Afghanistan Reconstruction
Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed Gao ID: GAO-08-689 July 8, 2008The Afghan government, the United States, and other donors consider road reconstruction a top development priority for Afghanistan. Almost 20 percent of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) $5.9 billion in assistance to Afghanistan has been for roads. The Department of Defense (Defense) has committed about $560 million for roads, of which Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds account for over half. GAO examined (1) the status of road reconstruction and challenges affecting project implementation, (2) U.S. agencies' efforts to evaluate the impact of road projects, and (3) efforts to develop a sustainable road maintenance program. GAO reviewed U.S. and Afghan governments' planning, evaluation, and funding documents and interviewed relevant stakeholders in Afghanistan.
The United States and other donors have completed construction of several regional and national highways since 2002, but the status of other roads is uncertain and various challenges have delayed construction. The Afghan government and international donors planned to complete the high-priority regional highways by the end of 2008, and as of February 2008, about 60 percent of these roads were built. USAID has completed its portion, but completion of other portions is not expected until late 2009. Donors have committed to construct over 30 percent of national highways, which connect provincial capitals to the regional highways, and only USAID has completed portions of these highways. Detailed information on the status of provincial and rural roads is lacking. Although Defense reported committing CERP funds for 1,600 kilometers of roads, data on the roads were incomplete and Defense has not reported information on these roads to USAID, as required. Poor security, project implementer limitations, and starting construction with limited planning have contributed to project delays and cost increases. U.S. agencies have not conducted sound impact evaluations to determine the degree to which projects achieved the objective of economic development. Limitations of USAID's funding, data collection, and frameworks to assess results have impeded its ability to evaluate project impact. Defense has not conducted any impact evaluations and lacks clear guidance on project evaluation. However, agency officials have noted some anecdotal examples of road construction impact, such as reduced travel times and increased commerce. Moreover, no other donor has performed impact evaluations. A sustainable road maintenance program has not been established, although it is a goal of the Afghan government and international donors. The Afghan government's support of this goal has been limited due to factors such as a lack of resources and a fragmented institutional organization. As a result, international donors have agreed to temporarily fund road maintenance to protect their investments. While USAID plans to maintain about 1,500 kilometers of roads it built, it did not meet its 2007 target to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-689, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2008:
Afghanistan Reconstruction:
Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining
Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed:
GAO-08-689:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-689, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Afghan government, the United States, and other donors consider
road reconstruction a top development priority for Afghanistan. Almost
20 percent of the U.S. Agency for International Development‘s (USAID)
$5.9 billion in assistance to Afghanistan has been for roads. The
Department of Defense (Defense) has committed about $560 million for
roads, of which Commander‘s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds
account for over half. GAO examined (1) the status of road
reconstruction and challenges affecting project implementation, (2)
U.S. agencies‘ efforts to evaluate the impact of road projects, and (3)
efforts to develop a sustainable road maintenance program. GAO reviewed
U.S. and Afghan governments‘ planning, evaluation, and funding
documents and interviewed relevant stakeholders in Afghanistan.
What GAO Found:
The United States and other donors have completed construction of
several regional and national highways since 2002, but the status of
other roads is uncertain and various challenges have delayed
construction. The Afghan government and international donors planned to
complete the high-priority regional highways by the end of 2008, and as
of February 2008, about 60 percent of these roads were built. USAID has
completed its portion, but completion of other portions is not expected
until late 2009. Donors have committed to construct over 30 percent of
national highways, which connect provincial capitals to the regional
highways, and only USAID has completed portions of these highways.
Detailed information on the status of provincial and rural roads is
lacking. Although Defense reported committing CERP funds for 1,600
kilometers of roads, data on the roads were incomplete and Defense has
not reported information on these roads to USAID, as required. Poor
security, project implementer limitations, and starting construction
with limited planning have contributed to project delays and cost
increases.
Figure: Status of Afghan Highways for Which Donors Have Committed Funds
Since 2002:
Regional highways: Total kilometers for which funds are committed:
United States: 715;
Other donors: 2,525;
Funds not committed: 0;
Total highway kilometers: 3,240.
Total kilometers completed:
United States: 715;
Other donors: 1,239;
Funds not committed: 0.
National highways: Total kilometers for which funds are committed:
United States: 1,029;
Other donors: 614;
Funds not committed: 3,240;
Total highway kilometers: 4,884.
Total kilometers completed:
United States: 726;
Other donors: 0;
Funds not committed: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of data from USAID, the Consultative Group for the
Transport Sector, and the Road Sector Master Plan.
[End of figure]
U.S. agencies have not conducted sound impact evaluations to determine
the degree to which projects achieved the objective of economic
development. Limitations of USAID‘s funding, data collection, and
frameworks to assess results have impeded its ability to evaluate
project impact. Defense has not conducted any impact evaluations and
lacks clear guidance on project evaluation. However, agency officials
have noted some anecdotal examples of road construction impact, such as
reduced travel times and increased commerce. Moreover, no other donor
has performed impact evaluations.
A sustainable road maintenance program has not been established,
although it is a goal of the Afghan government and international
donors. The Afghan government‘s support of this goal has been limited
due to factors such as a lack of resources and a fragmented
institutional organization. As a result, international donors have
agreed to temporarily fund road maintenance to protect their
investments. While USAID plans to maintain about 1,500 kilometers of
roads it built, it did not meet its 2007 target to maintain 100
kilometers of reconstructed roads.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the USAID Administrator (1) take steps to improve
its framework for assessing results, (2) conduct impact evaluations in
coordination with other donors, and (3) work with the Afghan government
to address and fund maintenance of roads. GAO also recommends that the
Secretary of Defense (1) require impact evaluations of its CERP-funded
road projects where applicable, and (2) ensure that information on CERP-
funded roads is reported to a USAID database, as required by CERP
guidance. USAID and Defense agreed with our recommendations and have
begun taking steps to implement them.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-689]. For more
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or
johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Donors Have Made Progress in Building Highways, but Status of Other
Roads Is Uncertain and Challenges Have Delayed Road Construction:
Little Is Known about the Impact of Road Projects in Afghanistan:
A Fiscally Sustainable Road Maintenance Program for Afghan Roads Has
Not Been Established:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: USAID and Other Donor Road Project Data:
Appendix III: CERP Funding Data for Road Projects by Province in
Afghanistan:
Appendix IV: USAID's Grant Agreement with UNOPS for Road Reconstruction
in Afghanistan:
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: USAID and Defense's Afghan Road Reconstruction Awards:
Table 2: Afghan Ministries That Have Transportation Sector-Related
Functions:
Table 3: Examples of Goals and Measures for Road Operations and
Maintenance in the Ministry of Public Works Strategic Plan:
Figures:
Figure 1: Afghan Road Network Envisioned for 2015:
Figure 2: Afghan Road Types and Characteristics:
Figure 3: Road Reconstruction Funding by U.S. Agencies and Programs
between Fiscal Years 2002 and 2007:
Figure 4: Percentages of Donor Funds Committed for Regional and
National Highways in Afghanistan, 2002-2007:
Figure 5: Status of Donor-Funded Road Reconstruction in Afghanistan, as
of February 2008:
Figure 6: Donor-Funded Regional and National Highways in Afghanistan:
Figure 7: USAID-Funded Roads in Afghanistan and Funding Levels by
Province:
Figure 8: Location of CERP and Military Construction Roads in
Afghanistan and CERP Funding by Province:
Figure 9: Elements of USAID's Results Framework in the Performance
Management Plan (2006-2008):
Figure 10: Elements of USAID's Results Framework of IRP for the
Transportation Sector:
Figure 11: Time Frame, Estimated Cost, and Total Kilometers for UNOPS
Grant:
Abbreviations:
CERP: Commander's Emergency Response Program:
IRP: Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Program:
LBG: The Louis Berger Group:
LBG/B&V: The Louis Berger Group/Black & Veatch Joint Venture:
REFS: Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services program:
UNOPS: United Nations Office for Project Services:
USACE: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
July 8, 2008:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman:
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia: Committee on
Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
Almost three decades of war largely destroyed Afghanistan's roads and
other infrastructure. The remaining roads were only partially usable
because of years without basic maintenance. In late 2001, approximately
16 percent of Afghanistan's roads had been paved, in comparison with
over 80 percent in neighboring Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan. After the United States and its allies removed the Taliban
regime, the Afghan government and international donors identified road
reconstruction as a top priority to spur economic development, promote
governance, and improve security. As a result, the United States,
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), provided
about $5.9 billion in development aid to Afghanistan from fiscal year
2002 to fiscal year 2007, of which almost 20 percent has been committed
to reconstruct roads. Additionally, the Department of Defense (Defense)
has obligated about $600 million in Commander's Emergency Response
Program (CERP) funds for civilian projects, of which about $300 million
is for roads. Defense has also funded about $260 million in roads for
military purposes.
In this report, we (1) examine the status of donor-funded road
reconstruction projects since 2002 and challenges affecting donors'
ability to implement projects as planned, (2) assess U.S. agencies'
efforts to evaluate the impact of road reconstruction projects, and (3)
assess efforts to develop a sustainable maintenance program for donor-
funded roads.
To address these objectives, we reviewed USAID, Defense, and Afghan
government strategic planning, funding, and evaluation documents
relating to road reconstruction projects.[Footnote 1] We interviewed
USAID and Defense officials and road program implementers, including
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and private contractors, in
Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we also visited road
construction sites in Badakhshan, Nangarhar, and Khost provinces, and
interviewed Afghan government officials, U.S. Provincial Reconstruction
Team officials, and other international donors. We assessed the
reliability of the data on road funding and project status provided to
us, and used data that we determined to be sufficiently reliable for
our purposes. We conducted this performance audit from July 2007
through July 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
(See app. I for a complete description of our scope and methodology.)
Results in Brief:
The United States and other international donors have completed
construction of about 2,700 kilometers of Afghan regional and national
highways since 2002, but the status of other roads is uncertain and
various challenges have delayed road construction. The Afghan
government and international donors established the goal to complete
Afghanistan's regional highway network (which consists of the "ring
road" connecting several of Afghanistan's major cities and roads that
connect the ring road to neighboring countries) by the end of 2008, and
as of February 2008, about 60 percent of the network was complete. The
United States, through USAID, has completed its commitment of 715
kilometers, but the entire network is not expected to be completed
until at least the end of 2009. USAID has also completed construction
of 726 kilometers of national highways, which connect provincial
capitals to the regional highways. The construction of about 900
additional kilometers of these highways, funded by USAID and other
donors, is not yet complete. Information on the status of provincial
and rural roads is limited, as donors have not reported it to the joint
Afghan government and international donor group responsible for
collecting donor-funded road project data. Additionally, Defense
reported completing 155 out of about 1,600 kilometers of CERP-funded
civilian roads, but Defense's data are incomplete, and according to
officials, they cannot identify the location of some CERP-funded roads.
Moreover, Defense has not reported on the status of CERP-funded roads
for inclusion in a USAID database, as required by its own guidance.
Donors have made progress in constructing highways and smaller roads;
however, completion is behind schedule and, in some cases, has cost
more than expected. For example, although USAID constructed hundreds of
kilometers of roads in 2006 and 2007, it did not meet its annual
completion targets for those years. Challenges including poor security
conditions, limited capacity of project implementers, and
implementation without adequate planning have contributed to project
delays and cost increases.
U.S. agencies know little about the impact of road projects, since they
have not conducted sound evaluations to determine the degree to which
the projects have achieved the goals of economic development and
humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, agency officials and others have
reported some examples of projects' positive impact, such as increased
commerce and decreased transportation costs. However, these results are
based on a limited qualitative assessment or anecdotal information, and
therefore cannot be generalized. USAID devoted limited resources for
the design of impact evaluations and data collection, which are needed
prior to project implementation to perform a sound evaluation. Although
USAID started its first road reconstruction program in 2002, it did not
contract for an impact assessment for this program until late 2006. In
addition, data were not collected in a timely manner for the two major
road projects that have been completed. For example, for one USAID
project, baseline data were collected after substantial work had been
done on the road, making it likely that an evaluation would understate
its impact. USAID has recently developed an Afghanistan-specific
results framework, which links project activities to desired impact.
However, the frameworks have deficiencies and fall short of achieving
their intended purpose. For example, the results framework described in
the agency's performance management plan does not clearly explain how
road construction would lead to increased income from the private
sector. Additionally, the framework for its latest infrastructure
program does not include targets, as baseline studies to determine
appropriate targets were not completed as planned. Moreover, since no
other donor has conducted impact evaluation of its road projects in
Afghanistan, little is known about the impact of other road
reconstruction. Completing sound impact evaluations is vital to ensure
that the assistance provided by the United States and other
international donors is achieving the intended results and desired
outcomes. Defense has not evaluated its CERP-funded civilian road
projects and has not provided clear guidance on evaluation of these
projects.
A sustainable road maintenance program has not been established, and
the Afghan government relies on assistance from the international
community, because its ability to maintain newly constructed roads is
limited. The goal, set by the Afghan government in conjunction with
international donors to establish a fiscally sustainable road
maintenance program by the end of 2007, was not met. In part, this is
because the Afghan government (1) faces significant human and financial
resource constraints, (2) is hampered by a fragmented institutional
structure consisting of multiple Afghan ministries with a stake in the
transportation sector, and (3) lacks a comprehensive legal framework
and means of enforcement of fee collection for the transportation
sector. According to various plans, estimates of maintenance costs
range from about $70 million to $90 million annually, not including
rural roads. Since the Afghan government has not been able to maintain
newly reconstructed roads, the European Commission and USAID have
agreed to provide funding for 3 years to help maintain over 1,600
kilometers of the roads they built. However, USAID did not meet its
2007 target to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads.
We make recommendations to the USAID Administrator to take steps to
improve USAID's framework for assessing results and conduct impact
evaluations for road projects, in coordination with other donors. We
also recommend that the Administrator work with the Afghan government
to address maintenance needs and require that future USAID road
projects include plans to fund maintenance. Additionally, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense require impact evaluations of CERP-funded
roads where applicable, and ensure that the status of CERP-funded road
projects is reported for inclusion in a USAID database, as required by
CERP guidance.
In responding to our draft report, USAID and Defense concurred with our
findings and recommendations. USAID indicated that it has begun taking
steps or plans to take steps to address our recommendations. Defense
stated that it has included measures in its program guidance that
emphasize requirements that address our recommendations. Defense also
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated where
appropriate. We have reprinted USAID's and Defense's comments in
appendixes V and VI, respectively.
Background:
In 2001, when the United States and its allies removed the Taliban
regime, Afghanistan was in economic crisis. The nation's roads had
deteriorated, limiting economic growth and access to resources and
services for its citizens. The Afghan government has recognized that
improving the country's roads is an important element in lifting the
population from poverty. It considers a viable major road network
essential to becoming a transport and trading hub in Central Asia.
Additionally, road access for rural areas would help to promote licit
crops and broaden access to health and education. In 2003, the Afghan
government and international donors proposed a road network for
Afghanistan, which they hoped to complete by 2015. The proposed network
(as shown in fig. 1) identifies the country's major roads, including
the ring road, which links Afghanistan's major cities of Kabul,
Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif.[Footnote 2]
Figure 1: Afghan Road Network Envisioned for 2015:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the Afghan Road Network envisioned for 2015.
The map depicts provinces, regional highways, national highways, and
provincial roads.
Source: GAO from Afghanistan Information Management Services map.
[End of figure]
Afghanistan National Development Strategy:
In February 2006, the Afghan government introduced the interim
Afghanistan National Development Strategy and its accompanying
implementation plan, the Afghanistan Compact. The compact included two
benchmarks for roads: (1) a fully upgraded ring road as well as roads
connecting the ring road to neighboring countries by the end of 2008,
and (2) a fiscally sustainable system for road maintenance by the end
of 2007.[Footnote 3] The Afghan government and international donors
established the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board to oversee the
implementation of compact benchmarks. In addition, representatives of
relevant government ministries, agencies, and the international
community have formed groups to address implementation issues. For
example, the group working on roads is commonly referred to as the
Consultative Group for the Transport Sector.
Afghan Ministries:
Several Afghan ministries have transportation sector-related functions.
The two ministries with road construction and maintenance
responsibilities are the Ministry of Public Works, which has
jurisdiction over highways and provincial roads, and the Ministry of
Rural Rehabilitation and Development, which oversees the rural roads.
The Ministries of Transportation and Civil Aviation, Finance, Commerce,
Interior, and Foreign Affairs collect fees or tolls associated with the
transportation sector. Additionally, the Ministry of Finance disburses
funds to other ministries for road maintenance and operations. The
Ministry of Economy is responsible for all government procurement,
including for road maintenance.
Road Types:
Since 2005, the Ministry of Public Works has attempted to standardize
the nomenclature of roads in its Interim Road and Highway Standards,
and estimated the length of roads in the Road Sector Master Plan.
[Footnote 4] The four broad categories of Afghan roads are regional
highways, national highways, provincial roads, and rural roads (see
fig. 2).
Figure 2: Afghan Road Types and Characteristics:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains photographs of each road type, as well as the
following information:
Road type[A]: Regional highways;
Characteristics: Foster regional trade and economic linkages between
Afghanistan and neighboring countries. Includes the ring road and
principal roads connecting to neighboring countries. These are
generally paved roads[B];
Estimated length (kilometers): 3,200.
Road type[A]: National highways;
Characteristics: Promote trade and economic linkages. Connect capitals
of Afghanistan‘s 34 provinces to the regional highway network. These
are generally paved roads;
Estimated length (kilometers): 4,900.
Road type[A]: Provincial roads;
Characteristics: Improve administrative, trade, and economic contacts
between district headquarters and respective provincial capitals and
between important district headquarters. Connects provincial capitals
to district headquarters. These may be paved or gravel roads;
Estimated length (kilometers): 9,700[C].
Road type[A]: Rural roads;
Characteristics: Bring remote areas into commercial contact with
markets and seats of power. Includes roads inside districts. These are
smaller roads that may be paved, gravel, or cobblestone;
Estimated length (kilometers): 17,000[C].
Source: GAO analysis based on the Ministry of Public Works‘ Interim
Road and Highway Standards and Road Sector Master Plan.
[A] Urban roads are excluded from this list, as these roads fall under
the jurisdiction of local municipalities rather than national
ministries. However, the Transport Sector Strategy, finalized in
February 2008, includes an estimated 3,800 kilometers of urban roads.
[B] We use "paved" to describe roads with an asphalt, concrete, or
double bituminous surface treatment.
[C] According to the 2008 Transport Sector Strategy, which is part of
the final Afghanistan National Development Strategy, provincial roads
are now estimated to be 34,000 kilometers long and the rural road
network is estimated to be about 88,000 kilometers long.
[End of figure]
U.S.-Funded Afghan Road Projects:
The United States, through USAID and Defense, has committed about $1.7
billion for road reconstruction in Afghanistan between fiscal years
2002 and 2007. USAID, whose commitments represent 67 percent of the
total U.S. assistance, has funded highways and provincial roads through
its infrastructure program. In addition, USAID has funded rural roads
through its Agriculture, Alternative Development, and Quick Impact
Project programs, as well as the World Bank-led National Emergency
Rural Access Project. Defense, whose funding accounts for the remaining
33 percent of the total U.S. assistance, has committed CERP funds for
civilian road projects,[Footnote 5] and Military Construction and
Military Engineering funds for roads for military purposes (see fig.
3).
Figure 3: Road Reconstruction Funding by U.S. Agencies and Programs
between Fiscal Years 2002 and 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains photographs of a national highway and a rural
road, as well as the following information:
Road reconstruction commitments: $1.7 billion.
USAID: 67%;
Defense: 33%.
USAID:
Infrastructure: Large-scale infrastructure development such as regional
and national highways and provincial roads;
Funds committed[A]: $1,053,000;
Quick Impact Project: Small-scale projects undertaken during early
phases of reconstruction to win local support;
Funds committed[A]: $30,000,000;
National Emergency Rural Access Project: A mulitilateral effort led by
the World Bank to build roads in rural areas;
Funds committed[A]: $20,000,000;
Alternative Development and Agriculture: Includes rural road
reconstruction to provide alternatives to poppy production and increase
agricultural productivity, rural employment, and food security; Funds
committed[A]: $19,000,000.
Defense:
Commander‘s Emergency Response Program: Small-scale, urgent,
humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects to immediately assist
the Afghan people;
Funds committed[A]: $304,000,000;
Military construction: Construction of paved roads for military
purposes;
Funds committed[A]: $245,000,000;
Military Engineering: Construction for urgent military purposes such
as combat trails for operations;
Funds committed[A]: $15,000,000.
Sources: GAO analysis of data from USAID, Army Budget Office, USACE,
and Combined Joint Task Force-82; GAO (photos).
[A] The funding data have been rounded to the nearest million and
therefore may not match the total precisely.
[End of figure]
Since 2002, USAID and Defense have implemented road projects using
contracts and grant awards. For its major infrastructure projects,
USAID awarded contracts to the Louis Berger Group (LBG) in 2002 and to
LBG-Black & Veatch Joint Venture (LBG/B&V) in 2006, and a grant to the
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in 2004. Defense has
awarded contracts for CERP-funded road projects to USACE or directly to
local contractors through the U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams
between 2004 and 2007.[Footnote 6] Table 1 lists U.S. government awards
for road reconstruction in Afghanistan.
Table 1: USAID and Defense's Afghan Road Reconstruction Awards:
USAID:
Year: 2002;
Project name--instrument used: Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities
and Services Program (REFS)--Contract;
Implementer: LBG;
Project description: Regional highway sections, including Kabul-
Kandahar and Kandahar-Herat.
Year: 2004;
Project name--instrument used: Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of
National Secondary Roads--Grant;
Implementer: UNOPS;
Project description: National highways and provincial roads, including
Kandahar-Tarin Kowt and Feyzabad District Center Road.
Year: 2006;
Project name--instrument used: Afghanistan Infrastructure and
Rehabilitation Program (IRP)--Contract;
Implementer: LBG/B&V;
Project description: National highways and provincial roads, including
Keshim-Feyzabad.
Defense:
Year: 2004;
Project name--instrument used: CERP-funded road projects--Contracts;
Implementer: USACE or local contractors;
Project description: Provincial and rural roads, including Nangarej-
Mandol and Gulum Khan.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID and Defense data.
[End of table]
International Donor Funding for Afghan Highways:
The United States and other international donors have committed over
$2.2 billion for reconstruction of the regional and national highways
identified in the Afghan government's Road Sector Master Plan. Of the
total donor commitment for these roads, the United States (through
USAID) has committed about 42 percent (over $960 million), followed by
the Asian Development Bank (24 percent), Japan, and the World Bank (6
percent each) (see fig. 4). The government of Afghanistan has also
committed approximately $47 million for the construction of highways.
Figure 4: Percentages of Donor Funds Committed for Regional and
National Highways in Afghanistan, 2002-2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Percentages of Donor Funds Committed for Regional and National Highways
in Afghanistan, 2002-2007:
United States: 42%;
Asian Development Bank: 24%;
Japan: 6%;
World Bank: 6%;
Italy: 5%;
European Commission[A]: 4%;
Other[B]: 13%.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Consultative Group for the
Transport Sector and USAID.
[A] European Commission funding represents contributions by the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency.
[B] Other donors include the Islamic Development Bank, India, Iran,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
[End of figure]
Donors Have Made Progress in Building Highways, but Status of Other
Roads Is Uncertain and Challenges Have Delayed Road Construction:
The United States and other donors have completed construction of about
2,700 kilometers of regional and national highways in Afghanistan since
2002, but limited information is available on the status of provincial
and rural roads and various challenges have delayed road construction.
The Afghan government and international donors established the goal to
complete Afghanistan's regional highway network by the end of 2008, and
as of February 2008, about 60 percent of the network was complete. The
United States, through USAID, has completed its commitment of 715
kilometers, but the entire network is not expected to be completed by
the end of 2008, as planned. The United States has also completed
construction of 726 kilometers of national highways and construction of
an additional 917 kilometers of these highways, for which the United
States and other donors have committed funds, is ongoing or not yet
started. Limited information is available on the status of provincial
and rural roads, as donors have not reported these data to the joint
Afghan government and international donor group that collects data on
all Afghan road projects. Although Defense reported completing
construction of 155 out of about 1,600 kilometers of CERP-funded
civilian roads, project data are incomplete, and according to
officials, they cannot identify the location of some CERP-funded roads.
Moreover, Defense has not reported project data on CERP-funded roads
for inclusion in a USAID database, as required by guidance. Donors have
made progress, but road construction is behind schedule and, in some
cases, has cost more than expected. For example, USAID has not met its
annual completion targets for roads for 2006 and 2007. Challenges
including poor security conditions, limited capacity of project
implementers, and implementation without adequate planning have
contributed to project delays and cost increases.
The United States and International Donors Have Built or Committed
Funds for Afghan Highways, but Data on Other Roads Are Limited:
The United States and other donors have completed portions of the
regional and national highways (see fig. 5). While the donors have also
committed funds for the construction of provincial and rural roads, the
overall status of these roads is uncertain because of the lack of
available data.
Figure 5: Status of Donor-Funded Road Reconstruction in Afghanistan, as
of February 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a horizontal bar graph depicting the following data:
Regional highways: Total kilometers for which funds are committed:
United States: 715;
Other donors: 2,525;
Funds not committed: 0;
Total highway kilometers: 3,240;
Total kilometers completed:
United States: 715;
Other donors: 1,239;
Funds not committed: 0.
National highways: Total kilometers for which funds are committed:
United States: 1,029;
Other donors: 614;
Funds not committed: 3,240;
Total highway kilometers: 4,884;
Total kilometers completed:
United States: 726;
Other donors: 0;
Funds not committed: 0.
Provincial roads: Total kilometers for which funds are committed:
United States: 420;
Other donors: 0;
Funds not committed: 9,236;
Total highway kilometers: 9,656.
Total kilometers completed: 187;
United States: 187;
Other donors: 0;
Funds not committed: 0.
Rural roads: Total kilometers for which funds are committed:
United States: 2,651;
Other donors: 0;
Funds not committed: 14,349;
Total highway kilometers: 17,000 estimated[A].
Total kilometers completed: 1,205;
United States: 1,205;
Other donors: 0;
Funds not committed: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of data from USAID, the Consultative Group for the
Transport Sector, and the Road Sector Master Plan.
[A] CERP-funded roads include rural and provincial roads. However,
because we do not have CERP data disaggregated by road type and CERP
funding is used for small-scale projects, we included all CERP-funded
roads in the rural roads category.
[End of figure]
More than Half of Regional Highway Construction Is Complete, but
Construction Is behind Schedule:
Although more than half of the regional highway network in Afghanistan
has been completed, construction is behind schedule. In its Afghanistan
National Development Strategy, the Afghan government, in conjunction
with international donors, established the goal of completing a fully
upgraded regional highway network by the end of 2008. The construction
of the regional highways is a top road reconstruction priority of the
Afghan government and international donors, as these roads are expected
to foster regional trade and contribute to Afghanistan's economic
development. The United States and other donors have committed more
than $1.5 billion for the over-3,200-kilometers-long regional highway
network and had completed about 60 percent (1,954 kilometers) of these
highways as of February 2008 (see figs. 6 and 7). The United States,
through USAID, has completed the construction of the 715 kilometers of
the regional highways it funded.[Footnote 7] In addition, it also
managed the construction for the 115-kilometer-long Saudi-funded
section, which is complete. However, construction of an additional 29
percent (932 kilometers) of the regional highway network is ongoing and
donors have committed funding but have yet to start construction of the
remaining 11 percent (354 kilometers).[Footnote 8] Completion of at
least 300 kilometers of the regional highway network is not expected
until December 2009, in part because funding was not committed until
September 2006.
Figure 6: Donor-Funded Regional and National Highways in Afghanistan:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of Donor-Funded Regional and National Highways in
Afghanistan. The following entities are specifically noted:
* Regional highways;
* Provincial boundaries;
* Country capital;
* Provincial capitals.
Donor-funded road network: Portions funded by:
Afghanistan;
Asian Development Bank;
European Union;
India;
Iran;
Italy;
Japan;
Pakistan;
Saudi Arabia;
United States (USAID);
World Bank;
Islamic Development Bank.
This map has Interactive features: Roll your mouse over this
symbol on each road for more details on that road section.
See Appendix II for project details.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Consultative Group for the
Transport Sector and USAID.
[End of figure]
Figure 7: USAID-Funded Roads in Afghanistan and Funding Levels by
Province:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of USAID-Funded Roads in Afghanistan and funding
levels by Province. The following entities are specifically noted:
* Regional highways;
* Provincial boundaries;
* Country capital;
* Provincial capitals.
USAID-funded road network:
Regional highway;
Saudi funded; USAID implemented;
National highways;
District roads;
Road projects canceled;
District center with road construction.
Provinces with less than $10 million USAID funding:
Badghis;
Balkh;
Baghlan;
Bamyan;
Daikondi;
Faryab;
Ghor;
Jowzjan;
Kapisa;
Kunduz;
Laghman;
Nurestan;
Paktila;
Samangan;
Takhar.
Provinces with $10 million to $38 million USAID funding:
Helmand;
Kabul;
Khost;
Konar;
Lowgar;
Nangarhar;
Nimruz;
Panjshir;
Parwan;
Sar-e Pol;
Uruzgan.
Provinces with greater than $38 million USAID funding[A]:
Badakhshan;
Farah;
Ghazni;
Herat;
Kandahar;
Paktia;
Wardak;
Zabul.
This map has Interactive features: Roll your mouse over this
symbol on each road for more details on that road section.
See Appendix II for project details.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[A] USAID provided an average of $38 million for road reconstruction as
part of its infrastructure program in 28 out of 34 provinces.
[End of figure]
Less than Half of the National Highways for Which Donors Have Committed
Funds Are Complete:
International donors have completed 44 percent (726 kilometers) of the
1,600 kilometers of national highways for which they have committed
approximately $716 million. The national highways are expected to
connect the capitals of all 34 Afghan provinces to regional highways.
USAID has completed construction of 726 kilometers of national highways
and has committed funds for an additional 300 kilometers, which is
under construction. Other donors, consisting of the Asian Development
Bank, the World Bank, and Italy, have committed funds to construct
about 600 kilometers of national highways, but none of these roads is
complete (see app. II for the status of regional and national highway
projects).
Limited Information Is Available on Construction of Provincial and
Rural Roads; Defense Has Not Reported Data on Its Civilian Roads, as
Required:
The status of provincial and rural road construction is uncertain
because donors have not reported this information to the group
collecting road project data for all Afghan roads. Additionally,
Defense has not reported project details on its CERP-funded roads for
inclusion in a USAID database, as required by CERP guidance.
Limited Information on the Status of Provincial and Rural Roads:
Afghanistan's Road Sector Master Plan identifies about 9,700 kilometers
of provincial roads and an estimated 17,000 kilometers of rural roads,
and the United States and international donors have funded and built
some of these roads.[Footnote 9] However, limited information is
available on donors' funding commitments and completion status for
these roads. The Consultative Group for the Transport Sector, which
includes officials from donor agencies and Afghan ministries involved
in the transportation sector, is responsible for collecting information
on all road projects. However, information on some provincial and all
rural roads, which are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development, is currently not reported to the group,
according to the official who collects road project data. The official
noted that international donors have reported only road project
information for roads that are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Public Works.
According to USAID, it has completed construction of 237 kilometers of
provincial roads, and construction of over 185 additional kilometers is
under way.[Footnote 10] In addition, it has constructed over 1,000
kilometers of rural roads, such as labor-intensive cobblestone roads
and farm-to-market roads, as part of its Agriculture and Alternative
Development programs. However, the agency could not provide the
kilometers of roads constructed through its Quick Impact Project, which
included construction of small roads during the early phase of
reconstruction in Afghanistan.
Defense Has Not Reported Data on Its Civilian Roads:
Although Defense has provided CERP funding for road reconstruction
since 2004, its project status data are incomplete. According to
Defense officials in Afghanistan, Defense has committed CERP funds to
construct approximately 1,600 kilometers of provincial and rural roads
for civilian use, of which about 155 kilometers are reported as
complete.[Footnote 11] In addition to civilian roads, Defense officials
reported that about 540 kilometers of roads are under construction for
military purposes, including 400 kilometers of roads that have been
paved to prevent insurgents from planting improvised explosive devices.
[Footnote 12] However, Defense's information on CERP-funded roads may
not accurately represent kilometers of roads under construction or
completed, as the project data provided to us were incomplete. For
example, according to Defense officials in Washington, about $6 million
of CERP funds was provided for roads in the provinces of Farah and
Helmand (see app. III for CERP funding by province). However, as shown
in figure 8, project location information provided by Defense officials
in Afghanistan does not show any CERP roads in these provinces.
Figure 8: Location of CERP and Military Construction Roads in
Afghanistan and CERP Funding by Province:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of Afghanistan depicting the location of CERP and
Military construction roads and CERP funding by Province, as well as
the following information:
Defense-funded roads:
Military construction;
Commander's Emergency Response Program;
CERP funding level by province: Did not receive funding:
Badghis;
Baghlan;
Daikondi;
Faryab;
Ghor;
Jowzjan;
Nimruz;
Samangan;
Sar-e Pol;
Takhar.
CERP funding level by province: less than $1 million:
Badakhshan;
Balkh;
Bamyan;
Helmand;
Herat;
Kapisa;
Kunduz;
Laghman;
Lowgar;
Wardak.
CERP funding level by province: $1 million to $13 million:
Farah;
Kandahar;
Nangarhar;
Paktia;
Paktila;
Parwan;
Uruzgan;
Zabul.
CERP funding level by province: greater than $13 million[A]:
Ghazni;
Kabul;
Khost;
Konar;
Nurestan;
Panjshir.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data; USAID and Defense (map).
[A] Defense provided an average of $13 million in CERP funding for
roads in 24 provinces.
[End of figure]
Although Defense is required by CERP guidance to report on the status
of road projects to a USAID-maintained database, it has not done so.
The 2006 CERP guidance requires data for all construction projects to
be reported for inclusion in a USAID database. However, according to
USAID, no CERP project data have been reported into the database.
Furthermore, according to Defense officials in Afghanistan, Defense's
data collection systems often change when a new military command takes
charge, and project information is lost during the transition. They
said that because of missing documentation and frequent staff rotation,
they do not know where some CERP-funded roads were built prior to
fiscal year 2006. As a result, a comprehensive database of all U.S.-
funded road projects does not exist.
Several Challenges Have Contributed to Delays and Cost Increases:
Despite progress in building roads, construction is behind schedule.
For instance, USAID did not meet its annual targets for kilometers of
roads constructed as established in its Afghanistan Performance
Management Plan (2006-2008).[Footnote 13] Specifically, for fiscal year
2006, the agency set a target to complete 550 kilometers of roads, but
completed only 393 kilometers. In 2007, its initial target of 580
kilometers was later decreased to 423 kilometers, but the agency
completed only 228 kilometers. It has also decreased the target for the
current fiscal year from 550 kilometers to 314 kilometers.
U.S. agencies and other donors have faced several challenges in
implementing road projects, such as poor security conditions,
limitations of project implementers, and starting construction with
limited planning.[Footnote 14] These factors have contributed to
project delays and cost increases.
Poor Security Conditions:
According to U.S. government and other donor officials, poor security
is the most difficult challenge they face in implementing road
projects. The security situation in some parts of the country has
delayed road construction projects and increased costs. For example,
USAID signed a contract for about $8 million to construct the Kajaki
road in May 2007. According to USAID, this road is important as it
connects the Kajaki dam, a source of water and power in southern
Afghanistan, to the ring road. However, because attacks prevented
contractors from working on the project, it was terminated in 2008
after USAID had spent about $5 million. USAID's first Afghan
infrastructure program also experienced cost increases due to
deteriorating security. According to a USAID Office of the Inspector
General report, almost $9 million of a proposed ceiling increase to the
contract was directly attributable to increased security costs.
[Footnote 15] Additionally, according to USACE road project data and
officials, security issues resulted in frequent schedule delays for
roads. For example, a contractor in Zabul province had six employees
kidnapped, and as of May 2008, work on the project had not progressed
for almost 60 days.
According to donors we spoke with in Afghanistan, security is a major
concern in the south and the east, and is also becoming a concern in
the north. Due to deteriorating security conditions, as of February
2008, Japan has been able to complete construction of only 12 percent
of a 114-kilometer-long section of the Kandahar-Herat road in southern
Afghanistan.[Footnote 16] This road section was originally estimated to
be completed by July 2006. According to a Japanese official, the
construction costs for this section have increased to more than three
times the initial estimate. Additionally, because the Japanese
contractor responsible for this section left due to increasingly
dangerous conditions, Japan has re-awarded a contract for 50 kilometers
of this road section to a local contractor.
In addition to monetary costs, attacks in areas where roads are being
reconstructed have resulted in loss of life and injuries among workers.
As of March 2008, 162 contractors associated with USAID roads programs
have been killed and 202 have been injured or disabled in attacks since
2003.[Footnote 17] There are more casualties associated with road
programs than with any other USAID program in Afghanistan, according to
USAID data. Defense contractors have also suffered casualties. For
example, one project was delayed by at least 30 days while the
contractor organized a new team after 18 workers were killed in an
attack, according to a USACE official.
Project Implementer Limitations:
Limited capacity of local project implementers has impeded donors'
efforts to complete road construction projects on time and within
budget. According to donor officials we spoke to, the list of capable
local contractors is growing, but it still remains small. According to
USACE officials, one of their objectives is to build local capacity by
using Afghan contractors. However, the agency has had difficulties with
poor subcontractor performance, which, according to USACE officials,
has resulted in time delays. For example, although USACE planned to
complete its first road project in June 2007, it was not until March
2008 that USACE officials signed a letter documenting project
completion. When we visited the project in October 2007, the contract
cost had increased by about 45 percent and the completion date had been
extended by over a year. USACE officials said they rejected work done
on the project because of "poor contractor methods" and required the
contractor to redo work.
Additionally, according to USAID officials and a report on USAID's
first major road program, LBG terminated multiple subcontracts during
construction of the Jalalabad-Asmar road because of poor performance,
which resulted in an estimated 3-to 4-month delay for each termination.
Moreover, USAID paid over $7 million for the construction of several
segments of this road, all of which required rework. In an end-of-year
progress report to USAID, UNOPS stated that it had terminated 10
contracts in 2005 due to poor contractor performance that had resulted
in construction delays. According to USAID officials, one of the
reasons they opted to award funds to UNOPS was to support their
capacity building of local contractors, even though USAID officials
knew it would likely result in delays and additional cost. Each
terminated contract results in cost overruns due to the recurrent cost
of getting the contractor's equipment and materials to the construction
site and building a new construction camp, according to a USAID
official.
USAID's concerns about UNOPS's performance led to the termination of
the grant agreement after USAID had awarded over $365 million (see app.
IV for more details). USAID officials expressed concern about UNOPS's
financial management of grant funds and, in July 2007, required UNOPS
to have an independent financial audit done as a condition to approving
funds to cover cost overruns.[Footnote 18] In December 2007, USAID
terminated the grant due to "serious shortcomings in [UNOPS's]
financial and technical management" of the grant, according to USAID's
technical officer for the grant. At the time of the grant's
termination, construction of one major road project was only 60 percent
complete, although grant funds were depleted.
Starting Construction with Limited Planning:
Limited planning by donors prior to starting construction has resulted
in increased costs.[Footnote 19] According to a senior Ministry of
Public Works official, there have been several instances of cost
increases because donors have started construction without adequate
planning, such as completing engineering studies prior to construction.
For example, according to the ministry official, the cost of a regional
highway section that the Asian Development Bank funded increased from
$28 million to $56 million because detailed design work had not been
completed prior to project implementation. As a result of this cost
increase, the project had to be put on hold for up to 3 years. The
official stated that other donors, including Italy and the United
States, have also faced similar challenges.
According to a USAID official, detailed planning, including engineering
and feasibility studies, can take 1 year or more and such studies may
not be feasible due to deteriorating security conditions. Additionally,
long time frames for projects have not been acceptable in Afghanistan
due to pressure from donors and the Afghan government to show faster
results, according to USAID officials.[Footnote 20] As a result, USAID
has not completed project designs before beginning construction of its
road projects. For example, in a memo approving an expansion of the
UNOPS grant, USAID officials stated that the political context
necessitated having some roads under contract within weeks and under
construction "as soon as possible." In some cases, UNOPS was unable to
develop complete project descriptions and corresponding cost estimates
before it awarded contracts. In another case, according to a USAID
Office of Inspector General report, a detailed assessment of bridges
and an old road had not been done when USAID awarded the construction
contract for the Kandahar-Herat road.[Footnote 21] As a result, work
plans were modified during construction, contributing to a 43 percent
cost increase. Our review of contract file documentation for one of the
four U.S.-built sections of the Kandahar-Herat road showed a net
increase of over $10 million, due in part to revisions of construction
requirements of bridges.
Little Is Known about the Impact of Road Projects in Afghanistan:
U.S. agencies involved in road reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan
know little about the impact of road projects, since they have not
conducted assessments to determine the degree to which the projects
have achieved economic development and humanitarian assistance goals.
While agencies reported some examples of positive impact, these are
based on limited data, a qualitative evaluation, or anecdotal
information, and therefore cannot be generalized. Several factors have
limited agencies' abilities to conduct impact assessments. For USAID,
these include limited attention to the design of impact evaluations
prior to project implementation, lack of timely data collection for its
two major road projects, and deficiencies in the frameworks for
assessing results of Afghanistan road projects. For Defense, they
include failure to assess the results of its road projects and lack of
clear guidance on the evaluation of its CERP-funded projects. Moreover,
since no other donor has conducted impact evaluation of its road
projects in Afghanistan, little is known about the impact of other road
reconstruction as well. Completing sound impact evaluations in
coordination with other donors involved in road reconstruction is vital
to ensure that the assistance provided by the United States and other
international donors is achieving the intended results and desired
outcomes.
USAID Has Not Performed Sound Impact Assessments; Examples of Impact
Are Mostly Anecdotal:
USAID has not performed a sound impact assessment of its completed road
projects in Afghanistan. Because of this, there is limited evidence of
the positive impact of U.S.-funded road projects. In some cases the
limited evidence comes from a USAID-funded qualitative study, while in
other cases it is based on rough estimates, anecdotes, or impressions.
Neither the qualitative study nor the anecdotes shared by U.S.
officials are representative and therefore the results are not
generalizable. Examples of positive results reported in the qualitative
study or via anecdotes and impressions include the following:
According to USAID, the ring road is being heavily used and travel
times have decreased. Additionally, USAID estimates that 3,500 labor
days are produced for each kilometer of road constructed. However, it
could not provide us data to support this estimate.
Photograph: CERP-Funded Paved Road.
Source: GAO.
[Traffic on the newly paved sections of Defense‘s CERP-funded Kadem
Tana road in Khost province. According to Defense officials,
reconstructed roads have led to increased commerce and opened lines of
communications between different districts].
* Defense officials told us that they observed that traffic increased
significantly when a new road is built. According to these officials,
new roads have led to an increase in the number of gas stations, which
is evidence of an increase in commerce. Moreover, according to these
officials, roads have opened lines of communication among districts,
provinces, and the central government, thereby improving local
governance. Because they did not quantify these changes, they cannot
demonstrate the extent to which these projects led to observed impacts.
* According to some local elders we spoke with in a village close to
Jalalabad, Nangarhar province, the cobblestone road constructed with
USAID funds had enabled access to markets for agricultural products, as
well as to clinics and hospitals for the local population; generated
employment for daily laborers during road construction; increased
commerce as new shops have been constructed along the road; and
promoted community participation as locals contributed their land to
widen the road.
* UNOPS performed a qualitative study, funded by USAID, of the impact
of rehabilitated district roads and concluded that improvements to
these roads led to increased employment opportunities, reduced
transport costs, and increased traffic flows. In addition, the road
improvements helped to raise land values and encourage the development
of a marketing network. The results of this study were based on
discussions with a nonrepresentative group of respondents and did not
include a comparison, for example, of how employment opportunities
changed for a comparable location that did not benefit from a new road.
* LBG provided some estimates of the reductions in travel time and cost
savings from USAID's completed road projects. The road reconstruction
led to a reduction in travel time between 30 and 50 percent, and in
vehicle operating cost savings between 25 and 62 percent, according to
the estimates. These estimates are based on surveys by LBG's engineers.
However, LBG officials could not verify the accuracy of these numbers,
and to date, USAID has not financed a follow-up study of its completed
projects to support them.
Limitations in USAID's Planning Efforts Impede Its Ability to Assess
Impact:
Limitations in planning for evaluation prior to project implementation,
problems with data collection, and weaknesses associated with USAID's
Afghanistan-specific results frameworks have impeded impact assessments
of its road projects.
Limitations in Funding and Data Collection:
USAID's plans show that the agency focused little attention and funding
on the design of impact assessment for its first road reconstruction
program prior to project implementation. Sound evaluation design
includes plans to collect data before, during, and after project
implementation.[Footnote 22] Although its first large road
reconstruction program was launched in 2002, USAID did not issue a task
order to perform a socioeconomic impact assessment for this program
until October 2006. Although an assessment was planned for spring 2008,
no assessments for transport infrastructure projects have been
completed under this task order.
Additionally, USAID officials did not collect data for the two major
completed road projects, the Kabul-Kandahar and Kandahar-Herat
highways, in a timely manner to allow them to accurately measure impact
over time. Baseline data on project beneficiaries and a control group
collected before project implementation are used for comparison with
data collected after the project is completed to assess the project's
net results. Two baseline studies were conducted, one each for the
USAID-funded sections of the Kabul-Kandahar and Kandahar-Herat roads.
However, the baseline study for the Kabul-Kandahar road was undertaken
after considerable work had already been done, so an evaluation
comparing conditions before and after this project is likely to
understate its impact. While USAID conducted the baseline study for the
Kandahar-Herat road before starting construction, it has not collected
follow-up data since the project's December 2006 completion. Although
USAID officials have not completed a baseline study for any projects in
its latest roads program, they intend to collect baseline data for six
road projects and have begun efforts for one of them.
Limitations in Frameworks Linking Reconstruction Activities to Impact:
While USAID recently designed a framework that links reconstruction
activities in Afghanistan to expected impacts, weaknesses in
Afghanistan-wide and program-specific frameworks also impede assessment
of the efficient use of resources and evaluation of project impact.
Although USAID has developed an Afghanistan-specific framework to
assess results, it does not clearly explain how road reconstruction
will lead to the agency's strategic objective. In its Afghanistan
Performance Management Plan (2006-2008), developed following a 2005 GAO
recommendation, USAID lays out a logical framework to link road
reconstruction activities to its strategic objective of a licit
thriving economy led by the private sector.[Footnote 23] The framework
includes objectives, indicators to identify how progress will be
measured, and annual targets as numeric goals that help to assess
progress toward objectives (see fig. 9).[Footnote 24] However, the plan
does not explain how the kilometers of roads constructed (output) would
lead to impacts such as an increase in foreign direct investment and
income from the private sector. Specifically, the plan does not include
outcome indicators (such as cost and time savings) that would link the
outputs to impact indicators.
Figure 9: Elements of USAID's Results Framework in the Performance
Management Plan (2006-2008):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of Elements of USAID's Results Framework
in the Performance Management Plan (2006-2008), as follows:
Performance Management Plan objectives:
* Activity level:
- Road networks expansion;
* Intermediate:
- Improved physical infrastructure;
- Accelerated growth in the rural economy;
- Increased incomes through economic growth;
* Strategic:
- A licit thriving economy led by the private sector.
Performance Management Plan indicators:
* Output:
- 1. Kilometers of roads reconstructed:
Year: 2006: Kilometers: 550;
Year: 2007: Kilometers: 580[A];
Year: 2008: Kilometers: 550[A];
* Outcome:
- Not included;
* Impact:
- Increased foreign direct investment;
- Decreased income from drugs;
- Increased income from the private sector.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[A] The targets for 2007 and 2008 were subsequently reduced to 423
kilometers and 314 kilometers respectively.
[End of figure]
USAID also established a program-specific framework to link projects
that are part of USAID's most recent road program, IRP, to USAID's
strategic objectives, though the framework does not include output
indicators and associated targets to assess progress.[Footnote 25]
Unlike the countrywide plan, the IRP framework contains outcome
indicators such as vehicle operating costs and time savings (see fig.
10). These indicators measure progress toward intermediate objectives,
which link to the strategic objectives of a licit economy led by the
private sector and improving health and education of Afghans. However,
the framework does not include output indicators and associated targets
that would allow the agency to assess progress annually.
Figure 10: Elements of USAID's Results Framework of IRP for the
Transportation Sector:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of Elements of USAID's Results Framework
of IRP for the Transportation Sector, as follows:
IRP objectives:
* Activity level:
- Expanded and improved access to transportation;
- Improved private sector growth;
- Accelerated market-led growth in agriculture;
* Intermediate:
- Expanded and improved access to economic infrastructure;
- Increased income through economic growth;
- Rehabilitated rural economy;
- Increased access to education;
- Increased access to health care;
* Strategic[A]:
- A licit thriving economy led by the private sector;
- A better-educated and healthier population.
IRP indicators:
* Output:
- Not included;
* Targets:
- Not included;
* Outcome:
- Reduced vehicle operating costs;
- Reduced travel times;
- Increased household income;
- Increased rates of school attendance;
* Impact:
- Increased foreign direct investment;
- Decreased income from drugs;
- Increased income from the private sector.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[A] The strategic objectives in the IRP framework are based on
objectives in USAID's Afghanistan Performance Management Plan (2006-
2008).
[End of figure]
Because the IRP framework for assessing impact was not fully based on
the estimated benefits in the cost-benefit analysis used to select road
projects, USAID cannot verify that IRP projects will lead to the
estimated benefits and expected impact. A cost-benefit analysis should
be the basis for setting indicators and their target values in a
framework linking the project to expected impact. USAID's cost-benefit
analysis identified the indicators used in the framework and the target
values that could be used to measure annual progress toward those
indicators.[Footnote 26] However, USAID did not include those
measurable targets in its results framework for IRP. In its monitoring
and evaluation plan for IRP, USAID stated that targets would be set
based on baseline studies for individual projects by the end of 2007.
However, baseline studies have not been completed and no targets have
been set to date. Therefore, the estimated benefits from USAID's cost-
benefit analysis used to select IRP road projects may differ from the
expected impact identified by the IRP framework.
Defense Has Not Assessed the Impact of and Lacks Clear Guidance for
CERP Projects:
Defense has not conducted any impact assessment of its civilian road
projects. Defense's objective for CERP is to enable local U.S. military
commanders to respond to small-scale, urgent humanitarian relief and
reconstruction requirements. Because CERP is used for urgent local
needs such as small roads, the impact of such projects may be difficult
to quantify. Although CERP-funded projects contain measures of desired
impact--such as improved public sentiment toward local and national
governments, increased jobs and economic growth, and increased local
support to deter terrorist recruitment--it is not stated how these
indicators will be measured and what data collection efforts are
planned. Additionally, while CERP guidance for Afghanistan requires
project proposals to have an "adequate" plan to measure success in
achieving the desired impact, it does not contain criteria for
developing such a plan for performance measurement and evaluation.
No Other Donors Have Performed Impact Evaluations:
No other donors that we spoke to have performed impact evaluations of
their road projects, and therefore little is known about the impact of
road reconstruction in Afghanistan. Representatives from Japan, the
European Commission, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank
said they had not performed any evaluations to assess the impact of
roads they funded. Because various donors are constructing different
parts of an interconnected road network, attributing impact to a
specific donor's road project is difficult. Therefore, conducting
impact evaluations in coordination with other donors is vital to ensure
that the assistance provided by the United States and other
international donors is achieving the desired outcomes.
The World Bank has, however, taken some steps to allow for future
impact evaluations. For example, the bank developed a rough cost-
benefit analysis for its emergency infrastructure project in
Afghanistan, which allows for a framework to assess the outcomes of its
project. For its National Emergency Rural Access Program, which
includes the construction of rural roads, the bank plans to undertake a
rigorous impact evaluation.
A Fiscally Sustainable Road Maintenance Program for Afghan Roads Has
Not Been Established:
A fiscally sustainable program for road maintenance has not been
established, although the Afghan government and international donors
set a goal to do so by the end of 2007. Several factors have
contributed to the Afghan government's maintenance shortfall, including
(1) its lack of human and financial resources, (2) a fragmented
institutional organization, and (3) the lack of a comprehensive legal
framework and means to enforce fee collection for the transportation
sector in Afghanistan. Since 2005, various plans have estimated that
road maintenance would cost between about $70 million and $90 million
annually. Because the Afghan government has not been able to maintain
newly reconstructed roads, the European Commission and USAID have
agreed to fund maintenance on a temporary basis for the roads they
built. However, USAID did not meet its 2007 target to maintain 100
kilometers of reconstructed roads.
The Target Date for Achieving a Fiscally Sustainable Road Maintenance
Program Has Not Been Met due to Various Limitations:
The target to establish a fiscally sustainable road maintenance program
for Afghanistan by the end of 2007 was not met. The Afghan government,
in conjunction with international donors, established this target in
the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Although the
target date was subsequently extended to March 2008, according to an
official from the Consultative Group for Transport Sector, a
maintenance program has not been established. Moreover, while the final
Afghanistan National Development Strategy, issued in April 2008, still
includes the goal of establishing a maintenance program, it does not
include a date by which the program should be established.
Several factors have limited the Afghan government's support for road
maintenance activities. These include (1) resource constraints such as
a lack of human and financial resources and weak private sector
capacity, (2) a fragmented institutional organization, and (3) the lack
of a comprehensive legal framework and means to enforce road-related
fee collection.
Lack of Resources:
According to the Transport Sector Strategy (2008-2013), ministries and
institutions involved in the transportation sector lack human capacity
and organization to carry out tasks such as budgeting, procurement, and
contract administration, which are necessary to implement a road
maintenance program. Donor officials we spoke to in Afghanistan stated
that the Afghan government is not able to attract young workers due to
low wages. According to a March 2008 United Nations report, low
salaries place many working Afghans, including government employees, at
risk of falling below the poverty line. A senior official at the
Ministry of Public Works with whom we spoke noted that his ministry
cannot pay adequate salaries to its engineers and technical staff. For
example, the general director for maintenance is paid only about $200
per month, while a person with similar qualifications could earn five
times that salary in the private sector, according to the official.
According to a USAID official and a senior Afghan government official,
the Afghan government also lacks financial resources to cover road
maintenance costs. The Ministry of Public Works' Road Sector Master
Plan estimated in 2005 that the total maintenance cost for regional and
national highways and provincial roads would be $38 million for 2007.
In October 2007, a senior ministry official told us that while the
Ministry of Public Works estimated that it needed $30 million to
maintain roads in 2007, the Ministry of Finance had allocated only $8
million. Thus, the Ministry of Public Works planned only to undertake
routine maintenance, and postpone more expensive periodic maintenance
work.[Footnote 27]
Weak private sector capacity has also hindered the Afghan government's
ability to carry out road maintenance. Many donors have recommended
that the Ministry of Public Works involve more private sector entities
in its road maintenance efforts. However, according to a senior
official at the ministry, the private sector still lacks the capacity
to undertake and complete road maintenance projects. For example, in
2006, the Ministry of Public Works requested bids for maintenance of
the Kabul-Kandahar road three times without receiving a single bid. In
its 2005 assessment of road maintenance needs in Afghanistan, the World
Bank recommended that Ministry of Public Works staff perform urgent
maintenance until private sector contractors have the capacity to do
so. According to a USAID needs assessment of the transportation sector,
the Afghan private sector's participation is also limited due to a lack
of available cash and debt financing. This lack of initial funding
hinders local companies from bidding for costly road projects, as road
contractors usually get paid later in the life of the contract, thus
requiring them to have the resources to finance project start-up costs.
Fragmented Institutional Organization:
The Afghan government's participation in road maintenance has also been
limited by a fragmented organization of the transportation sector and
the lack of a comprehensive legal framework for this sector. Numerous
ministries are involved in road operations and maintenance (see table
2). According to officials from USAID and the European Commission,
donors affiliated with the Consultative Group for the Transport Sector
consider this fragmented governance a major impediment to effective
management, and they recommended consolidating the transportation
sector under a single ministry in the draft Transport Sector Strategy.
However, USAID officials and a Ministry of Finance official said that
ministries with a stake in the transportation sector are expected to
oppose such a recommendation. The Transport Sector Strategy finalized
in February 2008 includes a recommendation to establish an
interministry working group for the transportation sector, but falls
short of recommending consolidation of transportation sector functions
under one ministry. Additionally, donors have recommended that, in
accordance with international best practices, a road fund be
established to ensure that revenues from road user charges are used
only for road operations and maintenance. However, the Ministry of
Finance, which currently receives revenues from road-related charges,
has opposed this.
Table 2: Afghan Ministries That Have Transportation Sector-Related
Functions:
Ministry: Public Works;
Road-related function: Manages construction and maintenance for
regional and national highways and most provincial roads.
Ministry: Rural Rehabilitation and Development;
Road-related function: Manages construction of rural infrastructure,
including rural roads and some provincial roads.
Ministry: Transportation and Civil Aviation;
Road-related function: Inspects and issues commercial transit permits
and collects fees from all domestic and international commercial
vehicles.
Ministry: Finance;
Road-related function: Collects road tolls on major highways.
Ministry: Interior;
Road-related function: Manages registration and collection of fees for
commercial and private vehicles, safety inspections, and traffic
control.
Ministry: Commerce;
Road-related function: Collects transit fees and can also charge a
penalty for loads in excess of authorized limits.
Ministry: Foreign Affairs;
Road-related function: Issues transit permits to foreign commercial
vehicles entering and exiting Afghanistan.
Ministry: Economy;
Road-related function: Conducts baseline studies for infrastructure
projects. Its donor-supported unit currently is also responsible for
all government procurement of goods and services, including road
maintenance over $200,000.
Source: USAID Transport Sector Needs Assessment.
[End of table]
Lack of a Comprehensive Legal Framework and Enforcement of Fee
Collection:
The government also lacks a comprehensive legal framework for the
transportation sector. According to the Transport Sector Strategy and
USAID needs assessment of transportation sector capacity, the existing
decrees and laws do not clearly delineate the responsibilities of
various Afghan ministries involved in the transportation sector. For
example, as shown in table 2, more than one ministry collects fees from
and issues permits to commercial vehicles. Consequently, there are
overlapping jurisdictions and functions. Additionally, according to
these documents, transportation sector laws are incomplete. For
example, while there is a traffic regulation law that defines
restrictions on drivers and regulates the weight of vehicles, it does
not set the penalties for vehicle overloading, according to the
strategy. Overloaded vehicles cause the most serious damage to roads in
Afghanistan, according to USAID's needs assessment.
Additionally, the Afghan government has not been able to generate
sufficient revenues for road maintenance due, in part, to ineffective
enforcement of tolls and fee collection. For instance, according to a
USAID needs assessment, the Ministry of Finance started a new system of
issuing stickers for a fee based on vehicle size to drivers who use
toll roads. However, the ministry had no mechanism to ensure that
vehicles passing through road checkpoints had the stickers that allowed
them to use the toll road. According to the assessment, the Ministry of
Finance did not appear to have coordinated its efforts with the
Ministry of Interior, which controls the Afghan National Police who man
the checkpoints and have enforcement authority.[Footnote 28]
Consequently, the effort failed. A senior Ministry of Public Works
official confirmed that the sticker system had failed to generate
expected toll revenues. Moreover, the Afghan Parliament as well as the
Ministry of Public Works have opposed a fuel tax as a revenue
generation option on the grounds that it is difficult to implement and
may adversely affect the poor or those who use fuel for electricity
generators.[Footnote 29]
Plans Estimate Costs and Funding Options for Road Maintenance:
A variety of donor-funded plans have estimated costs and funding
options for road maintenance. Some of the funding options are already
being used by Afghan ministries, but with limited success.
Additionally, the estimates of maintenance costs do not include rural
roads.
In May 2005, the World Bank issued the Afghanistan Road Maintenance
Note, which identified maintenance costs as about $72 million annually
for major roads by the year 2011, when the regional and priority
national highways were expected to be completed. The document
recommended that the Afghan government develop clear policies for road
maintenance and prepare a maintenance program for the World Bank-funded
emergency road project that was implemented during the early stage of
reconstruction in Afghanistan.
In April 2006, the Asian Development Bank-funded Road Sector Master
Plan estimated the cost of road maintenance to be $85 million to $90
million annually between 2011 and 2015 once construction of the
currently funded road network is completed. This cost estimate does not
include maintenance costs for rural roads. The plan presented several
options to fund road maintenance, such as a fuel tax, vehicle
registration fees, and road tolls. Various Afghan ministries were
already using some of these mechanisms, such as road tolls and vehicle
registration fees; however, these methods have been plagued by problems
such as lack of enforcement and corruption. As a result, revenues from
these sources were less than $4 million in 2004.[Footnote 30]
In April 2007, the Ministry of Public Works published the final draft
of its strategic plan, with funding and technical assistance from
USAID. The plan estimated road maintenance costs for the next 5 years
at about $400 million (or an average of $80 million annually) for 7,000
kilometers of highways and provincial roads. It articulated goals and
measures as well as proposed activities such as developing public and
private sector capacity, standards for road maintenance, and a revenue
generation system (see table 3). However, this plan only covers roads
and activities under the Ministry of Public Works' jurisdiction, and
does not include rural roads that are under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.[Footnote 31]
Table 3: Examples of Goals and Measures for Road Operations and
Maintenance in the Ministry of Public Works Strategic Plan:
Operation and maintenance strategic goal:
To create a viable and efficient road maintenance system to keep the
roads open year-round and allow people and goods to move safely and
efficiently in Afghanistan;
Some indicators:
* Forty well-trained managerial staff;
* Formulation of about 7,000 kilometers of maintenance projects in the
next 5 years;
* Maintenance project contracts with about 500 private companies in the
next 5 years;
* Creation of eight maintenance training centers;
* New contract rules.
Intermediate objective:
To create a Revenue Generation System to help with sustainability of
operations and maintenance.
Indicator: Sustainable operations and maintenance generation by the end
of 2008; Proposed activities:
* Establish a revenue generation department;
* Study different ways to generate revenue and implement them;
* Create a toll collection system;
* Install scales in various places to control vehicle tonnage;
* Create effective road user tax system.
Source: Ministry of Public Works Strategic Plan.
[End of table]
Donors Have Recently Started Maintenance Programs for Sections of the
Major Roads; USAID Did Not Meet its 2007 Maintenance Target:
Since 2006, the European Commission and USAID started separate 3-year
road maintenance programs that would cover over 1,600 kilometers of the
regional highways they built. However, USAID did not meet its 2007
target to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads.
In June 2006, the European Commission initiated a road maintenance
program for the 150-kilometer section of the regional highway from
Kabul to Jalalabad, the construction of which it had previously funded.
USAID signed a task order under the IRP contract effective in November
2007 for an estimated cost of $33 million for a 3-year road maintenance
program covering about 1,500 kilometers of roads it has completed.
Additionally, Defense has provided ad hoc assistance for road
maintenance using CERP funding. For example, CERP funds have been used
to provide road maintenance equipment to local governments and to
undertake some urgent winter maintenance.
USAID's road maintenance program includes establishing a Road
Maintenance Unit housed in the Ministry of Public Works to implement
maintenance projects with the assistance of a contractor. Additionally,
the contractor will establish new management procedures and develop
manuals on maintenance-related topics such as planning, budgeting,
contracting, and performance monitoring.
In its Performance Management Plan (2006-2008), USAID identified
kilometers of reconstructed road maintained as the indicator to measure
progress toward road maintenance and established yearly targets for
fiscal years 2007 and 2008. However, because USAID had not started any
maintenance, it did not meet its target of 100 kilometers of
reconstructed roads maintained for fiscal year 2007. Additionally,
while USAID proposed measuring Afghan government contributions toward
road maintenance by calculating the increase in the Ministry of Public
Works' budget for this purpose, our review of the Performance
Management Plan found that it did not include annual targets or report
on actual contributions of the ministry. Therefore, it is not clear
whether or to what extent the Afghan government has increased its
support for road maintenance.
Photograph: USAID-Funded Road Lacking Routine Maintenance:
Source: GAO.
A culvert that is part of the USAID-funded Jalalabad - Asmar road in
Nangarhar province. Due to lack of regular maintenance, the culvert is
blocked by overgrown grass and debris.
[End of figure]
Conclusions:
The United States and other international donors have committed
billions of dollars toward road reconstruction in Afghanistan to
promote economic and social development as well as security and
stability. While some have noted that reconstructed roads contribute
positively to economic and social conditions in Afghanistan, there is
currently little evidence based on sound impact assessments that these
projects have resulted in expected benefits. Because donors are
building an interconnected road network, coordination in planning and
conducting impact assessments would complement individual donors'
efforts to assess the impact of their own projects and could result in
more efficient use of resources. Moreover, without a sustainable road
maintenance program, newly constructed roads will ultimately
deteriorate, expected benefits will not materialize, and the billions
of dollars spent on road reconstruction would be wasted. There is a
lack of comprehensive information on all donor-funded road projects in
Afghanistan, as donors are not reporting road project data
systematically and regularly to the Consultative Group for the
Transport Sector, a joint Afghan government and donor group responsible
for collecting these data. Furthermore, there is a lack of
comprehensive data on U.S.-funded road projects, as agencies are not
reporting information for all their civilian road projects to a USAID
database. In the absence of complete information on all road projects
in Afghanistan, the Afghan government and international donors will not
be able to efficiently coordinate their efforts and better plan future
road projects. Additionally, due to lack of coordination among Afghan
ministries involved in the transportation sector, it is not clear
whether or when the Afghan government will be able to assume greater
responsibility for its road construction and maintenance activities.
Improvements in efforts to assess, maintain, and document road
reconstruction projects are necessary for USAID and Defense to provide
better assurance that their efforts will achieve U.S. and Afghan
government road reconstruction goals.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve evaluation as well as efficiency and effectiveness of USAID-
funded road reconstruction projects, we recommend that the
Administrator of USAID take the following actions:
* improve the results framework to ensure that it is based on expected
benefits from a cost-benefit analysis with clearly stated goals,
indicators, and targets and:
* in coordination with other donors, consider building impact
evaluations into project design and perform such evaluations after
project implementation.
To ensure the evaluation of CERP-funded roads, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense require impact evaluations of these projects where
applicable.
Until the Afghan government is able to establish a road maintenance
program, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID:
* work with the Afghan government to take steps to address urgent
maintenance needs, such as formulating and enforcing vehicle weight
standards, while continuing to take steps to address long-term
maintenance needs, such as by developing a maintenance implementation
plan and:
* require that future agreements for road reconstruction projects
include plans detailing options for funding road maintenance.
To ensure that Defense and USAID officials have adequate information to
make effective future project management decisions, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense require that data for Defense's CERP-funded
road projects be reported for inclusion in USAID's database, as
required by CERP guidance.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
USAID and Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report,
which are reproduced in appendixes V and VI, respectively. USAID and
Defense agreed with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. In
response to our recommendations, USAID stated that it is conducting an
assessment of the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat road, which will be completed by
early fall 2008, and will revise its results framework for road
reconstruction projects to include goals, indicators, and targets, and
to link it to a cost-benefit analysis. USAID also indicated it will
introduce the issue of impact evaluations to the joint government-donor
forum for road sector policy coordination. USAID also stated that it
will offer a technical assistance package to the Afghan government to
help draft road regulations needed to maintain Afghanistan's roads, and
highlighted plans to follow through with the $33 million it committed
in fiscal year 2008 for road maintenance while longer-term solutions
for road maintenance are being developed. Defense indicated that its
CERP guidance has been revised to include a requirement that proposals
for CERP projects include performance metrics and indicators for
evaluating projects. The guidance also requires Defense to transfer
project data to all required databases, including USAID's, as part of
CERP project closeouts. USAID and Defense also reviewed a draft of this
report for technical accuracy. Defense provided technical comments,
which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. We will also make copies available to others on request. In
addition, this report is available on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any questions concerning
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors
to this report are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To review the status of donor-funded road projects, we obtained road
project data on international donors from the Consultative Group for
the Transport Sector, a coordination body that includes donor
representatives and Afghan officials from relevant ministries. For U.S.-
funded roads, we obtained relevant data from the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE), and the Department of Defense's (Defense) Army Budget Office
as well as the Combined Joint Task Force in Afghanistan.
To assess the reliability of the data on the commitments made by
international donors, we (1) interviewed the USAID-funded contractor at
the Consultative Group for the Transportation Sector who is responsible
for compiling these data on a monthly basis based on information
provided by all the donors and the government of Afghanistan, and (2)
performed some basic reasonableness checks of the data against other
sources of information. We determined that the data are sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of (1) assessing the status of road projects,
and (2) making a broad comparison of the United States' contributions
to those of other major donors. However, the data have various
limitations, including the fact that they are largely self-reported by
donor nations to the Afghan government, are affected by differences in
exchange rates, and may not represent all road projects. Due to these
limitations and the fact that we could not contact each of the donors,
we were unable to determine the reliability of the most current status
of projects and the precise dollar amounts committed by every donor.
Nevertheless, because these are the best available data on donor-funded
road reconstruction projects, we present the status and funding amounts
reported by each donor in appendix II.
For USAID road projects, we primarily used data from its database
called Geobase. These data were for two USAID departments involved in
road construction: the Office of Infrastructure, Engineering and Energy
and the office of the Provincial Reconstruction Team. While we received
comprehensive information for Office of Infrastructure, Engineering and
Energy roads, we obtained Provincial Reconstruction Team road data only
for completed Quick Impact Projects and not for current road projects.
The amount of funding for the current road projects is very small,
according to USAID officials.
For Defense road projects, we obtained data from several departments
and agencies. For USACE-implemented projects, which include a number of
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)-funded road projects and
all Military Construction-funded roads, we obtained detailed data
directly from the agency. Defense officials in Afghanistan provided
data for projects that used CERP, Military Construction, and Military
Engineering funds. CERP and Military Construction project data included
kilometers of roads for completed and ongoing projects. However,
funding information for a large number of CERP projects was missing.
Consequently, we obtained funding data for CERP from the Army Budget
Office at the Pentagon. Last, due to sensitivity of Military
Engineering roads, Defense officials provided only the aggregate funds
committed for these projects.
To assess challenges in implementing road reconstruction projects, we
interviewed agency officials from USAID and Defense in Washington,
D.C., and in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we met with officials in
Kabul and Bagram. We also met with U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team
officials during site visits to road projects in Badakhshan, Nangarhar,
and Khost provinces. We reviewed USAID's major contract and grant
agreements and select Defense CERP contracts and analyzed contract file
documents, such as agency memorandums, modifications to contracts, and
contract summary reports where appropriate and available. We also
reviewed construction industry best practices and USAID and Defense
Inspector General reports relating to road construction.
To examine USAID and Defense's assessment of impact of road
reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, we reviewed documentation
including agencywide guidance for monitoring and evaluation,
performance monitoring plan, and documents for USAID's Rehabilitation
of Economic Facilities and Services (REFS) program and Infrastructure
and Rehabilitation Program (IRP) projects and Defense's CERP projects.
We limited our review of results frameworks to USAID's overall
Performance Management Plan, and its REFS and IRP programs. We did not
assess the framework for the projects implemented under the United
Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) grant. We assessed the
documents for the following elements: a logical framework to assess
results; statement of strategic and intermediate goals; output,
outcome, and impact indicators; and targets for these indicators.
Additionally, we reviewed the explanation of how targets were selected
and if they were met. We also reviewed articles and books on monitoring
and evaluation that provided us tools to assess impact evaluation of
the completed road projects and helped identify methodological
challenges in the design and implementation of such evaluations.
To assess the extent of road maintenance for newly constructed roads,
we reviewed pertinent strategic and planning documents, and interviewed
Afghan and donor officials during our fieldwork. To identify the
national goal for road maintenance and progress on this goal, we
reviewed the Afghan Compact, the interim and final Afghan National
Development Strategy, and the periodic Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Board reports. To identify USAID's maintenance goals and
progress on these, we reviewed USAID's Afghanistan Performance
Management Plan (2006-2008) and the agency's reporting on these goals.
To identify the extent to which donors and the Afghan government have
discussed and planned for road maintenance, we reviewed key documents
including the World Bank's Road Maintenance Note, Road Sector Master
Plan for Afghanistan, Ministry of Public Works Strategic Plan, draft
and final Transport Sector Strategy, and Needs Assessment for Transport
Sector for USAID-funded road projects. To assess USAID's project for
road maintenance, we reviewed the relevant contract to identify details
of the plan.
[End of section]
Appendix II: USAID and Other Donor Road Project Data:
Regional highways:
No.: 1;
Road projects: Kabul-Kandahar (Sections B to F);
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $311;
Kilometers: 389;
Status: Complete.
No.: 2;
Road projects: Kabul-Kandahar (Section G);
Donor (Implementer): Japan;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $29;
Kilometers: 50;
Status: Complete.
No.3:
Road projects: Kandahar-Herat (Section 1);
Donor (Implementer): Japan;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $100;
Kilometers: 114;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 3;
Road projects: Kandahar-Herat (Section 2);
Donor (Implementer): Saudi Arabia, USAID (Implementer);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): Saudia Arabia, $52; USAID, $13;
Kilometers: 116;
Status: Complete.
No.: 4;
Road projects: Delaram-Zaranj;
Donor (Implementer): India;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $84;
Kilometers: 216;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 5;
Road projects: Kandahar-Herat; (Sections 3 to 5);
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $181;
Kilometers: 326;
Status: Complete.
No.: 6;
Road projects: Herat-Islam Qala;
Donor (Implementer): Iran;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $45;
Kilometers: 120;
Status: Complete.
No.: 6;
Road projects: Herat-Armalik;
Donor (Implementer): Iran;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $25;
Kilometers: 60;
Status: Complete.
No.: 7;
Road projects: Herat-Torghondi;
Donor (Implementer): Afghanistan;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $30;
Kilometers: 119;
Status: Pending.
No.: 8;
Road projects: Armalik-Leman[B];
Donor (Implementer): Islamic Development Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $10;
Kilometers: 50;
Status: Pending.
No.: 9;
Road projects: Leman-Bala Murghab[C];
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $176;
Kilometers: 143;
Status: Pending.
No.: 9;
Road projects: Bala Murghab-Qaysar;
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $55;
Kilometers: 90;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 9;
Road projects: Qaysar-Andkhoy;
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $75;
Kilometers: 210;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 9;
Road projects: Andkhoy-Mazar-e Sharif;
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $36;
Kilometers: 182;
Status: Complete.
No.: 9;
Road projects: Mazar-e Sharif-Pol-e Khomri-Hayratan;
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $34;
Kilometers: 265;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 10;
Road projects: Andkhoy-Aquina;
Donor (Implementer): Islamic Development Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $20;
Kilometers: 37;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 11;
Road projects: Pol-e Khomri-Kunduz-Sher Khan Bandar and Kunduz-Taloqan;
Donor (Implementer): World Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $30;
Kilometers: 232;
Status: Complete.
No.: 11;
Road projects: Pol-e Khomri-Kabul;
Donor (Implementer): World Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $68;
Kilometers: 202;
Status: Complete.
No.: 11;
Road projects: Pol-e Khomri-Doshi;
Donor (Implementer): Islamic Development Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): Unknown;
Kilometers: Unknown;
Status: [Empty].
No.: 12;
Road projects: Kabul-Jalalabad;
Donor (Implementer): European Commission[D];
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $66;
Kilometers: 142;
Status: Complete.
No.: 13;
Road projects: Jalalabad-Torkham;
Donor (Implementer): Pakistan;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $50;
Kilometers: 74;
Status: Complete.
No.: 14;
Road projects: Kandahar-Spin Boldak;
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank[E];
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $25;
Kilometers: 61;
Status: Complete.
No.: 14;
Road projects: Kandahar-Spin Boldak;
Donor (Implementer): Afghanistan;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $13;
Kilometers: 42;
Status: Pending.
Subtotal[F]:
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $1,528;
Kilometers: 3,240.
National highways:
No.: 15;
Road projects: Kabul-Gardez;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG and UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $47;
Kilometers: 120;
Status: Complete.
No.: 16;
Road projects: Gardez-Khost;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG/B&V);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $69;
Kilometers: 98;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 17;
Road projects: Lashgar Gah-Ring road;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $13;
Kilometers: 49;
Status: Complete.
No.: 18;
Road projects: Ghazni-Sharan;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $20;
Kilometers: 63;
Status: Complete.
No.: 19;
Road projects: Pol-e Alam-Ring road;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $7;
Kilometers: 35;
Status: Complete.
No.: 20;
Road projects: Farah-Ring road;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $18;
Kilometers: 68;
Status: Complete.
No.: 21;
Road projects: Panjshir Valley road;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $21;
Kilometers: 67;
Status: Complete.
No.: 22;
Road projects: Ghazni-Gardez;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG/B&V);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $63;
Kilometers: 102;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 23;
Road projects: Sheberghan-Sar-e Pol;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $15;
Kilometers: 54;
Status: Complete.
No.: 24;
Road projects: Keshim-Feyzabad;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG/B&V);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $118;
Kilometers: 103;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 25;
Road projects: Kandahar-Tarin Kowt;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $25;
Kilometers: 149;
Status: Complete.
No.: 26;
Road projects: Jalalabad-Asmar;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $38;
Kilometers: 121;
Status: Complete.
No.: 27;
Road projects: Mazar-e Sharif-Dara i Suf;
Donor (Implementer): Asian Development Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $69;
Kilometers: 151;
Status: Pending.
No.: 28;
Road projects: Yakawlang-Bamyan;
Donor (Implementer): [Empty];
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $59;
Kilometers: 99;
Status: Pending.
No.: 29;
Road projects: Maidanshahr-Bamyan Segment 1;
Donor (Implementer): Italy;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $31;
Kilometers: 54;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 29;
Road projects: Maidanshahr-Ounai Pass Segment 2;
Donor (Implementer): Italy;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $72;
Kilometers: 82;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 30;
Road projects: Taloqan-Keshim;
Donor (Implementer): World Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $22;
Kilometers: 68;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 31;
Road projects: Kajaki Dam-Ring road[G];
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG/B&V);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $5;
Kilometers: 0;
Status: Terminated.
No.: 32;
Road projects: Charikar-Bamyan;
Donor (Implementer): World Bank;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $5;
Kilometers: 160;
Status: Pending.
Subtotal:
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $716;
Kilometers: 1,644.
Total for regional and national highways:
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $2,243;
Kilometers: 4,883.
Provincial roads:
No.: 33;
Road projects: Kandahar-Bikah;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $24;
Kilometers: 94;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 34;
Road projects: Spin Boldak-Bikah;
Donor (Implementer): USAID (USACE);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $20;
Kilometers: 68;
Status: Ongoing.
No.: 35;
Road projects: Bikah-Shinkay[G];
Donor (Implementer): USAID;
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $13;
Kilometers: 71;
Status: Terminated.
No.: 36;
Road projects: District Center Roads (various);
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $8;
Kilometers: 78;
Status: Complete.
No.: 37;
Road projects: District Roads (various);
Donor (Implementer): USAID (UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $21;
Kilometers: 105;
Status: Complete.
No.: 38;
Road projects: Urban Roads (2);
Donor (Implementer): USAID (LBG and UNOPS);
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $5;
Kilometers: 5;
Status: Complete.
Total for provincial roads:
Funding[A](U.S. dollars in millions): $91;
Kilometers: 420.
Source: GAO analysis of data from USAID and the Consultative Group for
the Transport Sector.
[A] Funding represents funds spent for completed projects and committed
for ongoing and pending projects.
[B] The government of Afghanistan is in negotiations with the Asian
Development Bank for an additional $10 million for the reconstruction
of this road section.
[C] The government of Afghanistan will contribute an additional $4
million to this project.
[D] The Swedish International Development Agency contributed funds for
this project.
[E] Asian Development Bank funding for this project includes
contributions from the governments of Kuwait and Japan.
[F] Funding data have been rounded and therefore may not precisely
match the total.
[G] These road projects have been terminated due to poor security
conditions.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: CERP Funding Data for Road Projects by Province in
Afghanistan:
No.: 1;
Province: Badakhshan;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $6,920.
No.: 2;
Province: Badghis;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0.
No.: 3;
Province: Baghlan;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0.
No.: 4;
Province: Balkh;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $85,599.
No.: 5;
Province: Bamyan;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $3,640,945.
No.: 6;
Province: Daikondi;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0.
No.: 7;
Province: Farah;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $2,644,655.
No.: 8;
Province: Faryab;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0.
No.: 9;
Province:
Ghazni; Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $15,248,511.
No.: 10;
Province: Ghor;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0.
No.: 11;
Province: Helmand;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $3,308,548.
No.: 12;
Province: Herat;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $186,534.
No.: 13;
Province: Jowzjan;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0.
No.: 14;
Province: Kabul;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $30,997,244.
No.: 15;
Province: Kandahar;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $11,348,614.
No.: 16;
Province: Kapisa;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $4,239,841.
No.: 17;
Province: Khost;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $15,943,071.
No.: 18;
Province: Konar;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $20,561,192.
No.: 19;
Province: Kunduz;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $26,356.
No.: 20;
Province: Laghman;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $3,040,482.
No.: 21;
Province: Lowgar;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $433,018.
No.: 22;
Province: Nangarhar;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $11,943,432.
No.: 23;
Province: Nimruz;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0.
No.: 24;
Province: Nurestan;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $106,589,515.
No.: 25;
Province: Paktia;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $3,148,669.
No.: 26;
Province: Paktika;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $45,670,849.
No.: 27;
Province: Panjshir;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $5,739,590.
No.: 28;
Province: Parwan;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $10,367,817.
No.: 29;
Province: Samangan;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0.
No.: 30;
Province: Sar-e Pol;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0.
No.: 31;
Province: Takhar;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): 0.
No.: 32;
Province: Uruzgan;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $3,575,960.
No.: 33;
Province: Wardak;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $304,774.
No.: 34;
Province: Zabul;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $4,439,748.
Province: Province not stated;
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $293,956.
Total:
Funds committed (fiscal years 2004-2007): $303,785,839.
Source: GAO analysis of Army Budget Office data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: USAID's Grant Agreement with UNOPS for Road Reconstruction
in Afghanistan:
Throughout the life of its road reconstruction grant with UNOPS, USAID
increased its size over 10 times, from $35 million to over $365
million, adding nearly 700 kilometers of roads to the original 300, and
extending the period of performance by nearly 3 years (see fig. 11).
USAID transferred several roads from REFS to UNOPS because REFS hit its
contract ceiling. According to USAID officials, they did not want to
use LBG as the prime contractor for all of their major infrastructure
projects in Afghanistan, especially in light of "congressional and
private sector" criticism of LBG's management of other Afghan
infrastructure projects. However, USAID required UNOPS to subcontract
engineering responsibilities for the transferred roads to LBG, adding
an extra layer of management. After the termination of the grant due to
concerns about UNOPS's financial management, five senior UNOPS
officials associated with the USAID program resigned or were released,
according to a USAID official.
Figure 11: Time Frame, Estimated Cost, and Total Kilometers for UNOPS
Grant:
[See PDF for image]
Time frame:
Grant start date: February 2004 (original period of agreement: 12
months);
First extension granted: (First schedule extension: 16 months)
Second extension granted: (Second schedule extension: 18 months);
Grant suspension date: December 2007.
Total estimated amount:
Grant start date: $35 million;
First extension granted: $218 million;
Second extension granted: $311 million;
October 2006: $314 million;
December 2006: $366 million;
Grant suspension date: $366 million.
Planned total kilometers:
Grant start date: 300;
First extension granted: 858;
Second extension granted: 913;
October 2006: 1077;
December 2006: 987;
Grant suspension date: 959.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
From The American People:
Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.,
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 26, 2008:
Dear Mr. Johnson:
USAID appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your draft
audit report, "Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in
Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a
Sustainable Maintenance Program are Needed," GAO-08-689. We found the
report to be a comprehensive and detailed assessment of U.S. road
construction efforts in Afghanistan, and a realistic picture of the
security, geographic, and institutional constraints we face daily.
We concur with your recommendations. We intend to take steps to address
the recommendations as follows:
1. Recommendation: That USAID take the following actions for USAID-
funded road reconstruction projects (page 54):
* Improve the results framework to ensure that it is based on expected
benefits from a cost-benefit analysis with clearly stated goals,
indicators and targets; and;
* In coordination with other donors, consider building impact
evaluations into project design and perform such evaluations after
project implementation.
USAID Response: We recognize the importance of impact evaluations and
to this end, we are currently conducting an assessment of the Kabul-
Kandahar-Herat road, our biggest road investment to date. The
assessment should be completed in early fall of 2008.
USAID will revise its Results Framework for road reconstruction
projects to include a reference to cost-benefits analysis, with goals,
indicators and targets. USAID will begin this effort with the Strategic
Provincial Roads - South and East Afghanistan activity, applying a
framework. for capturing the cost-benefit and impact that is being used
by the Afghan National Rural Access Program. This will be a major step
forward in developing a single national model for such analyses.
USAID will introduce the issue of impact evaluations as an element of
project design and post-project follow-up to the Roads Working Group,
the joint government - donor forum for road sector policy coordination.
In addition, USAID is assisting the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan to collect the road network data required for
cost/benefit evaluations and forecasting of future benefits. These data
(traffic frequency, vehicle operating costs, time savings and
transaction costs) will be entered into the Highway Development and
Management econometric model, the world-wide standard for road sector
cost-benefit analysis.
2. Recommendation: Until the Afghan government is able to establish a
road maintenance program, we recommend (page 54) that USAID:
* Work with the Afghan government to take steps to address urgent
maintenance needs, such as formulating and enforcing vehicle weight
standards, while continuing to take steps to address long-term
maintenance needs, such as developing a maintenance implementation
plan; and;
* Require that future agreements for road construction projects include
plans detailing options for road maintenance.
USAID Response: Responsibility for controlling vehicle weights is
currently divided among four Afghan ministries. Improved implementation
of axle load controls will require organizational reform, based on
either new legislation or a Presidential Decree. USAID will offer a
technical assistance package to the Afghan Government to help draft the
regulations and procedures required to establish an axle-load control
program.
USAID set aside $33 million for road operations and maintenance in
October 2007, to maintain roads financed by USAID for three years after
completion, while longer term solutions are being developed.
USAID is working with the Ministry of Public Works to establish a Road
Maintenance Unit (RMU), staffed with knowledgeable planners, engineers
and economists. USAID provided $5 million to support the establishment
of the RMU, to include capacity building, training, and equipment. The
RMU will develop a national road maintenance plan as well as formulate
and execute a maintenance program. The RMU will have the ability to
plan, execute and manage contracts with private firms for maintenance
and to collect the data needed to determine the best economic and
financial solutions using proven economic models.
We are proud of the accomplishments USAID has achieved in road
construction in Afghanistan, in the face of difficult security and
harsh terrain. We are committed to ensuring the sustainability of our
investments and look forward to sharing information on our progress in
the coming months with the GAO.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this
review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sean R. Mulvaney:
Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Management:
cc: Jim Nussle, Director of OMB:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:
The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs:
2700 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2700:
June 26, 2008:
Mr. Charles Johnson Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Mr. Johnson:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-08-689, 'Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in
Constructing Roads, But Assessments for Determining Impact and a
Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed,' dated June 9, 2008 (GAO
Code 320494).
My point of contact is Ms. Madeline LePage, (703) 695-2859, or email:
madeline.lepage@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James J. Shinn:
Attachment: DoD response to draft GAO report:
GAO Draft Report Dated June 9, 2008:
GAO-08-689 (GAO Code 320494):
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made In Constructing Roads, But
Assessments For Determining Impact And A Sustainable Maintenance
Program Are Needed:
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation:
Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require impact evaluations of the CERP funded road projects. (p.54
Draft Report)
DOD Response: The Department of Defense concurs with this GAO
recommendation. The most recent Commander's Emergency Response Program
(CERP) guidance, dated June 6, 2008, documents the requirement that
project proposals include performance metrics/indicators in the
proposal packages. These indicators are further required to be used
during the project and as part of the project close-out process for
evaluating projects upon completion.
Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require that data for Defense's Commander's Emergency Response Program
(CERP) funded road projects are reported for inclusion in U.S. Agency
for International Development's database, as required by CERP guidance.
(p. 55/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: The Department concurs with this recommendation and in
fact incorporated in the June 2008 revision to the Department of
Defense's guidance specific direction that CERP project close-outs
include the transfer of project data to all required databases. This is
in addition to the GAO referenced theater guidance which required that
road project data be reported to USAID for their database.
Attachment:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant
Director), Jaime Allentuck, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Gergana Danailova-
Trainor, Karen Deans, Etana Finkler, and Mona Sehgal made key
contributions to this report. Michael Armes, Timothy DiNapoli, Mark
Dowling, Cindy Gilbert, John Hutton, and Jena Sinkfield also provided
technical assistance.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to
Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable
Afghan National Security Forces. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-661]. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008.
Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police
Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help
Ensure Accountability. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-883T]. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-801SP]. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007.
Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating
Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-78]. Washington, D.C.: Nov.
15, 2006.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating
Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S.
Goals. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-742].
Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made
Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575]. Washington, D.C.: June
30, 2005.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited
Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403]. Washington,
D.C.: June 2, 2004.
Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-607]. Washington, D.C.: June
30, 2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Reconstruction includes rehabilitation and construction of roads
and bridges. Road lengths are provided in kilometers, as the Afghan
government, U.S. agencies, and other donors have set goals and reported
data on roads in kilometers. One kilometer is equal to about 0.62
miles.
[2] More than 60 percent of the population lives within 50 kilometers
of the ring road.
[3] The President of Afghanistan approved the final Afghanistan
National Development Strategy on April 21, 2008.
[4] The Road Sector Master Plan for Afghanistan was released in April
2006. According to this plan, except for current projects, most roads
either have not been surveyed or earlier survey information has been
lost. Additionally, some roads are being extended or realigned as part
of current rehabilitation projects. Therefore the road inventory is
changing continuously and it is not possible to compile a list of
precise road lengths.
[5] CERP funding for road projects has increased from $2.6 million in
fiscal year 2004 to $143 million in fiscal year 2006, and decreased
slightly to $107 million in fiscal year 2007.
[6] Provincial Reconstruction Teams are intended to deliver assistance
to advance military goals and enhance security, increase the reach of
the Afghan central government in the provinces, and allow assistance
agencies to implement projects. In 2007, there were 12 U.S.-led
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.
[7] According to an Afghan official and a donor official, the U.S.-
funded road projects tend to be more expensive than those funded by
other donors. The cost of construction depends on, among other factors,
site characteristics (such as mountainous terrain, flat plains, and
rocky soil), technical specifications for construction, and security
conditions. Because we do not have information on the site conditions
and design specifications for roads constructed by different donors, we
are unable to comment on how the cost of U.S.-funded sections compares
to the cost of those sections funded by other donors.
[8] These roads include about 160 kilometers of highways for which the
Afghan government has committed funds.
[9] According to the Afghan government's Transport Sector Strategy,
road classification and definitions proposed in the Road Sector Master
Plan are not fully consistent with those used in a memorandum of
understanding, signed prior to this plan, between the Ministry of
Public Works and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.
As a result, some roads classified as provincial roads under the plan
are classified as rural roads in the memorandum. Therefore, in the
absence of adequate coordination between the two Afghan ministries,
some transport infrastructure may not be improved.
[10] USAID-funded provincial roads include various district center and
district roads. We have also included about 5 kilometers of urban roads
in this category.
[11] We obtained information on CERP funding and project status from
multiple sources. Specifically, the Army Budget Office in Washington
provided CERP funding data. Defense officials in Afghanistan provided
project-specific data for CERP-funded road projects. However, this
information was incomplete. We obtained more complete project-specific
data from USACE for the CERP-and Military Construction-funded road
projects they implement, which we used to supplement the data from
Defense officials in Afghanistan. Despite our efforts to gather
information on all CERP-funded road projects, we were unable to find a
comprehensive data source. For more information on our methodology and
data collection efforts, see appendix I.
[12] Defense officials did not provide project-specific data on
Military Engineering roads, as they consider this information to be
sensitive.
[13] Although USAID provided us aggregate data for kilometers of roads
built since 2002, officials could not provide data by fiscal year prior
to 2006.
[14] Agency officials have also identified other challenges--such as
mountainous terrain, extreme weather conditions, and increases in
material costs--that have contributed to delays or increases in project
cost. For example, diesel fuel costs increased to higher levels than
anticipated, thereby increasing the cost of road reconstruction, which
depends on diesel-run vehicles. According to a USAID official, diesel
fuel that cost $0.65 per liter in 2007 rose to $0.85 per liter by April
2008 and USAID officials have struggled to make reasonable predictions
for future costs.
[15] USAID Office of the Inspector General, 5-306-06-005-P, Audit of
USAID/Afghanistan's Reconstruction of the Kandahar-Herat Highway under
the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services (REFS) Program
(May 18, 2006).
[16] According to a Japanese official, donors, like Japan, who do not
have their own military for protection have to rely on the Afghan
government for security. However, the official noted that the Afghan
National Army, which should help secure areas, is either missing from
key places or does not have the necessary weapons and training.
[17] Most of these contractors were local Afghans.
[18] As of April 2008, USAID had not received the results of the audit.
Additionally, the United Nations Board of Auditors published reports in
2004 and 2007 noting concerns about UNOPS-wide internal accounting and
financial management systems. The auditors highlighted, for example,
nearly $3 million in project-related costs incurred without authorized
budgets.
[19] Projects for which construction begins with limited planning may
result in actual costs that exceed original estimates. Construction
Industry Institute best practices suggest that actual costs for
projects for which limited information on conditions is available can
be expected to range from 20 percent lower to 30 percent higher than
estimated costs. See Construction Industry Institute, Improving Early
Estimates: Best Practices Guide (Austin, Texas, September 1998).
[20] To get work done quickly, USAID used cost-reimbursable contracts
for the projects in its first and most recent road programs. With cost-
reimbursable contracts, the government pays contractors allowable costs
and a fee that may be related to performance. The government assumes
the risk of cost overruns. USACE-implemented projects have used fixed
price contracts, under which the government pays a fixed price even if
the actual total cost of the product or service falls short of or
exceeds the contract price. With fixed price contracts, the contractor
assumes the risk of cost overrun.
[21] Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Reconstruction of the Kandahar-Herat
Highway under the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services
(REFS) Program.
[22] Evaluation design helps to determine the choice of the group that
does not benefit from the project, the way people are assigned either
to a (control) group that does not benefit from the project or to the
group that is expected to benefit from the project, and the data
collection methods to be employed to determine project impact.
[23] USAID's Performance Management Plan (2006-2008) includes three
strategic objectives for its programs in Afghanistan: a thriving licit
economy led by the private sector, a democratic government with broad
citizen participation, and a better educated and healthier population.
[24] Baseline values are used to establish subsequent annual targets.
For road projects, USAID used 939 kilometers as its plan's baseline,
because that was the number of kilometers of road it had constructed in
2004 and 2005.
[25] USAID's first major infrastructure program, REFS, predated its
Afghanistan Performance Management Plan (2006-2008). Although the REFS
program did have goals of promoting economic recovery and political
stability, it lacked a well-developed results framework.
[26] GAO could not verify some of the assumptions used to generate
estimated benefits in the analysis. For example, the expected impact of
IRP is based on a study that shows a correlation between per capita
income and quantity of paved roads for a cross section of low-income
countries. However, we could not verify the results because LBG was
unable to provide us this study.
[27] According to the Ministry of Public Works Strategic Plan, routine
maintenance includes small-scale work, such as roadside clearing and
cleaning of silted culverts to ensure "the daily use and safety of
existing roads in the short-run and to prevent premature deterioration
of the roads." Periodic maintenance covers activities, such as
resurfacing and pavement reconstruction, conducted at relatively long
intervals "to preserve the structural integrity of the road."
[28] GAO has examined the training of the Afghan National Police as
part of its broader review of the Afghan National Security Forces. This
report was issued in June 2008. Afghanistan Security: Further
Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed
Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-661] (Washington,
D.C.: June 18, 2008).
[29] According to a Ministry of Public Works official, as much as 80
percent of fuel may be illegally imported to Afghanistan.
[30] Data on government revenues for 2004 were the latest available
when the Road Sector Master Plan was developed.
[31] The Transport Sector Strategy (2008-2013), which addresses the
governance of the entire transportation sector, also noted the lack of
a rural road maintenance program.
[End of section]
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