Afghanistan Security
U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability Gao ID: GAO-08-883T June 18, 2008Since 2005, the Department of Defense (Defense), with support from the Department of State (State), has directed U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Police (ANP) into a force capable of enforcing the rule of law and supporting actions to defeat insurgency, among other activities. This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop a capable ANP; (2) challenges that affect the development of a capable ANP; and (3) GAO analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which comprise the ANP and the Afghan National Army (ANA). This statement is based on a concurrently issued GAO report titled Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008).
Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of more than $6 billion, no Afghan police unit (0 of 433) is assessed by Defense as fully capable of performing its mission and over three-fourths of units (334 of 433) are assessed at the lowest capability rating. In addition, while the ANP has reportedly grown in number to nearly 80,000 personnel, concerns exist about the reliability of this number. Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP forces. First, the shortage of police mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and evaluation and verify that police are on duty. Second, the ANP continues to encounter difficulties with equipment shortages and quality. Third, the ANP faces a difficult working environment, including a weak Afghan judicial sector and consistent problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks by insurgents. Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and, in November 2007, began a new initiative called Focused District Development--an effort to train the police as units--to address them. This effort is too new to fully assess, but the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put the effort at risk. Despite a 2005 GAO recommendation calling for a detailed plan and a 2008 congressional mandate requiring similar information, Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, milestones for completing and sustaining the ANSF, and a sustainment strategy. In 2007, Defense produced a 5-page document intended to address GAO's 2005 recommendation. However, the document does not identify the role or involve the participation of State--Defense's partner in training the ANP. Further, State has not completed a plan of its own. In the absence of a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly defines agency roles and responsibilities, a dual chain of command exists between Defense and State that has complicated the efforts of mentors training the police. Defense's 5-page document also contains few milestones, including no interim milestones that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP. Without interim milestones, it is difficult to know if current ANP status represents what the United States intended to achieve by 2008. In addition, Defense's 5-page document lacks a sustainment strategy. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission.
GAO-08-883T, Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 18, 2008:
Afghanistan Security:
U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges
and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability:
Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-08-883T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-883T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2005, the Department of Defense (Defense), with support from the
Department of State (State), has directed U.S. efforts to develop the
Afghan National Police (ANP) into a force capable of enforcing the rule
of law and supporting actions to defeat insurgency, among other
activities. This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop a
capable ANP; (2) challenges that affect the development of a capable
ANP; and (3) GAO analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated,
detailed plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), which comprise the ANP and the Afghan National
Army (ANA). This statement is based on a concurrently issued GAO report
titled Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed
to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable
Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2008).
What GAO Found:
Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an
investment of more than $6 billion, no Afghan police unit (0 of 433) is
assessed by Defense as fully capable of performing its mission and over
three-fourths of units (334 of 433) are assessed at the lowest
capability rating. In addition, while the ANP has reportedly grown in
number to nearly 80,000 personnel, concerns exist about the reliability
of this number.
Table: Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008:
Number of ANP units: 433;
Fully Capable: 0;
Capable with Coalition Support: 12 (3%);
Partially Capable: 18 (4%);
Not Capable: 334 (77%);
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting: 69 (16%).
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
[End of table]
Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP forces.
First, the shortage of police mentors has been a key impediment to U.S.
efforts to conduct training and evaluation and verify that police are
on duty. Second, the ANP continues to encounter difficulties with
equipment shortages and quality. Third, the ANP faces a difficult
working environment, including a weak Afghan judicial sector and
consistent problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks by
insurgents. Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and,
in November 2007, began a new initiative called Focused District
Development”an effort to train the police as units”to address them.
This effort is too new to fully assess, but the continuing shortfall in
police mentors may put the effort at risk.
Despite a 2005 GAO recommendation calling for a detailed plan and a
2008 congressional mandate requiring similar information, Defense and
State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan with clearly
defined roles and responsibilities, milestones for completing and
sustaining the ANSF, and a sustainment strategy. In 2007, Defense
produced a 5-page document intended to address GAO‘s 2005
recommendation. However, the document does not identify the role or
involve the participation of State”Defense‘s partner in training the
ANP. Further, State has not completed a plan of its own. In the absence
of a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly defines agency roles and
responsibilities, a dual chain of command exists between Defense and
State that has complicated the efforts of mentors training the police.
Defense‘s 5-page document also contains few milestones, including no
interim milestones that would help assess progress made in developing
the ANP. Without interim milestones, it is difficult to know if current
ANP status represents what the United States intended to achieve by
2008. In addition, Defense‘s 5-page document lacks a sustainment
strategy. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is
difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue
providing funding and other resources for this important mission.
What GAO Recommends:
To help ensure coordination and accountability of U.S. efforts to build
a capable ANSF and facilitate assessment of progress, GAO has
encouraged Congress to consider conditioning a portion of future
appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan. Defense
disagreed with conditioning future funding and State expressed similar
concerns. GAO maintains that further action is needed to ensure
completion of a coordinated, detailed plan.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-883T]. For more
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or
johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. efforts to assist in the
development of Afghan National Police (ANP) forces and the
establishment of rule of law in Afghanistan. My testimony is based on
our concurrently issued report[Footnote 1] regarding U.S. efforts to
develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which consist of
the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the ANP. According to Defense, an
improved police force is vital to stabilizing and maintaining security
throughout Afghanistan. U.S. support for the ANP began in 2002 and
increased significantly in 2005 in response to deteriorating security
in Afghanistan and concerns that ANP development was proceeding too
slowly. U.S. activities currently include manning, training, and
equipping of police forces as well as efforts to reform the Afghan
Ministry of Interior, which oversees the ANP.[Footnote 2]
My testimony today focuses on (1) U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP
forces; (2) challenges that affect the development of capable ANP
forces; and (3) our analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated,
detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF, including the
ANP. Over the course of our work, we reviewed and analyzed Defense
reporting and planning documents. In addition, we interviewed cognizant
Defense, State, and contractor officials in Washington, D.C., as well
as in Kabul, Afghanistan, where we also met with Afghan government
officials. We also visited an equipment warehouse and police training
facilities.
We conducted our work for the concurrently issued report from March
2007 through June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
Since 2002, the United States has provided about $6.2 billion[Footnote
3] to train and equip the ANP. However, as of April 2008, no police
unit was assessed as fully capable of performing its mission. Over
three-fourths of the police units were assessed as not capable--the
lowest capability rating Defense assigns to units that have been
formed. As of the same date, the ANP had reportedly grown in number to
nearly 80,000--about 97 percent of the force's end-strength of 82,000.
However, the extent to which the ANP has truly grown is questionable
given concerns that have been raised by Defense about the reliability
of police manning figures.
Building a capable ANP requires manning, training, and equipping
forces; however, several challenges have impeded U.S. efforts to build
a capable ANP.
* The shortage of police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to conduct
training, evaluation, and verification that police are on duty.
[Footnote 4] As of April 2008, only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of
required military mentors were present in Afghanistan.[Footnote 5]
According to Defense, the shortfall in military mentors is due to the
higher priority assigned to deployments of U.S. military personnel
elsewhere, particularly Iraq.
* The ANP continues to encounter difficulties with equipment shortages
and quality. As of February 2008, shortages remained in several types
of police equipment that Defense considers critical, such as trucks,
radios, and body armor. In addition, Defense officials expressed
concerns about the quality and usability of thousands of weapons
donated to the police. For example, officials estimated that only about
1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000 AK-47 automatic rifles received through
donation was of good quality. In addition, distribution of hundreds of
equipment items on hand has been delayed due to limited police ability
to account for equipment provided to them.
* The ANP faces a difficult working environment. For example, although
a working judiciary is a prerequisite for effective policing, State
noted that much of Afghanistan continues to lack a functioning justice
sector. In addition, police in the field face consistent problems with
pay, corruption, and attacks.
In November 2007, Defense began a new initiative called Focused
District Development to address some of these concerns. Under this
initiative, the entire police force of a district is withdrawn to train
as a unit--similar to the way Defense trains the Afghan army--and
receive all authorized equipment. We have not fully assessed this new
initiative; however, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put
this effort at risk.
Despite our 2005 recommendation and a 2008 congressional mandate,
Defense and State have yet to develop a coordinated, detailed plan with
milestones for completing and sustaining the Afghan police and army
forces. In 2007, Defense produced a 5-page document intended to meet
our 2005 recommendation. However, the document does not identify the
role or involve the participation of State--Defense's partner in
training the ANP. Further, State has not developed a plan of its own.
In the absence of a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly states the
various agencies' roles and responsibilities, a dual chain of command
exists between Defense and State that has complicated the efforts of
civilian mentors training the police.
Defense's 5-page document also contains few milestones, including no
interim milestones that would enable assessment of progress made in
developing the ANP. While Defense maintains that its monthly status
reports allow progress to be monitored, these status reports also lack
the interim milestones and end dates needed to determine if U.S.
efforts are on track. Similarly, although Defense's newly adopted
Focused District Development initiative involves considerable resources
and is projected to last until 2012 at a minimum, Defense has not
identified interim milestones or a consistent end date by which to
gauge the progress of this new effort. Without interim milestones
against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to know if current ANP
status represents what the United States intended to achieve by 2008.
In addition, Defense's 5-page document lacks a sustainment strategy.
U.S. officials have stated that until Afghan revenues increase
substantially, the international community will likely need to assist
in paying sustainability costs. Defense officials in Washington have
not indicated how long and in what ways the U.S. government expects to
continue assisting the ANSF. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining
the ANSF, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may
need to continue providing funding and other resources for this
important mission.
To help ensure accountability of U.S. efforts to build a capable ANSF
and facilitate assessment of progress, we included a matter for
congressional consideration in our report issued concurrently with this
testimony encouraging Congress to consider conditioning a portion of
future appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan to
develop the ANSF. Defense disagreed with our matter for congressional
consideration, stating that current guidance provided to the field is
sufficient to implement a successful program to train and equip the
ANSF. State also expressed concerns about conditioning future
appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan. We continue to
believe that a coordinated, detailed plan is essential to helping
ensure accountability for U.S. investments and facilitating assessment
of progress.
Background:
Afghanistan's security institutions, including its police and
judiciary, were severely damaged prior to the U.S. and coalition
overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. Reconstitution of the ANP
formally began in February 2002 when donor nations agreed to establish
a multiethnic, sustainable, 62,000-member professional police service
committed to the rule of law. Germany volunteered to lead the police
reform effort; however, due, in part, to Afghanistan's pressing
security needs and concerns that the German training program was moving
too slowly, the United States expanded its role in the police training
effort in 2005--including involvement, for the first time, of the U.S.
Department of Defense, as well as increased funding.[Footnote 6] In May
2007, the Afghan government and its international partners approved an
interim increase in the number of police forces from 62,000 to 82,000,
to be reviewed every 6 months. The force structure for the police
includes Ministry of Interior headquarters and administrative staff,
uniformed police personnel, and several specialized police units. (See
app. I for further details on the force structure and functions of the
ANP.)
In addition to enforcing the rule of law, the role of the ANP is to
protect the rights of citizens, maintain civil order and public safety,
control national borders, and reduce the level of domestic and
international organized crime, among other activities. Also, the
deterioration in Afghanistan's security situation since 2005 has led to
increased ANP involvement in counterinsurgency operations, resulting in
additional training in weapons and survival skills and
counterinsurgency tactics.
U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the ANP are directed by
Defense through its Combined Security Transition Command--Afghanistan
(CSTC-A), with support from State, which provides policy guidance to
the effort and oversight of civilian contractors implementing police
training courses. The primary U.S. contractor involved in training the
ANP is DynCorp International.
From 2002 to 2008, the United States provided about $16.5 billion to
train and equip the ANSF, including about $6.2 billion for the ANP (see
table 1). Over 40 percent (about $2.7 billion) of funds for training
and equipping the ANP were provided in fiscal year 2007, in an effort
to accelerate ANP development and enhance its capability in response to
increased levels of violence and insurgent activity.
Table 1: Defense and State Funding for Training and Equipping Afghan
National Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008:
Assistance program: Afghan Police; Dollars in millions:
FY 2002: $25.5 million;
FY 2003: $5.0 million;
FY 2004: $223.9 million;
FY 2005: $837.9 million;
FY 2006: $1,299.8 million;
FY 2007: $2,701.2 million;
FY 2008 request[A]: $1,105.6 million;
Total: $6,198.8 million.
Sources: GAO analysis of Defense and State data.
Note: Totals above include funding from a variety of Defense and State
sources. In fiscal years 2007 and 2008, these sources included Afghan
Security Forces Funding, Defense Counternarcotics funding, and
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement counternarcotics
funding.
[A] Fiscal year 2008 includes approximately $342 million that has been
appropriated and approximately $764 million that has been requested.
[End of table]
Defense has developed criteria--called capability milestones (CM)--to
assess police and army capability. The table below provides
descriptions of the capability milestones.
Table 2: Capability Milestones for Afghan National Security Forces:
Capability milestone: CM1;
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is
capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Depending on the
situation, units may require specified assistance from the Coalition or
international community.
Capability milestone: CM2;
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is
capable of conducting primary operational mission(s) with routine
assistance from, or reliance on, international community support.
Capability milestone: CM3;
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is
capable of partially conducting primary operational mission(s), but
still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international
community support.
Capability milestone: CM4;
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is
formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational
mission(s). It may be capable, available, or directed to undertake
portions of its operational mission but only with significant
assistance from, and reliance on, international community support.
Source: CSTC-A.
[End of table]
Most Afghan National Police Units Are Rated as Not Capable of
Performing Their Mission:
After an investment of more than $6 billion, Defense reporting
indicates that, as of April 2008, no police unit (0 of 433) was
assessed as fully capable of performing its mission and more than three-
fourths of units rated (334 of 433) were assessed as not capable (see
table 3).[Footnote 7] Furthermore, among rated units, about 96 percent
(296 of 308) of uniformed police districts and all border police
battalions (33 of 33), which together comprise about 75 percent of the
ANP's authorized end-strength, were rated as not capable.[Footnote 8]
Table 3: Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008:
Police units: Uniformed Police Districts (365);
CM1 Fully Capable: 0;
CM2 Capable with Coalition Support: 6;
CM3 Partially Capable: 6;
CM4 Not Capable: 296;
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 57.
Police units: Border Police Battalions (33);
CM1 Fully Capable: 0;
CM2 Capable with Coalition Support: 0;
CM3 Partially Capable: 0;
CM4 Not Capable: 33;
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 0.
Police units: Civil Order Police Battalions (20);
CM1 Fully Capable: 0;
CM2 Capable with Coalition Support: 6;
CM3 Partially Capable: 2;
CM4 Not Capable: 2;
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 10.
Police units: Counter Narcotics Police Units (15);
CM1 Fully Capable: 0;
CM2 Capable with Coalition Support: 0;
CM3 Partially Capable: 10;
CM4 Not Capable: 3;
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 2.
Police units: Number of ANP units (433);
CM1 Fully Capable: 0;
CM2 Capable with Coalition Support: 12 (3%);
CM3 Partially Capable: 18 (4%);
CM4 Not Capable: 334 (77%);
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 69 (16%).
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
[A] A uniformed police district that is categorized as "not formed or
not reporting" has not been rated by Defense. A civil order police
battalion or a counter narcotics police unit that is categorized as
"not formed or not reporting" is a planned unit or in training.
[End of table]
Six of the remaining 12 uniformed police districts were rated as
capable of leading operations with coalition support, and the other 6
as partially capable. Overall, Defense assessed approximately 4 percent
(18 of 433 units rated) of police units as partially capable and about
3 percent (12 of 433 units rated) as capable of leading operations with
coalition support. According to Defense reporting as of April 2008, the
expected date for completion of a fully capable Afghan police force is
December 2012. However, the benchmark set by the Afghan government and
the international community for establishing police forces that can
effectively meet Afghanistan's security needs is the end of 2010.
Growth of Police Force Is Difficult to Quantify:
Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, nearly 80,000
police had been assigned out of an end-strength of 82,000. This is an
increase of more than double the approximately 35,000 we reported as
trained as of January 2005. Despite this reported increase in police
manning, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the police
force has grown. As we noted in May 2007, the Afghan Ministry of
Interior produces the number of police assigned and the reliability of
these numbers has been questioned. A Defense census undertaken since
our May 2007 report to check the reliability of ministry payroll
records raises additional concerns about numbers of police reportedly
assigned. In September 2007, Defense reported that it was unable to
verify the physical existence of about 20 percent of the uniformed
police and more than 10 percent of the border police listed on the
ministry payroll records for the provinces surveyed. Because Defense's
census did not cover all 34 Afghan provinces, these percentages cannot
be applied to the entire police force. Nonetheless, the results of
Defense's census raise questions about the reliability of the nearly
80,000 number of police reportedly assigned.
Several Challenges Impede Development of Capable Police Forces:
Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to build a capable police force.
These include (1) shortages in the police mentors needed to provide
training and evaluation and verify that police are on duty; (2)
shortfalls in several types of equipment that Defense considers
critical; (3) a weak judicial system; and (4) consistent problems with
police pay, corruption, and attacks by insurgents. Recognizing these
challenges to ANP development, Defense began a new initiative in
November 2007 to reconstitute the uniformed police--the largest
component of the Afghan police. Although this effort is too new to
fully assess, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put the
initiative at risk.
Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training, Evaluation, and
Verification of Police on Duty:
According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police
mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training
and evaluation and to verify that police are on duty. Police mentor
teams in Afghanistan consist of both civilian mentors, who teach law
enforcement and police management, and military mentors, who provide
training in basic combat operations and offer force protection for the
civilian mentors. As of April 2008, only about 32 percent (746 of
2,358) of required military mentors were present in country. Due to
this shortage of military mentors to provide force protection, movement
of available civilian mentors is constrained.[Footnote 9] According to
Defense officials, the shortfall in military mentors for the ANP is due
to the higher priority assigned to deploying U.S. military personnel
elsewhere, particularly Iraq.
Defense officials identified the continuing shortfall in police mentors
as an impediment to U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan police in three
areas. First, senior Defense officials, including the commanding
general of CSTC-A, stated that the ongoing shortfall in police mentors
has been the primary obstacle to providing the field-based training
necessary to develop a fully capable police force. Second, while
Defense recently introduced a monthly assessment tool to be used by
mentors to evaluate police capability and identify areas in need of
further attention, CSTC-A identified extremely limited mentor coverage
as a significant challenge to using this tool. Third, the shortage of
available police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to verify the number
of Afghan police on duty. For example, as of April 2008, Defense could
not verify whether any police were reporting for duty in 5 of
Afghanistan's 34 provinces due to the lack of mentors. Without
sufficient police mentors present to conduct field-based training and
evaluation and verify police manning, the development of fully capable,
fully staffed Afghan police forces may continue to be delayed.
Police Continue to Face Difficulties with Equipment Shortages and
Quality:
As of February 2008, shortages remained in several types of police
equipment that Defense considers critical, such as trucks, radios, and
body armor. In addition, Defense officials expressed concerns with the
quality and usability of thousands of weapons donated to the police.
For example, officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly
50,000 AK-47 automatic rifles received through donation was of good
quality (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Donated Rifles of Variable Quality:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of donated rifles of variable quality.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Our analysis of weekly progress reports produced in 2007 by DynCorp
civilian police mentors provides additional evidence of equipment-
related challenges and other logistical difficulties.[Footnote 10]
Specifically, 88 percent (46 of 52) of weekly reports contained
instances of police operating with equipment of insufficient quality or
quantity or facing problems with facilities or supplies. In addition,
81 percent (42 of 52) of weekly reports contained examples of limited
police ability to account for the equipment provided to them.[Footnote
11] In July 2007, CSTC-A initiated efforts to train the police in basic
supply and property accountability procedures. According to CSTC-A,
equipment is no longer being issued to police districts unless the
districts' property officers are first trained. For example, according
to Defense, more than 1,500 trucks have been on hand and ready for
issue since late 2007 (see fig. 2), but the Afghan Minister of Interior
has delayed distribution of these vehicles until adequate
accountability procedures are established in the target districts.
Figure 2: Trucks Awaiting Distribution to ANP:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of trucks awaiting distribution to ANP.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector, Pay, Corruption, and
Attacks:
Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of
law is a prerequisite for effective policing. However, in 2005, we
reported that few linkages existed in Afghanistan between the Afghan
judiciary and police, and the police had little ability to enforce
judicial rulings. Our 2005 report also noted that overall justice
sector reform was underfunded and understaffed. Subsequently, we
reported in 2006 and 2007 that rebuilding the Afghan judicial sector
lagged behind the other four security pillars--army, police, combating
drugs, and disarmament.[Footnote 12] According to State, much of
Afghanistan continues to lack a functioning justice system. In
addition, according to CSTC-A, the slow rate at which the rule of law
is being implemented across Afghanistan inhibits effective community
policing.
Furthermore, our analysis of DynCorp's weekly progress reports from
2007 indicates that police in the field also face persistent problems
with pay, corruption, and attacks (see table 4).[Footnote 13]
Table 4: Examples and Frequency of Problems Faced by ANP Relating to
Pay, Corruption, and Attacks:
Issue: Pay;
Selected examples of problems cited:
* Police not being paid for several months;
* Police receiving incomplete pay;
* Police quitting due to pay-related problems;
* Remote location of payment sites leading police to spend part of pay
on transportation;
Frequency of related problems: 94 percent (49 of 52 weekly reports).
Issue: Corruption;
Selected examples of problems cited:
* Police personnel providing weapons or defecting to the Taliban;
* High-ranking officials engaging in bribery or misconduct;
* Police collecting unauthorized "tolls" from drivers;
Frequency of related problems: 87 percent (45 of 52 weekly reports).
Issue: Attacks;
Selected examples of problems cited:
* Police targeted by suicide bombers or with improvised explosive
devices;
* Police stations overrun by insurgent forces;
* Dangerous working conditions causing difficulties in retaining or
recruiting police;
Frequency of related problems: 85 percent (44 of 52 weekly reports).
Source: GAO analysis of documents provided to State by DynCorp.
Note: Examples provided are illustrative only and do not constitute the
entirety of problems that we found.
[End of table]
New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun, but Limited Mentor
Coverage Is a Risk Factor:
Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and began a new
initiative called Focused District Development in November 2007 to
address them. According to Defense documentation, the objective of this
initiative is to focus resources on reforming the uniformed police--the
largest component of the ANP--as the key to the overall reform of the
ANP. [Footnote 14] Under this initiative, the entire police force of a
district is withdrawn from the district and sent to a regional training
center for 8 weeks to train as a unit--similar to how Defense trains
the Afghan army--and receive all authorized equipment while their
district is covered by the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP),
a specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest
and lawlessness.[Footnote 15] The police force then returns to its
district, where a dedicated police mentor team provides follow-on
training and closely monitors the police for at least 60 days. Defense
expects to be able to reconstitute about 5 to 10 districts at a time,
with each training cycle lasting about 6 to 8 months. Overall,
according to State, it will take a minimum of 4 to 5 years to complete
the initiative.
Defense documentation indicates that no districts had completed an
entire Focused District Development cycle as of April 2008. Until an
entire cycle is completed, it will be difficult to fully assess the
initiative. However, limited police mentor coverage may complicate
efforts to execute this new program. Defense documentation identifies
sufficient police mentor teams as the most important requirement for
successful reform. However, according to the commanding general of CSTC-
A, the ongoing shortfall in police mentors available to work with newly
trained district police will slow implementation of the initiative. In
addition, a senior Defense official stated that unless the mentor
shortage is alleviated, the number of police mentor teams available to
provide dedicated training and monitoring will eventually be exhausted.
Defense and State Have Not Developed a Coordinated, Detailed Plan for
Completing and Sustaining the ANSF:
In our June 2005 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense
and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF
that contain several elements, including milestones for achieving
stated objectives and a sustainability strategy. Despite the
concurrence of both agencies with our recommendation, Defense and State
have not completed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and
sustaining the ANSF. In the absence of such a plan, coordination
difficulties have occurred and progress is difficult to assess. In
2008, Congress mandated that the President, acting through the
Secretary of Defense, submit reports to Congress on progress toward
security and stability in Afghanistan, including a comprehensive and
long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF.[Footnote 16]
Congress also mandated that Defense submit reports on a long-term
detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF.[Footnote 17] The first
submission of each of these reports was due at the end of April 2008,
but neither has yet been provided to Congress.
Recurrent Coordination Difficulties Have Arisen in the Absence of a
Coordinated Plan:
In February 2007, Defense provided us a 5-page document that, according
to Defense officials, is intended to meet GAO's 2005 recommendation for
detailed plans to complete and sustain the ANSF. Although Defense and
State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not
identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of State. State also
did not contribute to the development of this document and has not
developed a plan of its own. In the absence of such a plan,
coordination has been a problem. For example, DynCorp stated that a
dual chain of command between Defense and State has affected the
efforts of civilian mentors in multiple ways, such as by producing
conflicting guidance and complicating reporting, placement of
personnel, the use of facilities, and training and mentoring
activities. Prior work by the State and Defense inspectors general
highlighted the same challenge over a year ago. While Defense and State
have both cited improvements in coordination since our August 2007
visit to Afghanistan, a coordinated plan that clearly states the
various agencies' roles and responsibilities would nonetheless be
beneficial given the continuous turnover of U.S. government staff. For
example, Defense officials told us that CSTC-A staff typically serve
tours of 1 year or less and often have no period of overlap with
outgoing officials during which to gain knowledge about their new
positions. Given such turnover and loss of institutional knowledge, a
coordinated, detailed plan that clearly identifies the agencies
involved in developing the ANP and their respective roles and
responsibilities could help incoming personnel become familiarized with
their new duties.
Limited Milestones Hinder Assessment of Progress:
Defense's 5-page document developed in response to our 2005
recommendation contains few milestones, including no interim milestones
that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP.
Furthermore, while Defense maintains that the monthly status reports it
produces allow progress to be monitored, these status reports also lack
the interim milestones needed to determine if the program is on track.
For instance, Defense status reports as of April 2008 note that no ANP
units (0 of 433) are rated as fully capable and 3 percent (12 of 433)
are capable of leading operations with coalition support. Without
interim milestones against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to
know if this status represents what the United States intended to
achieve after 3 years of increased efforts and an investment of more
than $6 billion in the program.
Defense's monthly status reports also lack consistent end dates. In
particular, completion dates cited in Defense status reports have
shifted numerous times during the course of our review. For instance,
the completion dates for development of the ANP stated in monthly
status reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008 fluctuated
from December 2008 to March 2009 to December 2012, with a 3-month
period when the completion date was reported as "to be determined."
Similarly, although Defense's newly adopted Focused District
Development initiative to reconstitute the uniformed police involves
considerable resources and is expected to last 4 to 5 years at a
minimum, no interim milestones or consistent end date for the effort
are identified in Defense's 5-page document, monthly status reports, or
briefings that outline the effort. In the absence of interim milestones
and a consistent end date for Focused District Development, it will be
difficult to determine if this ambitious new effort is progressing as
intended. Furthermore, without an end date and milestones for the U.S.
effort to complete and sustain the entire ANP, it is difficult to
determine how long the United States may need to continue providing
funding and other resources for this important mission--one that U.S.
military officials stated may extend beyond a decade.
Defense Document Lacks Sustainment Strategy:
Defense's 5-page document developed in response to our 2005
recommendation does not provide a detailed strategy for sustaining the
ANSF. Defense currently estimates that approximately $1 billion a year
will be needed to sustain the ANP, and expects the sustainment
transition to begin in fiscal year 2009. However, despite the estimate
of U.S. military officials in Afghanistan that U.S. involvement in
training and equipping the ANSF may extend beyond a decade, neither
Defense nor State has identified funding requirements or forecasts
beyond 2013.
U.S. officials stated that until Afghan revenues increase
substantially, the international community would likely need to assist
in paying sustainability costs. At present, Afghanistan is unable to
support the recurring costs of its security forces, such as salaries,
equipment replacement, and facilities maintenance, without substantial
foreign assistance. According to Defense and State, sustainment costs
will be transitioned to the government of Afghanistan commensurate with
the nation's economic capacity, and the United States and the
international community will need to assist Afghanistan in developing
revenues. Defense officials in Washington have not indicated how long
and in what ways the U.S. government expects to continue assisting the
ANSF. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is
difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue
providing funding and other resources for this important mission.
Conclusion:
Establishing capable Afghan police is critical to improving security in
Afghanistan. The United States has invested more than $6 billion since
2002 to develop the ANP, but no police forces are assessed as fully
capable of conducting their primary mission. As such, interagency
coordination, assessment of progress, and estimation of long-term costs
are particularly important given that Defense has begun a new
initiative that is expected to last at least 4 to 5 years and military
officials estimate that U.S. involvement in developing the ANP could
exceed a decade. We believe a coordinated, detailed plan that outlines
agency roles and responsibilities, lists clear milestones for achieving
stated objectives, and includes a sustainment strategy may improve
coordination and would enable assessment of progress and estimation of
costs. However, despite our prior recommendation and a mandate from
Congress that a plan be developed, Defense and State have not done so.
Until a coordinated, detailed plan is completed, Congress will continue
to lack visibility into the progress made to date and the cost of
completing this mission--information that is essential to holding the
performing agencies accountable.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Because Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed
plan, we state in our concurrently issued report that Congress should
consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations related to
training and equipping the ANSF on completion of a coordinated,
detailed plan. This plan should include, among other things, clearly
defined objectives and performance measures, clearly defined roles and
responsibilities, milestones for achieving these objectives, future
funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results
achieved, including plans for transitioning responsibilities to
Afghanistan.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In response to our concurrently issued report, Defense disagreed that
Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future
appropriations on completion of a detailed plan to develop the ANSF,
stating that current guidance provided by State and Defense to the
field is sufficient to implement a successful program to train and
equip the ANSF. State also expressed concerns about conditioning future
appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan. We continue to
believe that a coordinated, detailed plan that outlines agency roles
and responsibilities and includes clear milestones is essential to
ensuring accountability of U.S. efforts and facilitating assessment of
progress.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Charles Michael
Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Other
contributors to this statement were Hynek Kalkus (Assistant Director),
Elizabeth Guran, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Elizabeth Repko, Al Huntington,
Lynn Cothern, Cindy Gilbert, and Mark Dowling.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National
Police:
The Afghan National Police (ANP) currently consists of six authorized
components under the Ministry of Interior. The uniformed police, the
largest of these six components, report to the police commanders of
each Afghan province. Provincial commanders report to one of five
regional commanders, who report back to the Ministry of Interior. The
other five authorized components of the ANP all report directly to the
ministry (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: ANP Chain of Command:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an organizational chart depicting the following
information:
ANP Chain of Command:
Ministry of Interior:
* Border Police;
* Civil Order Police;
* Criminal Investigation Police;
* Counter Narcotics Police;
* Counter Terrorism Police;
* Regional Commanders:
- Provincial Commanders;
- Uniformed Police.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense and State data.
[End of figure]
Table 5 provides further detail on the Ministry of Interior and the
various components of the ANP that it oversees.
Table 5: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National
Police:
Component: Ministry of Interior;
Description: Department of the Government of Afghanistan responsible
for the protection of the country's international borders and the
enforcement of the rule of law.
Component: Afghan Uniformed Police;
Description: Police assigned to police districts and provincial and
regional commands; duties include patrols, crime prevention, traffic
duties, and general policing.
Component: Afghan Border Police;
Description: Provide broad law enforcement capability at international
borders and entry points.
Component: Afghan National Civil Order Police;
Description: Specialized police force trained and equipped to counter
civil unrest and lawlessness.
Component: Criminal Investigative Division;
Description: Lead investigative agency for investigations of national
interest, those with international links, and those concerned with
organized and white-collar crime.
Component: Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan;
Description: Lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing
narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan.
Component: Counter Terrorism Police;
Description: Lead police and law enforcement efforts to defeat
terrorism and insurgency.
Component: Standby Police/Highway Police/Auxiliary Police/Customs
Police;
Description: No longer authorized.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be
Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain
Capable Afghan National Security Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-661] (Washington, D.C.: June
18, 2008).
[2] GAO is currently performing a detailed review of U.S. efforts to
reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior and National Police. This report
is currently planned for release in early 2009.
[3] This figure includes $342 million appropriated and $764 million
requested in fiscal year 2008.
[4] In this testimony, personnel who train Afghan police in the field
are collectively referred to as mentors. U.S. military personnel who
train Afghan police in the field are referred to as military mentors,
while contractors who train Afghan police in the field are referred to
as civilian mentors.
[5] As of the same date, about 98 percent (540 of 551) of the
authorized number of civilian mentors were present in country.
[6] Defense also leads U.S. efforts to develop capable ANA forces.
[7] CSTC-A provided us with capability ratings for 433 police units,
which include uniformed police districts, civil order and border police
battalions, and counter narcotics police units.
[8] This does not include 57 uniformed police districts that Defense
assessed as not formed or not reporting.
[9] Additionally, DynCorp officials stated that moving around
Afghanistan to conduct mentoring operations is difficult due to the
size of the country and the lack of roads. GAO is currently completing
a review of U.S. and donor efforts to build roads in Afghanistan. This
report is due to be released in July 2008.
[10] We limited our analysis to 2007 reporting because State was unable
to provide a complete set of weekly reports for prior years. Instances
discussed in more than one report were only categorized and counted the
first time they appeared.
[11] GAO is currently performing a detailed review of the
accountability of lethal equipment provided to the ANSF. This report is
currently planned for release in early 2009.
[12] GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts,
Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-78] (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
15, 2006); [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-801SP].
[13] The security situation in Afghanistan, police performance, and
retaining and recruiting police were other top issues identified in our
analysis. These topics are discussed in our concurrently issued report.
[14] Defense documents indicate that the Afghan border police will also
eventually be reconstituted through the Focused District Development
initiative; however, according to a Defense official, it is uncertain
when such efforts will begin.
[15] Defense documents indicate that, in addition to being trained, a
district police force undergoing Focused District Development will also
have corrupt leaders replaced by nationally vetted ones, receive new
salaries on parity with Afghan army salary rates, and have electronic
funds transfer accounts established. Defense also has identified the
development of the Afghan justice system as a goal of the Focused
District Development initiative but anticipates limited integration of
rule of law reform into the initiative until summer 2008.
[16] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
110-181, sec. 1230.
[17] Pub. L. 110-181, sec. 1231.
[End of section]
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