equipment, program
compliance, and training, and compile statistical information and
analyses on material deficiencies.
[27] The Commander, Submarine Group Trident, provides policy and
guidance input on all matters pertaining to strategic missile and
guided missile submarine operations and readiness.
[28] The Blue-Gold rotational crewing alternative implemented in the
ballistic missile submarine community has been successful without an
implementation team. This underscores a number of factors that
influence the management of rotational crewing efforts including shared
experience, the type of rotational crewing, the number of crews, and
leadership.
[29] DOD Instruction 5025.01, DOD Directives Program (Oct. 28, 2007).
[30] Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5215.17, Navy Directives
Issuance System (Jun. 13, 2005).
[31] Best practices for developing a concept of operations were derived
from a number of sources, including: Commander U.S. Fleet Forces
Command Instruction 5401.1, Fleet Concept of Operations Development
(Sept. 4, 2007); Naval Warfare Development Command concepts of
operations briefings and fact sheets; Sholom Cohen, Guidelines for
Developing a Product Line Concept of Operations, Software Engineering
Institute, Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, Pa., August 1999),
under a contract sponsored by DOD; Department of Transportation,
Systems Engineering Guidebook for ITS, Version 2.0, (Jan. 2, 2007), and
others.
[32] U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile
Submarine (SSGN) Concept of Operations (February 2006); Commander,
Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap
Concept of Operations (Oct. 19, 2005); and U.S. Fleet Forces Command,
Littoral Combat Ship Platform Wholeness Concept of Operations (Revision
B) (Mar. 8, 2007).
[33] The stakeholders included, but were not limited to, the Fleet
Forces Command, Second Fleet, Fifth Fleet, and Navy Surface Forces
commanders and staff officials; ship squadrons; fleet training group;
and Sea Swap ship commanders and crews.
[34] Commander Naval Surface Forces Instruction 5440.1, Exchange of
Command Guidance (Feb. 14, 2005). This instruction addressed several
concerns identified in the 2004 reports by GAO and the Center for Naval
Analyses. See GAO-05-10 and Center for Naval Analyses, Sea Swap
Assessment (Alexandria, Va., September 2004).
[35] Commander Mine Warfare Command Instruction 5400.2, Crew Swap
Checklist (July 23, 2004).
[36] Commander Mine Countermeasures Squadron Two Instruction 5400.3,
Exchange of Command Guidance (Apr. 9, 2007).
[37] Patrol Coastal Class Squadron (PCRON) Instruction 5440.1A, Patrol
Coastal (PC) Employment Guide Manual (Aug. 28, 2007).
[38] Littoral Combat Ship Class Squadron Combined Directives Manual
(Draft) (February 2008).
[39] Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Atlantic Fleet
DDG Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan.
[40] U.S. Fleet Forces Command. U.S. Fleet Forces DDG Sea Swap
Initiative Final Report.
[41] Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94, Guidelines and
Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (Oct. 29,
1992).
[42] The Surface Warfare Enterprise integrates all surface warfare
stakeholders together in order to provide one voice for policy,
waterfront execution, and requirements. The Surface Warfare Enterprise
consists of a board of high-ranking Navy officials led by the
Commander, Naval Surface Forces, and three cross-functional teams:
Sustainment and Modernization, Personnel Readiness, and Strategic
Financial Management.
[43] The origin of the DDG-1000 ship dates back to January 1995 when
the Navy developed a strategy for acquiring a next-generation destroyer
called DD-21. In May 2001, the Under Secretary of the Navy suspended
the DD-21 program; however, in November of that same year, the program
was restructured and renamed the DD(X) program. The ship program
remained under the name DD(X) until April 2006 when the Navy announced
that the class and lead ship of the destroyer would carry the
designation and ship number DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class.
[44] We were unable to determine to what extent the Navy assessed
rotational crewing for a fourth ship class in development, the next
generation guided missile cruiser, because the analysis of alternatives
had not been completed.
[45] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2C, Implementation and
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (Nov. 19, 2004). The instruction
states that an analysis of alternatives shall be conducted to assess
how alternative approaches to a proposed Navy or Marine Corps system
contribute to the total mission capability of a system of systems or
family of systems.
[46] The Navy performed an analysis of multiple concepts between June
2002 and January 2004 to satisfy the DOD acquisition instruction
requirement to conduct an analysis of alternatives prior to Milestone A
decision. The study name, analysis of multiple concepts, reflected an
earlier interim policy. The Navy also commissioned and completed as
part of the analysis of multiple concepts a functional solutions
analysis. The functional solutions analysis study addressed a broad
range of potential solutions and the results are consistent with the
study.
[47] The global fleet station is envisioned to be a persistent sea base
of operations from which to coordinate and employ adaptive force
packages within a regional area of interest. Focusing primarily on
theater security cooperation, global maritime awareness, and tasks
associated specifically with the War on Terror, the concept offers a
means to increase regional maritime security through the cooperative
efforts of joint, interagency, and multinational partners, as well as
nongovernmental organizations. The Swift has participated in two of
these missions, the Global Fleet Station Pilot 2007 in the U.S.
Southern Command area of operations and the Africa Partnership Station
initiative along the western coast of Africa.
[48] The DD(X) Operational Requirements Document provided descriptions
of the ship's multimission capabilities to effectively support the
national strategy and global military operations.
[49] Since the program's origin the program requirement has changed
from 16-24 ships to 8-12 ships, and finally to 7 ships. The DDG-1000
program is essentially a restructured continuation of the earlier DD-21
program, and the DDG-1000 will resemble the DD-21 in terms of mission
orientation and ship design. The DDG-1000 is to be a multimission ship
with an emphasis on land-attack operations, reflecting a Navy desire to
replace the large-caliber naval gunfire support capability that the
Navy lost in 1990-1992, when it removed its four reactivated Iowa-class
battleships from service.
[50] The Navy had expected to complete the analysis in 2007. However,
in response to a question about the timing of the analysis during a
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on February 28, 2008, the
Secretary of the Navy stated "we're still in the process of going
through that right now. I will say that based on the preliminary
reviews I've had, we still have a ways to go and I would be hard-
pressed to give you a definitive date at this point in time."
[51] Ship communities submit proposed lessons learned to their
respective fleet commands, which process and validate the proposed
lessons learned. Approved lessons learned are then forwarded to be
officially entered into the system. Those identified as deficiencies
requiring corrective measures are tracked and closed out when resolved.
[52] Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.37C, Navy Lessons
Learned System (Mar. 19, 2001).
[53] Best practices for developing a concept of operations were derived
from a number of sources, including: Commander U.S. Fleet Forces
Command Instruction 5401.1, Fleet Concept of Operations Development
(Sept. 4, 2007); Naval Warfare Development Command concepts of
operations briefings and fact sheets; Sholom Cohen, Guidelines for
Developing a Product Line Concept of Operations, Software Engineering
Institute, Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, Pa., August 1999),
under a contract sponsored by DOD; Department of Transportation,
Systems Engineering Guidebook for ITS, Version 2.0 (Jan. 2, 2007); and
others.
[54] Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System, (May 12, 2003) and Secretary of the Navy
Instruction 5000.2C, Implementation and Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (Nov. 19, 2004).
[55] The Defense Acquisition Guidebook is an Internet-based resource
maintained by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Knowledge Sharing System program
office at the Defense Acquisition University.
[56] See GAO, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would
Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing,
GAO-06-84 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005) and Force Structure: Joint
Seabasing Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and
Rigorous Experimentation before Services Spend Billions on New
Capabilities, GAO-07-211 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007).
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
