Personnel Clearances
Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process Gao ID: GAO-08-776T May 22, 2008Since 1974, GAO has examined personnel security clearance processes and acquired a historical view of key factors to consider in reform efforts. GAO placed the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security clearance program, which represents 80 percent of federal government clearances, on its high-risk list in 2005 due to long-standing problems. These problems include incomplete investigative reports from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the agency primarily responsible for providing clearance investigation services; the granting of some clearances by DOD adjudicators even when required data were missing from the investigative reports used to make such determinations; and delays in completing clearance processing. Delays can lead to a heightened risk of disclosure of classified information, additional costs and delays in completing related contracts, and problems retaining qualified personnel. DOD has reported on these continuing delays. However, there has been recent high-level governmentwide attention to improving the process, including establishing a team to develop a reformed federal government security clearance process. This statement addresses four key factors that should be considered in personnel security clearance reforms. This statement draws on GAO's past work, which included reviews of clearance-related documents and interviews of senior officials at DOD and OPM.
Efforts to reform personnel security clearance processes should consider, among other things, the following four key factors: (1) a strong requirements determination process, (2) quality in all clearance processes, (3) metrics to provide a fuller picture of clearance processes, and (4) long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform. In February 2008, GAO noted that a sound requirements process is important because requesting a clearance for a position in which it will not be needed, or in which a lower-level clearance would be sufficient, will increase both costs and investigative workload unnecessarily. For example, the cost of obtaining and maintaining a top secret clearance for 10 years is approximately 30 times greater than the cost of obtaining and maintaining a secret clearance for the same period. Also, changing a position's clearance level from secret to top secret increases the investigative workload for that position about 20-fold. Building quality throughout the clearance process could promote positive outcomes, including more reciprocity governmentwide. However, agencies have paid little attention to this factor despite GAO's 2006 recommendation to place more emphasis on quality. For example, the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) February 2007 report on security clearances documented quality with a single metric in only one of the six phases of the process. Further, OMB did not discuss the development or existence of any metric measuring the level of quality in security clearance processes or products in its February 2008 report. Concerns about the quality of investigative and adjudicative work underlie the continued reluctance of agencies to accept clearances issued by other agencies; thus, government resources may be used to conduct duplicative investigations and adjudications. Federal agencies' efforts to monitor clearance processes emphasize timeliness, but additional metrics should be developed to provide a fuller picture of the performance of the clearance process. GAO has highlighted a variety of metrics in its reports (e.g., completeness of investigative reports, staff's and customers' perceptions of the process, and the adequacy of internal controls), all of which could add value in monitoring clearance processes. The emphasis on timeliness is due in part to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which provides guidelines for the speed of completing clearances and requires annual reporting of that information to Congress. Providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to implement changes to security clearance processes could enable more-informed congressional oversight. Reform efforts should identify long-term funding requirements to implement proposed changes, so that decision makers can compare and prioritize alternate reform proposals in times of fiscal constraints. The absence of long-term funding requirements to implement reforms would limit decision makers'--in the executive and legislative branches--ability to carry out their budgetary development and oversight functions.
GAO-08-776T, Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, May 22, 2008:
Personnel Clearances:
Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process:
Statement of Brenda S. Farrell:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-08-776T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-776T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 1974, GAO has examined personnel security clearance processes and
acquired a historical view of key factors to consider in reform
efforts. GAO placed the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) personnel
security clearance program, which represents 80 percent of federal
government clearances, on its high-risk list in 2005 due to long-
standing problems. These problems include incomplete investigative
reports from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the agency
primarily responsible for providing clearance investigation services;
the granting of some clearances by DOD adjudicators even when required
data were missing from the investigative reports used to make such
determinations; and delays in completing clearance processing. Delays
can lead to a heightened risk of disclosure of classified information,
additional costs and delays in completing related contracts, and
problems retaining qualified personnel. DOD has reported on these
continuing delays. However, there has been recent high-level
governmentwide attention to improving the process, including
establishing a team to develop a reformed federal government security
clearance process.
This statement addresses four key factors that should be considered in
personnel security clearance reforms. This statement draws on GAO‘s
past work, which included reviews of clearance-related documents and
interviews of senior officials at DOD and OPM.
What GAO Found:
Efforts to reform personnel security clearance processes should
consider, among other things, the following four key factors: (1) a
strong requirements-determination process, (2) quality in all clearance
processes, (3) metrics to provide a fuller picture of clearance
processes, and (4) long-term funding requirements of security clearance
reform. In February 2008, GAO noted that a sound requirements process
is important because requesting a clearance for a position in which it
will not be needed, or in which a lower-level clearance would be
sufficient, will increase both costs and investigative workload
unnecessarily. For example, the cost of obtaining and maintaining a top
secret clearance for 10 years is approximately 30 times greater than
the cost of obtaining and maintaining a secret clearance for the same
period. Also, changing a position‘s clearance level from secret to top
secret increases the investigative workload for that position about 20-
fold.
Building quality throughout the clearance process could promote
positive outcomes, including more reciprocity governmentwide. However,
agencies have paid little attention to this factor despite GAO‘s 2006
recommendation to place more emphasis on quality. For example, the
Office of Management and Budget‘s (OMB) February 2007 report on
security clearances documented quality with a single metric in only one
of the six phases of the process. Further, OMB did not discuss the
development or existence of any metric measuring the level of quality
in security clearance processes or products in its February 2008
report. Concerns about the quality of investigative and adjudicative
work underlie the continued reluctance of agencies to accept clearances
issued by other agencies; thus, government resources may be used to
conduct duplicative investigations and adjudications.
Federal agencies‘ efforts to monitor clearance processes emphasize
timeliness, but additional metrics should be developed to provide a
fuller picture of the performance of the clearance process. GAO has
highlighted a variety of metrics in its reports (e.g., completeness of
investigative reports, staff‘s and customers‘ perceptions of the
process, and the adequacy of internal controls), all of which could add
value in monitoring clearance processes. The emphasis on timeliness is
due in part to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 which provides guidelines for the speed of completing clearances
and requires annual reporting of that information to Congress.
Providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to implement
changes to security clearance processes could enable more-informed
congressional oversight. Reform efforts should identify long-term
funding requirements to implement proposed changes, so that decision
makers can compare and prioritize alternate reform proposals in times
of fiscal constraints. The absence of long-term funding requirements to
implement reforms would limit decision makers‘”in the executive and
legislative branches”ability to carry out their budgetary development
and oversight functions.
To view the full product, click on [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-776T]. For more information,
contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Akaka and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss reforming the
federal government's personnel security clearance process. Since 1974,
we have been examining personnel security clearance processes to assist
Congress. Through scores of reports and testimonies, we have acquired
broad institutional knowledge that gives us a historical view of key
factors that should be considered in clearance reform efforts. A list
of our related GAO products is provided at the end of this statement.
Specifically, we have testified on clearance-related issues in four
prior hearings that this Subcommittee has held since January 2005, when
we first placed the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security
clearance program--which represents about 80 percent of the security
clearances adjudicated by the federal government--on our list of high-
risk government programs and operations.[Footnote 1]
We placed DOD's personnel security clearance program on our high-risk
list in 2005 and again in 2007[Footnote 2] because of a variety of long-
standing problems in the program. Some of those problems included (1)
incomplete investigative reports from the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), the agency that supplies about 90 percent of all
federal clearance investigations, including those for DOD; (2) the
granting of some clearances by DOD adjudicators even though required
data were missing from the investigative reports used to make such
determinations; and (3) long-standing delays in completing clearances.
We have recently initiated additional work to examine the timeliness
and quality of personnel security clearances in DOD. This work will
help determine whether DOD's personnel security clearance program
should remain on our 2009 high-risk list.
In February 2008, we testified[Footnote 3] that DOD's August 2007
report to Congress[Footnote 4] noted continuing problems with delayed
processing of industry personnel security clearances. We testified that
the time required to process clearances continues to exceed time
requirements established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. This law currently requires adjudicative
agencies to make a determination on at least 80 percent of all
applications for a security clearance within an average of 120 days
after the date of receipt of the application, with no longer than 90
days allotted for the investigation and 30 days allotted for the
adjudication. DOD's August 2007 congressionally-mandated report on
clearances for industry personnel described continuing delays in the
processing of clearances. For example, during the first 6 months of
fiscal year 2007, the end-to-end processing of initial top secret
clearances took an average of 276 days; renewal of top secret
clearances, 335 days; and all secret clearances, 208 days. Moreover,
DOD's February 2008 congressionally-mandated report[Footnote 5] on
clearance investigations for industry personnel noted that problems
persist. Specifically, during the second half of fiscal year 2007, DOD
reported that the end-to-end processing of initial top secret
clearances averaged 311 days, renewal of top secret clearances averaged
444 days, and both initial and renewal of secret and confidential
clearances averaged 229 days.
Problems in the clearance program can negatively affect national
security. For example, delays reviewing security clearances for
personnel who are already doing classified work can lead to a
heightened risk of disclosure of classified information. In contrast,
delays in providing initial security clearances for previously
noncleared personnel can result in other negative consequences, such as
additional costs and delays in completing national security-related
contracts, lost-opportunity costs, and problems retaining the best
qualified personnel.
While delays continue in completing the end-to-end processing of
security clearances, recent high-level governmentwide attention has
been focused on improving the clearance process. For example, we
previously reported that the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB)
Deputy Director for Management has led efforts to improve
governmentwide security clearance processes since June 2005. In
addition, in June 2007, the OMB Deputy Director--in collaboration with
the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence--established the Joint Security and
Suitability Reform Team (hereafter referred to as the Joint Reform
Team). The Joint Reform Team was established to develop a reformed
federal government security clearance process.[Footnote 6] On February
5, 2008, the President issued a memorandum that called for aggressive
reform efforts of the security clearance process, acknowledged the work
being performed by the Joint Reform Team, and directed that the team
submit to the President an initial reform plan no later than April 30,
2008. As directed, the Joint Reform Team submitted a plan to the
President on April 30, 2008, which presents the proposed design of a
transformed hiring and clearing process.
The reformed security clearance process developed by the Joint Reform
Team would be applicable not only to DOD but across the federal
government including the intelligence community. In February, we
testified before this subcommittee about areas in which we could
support the intelligence committees and community on oversight of
management reforms, including the security clearance process. Recently,
we received two requests from the U.S. House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to review security clearance
programs in the intelligence community. Specifically, we have been
asked to assess (1) the Joint Reform Team's reform efforts and (2) the
timeliness and quality of personnel security clearances in the
intelligence community.
For this testimony, you asked that we identify key factors that should
be considered in personnel security clearance reform efforts. My
statement today draws on our prior work on clearance processes since
2004, which included reviews of clearance-related documents and
interviews of senior officials at DOD and OPM, which has the primary
responsibility for providing clearance investigation services to DOD.
Our work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions, based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence we obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Summary:
Ensuring a strong requirements-determination process, building quality
in all clearance processes, including metrics to provide a fuller
picture of clearance processes, and providing long-term funding
requirements of security clearance reform are important factors to
consider in efforts to reform the personnel security clearance process.
First, ensuring a strong requirements-determination process can help
the government manage the workloads and costs associated with the
security clearance process. A sound requirements process is important
because requests for clearances for positions that do not need a
clearance or need a lower level of clearance increase investigative
workload and costs unnecessarily. Second, building quality in all
security clearance processes could promote positive outcomes such as
greater reciprocity of clearances. Concerns about the quality of
investigative and adjudicative work underlie the continued reluctance
of agencies to accept clearances issued by other agencies; as a result,
government resources may be used to conduct duplicative investigations
and adjudications. Third, efforts to monitor clearance processes
emphasize timeliness measurement, but additional metrics should be
developed to provide a fuller picture of the performance of the
clearance process. We have highlighted a variety of metrics in our
reports (e.g., completeness of investigative reports, staff's and
customers' perceptions of the process, and the adequacy of internal
controls), all of which could add value in monitoring different aspects
of the quality of clearance processes. Fourth, providing Congress with
the long-term funding requirements in reports on implementing changes
to security clearance processes could enable more-informed
congressional oversight. As noted in our February 2008 report on
industry personnel security clearances, limiting or excluding funding
information in reports on changes to security clearance processes
reduces the utility of information for Congress and the executive
branch by limiting decision makers' ability to compare and prioritize
alternate reform proposals when carrying out their budgetary
development and oversight functions.
Background:
Military servicemembers, federal workers, and industry personnel must
generally obtain security clearances to gain access to classified
information. The three clearance level categories are: top secret,
secret, and confidential. The level of classification denotes the
degree of protection required for information and the amount of damage
that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably cause to national
security. The degree of expected damage that unauthorized disclosure
could reasonably be expected to cause is "exceptionally grave damage"
for top secret information, "serious damage" for secret information,
and "damage" for confidential information.[Footnote 7]
DOD's Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has
responsibility for determining eligibility for clearances for
servicemembers, DOD civilian employees, and industry personnel
performing work for DOD and 23 other federal agencies, as well as
employees in the federal legislative branch.[Footnote 8] That
responsibility includes obtaining background investigations, primarily
through OPM. Within DOD, government employees use the information in
OPM-provided investigative reports to determine clearance eligibility
of clearance subjects. DOD's program maintains approximately 2.5
million clearances.
Although our high-risk designation covers only DOD's program, our
reports have documented clearance-related problems affecting other
agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For
example, our October 2007 report on state and local information fusion
centers[Footnote 9] cited two clearance-related challenges: (1) the
length of time needed for state and local officials to receive
clearances from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS, and
(2) the reluctance of some federal agencies--particularly DHS and FBI-
-to accept clearances issued by other agencies (i.e., clearance
reciprocity). Similarly, our April 2007 testimony[Footnote 10] on
maritime security and selected aspects of the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006[Footnote 11] (SAFE Port Act)
identified the challenge of obtaining clearances so that port security
stakeholders could share information through area committees or
interagency operational centers. The SAFE Port Act includes a specific
provision requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to sponsor and
expedite individuals participating in interagency operational centers
in gaining or maintaining their security clearances.
Recent events affecting clearance programs across the federal
government include the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 and the issuance of the June 2005
Executive Order 13381, "Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information."
IRTPA included milestones for reducing the time to complete clearances,
general specifications for a database on security clearances, and
requirements for reciprocity of clearances. The executive order stated,
among other things, that OMB was to ensure the effective implementation
of policy regarding appropriately uniform, centralized, efficient,
effective, timely, and reciprocal agency functions relating to
determining eligibility for access to classified national security
information. Since 2005, OMB's Deputy Director for Management has taken
several actions to improve the security clearance process, including
establishing an interagency working group to improve the reciprocal
acceptance of clearances issued by other agencies and taking a lead
role in preparing a November 2005 strategic plan to improve personnel
security clearance processes governmentwide.
Four Key Factors Should Be Considered in Efforts to Reform the Security
Clearance Process:
In our prior work, we identified four key factors that should be
considered to reform the security clearance process. These include (1)
ensuring a strong requirements-determination process, (2) building
quality in all clearance processes, (3) developing additional metrics
to provide a fuller picture of clearance processes, and (4) including
long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform.
Ensuring a Strong Requirements-Determination Process Can Help Manage
Clearance Workloads and Costs:
As we testified in February 2008, ensuring a strong requirements-
determination process can help the government manage the workloads and
costs associated with the security clearance process. Requirements-
determination in the clearance process begins with establishing whether
a position requires a clearance, and if so, at what level. We have
previously stated that any reform process should address whether the
numbers and levels of clearances are appropriate, since this initial
stage in the clearance process can affect workloads and costs in other
clearance stages. While having a large number of cleared personnel can
give the military services, agencies, and industry a great deal of
flexibility when assigning personnel, having unnecessary requirements
for security clearances increases the investigative and adjudicative
workloads that are required to provide the clearances and flexibility,
and further taxes a clearance process that already experiences delays
in determining clearance eligibility. A change in the level of
clearances being requested also increases the investigative and
adjudicative workloads. For example, an increase in the proportion of
investigations at the top secret level increases workloads and costs
because top secret clearances must be renewed twice as often as secret
clearances (i.e., every 5 years versus every 10 years). In August 2006,
OPM estimated that approximately 60 total staff hours are needed for
each investigation for an initial top secret clearance and 6 total
staff hours are needed for each investigation to support a secret or
confidential clearance. The doubling of the frequency along with the
increased effort to investigate and adjudicate each top secret
reinvestigation adds costs and workload for the government.
* Cost. For fiscal year 2008, OPM's standard billing rate is $3,711 for
an investigation for an initial top secret clearance; $2,509 for an
investigation to renew a top secret clearance, and $202 for an
investigation for a secret clearance. The cost of obtaining and
maintaining a top secret clearance for 10 years is approximately 30
times greater than the cost of obtaining and maintaining a secret
clearance for the same period. For example, an individual getting a top
secret clearance for the first time and keeping the clearance for 10
years would cost the government a total of $6,220 in current year
dollars ($3,711 for the initial investigation and $2,509 for the
reinvestigation after the first 5 years). In contrast, an individual
receiving a secret clearance and maintaining it for 10 years would
result in a total cost to the government of $202 ($202 for the initial
clearance that is good for 10 years).
* Time/Workload. The workload is also affected by the scope of coverage
in the various types of investigations. Much of the information for a
secret clearance is gathered through electronic files. However, the
investigation for a top secret clearance requires the information
needed for the secret clearance as well as data gathered through time-
consuming tasks such as interviews with the subject of the
investigation request, references in the workplace, and neighbors. The
investigative workload for a top secret clearance increases about 20-
fold compared to the workload for a secret clearance, since (1) the
average investigative report for a top secret clearance takes about 10
times as many investigative staff hours as the average investigative
report for a secret clearance, and (2) the top secret clearance must be
renewed twice as often as the secret. Additionally, the adjudicative
workload increases about 4-fold. In 2007, DOD officials estimated that
it took about twice as long to review an investigative report for a top
secret clearance, which would need to be done twice as often as for a
secret clearance.
We are not suggesting that the numbers and levels of clearances are or
are not appropriate--only that any unnecessary requirements in this
initial phase use government resources that can be utilized for other
purposes, such as building additional quality into other clearance
processes or decreasing delays in clearance processing. Unless reforms
ensure a strong requirements-determination process is present, workload
and costs may be higher than necessary.
Building Quality in All Processes Could Promote Positive Outcomes Such
as Greater Clearance Reciprocity:
We have emphasized--since the late 1990s--a need to build more quality
and quality monitoring throughout the clearance process to promote
positive outcomes such as greater clearance reciprocity. In our
November 2005 testimony on the previous governmentwide strategic plan
to improve the clearance process, we noted that the plan devoted little
attention to monitoring and improving the quality of the personnel
security clearance process, and that limited attention and reporting
about quality continues. In addition, when OMB issued its February 2007
annual report on security clearances,[Footnote 12] it documented
quality with a single metric in one of the six phases of the security
clearance process (i.e., requirements setting, application submission,
investigation, adjudication, appeal, and clearance updating). OMB
stated that overall, less than 1 percent of all completed
investigations are returned to OPM from the adjudicating agencies for
quality deficiencies. When OMB issued its February 2008 annual report
on security clearances,[Footnote 13] it did not discuss the percentage
of completed investigations that are returned to OPM or the development
or existence of any other metric measuring the level of quality in
security clearance processes or products.
We have also reported that it is problematic to equate the quality of
investigations with the percentage of investigations that are returned
by requesting agencies due to incomplete case files. For example, in
October 1999 and again in our November 2005 evaluation of the
governmentwide strategic plan, we stated that the number of
investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator
of quality because adjudication officials said they were reluctant to
return incomplete investigations as they anticipated this would lead to
further delays. As part of our September 2006 report,[Footnote 14] we
examined a different aspect of quality--the completeness of
documentation in investigative and adjudicative reports. We found that
OPM provided some incomplete investigative reports to DOD adjudicators,
which the adjudicators then used to determine top secret clearance
eligibility. In addition, DOD adjudicators granted clearance
eligibility without requesting additional information for any of the
incomplete investigative reports and did not document that they
considered some adjudicative guidelines when adverse information was
present in some reports. In our September 2006 report, we recommended
that regardless of whether the metric on investigations returned for
rework continues to be used, OMB's Deputy Director for Management
should require OPM and DOD to develop and report metrics on
investigative and adjudicative completeness and other measures of
quality. In his comments to our report, OMB's Deputy Director for
Management did not take exception to this recommendation. We are
currently reviewing the timeliness and quality of DOD personnel
security clearances in ongoing work and plan to review any actions
taken by OMB with regard to this recommendation.
In September 2006, we also reported that while eliminating delays in
clearance processes is an important goal, the government cannot afford
to achieve that goal at the expense of quality. We additionally
reported that the lack of full reciprocity of clearances is an
outgrowth of agencies' concerns that other agencies may have granted
clearances based on inadequate investigations and adjudications. An
interagency working group, the Security Clearance Oversight Steering
Committee,[Footnote 15] noted that agencies are reluctant to be
accountable for poor quality investigations or adjudications conducted
by other agencies or organizations. To achieve fuller reciprocity,
clearance-granting agencies need to have confidence in the quality of
the clearance process. Without full documentation of investigative
actions, information obtained, and adjudicative decisions, agencies
could continue to require duplicative investigations and adjudications.
It will be important for any reform process to incorporate both quality
and quality monitoring and reporting throughout the clearance process.
In their absence, reciprocity concerns will continue to exist and
Congress will not have sufficient information to perform its oversight
function.
Government Clearance Metrics Emphasize Timeliness Measurement, but
Additional Metrics Could Provide a Fuller Picture of Clearance
Processes:
As we testified in February 2008, reform efforts should also consider
metrics beyond timeliness to evaluate the clearance processes and
procedures and to provide a more complete picture of the performance of
a reformed clearance process.[Footnote 16] Prior GAO reports as well as
inspector general reports identify a wide variety of methods and
metrics that program evaluators have used to examine clearance
processes and programs. For example, our 1999 report[Footnote 17] on
security clearance investigations used multiple methods to examine
numerous issues that included:
* documentation missing from investigative reports;
* investigator training (courses, course content, and number of
trainees);
* investigators' perceptions about the process;
* customer perceptions about the investigations; and:
* internal controls to protect against fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement.
Much of the recent quantitative information provided on clearances has
dealt with how much time it takes for the end-to-end processing of
clearances (and related measures such as the numbers of various types
of investigative and adjudicative reports generated); however, there is
less quantitative information on other aspects of the clearance process
such as the metrics listed above. In February 2008, we noted that
including these additional metrics could add value in monitoring
clearance processes and provide a more complete picture of the
performance of a reformed clearance process. In our November 2005
testimony, we noted that a previous government plan to improve the
clearance process placed an emphasis on monitoring the timeliness of
clearances governmentwide, but that plan detailed few of the other
elements that a comprehensive strategic plan might contain.
An underlying factor that places emphasis on timeliness is the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).
[Footnote 18] Among other things, IRTPA established specific timeliness
guidelines to be phased in over 5 years. The act states that, in the
initial period that ends in 2009, each authorized adjudicative agency
shall make a determination on at least 80 percent of all applications
for personnel security clearances within an average of 120 days after
the receipt of the application for a security clearance by an
authorized investigative agency. This 120-day period includes no more
than 90 days to complete the investigative phase of the clearance
review and a period of not longer than 30 days to complete the
adjudicative phase of the clearance review. By December 17, 2009, the
act will require that adjudicative agencies make a determination on at
least 90 percent of all applications for a security clearance within an
average of 60 days after the date of receipt of the application,
including no more than 40 days for the investigation and 20 days for
the adjudication. Moreover, IRTPA also includes a requirement for a
designated agency (currently OMB) to provide information on, among
other things, the timeliness of security clearance determinations in
annual reports to Congress through 2011, as OMB did most recently in
February 2008. While timeliness is important, other metrics are also
needed to evaluate a reformed clearance process.
Long-Term Funding Requirements Information Could Enable More-Informed
Congressional Oversight of Security Clearance Reform:
In February 2008, we recommended that the Joint Reform Team also
provide Congress with long-term funding requirements as it develops
plans to reform the security clearance process. We have previously
reported that DOD has not provided Congress with long-term funding
needs for industry personnel security clearances.[Footnote 19] In
February 2008, we reported that in its August 2007 report to Congress,
DOD provided funding requirements information that described its
immediate needs for its industry personnel security program, but it did
not include information about the program's long-term funding needs.
Specifically, DOD's August 2007 required report on clearances for
industry personnel provided less than 2 years of data on funding
requirements. In its report, DOD identified its immediate needs by
submitting an annualized projected cost of $178.2 million for fiscal
year 2007 and a projected funding need of approximately $300 million
for fiscal year 2008. However, the report did not include information
on (1) the funding requirements for fiscal year 2009 and beyond even
though the survey used to develop the funding requirements asked
contractors about their clearance needs through 2010 and (2) the tens
of millions of dollars that the Defense Security Service Director
testified before Congress in May 2007 were necessary to maintain the
infrastructure supporting the industry personnel security clearance
program.
As noted in our February 2008 report,[Footnote 20] limiting or
excluding funding information in security clearance reports for
Congress and the executive branch reduces the utility of those reports
in developing and overseeing budgets for reform. In addition, the long-
term funding requirements to implement changes to security clearance
processes are also needed to enable the executive branch to compare and
prioritize alternative proposals for reforming the clearance processes
especially as the nation's fiscal imbalances constrain federal funding.
Without information on long-term funding requirements, both Congress
and the executive branch will not have sufficient information to
perform their budget oversight and development functions.
Conclusions:
We are encouraged that the Joint Reform Team issued an initial plan to
develop a reformed federal government security clearance process. As
the Joint Reform Team develops its reform initiatives, we encourage the
team to consider the four factors highlighted in my statement today. As
much remains to be done before a new system can be designed and
implemented, we look forward to evaluating the Joint Reform Team's
efforts to assist Congress in its oversight.
Chairman Akaka and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this
testimony are David E. Moser, Assistant Director; Renee S. Brown;
Shvetal Khanna; James P. Klein; Caryn Kuebler; Ron La Due Lake; Gregory
Marchand; and Brian D. Pegram.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform
Security Clearance Processes. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-352T]. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts
to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-470T]. Washington, D.C.:
February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More
Informed Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-350]. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some
Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-35]. Washington,
D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Defense Business Transformation: A Full-time Chief Management Officer
with a Term Appointment Is Needed at DOD to Maintain Continuity of
Effort and Achieve Sustainable Success. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-132T]. Washington, D.C.:
October 16, 2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for
Industry Personnel. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
07-842T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port
Act. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-754T].
Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January
2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to Improve
the Security Clearance Process. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1070]. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006.
Managing Sensitive Information: DOD Can More Effectively Reduce the
Risk of Classification Errors. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-706]. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record
Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security
Clearance Process. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-
693R]. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances
for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-748T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow
Clearances for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-747T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance
Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-323R]. Washington,
D.C.: January 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing
Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-233T]. Washington, D.C.:
November 9, 2005.
Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection Issues
Associated with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-71SU]. Washington, D.C.:
November 4, 2005.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance
Program. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-988R].
Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors
under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-681]. Washington, D.C.: July
15, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles
Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-
842T]. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires
Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-520T]. Washington, D.C.: April
13, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-05-207]. Washington, D.C.: January 2005.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11
Commission's Proposed Reforms. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1084T]. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce
Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for
Industry Personnel. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
04-632]. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs
and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry
Personnel. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-202T].
Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its
Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-332]. Washington, D.C.: March
3, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-344]. Washington, D.C.:
February 9, 2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-207] (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[2] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).
[3] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its
Efforts to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-470T] (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 13, 2008).
[4] DOD, Annual Report to Congress on Personnel Security Investigations
for Industry and the National Industrial Security Program (August
2007). This first of a series of annual reports was mandated by the
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Pub. L. No. 109-364, §347 (2006).
[5] DOD, Annual Report to Congress on Personnel Security Investigations
for Industry and the National Industrial Security Program (February
2008).
[6] Since June 2007, the goal of the Joint Reform Team expanded to
include the elimination of duplicative steps in the investigations for
security clearances and suitability determinations for federal
employment. In addition, OPM is also now a member of the Joint Reform
Team.
[7] 5 C.F.R. § 1312.4 (2008).
[8] DOD, National Industrial Security Program: Operating Manual, DOD
5220.22-M (Feb. 28, 2006), notes that heads of agencies are required to
enter into agreements with the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of
rendering industrial security services. The following 23 departments
and agencies have entered into such agreements: (1) National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, (2) Department of Commerce, (3)
General Services Administration, (4) Department of State, (5) Small
Business Administration, (6) National Science Foundation, (7)
Department of the Treasury, (8) Department of Transportation, (9)
Department of the Interior, (10) Department of Agriculture, (11)
Department of Labor, (12) Environmental Protection Agency, (13)
Department of Justice, (14) Federal Reserve System, (15) Government
Accountability Office, (16) U.S. Trade Representative, (17) U.S.
International Trade Commission, (18) U.S. Agency for International
Development, (19) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (20) Department of
Education, (21) Department of Health and Human Services, (22)
Department of Homeland Security, and (23) Federal Communications
Commission.
[9] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate
Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion
Centers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-35]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007). Since the attacks of September 11,
2001, most states and some local governments have, largely on their own
initiative, established fusion centers to address gaps in homeland
security, terrorism, and law enforcement information sharing by the
federal government and to provide a conduit of this information within
the state.
[10] GAO, Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the
SAFE Port Act, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
754T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2007).
[11] Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006).
[12] OMB, Report of the Security Clearance Oversight Group Consistent
with Title III of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (February 2007).
[13] OMB, Report of the Security Clearance Oversight Group Consistent
with Title III of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (February 2008).
[14] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed
to Improve the Security Clearance Process, GAO-06-1070 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006).
[15] This committee is led by OMB's Deputy Director for Management and
is comprised of representatives from DOD, DHS, the Departments of
Energy, Justice, Transportation, Commerce, and State, the Director of
National Intelligence, the National Security Council, and the National
Archives and Records Administration.
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-352T].
[17] GAO, DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations
Pose National Security Risks, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-12] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999).
[18] Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, §3001 (g), Reduction of Length of Personnel Security
Clearance Process (2004).
[19] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would
Enable More Informed Congressional Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-350] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
13, 2008).
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-350].
[End of section]
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