Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Federal Actions Needed to Ensure Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National Airspace System Gao ID: GAO-08-511 May 15, 2008Government and private-sector interest is growing in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for use in a variety of missions such as U.S. border protection, hurricane research, law enforcement, and real estate photography. However, UASs can fly only after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducts a case-by-case safety analysis. GAO's research questions included (1) What are the current and potential uses and benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs safely and routinely in the national airspace system? and (3) What is the federal government's response to these challenges? To address these questions, GAO reviewed the literature, interviewed agency officials and aviation stakeholders, and surveyed 23 UAS experts.
UASs are currently being used by federal agencies for border security, science research, and other purposes. Local governments see potential uses in law enforcement or firefighting and the private sector sees potential uses, such as real estate photography. An industry survey states that UAS production could increase in the future to meet such government and private-sector uses. Experts predict that UASs could perform some manned aircraft missions with less noise and fewer emissions. UASs pose technological, regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges that affect their ability to operate safely and routinely in the national airspace system. UASs cannot meet aviation safety requirements, such as seeing and avoiding other aircraft. UASs lack security protection--a potential challenge if UASs proliferate as expected after obtaining routine airspace access. The lack of FAA regulations for UASs limits their operation to case-by-case approvals by FAA. Anticipated increases in requests to operate UASs could pose a workload challenge for FAA. Coordinating multiple efforts to address these challenges is yet another challenge. FAA and the Department of Defense (DOD) are addressing technological challenges. DHS has not addressed the national security implications of routine UAS access to the airspace. FAA estimates that completing UAS safety regulations will take 10 or more years, but has not yet issued its program plan to communicate the steps and time frames required for providing routine UAS access. FAA is working to allow small UASs to have airspace access and has designated specific airspace for UAS testing. It plans to use data from this testing and from DOD to develop regulations, but has not yet analyzed data that it has already collected. To address its workload challenge, FAA is using more automation. Aviation stakeholders and experts suggested that an overarching entity could help coordinate and expedite federal, academic, and private-sector efforts. In 2003, Congress created a similar entity in FAA to coordinate planning for the next generation air transportation system among multiple federal agencies and the private sector.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-511, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions Needed to Ensure Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National Airspace System
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2008:
Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
Federal Actions Needed to Ensure Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses
within the National Airspace System:
GAO-08-511:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-511, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Government and private-sector interest is growing in unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS) for use in a variety of missions such as U.S. border
protection, hurricane research, law enforcement, and real estate
photography. However, UASs can fly only after the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) conducts a case-by-case safety analysis. GAO‘s
research questions included (1) What are the current and potential uses
and benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs
safely and routinely in the national airspace system? and (3) What is
the federal government‘s response to these challenges? To address these
questions, GAO reviewed the literature, interviewed agency officials
and aviation stakeholders, and surveyed 23 UAS experts.
What GAO Found:
GAO suggests that Congress create an overarching body within FAA to
coordinate UAS development and integration efforts. To realize public
benefits from UASs as soon as possible, GAO recommends that FAA issue
its program plan and analyze the data it has collected, and that the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assess the security implications
of routine UAS access to the airspace. Relevant agencies reviewed a
draft of this report. The Department of Transportation agreed to
consider its relevant recommendations. DHS agreed with its relevant
recommendation.
What GAO Recommends:
UASs are currently being used by federal agencies for border security,
science research, and other purposes. Local governments see potential
uses in law enforcement or firefighting and the private sector sees
potential uses, such as real estate photography. An industry survey
states that UAS production could increase in the future to meet such
government and private-sector uses. Experts predict that UASs could
perform some manned aircraft missions with less noise and fewer
emissions.
UASs pose technological, regulatory, workload, and coordination
challenges that affect their ability to operate safely and routinely in
the national airspace system. UASs cannot meet aviation safety
requirements, such as seeing and avoiding other aircraft. UASs lack
security protection”a potential challenge if UASs proliferate as
expected after obtaining routine airspace access. The lack of FAA
regulations for UASs limits their operation to case-by-case approvals
by FAA. Anticipated increases in requests to operate UASs could pose a
workload challenge for FAA. Coordinating multiple efforts to address
these challenges is yet another challenge.
FAA and the Department of Defense (DOD) are addressing technological
challenges. DHS has not addressed the national security implications of
routine UAS access to the airspace. FAA estimates that completing UAS
safety regulations will take 10 or more years, but has not yet issued
its program plan to communicate the steps and time frames required for
providing routine UAS access. FAA is working to allow small UASs to
have airspace access and has designated specific airspace for UAS
testing. It plans to use data from this testing and from DOD to develop
regulations, but has not yet analyzed data that it has already
collected. To address its workload challenge, FAA is using more
automation. Aviation stakeholders and experts suggested that an
overarching entity could help coordinate and expedite federal,
academic, and private-sector efforts. In 2003, Congress created a
similar entity in FAA to coordinate planning for the next generation
air transportation system among multiple federal agencies and the
private sector.
Figure: Photograph of Predator B UASs used for border security.
[See PDF for image]
Source: DHS.
[End of figure]
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-511]. For more
information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham, (202) 512-2834
dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Federal Agencies Have Used UASs in Many Ways and Expanded Government
and Commercial Use Is Possible in the Future:
Routine Access to the National Airspace System Poses Technological,
Regulatory, Workload, and Coordination Challenges:
Fully Addressing UAS Challenges Involves Several Agencies and Could
Take a Decade or Longer:
Impact of Routine UAS Operations Is Unknown:
Conclusion:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methods:
Appendix II: Survey Methods:
Appendix III: Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Examples of UAS Integration Efforts in Other Countries:
Figures:
Figure 1: Conceptual Unmanned Aircraft System:
Figure 2: Examples of UASs:
Figure 3: CBP's Predator B UAS Inventory as of December 2007:
Figure 4: UASs Used as Communications Relays:
Figure 5: Illustration of UAS Use for Hurricane Data Collection:
Figure 6: Forecast of Civil UASs Produced, 2008 through 2017:
Figure 7: Applications for Certificates of Waiver or Authorization,
Received in Calendar Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010:
Figure 8: Applications for Special Airworthiness Certificates, Received
in Fiscal Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010:
Figure 9: UAS Test Center at New Mexico State University:
Abbreviations:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
COA: Certificate of Waiver or Authorization:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
EUROCAE: European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment:
EUROCONTROL: European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization:
JPDO: Joint Planning and Development Office:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NextGen: next generation air transportation system:
NOAA: National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration:
RTCA: Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
UAPO: Unmanned Aircraft Program Office:
UAS: unmanned aircraft system:
TCAS: Traffic Alert and Collision and Avoidance System:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 15, 2008:
The Honorable John Mica:
Ranking Republican Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jerry F. Costello:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Aviation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
Government and private-sector interest in unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS) is growing, due in large part to the U.S. military's expanded
development and use of these systems in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
absence of a pilot on board the aircraft allows unmanned aircraft to
perform a variety of missions not generally considered favorable for
manned aircraft. Some unmanned aircraft can remain aloft for 30 hours
or more, because there is no need for them to land to change pilots.
Unmanned aircraft can also perform dangerous missions without risking
loss of life.
The federal government has used UASs for a number of years for various
purposes, such as collecting scientific data, assisting with border
security, and gathering weather data from inside hurricanes. Federal
agencies are planning to increase their use of UASs and state and local
governments envision using UASs to aid in law enforcement or
firefighting. Potential commercial uses are also possible, for example,
in real estate photography or pipeline inspection. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) is responsible for ensuring that UASs operate
safely in the national airspace system and is working to develop a
regulatory framework to address the unique characteristics of UASs. For
example, current regulations do not indicate how, in the absence of an
on-board pilot, UASs should detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft to
avoid collisions. FAA's long-range goal is to permit, to the greatest
extent possible, routine government and commercial UAS operations in
the national airspace system while ensuring safety. Presently, because
of safety concerns, FAA authorizes civil government and military UAS
operations in the national airspace system on a limited basis after
conducting a case-by-case safety review. Regulations do not currently
permit commercial UAS operations.
You asked us to assess efforts to safely integrate UASs into the
national airspace system and the potential impact of those UASs after
such integration occurs. To meet this objective, we developed the
following research questions: (1) What are the current and potential
uses and benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs
safely and routinely in the national airspace system? (3) What is the
federal government's response to these challenges? and (4) Assuming
that UASs have routine access to the national airspace system, how
might they impact the system and the environment?
To address these questions, we reviewed the literature, FAA and
Department of Defense (DOD) documents, and aviation trade association
reports. We also interviewed officials from DOD, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) about their operations and plans to operate UASs
in the national airspace system. We interviewed officials in
associations that represent UAS manufacturers and users of the national
airspace system. To determine the expected growth of UASs, we obtained
industry forecasts. Additionally, we administered a Web-based survey to
23 UAS experts, selected with the assistance of the National Academies,
to obtain their opinions of the steps that FAA could take to accelerate
UAS integration in the national airspace system and the impact that
UASs might have on the system and the environment after integration
occurs.[Footnote 1] We conducted this performance audit from October
2006 to May 2008, in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
(See app. I for additional information on our scope and methods.)
Results in Brief:
Federal agencies such as DHS, the Department of Commerce, and NASA use
UASs in many areas, such as border security, weather research, and
forest fire monitoring. These agencies have plans to expand their UAS
use in domestic airspace, and local governments and commercial entities
also have interest in using UASs. Many factors support the potential
for expanded use of UASs. For example, the nation's industrial base has
expanded to support military operations and the number of trained UAS
operators is increasing as personnel return from overseas duty.
Moreover, some of the technology used in military UAS operations could
be applied to civil uses. DHS is expanding its use of UASs for border
security and NASA is likely to continue using UASs to gather scientific
data. Additionally, local law enforcement and firefighting agencies
have expressed interest in using UASs to assist at crime scenes and
wildfire locations, and commercial users envision using UASs for tasks
such as photographing real estate or inspecting pipelines. According to
an industry forecast, the market for government and commercial-use UASs
could grow in the future. The forecast also indicates that the United
States could account for 73 percent of the world's research and
development investment for UAS technology over the coming decade.
According to a UAS study and experts we surveyed, UAS development could
lead to technological advances that could benefit all national airspace
users. For example, some experts we surveyed noted that improved
collision avoidance technologies developed for UASs could lead to
reduced aircraft separation requirements, which could increase airspace
capacity. Additionally, UASs could produce environmental benefits if
they assume some missions currently performed by manned aircraft by
using quieter engines that produce fewer emissions, according to
experts we surveyed.
Routine UAS access to the national airspace system poses technological,
regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges. A key technological
challenge is providing the capability for UASs to meet the safety
requirements of the national airspace system. For example, a person
operating an aircraft must maintain vigilance so as to see and avoid
other aircraft. However, because UASs have no person on board the
aircraft, on-board equipment, radar, or direct human observation must
substitute for this capability. No technology has been identified as a
suitable substitute for a person on board the aircraft in seeing and
avoiding other aircraft. Additionally, UASs' communications and control
links are vulnerable to unintentional or intentional radio interference
that can lead to loss of control of an aircraft and an accident,
[Footnote 2] and in the future, ground control stations--the UAS
equivalent to a manned aircraft cockpit--may need physical security
protection to guard against hostile takeover. Although DOD has achieved
operational successes with its use of UASs in Iraq and Afghanistan,
accidents of varying degrees of severity have resulted from UAS
reliability problems and human factors issues, i.e., equipment designs
that did not fully account for human abilities, characteristics, and
limitations. Our analysis of 4˝ years of DOD's data indicates that UAS
component failures caused about 65 percent of the accidents and human
factors issues--a common challenge in new technology--caused about 17
percent of the accidents. Because a regulatory framework to ensure UAS
safety does not exist, UASs have had only limited access to the
national airspace, which, in turn, has created additional challenges.
For example, UAS developers have faced a lack of airspace for testing
and evaluating their products, and data on UAS operations in the
national airspace, which could aid in developing regulations, is
scarce. In the coming years, FAA could face a workload challenge in
responding to increasing requests from federal agencies to operate UASs
in the national airspace system. However, FAA's future workload is
uncertain because there is no accurate inventory of federally-owned and
-leased UASs. GSA has responsibility for maintaining the inventory of
federally-owned and -leased aircraft, but its regulations have not been
updated to require federal agencies to report UASs. Coordinating the
efforts of federal agencies with those of academic institutions that
have UAS expertise, and with the private sector, which has a stake in
UASs obtaining routine airspace access, serves as another challenge.
Addressing the challenges of allowing routine UAS access to the
national airspace system involves the efforts of several federal
agencies and could require a decade or more of additional work. FAA is
addressing technological challenges by sponsoring research on topics
such as detect, sense, and avoid, and taking steps to obtain dedicated
radio frequency spectrum for UAS operations, which could address UAS
communications and control vulnerabilities. DOD is addressing UAS
reliability challenges by urging manufacturers to use redundant, fail
safe designs, and has made some progress in addressing human factors
challenges by standardizing some UAS ground control stations.
Additionally, a federal advisory body is developing technical standards
for UASs. However, DHS's Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
has not yet examined the security implications of routine UAS
operations in the national airspace. Fully addressing regulatory
challenges to allowing all UASs to have routine access to the national
airspace system may not occur until 2020, after the aforementioned
advisory body completes its technical standards work and FAA
incorporates those standards in its regulations. In the interim, FAA
has created an Unmanned Aircraft Program Office to coordinate efforts
to develop standards and regulations. FAA is also developing a UAS
program plan that would inform the aviation community of the steps and
time frames required for providing routine UAS access. Although the
plan was being developed in December 2006, it had not been approved for
issuance as of March 2008. Additionally FAA is developing regulatory
procedures to allow small UAS operations in the national airspace under
low-risk conditions. FAA has established a 12,000 square mile UAS test
center to provide airspace for testing and evaluating UASs and to
provide data for use in developing regulations. FAA expects to obtain
additional data from increased coordination with DOD. However, FAA has
not yet analyzed the limited data that it has already accumulated on
recent UAS operations in the national airspace system, citing resource
constraints. To address expected workload increases, FAA is introducing
more automation into its work processes and has granted DOD authority
to operate small UASs, weighing 20 pounds or less, over its
installations without receiving prior FAA approval. Additionally, GSA
is updating its regulations to require federal agencies to report their
owned and leased UASs, which could help FAA plan for its future
workload. Given the variety of federal entities involved with UAS
issues, as well as the stake that the private sector has in routine UAS
operations in the national airspace system, experts and stakeholders
suggested that an overarching entity be established to coordinate and
expedite these efforts. Congress used a similar approach in 2003 when
it passed legislation to create the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO), within FAA, to coordinate planning for the next
generation air transportation system among multiple federal agencies
and the private sector.
Because data on UAS operations in the national airspace system are
scarce and routine operations are many years away, the impact of
routine access on the system and the environment remains generally
speculative. The impact will depend on a number of factors that, today,
are unpredictable due to a lack of data. For example, one study notes
that, while more needs to be known about the needs and capabilities of
future UASs, their operations could have a disruptive impact on
aviation by introducing more complexity. A federal advisory body has
reported that UASs will create unique challenges because, in comparison
to manned aircraft, UAS missions often involve hovering or circling in
one location and UASs' speed, maneuverability, and climb rates, may
differ from manned aircraft. These differences could affect air traffic
flow, air traffic controller workload, and departure and arrival
procedures. Many of the experts we surveyed predicted that UASs would
add to the number of aircraft and therefore affect airspace and airport
capacity and add to the workload of air traffic control in the same
manner as additional manned aircraft. However, our experts also noted
that, if UASs assume some missions currently performed by manned
aircraft, and perform them with smaller and quieter engines, UASs could
benefit the environment.
We suggest that Congress consider creating an overarching body within
FAA, as it did when it established JPDO, to coordinate the diverse
efforts of federal agencies, academia, and the private sector in
meeting the safety challenges of allowing routine UAS access to the
national airspace system. We also recommend that FAA issue its UAS
program plan, analyze the UAS operations data that it has collected,
and establish a process to analyze DOD's data on UAS research,
development, and operations. In addition, we recommend that DHS examine
and fully address the security implications of routine civil UAS access
in the national airspace system. We provided a draft of this report to
the Department of Transportation (DOT), DHS, DOD, GSA, NASA, and the
Department of Commerce. DOT agreed to consider the relevant
recommendations and DHS agreed with our recommendation to it. GSA
commented that it will continue its efforts to ensure that FAA has
accurate information on the number of federally-owned and -leased UASs.
DOT commented that the report would benefit from additional information
on the impact of UASs on airports. We revised the report to include
DOT's concern that the impact of UASs on safety and capacity at
airports requires further study. DOT, DOD, and DHS provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. NASA and the Department
of Commerce had no comments.
Background:
FAA defines an unmanned aircraft as one that is operated without the
possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the
aircraft. In the past, these aircraft were sometimes called "unmanned
aerial vehicles," "remotely piloted vehicles," or "unmanned aircraft."
FAA and the international community have adopted the term "unmanned
aircraft system" to designate them as aircraft and to recognize that a
UAS includes not only the airframe, but also the associated elements--
the control station and communications links--as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Conceptual Unmanned Aircraft System:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of a conceptual unmanned aircraft
system. The following information is provided with the illustration:
Over the horizon link: between satellite and aircraft;
Line of sight link: between aircraft and ground radar.
Data and voice communications element:
* Landline or communication relay services;
* Uplink/downlink spectrum.
Air vehicle element:
* Airframe and structure;
* Propulsion system;
* Flight control system;
* Communications suite;
* Conflict avoidance system;
* Navigation system;
* Electrical system;
* Flight recovery system.
Control element:
* Mission planning;
* Mission control and operations;
* Conflict avoidance monitoring;
* Weather avoidance monitoring;
* Maintenance and logistics;
* Supply and provisioning;
* Support and training;
* Launch and recovery;
* Towing and taxiing.
Source: GAO and NASA.
[End of figure]
The capabilities of UASs differ from manned aircraft in several ways. A
UAS can operate for far longer periods than an onboard pilot could
safely operate an aircraft. Future scenarios envision UASs remaining
aloft for weeks or even months using fuel cell technology or airborne
refueling operations. UASs may fly at slower speeds than most manned
aircraft; some operate at low altitude (between buildings) while others
fly well above piloted aircraft altitudes. Some UASs can fly
autonomously based on pre-programmed data or flight paths, while others
fly based on commands from pilot-operated ground stations. UASs also
vary widely in size, shape, and capabilities. Some UASs, such as the
Global Hawk, have a wingspan as large as that of a Boeing 737. Others,
because they do not need the power or physical size to carry a pilot,
can be small and light enough to be launched by hand, as is the case
for the SkySeer UAS shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Examples of UASs:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains six photographs with the following accompanying
information:
Aerosonde®[A]:
Weight: 33.5 pounds;
Launch mechanism: catapult or from roof of fast moving ground vehicle;
Wingspan: 9.5 feet;
Maximum speed: 60 knots;
Maximum altitude: 15,000 feet;
Mission duration: up to 30 hours;
Current application: civil and military.
SkySeer:
Weight: 4 pounds;
Launch mechanism: hand launch;
Maximum speed: 24 knots;
Maximum altitude: 11,000 feet;
Mission duration: 50 minutes;
Current application: civil.
Predator B[B]:
Weight: 10,000 pounds;
Launch mechanism: runway;
Wingspan: 66 feet;
Maximum speed: over 220 knots;
Maximum altitude: 50,000 feet;
Mission duration: 30 hours;
Current application: civil and military.
ScanEagle™:
Weight: 38 pounds;
Launch mechanism: catapult;
Wingspan: 10.2 feet;
Maximum speed: 70 knots;
Maximum altitude: 16,400 feet;
Mission duration: 20 hours;
Current application: civil and military.
RQ-4A[C]:
Weight: 26,750 pounds;
Launch mechanism: runway;
Wingspan: 116 feet;
Maximum speed: 350 knots;
Maximum altitude: 65,000 feet;
Mission duration: 32 hours;
Current application: civil and military.
Fire Scout:
Weight: 3,150 pounds;
Launch mechanism: vertical;
Wingspan: 27.5 feet (rotor diameter);
Maximum speed: 125 knots;
Maximum altitude: 20,000 feet;
Mission duration: up to 8 hours;
Current application: military.
Sources: AAI Corporation, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and Octatron Inc.
[A] Aerosonde® is a registered trademark of Aerosonde Pty Ltd.
[B] The civil version of the Predator B is shown. The military version
of the Predator B is known as the Reaper (MQ-9).
[C] Model shown is RQ-4A. The Air Force has begun procuring model 4B
for which some characteristics differ. Model 4B's weight is 32,250
pounds; wingspan is 131 feet; maximum speed is 340 knots; maximum
altitude is 60,000 feet; and mission duration is 28 hours.
[End of figure]
DOD has pioneered UAS applications for wartime use and, in 2007, was
the major user of UASs, primarily for ongoing conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. While many of DOD's UAS operations currently take place
outside the United States, DOD needs access to the national airspace
system for UASs to, among other things, transit from their home bases
for training in restricted military airspace or for transit to overseas
deployment locations.[Footnote 3] DOD officials stated that the need
for military UAS access to the national airspace system is under
review, and also noted that increased access would also allow their
UASs to be more easily used to aid in fighting wildfires.
Several federal agencies have roles related to UASs. FAA is responsible
for ensuring UASs are safely integrated into the national airspace
system's air traffic control procedures, airport operations, and
infrastructure, and with existing commercial, military, and general
aviation users of the system. When UASs operate in that system, they
must meet the safety requirements of the U.S. Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 14, parts 61 and 91.[Footnote 4] FAA approves, on a
case-by-case basis, applications from government agencies and private-
sector entities for authority to operate UASs in the national airspace
system. Federal, state, and local government agencies must apply for
Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), while private-sector
entities must apply for special airworthiness certificates. In either
case, FAA examines the facts and circumstances of proposed UAS
operations to ensure that the prospective operator has acceptably
mitigated safety risks. Special airworthiness certificates are the only
means through which private-sector entities can operate UASs in the
national airspace system. Because special airworthiness certificates do
not allow commercial operations, there is currently no means for
authorizing commercial UAS operations.
NASA has conducted UAS research in the past. NASA led the 9-year
Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology Program that
focused on UAS technology for high altitude, long-endurance aircraft
engines, sensors, and integrated vehicles. NASA also played a key role
in a partnership with other federal agencies and industry called
"Access-5." Access-5 incorporated the efforts of the UAV National
Industry Team, known as UNITE, formed by six private-sector aerospace
firms, as well as FAA, DOD, and other industry participants. The Access-
5 partnership sought to achieve routine operations for high-level, long-
endurance UASs in the national airspace system. NASA contributed about
75 percent of the funding for this effort and the partnership had laid
out plans through 2010. Although the partnership ended in fiscal year
2006 when NASA canceled its funding, the project claimed a number of
accomplishments, including creating productive and cohesive working
relationships among key stakeholders and recommendations to advance the
introduction of UASs into the national airspace system.
Other agencies and organizations have roles or interests relating to
UASs. For example, DHS's TSA has authority to regulate security of all
transportation modes, including non-military UASs, to ensure that
appropriate security safeguards are in place. GSA has the
responsibility for maintaining an inventory of all federally-owned or -
leased aircraft, as reported by federal agencies. Additionally, a
number of associations, representing private-sector aviation
industries, such as airframe and components manufacturers, and users of
the national airspace system, have interest in UASs progressing toward
routine access to the system. We refer to officials of these
associations as stakeholders in this report.
Federal Agencies Have Used UASs in Many Ways and Expanded Government
and Commercial Use Is Possible in the Future:
Several federal agencies are using UASs of varying sizes for missions
ranging from forest fire monitoring to border security. These agencies
are interested in expanded use of UASs and state and local governments
would also like to begin using UASs for law enforcement or
firefighting. UASs also could eventually have commercial applications.
Federal Agencies Are Benefiting from Using UASs:
Federal agencies use UASs for many purposes. NASA, for example, uses
UASs as platforms for gathering scientific research data and has
partnered with other government agencies to demonstrate and use UASs'
unique capabilities. At its Wallops Island, Virginia, Flight Facility,
NASA operates a small fleet of Aerosonde® UASs on a lease-to-fly basis
for researchers. NASA also operates a modified Predator B UAS from its
Dryden Flight Research Center, in California, and used it to aid
firefighting efforts in southern California in 2007. During 2005, the
Department of Commerce's National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) partnered with NASA and industry to use a UAS to
fill data gaps in several areas, including climate research, weather
and water resources forecasting, ecosystem monitoring and management,
and coastal mapping. During 2007, NOAA partnered with NASA to use an
Aerosonde® UAS to gather data from Hurricane Noel and reported
receiving valuable low-altitude data that could aid future weather
forecasts and potentially reduce property damage and save lives.
Several other federal agencies have benefited from using UASs. DHS's
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses Predator B UASs to help
conduct surveillance along portions of the U.S. border with Mexico.
(See fig. 3.) CBP credits its UAS operations as helping its agents make
over 4,000 arrests and seize nearly 20,000 pounds of illegal drugs
between September 2005 and March 2008. In the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, UASs searched for survivors in an otherwise inaccessible area
of Mississippi. Additionally, in 2004, the U.S. Geological Survey and
the U.S. Forest Service used a UAS to study renewed volcanic activity
at Mount St. Helens, Washington. The UAS proved useful in this study
because it could operate above the extreme heat and toxic gases and
solids emitted by the volcano.
Figure 3: CBP's Predator B UAS Inventory as of December 2007:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of CBP's Predator B UAS Inventory as of December 2007.
Source: DHS.
[End of figure]
Interest Exists in Expanding UAS Operations to Obtain More Benefits:
Recent events have contributed to increasing interest in expanding UAS
operations. The nation's industrial base has expanded to support
current overseas conflicts. Moreover, personnel returning from duty in
war theaters provide a growing number of trained UAS operators.
Advances in computer technology, software development, light weight
materials, global navigation, advanced data links, sophisticated
sensors, and component miniaturization also contribute to the
heightened interest in using UASs in civilian roles.
In addition, the military's use of UASs has raised the visibility of
the possible benefits of using UASs in non-military applications. For
example, the military recently demonstrated how operators can use UASs
as communications platforms to bridge rugged terrain as shown in figure
4. Disaster recovery officials could use UASs in a similar manner to
help establish and maintain communications when the infrastructure is
disabled or overloaded. The latter was an issue in the hours
immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Figure 4: UASs Used as Communications Relays:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of how UASs are used as communications
relays. The following information is depicted:
Ground station 1:
Link of sight link to UAS 1.
UAS 1:
Line of sight link to UAS 2 (above rugged terrain).
UAS 2:
Line of sight link to Ground station 2.
Source: GAO and DOD.
[End of figure]
An industry forecast anticipates that federal agencies will continue to
be the main users of large UASs for much of the coming decade. CBP is
expanding its fleet of Predator B UASs. The agency received its fourth
aircraft in February 2008 and expects to acquire two more during fiscal
year 2008. CBP also plans to expand its UAS operations along the
southern U.S. border, and in the spring of 2008, begin operations along
the northern U.S. border, and then eventually expand operations to the
Great Lakes and Caribbean. CBP's Air and Marine Operations Center in
Riverside, California, will eventually control most of the agency's
UASs via satellite link. DHS's Coast Guard is evaluating various UAS
designs for future use in maritime border protection, law and treaty
enforcement, and search and rescue.
Expanded UAS use for scientific applications is also possible.
According to NOAA, UASs have the potential to continue to fill critical
observation gaps in climate change research, weather and water
resources forecasting, ecosystem monitoring and management, and coastal
mapping. NOAA also anticipates further use of UASs for hurricane
observation. Figure 5 illustrates how a high-altitude UAS might obtain
hurricane data. The National Academies recently recommended that NASA
should increasingly factor UAS technology into the nation's strategic
plan for Earth science. In 2007, NASA acquired two Global Hawk UASs
from the Air Force for potential use in long endurance missions
monitoring polar ice melt or for gathering data on hurricane
development 2,500 miles off the U.S. Atlantic coast.
Figure 5: Illustration of UAS Use for Hurricane Data Collection:
[See PDF for image]
The figure is an illustration of UAS use for hurricane data collection.
The following is illustrated:
* Base of operations link to satellite which links to UAS;
* UAS climbs to an altitude of 60,000 feet;
* UAS flies 1,500 nautical miles in transit to hurricane (12-24 hours);
* UAS flies above hurricane collecting real-time data;
- Expendable sensors collect air and ocean data;
* UAS returns to base of operations.
Sources: GAO and AeroVironment.
[End of figure]
State and local agencies and commercial users envision using smaller
UAS models. To facilitate more rapid resolution of emergency
situations, an official with the International Association of Chiefs of
Police envisions police and firefighting units having small, hand-
deployed UASs available to assist at crime scenes and wildfire
locations. According to FAA, as of January 2008, about a dozen law
enforcement agencies had contacted the agency to discuss potential use
of UASs. An industry forecast of UAS growth from 2008 to 2017 predicts
that interest among local law enforcement agencies in operating UASs
could increase late in the forecast period.[Footnote 5]
In the private sector, some entrepreneurs have become interested in
obtaining authorization to use small UASs to provide real estate
photography services. Small UASs could also help companies survey
pipeline or transportation infrastructure. However, an industry
forecast noted that, for commercial applications, manned aircraft
continue to be less costly than UASs. Consequently, demand for
commercial applications will be limited in the near term. While the
forecast indicates that civil and commercial UAS markets will
eventually emerge, the forecast notes that, for the next several years,
a more likely scenario would be for a UAS leasing industry to emerge to
serve the needs of businesses that do not want to invest in UAS
ownership.
UASs also could provide benefits to manned aviation. Efforts to move
toward routine access for UASs could produce technological improvements
in areas such as materials, fuel cells, antennae, and laser
communications, which could also benefit manned aviation, according to
one study of UAS impact.[Footnote 6] Some experts we surveyed had
similar observations, noting that advancements in see and avoid
technology could lead to reduced aircraft separation requirements and,
in turn, to increased airspace capacity. Five experts indicated that
technological improvements could benefit the airspace, and four
indicated that such improvements could benefit airports.[Footnote 7]
Additionally, five experts predicted that UASs could provide a variety
of benefits by assuming some of the missions currently performed by
manned aircraft or surface vehicles. These experts predicted that UASs
might perform these missions in less congested airspace or with engines
that burn less fuel or produce less air pollution.
Some experts view the routine use of UASs in the national airspace
system as a revolutionary change in aviation. According to one study,
the state of UASs today resembles the early days of manned aviation
where innovation and entrepreneurial spirit spawned a new market and
permanently changed the transportation landscape. The UAS industry is
poised to meet the potential demand for UASs. A 2004 study, prepared
for JPDO, reported that 49 UAS manufacturers operated in the United
States.[Footnote 8] According to a 2007 industry estimate, UAS
development and components manufacturing involved over 400 companies in
the United States.[Footnote 9] An industry forecast for UASs indicates
that, over the coming decade, the United States will account for 73
percent of the world's research and development investment for UAS
technology.[Footnote 10] The aforementioned 2004 JPDO report notes that
the emergence of a civil UAS industry could provide a number of
economic, social, and national security benefits, such as extending
U.S. aerospace leadership in the global UAS market; sustaining, and
perhaps increasing, employment in the U.S. aerospace industry;
contributing to expanding the U.S. economy by increasing domestic
productivity and aerospace exports; and creating the potential for a
UAS civil reserve fleet for use in major national and international
emergencies.[Footnote 11]
Routine Access to the National Airspace System Poses Technological,
Regulatory, Workload, and Coordination Challenges:
Routine UAS access to the national airspace system poses a variety of
technological, regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges.
Technological challenges include developing a capability for UASs to
detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft; addressing communications and
physical security vulnerabilities; improving UAS reliability; and
improving human factors considerations in UAS design. A lack of
regulations for UASs limits their operations and leads to a lack of
airspace for UAS testing and evaluation and a lack of data that would
aid in setting standards. Increased workload would stem from FAA's
expectation of increased demand for UAS operations in the national
airspace system without a regulatory framework in place. In addition,
coordination of efforts is lacking among diverse federal agencies as
well as academia and the private sector in moving UASs toward meeting
the safety requirements of the national airspace system.
Several Technological Issues Must Be Addressed before UASs Can
Routinely Access the National Airspace System:
FAA requires UASs to meet the national airspace system's safety
requirements before they routinely access the system. However, UASs do
not currently have the capability to detect, sense, and avoid other
aircraft and airborne objects in a manner similar to manned aircraft.
UASs also have communications and physical security vulnerabilities.
Moreover, some UASs have demonstrated reliability problems and lack
human-machine interface considerations in their design.
UASs Cannot Detect, Sense, and Avoid Other Aircraft in a Manner Similar
to Manned Aircraft:
Although research, development, and testing of sense and avoid
technologies has been ongoing for several years, no suitable technology
has been identified that would provide UASs with the capability to meet
the detect, sense, and avoid requirements of the national airspace
system. These requirements call for a person operating an aircraft to
maintain vigilance so as to see and avoid other aircraft. Without a
pilot on board to scan the sky, UASs do not have an on-board capability
to directly "see" other aircraft. Consequently, the UAS must possess
the capability to sense and avoid the object using on-board equipment,
or do so with assistance of a human on the ground or in a chase
aircraft, or by using other means, such as radar. Many UASs,
particularly smaller models, will likely operate at altitudes below
18,000 feet, sharing airspace with other objects, such as gliders.
Sensing and avoiding these other objects represents a particular
challenge for UASs, since the other objects normally do not transmit an
electronic signal to identify themselves and FAA cannot mandate that
all aircraft or objects possess this capability so that UASs can
operate safely. Many small UAS models do not have equipment to detect
such signals and, in some cases, are too small to carry such equipment.
The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association,[Footnote 12] in a 2006
survey of its membership, found that UASs' inability to see and avoid
manned aircraft is a priority concern. Additionally, the experts we
surveyed suggested, more frequently than any other alternative,
conducting further work on detect, sense, and avoid technology as an
interim step to facilitate UAS integration into the national airspace
system while FAA develops a regulatory structure for routine UAS
operations.
The effort to develop the Traffic Alert and Collision and Avoidance
System (TCAS), used widely in manned aircraft to help prevent
collisions, demonstrates the challenge of developing a detect, sense,
and avoid capability for UASs. Although FAA, airlines, and several
private-sector companies developed TCAS over a 13-year period, at a
cost of more than $500 million, FAA officials point out that the
designers did not intend for TCAS to act as the sole means of avoiding
collisions and that the on board pilot still has the responsibility for
seeing and avoiding other aircraft. FAA officials also point out that
TCAS computes collision avoidance solutions based on characteristics of
manned aircraft, and does not incorporate UASs' slower turn and climb
rates in developing conflict solutions. Consequently, FAA officials and
stakeholders we interviewed believe that developing the detect, sense,
and avoid technology that UASs would need to operate routinely in the
national airspace system poses an even greater challenge than TCAS did.
FAA officials believe that an acceptable detect, sense, and avoid
system for UASs could cost up to $2 billion to complete and is still
many years away.
UASs Have Communications, Command, Control, and Physical Security
Vulnerabilities:
Ensuring uninterrupted command and control for a UAS is important
because without it, the UAS could collide with another aircraft or, if
it crashes to the earth, cause injury or property damage. The lack of
protected radio frequency spectrum for UAS operations heightens the
possibility that an operator could lose command and control of the UAS.
Unlike manned aircraft, which use dedicated, protected radio
frequencies, UASs currently use unprotected radio spectrum and, like
any other wireless technology, remain vulnerable to unintentional or
intentional interference. This remains a key security vulnerability for
UASs, because in contrast to a manned aircraft where the pilot has
direct, physical control of the aircraft, interruption of radio
frequency, such as by jamming, can sever the UASs' only means of
control. One of the experts we surveyed listed providing security and
protected spectrum among the critical UAS integration technologies.
To address the potential interruption of command and control, UASs
generally have pre-programmed maneuvers to follow if the command and
control link becomes interrupted (called a "lost-link scenario") and a
means for safe return to the ground if operators cannot reestablish the
communications link before the UAS runs out of fuel. However, these
procedures are not standardized across all types of UASs and,
therefore, remain unpredictable to air traffic controllers.
Predictability of UAS performance under a lost link scenario is
particularly important for air traffic controllers who have
responsibility for ensuring safe separation of aircraft in their
airspace.
Ensuring continuity of UAS command and control also depends on the
physical security provided to UASs. Presently, UAS operations in the
national airspace are limited and take place under closely controlled
conditions. However, this could change if UASs have routine access to
the national airspace. One study identifies security as a significant
issue that could be exacerbated with the proliferation of UASs. TSA
notes that in 2004, terrorists flew a UAS over northern Israel.
[Footnote 13] One stakeholder questioned how we could prevent this from
happening in the United States. UASs have the capability to deliver
nuclear, biological, or chemical payloads, and can be launched
undetected from virtually any site. In response to the events of
September 11, 2001, entry doors to passenger airplane cockpits were
hardened to prevent unauthorized entry. However, no similar security
requirements exist to prevent unauthorized access to UAS ground control
stations--the UAS equivalent of the cockpit. Security is a latent issue
that could impede UAS developments even after all the other challenges
have been addressed, according to one study.
UASs Have Shown a Lack of Reliability:
Although DOD has obtained benefits from its UAS operations overseas,
the agency notes in its Unmanned Systems Roadmap[Footnote 14] that UAS
reliability is a key factor in integrating UASs into the national
airspace system.[Footnote 15] Our analysis of information that DOD
provided on 199 military UAS accidents, of varying degrees of severity,
that occurred over 4˝ years during operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom, indicates that reliability continues to be a challenge.
About 65 percent of the accidents resulted from materiel issues, such
as failures of UAS components.[Footnote 16]
Studies indicate that a number of factors could contribute to UAS
reliability problems. Many UASs have been designed primarily as
expendable or experimental vehicles, where factors such as cost,
weight, function, and performance outweigh reliability concerns,
according to a 2004 study.[Footnote 17] The Congressional Research
Service reported in 2006 that the lack of reliability stems from the
fact that UAS technology is still evolving, and, consequently, less
redundancy is built into the operating system of UASs than of manned
aircraft, and until redundant systems are perfected, accident rates are
expected to remain high.[Footnote 18] Reliability issues also stem from
the nature of the components used in some UASs. A DOD report notes that
there has been a tendency to design UASs at low cost using readily
available materials that were not intended for use in an aviation
environment. For example, one UAS used by DOD was equipped with a
wooden propeller that could disintegrate in the rain.[Footnote 19] A
composite or metal propeller could cost two to three times more than a
wooden propeller.
Human Factors Deficiencies in UAS Design Have Caused Accidents:
UAS developers have not yet fully incorporated human factors
engineering in their products. Such engineering incorporates what is
known about people, their abilities, characteristics, and limitations
in the design of the equipment they use, the environments in which they
function, and the jobs they perform. According to researchers and
agency officials we interviewed, technology in its early developmental
stages typically lacks human factors considerations. Researchers noted
that UASs, similar to any new technology, have been designed by
engineers who focused on getting the technology to work, without
considering human factors, such as ease of use by non-engineers. FAA
officials noted that UASs today are at a similar stage as personal
computers in their early years before newer, more user-friendly
operating systems became standard. Studies indicate that human factors
issues have contributed to military UAS accidents and DOD has indicated
the need for further work in this area.[Footnote 20] Our analysis of
DOD's data on UAS accidents during Operation Enduring Freedom and
Operation Iraqi Freedom showed that 17 percent were due to human
factors issues.
Several human factors issues have yet to be resolved. For example, the
number of UASs that a single ground-based pilot can safely operate
remains undetermined, as some future scenarios envision a single pilot
operating several UASs simultaneously. Other unresolved issues include
how pilots or air traffic controllers respond to the lag in
communication of information from the UAS, the skill set and medical
qualifications required for UAS pilots,[Footnote 21] and UAS pilot
training requirements.[Footnote 22]
The variety of ground control station designs across UASs is another
human factors concern. For example, pilots of the Predator B UAS
control the aircraft by using a stick and pedals, similar to the
actions of pilots of manned aircraft. In contrast, pilots of the Global
Hawk UAS use a keyboard and mouse to control the aircraft. Differences
in UAS missions could require some variation among control station
designs, but the extent to which regulations should require
commonalities across all ground control stations awaits further
research.
The transition from one crew to another while UASs are airborne serves
as another human factors issue needing resolution. Because UASs have
the capability of extended flight, one crew can hand off control to
another during a mission. Several military UAS accidents have occurred
during these handoffs, according to a 2005 research study.[Footnote 23]
The National Transportation Safety Board cited a similar issue in its
report on the April 26, 2006, crash of CBP's Predator B UAS. According
to the report, the pilot inadvertently cut off the UAS's fuel supply
when he switched from a malfunctioning console to a functioning
one.[Footnote 24] When the switch was made, a lever on the second
console remained in a position that would cut off the fuel supply if an
operator used the console to control the aircraft. Although procedures
required that the controls on the two consoles be matched prior to
making such a switch, this procedure was not followed. CBP reports that
it has taken action to address this issue and has also addressed nearly
all of the board's other recommendations stemming from this accident.
A remote pilot's lack of situational awareness serves as another human
factors-related challenge for the safe operation of UASs. For example,
FAA officials have noted that situational awareness remains a key
factor for operators to detect and appropriately respond to turbulence.
A pilot on board an aircraft can physically sense and assess the
severity of turbulence being encountered, whereas a remote pilot
cannot. A UAS could break apart and become a hazard to other aircraft
or to persons or property on the ground if the pilot has no indication
of turbulence or its severity. Even if a remote pilot had an awareness
of the turbulence, the level of risk that the pilot might accept needs
further study. Because a pilot does not risk his own safety when
operating a UAS, the pilot may operate the UAS in situations unsuitable
for the aircraft, such as flying through turbulence strong enough to
destroy the UAS's airframe.
Although many experts and aviation stakeholders believe that the
technical issues discussed above represent difficult challenges for UAS
integration into the national airspace system, others do not. For
example, DOD's Unmanned Systems Roadmap asserts that the technology for
detecting and maneuvering to avoid objects does not present a major
obstacle. Some experts responding to our survey expressed similar
opinions. For example, one noted that technology needed to safely
integrate UASs into the national airspace system exists today and that
implementation should be the focus. Another said that FAA is too slow
in adopting new technology and that sense and avoid techniques are
available today that, when used in combination with a qualified pilot
at the ground station's controls, would be sufficient to allow free
access for larger UASs. However, FAA expects to continue its current
practice of allowing UAS access to the national airspace system on a
case-by-case basis, after a safety review, until technology, research,
and regulations mature.
A Lack of Regulations Limits UAS Operations:
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations[Footnote 25] prescribes rules
governing the operation of most aircraft in the national airspace
system. However, these regulations were developed for manned aircraft.
Minimum performance standards for UAS detect, sense, and avoid and
communications, command, and control capabilities, as well as
regulations that incorporate these minimum standards, do not exist.
Moreover, existing regulations may need changes or additions to address
the unique characteristics of UASs. For example, because UASs do not
need to be large or powerful enough to carry a pilot, they can be much
smaller than any aircraft that today routinely operates in the national
airspace system. Existing regulations were developed for aircraft large
enough to carry a human.
The lack of a regulatory framework has limited the amount of UAS
operations in the national airspace system, which has, in turn,
contributed to a lack of operational data on UASs and a lack of
airspace in which developers can test and evaluate their products. An
industry forecast indicates that growth in a civil UAS market is not
likely until regulations exist that allow UASs to operate routinely.
The forecast assumes that such regulations would be in place by 2012,
but notes that few civil-use UASs would be produced in the near term,
with numbers increasing towards 2017. (See fig. 6.)
Figure 6: Forecast of Civil UASs Produced, 2008 through 2017:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Year: 2008;
Civil UASs produced: 7.
Year: 2009;
Civil UASs produced: 7.
Year: 2010;
Civil UASs produced: 7.
Year: 2011;
Civil UASs produced: 7.
Year: 2012;
Civil UASs produced: 35.
Year: 2013;
Civil UASs produced: 67.
Year: 2014;
Civil UASs produced: 69.
Year: 2015;
Civil UASs produced: 84.
Year: 2016;
Civil UASs produced: 111.
Year: 2017;
Civil UASs produced: 161.
Source: Teal Group Corporation, 2008.
[End of figure]
Studies indicate that the lack of regulations can affect liability risk
of UAS operations, which can increase insurance costs. For example,
without airworthiness standards, insurers would be even more concerned
about the liability hazard of UASs crashing in a dense urban
environment. The lack of regulations to govern access to airspace has
also posed challenges for developers of civil UASs. Officials of
associations representing UAS developers told us of difficulties in
finding airspace in which to test and evaluate UASs. One of these
officials noted that some manufacturers have their own test ranges, and
some have access to restricted military airspace, but other UAS
developers have not had this access. Additionally, because UAS
operations in the national airspace have been limited, operational data
is scarce. Having data on UAS operations is an important element in
developing regulations.
Because UASs have never routinely operated in the national airspace
system, the level of public acceptance is unknown. One researcher
observed that as UASs expand into the non-defense sector, there will
inevitably be public debate over the need for and motives behind such
proliferation. One expert we surveyed commented that some individuals
may raise privacy concerns about a small aircraft that is "spying" on
them, whether operated by law enforcement officials or by private
organizations, and raised the question of what federal agency would
have the responsibility for addressing these privacy concerns. On the
other hand, a study for JPDO noted that if UASs were increasingly used
to produce public benefits in large-scale emergency response efforts,
public acceptance could grow as the public notes the benefits that UASs
can provide.[Footnote 26]
Coordinating with Other Countries' Efforts to Integrate UASs Is a Key
Task:
As other countries work toward integrating UASs in their respective
airspaces, FAA faces a challenge to work with the international
community in developing harmonized standards and operational procedures
so that UASs can seamlessly cross international borders and U.S.
manufacturers can sell their products in the global marketplace.
International bodies such as the European Organization for Civil
Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE), and the European Organization for the
Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), as well as individual countries
face challenges similar to those that the United States faces in
integrating UASs into their respective airspaces.
EUROCAE formed a working group--WG-73--in 2006 to focus on UAS issues.
The working group completed its first product in January 2007--a
preliminary inventory of airworthiness certification and operational
approval items that need to be addressed. The working group also plans
to develop a work plan that lays out work packages and timelines; a
concept for UAS airworthiness certification and operational approval
that will provide recommendations and a framework for safe UAS
operations in non-segregated airspace[Footnote 27]; requirements for
command, control, and communications, as well as for sense and avoid
systems; and a catalog of UAS-air traffic management incompatibility
issues that need to be addressed.
EUROCONTROL has established a UAS Air Traffic Management Activity and
is hosting workshops to seek feedback, suggestions, and advice from a
broad range of aviation stakeholders on its approach to UAS integration
into European airspace. The second workshop is scheduled for May 2008
and is open to all interested civil and military stakeholders,
including air navigation service providers, UAS operators and
manufacturers, regulators, as well as associations and professional
bodies. EURCONTROL has also established an Operational Air Traffic Task
Force that has developed high-level specifications for military UASs
operating outside segregated airspace in a form suitable for European
states to incorporate into their national regulations. The
specifications state that UAS operations should not increase the risk
to other airspace users, that air traffic management procedures should
mirror those applicable to manned aircraft, and that the provision of
air traffic services to UASs should be transparent to air traffic
controllers.
Table 1 illustrates the variety of individual country efforts to
integrate UASs into their respective airspaces. With the variety of
ongoing efforts around the world, FAA and other countries face a
challenge in harmonizing UAS standards and procedures.
Table 1: Examples of UAS Integration Efforts in Other Countries:
Country: United Kingdom;
UAS integration efforts: "The Autonomous Systems Technology Related
Airborne Evaluation and Assessment" project is focusing on the
technologies, systems, facilities, and procedures that will allow UASs
to operate safely and routinely in United Kingdom airspace. The project
has received funding from the British government, industries, and
universities and work has commenced to address topics such as
communications, collision avoidance, operating rules and procedures,
and integration with the operating environment.
Country: Australia/New Zealand;
UAS integration efforts: An Australian aerospace firm has commissioned
a program, Unmanned Aircraft Technology Applications Research, to
organize efforts to address UAS issues. The program has, in turn,
established an Australian/New Zealand working group to use
demonstration programs to solve the critical issues currently
inhibiting commercial UAS operations. The working group includes
global, regional, and Australian UAS manufacturers and operators,
researchers, military aviation, and an international insurance
underwriter.
Country: Japan;
UAS integration efforts: In 2004, a consortium of Japanese
manufacturers and a government ministry completed formulation of safety
guidelines for using unmanned helicopters for commercial purposes over
unpopulated areas. This consortium became an association that includes
additional manufacturers and individuals from universities and research
agencies and plans to develop safety guidelines for UASs. Japan
currently uses unmanned helicopters for pesticide spraying.
Country: Canada;
UAS integration efforts: In 2007, Transport Canada issued the Final
Report of its Unmanned Air Vehicle Working Group. The working group
developed a plan to safely integrate unmanned air vehicles into the
Canadian airspace system. The working group included representation
from government, defense, and private-sector entities.
Country: Germany;
UAS integration efforts: Germany has established a working group called
"UAS-Deutschland" to facilitate the operation of UASs in German
airspace. The working group is tasked with developing a national
opinion concerning enabling the integration of UAS operations in non-
segregated airspace and preparing for and fostering international
harmonization. Another working group called "UAV DACH" has been
established for German-speaking countries--Austria, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland--to develop standards for national and
international regulations for civil and military UAS flights. The group
is also charged with finding solutions for UAS technical challenges
such as sensing and avoiding other aircraft.
Source: FAA documents, Internet Web pages, a press release, and a UAS
expert.
[End of table]
FAA Faces Increased Workload to Process COA and Special Airworthiness
Certificate Applications for UAS Operations:
FAA could face a workload challenge in conducting an increasing number
of case-by-case safety reviews for proposed UAS operations in the
national airspace system. FAA is already having difficulty in meeting
its 60-calendar day goal for processing COAs, used for government
requests to operate UASs. From December 2006 through January 2008,
FAA's COA processing time averaged 66 calendar days[Footnote 28]. FAA
anticipates a substantial increase in requests for COAs, as well as for
special airworthiness certificates, used by private-sector entities
proposing UAS operations in the national airspace system, by 2010. (See
figs. 7 and 8.) Increased demand could result in even longer processing
times for COAs.
Figure 7: Applications for Certificates of Waiver or Authorization,
Received in Calendar Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Year: 2005;
Applications received: 24.
Year: 2005;
Applications received: 64.
Year: 2006;
Applications received: 102.
Year: 2007;
Applications received: 109.
Year: 2008;
Applications received: 153.
Year: 2009;
Applications received: 229.
Year: 2010;
Applications received: 343.
Source: FAA.
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Applications for Special Airworthiness Certificates, Received
in Fiscal Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Year: 2005;
Applications received: 0.
Year: 2005;
Applications received: 1.
Year: 2006;
Applications received: 3.
Year: 2007;
Applications received: 15.
Year: 2008;
Applications received: 17.
Year: 2009;
Applications received: 24.
Year: 2010;
Applications received: 32.
Source: FAA.
[End of figure]
A lack of knowledge of the number of federally-owned or -leased UASs
adds uncertainty to FAA's expected future workload. The number of COAs
does not provide a count of federally-owned or -leased UASs because
each COA reflects an authorization to operate a UAS, not the number of
UASs owned or leased by an agency. According to FAA, an agency could
have multiple copies of the same type of UAS whose operation is
approved in a COA. Moreover, having multiple UASs of the same type
could drive additional workload for FAA if the agency requests
authorization to operate its UASs under different operating scenarios,
each of which would require a separate COA. An agency could also have
only one UAS, but more than one COA, if the agency required and
received approval for the UAS to operate under different sets of
conditions. GSA has responsibility for maintaining the inventory of
federally-owned and -leased aircraft, but its regulations on reporting
these aircraft have not been updated to require federal agencies to
report UASs.
Coordination among Federal Agencies and Others Is Lacking:
Coordinating the efforts of numerous federal agencies, academic
institutions, and private-sector entities that have UAS expertise or a
stake in routine access to the national airspace system is a challenge.
As discussed above, several federal agencies are involved to varying
degrees in UAS issues. Additionally, academic institutions have UAS
expertise to contribute and UAS manufacturers have a stake in supplying
the demand for UASs that routine access could create. FAA and experts
referenced the Access-5 program that, in the past, served as an
overarching coordinating body and provided a useful community forum.
While some experts believe that Access-5's focus on high-altitude, long-
endurance UASs is no longer appropriate, the program's institutional
arrangements demonstrated how federal government and the private-sector
resources could be combined to focus on a common goal.
Stakeholders and experts we surveyed believe that coordination and
focus are lacking among the diverse entities working on UAS issues, and
expressed concerns that the potential public and economic benefits of
UASs could be delayed while FAA develops the safety regulations
required to enable routine UASs operations in the national airspace
system. They noted the numerous potential uses in public safety, law
enforcement, weather forecasting, and national security, discussed
previously, stating that these benefits will be delayed until standards
are developed. Some also noted that economic benefits realized through
industry growth and productivity gains in the commercial sector would
also be delayed. Additionally, some experts believe that, at the
current pace of progress, the United States would lose its leadership
position and manufacturers would move to other countries where the
regulatory climate is more receptive. However, as previously noted, an
industry forecast indicates that the United States will account for
about two-thirds of the worldwide UAS research and development in the
coming decade.
Fully Addressing UAS Challenges Involves Several Agencies and Could
Take a Decade or Longer:
FAA and other agencies have roles in addressing technological,
regulatory, and workload challenges, but no entity is in charge of
coordinating these efforts. FAA and DOD are addressing some
technological challenges, but TSA has not addressed the security
implications of routine UAS operations. FAA is establishing a
regulatory framework, but routine UAS access to the national airspace
may not occur for over a decade. FAA is mitigating its expected
increased workload by automating some of its COA processing steps. GSA
is updating its federal aircraft reporting requirements to include
UASs. Experts and stakeholders believe that an overarching entity could
add focus to these diverse efforts and facilitate routine UAS access to
the national airspace system.
Federal Agencies Are Addressing Some Technological Issues:
FAA is addressing technological issues by sponsoring research and
taking steps to address UAS vulnerabilities in communications, command,
and control. DOD is taking steps toward improving UAS reliability and
the extent of human factors consideration in UAS design. An FAA-
sponsored federal advisory committee is developing technical standards
for FAA to use in developing UAS regulations. Although TSA issued an
advisory circular in 2004 on UAS security concerns, it has not
addressed the security implications of routine UAS access in the
national airspace system.
FAA Is Sponsoring Research on Detect, Sense, and Avoid Technologies and
Other Topics:
FAA has budgeted $4.7 million for fiscal years 2007 through 2009 for
further UAS research on topics such as detect, sense, and avoid;
command and control; and system safety management. NASA, FAA, and
others have conducted tests to determine the capabilities of and
potential improvements to detect, sense, and avoid technology. For
example, in 2003, NASA installed radar on a manned aircraft that was
equipped for optional control from the ground. The tests indicated that
the radar detected intruding aircraft earlier than the onboard pilot,
but also revealed the need for further work on the onboard sensing
equipment to ensure adequate response time for the remote pilot. In
another example, FAA and the Air Force Research Laboratory collaborated
to execute flight tests for sense and avoid technology between October
2006 and January 2007. According to a summary of the lessons learned
from these tests, the results showed some promise, but indicated that
much work and technology maturation would need to occur before the
tested system could be deemed ready for operational use.
FAA Has Begun to Address Radio Frequency Spectrum Allocation for UASs
to Ensure Uninterrupted Communications, Command, and Control:
Addressing the challenge of radio frequency allocation for UAS
operations is moving forward, but may not be completed for several
years. The International Telecommunication Union allocates radio
frequency spectrum and deliberates such issues at periodic World
Radiocommunication Conferences, the most recent of which was held in
the fall of 2007. To obtain spectrum allocation for UASs, FAA has
participated with the Department of Commerce in a national preparation
process to place spectrum allocation decisions on the conference's
future agenda. At the 2007 conference, delegates agreed to discuss at
the next conference, in 2011, the spectrum requirements and possible
regulatory actions, including spectrum allocations, needed to support
the safe operation of UASs. The Department of Commerce and the Federal
Communications Commission would jointly implement and manage the
spectrum allocation decisions made at the 2011 conference, as these
agencies manage, respectively, federal and non-federal use of frequency
spectrum.[Footnote 29]
DOD Is Working to Improve UAS Reliability and Incorporate Human Factors
in UAS Design:
DOD is urging manufacturers to increase UAS reliability while keeping
costs low by using such practices as standard systems engineering,
ensuring that replacement parts are readily available, and using
redundant, fail-safe designs. DOD also notes in its Unmanned Systems
Roadmap that, although UASs suffer accidents at one to two orders of
magnitude greater than the rate incurred by manned military aircraft,
accident rates have declined as operational experience increased. For
some UASs, the accident rates have become similar to or lower than that
of the manned F-16 fighter jet, according to the roadmap. According to
a study by The MITRE Corporation, General Atomics designed the Predator
B UAS with reliability in mind, and the Altair UAS, which is a modified
version of the Predator, has, among other things, triple redundant
avionics to increase reliability.
The Army has made some progress in limiting the variety of ground
control station designs for unmanned aircraft--a human factors concern-
-by developing its "One System®," which involves a single ground
control station capable of operating a variety of UASs. Further
increasing standardization and interoperability across all unmanned
systems is a continuing DOD goal.
A Federal Advisory Body Is Developing Technical Standards:
The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), a federal
advisory committee sponsored by FAA,[Footnote 30] is establishing
minimum performance standards for FAA to use in developing UAS
regulations. RTCA established Special Committee 203 in October 2004 to
develop such standards for UAS detect, sense, and avoid and for UAS
communications, command, and control. Individuals from academia and the
private sector serve on the committee without government compensation
along with FAA, NASA, and DOD officials.
Special Committee 203 has begun assessing the technological and
regulatory landscape as it pertains to UASs to determine the scope of
its task. The committee published guidance materials to provide a
framework for its standards development effort and to help UAS
designers, manufacturers, installers, service providers, and users
understand the breadth of operational concepts and systems being
considered for integration into the national airspace system.[Footnote
31] The committee anticipates that the guidance will be further refined
and validated as the standards development process moves along.
According to a committee co-chair, the committee did not realize, at
the outset, that developing technical standards for UASs would be a
project of unprecedented complexity and scope for RTCA. RTCA's projects
have been narrower in scope in the past, he said. Although the
committee officials had previously estimated that the standards would
be completed by 2011 or 2012, the completion date is now between 2017
and 2019. The additional time has been added to apply a data-driven,
systems engineering approach that will require the collaborative
efforts of FAA, DOD, and MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development.[Footnote 32]
RTCA anticipates that reliability and human factors requirements will
be integrated into its minimum performance standards. The guidance
materials note that UASs must meet the same reliability as manned
aircraft, and that reliability is an important component of safety;
flight control systems; certification requirements for detect, sense,
and avoid avionics; and for command and control systems such as the
UAS's autopilot. According to RTCA officials, human factors will be an
overarching consideration in standards development.
Security Implications of Routine UAS Access to the National Airspace
System Have Not Been Addressed:
Although UASs remain vulnerable to many of the same security risks as
manned aircraft, little attention has been afforded to UAS security. In
2004, TSA issued an advisory that described possible terrorist interest
in using UASs as weapons. The advisory noted the potential for UASs to
carry explosives or disperse chemical or biological weapons. However,
the advisory noted that there was no credible evidence to suggest that
terrorist organizations plan to use UASs in the United States and
advised operators to stay alert for UASs with unusual or unauthorized
modifications or persons observed loitering in the vicinity of UAS
operations, loading unusual cargo into a UAS, appearing to be under
stress, showing identification that appeared to be altered, or asking
detailed questions about UAS capabilities. In 2007, the agency advised
model aircraft clubs to fly their aircraft only at chartered club
facilities or at administered sites and to notify local authorities of
scheduled flying events.
TSA considers these actions appropriate to address the security threat
posed by UASs. According to TSA, the agency uses a threat based, risk
management approach to prioritize risk, threats, and vulnerabilities in
order to appropriately apply resources and implement security
enhancements. TSA informed us that the agency continues to monitor
threat information regarding UASs and has processes in place to act
quickly to mitigate and respond to any identified vulnerabilities.
While these actions may be appropriate for the low tempo of today's UAS
operations, growth forecasts indicate that UASs could proliferate in
the national airspace in the future. Such a proliferation could
increase the risk of UASs being used by terrorists for attacks in the
United States. A lack of analysis of security issues, while FAA
develops the regulatory framework, could lead to further delays in
allowing UASs routine access to the national airspace system.
FAA Is Establishing a Regulatory Framework, but Routine UAS Access to
the National Airspace May Not Occur for a Decade or More:
FAA has established a UAS program office and is reviewing the body of
manned aviation regulations to determine the modifications needed to
address UASs, but these modifications may not be completed until 2020.
As an interim step, FAA has begun an effort to provide increased access
to the national airspace system for small UASs. FAA is taking steps to
develop data to use in developing standards, but has been slow to
analyze the data that it has already collected. FAA is also
coordinating with other countries to harmonize regulations.
FAA Has Created an Unmanned Aircraft Program Office to Ensure That UASs
Operate Safely:
In February 2006, FAA created the Unmanned Aircraft Program Office
(UAPO) to develop policies and regulations to ensure that UASs operate
safely in the national airspace system. With 19 staff, UAPO serves as
FAA's focal point to coordinate efforts to address UAS technical and
regulatory challenges and for outreach to other government agencies,
the private sector, and other countries and international bodies
working on UASs integration challenges. UAPO is developing a program
plan to inform the aviation community of FAA's perspective on all that
needs to be accomplished and the time frames required to create a
regulatory framework that will ensure UAS safety and allow UASs to have
routine access to the national airspace system. Although officials
informed us that this plan was in progress in December 2006, as of
March 2008 the plan was awaiting final approval for release. Issuing
the program plan could provide industry and potential UAS users with a
framework that describes FAA's vision and plans for integrating UASs
into the national airspace system.
While RTCA is developing minimum performance standards for UASs, FAA
has begun to review the existing body of regulations for manned
aviation to determine what regulations need to be modified or whether
new regulations are needed to address the unique characteristics of
UASs. Some of the rules for manned aircraft may not apply to UASs. For
example, the rule requiring that oxygen be on board for passenger use
on all aircraft operating above 14,000 feet would not apply to a UAS.
On the other hand, new standards may be needed. For example, while FAA
has developed standards for manned airframe stress, no similar standard
exists for UASs. UASs may require unique standards because, as
mentioned previously in this report, a remote pilot cannot physically
experience and judge the severity of turbulence that could potentially
harm the airframe and cause an accident.
However, UASs may not receive routine access to the national airspace
system until 2020. FAA's final step in developing UAS regulations must
wait until the 2017 to 2019 time frame, after RTCA's Special Committee
203 develops minimum technical standards for UASs. FAA would then
conduct a rulemaking to adopt the committee's standards, which would
require an additional year, according to an FAA official.
As an interim effort to increase UAS access to the national airspace
system, FAA began an effort in 2007 to establish regulations to
incrementally allow small UASs to operate in the national airspace
system, under low-risk conditions without undergoing the case-by-case
approval process that is currently required. FAA has established a plan
to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking by July 2009 and a final
rule by 2010 or 2011. Although FAA has not reached any final decisions,
FAA may limit these regulations to UASs weighing less than 30 pounds,
operating within line of sight, and traveling at speeds less than 40
knots, according to an FAA official.[Footnote 33] FAA is considering
using a nontraditional certification approach that would allow
applicants to register small UASs using a Web-based tool. FAA
anticipates that, following the rulemaking, it will obtain data and
experience with UAS operations that could lead to further gradual
expansion of small UAS access to the national airspace system.
Allowing incremental access of certain UASs that pose low risks is
consistent with pending legislation[Footnote 34] and local government
agencies and potential commercial operators have expressed much
interest in operating small UASs. However, FAA recognizes that some
small UASs may never have routine access to the national airspace
system because their small size limits their ability to carry detect,
sense, and avoid equipment. Additionally, FAA notes that, like all
UASs, small UASs will require secure radio frequency spectrum for
command and control, and this issue has not yet been resolved.
FAA Seeks Data on UAS Operations, but Progress Is Slow:
The absence of a comprehensive database on UAS safety and reliability
that could inform the standards and regulations development process
hinders FAA's efforts to establish a regulatory framework for UASs. FAA
has been working to leverage DOD's decades of experience with UASs.
Collaboration between FAA and DOD could provide mutual benefits. DOD
plans to spend over $7 billion in research, development, test, and
evaluation funds for UASs between fiscal years 2007 and 2013. Data from
these efforts could facilitate FAA's development of a regulatory
framework to allow UASs to have routine access to the national airspace
system. DOD would benefit from this access by being able to operate its
UASs in the national airspace, without first obtaining a COA, as UASs
transit from home bases to training areas or to overseas deployment. To
this end, FAA and DOD finalized a memorandum of agreement in September
2007 that provides a formal mechanism for FAA to request, and DOD to
provide, data on UAS operations to support safety studies. Through the
memorandum, FAA will share the results of its studies with DOD and vice
versa. FAA also participates with DOD on a joint integrated product
team that is focusing on obtaining military UAS access to the national
airspace system. According to DOD's Unmanned Systems Roadmap, the
team's activities include modeling and simulation, technology
development, acquisition, demonstrations, and flight tests.
While DOD's extensive experience with UAS operations and its
accumulated data represent potentially rich sources of information on
UAS operations, regulators should use such information with the
understanding that it comes from a wartime operating environment. FAA
and DOD officials acknowledge that military experience and operational
data on UASs are not always directly transferable to operations in the
national airspace system. The military's use of UASs is focused on
mitigating the danger to troops. Safety and reliability risks that may
be appropriate in a war zone to protect troops may not be acceptable in
the national airspace system.
FAA's efforts to develop and analyze UAS operations data are a good
start, but FAA has not yet analyzed the data that it has already
collected. The COA requires the applicant to provide FAA with a variety
of operational data, such as the number of flights conducted, the pilot
duty time per flight, equipment malfunctions, and information on any
accidents. FAA has been archiving this information as it is received,
but has not analyzed it because of resource constraints, according to a
UAPO official. Analyzing this data could add to the information
available for developing standards.
As a vehicle for collecting data on UAS operations and to address the
challenge that UAS developers have had in finding airspace for testing
and evaluating their products, FAA has established a UAS test center at
New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, New Mexico. FAA expects that
UAS operations at the test center, which opened in the spring of 2008,
will provide FAA with some of the data needed to develop standards and
regulations for allowing routine UAS access to the national airspace
system. The university will operate the 12,000 square mile test center,
where UASs can operate at altitudes up to 18,000 feet. (See fig. 9.)
The university has several years of experience in demonstrating,
testing, and evaluating UAS technologies. The New Mexico environment
has the advantage of a very low population density and a low volume of
air traffic, and the test center is located over mostly undeveloped
government-owned land. FAA will provide oversight of the test center
operation by way of announced and unannounced visits, according to an
FAA official.
Figure 9: UAS Test Center at New Mexico State University:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of New Mexico with an area of detail shown
indicating the UAS test center at New Mexico State University.
Source: GAO and FAA.
[End of figure]
FAA Is Coordinating with Other Countries to Harmonize Regulations:
To address the challenge of coordinating U.S. efforts with those of
other countries, FAA is working with international aviation bodies and
maintaining contact with other countries as they also work to overcome
the challenges of integrating UASs into their respective airspaces. For
example, the manager of FAA's UAPO serves as a vice chairman of
EUROCAE's WG-73,[Footnote 35] and FAA has established a collaborative
effort with EUROCONTROL to leverage mutual expertise and resources. FAA
told us that the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO)[Footnote 36] has formed a study group to identify changes needed
in global standards and practices to address UAS issues. FAA has also
established a memorandum of cooperation with the Netherlands' Civil
Aviation Authority to work on UAS technology, hazards, and risks. FAA
plans to contribute, subject to appropriations, $1 million during
fiscal years 2007 through 2011, to provide the Netherlands with data
and expertise, while the Netherlands plans to contribute €160,000
($251,279).[Footnote 37] FAA has received briefings on Japan's use of
UASs for pesticide spraying and has collaborated with several countries
to address UAS issues with ICAO.
FAA's efforts to work with the international community could facilitate
mutual sharing of experiences and substantially increase the amount of
information available to all countries. One stakeholder suggested
Israel as a potential source of data, as that country has had extensive
experience with UAS operations. An Israel Space Agency official, noting
the growing importance of UASs in that country, stated that the numbers
of unmanned aircraft in the Israel Air Force will outnumber manned
aircraft within 20 years. The official also stated that in a recent
conflict, Israel's UASs compiled more flying hours than manned
aircraft.
FAA Is Mitigating Anticipated Workload Increase by Automating Some COA
Processing Steps, and GSA Is Working to Develop an Inventory of Federal
UASs:
FAA has taken some actions to mitigate the workload challenge stemming
from an anticipated increase in requests for COAs to operate UASs in
the national airspace system. During the spring of 2007, FAA began to
introduce more automation into its COA review process for UASs and has
plans for increasing automation. For example, FAA established a Web-
based COA application, which became mandatory for applicants' use on
July 1, 2007. FAA officials believe that the Web-based process allows
applicants to more easily determine the application's requirements,
thereby eliminating rework and repeated reviews before FAA accepts the
application. FAA also expects that the September 2007 memorandum of
agreement with DOD will reduce the number of COA applications because
it allows DOD to conduct certain operations with UASs weighing 20
pounds or less over military installations and in other specified
airspace without obtaining a COA.[Footnote 38] Additionally, FAA is
working to identify characteristics of routine COA applications, which
FAA estimates constitute up to 80 percent of total COA applications,
enabling agency staff to focus limited resources on non routine cases.
Focusing less attention on routine cases is consistent with comments
from three of our experts who noted the need for an expedited process
for obtaining COAs and special airworthiness certificates. FAA
officials also stated that because applicants are becoming more
familiar with COA requirements, a higher percentage of applications do
not need additional work and review.
Knowledge of the number of federally-owned or -leased UASs could help
FAA to plan for future workload. Forecasters indicate that UASs
operated by federal agencies could be a major component of UAS growth
in the immediate future. Although the current number of federally-owned
or federally-leased UASs is unknown, GSA is taking steps to obtain this
information. In response to our requests for data on the number of
federally-owned or federally-leased UASs, GSA sent letters to federal
agencies in February 2008, clarifying that FAA defines a UAS as an
aircraft and requesting agencies to report their UASs by March 31,
2008. GSA is also in the process of revising regulations to require
federal agencies to include owned or leased UASs in their aircraft
inventory reports. GSA expects to have its regulation updated by
February 2009. GSA anticipates that the first public reporting of UASs
will be in the fiscal year 2008 Federal Aviation Report, due by March
31, 2009. This report could add a degree of certainty to FAA's future
workload requirements.
Experts and Stakeholders Believe an Overarching Entity Could Facilitate
Efforts to Achieve Routine UAS Access to the National Airspace System:
In addition to FAA, DOD, TSA, and GSA, other federal agencies,
academia, and the private sector also have UAS expertise or a stake in
obtaining routine UAS access to the national airspace system. For
example, RTCA notes that developing standards will require
collaboration with DOD's joint integrated product team and technical
expertise from staff in MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development. DOD seeks expanded access to the national airspace and, as
previously discussed, has extensive experience with operating its own
UASs. Beyond DOD and FAA, other entities also have UAS expertise or a
stake in achieving routine UAS access to the national airspace system.
For example, DHS's CBP and Coast Guard need UAS access to the national
airspace system to perform their missions. Several academic
institutions have been involved in developing UAS technology in areas
such as vehicle design and detect, sense, and avoid capability.
Additionally, the private sector has a stake in being ready to respond
to the anticipated market that could emerge when FAA makes routine
access available to most UASs. Although FAA's UAPO serves as a focal
point within FAA, the office has no authority over other agencies'
efforts.
Experts and stakeholders suggested that an overarching body might
facilitate progress toward integrating UASs into the national airspace
system. DOD, as the major user of UASs, is taking such an approach. DOD
has recognized the need for coordination of UAS activities within its
own sphere of influence, as each service has recognized the value of
UASs for its respective missions. Consequently, DOD established an
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force to coordinate critical issues
related to UAS acquisition and management within DOD. According to DOD,
the task force will establish new teams or lead or coordinate existing
Army, Navy, and Air Force teams to enhance operations, enable
interdependencies, and streamline acquisitions. FAA is participating in
a joint integrated product team that is part of this task force, and
DOD has invited DHS to join the task force.
The European Defense Agency has also recognized the challenge of
channeling diverse entities, as well as multiple nation-states, toward
the common goal of UAS access to non-segregated airspace. In January
2008, the agency announced that it had awarded a contract to a
consortium of defense and aerospace companies to develop a detailed
roadmap for integrating, by 2015, UASs into European airspace. The
project is intended to help European stakeholders such as airworthiness
authorities, air traffic management bodies, procurement agencies,
industry, and research institutes to develop a joint agenda for common
European UAS activities. The consortium held its first workshop in
February 2008 and has since prepared a roadmap outline based on the
needs and requirements expressed by the stakeholders. The consortium
has also identified as a baseline, key actions to be undertaken and key
topics for further investigation. The consortium has invited
stakeholders to discuss this common baseline at a second workshop,
scheduled for May 2008.
Congress addressed a similar coordination challenge in 2003 when it
passed legislation to create JPDO to plan for and coordinate a
transformation of the nation's current air traffic control system to
the next generation air transportation system (NextGen) by 2025.
NextGen involves a complex mix of precision satellite navigation;
digital, networked communications; an integrated weather system;
layered, adaptive security; and more.
NextGen's coordination and planning challenges are similar to those
posed by UASs. For example, as required for UAS integration, the
expertise and technology required for NextGen resides in several
federal agencies, academia, and the private sector. DOD has expertise
in "network centric" systems, originally developed for the battlefield,
which are being considered as a framework to provide all users of the
national airspace system with a common view of that system. JPDO's
responsibilities include coordinating goals, priorities, and research
activities of several partner agencies, including DOD, FAA, the
Department of Commerce, DHS, and NASA with aviation and aeronautical
firms. Congress directed JPDO to prepare an integrated plan that would
include, among other things, a national vision statement and a
multiagency research and development roadmap for creating NextGen. The
legislation called for the roadmap to identify obstacles, the research
and development necessary to overcome them, and the roles of each
agency, corporations, and universities.
Impact of Routine UAS Operations Is Unknown:
The impact of routine UAS operations on the national airspace system
and the environment depends on a number of factors and remains
generally speculative. UAS impact will depend on factors such as the
number of UASs purchased for civil uses and the altitudes and
geographic locations where they are used. Stakeholders whom we
interviewed provided a variety of perspectives on UASs' potential
impact. One official told us that UASs that use airports will impact
air traffic control, while the impact of small UASs that do not need to
use airports is less clear. Officials also noted that the level of risk
depends on factors such as the UAS's weight and horsepower. For
example, a small, 2-or 3-pound UAS would pose little risk to aircraft
or people on the ground, but UASs weighing more than 20 pounds could do
significant damage to an aircraft. Officials also noted that a UAS used
over a sparsely populated area would have less impact than UAS
operations over densely populated areas.
Predictions of the impact of UASs on the national airspace system are
speculative because there are few data upon which to base predictions.
Predictions become even more speculative in view of RTCA's recent
estimate that minimum standards for UASs--a prerequisite for routine
UAS access to the national airspace system--will require about another
10 years to complete. One study notes that more needs to be known about
the needs and capabilities of future UASs as well as the potential
market, but concluded that their operations could have a significant
and potentially disruptive impact on aviation by affecting capacity and
introducing more complexity. In 2007, RTCA's Special Committee 203
reported similar concerns, indicating that UASs will create some unique
challenges because they operate differently from typical manned
aircraft. While manned aircraft generally go from one location to
another, UASs may hover or circle in one location for a significant
time. Additionally, UAS speed, maneuverability, climb rate and other
performance characteristics may differ substantially from those of
conventional aircraft. The committee believes that these
characteristics could affect air traffic flow, air traffic controller
workload, and departure and arrival procedures, among other things.
Similarly, FAA officials noted that UASs pose airport safety and
capacity questions that require further analysis.
Most of the experts stated that the impact of UAS's would be at least
as significant as that of additional manned aircraft on airspace,
airports, and air traffic control. For example, they predicted that, as
with manned aircraft, UASs would add to the number of aircraft and,
therefore, affect airspace and airport capacity and add to the workload
of air traffic controllers. However, the experts also predicted that
UASs could have a beneficial impact on the environment. The experts
predicted that UASs could assume some missions currently performed by
manned aircraft, but could perform these missions using engines that
burn less fuel or produce less air pollution.
Conclusion:
Although ensuring that UASs operate safely in the national airspace
system is a new and complex challenge for FAA, the national airspace
system should be prepared to accommodate them. Understanding the
issues, trends, and influences of UASs will be critical in
strategically planning for the future airspace system. FAA is making
progress in addressing the challenges. Establishing a UAS test center
to provide UAS developers with airspace in which to test, evaluate, and
refine their aircraft designs, and initiating efforts to increase
airspace access for small UASs are significant steps. Moving forward,
issuing FAA's long-awaited program plan should benefit the aviation
community by communicating FAA's strategy of how it plans to address
the interactive complexities and unique properties of UASs and how it
plans to leverage the resources of multiple entities that have
expertise and experience in this area. FAA's efforts to accumulate and
analyze data will be important to facilitate the regulatory development
process. However, analyzing the data that it already has collected from
recent UAS operations would further support decisions on the new
regulations. FAA's new estimate that the regulatory framework is not
likely to be completed until sometime near 2020--about 8 years later
than the date assumed by the industry forecast cited in this report--
could further delay the time frame when civil-use UAS production begins
to increase. While TSA's risk assessment of UASs may be appropriate for
today's UAS environment, a national airspace system that allows routine
UAS access for all government and private UASs will require increased
safeguards to protect against security vulnerabilities like those
exposed in the events of September 11, 2001. Proactively assessing and
addressing these issues will help ensure that the benefits of UASs are
not further delayed pending resolution of security challenges.
Additionally, it will be important for GSA to follow through and ensure
that federal agencies report all of their owned or leased UASs, so that
FAA has a more accurate basis for workload planning. It remains to be
seen whether Europe will be successful in integrating UASs into its
airspace by 2015, which is considerably sooner than the 2020 time frame
expected in the United States. An overarching entity, modeled after
JPDO and set up to coordinate federal, academic, and private-sector
entities, could facilitate progress in moving toward UASs having
routine access to our national airspace system.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
To coordinate and focus the efforts of federal agencies and harness the
capabilities of the private sector so that the nation may obtain
further benefits from UASs as soon as possible, Congress should
consider creating an overarching body within FAA, as it did when it
established JPDO, to coordinate federal, academic, and private-sector
efforts in meeting the safety challenges of allowing routine UAS access
to the national airspace system.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To obtain further benefits from UASs, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to expedite
efforts to ensure that UASs have routine access to the national
airspace system by taking the following two actions:
1. Finalize and issue a UAS program plan to address the future of UASs.
2. Analyze the data FAA collects on UAS operations under its COAs and
establish a process to analyze DOD data on its UAS research,
development, and operations.
To ensure that appropriate UAS security controls are in place when
civil-use UASs have routine access to the national airspace system, we
are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the TSA
Administrator to examine the security implications of future, non-
military UAS operations in the national airspace system and take any
actions deemed appropriate.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DOT, DHS, DOD, GSA, NASA, and the
Department of Commerce. DOT agreed to consider our recommendations as
it moves forward in addressing UASs and DHS agreed with our
recommendation to it. GSA commented that, although our report contained
no recommendations to the agency, it will continue to work with federal
agencies to ensure that FAA has accurate information on the number of
federally-owned or -leased UASs. DOT commented that the report would
benefit from additional information on the impact of UASs on airports.
We revised the report to include DOT's concern that the impact of UASs
on safety and capacity at airports requires further study. DOT, DOD,
and DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate. NASA and the Department of Commerce had no comments.
We are sending electronic copies of this report to FAA, DHS, DOD, GSA,
NASA, the Department of Commerce, and interested congressional
committees. We also will make electronic copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methods:
Our objective was to assess the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
efforts to ensure that unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are safely
integrated into the national airspace system and the potential impact
of UASs on the national airspace system and the environment after
integration occurs. To meet this objective, we developed the following
research questions: (1) What are the current and potential uses and
benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs safely
and routinely in the national airspace system? (3) What is the federal
government's response to these challenges? and (4) Assuming that UASs
have routine access to the national airspace system, how might they
impact the system and the environment?
To address these questions, we surveyed the literature and also
obtained and reviewed documents and interviewed officials of
government, academic, and private-sector entities involved with UAS
issues. We discussed current and future use of UASs with officials at
FAA, Department of Defense (DOD), National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We
interviewed leaders of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics'
(RTCA) Special Committee 203, which is developing UAS standards, and
met with officials from a federally-funded research and development
center. We discussed potential use of UASs for cargo transport with the
United Parcel Service and Federal Express. We also discussed our
questions with officials of associations of UAS manufacturers and users
of the national airspace system, specifically, the Air Transport
Association; Aerospace Industries Association; Association for Unmanned
Vehicle Systems International; Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association;
Air Line Pilots Association, International; American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics; ASTM International, originally known as
the American Society for Testing and Materials; Palm Bay Police
Department; and Los Angeles Sheriff Department. We discussed UAS
operations with officials and observed UAS operations at Fort Huachuca,
Arizona, and met with DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
officials in Arizona to discuss UAS use in border protection.
Additionally, we obtained industry forecasts of UAS growth and
interviewed a senior analyst involved in preparing Teal Group
Corporation's UAS market profile and forecast. We also observed a
demonstration of unmanned systems at Webster Field, St. Inigoes,
Maryland.
To obtain additional information on the challenges that must be
overcome before UASs can safely and routinely operate in the national
airspace system, we leveraged information that was originally obtained
and analyzed for a related GAO engagement.[Footnote 39] For that
engagement, we contacted the Army Combat Readiness Center, Naval Safety
Center, and Air Force Safety Center to obtain data on each service's
UAS accidents from October 2001 to April or May 2006, depending on when
the services queried their databases. The services provided data on
class A, B, C, and D accidents.[Footnote 40] Using the descriptive
information that the services provided for each accident, we determined
whether human, materiel, environmental, or undetermined factors caused
the accident and categorized each accordingly. We used the definitions
of human, materiel, and environmental factors provided in Army
Regulation 385-40, Accident Reporting and Records. We classified
accidents as "undetermined" when descriptive information did not fall
within one of the first three categories of factors. We discussed the
results of our analysis with DOD officials and incorporated their
comments as appropriate.
To obtain additional information on the federal response to the
challenge of integrating UASs into the national airspace system and the
impact that UASs might have on the system after they have routine
access, we reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials of the
General Services Administration and the Department of Commerce's
National Telecommunications and Information Administration. We also
obtained information from DHS's Transportation Security Administration.
Additionally, we surveyed 23 UAS experts, whose names were identified
with the assistance of the National Academies. We asked the experts to
provide, in narrative format, their views on the interim regulatory,
technological, research, or other efforts that could be undertaken for
UASs to operate, if not routinely, then to the maximum extent possible
in the national airspace system while FAA develops the regulatory
structure to enable all UASs to have routine access to the system. We
also asked the experts to provide their predictions on how small and
large UASs might impact the national airspace, airports, air traffic
control, noise, and air quality, using a 7-point scale from large
adverse impact to large beneficial impact, and asked that they explain
their answers. Appendix II discusses how we developed and conducted the
survey. The complete survey instrument appears as appendix III.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2006 to May 2008, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Survey Methods:
We administered a Web-based survey to gather the professional views of
experts on the impact of UASs on the national airspace system and the
actions needed to move toward safe and routine UAS operations. The
structured survey questions ensured that all individuals had the
opportunity to provide information in response to the same questions
and enabled us to quantify the results.
We contracted with the National Academies to identify experts to
participate in our survey. Using criteria to ensure adequate
representation across the criteria that we had specified, the National
Academies identified 26 experts. The criteria ensured that we achieved:
* balance in terms of the type of expertise (i.e., aircraft and
avionics manufacturing officials, association representatives,
engineers, academics, foreign civil aviation authorities, and
researchers involved in aviation safety);
* balance of knowledge across relevant content areas (i.e., aviation
regulations and safety, UAS technology, next generation air
transportation system planning, airport operations, human factors, and
international issues); and:
* balance in representation of relevant organizations (i.e., academia,
business, government, and professional organizations).
The survey responses represent the professional views of the experts.
Their expertise can be derived from formal education, professional
experience, or both. The experts were identified by the National
Academies as individuals who are recognized by others who work in the
same subject matter area as having knowledge that is greater in scope
or depth than that of most people working in the area. The experts
included researchers, consultants, vice presidents, directors, and
professors who were associated with private sector firms, associations,
or academic institutions involved with UASs. Some of the experts were
retired federal officials.
We recognize that it is likely that no one individual possessed
complete knowledge in each of the content areas addressed in the
survey. However, through our selection criteria, we attempted to
identify a set of individuals who, when their responses were considered
in the aggregate, could be viewed as representing the breadth of
knowledge in each of the areas addressed in the survey.
We identified the information to collect in our surveys based on our
congressional request, Internet and literature searches, professional
conferences we attended, background interviews, and through discussions
with external expert advisors. A social science survey specialist
collaborated with staff with subject matter expertise on the
development of the surveys.
We pretested the survey to ensure that the questions appropriately
addressed the topics, were clearly stated, easy to comprehend,
unbiased, and did not place undue burden on respondents. We also
evaluated the usability of the Web-based survey. Based on the pretest
results, we made necessary changes to the survey prior to
implementation.
We administered the Web-based survey during August and September 2007.
We used email to inform the respondents of the survey administration,
and provided them with the Web link for the survey and their log-in
name and password. In the email message, we informed respondents that
our report will not contain individual survey responses; instead, it
may present the aggregated results of all participants. To maximize the
response rate, we sent follow up email reminders and followed up by
telephone as necessary to encourage survey participation.
The survey was sent to 26 experts; three did not respond, giving the
survey a response rate of 89 percent.
The narrative responses in question 1 and the explanations for the
closed-ended items in questions 2 and 3 were analyzed and coded into
categories. A reviewer checked the resulting categories and coded
responses and, where interpretations differed, agreement was reached
between the initial coder and the reviewer. The coded results were
tallied and provide the basis for our survey findings for these items.
Because we did not report on aggregate responses to question 4, we did
not perform content analysis on this question.
The number of responses reported for the closed-ended questions may
vary by question because a number of experts responded "Don't know" or
"No basis to judge," or did not answer specific questions.
The survey was administered via the Web and is reproduced as a graphic
image in appendix III.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Welcome to the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Survey of
Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). GAO is conducting this
survey as a part of our study on the future of UASs in the national
airspace system which was requested by the Aviation Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. The purpose of
the survey is to collect information on the impact of UASs on the
national airspace system and the actions needed to move toward safe and
routine UAS operations.
To begin, you will need the user name and password from the e-mail
message we sent you. In addition, please click here to download
important information that will help you complete the questionnaire.
The questionnaire will be available on the web for one week. During
this time, you may log into the questionnaire to enter and edit
information as often as you like. It will take between 30 and 45
minutes to complete the questionnaire.
You may bookmark this page to make it easier to start the questionnaire
again.
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the Adobe Acrobat Reader software to do this. If you do not already
have this software, click on the Adobe icon to download the software.
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download a copy. You will not be able to enter responses into this PDF
file.
If you have questions, please contact: Ed Menoche (menochee@gao.gov) at
202-512-3420 or Teresa Spisak (spisakt@gao.gov) at 202-512-3952.
Click on the button below [Start log in] to start this questionnaire.
Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Page 1 of 12
Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Click here to learn more about navigating, saving, and exiting the
survey, copying and pasting text responses, and printing all your
survey responses at one time.
Please be aware that you can print your responses to all the questions
at one time using the link at the end of the survey.
Interim Efforts Until UAS Operations are Safe and Routine:
1. Our review of the literature and discussions with knowledgeable
individuals indicates that it could be at least four years before a
technological and regulatory framework exists to permit UASs to operate
safely and routinely in the national airspace system. By safe, we mean
that UASs operate at a level of safety equivalent to manned aircraft.
By routine, we mean that they operate within existing regulations
without the case-by-case review that exists today.
In your opinion, between now and when UASs can operate safely and
routinely in the national airspace system, what regulatory,
technological, research, or other efforts could be undertaken for UASs
to operate, if not routinely, then to the maximum extent possible in
the national airspace system?
Impact of Smaller UASs Once They Are Safely and Routinely Operating in
the National Airspace System:
2. In the future, when smaller UASs are safely and routinely operating,
how do you think they will impact the following areas? (Choose one
answer for each row.)
2a. Airspace:
Large adverse impact:
Moderate adverse impact:
Limited adverse impact:
Neither adverse nor beneficial impact:
Limited beneficial impact:
Moderate beneficial impact:
Large beneficial impact:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
Please explain your answer:
2b. Airports:
Large adverse impact:
Moderate adverse impact:
Limited adverse impact:
Neither adverse nor beneficial impact:
Limited beneficial impact:
Moderate beneficial impact:
Large beneficial impact:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
Please explain your answer:
2c. Air traffic control:
Large adverse impact:
Moderate adverse impact:
Limited adverse impact:
Neither adverse nor beneficial impact:
Limited beneficial impact:
Moderate beneficial impact:
Large beneficial impact:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
Please explain your answer:
2d. Environmental noise:
Large adverse impact:
Moderate adverse impact:
Limited adverse impact:
Neither adverse nor beneficial impact:
Limited beneficial impact:
Moderate beneficial impact:
Large beneficial impact:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
Please explain your answer:
2e. Air quality:
Large adverse impact:
Moderate adverse impact:
Limited adverse impact:
Neither adverse nor beneficial impact:
Limited beneficial impact:
Moderate beneficial impact:
Large beneficial impact:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
Please explain your answer:
If there are other areas that would be impacted by smaller UASs, list
them in the space below and explain their expected impact:
Impact of Larger UASs Once They Are Safely and Routinely Operating in
the National Airspace System:
3. In the future, when larger UASs are safely and routinely operating,
how do you think they will impact the following areas? (Choose one
answer for each row.)
3a. Airspace:
Large adverse impact:
Moderate adverse impact:
Limited adverse impact:
Neither adverse nor beneficial impact:
Limited beneficial impact:
Moderate beneficial impact:
Large beneficial impact:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
Please explain your answer:
3b. Airports:
Large adverse impact:
Moderate adverse impact:
Limited adverse impact:
Neither adverse nor beneficial impact:
Limited beneficial impact:
Moderate beneficial impact:
Large beneficial impact:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
Please explain your answer:
3c. Air traffic control:
Large adverse impact:
Moderate adverse impact:
Limited adverse impact:
Neither adverse nor beneficial impact:
Limited beneficial impact:
Moderate beneficial impact:
Large beneficial impact:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
Please explain your answer:
3d. Environmental noise:
Large adverse impact:
Moderate adverse impact:
Limited adverse impact:
Neither adverse nor beneficial impact:
Limited beneficial impact:
Moderate beneficial impact:
Large beneficial impact:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
Please explain your answer:
3e. Air quality:
Large adverse impact:
Moderate adverse impact:
Limited adverse impact:
Neither adverse nor beneficial impact:
Limited beneficial impact:
Moderate beneficial impact:
Large beneficial impact:
Don't know/No basis to judge:
Please explain your answer:
If there are other areas that would be impacted by larger UASs, list
them in the space below and explain their expected impact:
Other Countries' UAS Efforts:
4. To your knowledge, what regulatory, technological, research, or
other approaches to integrating UASs that are used by other countries
are potentially transferable to the United States?
Additional Observations or Comments:
5. Please provide any additional observations or comments you may have
on the safe and routine operation of UASs in the national airspace
system:
Submit Your Completed Questionnaire:
6. Are you ready to submit your completed questionnaire for the first
phase of the survey to GAO now? (Check one.)
1. Yes, I have completed the questionnaire.
2. No, the questionnaire is not yet complete.
7. Would you like to print all of your answers? (Check one.)
1. Yes. Click here to get a copy of your responses.
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[End of survey]
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Definition of smaller unmanned aircraft systems:
For purposes of this survey, we are defining smaller UASs as those
similar to model aircraft, which have traditionally been covered under
FAA's Advisory Circular for Model Aircraft Operation (AC 91-57). We are
focusing on the size dimension because, to a great extent, size is
associated with the UAS capabilities, such as range and type of
operations, that may have varied impacts on the national airspace
system.
Click here to close this page:
Definition of safe and routine:
By safe, we mean that UASs operate at a level of safety equivalent to
manned aircraft. By routine, we mean that they operate within existing
regulations without the case-by-case review that exists today.
Click here to close this page:
Definition of larger unmanned aircraft systems:
For purposes of this survey, larger UASs include all UASs not covered
by our small UAS definition. We define smaller UASs as those similar to
model aircraft, which have traditionally been covered under FAA's
Advisory Circular for Model Aircraft Operation (AC 91-57) We are
focusing on the size dimension because, to a great extent, size is
associated with the UAS capabilities, such as range and type of
operations, that may have varied impacts on the national airspace
system.
Click here to close this page:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgements:
In addition to the contact named above, Teresa Spisak, Assistant
Director; Edmond Menoche, Senior Analyst; Colin Fallon; Jim Geibel;
Evan Gilman; David Hooper; Jamie Khanna; Patty Lentini; Josh Ormond;
Manhav Panwar; and Larry Thomas made significant contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] At our request, the National Academies provided names of 26 experts
in aviation regulations and safety, UAS technology, next generation air
transportation system planning, airport operations, human factors, and
international issues. Three experts did not respond to the survey.
[2] Although DOD often uses the term "mishap" to refer to UAS
accidents, we use accidents throughout this report.
[3] DOD has more than 5,000 UASs, ranging in size from the Raven, a
hand-launched UAS, to large UASs such as the Global Hawk and Predator.
Most of DOD's UASs are currently deployed overseas.
[4] Part 61 addresses certification requirements for pilots, flight
instructors, and ground instructors. Part 91 addresses general
operating and flight rules.
[5] Teal Group Corporation, World Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems
(Fairfax, Va: 2008).
[6] Matthew T. DeGarmo, Issues Concerning Integration of Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles in Civil Airspace (McLean, Va: The MITRE Corporation,
Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, November 2004).
[7] Three of these experts indicated that technology improvements could
be applied to both airspace and airports.
[8] In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office
to plan for and coordinate, with federal and nonfederal stakeholders, a
transformation from the current air traffic control system to the next
generation air transportation system by 2025.
[9] Testimony of Steven M. Silwa, Chief Executive Officer and President
of Insitu Inc., before the House Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure (Mar. 22, 2007).
[10] Teal Group Corporation, 2008.
[11] Unmanned Aerial Vehicle National Task Force, The Impact of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on the Next Generation Air Transportation
System: Preliminary Assessment (Oct. 22, 2004).
[12] The Airline Owners and Pilots Association is a not-for-profit
organization representing the interests of general aviation.
[13] Transportation Security Administration, Advisory - Security
Information Regarding Remote Controlled Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (Arlington, Va: Nov. 22, 2004).
[14] Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007 - 2032,
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007). We did not evaluate the validity of
information contained in the roadmap.
[15] DOD defines reliability as (1) the probability that an item will
perform its intended function for a specified time under stated
conditions or (2) the ability of a system and its parts to perform its
mission without failure, degradation, or demand on the support system.
[16] DOD classifies accidents according to severity. The accident data
that DOD provided included accidents in class A, B, C, and D. See
appendix I for accident class definitions and further details on our
methodology. We also determined that 17 percent of the accidents were
due to human factors (i.e., issues associated with how humans interact
with machines); 6 percent of the accidents were caused by environmental
issues; and 12 percent of the accidents' causes were undetermined. We
did not evaluate the validity of the accident information that DOD
provided.
[17] The MITRE Corporation, 2004.
[18] Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security: Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles and Border Surveillance (Washington, D.C.: 2006).
[19] A DOD official commented that wooden propeller damage is managed
by adding treatments to the wood and by regular maintenance and
inspection.
[20] Human factors, such as pilot error, have also been significant
contributors to manned aircraft accidents.
[21] FAA currently requires that UAS pilots and observers have in their
possession a current second class or higher airman medical certificate
issued under chapter 14, Code of Federal Regulations part 67.
[22] Jason S. McCarley and Christopher D. Wickens, Human Factors
Implications of UAVs in the National Airspace (Institute of Aviation,
Aviation Human Factors Division, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, 2005).
[23] McCarley and Wickens, 2005.
[24] The second console can be used to operate the Predator's camera or
to control the aircraft.
[25] Part 91 of title 14.
[26] Unmanned Aerial Vehicle National Task Force, 2004.
[27] Non-segregated airspace is airspace that is available for all
aircraft.
[28] FAA does not start calculating the processing time until officials
have determined that the application is administratively correct and
that the proposed UAS operation is feasible.
[29] The National Telecommunications and Information Administration of
the Department of Commerce manages federal use of spectrum.
[30] RTCA is a private, not-for-profit corporation that develops
consensus-based performance standards regarding communications,
navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management system issues.
RTCA serves as a federal advisory committee, and its recommendations
are the basis for a number of FAA's policy, program, and regulatory
decisions.
[31] RTCA Special Committee 203, Guidance Material and Considerations
for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Washington, D.C.: 2007).
[32] MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System Development is a
federally-funded research and development center that performs systems
research and development work for FAA and other civil aviation
authorities.
[33] DOD defines a small UAS as one that weighs less than 55 pounds,
flies slower than 100 knots, and operates at altitudes below 1,000
feet.
[34] H.R. 2881, § 322.
[35] EUROCAE formed WG-73 in 2006 to focus on UAS issues.
[36] ICAO is the global forum for civil aviation. ICAO works to achieve
its vision of safe, secure, and sustainable development of civil
aviation through the cooperation of its member States.
[37] Based on conversion rate as of April 9, 2008.
[38] Previously, UAS operations could occur without a COA only within
DOD's restricted airspace or warning areas.
[39] See GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and
Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-836] (Washington, D.C.: July
11, 2007). The data, although not used in this report, was obtained and
analyzed using generally accepted government auditing standards.
[40] DOD classifies accidents in categories A, B, and C, based on the
severity of resulting injury, occupational illness, or property damage.
Property damage severity is generally expressed in terms of cost and is
calculated as the sum of the costs associated with DOD property and non-
DOD property that is damaged in a DOD accident. Class A accidents
result in damages of $1 million or more, total loss of a DOD aircraft,
or a fatality or permanent total disability. Class B accidents result
in damages of $200,000 or more, but less than $1 million, a permanent
partial disability, or hospitalization of three or more personnel.
Class C accidents result in damages of $20,000 or more, but less than
$200,000, a nonfatal injury that causes any loss of time from work
beyond the day or shift on which it occurred, or a nonfatal
occupational illness or disability that causes loss of time from work
or disability at any time. Additionally, the services have varying
classifications of less severe accidents. Only the Army provided
accident data for Class D accidents, which the Army defines as those
which result in property damage of $2,000 or more but less than
$20,000, or a nonfatal injury that does not meet the criteria of a
Class C accident.
[End of section]
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