Ballistic Missile Defense
Actions Needed to Improve Process for Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities Gao ID: GAO-08-740 July 31, 2008In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the Missile Defense Agency to develop and deploy globally integrated ballistic missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies. To deliver an operational capability as quickly as possible, the agency was not subject to traditional DOD requirements and oversight processes. While directed to work closely with the combatant commands, the agency was not required to build missile defenses to meet specific operational requirements. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD has developed a process that identifies, prioritizes, and addresses overall combatant command priorities as the Missile Defense Agency develops ballistic missile defense capabilities. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed relevant documents and visited several combatant commands, the Missile Defense Agency, Joint Staff, and other DOD organizations.
DOD has taken some steps to address the combatant commands' ballistic missile defense needs, but it has not yet established an effective process to identify, prioritize, and address these needs, or to provide a DOD-wide perspective on which priorities are the most important. U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency created the Warfighter Involvement Process in 2005. Although the process is still evolving, the Missile Defense Agency has addressed some combatant command capability needs. However, even as they move forward with the process, U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have not yet overcome three interrelated limitations to the process's effectiveness. First, U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have not put into place the approved and complete guidance needed to implement the Warfighter Involvement Process, which would clearly define each organization's respective roles and responsibilities for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing the combatant commands' capability needs. This has left the combatant commands without an agreed-upon mechanism for influencing agency investments. Second, the Missile Defense Agency has lacked clear information about how to best address the commands' needs, and until recently has not clearly communicated how it has adjusted its investments in response to these needs. Without such information, the commands have not been able to provide feedback to the Missile Defense Agency about how well the agency has addressed their priorities in its funding plans. Third, senior civilian DOD leadership has not been involved in adjudicating potential differences among the commands' priorities. Instead, U.S. Strategic Command has consolidated and submitted the commands' prioritized capability needs to the Missile Defense Agency without first vetting these priorities though senior civilian DOD officials with departmentwide responsibilities for assessing risk and allocating resources. As a result, the Missile Defense Agency has not benefited from receiving a broader, departmentwide perspective on which of the commands' needs were the most significant. DOD has established a new board to advise senior Office of the Secretary of Defense officials on ballistic missile defense priorities; however, whether this board will be involved in reviewing or adjudicating differences among the commands' priorities is unclear. Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that the Warfighter Involvement Process is evolving. However, unless and until they overcome these interrelated limitations, DOD remains at risk of not effectively providing the combatant commands with the missile defense capabilities they need.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-740, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Process for Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities
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Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2008:
Ballistic Missile Defense:
Actions Needed to Improve Process for Identifying and Addressing
Combatant Command Priorities:
GAO-08-740:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-740, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the Missile
Defense Agency to develop and deploy globally integrated ballistic
missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland, deployed forces,
friends, and allies. To deliver an operational capability as quickly as
possible, the agency was not subject to traditional DOD requirements
and oversight processes. While directed to work closely with the
combatant commands, the agency was not required to build missile
defenses to meet specific operational requirements. GAO was asked to
assess the extent to which DOD has developed a process that identifies,
prioritizes, and addresses overall combatant command priorities as the
Missile Defense Agency develops ballistic missile defense capabilities.
To conduct its work, GAO reviewed relevant documents and visited
several combatant commands, the Missile Defense Agency, Joint Staff,
and other DOD organizations.
What GAO Found:
DOD has taken some steps to address the combatant commands‘ ballistic
missile defense needs, but it has not yet established an effective
process to identify, prioritize, and address these needs, or to provide
a DOD-wide perspective on which priorities are the most important. U.S.
Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency created the Warfighter
Involvement Process in 2005. Although the process is still evolving,
the Missile Defense Agency has addressed some combatant command
capability needs. However, even as they move forward with the process,
U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have not yet
overcome three interrelated limitations to the process‘s effectiveness:
* First, U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have not
put into place the approved and complete guidance needed to implement
the Warfighter Involvement Process, which would clearly define each
organization‘s respective roles and responsibilities for identifying,
prioritizing, and addressing the combatant commands‘ capability needs.
This has left the combatant commands without an agreed-upon mechanism
for influencing agency investments.
* Second, the Missile Defense Agency has lacked clear information about
how to best address the commands‘ needs, and until recently has not
clearly communicated how it has adjusted its investments in response to
these needs. Without such information, the commands have not been able
to provide feedback to the Missile Defense Agency about how well the
agency has addressed their priorities in its funding plans.
* Third, senior civilian DOD leadership has not been involved in
adjudicating potential differences among the commands‘ priorities.
Instead, U.S. Strategic Command has consolidated and submitted the
commands‘ prioritized capability needs to the Missile Defense Agency
without first vetting these priorities though senior civilian DOD
officials with departmentwide responsibilities for assessing risk and
allocating resources. As a result, the Missile Defense Agency has not
benefited from receiving a broader, departmentwide perspective on which
of the commands‘ needs were the most significant.
DOD has established a new board to advise senior Office of the
Secretary of Defense officials on ballistic missile defense priorities;
however, whether this board will be involved in reviewing or
adjudicating differences among the commands‘ priorities is unclear.
Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that
the Warfighter Involvement Process is evolving. However, unless and
until they overcome these interrelated limitations, DOD remains at risk
of not effectively providing the combatant commands with the missile
defense capabilities they need.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD improve its process for identifying,
prioritizing, and addressing combatant command priorities by completing
and publishing guidance that clearly defines each organization‘s
responsibilities; establishing effective methodologies; comparing the
Missile Defense Agency‘s funding plans to the commands‘ priorities; and
providing a DOD-wide perspective on the commands‘ priorities. DOD
generally agreed with GAO‘s recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-740]. For more
information, contact John H. Pendleton, 404-679-1816, or
pendletonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Warfighter Involvement Process Has Helped the Missile Defense Agency
Address Some Capability Needs but the Process Faces Key Limitations:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: The 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Ballistic Missile Threat Categories:
Table 2: Organizations and Offices Contacted during Our Review:
Table 3: Capabilities on the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List:
Abbreviation:
DOD: Department of Defense:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 31, 2008:
The Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher:
Chairman:
The Honorable Terry Everett:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
In 2002, the President directed the development and deployment of a
globally integrated ballistic missile defense system to protect the
United States, deployed forces, friends, and allies from the threat of
ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. Also in
2002, the Secretary of Defense established the Missile Defense Agency
and directed it to develop and deploy a useful military capability to
detect, track, intercept, and defeat short-, medium-, intermediate-,
and long-range ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.[Footnote 1]
With the establishment of the Missile Defense Agency, the Secretary of
Defense delegated it the authority to manage all ballistic missile
defense systems then under development by the military services. Funded
at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion annually since its creation, the
Missile Defense Agency is responsible for managing the largest research
and development program in the Department of Defense (DOD) budget.
Since the 1980s, DOD has spent more than $100 billion to develop and
deploy missile defenses.
To expedite the delivery of an operationally capable missile defense
system to the combatant commands, the Secretary of Defense directed
that the Missile Defense Agency would not be subject to DOD's
traditional joint requirements determination and oversight processes.
Combatant commanders are responsible for performing missions assigned
to their command by the President or the Secretary of Defense. These
responsibilities include deterring attacks against the United States,
its territories, possessions, and bases, and employing appropriate
force should deterrence fail. Under DOD's traditional requirements
processes, the combatant commands play a key role in setting
operational requirements for new weapon systems. However, DOD concluded
that streamlined executive oversight, instead of its traditional
process, was needed to rapidly deliver needed missile defense
capabilities to the commands. Instead, the Secretary of Defense gave
the Missile Defense Agency expanded responsibility and authority to
define the ballistic missile defense system's technical requirements,
change goals and plans, and allocate resources. Although not required
to build systems to meet specific operational requirements as it would
under traditional DOD processes, the Secretary of Defense directed the
Missile Defense Agency to work closely with the combatant commands when
developing ballistic missile defense capabilities.
Other organizations have a stake in developing defenses against
ballistic missiles. Even as DOD established the Missile Defense Agency,
the President established U.S. Strategic Command in 2002 to more
effectively and efficiently anticipate and counter the diverse and
increasingly complex global threats the United States faces for the
foreseeable future, including the threats posed by ballistic missiles.
[Footnote 2] In 2003, the President made U.S. Strategic Command
responsible for advocating for desirable missile defense
characteristics and capabilities on behalf of all combatant commands to
the Missile Defense Agency.[Footnote 3] To carry out this
responsibility, U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency
created the Warfighter Involvement Process in 2005.[Footnote 4] A
primary focus of the Warfighter Involvement Process has been to
identify and prioritize the combatant commands' capability needs and
provide the resulting Prioritized Capabilities List to the Missile
Defense Agency.
Although the Missile Defense Agency has been given a significant amount
of flexibility to develop ballistic missile defenses, including the
ability to operate with considerable autonomy to change goals and
plans, the Office of the Secretary of Defense retains executive
oversight authority over the agency.[Footnote 5] For example, in
establishing the Missile Defense Agency in 2002, the Secretary of
Defense designated responsibility to the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
as chairman of the Senior Executive Council,[Footnote 6] for providing
the agency with policy, planning, and programming guidance; overseeing
DOD missile defense activities; and approving recommendations for
fielding ballistic missile defense assets. The Secretary of Defense
also placed the Missile Defense Agency directly under the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and
assigned responsibility to the Under Secretary's office for
establishing a single development program for all work needed to
develop integrated ballistic missile defenses. In 2004, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense also assigned responsibility to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for
providing acquisition policy direction and overall management oversight
of the Missile Defense Agency. In March 2007, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense created a new Missile Defense Executive Board. Comprised of
senior-level representatives from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, the military
departments, and other organizations, the Board is responsible for
advising the Missile Defense Agency; the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and for making recommendations
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for action.
To help Congress exercise oversight of ballistic missile defenses as
these capabilities increasingly become operational, this report
assesses the extent to which DOD has developed a process that
identifies, prioritizes, and addresses overall combatant command
priorities as the Missile Defense Agency develops ballistic missile
defense capabilities.[Footnote 7] To obtain information on DOD's
process for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing overall combatant
command priorities in developing ballistic missile defense
capabilities, we obtained and reviewed U.S. Strategic Command, Missile
Defense Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff
guidance, directives, instructions, concepts, testimonies, and plans.
We reviewed drafts of U.S. Strategic Command's instruction establishing
the Warfighter Involvement Process,[Footnote 8] and obtained from U.S.
Strategic Command the prioritized lists of the combatant commands'
ballistic missile defense capability needs, which U.S. Strategic
Command provided to the Missile Defense Agency in 2006 and 2007. We
reviewed Missile Defense Agency guidance, plans, directives, briefings,
and other documents that identify key steps, stakeholders, and factors
that the Missile Defense Agency considers during its process for
planning, designing, developing, and fielding ballistic missile defense
capabilities. We also obtained and reviewed briefings describing a 2007
Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command study of how to more
effectively involve the combatant commands in developing missile
defense capabilities. We visited U.S. Strategic Command and met with
officials to discuss the command's role as advocate for the warfighter
for ballistic missile defense capabilities, and met with Missile
Defense Agency officials to obtain their perspectives on how the agency
has addressed combatant command priorities. We also obtained
information from U.S. Central Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S.
Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command about their respective
priorities for ballistic missile defenses. We also obtained
documentation from and met with officials from the Joint Staff and from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to understand their
perspectives. Further, we reviewed DOD directives, memorandums, and
other guidance to the Missile Defense Agency that establishes DOD's
overall approach for developing ballistic missile defense capabilities.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to May 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Our scope and methodology
are described in more detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
DOD has taken some steps to address the combatant commands' ballistic
missile defense needs, but it has not yet established an effective
process to identify, prioritize, and address these needs, or to provide
a DOD-wide perspective on which priorities are the most important. U.S.
Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency created the Warfighter
Involvement Process in 2005. Although the process is still evolving, it
has helped the Missile Defense Agency address some of the combatant
commands' needs. For example, in response to the combatant commands'
first Prioritized Capabilities List, the Missile Defense Agency
initiated new programs to develop sea-based defenses against short-
range ballistic missiles. However, the Warfighter Involvement Process
has not yet effectively conveyed either the commands' priorities to the
Missile Defense Agency, or the Missile Defense Agency's planned
adjustments back to the commands, for three interrelated reasons.
First, U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have not
clarified their respective Warfighter Involvement Process roles and
responsibilities by putting into place the approved and complete
guidance needed to implement the process. Lacking such guidance, the
combatant commands have not had an agreed-upon mechanism for
influencing Missile Defense Agency investments. Second, in addition to
lacking approved and complete guidance, U.S. Strategic Command and the
Missile Defense Agency have not yet established effective methodologies
for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing combatant command needs.
As a result, the Missile Defense Agency has lacked clear information
about how to best address the combatant commands' capability needs.
Additionally, until recently the Missile Defense Agency has not clearly
communicated how it has adjusted investments in response to the
commands' needs. Without such information, the commands have not been
able to provide the Missile Defense Agency feedback about how well the
agency has addressed the commands' priorities in its funding plans.
Third, senior civilian DOD leadership has not been involved in the
Warfighter Involvement Process to adjudicate potential differences
among the combatant commands' priorities as the leadership would under
traditional DOD processes. Instead, under the Warfighter Involvement
Process, U.S. Strategic Command has consolidated and submitted the
commands' prioritized capability needs to the Missile Defense Agency
without first vetting these priorities though senior civilian DOD
officials with departmentwide responsibilities for assessing risk and
allocating resources. Lacking such participation, the Missile Defense
Agency has not benefited from receiving a broader, departmentwide
perspective on which of the commands' needs were the most significant.
DOD has established a new board to advise the Deputy Secretary of
Defense on ballistic missile defense priorities; however, it operates
outside the Warfighter Involvement Process, and the extent to which
this board will be involved in reviewing or adjudicating differences
among the commands' priorities is unclear. The Missile Defense Agency
and U.S. Strategic Command have jointly studied ways to improve the
Warfighter Involvement Process as this process evolves. However, unless
and until U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency
overcome these limitations, DOD remains at risk of not effectively
providing the combatant commands with the missile defense capabilities
they need. We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to
(1) improve DOD's process for identifying and addressing combatant
command priorities; and (2) provide a DOD-wide perspective on the
combatant commands' priorities, given the range of ballistic missile
threats facing the United States. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD agreed with three of our recommendations intending to
improve DOD's process. While DOD was commenting on our draft, U.S.
Strategic Command issued guidance to define its roles and
responsibilities in the Warfighter Involvement Process; this action
partially implemented our recommendation that the command and the
Missile Defense Agency complete and publish such guidance. As a result
of U.S. Strategic Command's action, we modified our recommendation to
direct U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency to
regularly review and update their guidance as the Warfighter
Involvement Process evolves. DOD also partially agreed with two other
recommendations that are intended to improve DOD's process for
identifying DOD-wide priorities for ballistic missile defense
capabilities. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III.
Background:
The Missile Defense Agency has been charged with developing and
deploying ballistic missile defenses against threats posed by
adversaries from all geographic regions, at all ranges, and in all
phases of flight. At least 25 countries have acquired ballistic
missiles, including many countries that are also seeking or have
acquired weapons of mass destruction that could be used on these
missiles. In response, the Missile Defense Agency has been developing
defenses against short-, medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-
range ballistic missiles that could be targeted against U.S. forces
abroad, U.S. friends and allies, and the U.S. homeland.[Footnote 9] For
example, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, Patriot
Advanced Capability-3, and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system are
being developed primarily to provide an integrated capability to defend
deployed U.S. forces, friends, and allies against short-and medium-
range ballistic missiles. The Missile Defense Agency is also developing
sea-based defenses to destroy short-range missiles in the terminal
phase of flight in order to defend deployed forces. In addition, the
Missile Defense Agency is developing a Ground-based Midcourse Defense
system designed to destroy intercontinental-range ballistic missiles
targeted against the U.S. homeland, deployed U.S. forces, friends, and
allies. Some ballistic missile defense systems are being designed to
defend against more than one type of threat. For example, the Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense system is being designed not only to defend
deployed U.S. forces, allies, and friends from short-and medium-range
missiles, but also to help defend the U.S. homeland from longer range
missiles. Table 1 summarizes the threat categories to be addressed by
U.S. ballistic missile defenses.
Table 1: Ballistic Missile Threat Categories:
Ballistic missile category: Short-range ballistic missile;
Maximum range: Less than 600 kilometers (373 miles);
Primary target of the threat: Deployed U.S. forces, friends, and
allies.
Ballistic missile category: Medium-range ballistic missile;
Maximum range: 600 to 1,300 kilometers (373 to 808 miles);
Primary target of the threat: Deployed U.S. forces, friends, and
allies.
Ballistic missile category: Intermediate-range ballistic missile;
Maximum range: 1,300 to 5,500 kilometers (808 to 3,418 miles);
Primary target of the threat: Deployed U.S. forces, friends, and
allies.
Ballistic missile category: Intercontinental-range ballistic missile;
Maximum range: Greater than 5,500 kilometers (3,418 miles);
Primary target of the threat: U.S. homeland.
Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency information.
[End of table]
While the Missile Defense Agency is responsible for developing missile
defenses, the unified combatant commands are the military organizations
primarily responsible for deterring attacks and for employing forces
should deterrence fail.[Footnote 10] The Unified Command Plan, which is
signed by the President, establishes the combatant commanders' missions
and responsibilities and establishes their geographic areas of
responsibility. The most recent version of the Unified Command Plan,
which was published in 2006, identified five combatant commands--U.S.
Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S.
Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command--with responsibilities
covering specific geographic regions.[Footnote 11] For example, U.S.
Northern Command's area of responsibility includes all of North America
and surrounding waters; for missile defenses, U.S. Northern Command
would have primary responsibility for defending the continental United
States from an intercontinental-range missile attack.
U.S. Strategic Command is a unified combatant command with
responsibilities to integrate global missions and capabilities that
cross the boundaries of the geographic commands. Initially assigned
responsibility for nuclear deterrence, space, and computer network
operations, the President, in January 2003, expanded the command's
responsibilities to include several missions not previously assigned to
a combatant command. These missions were: global strike planning and
execution; planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile
defense (including missile defense advocacy); oversight of
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and global command and
control; and DOD information operations. In January 2005, the Secretary
of Defense also assigned the command responsibility for integrating and
synchronizing DOD's efforts in combating weapons of mass destruction.
DOD envisioned that U.S. Strategic Command's global operations would
potentially add value to the geographic combatant commands as they
carried out their responsibilities, and provide the President and
Secretary of Defense with an expanded range of military options for
responding to future threats.
U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency created the
Warfighter Involvement Process in 2005 to accomplish U.S. Strategic
Command's responsibility to advocate for desired global missile defense
characteristics and capabilities on behalf of all combatant commanders.
Additionally, U.S. Strategic Command envisions using the process as a
way for the military services and the Joint Staff to provide the
Missile Defense Agency with guidance and advice on desired ballistic
missile defense capabilities, operational approaches, and suitability
and supportability features. The Warfighter Involvement Process is
intended to provide a collaborative forum for the combatant commands,
U.S. Strategic Command, Joint Staff, and military services to identify,
assess, and articulate capability needs to the Missile Defense Agency,
analyze the risks associated with capability gaps and redundancies, and
examine possible solutions and implementation timelines. Although the
Warfighter Involvement Process involves a variety of organizations,
U.S. Strategic Command is responsible for administering and managing
the various analytical activities, software tools, focus groups, and
review boards that make up the process.
GAO has previously reviewed DOD's plans to operate ballistic missile
defense systems as certain systems have transitioned from a research
and development emphasis to operational military capabilities.[Footnote
12] For example, in 2006 we assessed DOD's preparations to operate and
support ballistic missile defenses that are under continuous
development. In 2007, we reported that DOD's long-term plans to develop
boost and ascent phase missile defense systems did not consider
operational perspectives on how many of these systems would be required
for various deployment periods, or the challenges of establishing bases
at potential deployment locations. Additionally, in response to a
congressional mandate, we have annually reported since 2003 on the
cost, schedule, testing, and performance progress that the Missile
Defense Agency is making in developing ballistic missile defenses.
[Footnote 13]
Warfighter Involvement Process Has Helped the Missile Defense Agency
Address Some Capability Needs but the Process Faces Key Limitations:
U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency created the
Warfighter Involvement Process in 2005 to identify and address the
combatant commands' ballistic missile defense capability needs, but the
process has yet to overcome key limitations to its effectiveness.
Although the Warfighter Involvement Process is still evolving, it has
helped the Missile Defense Agency address some of the combatant
commands' needs. However, even as U.S. Strategic Command and the
Missile Defense Agency move forward with the process, they have not
finalized the implementation guidance needed to clarify their
respective roles and responsibilities; have not yet established
effective methodologies for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing
combatant command needs; and have not involved senior civilian DOD
leadership to adjudicate potential differences among the combatant
commands' priorities and provide a departmentwide perspective about how
to best allocate resources. As a result, DOD is at risk of not
addressing the combatant commands' missile defense needs if
improvements are not made that establish an effective and well
documented process and provide a DOD-wide perspective when prioritizing
these needs.
Warfighter Involvement Process Is Still Evolving but Has Helped the
Missile Defense Agency Address Some Combatant Command Needs:
Although the Warfighter Involvement Process was created in 2005 and is
still evolving, the process has helped the Missile Defense Agency to
address some combatant command ballistic missile defense capability
needs. Since 2001, DOD has emphasized a capabilities-based development
strategy to provide the combatant commands with the capabilities they
require to deter and defeat a broad range of adversaries.[Footnote 14]
By establishing the Missile Defense Agency in 2002, DOD intended to
follow a more streamlined capabilities-based development strategy to
rapidly develop and field ballistic missile defenses. Through the
Warfighter Involvement Process, the agency has addressed some of the
combatant commands' capability needs in developing ballistic missile
defenses. However, because the Warfighter Involvement Process is still
evolving, the combatant commands have not yet formally determined the
extent to which the agency's plans are in line with the commands'
needs.
Warfighter Involvement Process Is Still Evolving:
The Warfighter Involvement Process has not fully evolved to effectively
convey either the commands' priorities to the Missile Defense Agency or
the Missile Defense Agency's planned adjustments back to the commands.
When the Secretary of Defense created the Missile Defense Agency in
2002, DOD lacked a process for the agency to consider the combatant
commands' priorities as it developed ballistic missile defenses.
Instead, the Missile Defense Agency focused on developing and deploying
capabilities based on its own technology-driven assessment of what
could be fielded quickly in order to meet the President's direction to
quickly field a limited ballistic missile defense system by 2004. As a
result, the Missile Defense Agency expedited its initial designs and
development plans without formally considering the combatant commands'
needs, according to the DOD Inspector General.[Footnote 15]
Additionally, the agency identified long-term ballistic missile defense
system capability goals before having a process in place to identify
the commands' capability needs.
In emphasizing the rapid initial development of ballistic missile
defense systems, the Missile Defense Agency anticipated that further
investments could be needed to better meet the combatant commands'
requirements. Under the Secretary of Defense's 2002 direction, the
Missile Defense Agency's approach has been to deploy capabilities
early, which may only partially meet warfighter needs, and then
incrementally improve the deployed capabilities' effectiveness by
inserting new technologies as they become available and as the threat
warrants. To initiate this approach, the agency focused on further
developing ballistic missile defenses that had been previously under
development by the military services and subjected to DOD's traditional
joint requirements determination process. Officials from U.S. Strategic
Command, U.S. Northern Command, the Missile Defense Agency, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that the agency's approach
resulted in the rapid deployment of operational missile defenses. A
senior Missile Defense Agency official added that the Secretary of
Defense reviewed and approved the agency's plans for developing this
initial defensive capability. However, absent the combatant commands'
inputs, U.S. Strategic Command concluded in January 2005 that taking
this approach made it difficult not only for the Missile Defense Agency
to associate its actions with the commands' requirements, but also for
the combatant commands to evaluate the agency's progress. According to
U.S. Strategic Command, the lack of a process also created the
potential for inefficiencies and unnecessary redundancies in the
Missile Defense Agency's investments, resulting in increased risk to
the baseline costs and operational effectiveness of the ballistic
missile defense systems under development.
U.S. Strategic Command recognized the need to formalize a process to
carry out its missile defense advocacy responsibilities, even as the
Missile Defense Agency was focused on developing and deploying
capabilities quickly. Following U.S. Strategic Command's creation in
2002 and assignment of several new missions in January 2003, the
command took a wide range of actions to implement and integrate these
missions, such as developing various plans, concepts, and guidance;
establishing procedures and processes; identifying personnel and
funding resources; developing new relationships; building communication
networks; and providing training, education, and exercises. Among these
activities, U.S. Strategic Command took steps to establish its role as
the combatant commands' advocate for missile defenses. For example, in
its November 2003 Strategic Concept for Global Ballistic Missile
Defense,[Footnote 16] U.S. Strategic Command outlined its initial
concept for developing and advocating for desired ballistic missile
defense capabilities. Subsequently, in late 2004 and early 2005, U.S.
Strategic Command recognized the need for creating a more formalized
process for identifying and addressing the warfighter's ballistic
missile defense needs. Additionally, the command undertook several
reorganizations, the latest occurring in late 2004 and early 2005,
where it established a new functional component for integrated missile
defense to bring focus and attention to the command's operational
responsibilities.[Footnote 17]
Missile Defense Agency Has Addressed Some Combatant Command Needs
following the Warfighter Involvement Process's Creation:
The Missile Defense Agency has addressed some combatant command needs
since it and U.S. Strategic Command created the Warfighter Involvement
Process in 2005. A key output of this newly established process is the
Prioritized Capabilities List, which is intended to specify how the
combatant commands collectively prioritize the full range of
capabilities needed to perform ballistic missile defense missions. U.S.
Strategic Command first provided the Prioritized Capabilities List to
the Missile Defense Agency in 2006; a revised list was also provided in
2007. Combatant commands that provided inputs to the Prioritized
Capabilities List include: U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command,
U.S. Joint Forces Command,[Footnote 18] U.S. Northern Command, U.S.
Pacific Command, and U.S. Strategic Command. Appendix II identifies
short descriptions of the 27 capabilities listed in the 2007
Prioritized Capabilities List.
Following the Warfighter Involvement Process's creation and preparation
of the first Prioritized Capabilities List, the Missile Defense Agency
adjusted some investment programs in response to the combatant
commands' prioritized requirements. In particular:
* The Missile Defense Agency created new investment programs to develop
sea-based defenses against short-range missiles in their terminal phase
of flight. The first Prioritized Capabilities List identified the
combatant commands' need for a sea-based terminal defense capability,
but at that time the Missile Defense Agency was not investing resources
to develop sea-based terminal defenses. After receiving the first
Prioritized Capabilities List, the Missile Defense Agency included a
program in its fiscal year 2008 budget proposal to modify and deploy up
to 100 Navy Standard Missile-2 interceptors as a near-term option.
Additionally, the Missile Defense Agency created a second program to
develop more capable systems that would be available in the long term.
The Missile Defense Agency's current plans for these programs include
spending a total of $124 million through fiscal year 2011 on the near-
term option,[Footnote 19] and $487 million through fiscal year 2013 to
develop more advanced, long-term options.
* The Missile Defense Agency shifted funding to place greater emphasis
on some existing investments because of requirements identified on the
Prioritized Capabilities List. In particular, the Missile Defense
Agency has been developing capabilities to sustain ballistic missile
defense operations while simultaneously making the system available for
testing, training, upgrades, and maintenance. Although the combatant
commands had identified this capability need and the Missile Defense
Agency funded this capability, it took on new urgency when the
ballistic missile defense system was taken out of test mode and put in
an operational status for the first time in 2006. While the system was
operational, it was not available to either the Missile Defense Agency
for developmental activities and maintenance or to the combatant
commands for training. To address this shortfall, the Missile Defense
Agency increased resources to more quickly develop concurrent testing,
training, and operations capabilities. According to the Missile Defense
Agency, the agency increased funding for this effort from about $0.5
million in fiscal year 2006 to $6.9 million in fiscal year 2007.
[Footnote 20]
* The Missile Defense Agency has responded to numerous combatant
command requests to change systems that have already been fielded.
Working closely with U.S. Strategic Command's functional component for
integrated missile defense, the Missile Defense Agency has modified
some systems' hardware and software to meet the combatant commands'
capability needs. U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that the
combatant commands typically identify the need for such changes as the
result of exercises, training, or operational experience. Although
officials we spoke with viewed the agency's responsiveness to these
requests as positive, some observed that a more effective process for
involving the warfighter earlier in developing systems could reduce the
need to change these systems once they had been developed and fielded.
Although the Warfighter Involvement Process has not yet fully evolved,
Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command officials believe the
agency has generally been responsive to the combatant commands'
capability needs. For example, a 2007 joint study by the Missile
Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command concluded that the agency was
at least partially addressing all of the combatant commands' capability
needs. Additionally, Missile Defense Agency officials told us that,
based on the study's results and the agency's assessment of the 2007
Prioritized Capabilities List, the agency was making adjustments to its
investment plans to help mitigate potential gaps between the commands'
needs and the agency's programs. However, for approximately 3 years
after it began making investments to develop and deploy systems, the
Missile Defense Agency lacked the ability to ascertain the extent to
which its efforts were aligned with the commands' needs. Moreover, as
of May 2008, the combatant commands had not yet formally assessed and
responded to the Missile Defense Agency's recently revised plans. As a
result, the commands have not formally determined the extent to which
the agency's plans are in line with the commands' needs.
Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command Have Not Yet Overcome
Key Limitations:
Although the Warfighter Involvement Process has helped address some of
the commands' needs, U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense
Agency have yet to overcome key limitations as they move forward with
the process. These interrelated limitations include a lack of clear and
well documented roles and responsibilities; ineffective methodologies
for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing combatant command
priorities; and the lack of senior civilian DOD participation in the
process to adjudicate among the commands' priorities and assess
departmentwide risk about how to best allocate resources.
U.S. Strategic Command and Missile Defense Agency Roles and
Responsibilities Are Not Well Documented:
U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have not yet
clarified their respective roles and responsibilities by putting into
place the approved and complete guidance needed to implement the
process and to hold them accountable for achieving results. The Office
of Management and Budget's guidance on establishing internal controls
emphasizes that agencies should design management structures for
programs to help ensure accountability for results.[Footnote 21]
According to GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government,[Footnote 22] such management structures include clearly
documented guidance, including policies, procedures, directives,
instructions, and other documentation that establish roles and
responsibilities needed to achieve an organization's mission and
objectives. Additionally, our prior work on internal controls and
management accountability also has emphasized that complete guidance
should be approved, current, and binding on all appropriate
stakeholders. Lacking approved and complete guidance, the combatant
commands have not had a clear understanding of U.S. Strategic Command's
and the Missile Defense Agency's roles and responsibilities, and have
lacked a mechanism to hold either organization accountable for
effectively identifying, prioritizing, and addressing their needs.
U.S. Strategic Command has not yet put into place approved guidance
formally establishing its roles and responsibilities under the
Warfighter Involvement Process, although it has been developing a
commandwide instruction to do so since 2005. In preparing the
instruction, U.S. Strategic Command solicited comments from stakeholder
organizations, including other combatant commands and the Joint Staff,
in order to build consensus around key relationships that support the
Warfighter Involvement Process. Some stakeholders raised key issues
about U.S. Strategic Command's roles in the Warfighter Involvement
Process. For example, U.S. Central Command officials commented that a
draft version of U.S. Strategic Command's instruction conveyed too much
responsibility to U.S. Strategic Command for speaking on behalf of the
other commands when advocating for their capability needs. In response,
U.S. Strategic Command modified its instruction to more clearly limit
its responsibilities for prioritizing the different commands' needs. In
addition to addressing stakeholder comments, U.S. Strategic Command
changed the draft instruction to incorporate recommendations from a
2007 joint study by the Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic
Command on how to improve the Warfighter Involvement Process. In
February 2008, the command also updated the draft instruction to
account for its newly assigned responsibility relating to DOD's efforts
to integrate air and missile defenses across the department. U.S.
Strategic Command officials told us that the command plans to approve
and issue the instruction by mid-2008. However, the command's draft
instruction recognizes that further clarifications and details for
implementing the Warfighter Involvement Process are still needed, which
may require additional revisions after the current draft is approved.
Until U.S. Strategic Command has approved guidance in place, the
combatant commands continue to lack a mechanism that holds U.S.
Strategic Command accountable for its roles and responsibilities under
the Warfighter Involvement Process.
The Missile Defense Agency also does not have finalized guidance in
place detailing its responsibilities in the Warfighter Involvement
Process. Lacking such guidance, officials from several combatant
commands told us that the Missile Defense Agency has not provided them
with enough insight into how it takes their needs into account.
Although some of the Missile Defense Agency's Warfighter Involvement
Process responsibilities are identified in U.S. Strategic Command's
draft instruction, this instruction does not provide specific details
about how the agency will carry them out. Additionally, the U.S.
Strategic Command draft instruction will not be binding on the Missile
Defense Agency once it is completed. In commenting on U.S. Strategic
Command's draft instruction, Joint Staff officials asked U.S. Strategic
Command how the Missile Defense Agency would be held accountable for
its Warfighter Involvement Process responsibilities. U.S. Strategic
Command responded that its goal was for the Missile Defense Agency to
either approve the U.S. Strategic Command instruction, or publish a
complementary document stipulating its responsibilities. Missile
Defense Agency officials told us in May 2008 that the agency had not
yet taken either of these actions because U.S. Strategic Command's
instruction was still incomplete.
Until recently, the Missile Defense Agency did not plan to prepare its
own guidance for establishing its roles and responsibilities in the
Warfighter Involvement Process. In March 2006, a senior Missile Defense
Agency official stated to the DOD Inspector General that the agency did
not plan to issue a new directive that complemented U.S. Strategic
Command's instruction.[Footnote 23] Instead, the official stated that
the agency's Integrated Program Policy and Systems Engineering Plan
would be used to document the agency's Warfighter Involvement Process
responsibilities.[Footnote 24] However, these documents provide top-
level direction and descriptions of the agency's decision-making
processes and lack specific details about how the agency would fulfill
its Warfighter Involvement Process responsibilities. Moreover, the
agency has not yet updated these documents to identify specific
Warfighter Involvement Process roles and responsibilities.
Additionally, a Missile Defense Agency official told us that, based on
its experience during 2006 and 2007, the agency needed to prepare
internal guidance to ensure that all of its project offices understood
and could be held accountable for their responsibilities under the
process. In May 2008, agency officials told us that the agency not only
was planning to update some of this internal guidance, but also was
beginning to prepare its own Warfighter Involvement Process guidance to
complement U.S. Strategic Command's instruction. Until the Missile
Defense Agency completes this effort, the combatant commands will
continue to lack both transparency into the Missile Defense Agency's
process for addressing their needs, and the means to hold the agency
accountable.
Warfighter Involvement Process Has Not Resulted in Effective
Methodologies for Identifying, Prioritizing, and Addressing Capability
Needs:
The Warfighter Involvement Process has not yet resulted in effective
methodologies for the combatant commands to identify and prioritize
their capability needs and for the Missile Defense Agency to address
the combatant commands' capability needs. According to U.S. Strategic
Command's draft instruction, the goals of the Warfighter Involvement
Process include providing a unified means for the combatant commands to
communicate desired capabilities to the Missile Defense Agency, and for
the Missile Defense Agency to communicate its resultant acquisition
plans back to the commands. The Prioritized Capabilities List is
intended to achieve these goals through methodologies that clearly,
completely, and accurately identify the commands' needed capabilities,
and distinguish one priority from the next. Additionally, U.S.
Strategic Command's draft Warfighter Involvement Process instruction
indicates that an effective methodology for addressing the commands'
needs would clearly associate the agency's investments with those
needs. Lacking effective methodologies, the combatant commands have not
communicated their capability needs in an understandable and useful way
to the Missile Defense Agency, and the agency has not clearly
communicated how the combatant commands' capability needs are being
addressed in its development and investment decisions.
Some Combatant Commands' Needs Not Clearly Identified:
Our work revealed several examples where the methodology used to
develop the Prioritized Capabilities List did not effectively identify
the specific capability needs of some of the combatant commands. In
identifying the capability needs on the Prioritized Capabilities List,
U.S. Strategic Command used a capabilities-based approach to prepare
broad, generalized statements describing the full range of capabilities
needed to operate a global ballistic missile defense system. As a
result of this approach, several of the capabilities on the list
encompass multiple functional areas, such as interceptors, sensors, and
communications, which has made it difficult for the Missile Defense
Agency to identify the specific capabilities that the commands require.
Additionally, by focusing on developing the capabilities that the
combatant commands would need in the future,[Footnote 25] U.S.
Strategic Command officials told us the Prioritized Capabilities List
has not provided an adequate format for the combatant commands to
identify their needs for forces to meet ongoing operational
requirements. Although U.S. Joint Forces Command officials told us that
the 2007 list clearly identified the capabilities that were important
to their command, officials from the three geographic combatant
commands with whom we spoke told us that the list did not effectively
represent their needs. For example:
* U.S. Northern Command officials told us that the capabilities did not
adequately or clearly identify some of their more specific needs
because the capabilities on the list encompass the specific needs of
multiple commands, which could obscure the meaning and intent of the
underlying needs of the individual commands.
* U.S. Pacific Command officials told us that the 2007 Prioritized
Capabilities List did not fully meet their command's needs because the
list was not designed to identify the quantities of interceptors that
the command needs to meet specific requirements for missile defense
operations in the Pacific region,[Footnote 26] given the potential
ballistic missile threats posed to U.S. forces and allies in the
region.
* U.S. Central Command officials told us that the 2007 Prioritized
Capabilities List provided the appropriate detail for systems that have
yet to be developed. However, the officials also told us that U.S.
Central Command's primary need is to be sure that the command has
access to sufficient short-range missile defense systems for operations
in its region.[Footnote 27] They added that the Prioritized
Capabilities List has not been an effective tool for advocating for
these needs because it is focused, instead, on future capability
requirements.
U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that they used a capabilities-
based approach to identify and prioritize capability needs because this
approach is consistent with DOD's traditional joint requirements
determination process used by the combatant commands in non-missile-
defense areas, which initially identifies requirements in broad terms.
[Footnote 28] U.S. Strategic Command stated that this approach allowed
it to identify and condense over 100 tasks required to plan and execute
ballistic missile defense missions into the 27 capabilities on the 2007
Prioritized Capabilities List. U.S. Strategic Command officials added
that this approach resulted in a list of manageable length and level of
detail needed to provide the Missile Defense Agency with insight into
the commands' needs. The officials further stated that the list was not
designed to identify the commands' short-term operational requirements,
adding that U.S. Strategic Command planned to put into place a
Warfighter Involvement Process function to identify and advocate for
the commands' operational force requirements. However, the U.S.
Strategic Command and Missile Defense Agency officials agreed that the
lists prepared to date have not provided enough specific detail to
inform the Missile Defense Agency about how to best address the
commands' needs when developing new capabilities. Until U.S. Strategic
Command develops a methodology to more clearly identify the commands'
capability needs, the Prioritized Capabilities List's effectiveness as
a guide for the Missile Defense Agency for investing resources will
continue to be limited.
Combatant Commands' Needs Not Consistently Prioritized:
In addition to not effectively identifying some of the combatant
commands' capability needs, the Warfighter Involvement Process also has
not resulted in a consistent methodology for prioritizing these needs.
In preparing the 2006 Prioritized Capabilities List, the combatant
commands grouped the capabilities by the time frames in which they will
be needed--either near-, mid-, or far-term.[Footnote 29] In contrast,
for preparing the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List, U.S. Strategic
Command asked the combatant commands to evaluate each capability's
relative importance to (1) the command's ballistic missile defense
mission, weighted at 60 percent; (2) the command's other missions,
weighted at 30 percent; and (3) other joint capability areas, weighted
at 10 percent. For each capability, the combatant commands were told to
assign a rating of 1 (lowest importance) to 5 (highest importance) for
each factor, multiply the rating by the appropriate weight, and add the
three ratings up to develop a score for each capability. However, the
individual combatant commands did not consistently apply this
methodology:
* Some combatant commands took additional factors into account when
prioritizing their individual capability needs. U.S. Strategic Command
officials told us that each of the combatant commands was best
positioned to determine for itself how to use the criteria for
prioritizing the capabilities on the list. However, in the analysis
accompanying the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List, U.S. Strategic
Command recognized as a limitation that the commands may have
considered the current performance of a system or other criteria when
prioritizing their needs. Missile Defense Agency officials told us that
some combatant commands appeared to follow U.S. Strategic Command's
direction and prioritize the capabilities based on their overall
importance to their current responsibilities, while other commands
appeared to prioritize their needs based on what capabilities they were
lacking. As a result, the Missile Defense Agency officials told us that
the Missile Defense Agency lacked clarity on what the commands were
trying to communicate in the Prioritized Capabilities List.
* The combatant commands also did not consistently rank their
capability needs. For example, U.S. Northern Command officials told us
that they believed it was important to clearly distinguish among
priorities by not assigning the same score to more than one capability,
whereas U.S. Joint Forces Command officials told us that duplicate
scores indicated that some capabilities were equally important to the
command. Additionally, U.S. Joint Forces Command officials told us that
U.S. Strategic Command did not initially provide guidance on whether
duplicate scores were acceptable; however, they stated that U.S.
Strategic Command officials later told them that such results were
valid. In addition to U.S. Joint Forces Command, which assigned the
second-highest score to four capabilities, U.S. Central Command and
U.S. Pacific Command both assigned the highest score to four
capabilities, and U.S. European Command assigned the second-highest
score to three capabilities. However, Missile Defense Agency officials
told us that it would be more useful to the agency if the combatant
commands more clearly distinguished among their prioritized needs by
not assigning duplicate scores.
Missile Defense Agency's Response to the Prioritized Capabilities List
Not Formally Assessed:
U.S. Strategic Command has not formally assessed the Missile Defense
Agency's responses to the 2006 and 2007 Prioritized Capabilities Lists
to determine whether the agency has developed an effective methodology
for addressing the combatant commands' needs. Such an analysis of the
Missile Defense Agency's response is envisioned in U.S. Strategic
Command's draft Warfighter Involvement Process instruction. However,
U.S. Strategic Command did not prepare a formal response to the
agency's first Achievable Capabilities List,[Footnote 30] which the
Missile Defense Agency provided to the combatant commands in 2006. U.S.
Strategic Command and Missile Defense Agency officials stated that the
2006 Achievable Capabilities List was ineffective because the agency
did not analyze its detailed investment programs to determine the
extent to which its programs were well aligned with the commands'
priorities. U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that clear, direct
linkages between the Prioritized Capabilities List and the Missile
Defense Agency's programs were difficult to establish because the
capabilities on the Prioritized Capabilities List are at a broad,
generalized level and the Missile Defense Agency's program of record is
at a system-specific level. As a result, the Missile Defense Agency's
response to the first Prioritized Capabilities List did not provide
U.S. Strategic Command with funding or budget information needed to
prepare a formal response to the 2006 Achievable Capabilities List.
The Missile Defense Agency has prepared a more complete and detailed
response to the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List, but U.S. Strategic
Command has not yet formally analyzed the agency's response. Missile
Defense Agency officials told us that compared to the 2006 Achievable
Capabilities List, the 2007 Achievable Capabilities List provides
better information about how the agency has addressed the commands'
needs. Unlike the previous list, the 2007 Achievable Capabilities List
provides more information, including a capability gap analysis and a
detailed budget analysis that links each of the commands' 27 capability
needs to the agency's investment programs. According to the Missile
Defense Agency, at least four combatant commands have provided
favorable feedback to the Missile Defense Agency about its 2007
response. However, the combatant commands have not yet formally
assessed whether the agency's methodology for addressing their needs is
effective. As envisioned by the U.S. Strategic Command's Warfighter
Involvement Process draft instruction, U.S. Strategic Command would
analyze and reply to the agency's Achievable Capabilities List by
preparing a Capability Assessment Report. U.S. Strategic Command stated
that this report is to appraise the Missile Defense Agency's funding
plans, assess whether the agency's development trends are expected to
provide effective capabilities, and facilitate further interaction with
the agency about potential changes to the Missile Defense Agency's
investments. Having received the agency's most recent Achievable
Capabilities List in April 2008, U.S. Strategic Command officials told
us that they plan to complete this assessment and provide the
Capability Assessment Report to the Missile Defense Agency by mid-
August 2008. However, the officials told us that they did not expect
that the Missile Defense Agency would have time to make significant
adjustments to its fiscal year 2010 budget proposal after receiving the
Capability Assessment Report. Until U.S. Strategic Command prepares
this assessment, the agency will lack the commands' formal feedback on
how well it is addressing their needs and may miss opportunities to
make adjustments to its plans and future budgets.
U.S. Strategic Command and Missile Defense Agency Are Taking Steps to
Improve Warfighter Involvement Process:
U.S. Strategic Command and Missile Defense Agency officials told us
that the Warfighter Involvement Process has provided the Missile
Defense Agency with important information about the combatant commands'
needed capabilities, and that they are taking steps to improve their
respective inputs to the process. U.S. Strategic Command officials told
us that the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List highlighted an overall
preference among the commands for the Missile Defense Agency to further
improve existing capabilities, rather than develop new types of
ballistic missile defenses. Missile Defense Agency officials added that
the Warfighter Involvement Process has increased the agency's
interactions with the combatant commands, which has provided the agency
a broader perspective of the combatant commands' operational
responsibilities, including insight into their operational needs for
integrated planning, communications, and consequence management.
Further, U.S. Strategic Command has sought new methodologies to enhance
the ability to identify and prioritize the commands' capability needs
as the process has evolved. Moving forward, U.S. Strategic Command
plans to improve the Prioritized Capabilities List by distinguishing
between overall, long-term capability needs and shorter-term
development goals. Command officials also told us that they intend to
improve the list by clarifying the capability statements to provide
better guidance to the Missile Defense Agency. According to the
officials, this improved list would be prepared in time for the Missile
Defense Agency to consider when it prepares its 2012 budget proposal.
However, as of May 2008, U.S. Strategic Command had only begun the
process of determining the methodologies for identifying and
prioritizing the commands' capability needs. Until U.S. Strategic
Command prepares effective and consistent methodologies for identifying
and prioritizing these capabilities, the Prioritized Capabilities List
will continue to be of limited use to the Missile Defense Agency.
Moreover, Missile Defense Agency officials indicated that they may need
to make further improvements to the agency's approach for addressing
the commands' needs. Unless the Missile Defense Agency has developed an
effective methodology for addressing their needs, the commands' ability
to provide a detailed, formal assessment of the agency's plans will be
limited.
Warfighter Involvement Process Lacked Senior Civilian DOD Leadership
Involvement:
Unlike DOD's traditional process for prioritizing combatant command
capability needs when DOD prepares its funding plans, the Warfighter
Involvement Process has lacked the involvement of senior civilian DOD
officials with a departmentwide perspective to adjudicate potential
differences among the combatant commands' priorities. Under DOD's
traditional process, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, evaluates the
combatant commands' individual and collective requirements, and advises
the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which DOD investment plans
are addressing these requirements. In contrast, the Warfighter
Involvement Process is not structured to involve senior civilian DOD
leadership to provide their perspective on how to assess risk and
allocate resources for missile defenses and other DOD needs. Instead,
U.S. Strategic Command consolidated each command's capability needs
into an overall prioritized list, and then provided the list directly
to the Missile Defense Agency. Lacking the involvement of senior
civilian DOD officials in reviewing the commands' priorities, the
Missile Defense Agency has not benefited from receiving a broader,
departmentwide perspective on which of the commands' needs were the
most significant.
Under traditional DOD requirements processes, each combatant command is
responsible for identifying and seeking the specific military
capabilities that it needs to implement its own mission. Moreover, the
commands' capability needs differ and depend on their individual
mission responsibilities. For example, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S.
Central Command's missions and geographic responsibilities primarily
call for ballistic missile defenses that can address short-and medium-
range missile threats to deployed forces and to U.S. friends and
allies. U.S. Central Command officials added that they also require sea-
based missile defense capabilities to provide greater operational
flexibility in a politically volatile region. U.S. Northern Command's
mission is to defend the U.S. homeland, and its primary operational
focus for ballistic missile defense is on intercontinental threats. As
the combatant command responsible for developing robust, joint command
and control capabilities and interoperable systems, U.S. Joint Forces
Command has emphasized the need to integrate ballistic missile defense
capabilities with air and cruise missile defenses. U.S. Strategic
Command, which is responsible for planning, integrating, and
coordinating global missile defense operations, has worldwide
responsibilities that include working with all of the geographic
commands on an equal basis to defend their respective regions.
Given these varied mission needs, some combatant command officials told
us that they were not satisfied with U.S. Strategic Command's approach
for preparing the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List. To prepare the
list, U.S. Strategic Command determined an overall score for each of
the 27 capabilities on the list by adding together the scores that the
commands had assigned to each individual capability. U.S. Strategic
Command then listed the capabilities from highest to lowest aggregate
score to consolidate the commands' needs into a single, overall
prioritized list. U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command
officials told us that this was a reasonable approach to follow for
consolidating the commands' priorities because it equitably represented
each command's needs. However, other combatant command officials told
us that they were dissatisfied with this approach. For example, U.S.
Central Command officials told us this approach had limited utility
because it did not consider or distinguish among the different
commands' mission responsibilities. U.S. Pacific Command officials
similarly told us that compiling a single list should not be based only
on the sum of each capability's score, but should also consider each
command's specific military responsibilities relative to each other.
U.S. Northern Command officials told us that the combatant commands'
varied mission requirements made it difficult to consolidate the
commands' capability needs in a meaningful way without judging which
missile defense missions were the most pressing.
Although they prefer to have their commands' individual mission
responsibilities taken into account when preparing the Prioritized
Capabilities List, some combatant command officials told us that the
Warfighter Involvement Process was not well structured to adjudicate
potential differences among their needs. For example, in comments on a
draft of U.S. Strategic Command's Warfighter Involvement Process
instruction, U.S. Central Command stated the Unified Command Plan did
not implicitly or explicitly convey to U.S. Strategic Command the
responsibility to assess the relative importance of the other commands'
capability needs. U.S. Northern Command officials told us that although
U.S. Strategic Command is best positioned among the combatant commands
to advocate for warfighter-desired ballistic missile defense
capabilities, they were unsure whether the Unified Command Plan gave
U.S. Strategic Command the responsibility, as the Warfighter
Involvement Process administrator, to determine which of the other
commands' needs were the most important. U.S. Pacific Command officials
also told us that U.S. Strategic Command may lack the proper
perspective to assess and evaluate the other commands' mission areas
when determining overall priorities. The U.S. Pacific Command officials
added that senior civilian DOD officials could apply a broader
perspective to help specify whether the prioritized list should
emphasize one command's mission needs over another's. Although U.S.
Joint Forces Command officials told us that U.S. Strategic Command has
the appropriate authorities to develop a Prioritized Capabilities List
on behalf of the other commands, they stated that U.S. Strategic
Command would have difficulty reaching consensus among the combatant
commands about which of their mission needs were the most important,
which could make the process of preparing a final list unnecessarily
complicated and difficult. U.S. Strategic Command officials also stated
that adjudicating the priorities of the other commands is not within
the scope of the Warfighter Involvement Process; rather, the command
officials told us that they intended use the Prioritized Capabilities
List to identify the combatant commands' collective priorities for
developing a globally integrated ballistic missile defense system. U.S.
Strategic Command further stated that senior DOD leadership should be
responsible for instructing the Missile Defense Agency about how to
best address these priorities.
U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that, even as they did not
adjudicate the other commands' mission needs in preparing the 2007
Prioritized Capabilities List, they did not involve senior civilian DOD
authorities to do so. Rather, U.S. Strategic Command sought the other
combatant commands' approval of the list, and then provided the list to
the Missile Defense Agency without first seeking a review outside the
Warfighter Involvement Process by DOD officials with responsibilities
for assessing risk and allocating resources. In particular, U.S.
Strategic Command convened a meeting of 1-star and 2-star general and
flag officers from the combatant commands to review the list and
resolve any disagreements before it was finalized. U.S. Strategic
Command also circulated drafts of the list for the commands' senior
leadership to review, and made changes to the list in response to
critical comments from one of the commands. As a result, while the
commanders of the combatant commands approved the list before U.S.
Strategic Command sent it to the Missile Defense Agency, the list did
not receive a higher-level review to determine which of their
priorities was most important.
U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that they recognized that
consolidating the individual commands' needs into an overall set of
priorities would result in some commands having their priorities ranked
higher than those of other commands. However, U.S. Strategic Command
officials added that they were responsive to the need to make the
individual commands' priorities transparent. For example, the analysis
accompanying the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List documented how each
command individually ranked the 27 capabilities on the list, so that
the Missile Defense Agency could gain insight into what the individual
commands needed. Additionally, the analysis accompanying the 2007 list
highlighted that U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S.
Pacific Command gave higher scores for capabilities needed to defend
deployed forces, U.S. allies, and friends, while U.S. Strategic Command
and U.S. Northern Command prioritized higher those capabilities needed
to defend the U.S. homeland. Further, U.S. Strategic Command and U.S.
Joint Forces Command officials told us that the overall list provided a
fair perspective on the commands' overall priorities because the
capabilities ranked highest on the consolidated list were highly ranked
by multiple commands. However, without involving senior DOD officials
to provide a departmentwide review of these overall priorities, assess
the commands' varied mission responsibilities, and provide their
perspective on which priorities were the most significant, the
consolidated list could obscure the importance of a key national
defense priority if that need was ranked highly by only one command.
In contrast to preparing the Prioritized Capabilities List, other
aspects of U.S. Strategic Command's ballistic missile defense
responsibilities involve senior DOD officials for reviewing and
adjudicating decisions that affect the other combatant commands. For
example, under U.S. Strategic Command's 2003 concept for planning,
integrating, and coordinating global ballistic missile defense forces
during a crisis, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be
responsible for considering a U.S. Strategic Command recommendation to
reallocate ballistic missile defense forces from one combatant
command's region to another's. Although U.S. Strategic Command's
concept states that "in most cases, U.S. Strategic Command's
recommendations will be understood and accepted by the other combatant
commands," the affected commands could present alternative
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense if they disagreed with U.S.
Strategic Command's proposal. By providing for senior-level involvement
during planning, U.S. Strategic Command ensures that the decision to
reallocate forces from one region to another is made based on a full,
DOD-wide perspective on how to best meet national security needs.
DOD is taking steps to improve the oversight of ballistic missile
defense developments, but so far these steps have not included plans to
involve senior civilian DOD officials to adjudicate the combatant
commands' priorities. The Missile Defense Executive Board was chartered
in March 2007 to review and make recommendations on the Missile Defense
Agency's comprehensive acquisition strategy to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense. U.S. Northern Command officials stated to us that the Missile
Defense Executive Board could play a valuable role by reviewing the
Prioritized Capabilities List before it was provided to the Missile
Defense Agency. Similarly, U.S. Strategic Command officials told us
that the Missile Defense Executive Board could provide the combatant
commands with a venue outside the Warfighter Involvement Process for
reviewing and adjudicating their differing mission needs after the
Prioritized Capabilities List is completed, but before the list is
provided to the Missile Defense Agency. The U.S. Strategic Command
officials added that the board could provide a perspective that U.S.
Strategic Command lacked on the cost, risk, and benefits of allocating
resources to develop specific priorities. Since late 2007 the board has
been considering new processes to improve the management of DOD
resources to develop and operate ballistic missile defenses. Chaired by
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, the Board's membership includes senior-level representatives
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
U.S. Strategic Command, and other organizations. As a result, the board
is expected to provide DOD with a means to exercise broader oversight
of the Missile Defense Agency than its predecessor organizations.
[Footnote 31] However, U.S. Strategic Command and Office of the
Secretary of Defense officials told us that the board's current focus
is to align the services' and Missile Defense Agency's resource plans
to support ballistic missile defense operations, rather than assess the
relative importance of the combatant commands' ballistic missile
defense mission responsibilities and corresponding capability needs.
Unless senior civilian DOD officials get involved in adjudicating the
commands' overall priorities before DOD makes resource decisions, the
Missile Defense Agency will lack a departmentwide perspective on how to
best allocate resources to meet the broad array of missile threats that
confront U.S. national security.
Conclusions:
The Warfighter Involvement Process continues to evolve and mature as
U.S. Strategic Command works with the other combatant commands to
identify priorities and communicate them to the Missile Defense Agency.
Because the process is distinct from DOD's traditional process, U.S.
Strategic Command has had to build consensus around new roles,
responsibilities, and authorities needed to make the combatant
commands' capability needs known to the Missile Defense Agency. Even
without a mature and effective Warfighter Involvement Process in place,
the Missile Defense Agency has adjusted some of its investments to
better meet the combatant commands' capability needs. However, U.S.
Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have yet to overcome
key limitations that complicate both U.S. Strategic Command's efforts
to advocate on behalf of the other commands, and the Missile Defense
Agency's ability to address their needs. Although U.S. Strategic
Command has been drafting implementation guidance since 2005, neither
the command nor the Missile Defense Agency has finalized such guidance,
which is needed to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities.
Additionally, the Prioritized Capabilities List has not been a clear
and effective guide for the Missile Defense Agency to follow when
making investment decisions. Moreover, the Missile Defense Agency has
only recently analyzed the combatant commands' needs and linked them to
its investment programs; until the combatant commands formally assess
and respond to the agency's analysis, the extent to which the agency
has effectively addressed the commands' needs will remain unclear.
Finally, the Warfighter Involvement Process faces challenges in
determining the relative importance of the combatant commands' varied
ballistic missile defense responsibilities. Unless these priorities are
vetted by senior civilian DOD officials with departmentwide
responsibilities for assessing risk and allocating resources, the
Missile Defense Agency will be left to act on the commands' priorities
without the benefit of a DOD-wide perspective on the best approach to
counter the short-, medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range
missile threats facing the United States.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve DOD's process for identifying and addressing combatant
command priorities for ballistic missile defense capabilities, we
recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command, in conjunction with the Director, Missile Defense Agency, to
take the following two actions:
1. complete and publish the implementation guidance needed to clearly
define each organization's roles and responsibilities for identifying,
prioritizing, and addressing combatant command capability needs for
ballistic missile defenses, and review and update such guidance, as
needed, as DOD's process continues to evolve; and:
2. establish effective methodologies for identifying, prioritizing, and
addressing combatant command capability needs for ballistic missile
defenses.
Further, to provide the Missile Defense Agency with feedback as to how
well it has addressed the combatant commands' priorities in preparing
future funding plans, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in conjunction with the other
combatant commands, to prepare an assessment of the Missile Defense
Agency's funding plans compared to the commands' priorities, and
provide the assessment to the Director, Missile Defense Agency.
To provide a DOD-wide perspective on the combatant commands'
priorities, given their views on the range of ballistic missile threats
facing the United States, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct
the Missile Defense Executive Board to review each Prioritized
Capabilities List upon its release, including the individual commands'
priorities, and recommend to the Deputy Secretary of Defense an overall
DOD-wide list of prioritized capabilities. We further recommend the
Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide
guidance to the Director, Missile Defense Agency, on program priorities
taking into account the Missile Defense Executive Board's
recommendation.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with three
recommendations and partially agreed with two recommendations. DOD also
provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. DOD's
comments are reprinted in appendix III.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command and the
Missile Defense Agency complete and publish implementation guidance
needed to clearly define each organization's roles and responsibilities
for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing combatant command
capability needs for ballistic missile defenses. In its comments, DOD
stated that the department has initiated the implementing guidance to
define organizational roles and responsibilities. Specifically, DOD
commented that on June 25, 2008, U.S. Strategic Command approved an
instruction, titled Missile Defense Warfighter Involvement Process,
that defines and establishes the process and outlines the command's
roles and responsibilities to influence the development, coordination,
administration, and advocacy of global missile defense capabilities. We
believe this is a positive step. However, the issued instruction
indicates that the command anticipates the need for future revisions to
the instruction as the process continues to evolve and as DOD
undertakes efforts to integrate air and missile defenses across the
department. Since U.S. Strategic Command issued the instruction when
our draft report was with DOD for comment, we modified the
recommendation to direct U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense
Agency to regularly review and update their guidance as the process
evolves. DOD also commented that the Missile Defense Agency is defining
its own guidance for its organizational roles and responsibilities to
complement U.S. Strategic Command's guidance; however, DOD's comments
did not provide us with a schedule or time frame for the completion of
this effort. Until the Missile Defense Agency's guidance is completed,
the combatant commands will continue to lack transparency into the
Missile Defense Agency's process for addressing their needs and the
means to hold the agency accountable.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command and
the Missile Defense Agency establish effective methodologies for
identifying, prioritizing, and addressing the combatant commands'
capability needs for ballistic missile defenses. In its comments, DOD
stated that U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency are
implementing effective methodologies for identifying, prioritizing, and
addressing combatant command capability needs. Yet DOD also
acknowledged that these methodologies continue to be refined. Our
report recognizes that U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense
Agency are taking steps to improve the methodologies used in the
Warfighter Involvement Process; however, we identified limitations with
the current methodologies used to identify and prioritize the combatant
commands' capability needs. For example, we found that the Prioritized
Capabilities List did not fully identify some of the combatant
commands' specific needs. We also determined that the combatant
commands did not consistently apply criteria for prioritizing their
capability needs, and also did not clearly distinguish among their
priorities. As U.S. Strategic Command works to refine the methodologies
for identifying and prioritizing capabilities, it will need to overcome
these challenges.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command, in
conjunction with the other combatant commands, prepare an assessment of
the Missile Defense Agency's funding plans compared to the commands'
priorities and provide feedback to the Missile Defense Agency. In its
comments, DOD stated that U.S. Strategic Command is preparing a
Capabilities Assessment Report that examines the effectiveness and
programmatic aspects of the ballistic missile defense system compared
to the commands' priorities, which it will present to the Missile
Defense Agency in the fall of 2008. DOD also commented that U.S.
Strategic Command has prepared a "Quick Look" of this report, which it
provided to the Missile Defense Agency in June 2008. We encourage U.S.
Strategic Command to provide the final assessment to the Missile
Defense Agency as soon as possible so that the agency can consider the
results of the assessment in developing its future funding plans.
DOD partially agreed with both of our recommendations intended to
provide the Missile Defense Agency with a DOD-wide perspective on the
combatant commands' priorities. First, DOD partially agreed with our
recommendation to direct the Missile Defense Executive Board to review
each Prioritized Capabilities List upon its release, including the
individual commands' priorities, and recommend to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense an overall DOD-wide list of prioritized capabilities.
Second, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to direct the
Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide guidance to the Missile Defense
Agency on program priorities based on the Missile Defense Executive
Board's recommendation. However, it is not clear how DOD intends to
implement these recommendations. In its comments, DOD stated that the
Missile Defense Executive Board reviews the Prioritized Capability List
prepared by U.S. Strategic Command, but added that a DOD-wide list of
prioritized capabilities is not needed because the U.S. Strategic
Command-prepared list provides the agency with a single list of
prioritized needs. DOD also commented that it disagreed with the need
for the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide additional guidance to
the Missile Defense Agency. We believe that additional actions to
implement both recommendations are needed. First, officials from U.S.
Strategic Command and other combatant commands told us during our
review that the Warfighter Involvement Process was not well structured
to consider the combatant commands' individual mission responsibilities
when preparing a consolidated list of the commands' priorities. As a
result, U.S. Strategic Command's list could obscure the importance of a
key ballistic missile defense capability if that capability was ranked
high by only one of the combatant commands. Comprised of senior-level
representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, the military departments, and
other organizations, the Missile Defense Executive Board could provide
a broader, defensewide perspective factoring in the cost, risk, and
benefits of supporting one command's priorities over another's. Absent
a DOD-wide list of prioritized capabilities, the Missile Defense Agency
will continue to lack the benefit of a departmentwide perspective on
which of the combatant commands' priorities are the most significant.
Additionally, we continue to believe that the Deputy Secretary of
Defense should provide the Missile Defense Agency with guidance on
program priorities based on a DOD-wide list of prioritized
capabilities. In its comments, DOD stated that the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as chairman of the
Missile Defense Executive Board, has established a process for issuing
Acquisition Decision Memorandums to the Director, Missile Defense
Agency. Although the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics is responsible for overseeing the Missile
Defense Agency, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been responsible
for providing policy, planning, and programming guidance to the Missile
Defense Agency since the agency's establishment in 2002. Further, as
discussed in our report, the Missile Defense Executive Board is
responsible for making recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense on the Missile Defense Agency's comprehensive acquisition
strategy.
We are sending electronic copies of this report to interested
congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Missile Defense Agency; and the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. We will also make electronic copies
available to others on request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at 404-679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
During this review, we focused on assessing the Department of Defense's
(DOD) process for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing overall
combatant command priorities in developing ballistic missile defense
capabilities. To do so, we obtained and reviewed key documentation from
U.S. Strategic Command relevant to how the combatant commands identify
and prioritize their ballistic missile defense capability needs. The
U.S. Strategic Command documentation that we obtained included the July
4, 2007, October 31, 2007, and February 29, 2008, versions of a draft
U.S. Strategic Command instruction establishing the Warfighter
Involvement Process, U.S. Strategic Command's November 2003 Strategic
Concept for Global Ballistic Missile Defense, and the command's
November 2007 Report to Congress on USSTRATCOM Warfighter Involvement
Process. We also obtained and reviewed U.S. Strategic Command briefings
on the evolution of the Warfighter Involvement Process, current
features of the process, and efforts to improve the process.
Additionally, we obtained and reviewed the 2006 and 2007 Prioritized
Capabilities Lists to understand the commands' prioritized capability
needs and U.S. Strategic Command's approach for preparing these lists.
To further our knowledge, we obtained and reviewed minutes of
Warfighter Involvement Process management and focus group meetings,
including the minutes of the meeting where the 2007 Prioritized
Capabilities List was approved before it was sent to the Missile
Defense Agency. In addition to U.S. Strategic Command documentation, we
also obtained written comments provided by U.S. Central Command, U.S.
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command to
U.S. Strategic Command on the draft Warfighter Involvement Process
instruction. We also obtained combatant command comments provided to
U.S. Strategic Command to help develop the Prioritized Capabilities
Lists. We also reviewed testimonies from the commanders of U.S. Central
Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific
Command, and U.S. Strategic Command to help us better understand each
command's specific ballistic missile defense capability needs. In order
to gain the Missile Defense Agency's perspective on how it is
addressing combatant command priorities, we reviewed Missile Defense
Agency guidance, plans, directives, briefings, and other documentation
that identifies key steps, stakeholders, and factors that the Missile
Defense Agency considers during its process for planning, designing,
developing, and fielding ballistic missile defense capabilities. For
example, we reviewed the Missile Defense Agency's Integrated Program
Policy, dated July 2005, Ballistic Missile Defense Integrated Program
Policy Implementation Guide, dated June 2005, and System Engineering
Plan, dated July 2006, in order to understand the extent to which the
agency has documented how it addresses combatant command priorities in
its decision making. We also reviewed the Missile Defense Agency's 2006
Achievable Capabilities List, which was its response to the 2006
Prioritized Capabilities List, and examined Missile Defense Agency
briefings, budget documents, and testimonies by the Director, Missile
Defense Agency. We also obtained and reviewed briefings describing a
2007 Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command study of how to
make the Warfighter Involvement Process more effective, and reviewed
the 2007 Achievable Capabilities List to identify changes in the
Missile Defense Agency's approach for addressing combatant command
priorities. Additionally, we obtained and reviewed drafts of the
agency's directive and instruction for implementing the Warfighter
Involvement Process. We also reviewed public law, presidential
guidance, and DOD directives, memorandums, briefings, and other
documentation that establishes DOD's overall approach to developing
missile defense capabilities. Such documentation included chapters 5
and 6 of Title 10 of the United States Code; National Security
Presidential Directive 23 dated December 16, 2002; the Unified Command
Plan dated May 2006; DOD Directive 5134.9, Subject: Missile Defense
Agency, dated October 9, 2004; and other Secretary of Defense guidance
outlining the Missile Defense Agency's roles and responsibilities. We
also obtained and reviewed the Missile Defense Executive Board's
charter, as well as agendas and minutes from board meetings held in
2007.
In conducting our work, we contacted officials at the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Missile Defense Agency, U.S.
Strategic Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command,
U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the military services, and
other organizations. Table 2 provides information on the organizations
and offices contacted during our review. We conducted this performance
audit from August 2007 to May 2008 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Table 2: Organizations and Offices Contacted during Our Review:
Department of Defense:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense;
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics;
- Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation;
* Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff Directorate;
- Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment-Joint Theater Air and
Missile Defense Office;
* Office of the Department of Defense Inspector General.
U.S. Strategic Command:
* Capabilities and Resource Integration Directorate;
* U.S. Strategic Command Functional and Service Components;
- Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense;
- U.S. Air Force Space Command;
- U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.
Missile Defense Agency:
* Office of the Executive Director;
* Office of the Deputy for Engineering;
* Office of the Deputy for Integration and Fielding;
* Office of the Deputy for Acquisition Management.
Other Combatant Commands:
* U.S. Central Command;
* U.S. Joint Forces Command;
* U.S. Northern Command;
* U.S. Pacific Command.
Military Services:
* Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Strategic Plans and
Policy Division, Missile Defense;
* Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8,
Force Development Directorate, Air and Missile Defense and Space
Division;
* Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Warfare Division,
Theater Air and Missile Defense Branch.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: The 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List:
The Prioritized Capabilities List provided to the Missile Defense
Agency in 2007 includes four categories of desired capabilities:
weapons, sensors, battle management, and cross-functional capabilities.
Each of the desired capabilities on the list is identified by a title
and short description, and includes the following information:
* listing of the overall priority ranking of the capability, and
whether the capability was ranked as one of the five highest priorities
by one or more of the combatant commands;
* rationale for the capability;
* mission effect if the capability is not satisfied;
* summary of the applicable phases of flight, threats, and regions of
operations; and:
* key attributes, measures, and criteria for satisfying the capability.
Additionally, the classified U.S. Strategic Command report that conveys
the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List to the Missile Defense Agency
included a table that lists the combatant commands' consolidated
capability needs in order from highest to lowest priority. This table
also identifies the scores that each of the participating combatant
commands assigned to these capabilities.
In preparing the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List, U.S. Strategic
Command updated the 26 capabilities that had been identified and
provided to the Missile Defense Agency in the first list in 2006. These
updates and revisions were intended to eliminate redundancies and more
clearly communicate the commands' intent. For example, the 2007
Prioritized Capabilities List included a 27th capability capturing the
need for effective communication standards, which previously had been
embedded into multiple capabilities on the 2006 list. Short
descriptions of the capabilities on the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities
List are provided in table 3.
Table 3: Capabilities on the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List:
I. Weapons Capabilities:
Employ Mobile Active Defense Assets in Response to Emergent Threats[A]:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to employ mobile
active defense assets that are able to defeat ballistic missile threats
of all ranges in response to emergent threats.
Defend the Homeland Against Ballistic Missiles Other Than
Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to defend the homeland
against ballistic missile threats other than intercontinental-range
ballistic missiles.
Defeat Ballistic Missiles in the Terminal Phase (Sea-Based):
Provide the joint warfighter with a sea-based capability to defeat
ballistic missile threats in the terminal phase from appropriate named
area of interest.
Defeat Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to simultaneously
defeat intercontinental ballistic missile threats from different
regions, e.g., Northeast Asia and the Middle East.
Defeat Ballistic Missiles in the Boost Phase:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to defeat in the boost
phase all ballistic missile threats launched from any named area of
interest.
Defeat Ballistic Missiles in the Terminal Phase:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to defeat in the
terminal phase all ballistic missiles that threaten the designated
defended area.
II. Sensor Capabilities:
Determine Accurate Launch and Impact Points[B]:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to predict accurate
launch and impact points of threat objects early in the battlespace.
Discriminate Warhead/Reentry Vehicles[C]:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to discriminate
warheads and reentry vehicles during midcourse and terminal phases of
flight.
Classify Threat Missiles:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to classify each
threat missile.
Recall Multi-Mission Sensors to the Missile Defense Mission:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to rapidly recall all
missile defense capable multi-mission sensors to the missile defense
mission.
Deploy and Integrate Mobile Sensors in Response to Emergent Threats[D]:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to deploy and
integrate mobile sensors with existing systems in response to emergent
threats.
Assess Engagement Success:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to assess engagement
success in all phases of flight (boost, midcourse, and terminal)
against all types of missiles.
Detect, Track, and Correlate Threat Objects[E]:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to detect and track
threat objects and correlate their trajectories from named areas of
interest in order to successfully perform engagement operations.
Use Missile Defense Sensors to Support Other Mission Areas:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to use missile defense
sensors to support other mission areas.
Track and Report Predicted Impact Points of Debris:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to track and report
projected impact points of all meaningful debris from an intercept,
including partial or unsuccessful intercept.
III. Battle Management Capabilities:
Conform to Communication Management Infrastructure Requirements:
Provide the joint warfighter with ballistic missile defense
communication systems, whose elements conform to current warfighter
communication management infrastructure requirements, both theater and
strategic.
Conduct Integrated Planning:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to conduct integrated
planning.
Manage Multiple Engagements:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to manage multiple
engagements simultaneously within their theater/area of responsibility.
Interoperate with DOD Command, Control, Communications, and Computer
Systems and Infrastructure:
Provide the joint warfighter with a missile defense system that
interoperates with fielded DOD command, control, communications, and
computer systems and an infrastructure that supports communications and
data transfer.
IV. Cross-Functional Capabilities:
Conduct Training:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to conduct
distributed, high fidelity, and end-to-end training for missile defense
operations that incorporates missile warning activity.
Provide Single Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense Picture[F]:
Provide the joint warfighter with a single integrated ballistic missile
defense picture.
Share Releasable Missile Defense System Data with Allies:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability for allies to share
releasable missile defense system data. Inherent in this capability is
the ability to receive data from our allies as well.
Avoid Hazards and Safeguard Against Inadvertent Firing of Weapons and
Misidentification of Space Launches:
Provide the joint warfighter with a missile defense system that avoids
unnecessary hazards to operators and non-combatants and safeguards
against inadvertent firing of weapons and misidentification of space
launches.
Sustain Operations:
Provide the joint warfighter with the capability to sustain operations
while simultaneously supporting concurrent research, development, test,
and evaluation; maintenance; training; and system upgrade activities
without degrading protection capability.
Provide System Modeling Tools:
Provide the joint warfighter with system modeling tools that reflect
the most accurate and realistic estimates of system performance to
support capability analysis; training; tactics, techniques, and
procedure development; and contingency and crisis action planning.
Maintain Operational Availability:
Provide the joint warfighter with a missile defense system that
maintains operational availability through all natural and induced
environments.
Ensure Missile Defense Communications[G]:
Provide the joint warfighter with missile defense system communications
that enable desired information exchange requirements within
operational timelines.
Source: U.S. Strategic Command.
[A] Originally titled "Employ Mobile Active Defense"; re-written to
more clearly identify the need for mobile assets that can be deployed
where needed.
[B] Originally titled "Predict Accurate Impact Points"; rewritten to
more fully capture the intent of the capability.
[C] Originally titled "Discriminate Threat Objects"; rewritten to use
more precise terminology.
[D] Originally titled "Deploy and Integrate Sensors"; rewritten to more
clearly identify the need for mobile assets that can be deployed where
needed.
[E] Originally titled "Detect, Track, and Classify Threat
Trajectories"; rewritten to eliminate redundancy with another
capability statement ("Classify Missile Threats") and to more clearly
identify the need for track correlation.
[F] Originally titled "Provide a Single Integrated Ballistic Missile
Defense Picture"; rewritten to reflect preferred terminology.
[G] Does not identify a new capability, but reduces redundancy from the
2006 list by capturing communications standards within a single
capability statement.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
July 23, 2008:
Mr. John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-08-740, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to
Improve Process for Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command
Priorities," dated June 18, 2008 (GAO Code 351081).
The DoD concurs with three and partially concurs with two of the five
draft report recommendations. The rationales for our positions are
included in the enclosure.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point
of contact for this effort is Mr. Greg Hulcher, (703) 695-2680,
greg.hulcher@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated June 18, 2008:
GAO-08-740 (GAO CODE 351081):
"Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed To Improve Process For
Identifying And Addressing Combatant Command Priorities"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in conjunction with the
Director, Missile Defense Agency, to complete and publish the
implementation guidance needed to clearly define each organization's
roles and responsibilities for identifying, prioritizing, and
addressing combatant command capability needs for ballistic missile
defenses.
DOD Response: Concur. Department of Defense has initiated the
implementing guidance to define the organizational roles and
responsibilities for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing
combatant command capability needs for ballistic missile defenses. As
recommended, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) established
implementation guidance by approving United States Strategic Command
Instruction (SI) 538-3, "Missile Defense Warfighter Involvement Process
(WIP)," on June 25, 2008. This implementing instruction defines and
establishes the missile defense WIP and outlines USSTRATCOM's roles and
responsibilities to influence the development, coordination,
administration, and advocacy of global missile defense capabilities. To
complement the USSTRATCOM guidance, the Missile Defense Agency is in
the process of defining guidance for their organizational roles and
responsibilities.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in conjunction with the
Director, Missile Defense Agency, to establish effective methodologies
for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing combatant command
capability needs for ballistic missile defenses.
DOD Response: Concur. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) and the Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) are
implementing effective methodologies for identifying, prioritizing, and
addressing combatant command capability needs for ballistic missile
defenses under the Ballistic Missile Defense System structure. The
USSTRATCOM, Combatant Commands, Services and MDA continue to refine the
methodology for identifying and prioritizing combatant command
capability needs for ballistic missile defenses. The methodology
refinements will be used in development of the third list, Prioritized
Capabilities List 2009. The two preceding efforts provided valuable
information to MDA to meet warfighter needs. USSTRATCOM expects
additional methodology refinement to most effectively identify,
prioritize, and address Combatant Command capability needs. Prior
iterations have led to an increasingly sophisticated product to impact
MDA decisions. However, this does not invalidate prior activity. The
Department's goal remains a clear portrayal of Combatant Commands'
needs.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in conjunction with the
other Combatant Commands, to prepare an assessment of the Missile
Defense Agency's funding plans compared to the commands' priorities,
and provide the assessment to the Director, Missile Defense Agency.
DOD Response: Concur. U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), as
operational proponent and advocate for the Combatant Commands, is
preparing a Capabilities Assessment Report of the Ballistic Missile
Defense System, in accordance with Department of Defense Instruction
5134.9. The report examines the effectiveness and programmatic aspects
of the ballistic missile defense system compared to the commands'
priorities, examines the current capability acquisition funding, and
identifies capability areas requiring greater emphasis. Although a
prioritized list implicitly offers lower ranked items as sources of
funding, no capability area may be totally overlooked if advances are
to be made. Each item contributes to provision of ballistic missile
defense capability to the warfighter. A Quick Look of this report was
provided to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in June of 2008.
USSTRATCOM will present the final assessment to the Director, MDA in
the fall of 2008.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Missile Defense Executive Board to review each Prioritized
Capabilities List upon its release, including the individual commands'
priorities, and recommend to the Deputy Secretary of Defense an overall
DoD-wide list of prioritized capabilities.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Missile Defense Executive Board
reviews the Prioritized Capability List produced by U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) as operational proponent and advocate for the
Combatant Commands. Under Department of Defense Instruction 5134.9,
"Missile Defense Agency" and United States Strategic Command
Instruction 538-3 "Missile Defense Warfighter Involvement Process",
USSTRATCOM develops, with Combatant Command participation, the
Prioritized Capabilities List only for missile defense. DoD disagrees
with the need for an overall DoD-wide list of prioritized capabilities
as the USSTRATCOM Prioritized Capabilities List provides the Missile
Defense Agency with a single prioritized list of warfighter needs.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide guidance to the
Director, Missile Defense Agency, on program priorities taking into
account the Missile Defense Executive Board's recommendation.
DOD Response: Partially concur. Department of Defense (DoD) disagrees
with the need for additional guidance from Deputy Secretary of Defense.
DoD has adequate guidance for the Missile Defense Executive Board's
recommendations to be considered by the Director, Missile Defense
Agency (MDA). Under DoD Instruction 5134.9, the Director, MDA, reports
to the Under Secretary for Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics). in addition, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum,
"Missile Defense Executive Board", March 15, 2007, appointed the Under
Secretary as Chair, Missile Defense Executive Board, with the Director
as Executive Secretary. As Chair, Missile Defense Executive Board, the
Under Secretary has recently established the process of issuing
Acquisition Decision Memorandums to the Director regarding issues of
importance to the Missile Defense Executive Board.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John H. Pendleton, 404-679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant
Director; Grace A. Coleman; Nicolaas C. Cornelisse; Ronald La Due Lake;
Jennifer E. Neer; Kevin L. O'Neill, Analyst in Charge; and Karen D.
Thornton made significant contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] A missile attack involves four phases from launch to impact: (1)
the boost phase is the period immediately after launch when the
missile's booster stages are still thrusting and typically lasts 3-5
minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles; (2) the ascent phase
is when the booster stages have stopped thrusting and dropped away
leaving a warhead and possible decoys; (3) the midcourse phase, lasting
for about 20 minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles, begins
after the missile has stopped accelerating and the warhead travels
through space; and (4) the terminal phase begins when the warhead
reenters the atmosphere and lasts approximately a minute or less.
[2] A previous unified command, also called U.S. Strategic Command, had
been established in 1992 and had primary responsibility for strategic
nuclear forces. The new U.S. Strategic Command was formed from
combining the nuclear deterrence mission of the previous command and
the space and computer network operations missions of the also
disestablished U.S. Space Command.
[3] We have issued a report on U.S. Strategic Command's efforts to
establish and implement several missions that before 2003 had not
previously been assigned to a combatant command. These missions include
integrated missile defense; global strike; global command and control;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; DOD information
operations; and combating weapons of mass destruction. See GAO,
Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic
Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many Missions and New
Organization, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-847]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2006).
[4] In keeping with the intended scope of the Warfighter Involvement
Process, this report uses the term "warfighter" to refer to both the
combatant commands and the military services unless otherwise
indicated.
[5] Our prior work has shown that the flexibility given by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to the Missile Defense Agency has diluted
transparency into the agency's acquisition processes, making it
difficult to conduct oversight and hold the agency accountable. See
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense,
but Program Is Short of Meeting Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-448] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
14, 2008).
[6] The Senior Executive Council was created in July 2001 to advise the
Secretary of Defense in the application of sound business practices in
the military departments, DOD agencies, and other DOD organizations.
[7] This report complements other ongoing work, also at your request,
to review DOD's plans for preparing to operate ballistic missile
defense elements and support operations in the long term, including
plans to transition these elements from the Missile Defense Agency to
the services. We plan to issue a report on this other ongoing work
later in 2008.
[8] U.S. Strategic Command issued its instruction SI 538-3, titled
Missile Defense Warfighter Involvement Process, on June 25, 2008, after
our draft report had been submitted to DOD for comment.
[9] DOD defines the U.S. homeland to include the continental United
States, Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. possessions and territories, and
surrounding territorial waters and airspace.
[10] Title 10 of the United States Code defines a unified combatant
command as a military command which has broad, continuing missions and
which is composed of forces from two or more military departments.
[11] In 2007 the President ordered the creation of U.S. Africa Command
as a new geographic combatant command, but the Unified Command Plan has
not yet been updated to include the new command.
[12] GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational
Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-473] (Washington,
D.C.: May 31, 2006); Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve
Information for Supporting Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent
Phase Elements, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
430] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2007).
[13] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-
409] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004); Defense Acquisitions: Status of
Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-243] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
31, 2005); Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial
Capability but Falls Short of Original Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-327] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
15, 2006); Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy
Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-387] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
15, 2007); and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-
448].
[14] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Sept.
30, 2001).
[15] Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Acquisition:
Capabilities Definition Process at the Missile Defense Agency, D-2006-
071 (Arlington, Va., April 2006).
[16] A combatant commander's strategic concept contains the combatant
commander's decision and planning guidance for accomplishing tasks and
missions assigned to the combatant command, and provides the basis for
more detailed plans to carry out these responsibilities.
[17] A functional component command is one of the organizations that
constitute a joint force, is normally comprised of forces from more
than one military service, and may be established across the range of
military operations to perform particular operational missions.
[18] U.S. Joint Forces Command is a unified combatant command without
specific geographic responsibilities. Its mission areas include joint
concept development and experimentation, joint training, joint
capabilities development, and joint force provider. Among its strategic
goals, U.S. Joint Forces Command seeks to develop robust command and
control capabilities that ensure decision makers receive information
when they need it, allowing them to act faster than their adversaries.
[19] Additionally, according to a Navy official, the Navy has allocated
about $35 million to conduct an exercise and to begin modifying
Standard Missile-2 interceptors in cooperation with the Missile Defense
Agency to develop near-term sea-based terminal defenses.
[20] Beginning in fiscal year 2008, the agency combined its concurrent
testing, training, and operations effort with a separate effort to
develop a system of live, virtual, and constructive training
environments to support both warfighter and developer needs. This
separate effort had been appropriated about $25 million in fiscal year
2007. As reflected in the agency's 2009 budget submission, the agency
allocated approximately $41.4 million to these combined activities in
fiscal year 2008, and proposed to allocate $37.7 million in fiscal year
2009.
[21] Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123, Management's
Responsibility for Internal Control (Washington, D.C., December 2004).
[22] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[23] Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, D-2006-071.
[24] The Integrated Program Policy, last updated in July 2005, provides
top-level direction from the Director, Missile Defense Agency, that
identifies and emphasizes the key decisions that the agency must make
as it acquires ballistic missile defense capabilities, and the products
that the agency must produce to assure these decisions are based on
complete and timely information. The Missile Defense Agency's Systems
Engineering Plan, last updated in June 2006, complements the Integrated
Program Policy by providing a top-level description of the agency's
capabilities-based system engineering process, and the technical
management approach for developing and integrating different missile
defense capabilities into a global Ballistic Missile Defense System.
[25] The 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List sought to identify and
prioritize capabilities needed in 2015.
[26] U.S. Pacific Command's geographic area of responsibility includes
Northeast, South, and Southeast Asia, as well as Oceania.
[27] U.S. Central Command's geographic area of responsibility includes
the Middle East, eastern Africa, and several of the former Soviet
republics.
[28] The traditional DOD requirements development process is the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System. The purpose of this
system is to support the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint
Requirement Oversight Council in advising the Secretary of Defense in
identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability
needs. Capabilities represent warfighting needs that are studied as
part of the system's capabilities-based assessment process. The process
identifies the operational tasks, conditions, and standards needed to
achieve military objectives (Functional Area Analysis); assesses the
ability of current and planned systems to deliver the capabilities and
tasks identified in the Functional Area Analysis in order to produce a
list of capability gaps and identify redundancies (Functional Needs
Analysis); and identifies joint approaches to fill the identified
capability gaps (Functional Solution Analysis).
[29] When the first Prioritized Capabilities List was provided to the
Missile Defense Agency in 2006, it defined near-term needs as those
that were required immediately, mid-term needs as those required in the
fiscal year 2008-2010 time frame, and far-term needs as those required
in fiscal year 2012 or beyond.
[30] According to the February 29, 2008, draft U.S. Strategic Command
instruction on the Warfighter Involvement Process, the Achievable
Capabilities List is an appraisal of the commands' capability needs
against the Missile Defense Agency's planned investments where the
Missile Defense Agency describes the achievable time frames for
delivering each of the warfighters' desired capabilities.
[31] When the Missile Defense Support Group was chartered in 2002, it
was to provide constructive advice to the Director, Missile Defense
Agency. However, the Director was not required to follow the advice of
the group. According to a DOD official, although the support group met
many times initially, it did not meet after June 2005. This led, in
2007, to the formation of the Missile Defense Executive Board. See
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-448], p. 36.
[End of section]
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