Peacekeeping
Thousands Trained but United States Is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed Gao ID: GAO-08-754 June 26, 2008In 2004, in response to the Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the United States established the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a 5-year program to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a focus on Africa. Since 2005, the Department of State (State) has allocated $374 million and selected 52 countries to participate in the program. Congress mandated that GAO assess and report on the initiative. This report assesses (1) progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the training, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria and whether trainees are adequately screened for human rights abuses. GAO assessed State and Department of Defense (DOD) data and program documents, interviewed U.S. and host country officials, and conducted field work in eight countries.
State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI objectives in three principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing equipment and transportation for peacekeeping missions, and building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in meeting these goals. First, nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers have been trained and some training equipment has been provided. However, State is unlikely to meet the goal of training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 and has encountered problems in accounting for the delivery of training equipment to countries. Second, State supports an equipment depot in Africa and has supplied equipment for missions in Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan, but has been delayed in providing some equipment in support of these missions. Third, State and DOD have trained 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, conducted several multinational peacekeeping exercises, and refurbished some training centers. However, State has targeted a smaller share of resources to build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure than for training and equipping peacekeepers in Africa in comparison to other regions, in part due to needs and capabilities of the region and a focus on training African peacekeepers for current missions. Of the $98 million State has spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on building skills and infrastructure needed for long-term peacekeeping capabilities, compared to 20 percent to 51 percent in other regions. While 56 percent of trained military peacekeepers--primarily from Africa--have deployed to peacekeeping missions, State faces challenges in assessing the proficiency of trained peacekeepers against standard skills taught in training and accounting for the activities of trained instructors. Although GPOI training standards follow U.S. military doctrine and United Nations requirements, State does not have a program-wide standard to assess the proficiency of military peacekeepers in skills taught. Further, State is unable to fully account for the training activities of the trained instructors. Collectively, these program limitations result in State's inability to assess the overall outcomes of its program in providing high-quality, effective training. State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries that generally meet program criteria, but in some cases State did not screen trainees for human rights abuses. For 24 countries, State's human rights reporting identified documented human rights violations by security forces in 2007, and GAO found that peacekeepers were not always screened or were not properly screened for human rights abuses. For example, we found that 81 individuals from one country received military training but were not screened for human rights violations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-754, Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States Is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2008:
Peacekeeping:
Thousands Trained but United States Is Unlikely to Complete All
Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed:
GAO-08-754:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-754, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2004, in response to the Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the
United States established the Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI), a 5-year program to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide,
with a focus on Africa. Since 2005, the Department of State (State) has
allocated $374 million and selected 52 countries to participate in the
program.
Congress mandated that GAO assess and report on the initiative. This
report assesses (1) progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether
State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the
training, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria
and whether trainees are adequately screened for human rights abuses.
GAO assessed State and Department of Defense (DOD) data and program
documents, interviewed U.S. and host country officials, and conducted
field work in eight countries.
What GAO Found:
State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI objectives in
three principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing
equipment and transportation for peacekeeping missions, and building
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in
meeting these goals. First, nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers have
been trained and some training equipment has been provided. However,
State is unlikely to meet the goal of training 75,000 military
peacekeepers by 2010 and has encountered problems in accounting for the
delivery of training equipment to countries. Second, State supports an
equipment depot in Africa and has supplied equipment for missions in
Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan, but has been delayed in providing
some equipment in support of these missions. Third, State and DOD have
trained 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, conducted several
multinational peacekeeping exercises, and refurbished some training
centers. However, State has targeted a smaller share of resources to
build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure than for training and
equipping peacekeepers in Africa in comparison to other regions, in
part due to needs and capabilities of the region and a focus on
training African peacekeepers for current missions. Of the $98 million
State has spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on building skills and
infrastructure needed for long-term peacekeeping capabilities, compared
to 20 percent to 51 percent in other regions.
While 56 percent of trained military peacekeepers”primarily from
Africa”have deployed to peacekeeping missions, State faces challenges
in assessing the proficiency of trained peacekeepers against standard
skills taught in training and accounting for the activities of trained
instructors. Although GPOI training standards follow U.S. military
doctrine and United Nations requirements, State does not have a program-
wide standard to assess the proficiency of military peacekeepers in
skills taught. Further, State is unable to fully account for the
training activities of the trained instructors. Collectively, these
program limitations result in State‘s inability to assess the overall
outcomes of its program in providing high-quality, effective training.
State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries that
generally meet program criteria, but in some cases State did not screen
trainees for human rights abuses. For 24 countries, State‘s human
rights reporting identified documented human rights violations by
security forces in 2007, and GAO found that peacekeepers were not
always screened or were not properly screened for human rights abuses.
For example, we found that 81 individuals from one country received
military training but were not screened for human rights violations.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State improve oversight of
equipment delivery, develop methods to assess the overall outcomes of
the training program, and ensure that trainees are properly screened
for human rights violations, among other things. State and DOD
concurred or partially concurred with most of the recommendations,
except for developing a method for evaluating the GPOI training program
which State said already exists. GAO clarified the recommendation.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-754]. For more
information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
GPOI Has Made Progress in Meeting Program Goals, but Challenges Remain:
More than Half of GPOI-Trained Military Peacekeepers Have Deployed to
Missions, but State Cannot Assess the Quality or Effectiveness of Its
Training Program:
GPOI Partner Countries Generally Meet Program Criteria, but in Some
Cases State Did Not Screen Trainees for Potential Violations of Human
Rights:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: GPOI Partner Countries:
Appendix III: International Contributions to 2004 G8 Summit Goal and
GPOI:
Appendix IV: Training and Peacekeeping Deployments of GPOI Partners:
Appendix V: Equipment Provided to GPOI Partner Countries:
Appendix VI: GPOI Activities to Support Long-term Skills and
Infrastructure for Peacekeeping:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Status of Activities for GPOI Goals and Objectives:
Table 2: Peacekeeping Tasks Included in GPOI Military Skill Training:
Table 3: GPOI Partner Countries 2004 to 2008, as of April 2008:
Table 4: Military Peacekeepers Trained by GPOI and Deployed, by Country
and Region (as of April 2008):
Table 5: Types of Military Peacekeeping Equipment Provided to GPOI
Partners:
Table 6: Types of Training Equipment Provided for COESPU Training:
Table 7: Activities to Build Skills and Infrastructure for
Peacekeeping, by Region (as of April 2008):
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of GPOI Partner Countries:
Figure 2: GPOI Expenditures by Region, as of April 2008:
Figure 3: Projected and Actual Number of Trained Military Peacekeepers
by Fiscal Year, as of April 2008:
Figure 4: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Military
Peacekeepers, by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April
2008):
Figure 5: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Equipment by Region
(fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008):
Figure 6: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Deployment Assistance by
Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008):
Figure 7: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Building Peacekeeping Skills
and Infrastructure, by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of
April 2008):
Abbreviations:
ACOTA: Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance:
AU: African Union:
COESPU: Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units:
DOD: Department of Defense:
ECOWAS: Economic Community for West African States:
EIPC: Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities:
GCCGPOI: Coordination Committee:
GPOI: Global Peace Operations Initiative:
G8: Group of Eight:
State: Department of State:
UN: United Nations:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 26, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
Peace support operations throughout the world have grown from 4 United
Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in 1988 to 17 in 2008; more than
half of these missions began in the last 10 years.[Footnote 1] At the
2004 Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the United States and other
G8 nations responded to the growing need for well-trained and equipped
peacekeepers by committing to expand the global capability for peace
support operations--particularly African peacekeeping skills and
capabilities.[Footnote 2] In 2004, the United States established the
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a 5-year, $660 million
program to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a focus on
enhancing peacekeeping capabilities in Africa. Key goals of the program
are to train military peacekeepers and stability police[Footnote 3] for
peacekeeping missions, including a target of 75,000 military
peacekeepers; provide long-term skills and infrastructure to GPOI
partner countries and regional organizations; and provide nonlethal
equipment and transportation to support countries' deployment of
peacekeepers. Since 2005, the Department of State (State), in
consultation with the Department of Defense (DOD), has allocated $374
million to support GPOI objectives.[Footnote 4]
In the fiscal year 2008 Defense Authorization Act,[Footnote 5] Congress
mandated that GAO assess the initiative and report on a number of
issues, including the extent to which GPOI has met its goals, the
metrics used to measure progress, the quality of training, GPOI's
impact on countries' contributions to peacekeeping, and G8 and other
countries' financial and technical assistance to expand global capacity
for peace support operations. To address the mandate, this report
assesses (1) progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether State is
consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the training
program, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria
and whether trainees are adequately screened for human rights abuses.
Appendix III contains data on G8 and other countries' contributions to
expanding the global capability for peacekeeping.
To complete this review, we assessed State Department data on the
number of troops trained, equipment provided, and other indicators. We
interviewed officials from State and DOD in Washington, D.C.; officials
from U.S. Combatant Commands for the Pacific, Southern Hemisphere, and
Africa during visits to Germany and Miami; and U.S. and host country
officials during site visits to Guatemala, Italy, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Mongolia. We determined that the data
provided by State and DOD were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of our review. We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to
June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained in this review provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Results in Brief:
State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI goals in three
principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing
equipment and transportation for deployed missions, and building
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in
meeting these goals.[Footnote 6] First, State and DOD have trained
nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers, predominantly in Africa; supported
the training of over 1,300 stability police; and provided nonlethal
training equipment to some military peacekeepers. However, State is
unlikely to meet its goal of training 75,000 military peacekeepers by
2010 and has encountered problems with accounting for and timely
delivery of nonlethal training equipment to partner countries. Second,
State supports an equipment depot in Sierra Leone; has supplied
equipment for missions in Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti; and has
initiated a process for peacekeeping countries to request donor
assistance for transportation and logistics needs.[Footnote 7] However,
State has encountered some delays in providing timely delivery of
nonlethal equipment to deployed peacekeepers. Third, to build
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure,[Footnote 8] State and DOD have
trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, conducted
multinational peacekeeping exercises, refurbished training centers, and
taken steps to establish a communications system in West Africa.
However, State is unlikely to complete skills and infrastructure
activities in Africa by 2010, in part due to African peacekeeping
countries' limited resources and capabilities for supporting their own
peacekeeping programs. Moreover, State has targeted a smaller share of
resources for the development of long-term skills and infrastructure
for peacekeeping than for training and equipping peacekeepers in Africa
in other regions, in part due to needs and capabilities of the region
and a focus on training peacekeepers in this region for current
missions. Of the $98 million State has spent in Africa, 12 percent has
been spent--compared to 20 percent to 50 percent in other regions--on
activities to build the long-term skills and infrastructure that
countries need to sustain peacekeeping operations on their own.
While 56 percent of GPOI-trained military peacekeepers from 13
countries, primarily in Africa, have deployed to peacekeeping missions,
State faces challenges in assessing the proficiency of peacekeepers it
has trained and accounting for the activities of trained instructors.
Although GPOI training standards follow U.S. military doctrine and UN
requirements, State does not have a program-wide standard to assess the
proficiency of military peacekeepers in the skills taught. For example,
trainers we met with in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal stated that they
review participants' performance--of which Ghana and Senegal account
for 44 percent of the total deployed GPOI-trained troops--in training
exercises and exercise professional judgment to determine participants'
ability to perform specific tasks, but they are not required to test
the skills of military peacekeepers against a common standard. As a
result, State cannot ascertain the proficiency of the military
peacekeepers it has trained. State has mechanisms for monitoring and
documenting the performance of contractors in Africa, including a
program management team to monitor contractor performance in Africa.
However, the responsibility for retaining evaluations of contractors'
performance is unclear among State officials. Further, although State
and DOD have trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors,
State cannot fully account for the training activities of these
instructors in their home countries. As of April 2008, State had only
been able to identify that training had occurred by GPOI-trained
instructors in two countries. In addition, State has supported the
training of over 1,300 stability police instructors at Italy's Center
of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), but cannot identify
whether these instructors subsequently conduct training. Collectively,
these program limitations result in State's inability to assess the
overall outcomes of providing high-quality, effective peacekeeping
training.
State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries that
generally meet program criteria, but in some cases State did not screen
trainees from partner countries for potential violations of human
rights. Countries and their peacekeeping troops must generally meet a
list of criteria identified in the program's strategy before they can
receive GPOI-funded training and other assistance. Most partner
countries generally met the participation criteria, including having an
elected government, an acceptable human rights record, a willingness to
participate in peace support operations, and an agreement on the use
and security of U.S.-provided goods and services, but we found 24
countries in which State's human rights reporting identified documented
human rights violations by security forces in 2007. We found that
peacekeepers were not always screened or were not properly screened for
human rights abuses, in accordance with State guidance. Specifically,
we found that State trained 81 individuals in 2007 from one country but
did not screen them before they participated in GPOI-funded training.
In addition, 17 military peacekeepers and stability police from
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka were not vetted
out of 382 trained from those countries in 2007. We also found that the
commanders of seven composite units in three countries were screened
for human rights violations, but the individual members of these units
were not screened, as required by State guidance. As a result, it is
possible that State and DOD have provided training to security
personnel who have committed human rights abuses.
We recommend that the Secretary of State improve oversight of nonlethal
equipment delivery to partner countries, develop methods to assess the
overall outcomes of the training program, and ensure that trainees are
properly screened for human rights violations. We also recommend that
the Secretary of State, in consultation with DOD, assess the estimated
resources and time frames needed to complete activities to help achieve
the G8 goals for developing African countries' capabilities to maintain
peacekeeping operations on their own.
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Defense. We received written comments from State and DOD, which we have
reprinted in appendixes VII and VIII, respectively. State concurred or
partially concurred with seven of the eight recommendations and
provided additional information to highlight the program's
achievements. State did not concur with the recommendation to develop a
method for evaluating GPOI training. State noted that methods already
exist to evaluate the quality of the training program and measure
proficiency of trainees. We disagree that State's current evaluation
methods address our recommendation. State has not developed military
task lists and associated training that can be applied at all GPOI
training sites; sites currently use varying standards to assess the
proficiency of trainees. DOD agreed with the need for greater
standardization and more analysis of trainee performance. We modified
the recommendation to clarify the need for GPOI-wide standard military
tasks and related training that State, in consultation with DOD, should
develop in accordance with the commitments made in the GPOI strategy.
State also commented that it now projects that GPOI will train 75,000
peacekeepers by July 2010 based on new training rates. We were unable
to validate State's new data since as recently as May 2008, program
officials indicated that slow expenditure rates would delay State's
efforts to reach the 2010 training goal. DOD also concurred or
partially concurred with the findings and recommendations of the
report. DOD agreed that State should work with DOD and Italy to
validate personnel shortfalls at COESPU and fill the identified
positions. DOD also stated that an assessment of resources and time
frames should apply to all regions engaged by the GPOI program. We did
not revise this recommendation because it is intended to address our
finding that State is unlikely to complete skills and infrastructure
activities in Africa by 2010. State and DOD also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
Background:
On April 1, 2004, the President approved GPOI, a 5-year program to help
address significant gaps in international peace operations, including a
shortage of capable peacekeepers, limited national capabilities to
train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies, and a lack of mechanisms
to help countries deploy peacekeepers and provide logistics support for
them in the field. To support the development of peacekeeping
capabilities of GPOI countries, the program incorporates and expands on
the pre-existing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
(ACOTA) program and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping
Capabilities (EIPC) program.[Footnote 9]
GPOI Has Seven Objectives to Improve Peacekeeping Operations Worldwide:
In 2004, the United States established GPOI as a $660 million, 5-year
program with seven objectives to increase and maintain the capacity,
capability, and effectiveness of peace operations worldwide. These
objectives are to:
* train and, when appropriate, equip 75,000 military peacekeepers by
2010;
* support efforts at the International Center of Excellence for
Stability Police (COESPU) in Italy to increase the capabilities and
interoperability of stability police to participate in peace
operations;
* develop a program to procure and store peace operations equipment to
facilitate the equipment's quick mobilization for peace operations;
* develop a transportation and logistics support system to deploy and
sustain peacekeeping in the field;
* enhance the capacity of regional and subregional organizations for
peace operations;
* provide a worldwide clearinghouse function for GPOI-related
activities in Africa and globally; and:
* conduct activities that support and assist partners in achieving self-
sufficiency and maintaining the proficiencies gained from GPOI.
U.S. Agencies and Partner Countries Participate in GPOI:
State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in coordination with
DOD's Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, is
responsible for providing policy guidance; allocating resources; and
coordinating GPOI programs, events, and activities. All GPOI
allocations and program activities must be approved by the GPOI
Coordination Committee (GCC), the formal decision-making body co-
chaired by State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense. Participants of the GCC include the Joint
Staff and, as required, other program implementers. GPOI implementers
include the U.S. Combatant Commands, State's regional bureaus, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's regional offices, and U.S.
diplomatic posts. The regional combatant commands are the lead
implementers of GPOI activities throughout the world, with the
exception of Africa, where State's Bureau of African Affairs leads
implementation of GPOI activities. Within the African Affairs Bureau,
ACOTA is the lead implementer for the training and equipment portion of
GPOI activities in Africa.
State has designated 52 countries as partner countries eligible to
receive funding for GPOI activities--38 for military peacekeepers, 3
for stability police, and 11 for both military peacekeepers and
stability police, as of April 2008. As figure 1 shows, the majority are
located in Africa (22 countries) and the remaining are in Asia, South
and Central America, Europe, and the Near East and Central Asia. (See
app. II for a list of all GPOI partners.)
Figure 1: Map of GPOI Partner Countries:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the world with the following depiction
indicated for GPOI partner countries:
* Military partner;
* Stability police partner;
* Both military partner and stability police partner.
Source: Map Resources (map); GAO analysis of Department of State data.
[End of figure]
Majority of GPOI Funds Provided for Activities in Africa:
State has allocated $374 million, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal
year 2008, for GPOI activities worldwide, of which it has expended
about $152 million for activities in four major categories: training,
training equipment, deployment assistance, and skills and
infrastructure. As displayed in figure 2, the majority--about $98
million--has been spent[Footnote 10] in Africa, followed by about $30
million in Asia and $12 million in South and Central America. In
Africa, the majority has been spent on training and training equipment
together followed by deployment assistance of equipment and
transportation for deployed peacekeeping missions. In Asia, the
majority has been spent on skills and infrastructure followed by
training. In South and Central America, the majority has been spent on
training equipment followed by activities for building skills and
infrastructure. (App. II identifies the GPOI partner countries in these
geographic regions.)
Figure 2: GPOI Expenditures by Region, as of April 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Region: Africa;
Skills and infrastructure[A] funding: $12.2155 million;
Deployment assistance[B] funding: $28.2742 million;
Training equipment funding: $19.0079 million;
Training funding: $38.8121 million;
Total: $98.3097 million.
Region: Asia;
Skills and infrastructure[A] funding: $15.3522 million;
Deployment assistance[B] funding: $2 million;
Training equipment funding: $3.76712 million;
Training funding: $ 9.22004 million;
Total: $30.33344 million.
Region: South and Central America;
Skills and infrastructure[A] funding: $2.0211 million;
Deployment assistance[B] funding: $0.862212 million;
Training equipment funding: $8.39237 million;
Training funding: $0.263018 million;
Total: $ 11.5387 million.
Region: Europe;
Skills and infrastructure[A] funding: $2.02871 million;
Deployment assistance[B] funding: $2.5 million;
Training equipment funding: $0 million;
Training funding: $4.5 million;
Total: $9.02871 million;
Region: Near East and Central Asia;
Skills and infrastructure[A] funding: 0;
Deployment assistance[B] funding: 0;
Training equipment funding: 0;
Training funding: $2.97781 million;
Total: $2.97781 million.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.
Note: Data for training and equipping in Africa are as of Mar. 15,
2008.
[A] Peacekeeping skills and infrastructure include activities to
enhance the ability of countries to conduct training for their own
peacekeeping mission and improve the capabilities of regional
organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions.
See app. VI for information on the status of these activities in each
region.
[B] Deployment assistance includes expenditures on equipment and
transportation provided for deployed peacekeeping missions.
[End of figure]
State and DOD Provide Training Using a Variety of Means:
Training of military peacekeepers under GPOI can be provided by
contractors, U.S. military active duty personnel, or by trainers from
neighboring countries in the region, and is focused on providing
battalion-level training for peacekeeping missions. U.S. contractors
provide the majority of training in Africa and, when available, U.S.
military active duty personnel serve as mentors to African trainees. In
Asia, U.S. military personnel provide the majority of training but use
contractors to provide some of the training for military officers. In
Central America, training is provided by other countries and by U.S.
military personnel.[Footnote 11] The United States has funded the
training of a few individuals in the Near East and Europe. U.S.
military personnel may serve as mentors to trainees in these regions.
Training has not yet occurred in Central Asia. GPOI training of
stability police is provided at COESPU--Italy's international training
center for peace operations located in Vicenza, Italy, where the
Italian Carabinieri[Footnote 12] train instructors of stability police
units.[Footnote 13]
GPOI Has Made Progress in Meeting Program Goals, but Challenges Remain:
State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI goals in three
principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing
equipment and transportation for deployed missions, and building
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in
meeting these goals. Table 1 summarizes the status of GPOI activities
for the three principal goals and seven objectives. First, State and
DOD have trained about 40,000 military peacekeepers, predominantly in
Africa, and supported the training of over 1,300 stability police, but
it is unlikely that GPOI will meet its goal of training 75,000 military
peacekeepers by 2010 due to the time it takes to expend program funds,
and State and DOD have encountered delays in delivering nonlethal
training equipment.[Footnote 14] Second, State has provided equipment
to deployed missions in Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti; supports an
equipment depot in Sierra Leone; and initiated a process for
peacekeeping countries to request donor assistance for their
transportation and logistics needs, but some efforts have been delayed.
Third, State and DOD have trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeping
instructors and conducted other activities. However, State faces delays
in completing activities to build skills and infrastructure in Africa
by 2010. In addition, State has targeted a smaller share of resources
to build African peacekeeping skills and infrastructure than to train
and equip African peacekeepers, compared to other regions. This is due
in part to the needs and capabilities of the region and a focus on
training peacekeepers in this region for current missions. The
following sections provide more information about the progress made in
these areas.
Table 1: Status of Activities for GPOI Goals and Objectives:
GPOI Goal: Train and equip peacekeepers: Train and equip 75,000
peacekeepers by 2010;
Status of Activities: Trained about 40,000, not on track to train
75,000 by 2010. Expect to meet training goal when all training funds
are fully expended. Problems with procuring and accounting for training
equipment.
GPOI Goal: Train and equip peacekeepers: Provide support to Italy's
International Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU);
Status of Activities: On track to train 3,000 by 2010. Provided
personnel for one staff position at COESPU. Additional positions Italy
requested the United States to fill remain unfilled.
GPOI Goal: Provide equipment and transportation to deployed missions:
Develop a deployment equipment program for quick mobilization of
equipment to support peacekeeping missions;
Status of Activities: Equipment provided to six countries deployed in
four peacekeeping missions. Maintain and provide equipment to depot in
Sierra Leone. Delivery of some equipment has been slow.
GPOI Goal: Provide equipment and transportation to deployed missions:
Work with other G8 members to develop a program for peacekeeping
countries to request donor assistance for transportation and logistics
needs;
Status of Activities: In October 2007, established e-mail communication
system in cooperation with G8 to facilitate requests for assistance.
First request communicated through system in April 2008.
GPOI Goal: Build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure: Enhance the
capacity of regional and subregional organizations;
Status of Activities: In Africa, trained some staff of one regional
organization, provided computer equipment to three regional
peacekeeping centers, and provided equipment for communication systems.
GPOI Goal: Build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure: Conduct
activities that support peacekeeping countries' ability to develop and
maintain their peacekeeping programs;
Status of Activities: Trained 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors,
predominantly in Africa, and refurbished some training facilities in
Central America and Asia. Limited ability in African countries to build
and maintain their own training program.
GPOI Goal: Build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure: Create a
clearinghouse function;
Status of Activities: Supported the establishment of annual conferences
held with G8 and other nations to share information and discuss efforts
to support peacekeeping in Africa. In 2007, held first conference to
discuss worldwide efforts to enhance peacekeeping.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.
[End of table]
Thousands of Military Peacekeepers Trained in Africa, but Challenges
Remain in Supporting Stability Police Training and Providing Training
Equipment:
The majority--92 percent--of military peacekeepers trained under GPOI
are from African partner countries, while the remainder have been
trained in Asia, Central America, and Europe. In addition, State has
supported the training of over 1,300 stability police instructors at
COESPU, providing about one-quarter of the school's budget. However,
State is not likely to train 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 and
has not provided support for all requested staff positions at COESPU.
Further, State has provided about $31 million of training equipment to
military peacekeepers in 27 countries, predominantly in Africa.
However, State has faced challenges in delivering training equipment to
GPOI partner countries in a timely manner and accounting for equipment
delivery.
GPOI Has Supported Training and Equipping of Military Peacekeepers, but
Is Unlikely to Meet Its Goals by 2010:
State and DOD have trained about 40,000 military peacekeepers as of
April 2008--36,968 in Africa; 1,805 in Asia; 455 in Central and South
America; and 289 in Europe (see app. IV for details on the number
trained by region and country). State is not likely to complete the
training of 75,000 military peacekeepers by the target date of 2010. As
figure 3 shows, the actual number of troops trained is lower than
State's projections. State expects to reach its goal once it has spent
all GPOI training funds, but this will likely not occur until after
2010 due to the time it takes to expend training funds. In commenting
on a draft of this report, State asserts that it now expects that GPOI
will train 75,000 peacekeepers by July 2010 based on new training
rates. We were unable to validate State's new projections since as
recently as May 2008, program officials from the GPOI office in the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and its GPOI evaluation team
indicated that slow expenditure rates related to training rates would
delay their efforts to reach the 2010 training goal.
Figure 3: Projected and Actual Number of Trained Military Peacekeepers
by Fiscal Year, as of April 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data:
Fiscal year: 2005;
Projected number to be trained: 12,042
Actual number trained: 12,847.
Fiscal year: 2005-2006;
Projected number to be trained: 31,271;
Actual number trained: 25,743.
Fiscal year: 2005-2007;
Projected number to be trained: 48,449;
Actual number trained: 38,314.
Fiscal year: 2005-2008;
Projected number to be trained: 62,649;
Actual number trained: 39,518.
Fiscal year: 2005-2009;
Projected number to be trained: 75,099;
Actual number trained: [Empty].
Source: State Department data.
[End of figure]
State has spent approximately $56 million to train military
peacekeepers, as of April 2008. Figure 4 shows the expenditures of GPOI
funds for training military peacekeepers by region. The majority of the
funds, about $39 million, have been spent in Africa.
Figure 4: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Military
Peacekeepers, by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April
2008):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Military Peacekeepers, by
Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008):
Africa: $38,812,079 (69.6%);
Asia: $9,220,040 (16.5%);
Europe: $4,500,000 (8.1%);
Near East and Central Asia: $2,977,807 (5.3%);
South and Central America: $263,018 (0.5%).
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.
[End of figure]
In addition to these funds, some of the combatant commands have spent
additional DOD funds to support the State-funded GPOI training. For
example, U.S. Pacific Command officials identified that they spent an
estimated $8 million of additional DOD funds to develop courses for
peacekeeping training and support multinational training exercises held
in Mongolia and Bangladesh.
COESPU Is Likely to Meet Training Goal for Stability Police by 2010
Despite Shortfalls in State's Assistance:
Based on current projections, COESPU has indicated that it is likely to
meet its goal of training 3,000 stability police instructors by 2010.
As of April 2008, State had expended $9 million of $15 million
obligated for COESPU's operations, directly supporting about one-
quarter of COESPU's budget.[Footnote 15] In 2005, the Italians
requested assistance from the United States in filling six staff
positions at COESPU in the areas of management, training, research, and
publications. Since 2005, the United States has provided a military
officer to serve in the deputy director position, but support has not
been provided for the other requested staff positions at COESPU.
According to a February 2008 State document and COESPU and U.S.
officials we met with in Italy, the United States planned to provide
support to fill a total of five staff positions at COESPU: deputy
director, head of the training department for high-level courses,
manager of research for stability police training doctrine, evaluator
of course outcomes, and Web site and magazine manager. In January 2008,
COESPU and U.S. officials we met with in Italy stated that these
positions would help COESPU track the activities of its graduates,
dispatch mobile training teams, and expand the number of students in
each class. In May 2008, State officials in Washington, D.C., indicated
that they plan to fund the position for an evaluator of course outcomes
in the near future. In addition, we found that State does not always
use staff at U.S. missions in partner countries to facilitate U.S.
support to COESPU. For example, an embassy official in Senegal stated
that when COESPU sent a questionnaire to Senegalese officials inquiring
about deployments and training activities of COESPU graduates, State
did not instruct the embassy to follow up and help obtain a response.
State and DOD Have Encountered Problems in Providing and Accounting for
Training Equipment:
State has provided about $31 million in nonlethal training equipment to
military peacekeepers in 27 countries, predominantly in Africa. The
equipment provided includes individual and unit equipment for military
units training for peacekeeping missions, as well as equipment for
COESPU to train stability police instructors. State has encountered
delays in the purchase and delivery of this equipment, often resulting
in State's inability to provide equipment concurrently with training
sessions. Further, State officials have been unable to fully account
for training equipment delivered in Africa.
The equipment provided includes individual equipment such as boots,
first aid kits, and uniforms; and unit equipment such as radios, tents,
and toolkits. (See app. V for more information on the types of training
equipment provided in each region.) As figure 5 shows, the majority of
the equipment was provided to partner countries in Africa. State also
has provided individual training equipment directly to COESPU for
students attending the school. This equipment included nonlethal items
such as riot batons and shields.
Figure 5: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Equipment by Region
(fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Equipment by Region (fiscal
years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008):
Africa: $19,007,914 (61%);
South and Central America: $8,392,374 (27%);
Asia: $3,767,115 (12%).
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.
Note: Near East and Central Asia and Europe expended zero funds for
training in this time period.
[End of figure]
In addition, officials from some of the combatant commands stated that
they use other sources of funds to provide additional equipment to
military peacekeepers. For example, U.S. Central Command officials
identified an estimated $14 million in funds from DOD accounts to
provide items such as body armor, water purification units, vehicles,
and uniform equipment for a peacekeeping brigade in Kazakhstan in
fiscal years 2006 and 2007.
State and DOD have encountered problems in providing training equipment
to partner countries in a timely manner. The procurement of equipment
through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which is responsible
for a large amount of equipment for GPOI, has encountered delays due to
the procurement priorities for U.S. military forces, the time needed to
identify the specific equipment needs for each country, and
manufacturing backlogs. For example, a 2007 State program evaluation
found that only two of several hundred training equipment items
procured through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for Central
America with fiscal year 2005 funds had arrived in country by the end
of 2007, and the delivery dates for the remaining equipment were
unknown. Contractors and agency and host country officials in the
countries we visited in Africa stated that training equipment often is
not concurrently provided with GPOI training, due to the delays in
procurement and delivery. In addition, U.S. officials in Guatemala
stated they had to delay training when equipment was not delivered in
time.
State also has encountered problems in accounting for the delivery and
transfer of equipment to partner countries. Specifically, State
officials in Washington, D.C., have been unable to fully account for
training equipment delivered to Africa. State has used a contractor to
purchase in total approximately $19 million of equipment for African
partner countries but, as of December 2007, could not account for the
equipment's delivery. State officials responsible for implementing the
program in Africa said that they instituted a new system in mid-2007 to
account for the equipment delivered to partner countries. These
officials said that the difficulties with accounting for equipment
deliveries have been due to the fact that the previous system was
poorly organized. In June 2008, these officials stated they had
completed an inventory identifying the equipment items ordered and
delivered using GPOI funds and were now able to fully account for the
entire inventory of equipment purchase.
State Has Provided Equipment and Transportation Support to Deployed
Missions, but Some Efforts Have Been Delayed:
State has provided equipment to deployed missions and recently
established a system to facilitate donor assistance for transport and
logistic support to peacekeeping countries deploying to missions.
However, State has encountered delays in delivering equipment to
missions, similar to the delays in delivering equipment for training.
State has provided equipment to deployed missions in a number of ways.
As figure 6 shows, the majority of this support has been provided to
Africa. In Sierra Leone, since 2005, State has spent over $9 million in
equipment and operational support, for an equipment depot used for
peacekeeping missions and election support by the Economic Community
for West African States (ECOWAS).[Footnote 16] As of April 2008, State
also had provided $18 million of nonlethal equipment for six countries
deploying to missions in Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan. For
example, State provided field kitchens, field medical clinics, water
purification units, and generators to peacekeepers deploying to
Somalia. This equipment helped support the deployment of at least 4,600
peacekeepers, according to State.
Figure 6: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Deployment Assistance by
Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Deployment Assistance by Region:
Africa: $28,274,176 (84%);
Europe: $2,500,000 (7%);
Asia: $2,000,000 (6%);
South and Central America: $862,212 (3%).
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.
Note: Near East and Central Asia expended zero funding in this time
period.
[End of figure]
Although State's goal is to provide equipment to countries deployed to
peacekeeping missions in a timely manner, as of April 2008, $9 million
of equipment obligated since 2005 for countries deployed to missions in
Somalia and Sudan had not been provided by State. For example, State
obligated $9 million in fiscal year 2005 to support Nigeria, Kenya, and
the African Union in the peacekeeping mission to Sudan, but this
equipment was not provided until 2007, according to State reporting,
and $3.6 million remains to be expended. In another example, State
documents indicate that $5.6 million in fiscal year 2006 funds
obligated for the purchase of equipment to support peacekeepers
deployed from Rwanda, Ghana, Burundi, and Nigeria have not yet been
expended.
To facilitate donor support for transportation and logistical needs of
countries deploying peacekeepers, State established an electronic
communication system in the fall of 2007. Requests made by countries
seeking assistance with transportation and equipment for peacekeeping
missions can be sent by e-mail to G8 and other countries that could
provide such assistance. As of April 2008, five potential donor G8
countries have designated a contact person to receive such requests,
according to State. Although the GPOI strategy committed to initiating
the process and establishing an electronic system by 2006, State did
not establish the system until 2007. In April 2008, the first request
for assistance for one country's deployment to the African Union
mission in Somalia was communicated by State to donors through the
system, according to State.
State Has Targeted a Smaller Share of Resources to Build Peacekeeping
Skills and Infrastructure in Africa Compared with Other Regions and
Faces Delays in Completing Activities:
State and DOD have conducted a number of activities to enhance
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure to develop the ability of
countries to conduct training for their own peacekeeping missions and
to improve the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train
for, and execute peacekeeping missions. Although African partners
receive the majority of GPOI funds, State has targeted a smaller share
of resources, comparatively, for activities to build peacekeeping
skills and infrastructure among Africa peacekeepers, in part due to the
needs and capabilities of the region and its focus on training and
equipping peacekeepers to serve in current missions.
State and DOD Have Conducted Activities to Build Skills and
Infrastructure for Peacekeeping:
State and DOD have conducted a range of activities to build
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure among partner countries. (See
app. VI for information on the status of these activities in each
region.) These activities include the following:
* Enhancing the ability of countries to conduct their own peacekeeping
training:
- trained 2,384 military peacekeeping instructors in African countries,
266 in Asian countries, 43 in Central American countries, and 26 in
European countries;
- refurbished training centers in Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan,
Mongolia, and Ukraine; and:
- supported three annual multinational training exercises in Asia
beginning in 2006, enabling peacekeeping units from different countries
to train together.
* Improving the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train
for, and execute peacekeeping missions. These activities include the
following:
- trained ECOWAS staff on mission planning and management;
- provided equipment and supported operations for the ECOWAS equipment
depot;
- provided computer equipment to regional peacekeeping training centers
in Ghana, Kenya, and Mali; and:
- funded training of units from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua, which will serve as a multinational brigade under the
Conference of Central American Armed Forces.
Smaller Proportion of GPOI Resources Have Been Targeted for Skills and
Infrastructure Activities in Africa than in Asia:
State has spent approximately $32 million in building skills and
infrastructure in different regions of the world. As displayed in
figure 7, State has spent more in Asia than Africa on activities that
build skills and infrastructure--about $15 million in Asia and $12
million in Africa--although Africa receives the majority of GPOI funds
overall.
Figure 7: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Building Peacekeeping Skills
and Infrastructure, by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of
April 2008):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Building Peacekeeping Skills and
Infrastructure, by Region:
Asia: $15,352,196 (49%);
Africa: $12,215,476 (39%);
South and Central America: $$2,021,096 (6%);
Europe: $2,028,709 (6%);
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.
Note: Near East and Central Asia expended zero funding in this time
period.
[End of figure]
Further, State has targeted a higher proportion of funds in South and
Central America, Asia, and Europe on building skills and infrastructure
than on training and equipping peacekeepers within those regions. In
support of its goal to build skills and infrastructure, State has spent
51 percent of all funds for Asia in this area, and about 20 percent of
all funds for both South and Central America and Europe. In comparison,
of the $98 million spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on assisting
with peacekeeping skills and infrastructure.[Footnote 17] In response
to our findings, State officials attributed the limited focus of
resources for building skills and infrastructure in Africa to a drop in
funding of more than 20 percent from the funding initially anticipated
in 2005. These officials told us that the program objectives were
developed with the expectation of receiving $660 million and the
decrease in funding to approximately $500 million over 5 years has
influenced program decisions and priorities. In May 2008, State and DOD
officials said that discussions are underway to develop proposals for
future GPOI activities after 2010.
In addition to the funds expended by State, some of the combatant
commands have used DOD funds to support GPOI activities in Asia,
Africa, and Europe. For instance, U.S. Pacific Command officials
identified that they spent about $500,000 in fiscal year 2007 to
supplement the refurbishment of buildings at Mongolia's peacekeeping
training center. In addition, some of the commands assign officers to
serve as liaisons at peacekeeping training centers in other countries.
For instance, U.S. African Command has a liaison officer at a
peacekeeping training center in Ghana, and U.S. European Command has an
officer at a peacekeeping training center in Bosnia.[Footnote 18]
State Faces Delays in Completing Skills and Infrastructure Activities
in Africa:
Activities to build skills and infrastructure in Africa have faced
delays and will likely not be completed by 2010. Specifically, State
faces delays in building African countries' ability to maintain their
training programs, establishing a regional communication system for
ECOWAS and the African Union, and transferring the equipment depot to
ECOWAS. According to State officials, these delays are affected, in
part, by African peacekeeping countries' limited resources and
capabilities for supporting their own peacekeeping programs. State
officials also have noted that the ability these countries have to
support their peacekeeping program is directly affected by the rates of
peacekeeper deployments these countries provide to peacekeeping
missions.
* In two of the African countries we visited, high rates of deployments
of trained instructors limit their ability to build and maintain a
training program. For example, in Senegal, officials stated that
building a cadre of Senegalese instructors was difficult because once
these instructors complete GPOI training, they are frequently deployed
on missions due to their high skill levels.
* The strategic communications system that State established for ECOWAS
member countries is not fully operational. State documents identified
that, while some countries were using the equipment, others had yet to
either receive or use it. In commenting on a draft of this report,
State told us that 11 countries have equipment and 2 are waiting on
equipment delivery. State also obligated $4.5 million to set up a
strategic communications system for the African Union but has been
unable to install the system due to a licensing issue, according to
State.
* The ECOWAS equipment depot in Sierra Leone is likely to continue to
function under joint control of the United States and ECOWAS. State
maintains the depot, including the delivery and maintenance of
nonlethal equipment used by ECOWAS members for peacekeeping and
election support. State intends to transfer full responsibility to
ECOWAS for the maintenance of the depot, according to State officials,
but this is unlikely to happen in the near term. State officials said
that ECOWAS is not fully capable of financing the depot in the near
future and will require U.S. support in the near term for its
operations and maintenance.
More than Half of GPOI-Trained Military Peacekeepers Have Deployed to
Missions, but State Cannot Assess the Quality or Effectiveness of Its
Training Program:
State and DOD provide training on a number of military peacekeeping
skills, and 56 percent of these trained military peacekeepers from 13
countries have deployed to peacekeeping missions, as of April 2008.
[Footnote 19] However, State faces challenges in assessing the quality
and effectiveness of its training program. First, State cannot
ascertain the proficiency of the peacekeepers it has trained against a
standard level of skills taught during their training to determine if
it is providing effective training. Second, State officials are unclear
about their responsibilities for maintaining and recording evaluations
of performance evaluations in the contractor performance system of
contractors who provide training in Africa. Third, State is unable to
fully account for the activities of trained instructors to measure the
program's impact in building countries' capability to continue this
training. Specifically, as of April 2008, State had trained more than
2,700 military instructors and supported the training of over 1,300
stability police instructors at COESPU, but could not identify whether
these instructors subsequently conduct training.
State and DOD Train Military Peacekeeping Units and Support Training of
Stability Police but Cannot Ascertain the Proficiency of Trainees:
State and DOD train military units in peacekeeping skills, primarily to
aid participating countries in their deployment to peacekeeping
operations.[Footnote 20] According to GPOI strategy and agency
officials, the instruction is based on standard tasks identified in
U.S. military training doctrine and UN training materials and is
modified by the partner country's or region's needs, the skill levels
of the soldiers in the unit, and the specific requirements of the
peacekeeping mission. However, State does not have program-wide
standards in place to measure the proficiency of trainees, the quality
of instruction they receive, the performance of deployed trainees, or
the activities of the trained military peacekeeping instructors.
Further, State supports the Italian government, specifically the
Italian Carabinieri, in providing training to stability police
instructors for unit-level police operations on peacekeeping missions.
However, State has no measures in place to identify the training
provided by or the deployments of trained stability police instructors.
Military Peacekeeper Training Consists of U.S. Military and UN Training
Materials:
State and DOD have provided training to military peacekeeping units in
43 of the 52 countries, according to State documents.[Footnote 21]
According to State data, 56 percent of about 40,000 trained military
peacekeepers from 13 countries have deployed to peacekeeping missions,
the majority--97 percent--from African countries. Training is focused
on providing peacekeeping skills to military units to assist
preparation for deployment to a specific peacekeeping mission and is
intended to supplement training already provided by the partner
country.[Footnote 22] According to GPOI strategy and agency officials,
GPOI implementers use relevant U.S. military doctrine to develop
training instruction for military tasks. As displayed in table 2,
training for these military units includes categories such as tactical
skills for peacekeeping, medical care issues, and interaction with
civilian groups and organizations, which contain a variety of
peacekeeping tasks. For example, DOD and State provide instruction on
tactical peacekeeping tasks such as how to escort a convoy, conduct
checkpoint operations, or guard fixed sites. In addition, training of
military peacekeepers in Africa may include instruction on firearms
safety and marksmanship when training in such skills is identified as a
need of that unit or country's military peacekeepers.[Footnote 23]
Military peacekeeper training also includes standardized training
identified by the United Nations, such as basic information about the
United Nations, UN structure and capabilities, issues regulating the
behavior of the individual peacekeeper, standard operations procedures,
logistics, medical support, and human rights.
Table 2: Peacekeeping Tasks Included in GPOI Military Skill Training:
Category: Tactical peacekeeping;
Types of Tasks:
* Escorting convoys;
* Patrolling;
* Checkpoint operations;
* Guarding fixed sites;
* Operating a disarmament operation;
* Reacting to insurgents and improvised explosive devices;
* Marking unexploded ordinance.
Category: Civil-military relations;
Types of Tasks:
* Securing noncombatants;
* Evacuating noncombatants;
* Reacting to civil disturbances.
Category: Medical care;
Types of Tasks:
* Treating casualties;
* Evacuating casualties.
Category: Press and information operations;
Types of Tasks:
* Interacting with the media.
Category: UN organization and standards;
Types of Tasks:
* Understanding gender and sexual exploitation issues.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State training documents.
Note: This table is not intended to serve as an exhaustive list of
available peacekeeping tasks.
[End of table]
Military officers also are provided training in planning and managing
battalion functions during peacekeeping operations. For example,
officers are introduced to skills needed to plan and execute the
protection of a fixed site, such as a food distribution site or
protecting a convoy. In Africa, State provides more detailed training
in military staff skills than in Asia, in response to the level of
capabilities and needs of the peacekeeping units. For example, training
of peacekeeping military officers in Africa includes instruction on the
basic roles and responsibilities of officers staffed to a battalion.
While there are some consistencies across the regions in the curriculum
available, military peacekeepers do not receive the same training in
all regions. Regional implementers have developed a training curriculum
that is generally based on tasks identified in U.S. military doctrine
and UN training materials, which are modified to address the specific
needs or desires of the region or country. Identified training
instruction is further modified or adapted for each training session to
meet the identified needs of the partner country, skill levels of the
individuals in the unit to be trained, and the requirements of the
specific peacekeeping mission, according to training officials and
State and DOD program implementers.
COESPU Training Tailored to General Topics of Instruction for Stability
Police Units:
COESPU has trained stability police instructors from 13 countries,
providing training at two levels--senior-and junior-level officers or
their civilian equivalents. Training for junior-level instructors is
focused on the leaders of a stability police unit, while senior-level
training is focused on the overall leadership of stability police
operations. Courses in both levels include instruction on peace support
operations, tactics, stability police operations, humanitarian law,
international law, territorial awareness, and first aid. The Italian
government developed the COESPU curriculum to provide general
instruction for unit-level police operations on peacekeeping missions
rather than tailoring the curriculum to specific missions. The 5-week
senior-level course instructs course participants on the management of
stability police operations as well as tactical instruction on shooting
and driving. The 7-week junior-level course includes tactical courses
on crowd control, urban area patrolling, high-risk arrests, VIP
security, fire fighting, shooting, driving, and personal defense. The
junior-level course also contains a simulation where course
participants practice their skills in the training area.
State Cannot Assess the Proficiency of Trainees to Determine if
Capabilities Are Comparable to Other GPOI-Trained Peacekeepers:
State does not have an established process for measuring the
proficiency of trainees who receive similar types of training. GPOI
trainers conduct training exercises and use after-action reviews and
their professional judgment to determine students' ability to perform
tasks as a unit during a training course. However, State and DOD do not
evaluate the military peacekeeper trainees against a program-wide
standard level of proficiency in the skills taught during their
training. For example, the evaluation process to assess a unit's
proficiency in operating a checkpoint depends on the instructor's
judgment, and the information is not collected in a way that can be
compared against other trained units. Rather, a participant is
considered a GPOI-trained peacekeeper if he or she attends 80 percent
of the training GPOI provides.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State noted that an individual
participant is considered a GPOI-trained peacekeeper if his or her unit
masters 80 percent of the training GPOI provides. However, according to
the GPOI strategy and reporting provided by the GPOI evaluation team,
implementers and trainers collect information that identifies
individuals that participated in at least 80 percent of the training
curriculum. Furthermore, the GPOI strategy states that the number of
individuals who participate in unit training may be counted toward the
goal of 75,000 if individuals are present for 80 percent or more of the
unit training. In addition, implementers we met with told us that
participants are counted as trained if they participate in at least 80
percent of the training curriculum. State provided one example in which
50 students from one country participating in two training courses were
not counted as GPOI-trained because it was determined that the
personnel were not sufficiently trained due to poor English language
ability.
Training and program officials in the countries we visited stated that,
although they are not required to test students, they use their
professional judgment as former or current U.S. military personnel to
monitor students' performance and determine if more time should be
spent in developing certain skills, when possible. According to
training documents, after receiving instruction in tactical
peacekeeping tasks, trainees perform the task as a unit, and the
instructors are to observe their performance and determine how the unit
is performing against a standard checklist of items. For example,
during an exercise for securing a distribution site, instructors will
observe the training to judge if the unit follows proper procedures to
control a crowd, set up checkpoints and observation points for the
distribution area, and report incident information. Trainers in
Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal stated that the intent of the training is
to expose students to the tasks they need for peacekeeping, although
they are not expected to achieve a specific level of proficiency in the
skills taught. Military troops from Ghana and Senegal account for 44
percent of the deployed GPOI-trained troops. In addition, State
officials told us that although instructors follow training standards,
the evaluation process of training is subjective and a unit's
performance is affected by the skills and capabilities the soldiers
bring to the training.
The 2006 GPOI strategy states that GPOI program management personnel
were in the process of developing military task lists and related
trainings standards to contribute to standardization, interoperability,
and sustainability, and ensure the proper use of resources. The
strategy also states that developing such standards would help efforts
to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the GPOI training program,
events, and activities. However, during the course of our review State
officials were unable to provide program-wide standards against which
they could collect assessments to identify and evaluate the overall
proficiency in comparable peacekeeping skills provided by GPOI to
trainees worldwide. In commenting on a draft of this report, State
stated that the program currently does not have standard military task
lists and associated training standards to specify tasks, conditions,
and standards for different types of military units participating in
peacekeeping operations but that steps are being taken to develop
training standards and military task lists that would be used as a
basis to develop training plans and assess trainees. Such an evaluation
would provide a measure with which to evaluate data that may be
collected to identify the quality of the military peacekeepers GPOI has
trained.
Another measure of trainees' performance is how a unit performs during
a peacekeeping mission. However, State and DOD are unable to collect
assessments of peacekeepers' performance during a mission. GPOI
trainers in Senegal, Ghana, and Ethiopia said they occasionally receive
UN after-action reports that provide feedback on the performance of
military peacekeepers trained by GPOI. However, State and DOD do not
routinely collect or analyze these reports or independently assess how
GPOI-trained troops performed. Without consistent reporting on the
performance of the deployed units, State is unable to compare the
performance of units trained within a country or region or between
regions to identify similarities in the proficiency of military
peacekeepers trained by GPOI.
State Has Procedures for Monitoring Contractors Providing Training in
Africa but Officials Are Unclear about Their Responsibility for
Recording and Maintaining Performance Evaluations:
State has some procedures in place to monitor whether contractors are
meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements in training
peacekeepers and providing advisor support. Specifically, State has
assigned personnel in its Bureau of African Affairs to monitor the
performance of contractors providing advisor support in Africa,
established a program management team to oversee the activities of
contractors providing training in Africa,[Footnote 24] and developed a
plan to regularly monitor contractor performance. In addition, State
receives regular status reports from the contractors.
Quality assurance, especially regular surveillance and documentation of
results, is essential to determine whether goods or services provided
by the contractor satisfy the contract requirements. Surveillance
includes oversight of a contractor's work to provide assurance that the
contractor is providing timely and quality goods or services and to
help mitigate any contractor performance problems. An agency's
monitoring of a contractor's performance may serve as a basis for past
performance evaluations that are considered during future source
selections. State has a plan for monitoring and evaluating the
performance of its contractors providing training in Africa. The
quality assurance plan specifies the desired outcomes of the training
provided, performance standards that the contractors are to meet, and
State's process for evaluating contractors' performance.
Although State's quality assurance plan identifies the process for
evaluating contractors' performance, State officials implementing the
program are unclear which office at State is responsible for recording
the evaluation in the contractor performance system, as required by
State regulations.[Footnote 25] State's contracting officials were
uncertain whether evaluations of past contractor performance for
training in Africa had been entered in the system by the program
management team. An official from the ACOTA program management team
told us they are not responsible for entering performance evaluations
in the contractor performance system, in part because they are unable
to access the system. However, evaluations of contractor past
performance are prepared and maintained by this team, according to this
official. State provided some evidence that indicated that evaluations
of contractors' past performance had been prepared by the ACOTA program
management team and considered when new task orders were placed on the
existing contract for training in Africa. However, we did not fully
assess the extent to which the evaluations of contractors' performance
had been completed and considered in awarding training task orders. We
did not examine State's compliance with its performance plan and the
extent to which past performance evaluations were used to award
training task orders.
State Cannot Identify the Outcomes of the Training Program:
State cannot fully account for the training activities of more than
2,700 military peacekeeping instructors trained by the GPOI program.
Further, State has supported the training of more than 1,300 stability
police instructors at COESPU but cannot account for either the training
or the deployment activities of these instructors.
State Is Unable to Identify whether Military Peacekeeping Instructors
Are Conducting Training as Intended:
The activities of trained instructors provide a measure for the
progress made in building a partner country's capacity to sustain its
peacekeeper deployments in the future. Although State and DOD have
trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeper instructors to continue
training in their respective countries, State cannot fully determine
whether this training has taken place. For example, as of April 2008,
State had only been able to identify training that had occurred by GPOI-
trained instructors for two countries.[Footnote 26] The deployment of
peacekeepers trained by these instructors is another measure of the
program's ability to increase peacekeeping contributions. In March
2008, 47 GPOI partner countries had military peacekeepers and observers
deployed to UN peacekeeping missions. State cannot fully identify how
many troops from these 47 countries, if any, were trained by the 2,700
GPOI-trained military peacekeeping instructors.
State Is Unable to Identify the Extent to Which Stability Police
Instructors Are Conducting Training and Deploying to Peacekeeping
Missions:
COESPU has estimated that instructors trained at its training program
will train an additional 4,500 stability police, according to COESPU
documents and officials. The training activities of COESPU graduates
are one measure of the efforts by Italy and the United States to
increase worldwide capacity for stability police. Although State has
supported the training of more than 1,300 stability police instructors
at COESPU, State and COESPU have been unable to fully account for
training conducted by these instructors in their home countries.
Specifically, State has only been able to account for the indigenous
training of one stability police unit conducted by COESPU graduates
from one country, according to a State document.
State and COESPU also are unable to identify if stability police units
deploying to peacekeeping missions were trained by graduates from
COESPU or if these graduates have deployed to missions themselves.
First, State has been able to account only for the deployment of a
stability police unit from the one country in which the unit was
trained by graduates of COESPU, as of April 2008. Second, although
COESPU has trained some instructors that are likely to lead stability
police units in peacekeeping operations, State and COESPU cannot fully
account for the deployments of these instructors. Specifically, State
can account for the deployments of 13 of 236 students from India who
were trained at COESPU, as of April 2008.
GPOI Partner Countries Generally Meet Program Criteria, but in Some
Cases State Did Not Screen Trainees for Potential Violations of Human
Rights:
According to the GPOI strategy and State officials, before countries
and their peacekeepers can receive GPOI training and other assistance,
they must generally meet certain criteria including having an elected
government, an acceptable human rights record, and the willingness to
participate in peace support operations. GPOI partner countries
generally met the criteria for inclusion in the program. However, for
24 of the 52 countries, State's human rights reports for 2007
identified human rights violations by security personnel. To comply
with U.S. laws, State must verify that it does not have credible
evidence that the foreign security forces identified to receive
assistance have committed gross violations of human rights prior to the
provision of training.[Footnote 27] We found that military peacekeepers
and stability police were not always screened or were not properly
screened for human rights abuses, as required by State guidance for the
legislative requirements.
GPOI Partner Countries Generally Meet Program Criteria:
State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries to
participate in GPOI based on a list of criteria identified in the
program's strategy.[Footnote 28] Partner countries should have an
elected government and acceptable human rights record, willingness to
participate in peace support operations, and agreements to ensure that
U.S. training and equipment are used for the purposes intended,
according to agency documents.
State and DOD periodically review whether partner countries continue to
meet these criteria and may suspend GPOI funding in cases where
criteria are not met, according to agency officials. For example,
funding of GPOI activities for Thailand was suspended after a military
coup overthrew the democratically elected government in 2006.[Footnote
29] However, some DOD officials expressed concern about the selection
of certain countries and the criteria used to select countries. For
example, officials in the African and Pacific commands and the Joint
Staff said they did not agree with the selection of two countries in
Africa and Asia and they felt it would limit available resources for
ongoing activities in other countries. In another example, a DOD
official said that additional criteria, such as the military HIV
infection rates or attrition rates, should be taken into account in
selecting partner countries because these factors affect the country's
ability to deploy. For the training of stability police at COESPU,
Italy and the United States jointly decided which countries would
participate.
We found that most of the 52 partner countries met the participation
criteria, but 24 countries had identified human rights violations by
security personnel in State's human rights reporting for 2007.[Footnote
30] State officials cited a number of reasons to justify the inclusion
of these countries in GPOI: State did not consider the human rights
violations for some countries to be a systemic problem in the military
or stated that these violations were associated with private security
companies, not with the countries' military personnel;[Footnote 31]
some countries were selected to support other strategic goals; and
participation would allow some countries to receive human rights
training not otherwise available. In addition, State officials said
that the selection criteria are recommended but not required by the
program and the United States engaged in diplomatic discussions with
these countries to improve their human rights records. These officials
indicated that the vetting of trainees for human rights abuses guards
against the training of any human rights violators. Finally, State also
formally submits a list of GPOI partner countries each year to Congress
to ensure that Congress has oversight over the list of partner
countries.
State Did Not Properly Screen and Did Not Always Follow Its Guidance
for Human Rights Vetting:
Before providing any training or equipment support under GPOI, State
must verify that it does not have credible evidence that the foreign
security forces identified to receive assistance have committed gross
violations of human rights. In our review of vetting documentation of
2007 GPOI trainees from 14 countries[Footnote 32] identified in State
reporting to have documented human rights violations by security
personnel, we found cases where individuals and units that received
training were not properly vetted.
Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts from 1998 to
2006 included a provision, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment,
that restricted the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts
to any foreign security unit when the Secretary of State has credible
evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights.
In the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, the Foreign
Assistance Act was permanently amended to restrict the provision of
assistance to foreign security units when credible evidence exists of
gross violations of human rights by that unit. While the legal
provisions restrict funding to "any unit of the security forces of a
foreign country," State guidance is to screen or vet individuals who
are identified for individual training or who are members of newly
formed or composite units.[Footnote 33] Should an entire existing unit
receive the training together, State guidance requires vetting of the
unit name and commander only. To implement these legislative
restrictions, State's guidance calls for U.S. embassies and State
bureaus to screen individuals or units proposed for training to
determine whether these foreign security forces have committed gross
human rights violations.
We found that State did not vet some individuals and units for human
rights violations before training. Specifically, all 81 military
peacekeepers who received training in 2007 from Honduras were not
vetted before participating in GPOI-funded training courses. In
addition, 16 military peacekeepers and stability police from
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka were not vetted
out of 382 trained in those countries in 2007, and a 665-person
Nigerian battalion trained by GPOI was not vetted. In response to our
findings, State officials have begun the vetting process for the
individuals from Honduras who received GPOI training. We also found
that some individuals who received training in 2007 were not screened
in accordance with State's guidance for vetting newly formed or
composite units. Specifically, the commanders of seven composite units
in Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda and the commander of the ECOWAS standby
force were screened for human rights violations, but the individual
members of these units were not vetted, as required by State guidance.
As a result of these lapses in vetting, it is possible that State and
DOD have provided training to security personnel who committed human
rights violations.
State and DOD officials in the countries we visited said they face
challenges in conducting vetting prior to training due to the
difficulties both in getting the names of individuals in units prior to
training and in having sufficient time to properly conduct vetting in
the country and in Washington, D.C. State officials in the ACOTA office
told us they have taken corrective action to prevent further vetting
oversights by creating a new position in their office that would be
responsible, in part, for monitoring the vetting data for all training
provided in Africa.
Conclusions:
The growth of peace support operations has increased the importance and
need for more comprehensive measures to ensure worldwide capability and
capacity for responding to peacekeeping demands. The United States has
taken the lead in the G8 goal to build this peacekeeping capability
worldwide through GPOI. Since 2005, State and DOD, focusing the
majority of GPOI resources on efforts in Africa, have undertaken
numerous activities to increase countries' ability to serve in
peacekeeping missions, including the training of nearly 40,000 military
peacekeepers. However, it appears that GPOI will fall short of reaching
certain established goals, such as training 75,000 military
peacekeepers by 2010. State also has faced some challenges in
supporting COESPU's need for additional staff, accounting for the
delivery and transfer of nonlethal training equipment to partner
countries, evaluating the quality and effectiveness of its training
program, and screening trainees for human rights abuses. Addressing
these challenges will enhance GPOI's effectiveness as the program nears
the end of its 5-year authorization and will help ensure that U.S.
resources are focused on building partner countries' capabilities to
provide quality peacekeepers worldwide. To meet the G8 commitment to
expand global capabilities for peace support operations, GPOI
activities that extend beyond 2010 will require more emphasis on
developing the capabilities of African partners to maintain
peacekeeping operations on their own.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To enhance GPOI's effectiveness, better identify program outcomes, and
ensure proper screening for human rights violations, we recommend that
the Secretary of State take the following six actions:
1. Work in consultation with DOD to assist Italy in staffing the key
unfilled positions at COESPU to better evaluate progress made and
monitor results.
2. Monitor implementation of new procedures to account for delivery and
transfer of nonlethal training equipment to partner countries on an
ongoing basis.
3. Provide additional guidance to U.S. missions to help the United
States and Italy collect data on the training and deployment activities
of COESPU graduates in their home countries.
4. Develop and implement, in consultation with DOD and in accordance
with the GPOI strategy, the use of standard military task lists and
related training standards to enable program managers to evaluate the
quality of training and measure the proficiency of trainees program-
wide.
5. Ensure that the evaluations of contractor performance of training in
Africa are properly recorded into the contractor performance system as
required by agency regulations.
6. Develop a system for monitoring the vetting activities for all GPOI
training and ensure that all individuals in composite units are vetted
for human rights violations, as required by State policy.
To ensure that GPOI activities enhance the capabilities of countries to
maintain peacekeeping operations on their own, we also recommend that
the Secretary of State, in consultation with DOD, take the following
two actions:
1. Assess estimated resources and time frames needed to complete
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010.
2. Ensure that any plans for extending GPOI activities beyond 2010
identify sufficient resources for developing long-term peacekeeping
skills and infrastructure in Africa.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State and
Defense. We received written comments from State and DOD, which we have
reprinted in appendixes VII and VIII, respectively. State and DOD
provided technical comments which we have incorporated in the report,
as appropriate.
State concurred or partially concurred with seven of the eight GAO
recommendations and provided additional information to highlight the
program's achievements. State did not concur with GAO's recommendation
to develop a method for evaluating GPOI training. State notes that
methods already exist to evaluate the quality of the training program
and measure the proficiency of trainees. We disagree that State's
current evaluation methods address our recommendation. State has not
developed military task lists and associated training that can be
applied at all GPOI training sites; sites currently use varying
standards to assess the proficiency of trainees. DOD agrees with the
need for greater standardization and more analysis of trainee
performance. We modified the recommendation to clarify the need for
GPOI-wide standard military tasks and related training that State, in
consultation with DOD, should develop in accordance with the
commitments made in the GPOI strategy. State also commented that it now
projects that GPOI will train 75,000 peacekeepers by July 2010 based on
new training rates. We were unable to validate State's new data since
as recently as May 2008, program officials indicated that slow
expenditure rates would delay State's efforts to reach the 2010
training goal.
DOD agreed with the findings and concurred or partially concurred with
our recommendations. DOD agreed with the need for greater
standardization and more analysis of trainee performance and agreed
that State should work with DOD and Italy to validate personnel
shortfalls at COESPU and fill the identified positions. DOD also stated
that an assessment of resources and time frames required to achieve
GPOI objectives should apply to all regions engaged by the GPOI
program. We did not revise this recommendation because it is intended
to address our finding that State is unlikely to complete skills and
infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and
Defense. We will also make copies available to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IX.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In response to a congressional mandate in the fiscal year 2008 Defense
Authorization Act to review the Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI), we assessed (1) the progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2)
whether State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness
of the training program, and (3) the extent to which countries meet
program criteria and whether program participants are adequately
screened for human rights abuses. We attended a planning conference in
October 2007 in Washington, D.C., for GPOI implementers and an October
2007 conference with Group of Eight (G8) members and other partners to
discuss worldwide efforts to enhance peacekeeping.
Our scope of work included the Departments of State (State) and Defense
(DOD) in Washington, D.C.; U.S. Combatant Commands for Africa, Europe,
Pacific, and Southern Hemisphere; and site visits to Ethiopia, Ghana,
Guatemala, Italy, Mongolia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. We observed
training and visited facilities refurbished with GPOI funds during site
visits to Ghana, Guatemala, Italy, Mongolia, and Senegal. In selecting
field work countries, we considered the following criteria: funding
allocations, number of military peacekeepers trained, number of trained
peacekeepers that have deployed to missions, training schedules, and
unique characteristics, such as the location of Italy's training school
for stability police and the equipment depot in Sierra Leone. We
selected these countries in Africa, Asia, and Central America because
they had received more funding allocations and had trained and deployed
more troops than other GPOI partner countries in those regions and also
were scheduled to conduct training during our visits. We selected Italy
to assess U.S. support to stability police training at the Center of
Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), Germany to interview
officials from the U.S. European and African commands, Sierra Leone to
assess the GPOI equipment depot, and Ethiopia to assess GPOI activities
with the African Union.
To assess the progress GPOI made in meeting its goals, we reviewed data
gathered by State on the number of troops trained and the equipment
provided, reports from agencies and COESPU of activities at COESPU, and
monthly and annual progress reports. We compared the information in
these sources with benchmarks established in the GPOI strategy for the
goals and objectives of the program. In addition, we collected and
reviewed information on obligations and expenditures of GPOI funds and
surveyed the combatant commands responsible for implementing GPOI to
estimate any additional funds they used to support GPOI activities. To
assess the reliability of State's data on troops trained and equipment
provided, as well as obligations and expenditures, we reviewed relevant
documentation and spoke with agency officials, including the GPOI
program assessment team, about data quality control procedures. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report.
To determine whether State is consistently assessing the quality and
effectiveness of the GPOI training program, we identified the training
provided and determined what training assessments were conducted. We
reviewed training programs of instruction, training contracts and task
orders, and related training documents. We also interviewed State and
DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and during site visits to the
countries listed, as well as trainers in Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala,
Mongolia, and Senegal. To identify the training provided at COESPU, we
reviewed training documents and conducted interviews with Italian
officials at COESPU. To identify the measures that State has in place
to oversee contractor activities for training and advisor support in
Africa, we reviewed contracts and related documents and interviewed
State officials, including officials from the Office of Acquisitions
Management and the Bureau of African Affairs.
To identify the activities of trained instructors and stability police,
we reviewed data gathered by State on the deployments of trained
military peacekeepers, including instructors and stability police
instructors, and data gathered by State and COESPU on the training
activities of these instructors. We also interviewed Italian officials
at COESPU, State officials, and training officials and contractors. We
reviewed relevant documentation and spoke with agency officials,
including the GPOI program assessment team, about data quality control
procedures. We identified a limitation in the data on deployments of
trained peacekeepers. State is not able to obtain the individual names
of those who deploy to compare with the rosters of those trained under
GPOI. However, based on the fact that State can identify which of the
units trained under GPOI has deployed, and that any individual who
joins the peacekeeping unit subsequent to its training by GPOI may
receive additional training from their unit officers, we determined
that the data on military peacekeepers deployed were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of reporting the deployments of GPOI-trained
peacekeeping. For the data on the activities of instructors trained
under GPOI, we found that State and COESPU did not have complete or
reliable data for the purposes of identifying comprehensive information
about the training activities of these individuals in their home
country. We also found that COESPU and State did not have sufficient
information to identify the deployment or training activities of
stability police instructors trained at COESPU.
To determine the extent to which countries meet program criteria and
whether participants are adequately screened for human rights abuses,
we examined the GPOI strategy and interviewed State and DOD officials
in Washington, D.C., and during site visits to the countries listed
previously. To determine how human rights violations were taken into
account, we compared State's 2007 human rights reports, which
identified countries with documented human rights violations by
security personnel, with the list of GPOI partner countries. We also
reviewed State's human rights reports to identify whether partner
countries had an elected government. To determine whether GPOI
countries showed a willingness to deploy, we examined which countries
had deployed troops on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. To
ensure that end-use and re-transfer provisions for equipment and
training were agreed to, we reviewed whether Section 505 agreements
were signed with each of the countries.[Footnote 34] We interviewed
State officials and collected additional information for countries that
did not clearly meet some of these criteria. In addition, we reviewed
State documents identifying human rights vetting procedures. We
selected 14 countries with documented human rights violations by
security forces that received training in 2007 and assessed whether
individuals and units trained in these countries were vetted for human
rights violations. To do this, we compared vetting records from State
for the training provided to individuals and units from these countries
with the training rosters provided by State.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to June 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GPOI Partner Countries:
There are 52 countries that received GPOI training, equipment, or other
support to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities and contributions.
Table 3 provides a list of partner countries that received support for
their military peacekeeping, stability police, or both, from 2004 to
2008, as of April 2008.
Table 3: GPOI Partner Countries 2004 to 2008, as of April 2008:
Country/Organization: Africa: Angola;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Benin;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Botswana;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner:[Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Burkina Faso;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Burundi;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Cameroon;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check].
Country/Organization: Africa: Ethiopia;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Gabon;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Ghana;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Kenya;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check].
Country/Organization: Africa: Malawi;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Mali;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check].
Country/Organization: Africa: Mozambique;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Namibia;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Niger;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Nigeria;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check].
Country/Organization: Africa: Rwanda;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Senegal;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check].
Country/Organization: Africa: South Africa;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check].
Country/Organization: Africa: Tanzania;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Uganda;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Africa: Zambia;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Europe: Albania;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Europe: Macedonia;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Europe: Romania;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check].
Country/Organization: Europe: Serbia;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Check];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Europe: Ukraine;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check].
Country/Organization: Near East and Central Asia: Jordan;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check].
Country/Organization: Near East and Central Asia: Morocco[A];
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Check];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Near East and Central Asia: Kazakhstan;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Near East and Central Asia: Tajikistan;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Asia: Bangladesh;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Asia: Cambodia;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Asia: Fiji[A];
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Asia: India;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Check];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Asia: Indonesia;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check].
Country/Organization: Asia: Malaysia;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Asia: Mongolia;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Asia: Nepal;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Asia: Pakistan;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check].
Country/Organization: Asia: Philippines;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Asia: Sri Lanka;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Asia: Thailand;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: South and Central America: Belize;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: South and Central America: Chile;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: South and Central America: El Salvador;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: South and Central America: Guatemala;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: South and Central America: Honduras;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: South and Central America: Nicaragua;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: South and Central America: Paraguay;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: South and Central America: Peru;
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check];
Stability police partner: [Empty];
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty].
Country/Organization: Total: 52 countries;
Military peacekeeping partner: 38 countries;
Stability police partner: 3 countries;
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: 11 countries.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] Morocco and Fiji are not currently GPOI partner countries.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: International Contributions to 2004 G8 Summit Goal and
GPOI:
The members of the G8 and other nations have supported the commitments
of the 2004 G8 Summit and GPOI.[Footnote 35] The information below
provides additional information on the nature of contributions made by
the international community but does not provide a comprehensive list
of all contributions made by the G8 and other nations.
G8 nations have contributed to peace support operations in a number of
ways, including the training and equipping of military peacekeepers,
individual police, and stability police; supporting the development of
peacekeeping doctrine; providing funding to support national and
regional peacekeeping training centers; providing funding and
logistical support to regional organizations; and establishing a
stability police training school. For example, three G8 nations have
provided instructors to the COESPU, according to State and COESPU
officials. In another example, countries have provided equipment to
support the troops deployed to peacekeeping missions. Contributions of
G8 nations are largely for activities in Africa or in support of
peacekeeping missions in this region, according to State documents.
According to State, in 2007, the G8 and other nations identified 760
peacekeeping-related programs, events, and activities that member
states were conducting in Africa alone.
The G8 and other nations also have directly contributed to the U.S.
GPOI program. According to State, 19 countries have contributed to the
U.S. program, primarily by providing training instructors to support
GPOI-funded training.[Footnote 36] For example, 4 countries provided
instructors to the Central American peacekeeper training school in
Guatemala and 14 countries provided instructors to the multilateral
peacekeeper training exercises held in Mongolia in 2006 and 2007. State
paid travel costs for all the training instructors for the Central
American training. For the Mongolia exercises, seven countries paid
their own way, and State and DOD paid for the remaining countries.
Two countries also have provided funding and personnel support directly
to State for GPOI. Specifically, the Netherlands has committed to
provide State with $7 million per year for 3 years, to be used for
peacekeeping training and equipment activities in Africa. According to
State officials, about $5.3 million was received at the end of 2007,
and they expect to receive the remaining $1.7 million for 2007 in the
near term. State officials in the Bureau of African Affairs told us
that two additional countries have indicated plans to provide a total
of about $37 million directly to State to support peacekeeping missions
in Darfur and Somalia.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Training and Peacekeeping Deployments of GPOI Partners:
State and DOD have trained nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers from a
total of 43 countries and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). As of April 2008, about 56 percent of GPOI-trained military
peacekeepers have deployed to peacekeeping missions, and the majority
have deployed from African partner countries.[Footnote 37] As table 4
shows, of the 39,518 military peacekeepers trained by GPOI, almost
22,000 have deployed to peacekeeping missions.[Footnote 38] According
to State, these peacekeepers have deployed to 12 United Nations or
African Union missions, as well as other missions not supported by the
UN or the African Union. African partner countries have deployed the
majority of GPOI-trained military peacekeepers--97 percent or 21,435--
and the remaining 3 percent have deployed from partner countries in
Asia. An additional 6,277 military peacekeepers from African partner
countries were trained in anticipation of deployments to UN missions in
the near future, according to State reporting.
Table 4: Military Peacekeepers Trained by GPOI and Deployed, by Country
and Region (as of April 2008):
GPOI partner: Africa: Benin;
Peacekeepers trained: 2,519;
Peacekeepers deployed: 2,053.
GPOI partner: Africa: Botswana;
Peacekeepers trained: 165;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Africa: Burkina Faso;
Peacekeepers trained: 1,890;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Africa: Cameroon;
Peacekeepers trained: 12;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Africa: Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)[A];
Peacekeepers trained: 288;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Africa: Gabon;
Peacekeepers trained: 1,393;
Peacekeepers deployed: 202.
GPOI partner: Africa: Ghana;
Peacekeepers trained: 3,853;
Peacekeepers deployed: 2,920.
GPOI partner: Africa: Kenya;
Peacekeepers trained: 86;
Peacekeepers deployed: 39.
GPOI partner: Africa: Malawi;
Peacekeepers trained: 1,073;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Africa: Mali;
Peacekeepers trained: 997;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Africa: Mozambique;
Peacekeepers trained: 1,029;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Africa: Namibia;
Peacekeepers trained: 882;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Africa: Niger;
Peacekeepers trained: 1,157;
Peacekeepers deployed: 666.
GPOI partner: Africa: Nigeria;
Peacekeepers trained: 4,988;
Peacekeepers deployed: 3,758.
GPOI partner: Africa: Rwanda;
Peacekeepers trained: 4,903;
Peacekeepers deployed: 4,811.
GPOI partner: Africa: Senegal;
Peacekeepers trained: 7,888;
Peacekeepers deployed: 6,833.
GPOI partner: Africa: South Africa;
Peacekeepers trained: 243;
Peacekeepers deployed: 98.
GPOI partner: Africa: Tanzania;
Peacekeepers trained: 971;
Peacekeepers deployed: 55.
GPOI partner: Africa: Uganda;
Peacekeepers trained: 1,955;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Africa: Zambia;
Peacekeepers trained: 676;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Subtotal Africa;
Peacekeepers trained: 36,968;
Peacekeepers deployed: 21,435.
GPOI partner: Asia: Bangladesh;
Peacekeepers trained: 128;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: Brunei[B];
Peacekeepers trained: 6;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: Cambodia;
Peacekeepers trained: 173;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: Fiji;
Peacekeepers trained: 47;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: India[B];
Peacekeepers trained: 47;
Peacekeepers deployed: 45.
GPOI partner: Asia: Indonesia;
Peacekeepers trained: 208;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: Laos[B];
Peacekeepers trained: 1;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: Malaysia;
Peacekeepers trained: 116;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: Mongolia;
Peacekeepers trained: 629;
Peacekeepers deployed: 497.
GPOI partner: Asia: Nepal;
Peacekeepers trained: 11;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: Philippines;
Peacekeepers trained: 8;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: Singapore[B];
Peacekeepers trained: 10;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: Sri Lanka;
Peacekeepers trained: 58;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: Thailand;
Peacekeepers trained: 278;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Asia: Tonga[B];
Peacekeepers trained: 85;
Peacekeepers deployed: 19.
GPOI partner: Subtotal Asia;
Peacekeepers trained: 1,805;
Peacekeepers deployed: 561.
GPOI partner: South and Central America:
Belize; Peacekeepers trained: 2;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: South and Central America: El Salvador;
Peacekeepers trained: 24;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: South and Central America: Guatemala;
Peacekeepers trained: 306;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: South and Central America: Honduras;
Peacekeepers trained: 87;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: South and Central America: Nicaragua;
Peacekeepers trained: 36;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Subtotal South and Central America;
Peacekeepers trained: 455;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Europe: Albania;
Peacekeepers trained: 254;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Peacekeepers trained: 1;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Europe: Ukraine;
Peacekeepers trained: 34;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Subtotal for Europe;
Peacekeepers trained: 289;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Near East and Central Asia: Jordan;
Peacekeepers trained: 1;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Subtotal Near East and Central Asia;
Peacekeepers trained: 1;
Peacekeepers deployed: 0.
GPOI partner: Total;
Peacekeepers trained: 39,518;
Peacekeepers deployed: 21,996[C].
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] Training for ECOWAS was for the commander and staff of the Standby
Force Headquarters. Multiple countries participated in these exercises.
[B] Brunei, India, Laos, Singapore, and Tonga did not receive GPOI
funds, but sent peacekeepers to be trained during GPOI-funded events.
[C] GPOI also has provided deployment equipment and transportation to
support the deployment of 4,680 military peacekeepers from Indonesia,
Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda, and an unspecified number of military
peacekeepers from Chile and Guatemala. In addition, 229 military
peacekeepers from Mongolia deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, and 343
military peacekeepers deployed to Afghanistan from the South-Eastern
Europe Brigade of the Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Equipment Provided to GPOI Partner Countries:
Table 5 provides information on the type of equipment that has been or
may be provided to partner countries to support training and
deployments for peacekeeping. Table 6 provides information on the type
of equipment that has been provided to COESPU to support stability
police training. State officials indicated that military peacekeepers
keep some of the individual training equipment for use during
deployments.
Table 5: Types of Military Peacekeeping Equipment Provided to GPOI
Partners:
Category of equipment: Individual equipment;
Types of equipment:
* Uniforms[A];
* Boots;
* Helmets;
* First aid kits;
* Sleeping bags;
* Flashlights;
* Knee and elbow pads;
* Goggles;
* Hammocks;
* Wet weather ponchos;
* Load-bearing suspenders;
* Small arms cases;
* Shovels;
* Duffel bags;
* Field packs.
Category of equipment: Unit equipment;
Types of equipment:
* Computers, software, office supplies;
* Weapons cleaning kits;
* Kevlar helmets;
* Canteens;
* Compasses;
* Global positioning systems (GPS);
* Radios;
* Tents;
* Mine detection kits;
* Riot batons or policeman clubs;
* Riot shields;
* Pickup trucks, buses, military HUMVEEs, ambulances;
* Topography equipment;
* Tool kits for carpenters, electricians, and plumbers;
* Folding cots;
* Insect nets;
* Portable bath units.
Category of equipment: Deployment equipment;
Types of equipment:
* Level 1 medical clinic (100 beds, large tents, lab, surgery area)[B];
* Field kitchens[B];
* Night vision goggles;
* Radios;
* Refrigeration truck[B];
* Water purification units;
* Generators;
* Tents;
* Fork lifts, pick-up trucks;
* Fuel tankers (10,000 liters)[C];
* Fuel trucks (5000 liters)[C];
* Water tankers (5000 liters)[C];
* Concertina wire[B].
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] Uniform includes undershirt, shirt, pants, hats and belts. Gloves
include light duty gloves and barbed wire handling.
[B] Equipment provided to the African Union, directly to support the
African Union Mission to Somalia.
[C] Equipment provided to African Union Mission in Sudan.
[End of table]
Table 6: Types of Training Equipment Provided for COESPU Training:
Category of equipment: Individual equipment;
Types of equipment:
* Under garments;
* Uniforms;
* Gym suits;
* Winter jackets and hats;
* Basic hygiene products;
* Boots;
* Study materials (notebooks);
* SWAT gloves.
Category of equipment: Training equipment;
Types of equipment:
* Library and media materials;
* Computer equipment;
* Bedding;
* Plexiglas riot shields;
* Riot batons;
* Body armor;
* Shin and arm protectors;
* Mannequins for self-defense training;
* Helmets with face shields;
* NBCR[A] suits, decontamination kits, signals;
* Plastic weapons;
* Nonlethal teargas canister thrower;
* Nonlethal tear gas and flash bang canisters;
* Inert improvised explosive devices (for demonstrations);
* Firefighting equipment.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] NBCR is Nuclear Biological Chemical Radiological.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GPOI Activities to Support Long-term Skills and
Infrastructure for Peacekeeping:
Table 7 provides information on the type and status of activities that
State and DOD have conducted to build skills and infrastructure to meet
partner countries' long-term needs to sustain peacekeeping.
Table 7: Activities to Build Skills and Infrastructure for
Peacekeeping, by Region (as of April 2008):
Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Advisors to support
African Union (AU) and ECOWAS;
Status: Currently providing two advisors to support AU and ECOWAS: one
assisting ECOWAS Strategic Management Planning Cell, and one assisting
the AU in planning peacekeeping operations. In 2005 to 2006, two
additional positions for advisor support to AU and ECOWAS were
supported. State officials are considering phasing out advisor support
and providing direct financial assistance to AU and ECOWAS.
Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Training instructors to
continue peacekeeping training;
Status: Trained 2,384 instructors.
Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Strategic communications
systems for ECOWAS and AU;
Status: ECOWAS Regional Information Exchange System partially active,
but some countries do not have equipment installed. AU Regional
Information Exchange System has not been installed due to a licensing
issue. Also provided travel support for a command control and
communication information systems conference.
Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Training to ECOWAS to
support stand up of regional peacekeeping battalion;
Status: Three training sessions conducted for ECOWAS Standby Taskforce
Headquarters staff.
Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Multinational peacekeeping
exercises;
Status: In 2006, implemented a multinational peacekeeping exercise for
ECOWAS countries.
Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Support to peace
operations training centers;
Status: Provide computer and software equipment to peace operations
training centers in Ghana, Kenya, and Mali. Support also is planned for
Nigeria in fiscal year 2008.
Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Support equipment depots;
Status: Supporting an ECOWAS motor pool depot with equipment
refurbishment capability located in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Provided
equipment to support AU deployments to Sudan.
Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Support of AU facility;
Status: Provided mechanical and electrical supplies for renovation of
the AU situation room and computer equipment and furniture to the AU
strategic planning cell.
Type of support provided, by region: Asia: Support for a communications
system among training centers in the region;
Status: Funds have been expended to purchase equipment for centers in
Bangladesh, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand to support a
regional communication system for collaboration among peace support
operations training centers. Plans are in place to add Malaysia. The
network is not yet operational.
Type of support provided, by region: Asia: Multinational peacekeeping
exercises;
Status: Supported three multinational peacekeeping capstone exercises:
two in Mongolia and one in Bangladesh.
Type of support provided, by region: Asia: Peace operations training
centers;
Status: Provided funds to refurbish centers in Mongolia and Indonesia.
Additional support is planned for Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia,
Pakistan, and Thailand.
Type of support provided, by region: Asia: Training instructors to
continue peacekeeping training;
Status: Trained 266 instructors.
Type of support provided, by region: Europe: Peace operations training
centers;
Status: Supported U.S. uniformed instructor position at center in
Bosnia and provided funds to refurbish and provide equipment to center
in Ukraine.
Type of support provided, by region: Europe: Support for regional
organizations;
Status: Provided communications equipment and contractor support to the
South Eastern European Brigade for deployment to Afghanistan.
Type of support provided, by region: Europe: Training instructors to
continue peacekeeping training;
Status: Trained 26 instructors.
Type of support provided, by region: South and Central America: Peace
operations training Centers;
Status: Provided funds to refurbish center in Guatemala.
Type of support provided, by region: South and Central America:
Training instructors to continue peacekeeping training;
Status: Trained 43 instructors.
Type of support provided, by region: Near East: Support to peace
operations training centers;
Status: Plans to provide funds to peacekeeping training center in
Jordan to refurbish and supply computer equipment.
Type of support provided, by region: Central Asia: No activities to
build skills and infrastructure as of April 2008;
Status: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State funding data and reporting
documents.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
June 18, 2008:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but U.S. is Unlikely to Complete All
Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed," GAO Job Code
320519.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
David Potter, Wing Commander, Bureau of Political and Military Affairs
at (202) 647-1355.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Brafrod R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - Monica Brym:
PM - Stephen Mull:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
U.S. Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but U.S. is Unlikely to Complete All
Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed (GAO-08-754, GAO
Code 320519):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review and
comment on the Government Accountability Office draft Report entitled,
"Thousands Trained but U.S. is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by
2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed." The Department believes,
contrary to the findings of the report, that it is, in fact, on track
to meet the objectives of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
by 2010; and that with over 35,000 peacekeepers deployed to 18
peacekeeping operations around the world, GPOI has already demonstrated
significant success, forestalled the loss of life, prevented suffering,
and safeguarded property. [See comment1]
In outlining the rationale for this perspective, this response will
address each of GPOI's seven objectives, provide our position on the
draft Report's recommendations, which for the most part we are already
fulfilling, and provide additional comments where warranted. We will
highlight areas where our analysis differs from that of the GAO and
acknowledge areas in the report that highlight the need for improvement
in certain aspects of GPOI implementation.
Achievement of GPOI Objectives:
Contrary to the title of the GAO report, we assess that the GPOI
objectives will be achieved under current conditions and within
projected resource levels. The basis for this assessment is presented
below. Our analysis first presents the objectives as stated on page 6
of the draft GAO report, contrasts that wording with the actual
objectives of the GPOI Strategy, and then describes actual and/or
projected achievements by objective. [See comment 2]
Objective 1:
Draft GAO Report - "train and, when appropriate, equip 75,000 military
peacekeepers by 2010;"
GPOI Strategy - "Train and, as appropriate, equip at least 75,000
peacekeepers worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, from FY 2005-2010,
to increase global capacity to participate in peace operations."
Analysis - We have modeled the projected training under three sets of
assumptions. Our most conservative projection is based on the Africa
Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) Program's minimum
contracted throughput of 1,000 trainees per month with other programs
operating at a throughput of 75 percent of the current training rate.
This set of conditions will result in achievement of the 75,000
peacekeeper objective in the final quarter of 2010. More realistic
projections using ACOTA's current throughput and more representative
training rates for other programs suggest the objective will be
achieved in the third quarter of 2010. The GAO report provides no data
to the contrary. [See comment 3]
Objective 2:
Draft GAO Report - "support the Italian government's efforts to
establish an international center to train stability police forces that
would then participate in peacekeeping operations;"
GPOI Strategy - "Provide support to the international Center of
Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Italy to increase the
capabilities and interoperability of stability police to participate in
peace operations."
Analysis - The GPOI program has contributed $10.5M to COESPU in
Vicenza, Italy, and will soon provide an additional $4.5M. As of May
31, 2008, this institution has trained 1,399 stability police members
from 26 countries at the High Level/Senior Officers Course and the
Middle Managers Course. Each course provides their respective training
audiences with the skills to lead, command, and manage formed police
units participating in peace support operations. [See comment 4]
Objective 3:
Draft GAO Report - "develop a program to procure and store peace
operations equipment to facilitate the equipment's quick mobilization
for peace operations;"
GPOI Strategy - "Develop a cached equipment program to procure and
warehouse equipment for use in peace operations anywhere around the
globe."
Analysis -With a total $42.8M investment, the GPOI program has
established a system for storing and distributing equipment that has
been used successfully by seven GPOI partners in peace operations in
Darfur, Somalia, Southern Sudan, Afghanistan, and Haiti. Over $9M has
been expended to refurbish; re-stock with vehicles, communications
equipment, generators, and water purification units; and manage an
equipment depot in Sierra Leone. A further $33.8M has been obligated to
procure other equipment such as personal protective gear, vehicles and
vehicle parts, tactical radios, medical trauma kits, field rations, and
other supplies.
Objective 4:
Draft GAO Report -"develop a transportation and logistics support
system to deploy and sustain peacekeeping in the field;"
GPOI Strategy - "Work with other G8 members to develop a globally-
oriented transportation and logistics support arrangement (TLSA) to
help provide transportation for deploying peacekeepers and logistics
support to sustain units in the field."
Analysis -The United States is leading the G8 activity with regard to
this initiative, which came out of the G8's Sea Island Action Plan of
2004. The United States established a virtual donors' coordination
mechanism to enable deploying nations' requests for Transportation and
Logistics Support Arrangement (TLSA) assistance to be shared among TLSA
participants, which includes the United States and four other G8 member
nations. In response to requests for transportation and logistics
support, the USG has provided $13M to nations deploying to the African
Union Mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS), the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM), and the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon
(UNIFIL). [See comment 5]
Objective 5:
Draft GAO Report - "enhance the capacity of regional and sub-regional
organizations for peace operations;"
GPOI Strategy - "Enhance the capacity of regional and sub-regional
organizations to train for, plan, prepare for, manage, conduct, obtain,
and sustain lessons-learned from peace operations by providing
technical assistance, training, and material support; and, support
institutions and activities which offer these capabilities to a
regional audience."
Analysis - The draft GAO Report notes that GPOI has conducted
activities to improve the capabilities of regional organizations to
plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions. Specifically, they
cite training activities for ECOWAS and units from El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua that will comprise the multinational
CFAC brigade. Globally, GPOI is supporting or has supported 18 peace
operations training centers, 7 peace support operations collaboration
centers, 7 multinational peacekeeping exercises, 3 technical advisors,
and provided training for the peacekeeping mission planning and
management staffs of two regional organizations. As a result of these
and other programs, events, and activities, the peacekeeping-related
capabilities of the affected regional organizations and institutions
have been improved. [See comment 6]
Objective 6:
Draft GAO Report -"provide a worldwide clearinghouse function for GPOI-
related activities in Africa and globally."
GPOI Strategy - "Create a `clearinghouse' function to exchange
information and coordinate G8 efforts to enhance peace operations
training and exercises in Africa; and continue to provide support to
subsequent clearinghouse initiatives, including globally-oriented
activities, throughout the life of the G8's Action Plan for Expanding
Global Capability for Peace Support Operations."
Analysis - Africa Clearinghouse meetings were conducted in 2004, 2006,
2007, and 2008, with GPOI hosting the 2004 inaugural meeting in
Washington. Clearinghouse meetings are now firmly established as an
event within the annual cycle of G8 meetings. The United States
initiated and hosted a G8++ Global Clearinghouse in 2007 and
representatives from 32 countries concluded that the event was of value
and should be continued. The Clearinghouse meetings have raised the
awareness of all participants regarding the breadth and depth of
peacekeeping capacity building programs and are helping to reduce
potential redundancies and make individual country programs more
complementary.
Objective 7:
Draft GAO Report - "conduct activities that support and assist partners
in achieving self-sufficiency and maintaining the proficiencies gained
from GPOI."
GPOI Strategy - "Conduct sustainment/self-sufficiency activities in
support of the objectives above with a focus on assisting Partners to
sustain proficiencies gained in training programs."
Analysis - The GPOI strategy contains a model showing the requirements
to achieve and maintain operational effectiveness in peace operations.
The model recognizes that a number of elements are solely within the
purview of national governments and other organizations. Every activity
funded through GPOI can be linked directly or indirectly to one of the
elements within that model, therein demonstrating that GPOI activities
do support and assist in achieving self-sufficiency and maintaining
proficiencies.
Department Response to Draft Report Recommendations:
The GAO Report recommends the Secretary of State take the following six
actions and then, in consultation with DoD, take two additional actions:
Recommendation 1: "Work in consultation with DoD to assist Italy in
staffing the key unfilled positions at COESPU to better evaluate
progress made and monitor results."
State Response: Concur. We were, prior to the GAO investigation,
already working with COESPU and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) to staff a position at the training facility to address
evaluation and monitoring.
Recommendation 2: "Monitor implementation of new procedures to account
for delivery and transfer of non-lethal training equipment to partner
countries on an ongoing basis."
State Response: Concur. Three primary supply chains are used for the
delivery of non-lethal training equipment to partner countries: Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) - implemented through the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA); commercial acquisition - implemented through
the State Department's Office of Acquisition Management's regional
procurement support offices (RPSO); and commercial acquisition -
implemented through ACOTA. Procedural changes, including the use of
joint inventories, improved electronic record keeping, and the
requirement for national representatives to sign U.S. Government
acquisition documentation, are being implemented in each of these
supply chains to assure more robust accountability. Additional staff
personnel are also being contracted to ACOTA, U.S. Southern Command,
and State to apply greater scrutiny in this area.
It should be noted that State's GPOI Evaluation Team identified the
equipment accountability shortfall prior to the GAO's investigation of
the GPOI Program. This same team, through its existing procedures for
monitoring program achievement, will monitor the effectiveness of the
reforms being implemented.
Recommendation 3: "Provide additional guidance to U.S. missions to help
the United States and Italy collect data on the training and deployment
activities of COESPU graduates in their home countries."
State Response: Concur. GPOI has been examining mechanisms to improve
data collection on the activities of COESPU graduates and is developing
a systematic approach for the gathering of post-training data.
To that end, and following consultations with the Italian MFA and
COESPU, State has agreed to use GPOI funds to staff one contractor at
the training facility to develop an alumni database, outreach materials
for COESPU graduates, and tracking mechanisms. In addition, State is
examining ways to strengthen diplomatic outreach to COESPU partner
countries to request ongoing feedback from partners regarding the
performance and activities of their COESPU graduates. Guidance for
identifying responsibilities will be provided to the Posts in our
COESPU partner countries once the contractor is in place at COESPU and
the tracking mechanisms have been established.
Recommendation 4: "Develop, in consultation with DoD, a method for
evaluating the quality of training and measuring the proficiency of
trainees in critical skills."
State Response: These methods already exist. Evaluation of trainee
proficiency and the quality of training are conducted at all training
events. These evaluations occur at multiple levels. Lead trainers and
mentors, both active duty military and/or U.S. military veterans with
20 to 30 years experience constitute the core of GPOI training and
evaluation programs. The lead trainers conduct performance-oriented
training and remedial training; evaluate individual soldier
proficiencies and unit collective performance. The mentors, in turn,
serve to coach the trainers and render assessments on the overall
quality of the training. Supporting these individuals in conducting the
evaluation, particularly at the GPOI-funded United Nations-certified
specialist courses, are subject matter experts drawn from the broader
international community. GPOI managers from State and Defense evaluate
the overall effectiveness of the broader GPOI program.
One of GPOI's strengths has been its ability to tailor the program of
instruction to the desires and capabilities of the recipient nation.
This allows the GPOI partner to receive training at an appropriate
level, but does not mean that all nations are assessed to be equally
competent at the completion of training events. Units from various
countries participating in a multilateral peacekeeping operation will
begin the exercise with varying levels of proficiency and, while all
will benefit from the experience, it is not expected that all will have
exactly the same level of proficiency at the end. The evaluation data
maintained by State and the implementing agent will accurately indicate
the level of proficiency.
To provide greater standardization, we will be developing Military Task
Lists (MTLs) and associated training standards to specify tasks,
conditions, and standards for different types of military units
participating in peacekeeping operations. The MTLs will form the basis
from which training plans are developed and trainees assessed. A
Statement of Work to develop the MTLs and training standards has been
written, and requires a joint State and Defense steering board to
oversee the development.
Another area where we seek to improve is in reviewing post-training
proficiency. Currently, we collect formal and anecdotal reports from a
variety of sources. Our process also includes after-action reports on
UN peacekeeping operations and from the regional entities that field
peacekeeping operations such as the African Union (AU) or ECOWAS.
However, we recognize the need to do more and to do it in a systematic
manner. We are considering greater use of technology, such as the ACOTA
website and the Peace Support Operations Collaboration Center (PSOCC)
network, to capture informal field and host nation anecdotes, field
trips to mission areas, and post-training surveys. While we desire
rigor in the information collected on the performance of GPOI-trained
personnel when they deploy on operations or after they return to their
home country, we recognize that any collection process is dependent, in
part, on the cooperation of the host country, regional organization, or
the UN.
Recommendation 5: "Ensure that the evaluations of contractor
performance in Africa are properly recorded into the contractor
performance system as required by agency regulations."
State Response: Concur. Although evaluation data has been collected,
the data has yet to be entered into State's contracting databases. With
the imminent arrival of additional staff for State's Office of
Acquisition Management (AQM), we expect that evaluation data to be
loaded shortly.
Recommendation 6: "Develop a system for monitoring the vetting
activities for all GPOI training and ensure that all individuals in
composite units are vetted for human rights violations, as required by
State policy."
State Response: Partially Concur. State's policy on vetting composite
units has been published and distributed. While there were shortcomings
when the process was first implemented, we believe that they have been
remedied and that the process is effective in identifying and
preventing any potential recipients from receiving training where there
is credible evidence that they have committed gross violations of human
rights. [See comment 8]
In examining the section of the draft GAO Report that underpins this
recommendation, we note that State's policy on vetting composite units
changed in April 2007. At that time, the seven composite units referred
to on pages 5 and 35 of the draft Report were already in the
administrative pipeline for training (some of which was conducted in
April 2007). The failure to vet in accordance with the updated policy
should be considered as a consequence of the change in policy, a policy
change which in itself should be taken as an indicator of State's
commitment to ensure full compliance with this requirement.
Notwithstanding the above, the State is fully committed to compliance
with the Leahy Law and will undertake regularly to remind those U.S.
Government elements responsible for implementing GPOI of their
obligations and responsibilities.
Recommendation 7: "In consultation with DoD, assess estimated resources
and timeframes needed to complete peacekeeping and infrastructure
activities in Africa by 2010."
State Response: Partially Concur. The GPOI Strategy objectives are a
mixture of quantifiable targets and qualitative objectives that seek to
improve the status quo. The quantifiable targets will be met and the
status quo will be improved upon in the qualitative areas referred to
in GPOI's objectives. ACOTA, GPOI's primary activity in Africa,
regularly updates its Vision, Mission, and Strategy Plan to assess the
resources and timelines needed to continue peacekeeper training
programs for as long as they will be required by the AU, Africa's
regional economic communities, and the continent's troop contributing
countries.
Because African militaries are conscript armies, personnel at the
enlisted levels often serve for limited periods of time, thus requiring
that new and refresher training be conducted over the long term. In
keeping with this requirement, ACOTA maintains a highly detailed
program plan that lists all the requirements and resources pertaining
to the annual and long-term commitments that it has entered into on a
bilateral and multilateral basis, or in support of U.S. policy goals
and objectives. This document identifies the annual requirements needed
to conduct the ACOTA program in Africa at its optimum levels, and also
allows for prioritization and management of activities when budgetary
constraints restrict the full implementation of the program plan.
Recommendation 8: "In consultation with DoD, ensure that any plans for
extending GPOI activities beyond 2010 identify sufficient resources for
developing long-term peacekeeping skills and infrastructure in Africa."
State Response: Concur. While the goals of GPOI will be met with the
resources allocated for FY 2005-2009, the demand for international
peacekeeping continues to grow. Accordingly, the Administration is
exploring a proposal which would see GPOI-like activities continue
across the globe, to include developing additional long-term
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure in Africa.
Additional Comments:
PART Score and Data Reliability:
GPOI achieved a score of 91.5 percent and a rating of "effective" (the
highest of five possible ratings) by the Office of Management and
Budget's 2007 Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). We consider this
external rating a significant endorsement of GPOI's success and that
which deserves mention in the GAO Report. As the PART considered, inter
alia, the verifiability and auditability of data collected in support
of Program outcomes, we consider it an endorsement of the data
presented in this response. Additionally, the draft GAO Report states
on page 4 that "We determined that the data provided by State and DoD
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review."
Budget Projections:
GPOI's actual and projected achievements have occurred with increased
efficiencies, allowing us to achieve the goals with an overall funding
level projected at $480M over the life of the program. (This is a
projection because the final year's allocation has not been
established.) This amount will be well below the original announced
commitment to GPOI of $660M over five years.
Attribution of Activities against GPOI Objectives:
The template for activity proposals submitted as part of the budgetary
allocation development process requires GPOI implementing agencies to
identify which GPOI objectives the proposed activity would support.
Many proposals contribute towards two or three objectives, a fact
further reflected in the matrix of annual allocations approved by the
GPOI Coordinating Committee.
In reviewing achievements against the seven GPOI objectives, the draft
GAO Report rates performance by region. This methodology attributes
each GPOI activity to a single GPOI objective instead of acknowledging
the full spectrum of benefits that any single activity may generate.
One example of the problems that arise when a GPOI activity is linked
to only one objective is the issue of nations deploying trainers on
peace support operations. It is inaccurate to suggest that a nation is
not capitalizing on the GPOI investment by deploying trainers on
operations. Operational experience provides trainers with the
opportunity to reinforce the knowledge and skills that enable them to
act as a force multiplier for their nation in a practical setting that
no training activity can fully simulate.
Other Forms of Security Assistance/Foreign Aid in Africa:
In addition to allocating each GPOI activity to only one GPOI
objective, the draft GAO Report's assessment also does not take into
account other forms of U.S. and non-U.S. assistance in Africa. GPOI is
not the only USG program providing foreign assistance for peacekeeping,
nor is the United States the only country that provides foreign
assistance for peacekeeping in Africa. GPOI resource allocations are
based on regional program plans where implementers take into account
partner/regional needs, U.S. security objectives, and other
U.S./international programs. GPOI implementers are cognizant of
concurrent efforts, and design their programs accordingly. For example,
the regional peace operations training centers in Mali, Nigeria, Ghana,
and Kenya receive a greater portion of their operating funds from non-
U.S. sources, requiring GPOI to contribute only a partial amount of the
total costs of those efforts. The European Union, through the
Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities Program (RECAMP),
and the U.S. Combatant Commands provide regional exercise opportunities
that reduce the need to spend GPOI funds on capstone exercises (ACOTA
has only conducted one regional exercise).
Human Rights:
The USG invites countries to participate in GPOI following an
assessment against six criteria listed in the GPOI Strategy. One
criterion is the country's human rights record. The assessment is
conducted in an interagency forum and involves thoughtful consideration
of all available information. Separately, individuals or units
nominated to participate in GPOI-funded training activities undergo
vetting for credible allegations of gross human rights abuses. This
vetting demands that there be an absence of credible evidence against
the individual or unit prior to the commencement of training. The draft
GAO Report seeks to draw parallels between these two processes.
However, there is a significant difference between systemic human
rights abuses by the security forces of a nation and allegations of
abuse by an individual or single unit. The alleged actions of a small
group should not, in and of themselves, result in the cessation of GPOI
activities with the non-implicated security forces of that country. It
is also important to note that all GPOI-funded training contains
instruction on human rights.
The following are GAO's responses to the Department of State's letter
dated June 18, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. State asserts that GPOI is on track to meet its objectives with over
35,000 peacekeepers deployed to 18 peacekeeping operations. We disagree
that 35,000 peacekeepers have deployed to 18 missions with the training
or support of GPOI. State's assertion conflicts with GPOI evaluation
team data that identified 22,000 peacekeepers trained by GPOI that
deployed to 12 UN or AU missions, as well as other missions not
supported by the UN or AU, as of April 2008. State's statistics include
peacekeepers GPOI trained that have not deployed, supported but not
trained by GPOI, or troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan (non-UN
missions). Appendix IV provides additional information on the
peacekeeper deployments of GPOI partners.
2. State asserts that GPOI objectives will be achieved under the
current conditions and within projected resource levels. We disagree
with this assessment because according to State's own training
projections it is not likely to train 75,000 military peacekeepers by
2010, faces delays in providing support of nonlethal equipment to
deployed peacekeepers, and is unlikely to complete planned skills and
infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010. In addition, State has not
provided additional support for requested staff positions at COESPU
that would facilitate the evaluation of progress made at COESPU.
3. State now projects that GPOI will train 75,000 peacekeepers by the
third quarter of 2010 based on new training rates and asserts that we
do not provide a realistic projection. We were unable to validate this
information. As of April 2008, the number of military peacekeepers
trained is lower than the target number needed to meet the goal of
75,000 by the end of 2010. As recently as May 2008, officials from the
GPOI office in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and its GPOI
evaluation team indicated that slow expenditure rates related to
training rates would delay their efforts to reach the goal by 2010.
Accordingly, we are unable to validate State's new projections provided
in its comments to this report.
4. State asserts that it has contributed $10.5 million to COESPU and
plans to provide an additional $4.5 million. We disagree that this is a
contribution already provided to COESPU. State has obligated $15
million for COESPU, which includes the $10.5 million and $4.5 million,
but has only provided $9 million of that amount to COESPU, according to
State funding data identifying expenditures as of April 2008.
5. State has stated that the United States established a virtual
donors' coordination mechanism to enable deploying nations to
facilitate donor assistance in transportation and logistics support. We
agree that a communication system has been established, however, we
note that the mechanism for facilitating this support is an e-mail
system. We also note that the system was established in the fall of
2007 and that, as of April 2008, only one request had been communicated
by State to donors through this system, according to the State
officials responsible for this system.
6. State presents information on a number of activities that it asserts
were conducted under GPOI to improve the capabilities of regional
organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions. We
disagree that GPOI has conducted all of these activities and believe
that the activities listed in State's comment include a combination of
planned and completed activities. In appendix VI we have presented the
GPOI activities that have been completed to build skills and
infrastructure for peacekeeping in support of the GPOI objective to
assist partners in achieving self-sufficiency and maintaining GPOI
proficiencies. The information we have presented was obtained from
expenditure information and data provided by the GPOI assessment team
and GPOI program office. To confirm activities that were completed as
of April 2008, we crosschecked reported information by the GPOI program
with GPOI program implementers responsible for implementing these
activities, including the Africa Bureau and its ACOTA program, and U.S.
African, Pacific, and Southern Commands.
7. State asserts that methods already exist for evaluating the quality
of training and measuring the proficiency of trainees in critical
skills. We disagree that these methods address our recommendation.
State has not developed military task lists and associated training
that can be applied at all GPOI training sites, although the GPOI
strategy in 2006 identified the need for the development of military
task lists and related military training standards to contribute to
standardization, interoperability, and sustainability, and to ensure
the proper use of resources. The strategy also indicated that
developing such standards would help efforts to evaluate the overall
effectiveness of GPOI training programs, events, and activities. We
assert that there is value in evaluating the performance of trainees,
in the areas where there are consistencies in the training, against a
standard level of proficiency in the skills taught during their
training, in order to identify the quality of training provided across
the program and to identify the proficiency of trained troops program-
wide. We modified the recommendation to clarify the need for GPOI-wide
standards to provide program managers with the ability to measure
proficiency of GPOI-trained troops program-wide and in accordance with
the commitments made in the GPOI strategy.
8. State asserts that its process for vetting composite units to
prevent potential recipients from receiving training where there is
credible evidence of committed gross violations of human rights is
effective and that our findings on the vetting of composite units
trained under GPOI are unfairly applied against an updated agency
policy on vetting composite units. We disagree. The seven composite
units we identify in this report were vetted and received training
after the policy change in April 2007. We identified these units in our
review of vetting records provided by State's ACOTA office and training
rosters of individuals trained provided by State's GPOI evaluation
team. According to the data provided by State, three composite units
from Niger received training in August 2007 and November-December 2007,
one composite unit from Nigeria received training in September-October
2007, and three composite units from Uganda received training in July
2007. Records for these units indicate that vetting was completed
between June 2007 and November 2007.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Global Security Affairs:
2900 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2900:
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
The Department of Defense (DoD) supports the intent of the Global
Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), recognizes the increasing
demand for trained peacekeepers, and supports the efforts of the
Department of State in executing the program. DoD appreciates the
opportunity to review and comment on the Government Accountability
Office draft report, entitled "Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but U.S.
is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements
Are Needed," dated May 22, 2008. DoD believes that improvements in GPOI
are needed.
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State work
in consultation with DoD to assist Italy in staffing the key unfilled
positions at Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU)
to better evaluate progress made and monitor results. (p. 37/GAO Draft
Report)
DOD Response:
Partially concur - The Department of State and DoD should encourage
COESPU to better evaluate progress and monitor results. DoD has placed
a U.S. military liaison at COSEPU, and the Department of State should
work with DoD and Italy to validate any personnel shortfalls and fill
positions that result from this process.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State
develop in consultation with DoD, a method for evaluating the quality
of training and measuring the proficiency of trainees in critical
skills. (p. 37/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response:
Partially concur - Some GPOI training events are evaluated, however
there is room for greater standardization and more comprehensive
analysis of post-training performance.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State in
consultation with DoD assess estimated resources and timeframes needed
to complete peacekeeping skills and infrastructure activities in Africa
by 2010. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response:
Partially concur - DoD agrees with the recommendation to assess
resources and timeframes required to achieve GPOI objectives in Africa.
However, DoD would like to see this effort applied to all regions
engaged by the GPOI program.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State in
consultation with DoD ensure that any plans for extending Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI) activities beyond 2010 identify sufficient
resources for developing long-term peacekeeping skills and
infrastructure in Africa. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response:
Concur - State should closely consult with DoD to ensure that resources
provided are sufficient to meet the requirements of the extended
program.
My points of contact for this memorandum are COL Steve Whitmarsh, 703-
602-5287, and Ms. Kelly Waud, 703-602-5298.
Signed by:
Greg Gross:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Partnership Strategy:
[End of section]
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgements:
Key contributors to this report include Audrey Solis, Assistant
Director; Monica Brym; Justin Monroe; and Diahanna Post. Technical
assistance was provided by Ashley Alley, Johana Ayers, Joseph Brown,
Lynn Cothern, Barry Deweese, Nisha Hazra, Chris Kunitz, Isidro Gomez,
Matthew Reilly, Elizabeth Repko, Ronald Schwenn, Jay Smale, Adrienne
Spahr, Barbara Steel-Lowney, Laverne Tharpes, and Heather Whitehead.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In addition, according to the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, regional organizations led 33 peacekeeping
operations in 2007.
[2] G8 members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
[3] In this report, we refer to two types of peacekeepers: military
peacekeepers and stability police. We have defined stability police as
police whose duties bridge the gap between military troops and civilian
police in peace operations. The United States does not directly train
stability police for peacekeeping missions. The Departments of State
and Defense provide financial and personnel resources to support the
Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, which trains
instructors of stability police units for peacekeeping missions.
[4] State's and DOD's plans include funding activities for GPOI through
fiscal year 2009.
[5] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub.L. 110-
181 § 1211, 122 Stat. 369 (Jan. 28, 2008).
[6] We have categorized the seven objectives of the program under three
key program goals.
[7] The program provides only nonlethal equipment for training or to
support deployments to peacekeeping mission.
[8] For the goal of building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, we
have included activities to enhance the ability of countries to conduct
training for their own peacekeeping missions and improve the
capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train for, and execute
peacekeeping missions.
[9] The ACOTA program was established in 1997 under African Crisis
Response Initiative and focuses on field and staff training and
exercises for African battalions and multinational force staffs. ACOTA
continues to operate within the scope of GPOI. From 1997 to 2004, the
EIPC program provided support to 31 countries to develop their
institutional capacity to provide military units for peacekeeping and
similar multinational operations and to promote interoperability.
[10] In this report, we use "spent" to refer to expended funds.
[11] For example, Argentine peacekeeping instructors provide trainers
to Central America's peacekeeping training school in Coban, Guatemala.
[12] The Carabinieri are the Italian National Force that has both
military and police authority.
[13] Stability police units bridge the gap between military troops and
civilian police in peace operations.
[14] The program provides only nonlethal equipment for training or to
support deployments to peacekeeping mission.
[15] State obligated $10.5 million in fiscal year 2005 funds for COESPU
activities. State officials expect to obligate an additional $4.5
million of fiscal year 2005 GPOI funds by spring 2008. GPOI funds cover
about half of training and program expenses at COESPU, according to
U.S. officials in Italy.
[16] This equipment depot is currently run jointly by the United States
and ECOWAS. The 15 members of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo
Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinee, Guinee Bissau, Liberia,
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togolese Republic.
[17] Of the funds expended in Africa, 59 percent was spent on training
and training equipment and 29 percent on deployment assistance.
[18] GPOI provides funding for the nonsalary costs of the U.S. European
Command liaison officer position in Bosnia.
[19] We identified a limitation in the data on deployments of trained
peacekeepers. State is not able to obtain the individual names of those
who deploy to compare with the rosters of those trained under GPOI.
However, based on the fact that State can identify which of the units
trained under GPOI have deployed, and that any individual who joins the
peacekeeping unit subsequent to its training by GPOI may receive
additional training from his or her unit officers, we determined that
the data on military peacekeepers deployed were sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of reporting the deployments of GPOI-trained
peacekeeping.
[20] The intent of the training is to provide units with the skills to
function at the level of a military battalion unit in a peacekeeping
mission.
[21] Five additional countries participated in GPOI training, but GPOI
funds were not used to pay for their training.
[22] Basic training in military skills is the responsibility of the
partner nation.
[23] GPOI does not provide bullets or lethal weapons used by troops
during training.
[24] The ACOTA office is comprised of nine contractor employees and one
federal employee, according to a State official.
[25] State regulations require that past performance must be evaluated,
recorded, and entered electronically into the contractor performance
system, which is a computer database maintained by the National
Institutes of Health (48 C.F.R. 42.1502, 42.1503; 48 C.F.R. 642.1503-
70).
[26] One of these countries participated in military peacekeeper
training funded by GPOI in Mongolia, but is not a GPOI partner and paid
for the costs associated with attending the training exercise,
according to agency documents.
[27] The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 made permanent the
following requirement: "No assistance shall be furnished under this Act
or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a
foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that
such unit has committed gross violations of human rights." The
prohibitions do not apply if the Secretary determines and reports to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on
Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective
measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit
to justice (22 U.S.C. 2378d). A similar provision has appeared in prior
foreign operations appropriations acts.
[28] In May 2008, State officials informed us that Mauritania had been
added as a new GPOI country. We did not assess if this country meets
the criteria for partnership with GPOI.
[29] With the recent election of a new government in Thailand, State
expects to resume activities once U.S. prohibitions on security
assistance are lifted.
[30] These countries were Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines,
Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay.
[31] This was the case for Honduras, Cameroon, Mozambique, and Zambia.
[32] These 14 countries are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cameroon, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zambia.
[33] Composite units are defined as units in which individuals are
temporarily drawn together from already-established units to form a new
unit.
[34] Section 505 agreements prohibit the furnishing of defense articles
or related services or training on a grant basis unless the country
agrees that it will not use the defense articles or training for
purposes other than those for which furnished.
[35] G8 members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
[36] These countries include Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada,
Chile, France, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand,
United Kingdom, and Uruguay.
[37] We identified a limitation in the data on deployments of trained
peacekeepers. State is not able to obtain the individual names of those
who deploy to compare with the rosters of those trained under GPOI.
However, based on the fact that State can identify which of the units
trained under GPOI have deployed, and that any individual who joins the
peacekeeping unit subsequent to its training by GPOI may receive
additional training from his or her unit officers, we determined that
the data on military peacekeepers deployed were sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of reporting the deployments of GPOI-trained
peacekeepers.
[38] An additional 572 troops were trained or received equipment for
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.
[End of section]
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