Defense Space Activities
DOD Needs to Further Clarify the Operationally Responsive Space Concept and Plan to Integrate and Support Future Satellites Gao ID: GAO-08-831 July 11, 2008The Department of Defense's (DOD) operational dependence on space has placed new and increasing demands on current space systems to meet commanders' needs. DOD's Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept is designed to more rapidly satisfy commanders' needs for information and intelligence during ongoing operations. Given the potential for ORS to change how DOD acquires and fields space capabilities to support the warfighter, this report discusses to what extent DOD (1) is developing ORS to support warfighter requirements and (2) has a plan that integrates ORS into existing DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture. GAO reviewed and analyzed ORS planning documents, the ORS concept of operations, and processes for meeting warfighter needs and also interviewed defense and intelligence community officials who are involved with the ORS concept.
DOD is making some progress in developing the ORS concept, but whether it will meet warfighter requirements is unclear, principally because the concept is in the early stages of development and not commonly understood by all members of the warfighter and national security space communities. Our prior work examining successful organizational transformations shows the need to communicate to stakeholders often and early and to clearly define specific objectives. Since the Joint ORS Office was established in May 2007, it has developed a process for converting warfighter needs into formal requirements and identifying potential ORS solutions. Moreover, DOD issued the ORS Implementation Plan in April 2008 and is also developing new ORS guidance documents. However, GAO found disparity in stakeholder understanding of the ORS concept within the warfighter and national security space communities. This disparity exists because DOD has not clearly defined key elements of the ORS concept and has not effectively communicated the concept with key stakeholders. For example, initial ORS planning documents are broad and lack the specificity needed to guide the ORS concept, according to some members of the warfighter and national security space communities. Moreover, officials from the intelligence community were concerned about DOD's lack of consultation and communication with them regarding the ORS concept. Without having a well-defined and commonly understood concept, DOD's ability to fully meet warfighter needs may be hampered. DOD has acknowledged the need to integrate ORS into existing DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture, but it has not fully addressed how it will achieve this integration. The 1999 DOD Space Policy states that an integrated national security space architecture that addresses defense and intelligence missions shall be developed to the maximum extent feasible in order to minimize unnecessary duplication of missions. DOD plans to begin integrating any new ORS processes or systems that are developed for ORS sometime between 2010 and 2015. However, integrating national security space systems can be a complex activity, involving many entities within DOD and the intelligence community. GAO previously reported that DOD's existing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) processes activities already face significant integration challenges, and adding new ORS systems into the existing ISR enterprise will increase the challenges of an already complex and challenging environment. Given the concept's immaturity, members of the national security space community have raised concerns about how the ORS concept will be integrated with existing DOD and intelligence processes and architecture, and voiced concerns about being burdened by an additional new requirements process specific to ORS. Nonetheless, as GAO described earlier, DOD is developing a process unique to ORS for submitting ORS warfighter requirements. The complexity of the national security space environment calls for DOD to begin to adequately plan integration of the ORS concept now to help ensure that DOD avoids the risk of duplicative efforts and wasted resources.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-831, Defense Space Activities: DOD Needs to Further Clarify the Operationally Responsive Space Concept and Plan to Integrate and Support Future Satellites
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Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2008:
Defense Space Activities:
DOD Needs to Further Clarify the Operationally Responsive Space Concept
and Plan to Integrate and Support Future Satellites:
GAO-08-831:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-831, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) operational dependence on space has
placed new and increasing demands on current space systems to meet
commanders‘ needs. DOD‘s Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept
is designed to more rapidly satisfy commanders‘ needs for information
and intelligence during ongoing operations. Given the potential for ORS
to change how DOD acquires and fields space capabilities to support the
warfighter, this report discusses to what extent DOD (1) is developing
ORS to support warfighter requirements and (2) has a plan that
integrates ORS into existing DOD and intelligence community processes
and architecture. GAO reviewed and analyzed ORS planning documents, the
ORS concept of operations, and processes for meeting warfighter needs
and also interviewed defense and intelligence community officials who
are involved with the ORS concept.
What GAO Found:
DOD is making some progress in developing the ORS concept, but whether
it will meet warfighter requirements is unclear, principally because
the concept is in the early stages of development and not commonly
understood by all members of the warfighter and national security space
communities. Our prior work examining successful organizational
transformations shows the need to communicate to stakeholders often and
early and to clearly define specific objectives. Since the Joint ORS
Office was established in May 2007, it has developed a process for
converting warfighter needs into formal requirements and identifying
potential ORS solutions. Moreover, DOD issued the ORS Implementation
Plan in April 2008 and is also developing new ORS guidance documents.
However, GAO found disparity in stakeholder understanding of the ORS
concept within the warfighter and national security space communities.
This disparity exists because DOD has not clearly defined key elements
of the ORS concept and has not effectively communicated the concept
with key stakeholders. For example, initial ORS planning documents are
broad and lack the specificity needed to guide the ORS concept,
according to some members of the warfighter and national security space
communities. Moreover, officials from the intelligence community were
concerned about DOD‘s lack of consultation and communication with them
regarding the ORS concept. Without having a well-defined and commonly
understood concept, DOD‘s ability to fully meet warfighter needs may be
hampered.
DOD has acknowledged the need to integrate ORS into existing DOD and
intelligence community processes and architecture, but it has not fully
addressed how it will achieve this integration. The 1999 DOD Space
Policy states that an integrated national security space architecture
that addresses defense and intelligence missions shall be developed to
the maximum extent feasible in order to minimize unnecessary
duplication of missions. DOD plans to begin integrating any new ORS
processes or systems that are developed for ORS sometime between 2010
and 2015. However, integrating national security space systems can be a
complex activity, involving many entities within DOD and the
intelligence community. GAO previously reported that DOD‘s existing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) processes
activities already face significant integration challenges, and adding
new ORS systems into the existing ISR enterprise will increase the
challenges of an already complex and challenging environment. Given the
concept‘s immaturity, members of the national security space community
have raised concerns about how the ORS concept will be integrated with
existing DOD and intelligence processes and architecture, and voiced
concerns about being burdened by an additional new requirements process
specific to ORS. Nonetheless, as GAO described earlier, DOD is
developing a process unique to ORS for submitting ORS warfighter
requirements. The complexity of the national security space environment
calls for DOD to begin to adequately plan integration of the ORS
concept now to help ensure that DOD avoids the risk of duplicative
efforts and wasted resources.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that (1) DOD define ORS key terms, how timely
satisfaction of a need is evaluated, and what Joint Force Commander
needs the ORS concept is trying to satisfy; (2) establish an ongoing
communications and outreach approach for ORS; and (3) identify the
steps necessary to ensure the integration of the ORS concept into
existing DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture. DOD
partially concurred with our recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-831]. For more
information, contact Davi M. D‘Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Is Making Progress in Developing the ORS Concept to Meet Warfighter
Needs, but the Concept Is in the Early Stages of Development and Not
Commonly Understood:
DOD Plans to Integrate ORS into Existing DOD and Intelligence Processes
and Architecture, but Has Not Identified How It Will Accomplish This:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: The ORS Tiered Approach to Enhance Responsiveness of Space
Capabilities:
Figure 2: The ORS Requirements and Solutions Generation Process:
Abbreviations:
DNI: Director of National Intelligence:
DOD: Department of Defense:
ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration Development System:
JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council:
ORS: Operationally Responsive Space:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 11, 2008:
The Honorable Bill Nelson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Sessions:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Department of Defense (DOD) depends on space assets to support a
wide range of military missions to include intelligence collection;
battlefield surveillance and management; global command, control, and
communications; and navigation assistance. This operational dependence
on space has placed new and increasing demands on current space systems
and organizations to meet Joint Force Commanders' needs. Moreover, the
potential for emerging threats could affect the United States' and
other countries' access to the free use of space.
The Director of Space Policy in the Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy explained that the 2004 U.S. Space Transportation
Policy calls for demonstrating an initial capability for operationally
responsive access to and use of space to support national security
requirements before 2010. This includes demonstrating the capacity to
respond to unexpected loss or degradation of selected capabilities or
providing timely availability of tailored or new capabilities or both.
In that regard, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Director of Central Intelligence, shall develop the requirements and
concept of operations for launch vehicles, infrastructure, and
spacecraft to provide operationally responsive access to and use of
space to support national security.[Footnote 1] DOD designated
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) as the concept to implement one of
the policy goals contained in the U.S. Space Transportation Policy. DOD
defines ORS as assured space power focused on timely satisfaction of
Joint Force Commanders' needs.
In the conference report accompanying the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress made a finding that
access to and use of space are critical to preserving and protecting
U.S. national security. The Act required the Secretary of Defense to
establish an Operationally Responsive Space Program Office within DOD
whose mission is (1) to contribute to the development of low-cost,
rapid-reaction payloads, buses[Footnote 2], spacelift, and launch-
control capabilities in order to fulfill joint military operational
requirements for on-demand space support and reconstitution and (2) to
coordinate and execute operationally responsive space efforts across
DOD with respect to planning, acquisition, and operations.[Footnote 3]
The Joint ORS Office, located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico,
was officially activated in May 2007.
In the warfighter and national security space communities,[Footnote 4]
U.S. Strategic Command is responsible for establishing overall
operational requirements while the services are responsible for meeting
those requirements. The Air Force is DOD's primary procurer and
operator of space systems. The Army controls a defense satellite
communications system and operates ground mobile terminals. The Navy
procures DOD narrowband satellite communications capability and
operates several space systems that contribute to surveillance,
meteorology, and warning. The National Reconnaissance Office designs,
procures, and operates space systems dedicated to intelligence
activities. The National Security Space Office facilitates the
integration and coordination of defense, intelligence, civil, and
commercial space activities. The Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is responsible for
various DOD initiatives to improve the department's acquisition
processes and management of investments. The Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence exercises policy and strategic
oversight over all defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and
security plans and programs, including intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR).
We reviewed aspects of the ORS concept in 2006 and determined that DOD
needed a departmentwide strategy for pursuing low cost, responsive
tactical capabilities--both satellite and launch--for the warfighter,
and to identify corresponding funding.[Footnote 5] Subsequently, the
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
directed DOD to submit a report that sets forth a plan for DOD
acquisition of ORS capabilities to support military users and military
operations. This plan was submitted to Congress in April 2007. We also
reviewed DOD's development of a higher-level strategy to guide the ORS
concept, as well as other future space efforts, and issued a report
regarding the need for the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
National Intelligence to identify and resolve any remaining differences
of opinion and issue a National Security Space Strategy.[Footnote 6]
Moreover, we recently reported on the status of DOD's progress to date
in implementing the ORS concept and assessing associated challenges.
[Footnote 7] In that report, we recommended that the Secretary of the
Air Force develop an investment plan to guide the Joint ORS Office as
it works to meet urgent needs and develops a technological foundation
to meet future needs. Given the potential for ORS to change how DOD
acquires and fields space capabilities to support the warfighter, for
this report, we determined to what extent DOD (1) is developing ORS to
support warfighter requirements, and (2) has a plan that integrates ORS
into existing DOD and intelligence community processes and
architecture.
To determine whether ORS is being developed to support warfighter needs
and the extent to which DOD has a plan that integrates ORS into
existing DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture, we
reviewed and analyzed ORS planning documents, the ORS concept of
operations and processes for meeting warfighter needs. We also
interviewed defense and intelligence community officials that are
involved with the ORS concept, including the Undersecretaries of
Defense for Policy and Intelligence, the National Security Space
Office, U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint ORS Office, the National
Reconnaissance Office, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the National Security Agency, and the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
We have conducted our performance audit from June 2007 through July
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. More
detailed information on our scope and methodology is provided in
appendix I.
Results in Brief:
DOD is making some progress in developing the ORS concept, but whether
it will meet warfighter requirements is unclear, principally because
the concept is in the early stages of development and not commonly
understood by all members of the warfighter and national security space
communities. Our prior work examining successful organizational
transformations shows the need to communicate to stakeholders often and
early and to clearly define specific objectives. Since the Joint ORS
Office was established in May 2007, it has developed a process for
converting warfighter needs into formal requirements and identifying
potential ORS solutions. Moreover, DOD issued the ORS Implementation
Plan in April 2008 and is also developing new ORS guidance documents.
However, we found disparity in stakeholder understanding of the ORS
concept within the warfighter and national security space communities.
This disparity exists because DOD has not clearly defined key elements
of the ORS concept and has not effectively communicated the concept
with key stakeholders. For example, initial ORS planning documents are
broad and lack the specificity needed to guide the ORS concept,
according to some members of the warfighter and national security space
communities. An official from one geographic combatant command said
that the Initial Concept of Operations for ORS was not well-defined and
officials from another combatant command told us that it was really
more of a vision statement. Moreover, officials from the intelligence
community were concerned about DOD's lack of consultation and
communication with them regarding the ORS concept. Without having a
well-defined and commonly understood concept, DOD's ability to fully
meet warfighter needs may be hampered. We are recommending that DOD
clearly define all aspects of the ORS concept and establish an ongoing
communications and outreach approach to communicate this definition and
to foster the understanding and acceptance of the ORS concept among
stakeholders.
DOD has acknowledged the need to integrate ORS into existing DOD and
intelligence community processes and architecture, but it has not fully
addressed how it will achieve this integration. The 1999 DOD Space
Policy states that an integrated national security space architecture
that addresses defense and intelligence missions shall be developed to
the maximum extent feasible in order to eliminate programs operating in
isolation of one another and minimize unnecessary duplication of
missions and functions and to achieve efficiencies. DOD plans to begin
integrating any new processes or systems that are developed for ORS
sometime between 2010 and 2015. However, integrating national security
space systems can be a complex activity, involving many entities within
DOD and the intelligence community and may take longer than
anticipated. Senior ORS officials told us that they cannot determine
exactly how to integrate the ORS concept at this time until they know
more about the nature of ORS capabilities that will be developed. Given
the concept's immaturity, members of the warfighter and national
security space communities have already raised concerns about how the
ORS concept will be integrated with existing DOD and intelligence
processes and architecture. However, at the same time, combatant
command officials have voiced concerns about being burdened by an
additional new requirements process specific to ORS. Nonetheless, as we
described earlier, DOD is developing a process unique to ORS for
submitting ORS warfighter requirements. In addition, the intelligence
community has expressed concern that the ORS concept has not been
integrated into existing ISR analysis processes. We recently reported
that DOD's ISR activities already face significant integration
challenges, and adding new ORS systems into the existing ISR enterprise
will increase the challenges of an already complex and challenging
environment. If DOD does not begin to adequately plan integration of
the ORS concept now, DOD may not meet its time frames for integrating
the ORS concept. Also, the concept could result in duplicative efforts
and wasted resources, or it could jeopardize the concept's ability to
fully meet warfighter needs. Therefore, we are recommending that the
DOD Executive Agent for Space, working with stakeholders such as the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, identify the steps
necessary to integrate ORS as integration issues arise and take steps
to ensure these and future integration issues are addressed in the long-
term planning of the Joint ORS Office.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II.
Background:
Challenges in global political affairs have placed increasing demands
on the way the United States uses space capabilities to achieve
national security objectives. DOD's space network is expected to play
an increasingly important role in military operations. Yet in each
major conflict over the past decade, senior military commanders have
reported shortfalls in tactical space capabilities, such as those
intended to provide communications and imagery data to the warfighter.
To provide short-term tactical capabilities as well as identify and
implement long-term solutions to developing low-cost satellites, DOD
initiated the ORS concept. The ORS concept aims to quickly deliver low-
cost, short-term tactical capabilities to address unmet needs of the
warfighter. Unlike traditional large satellite programs, the ORS
concept is intended to address only a small number of unmet tactical
needs--one or two--with each delivery of capabilities. It is not
designed to replace current satellite capabilities or major space
programs in development. Rather, the ORS concept has long-term goals of
reducing the cost of space development by fostering low cost launch
methods as well as common design and interface methods.
The ORS concept is based on three tiers, as shown in figure 1, that are
distinguished by the means to achieve the effects as well as the length
of time required to deliver ORS capabilities. According to DOD, the
timelines may not be possible at the outset, but will remain an
important goal as the ORS program matures. The Joint ORS Office plans
to focus on fielding Tier 2 and 3 space capabilities and when directed,
support the achievement of Tier 1 response times in coordination with
other members of the warfighter and national security space
communities. ORS solutions can be derived from ORS activities from more
than one tier.
Figure 1: The ORS Tiered Approach to Enhance Responsiveness of Space
Capabilities:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the ORS tiered approach to enhance
responsiveness of space capabilities, as follows:
Tier 1 (ORS activity):
* Rapidly exploit existing capabilities that may extend or expand their
original purpose;
* The developers and operators of National Security Space systems
already have the responsibility for fully exploiting the responsiveness
of their particular capabilities, thereby enabling Tier 1 capabilities;
* The Joint ORS Office will advocate, coordinate, and provide resources
for Tier 1 solutions when there are opportunities, especially in
partnerships with other elements of the National Security Space
community;
* Time frame: Minutes to hours.
The Joint ORS Office is currently working to develop the enablers for
future Tier 2 and Tier 3 solutions.
Tier 2 (Joint ORS office; ORS activity):
* Replenish, augment, reconstitute: with existing:
- technologies;
- capabilities;
* New or additional capabilities will be ’field-ready“;
* Time frame: Days to weeks.
Tier 3 (Joint ORS office; ORS activity):
* Replenish, augment, and reconstitute: with newly developed:
- technologies;
- capabilities;
* Achieving this timeframe cannot be accomplished unless the amount of
new development is very limited;
* Time frame: Months to 1 year.
Source: GAO analysis of the ORS tiered approach.
[End of figure]
The Joint ORS Office has intentionally been limited in size, and
therefore it will rely on existing space organizations for specific ORS
support and execution activities. Capabilities developed under the ORS
concept will be complementary to other fielded space capabilities. With
a focus on augmenting, reconstituting, and filling unanticipated gaps
in U.S. space capabilities, ORS aims to provide a critical capability
for the United States to maintain the asymmetric advantage it has
derived from its space-based capabilities over potential adversaries.
DOD Is Making Progress in Developing the ORS Concept to Meet Warfighter
Needs, but the Concept Is in the Early Stages of Development and Not
Commonly Understood:
DOD has taken several steps to develop the ORS concept to meet
warfighter needs; however, the concept is still in the early stages of
its development and not commonly understood by all members of the
warfighter and national security space communities. DOD has developed a
process for converting warfighter needs into formal requirements and
identifying potential ORS solutions. In April 2008, DOD issued an
Implementation Plan and continues to draft instructions and guidance to
further clarify ORS and how it can meet warfighter needs. In spite of
this progress, common understanding of the ORS concept is lacking
because DOD has not clearly defined key elements of the ORS concept and
has not effectively communicated the concept to key stakeholders.
DOD Has Made Some Progress in Developing the ORS Concept:
DOD has made some progress in developing the ORS concept. Since the
Joint ORS Office was established in May 2007, it has developed a
process that converts warfighter needs into formal requirements and
potential ORS solutions. DOD also issued an Implementation Plan in
April 2008 and continues to develop further ORS guidance.
Process to Identify ORS Solutions Has Been Developed:
DOD has established a process that converts a warfighter need into
formal requirements and identifies potential ORS solutions for those
requirements.[Footnote 8] As shown in figure 2, the ORS Requirements
and Solutions Generation process begins when a Joint Force Commander or
other user submits a capability need to U.S. Strategic Command.
Figure 2: The ORS Requirements and Solutions Generation Process:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the ORS requirements and solutions
generation process, as follows:
Joint Force Commander or other user need:
* U.S. Strategic Command validates the need;
* Requirements development phase [Led by Joint ORS Office (or
designee)]:
- Capability Review Team: Review the need and convert it into a set of
detailed requirements. Requirements are written into a Capabilities
Requirements Document, which is then reviewed by the user who submitted
the need.
* Solutions development phase: [Led by Joint ORS Office (or designee)]:
- Solutions Development Team: Requirements are reviewed by a team of
joint and interagency community members to develop potential solutions.
* Potential solutions (get user input);
* Review of solutions and concurrence by Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command [Note: This process should take 5–30 days to complete to this
point (depending on the complexity of the problem)];
* Solution(s) approved by the Executive Agent for Space;
* ORS Office Solution Execution (get user input);
* Capability delivered to the warfighter or other user.
Source: GAO analysis of the ORS Requirements and Solutions Generation
process.
[End of figure]
During the requirements development phase and the solutions development
phase, teams are assembled from across the warfighter and national
security space communities by the designated lead for the respective
phases. At this time, the Joint ORS Office has asked Air Force Space
Command[Footnote 9] to facilitate the requirements development phase
and has asked the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center[Footnote
10] to facilitate the solutions development phase. The solutions
development phase can begin before the formal Capability Requirements
Document is delivered. The Joint Force Commander or other user who
submitted the need has multiple opportunities to provide input
throughout the ORS Requirements and Solutions Generation process to
ensure that the solutions being considered will actually fit the need.
At the time of this report, one warfighter need has completed the ORS
Requirements and Solutions Generation process and two other warfighter
needs are in process. The need that has completed the process was a
request to augment global ultra-high-frequency communications. The
Joint ORS Office received the need from U.S. Strategic Command on
September 14, 2007, and the initial solutions were presented to the
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command on October 17, 2007. The second
need is a classified space situational awareness need. Possible
solutions for the second need have also been presented to the Commander
of U.S. Strategic Command and the DOD Executive Agent for Space for
approval. According to the Deputy Director of the Joint ORS Office,
after completing the process, there was some question whether a space-
based capability was the best way to meet the need. He said that the
DOD Executive Agent for Space has asked for more information and the
potential solutions are now in senior leadership review. A third need
for an ISR capability has begun the ORS Requirements and Solutions
Generation process. As of the end of May 2008, this need has completed
the requirements development phase of the ORS Requirements and
Solutions Generation process.
The ORS Implementation Plan Has Been Released and Additional Guidance
Documents Are Currently Being Developed:
In July 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the DOD Executive
Agent for Space to develop by October 15, 2007, an ORS Implementation
Plan to guide ORS activities. The DOD Executive Agent for Space did not
meet this deadline, but the plan was issued April 28, 2008. The ORS
Implementation Plan identifies the DOD processes and staffing resources
required to meet ORS needs, and outlines the elements necessary to
implement the ORS concept as well as serving as the initial charter for
the Joint ORS Office. Additionally, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
required the military departments to assign personnel to fully staff
the Joint ORS Office no later than August 1, 2008, and to establish
dedicated funding for ORS beginning in fiscal year 2010.
In addition to issuing the implementation plan, three ORS guidance
documents are currently being drafted, but no timeline has been
established for their completion. First, U.S. Strategic Command is
drafting an update to its Initial ORS Concept of Operations that is
intended to make the initial concept of operations shorter and more
concise, to clarify the services' roles and responsibilities, and to
provide more information on ORS capabilities, including who will be
able to operate them. Second, DOD is drafting an instruction to assign
responsibilities and to prescribe procedures for Joint Force Commanders
to submit urgent operational needs for a possible ORS solution. Third,
U.S. Strategic Command is drafting an instruction that is designed to
assign responsibilities for ORS within U.S. Strategic Command and its
supporting Joint Functional Component Commands.[Footnote 11] According
to U.S. Strategic Command officials, this instruction will implement
and expand upon the guidance found in the DOD instruction mentioned
above. U.S. Strategic Command's instruction will also detail the
procedures the command will use to prioritize warfighter needs.
According to a U.S. Strategic Command document, factors that will be
taken into consideration for prioritization include: (1) the
operational relevance of the need, (2) the degree of urgency of the
need and how soon the need must be satisfied, (3) whether the need has
a potential space solution, (4) the technical feasibility of the need,
(5) whether ORS resources can address the need, and (6) whether ORS is
the best choice of all possible means to address the need.
The ORS Concept Is in the Early Stages of Development:
Most ORS efforts are in their initial phases and thus it is too early
to judge their success. According to the ORS Implementation Plan, the
Joint ORS Office will accomplish its objectives over time in a "crawl,
walk, and run," approach. At this time, the ORS concept is still in the
"crawl" phase which means that the warfighter is getting involved with
the ORS concept and the focus of ORS efforts is on demonstrating
building blocks for later efforts, conducting experiments, and
determining what can be accomplished with current assets. "Walking"
would be characterized as the evolution of the ORS concept into a
warfighter-driven concept with selected capabilities tied to gaps and
integrated within the existing architecture. The ORS Implementation
Plan states that this phase would not begin until approximately 2010. A
"run" would involve a full range of space effects delivered when and
where needed and is expected to begin in approximately 2015. The former
Deputy Commander of U.S. Strategic Command told us that he expects the
current tactical satellites to propel the ORS concept to somewhere
between a walk and a run.
A Common Understanding of the ORS Concept Is Lacking:
Key stakeholders do not share a common understanding of the ORS concept
for two primary reasons--the ORS concept is not clearly defined in its
initial guidance documents and DOD has not adequately communicated the
concept to key stakeholders. As a result, stakeholders throughout the
warfighter and national security space communities do not share a
common understanding of the ORS concept.
DOD Has Not Clearly Defined the ORS Concept:
DOD has not documented a clear definition of the ORS concept and as a
result key stakeholders in the warfighter and national security space
communities do not share a common understanding of the concept. Our
prior work examining successful organizational transformations shows
the necessity to communicate clearly defined goals and specific
objectives to key stakeholders. Initial ORS planning documents--the
Plan for ORS[Footnote 12] and the Initial Concept of Operations
[Footnote 13]--are broad and lack the specificity needed to guide the
ORS concept, according to some members of the warfighter and national
security space communities. For example, the associate director of the
National Security Space Office said that the Plan for ORS addressed the
eight areas required by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 in only a broad sense. Moreover, an official from one
combatant command said that the Initial Concept of Operations was not
well-defined, and officials from another combatant command told us that
the concept of operations was really more of a vision statement.
We found several examples of a lack of clarity within these initial
documents. First, the Initial ORS Concept of Operations states that ORS
is focused on the timely satisfaction of the urgent needs of the Joint
Force Commanders, but it does not adequately define what constitutes
"urgent." Additionally, the approach presented in the April 2007 Plan
for ORS for enhancing the responsiveness of space systems is to
implement ORS to develop more affordable, small systems that can be
deployed in operationally relevant time frames, but does not clarify
what is meant by "operationally relevant time frames." According to the
Plan for ORS and the Initial Concept of Operations, some ORS solutions
could take up to 1 year to execute. Officials in the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy questioned whether these time
frames could really meet an urgent need. Additionally, officials from
one combatant command told us that a time frame of 1 year to get a need
met would not be considered responsive enough for them unless a
satellite was already in orbit so that they could task it directly.
Based on these examples, key stakeholders are not operating under a
common understanding regarding the time frames for ORS. Moreover, key
stakeholders in the intelligence community have said that they are not
sure which operational needs or urgent needs the ORS concept is to
satisfy.
Additionally, at the time of our review, other guidance documents
needed to clarify the ORS concept had not yet been developed. The
August 2007 memorandum from the DOD Executive Agent for Space directed
the Joint ORS Office to develop an ORS Strategy, an ORS Road Map, and
an ORS Program Plan in addition to the ORS Implementation Plan. The
Deputy Director of the ORS Office said that they decided to complete
the ORS Implementation Plan before writing the other documents so that
it could guide the development of the other required documents. Now
that the ORS Implementation Plan has been released, he said that they
will need to get more guidance from the DOD Executive Agent for Space
regarding what specific information should be included in the remaining
documents.
DOD Has Not Communicated Effectively with Key Stakeholders:
DOD has not effectively communicated with key stakeholders or engaged
them regarding the ORS concept. Our prior work examining successful
organizational transformations shows the need to adopt a communication
strategy that provides a common framework for conducting consistent and
coordinated outreach within and outside its organization often and
early and seeks to genuinely engage all stakeholders in the
organization's transformation. However, DOD did not initially involve
the geographic combatant commands in the development of the ORS
concept. For example, officials from one geographic combatant command
told us that they did not have any input into the development of the
Initial Concept of Operations for ORS and were not involved in any of
the ORS working groups. These officials were concerned that failing to
involve the geographic combatant commands in the ORS concept
development would lead to new capabilities that drive warfighter
requirements instead of warfighter requirements determining how to
develop ORS capabilities. Additionally, officials from a functional
combatant command told us that key ORS meetings took place in August
2007 but they were not invited to participate and neither were the
geographic combatant commands. These officials were concerned that
failing to invite these combatant commands to the meetings might result
in the development of requirements that really do not benefit the
warfighter.
The first extensive outreach to the combatant commands was in
preparation for the November 2007 ORS Senior Warfighters Forum, which
took place 6 months after the standup of the Joint ORS Office. A senior
space planner, who is the lead for ORS for one combatant command, told
us that during preparatory briefings for the ORS Senior Warfighters
Forum, participants were told that the purpose of the forum would be to
learn what space capabilities the combatant commands needed that ORS
might be able to address. However, after a couple of briefings, he
learned that the purpose of the ORS Senior Warfighters Forum had
shifted to that of educating the combatant commands on the ORS process
and how to get an ORS capability. The senior space planner explained
that rather than asking the warfighter what they need, the focus was
now on placing their needs into a process that had already been
developed. This same combatant command official told us that no clear
answers were provided to questions asked at the ORS Senior Warfighters
Forum regarding the submission of warfighter needs or how these needs
would be prioritized and, as of the end of February 2008, they had
received no updates from U.S. Strategic Command on any of the issues
discussed at the forum. Similarly, an intelligence agency official told
us that no consensus was reached during the forum and very little
concrete information was relayed regarding how ORS will be used in the
future.
Officials from various commands called for better communication
strategies to enhance their understanding of the ORS concept. Various
geographic combatant command officials we spoke with generally said
that U.S. Strategic Command should increase its ORS outreach activities
(e.g., visits, briefings, and education) to reach more staff throughout
the commands and services. The Chief of Staff at the U.S. Strategic
Command Joint Functional Component Command for Space acknowledged that
outreach activities need to be completed with the combatant commands so
that they can better understand how future ORS capabilities can benefit
their area of operation. Officials from U.S. Strategic Command
acknowledged that they had not done a good job of educating the
combatant commands on the ORS concept in its early days. However, the
Deputy Director of the ORS Office told us that one of the
responsibilities of one of the division chiefs who arrived in March
2008 at the Joint ORS Office will be to reach out to the combatant
commands and engage the warfighter on the ORS concept.
Additionally, DOD has not communicated well with the intelligence
community regarding the ORS concept. Officials from the National
Security Agency said that they are very concerned about the lack of
consultation that has been done with the intelligence community
regarding the ORS concept. Officials from the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency also said that they believe that communication with
the intelligence community regarding the ORS concept has been
insufficient. However, both agencies acknowledged that communication
between DOD and the intelligence community has improved since they
started working together on tactical satellites, but their concerns
regarding communication remain.
While the U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint ORS Office have taken
some steps to promote the ORS concept such as the November 2007 ORS
Senior Warfighters Forum, directing one of the Joint ORS Office
division chiefs to reach out to the combatant commands, and engaging
the intelligence community on the tactical satellites, they have not
developed a consistent and comprehensive outreach strategy. The lack of
a clearly defined ORS concept and effective outreach to the
stakeholders has affected the acceptance and understanding of the ORS
concept throughout the warfighter and national security space
communities. Without a complete and clearly articulated concept that is
well communicated with key stakeholders, DOD could encounter
difficulties in fully implementing the ORS concept and may miss
opportunities to meet warfighter needs.
DOD Plans to Integrate ORS into Existing DOD and Intelligence Processes
and Architecture, but Has Not Identified How It Will Accomplish This:
DOD has recognized the need to integrate the ORS concept into the
warfighter and national security space communities' processes and
architecture, but it has not yet determined specific steps for
achieving integration. DOD does not plan to begin integrating the ORS
concept in accordance with the 1999 DOD Space Policy until between 2010
and 2015. However, integrating space systems is a complex activity that
involves many entities inside DOD and the intelligence community and
may take more time to accomplish than expected. Therefore, taking
incremental steps as the ORS concept matures may help the Joint ORS
Office to achieve timely integration and help assure that warfighter
requirements will be met. Senior ORS officials have told us that the
ORS concept is still too new to begin its integration, but combatant
command and intelligence community officials are concerned about how
the ORS concept will be integrated into their existing processes for
submitting warfighter needs and processing ISR data.
According to the 1999 DOD Space Policy,[Footnote 14] an integrated
national security space architecture that addresses defense and
intelligence missions shall be developed to the maximum extent feasible
in order to eliminate programs operating in isolation of one another
and minimize unnecessary duplication of missions and functions and to
achieve efficiencies. This policy also directs the Secretaries of the
Military Departments and Combatant Commanders to integrate space
capabilities and applications into their plans, strategies, and
operations. In order to be consistent with DOD Space Policy, new
processes or systems developed under the ORS concept should be
integrated into all facets of DOD's strategy, doctrine, education,
training, exercises and operations. DOD has acknowledged that the ORS
concept needs to be integrated and one of the goals in the ORS
Implementation Plan is to integrate the ORS concept into the existing
space architecture between 2010 and 2015.
Given the complex environment of the warfighter and national security
space communities, changes that affect one organization can have an
effect on integrating national security space systems, and may take
longer than anticipated. We previously reported that DOD is often
presented with different and sometimes competing organizational
cultures and funding arrangements, and separate requirements processes
among the agencies involved in the defense and national space
communities. This complex environment has prevented DOD from reaching
some of its past integration goals. For example, in 2005, changes at
the National Reconnaissance Office resulted in the removal of National
Reconnaissance Office personnel and funding from the National Security
Space Office, and restricted the National Security Space Office's
access to a classified information-sharing network, thereby inhibiting
efforts to further integrate defense and national space activities--
including ISR activities--that had been recommended by the Space
Commission.[Footnote 15] If the Joint ORS Office does not successfully
integrate the ORS concept into the existing space architecture within
established time frames, this may result in a lack of coordination
among various members of the warfighter and national security space
communities.
Officials from the Joint ORS Office and U.S. Strategic Command
acknowledged that they have not yet determined how any future ORS
processes and systems will be integrated into existing national
security space processes and systems, because the concept is still too
new for them to determine the best way to achieve integration.
Furthermore, the ORS Implementation Plan states that the Joint ORS
Office will be working with the military departments and appropriate
agencies to prepare for a smooth transition of systems when they are
developed and acquired by the Joint ORS Office. However, the Joint ORS
Office does not yet have any new space capabilities to be transitioned.
Senior ORS officials told us that they cannot develop a comprehensive
plan for the integration of ORS processes into existing DOD and
intelligence community processes and architecture until they know more
about the nature of ORS capabilities that they will be able to develop.
Moreover, U.S. Strategic Command officials said that integration of new
systems will have to take place on a case-by-case basis depending on
the type of capability that is developed. They also said that it is
conceivable that in certain situations, integrating some ORS solutions
might not be the most cost-effective and efficient way to provide an
urgent capability to a warfighter. For example, some of the
architecture for addressing ISR needs requires high levels of data
classification. If a warfighter had a need that could be met at a lower
classification level than a particular ISR system would allow, it might
be faster and less expensive to not integrate that particular ORS
capability in order to preserve a lower classification of the data
obtained and avoid the expense and complications associated with
processing data with higher classifications.
For these reasons, DOD has not laid out any specific steps toward the
longer-term goal of integrating the ORS concept into the existing space
architecture, which has raised some concern within the warfighter and
national security space communities about the possible creation of
unnecessary duplicative processes. For example, combatant command
officials told us that they are already burdened by multiple processes
for submitting their warfighter requirements. They emphasized that any
processes developed for submitting ORS requirements should be
integrated into existing requirements submission processes so as not to
require a new process for them to learn to use and manage. However, the
Deputy Director of the ORS Office said that the process of submitting
ORS requirements currently under development is a separate and parallel
process to existing methods of submitting warfighter needs and he does
not yet know how it will be integrated. He explained that the ORS
concept has only been tested with two warfighter needs so it is too
soon for them to determine how particular ORS processes--such as the
requirements submission process--will be integrated into existing
warfighter requirements processes. U.S. Strategic Command officials
told us that in the future, they envision receiving ORS requirements
from multiple existing processes already in place, but time is needed
to allow the concept to mature and develop before integration can be
fully addressed.
Intelligence community officials also raised concerns about the
importance of using their current processes and architecture so as not
to create unnecessary duplicative processes to get data to the
warfighter. Furthermore, officials from the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency told us that their analysts cannot keep up with the
data being collected from existing space assets, and they do not know
who will process information from any new assets that might be
developed under ORS.
DOD officials have acknowledged the need to integrate ORS into the
existing ISR enterprise; however, accomplishing this goal will be
especially challenging. We recently reported that DOD's existing
roadmap for integrating current ISR capabilities does not provide DOD
with a long-term comprehensive vision of the desired end state of the
ISR enterprise. We also reported that DOD has not been able to ensure
that ISR capabilities developed through existing processes are really
the best solutions to minimize inefficiency and redundancy. Therefore,
it will be difficult for the Joint ORS Office to reduce inefficiency by
integrating its processes and systems into the current ISR enterprise,
which already faces numerous integration challenges. The Deputy
Director of the Joint ORS Office said that the office has not yet
determined how data collected by any new ORS solutions developed for
ISR needs will be integrated into existing intelligence community back-
end processes for analyzing and distributing data collected from space
assets.
Integrating the ORS concept will involve many agencies across the
warfighter and national security space communities and may take more
time than anticipated. If the integration of the ORS concept is not
adequately planned, DOD may not meet its time frames for integrating
the ORS concept. If the ORS concept is not integrated into the existing
space architecture as integration issues arise, the ORS concept could
create duplicative efforts resulting in wasted resources and inhibiting
the ORS concept‘s ability to fully meet warfighter needs.
Conclusions:
While DOD has taken a number of steps to advance the ORS concept and to
develop a process for providing ORS capabilities to the warfighter, its
ability to implement the concept will be limited until it more clearly
defines key aspects of the ORS concept and increases its outreach and
communication activities. Without a complete and clearly articulated
concept that is well communicated and practiced among key stakeholders,
DOD could encounter difficulties in fully implementing the ORS concept
and building the relationships necessary to ensure ORS‘s success.
Furthermore, even though it may be too early to develop a comprehensive
plan for integrating ORS processes and systems into the existing
national security space architecture, DOD can identify the steps
necessary to achieve integration as the concept matures. Integrating
the ORS concept will be very challenging, especially as it pertains to
ISR activities that will have to be coordinated among many agencies
across DOD and intelligence community agencies. Identifying the
incremental steps toward integration could help DOD meet its time
frames for integrating the ORS concept, prevent the ORS concept from
creating duplicative efforts, ensure that the ORS concept meets
warfighter needs, and ensure its future satellites are adequately
supported.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend the DOD Executive Agent for Space take the following three
actions:
* Direct the Joint ORS Office, in consultation with U.S. Strategic
Command, to define ORS key terms including what qualifies as an urgent
need, how timely satisfaction of a need is evaluated, and what Joint
Force Commander needs the ORS concept is trying to satisfy.
* Direct the Joint ORS Office, in consultation with U.S. Strategic
Command, to establish an ongoing communications and outreach approach
for ORS to help guide DOD‘s efforts to promote, educate, and foster
acceptance among the combatant commands, military services,
intelligence community, and other DOD organizations.
* In consultation with the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics and the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence, and in cooperation with the military services, identify
the steps necessary to ensure the integration of the ORS concept into
existing DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture as
the Joint ORS Office continues its long-term planning of the ORS
concept.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our recommendations. DOD‘s comments are reprinted in appendix II.
The National Reconnaissance Office also provided technical comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to define ORS key terms
including what qualifies as an urgent need, how timely satisfaction of
a need is evaluated, and what Joint Force Commander needs the ORS
concept is trying to satisfy. In its comments, DOD stated that it
codified the definition of ORS on July 9, 2007, and U.S. Strategic
Command developed an Initial Concept of Operations containing
additional terms intended to further define and clarify ORS activities.
However, our work showed that the warfighter and intelligence community
believe that key ORS terms need to be better defined and clearer. As we
stated in our report, the initial guidance documents”such as the Plan
for ORS and the Initial Concept of Operations”are considered broad by
users and lack the specificity needed to guide the ORS concept. Based
on our work, this has led to a lack of a common understanding of the
concept among the warfighter and national security space communities.
DOD also stated that responsibility for providing overarching
definitions and policy guidance will remain with the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and U.S. Strategic Command will
continue to validate ORS requirements and provide additional
clarification, definition, and direction to the ORS Office as the
capability matures. However, our recommendation focuses on the need for
better-defined and clear ORS terms. Therefore, we continue to believe
that DOD should take additional steps now to define and clarify ORS and
provide more definition of key terms.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to establish an ongoing
communications and outreach approach for ORS to help guide DOD‘s
efforts to promote, educate, and foster acceptance among the combatant
commands, military services, intelligence community, and other DOD
organizations. In its comments, DOD stated that communicating a clear,
concise message was vitally important to the success of ORS and it is
currently conducting outreach efforts in numerous forums. We
acknowledged DOD‘s efforts to promote the ORS concept in our report;
however, despite these efforts, confusion regarding the ORS concept
persists. As stated in our report, the lack of a clear definition
combined with the lack of a consistent and comprehensive outreach
strategy has affected the acceptance and understanding of the ORS
concept throughout the warfighter and national security space
communities. DOD‘s comments also stated that the burden of outreach
should not be placed solely upon the ORS Office and that all ORS
stakeholders will continue to play an active role in promoting and
fostering acceptance of the ORS concept. Apart from who is designated
to develop and implement it, our work showed that a comprehensive
communication and outreach approach or strategy that reflects agreed-
upon definitions and direction for the ORS concept is needed or DOD
could encounter difficulties in fully implementing the ORS concept and
may miss opportunities to meet warfighter needs.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to identify the steps
necessary to ensure the integration of the ORS concept into existing
DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture as the Joint
ORS Office continues its long-term planning of the ORS concept. In its
comments, DOD stated that integration of ORS capabilities into current
processes and architecture will depend upon the value provided by the
current processes and architectures and that integration into existing
systems will be considered by the ORS Office as a matter of course. DOD
also stated that personnel assigned to the ORS Office from across DOD
and the intelligence community bring knowledge and experience that will
help to identify ways to selectively integrate ORS capabilities into
current systems, when appropriate, in order to streamline delivery of
products to the customers. However, based on our work, if integration
of the ORS concept is not timely and adequately planned, DOD may not
meet its time frames for integrating the ORS concept into the existing
space architecture between 2010 and 2015. Moreover, if the ORS concept
is not developed and integrated well in advance of launching future
satellites, the ORS concept could create duplicative efforts resulting
in wasted resources and inhibiting the ORS concept‘s ability to fully
meet warfighter needs. Therefore, we believe our recommendation to take
a more proactive approach to integrating the ORS concept, once better
defined and communicated with the warfighter and national security
space community, continues to have merit.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Copies will be made available to
others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no
charge on our Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Davi M. D‘Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine whether the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept
is being developed to support warfighter needs and the extent to which
DOD has a plan that integrates ORS into existing DOD and intelligence
community processes and architecture, we reviewed and analyzed ORS
planning documents, the ORS concept of operations, and ORS processes
for meeting warfighter needs. We also reviewed relevant legislation,
policies, and prior GAO reports. We interviewed officials at the U.S.
Strategic Command including the Joint Force Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and the Joint Force
Component Command for Space as well as officials from the Joint ORS
Office to discuss the progress of developing the ORS concept, the
initial ORS planning documents, outreach regarding the ORS concept, and
plans to integrate the ORS concept into the existing space
architecture. We also interviewed officials at Air Force Space Command
and the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center to discuss the new
process developed for converting warfighter needs into formal
requirements and potential ORS solutions. In addition, we interviewed
officials from the U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S.
Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Special Operations
Command regarding warfighter involvement in the creation of the ORS
concept, the ability of the ORS concept to meet warfighter needs, the
degree of outreach received regarding the ORS concept, and the
integration of the ORS concept into current processes for submitting
warfighter needs. To discuss issues regarding ORS capabilities that may
address warfighter ISR needs and the integration of these capabilities
into current intelligence community processes and systems, we
interviewed officials from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National
Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency. Furthermore,
we interviewed officials from the Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence, and the National Security Space Office to discuss policy
issues related to ORS. Finally, we interviewed officials from U.S. Air
Force Headquarters, U.S. Army Space Branch, the Air Force Research Lab,
and the Naval Research Lab to discuss service involvement with the ORS
concept and the tactical satellite experiments.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent
Capabilities:
2500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This letter is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO
draft report, GAO-08-831 "Defense Space Activities: DoD Needs to
Further Clarify the Operationally Responsive Space Concept and Plan to
Integrate and Support Future Satellites," dated June 6, 2008 (GAO Code
351053).
In general, DoD agrees with the assessment and recommendations
contained in the draft report, although we differ on the
responsibilities for implementing the recommendations (please see the
attached Comments to the Recommendations for specifics). It is
important to note that the research conducted by the GAO Team took
place within the first year of the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
Office's existence. While the GAO recommends improvement in selected
areas, the ORS Office has accomplished much during this short period of
time.
As the ORS Office matures and additional personnel are assigned,
relationships and responsibilities will continue to evolve and many of
the issues highlighted in the report will be addressed as a matter of
course. Linkages to the National Security community, including the
Intelligence Community, continue to improve. The new US Strategic
Command Concept of Operations will further clarify ORS timelines and
the requirements validation process.
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report. Questions should be directed to DoD's primary action officer,
COL Patrick Frakes, Director, Space Policy & Information Operations,
(703) 697-6364.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Brian Green:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated June 6, 2008:
GAO CODE 351053/GAO-08-831:
"Defense Space Activities: DoD Needs to Further Clarify the
Operationally Responsive Space Concept and Plan to Integrate and
Support Future Satellites"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the DoD Executive Agent for
Space direct the Joint Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office, in
consultation with the U.S. Strategic Command, to define ORS key terms
including: what qualifies as an urgent need, how timely satisfaction of
a need is evaluated, and what Joint Force Commander needs the ORS
concept is trying to satisfy.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. Defining the key terms, metrics, and
requirements is vital to achieving mission success. The Deputy
Secretary of Defense codified the Department's definition of
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) on July 9, 2007. This definition
provided focus for the intended purpose of ORS and differentiated ORS
from other space activities. Subsequently, United States Strategic
Command developed an initial Concept of Operations containing
additional terms intended to further define and clarify ORS activities.
While we agree with the substance of the GAO recommendation,
responsibilities for providing overarching definitions and policy
guidance will remain with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy; United States Strategic Command will continue to validate
ORS requirements in accordance with public law, and provide additional
clarification, definition, and direction to the ORS Office as we
further mature this capability.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the DoD Executive Agent for
Space direct the Joint Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office, in
consultation with the U.S. Strategic Command, to establish an ongoing
communications and outreach approach for ORS to help guide DoD's
efforts to promote, educate, and foster acceptance among the Combatant
Commands, Military Services, intelligence community, and other DoD
organizations.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. Communicating a clear, concise message
to the Combatant Commands, Military Services, intelligence community
and others is vitally important to the success of ORS. Numerous forums,
including the ORS Executive Committee and Senior Warfighter Forums, as
well as other outreach efforts, including ORS personnel participation
in exercises and conferences, are currently underway. We agree that
outreach is important, but that burden should not be placed solely upon
the ORS Office. All ORS stakeholders will continue to play an active
role in promoting and fostering acceptance of the ORS initiative.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the DoD Executive Agent for
Space, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, and in cooperation with the Military Services,
identify the steps necessary to ensure the integration of the
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept into existing DoD and
intelligence community processes and architecture as the Joint ORS
Office continues its long-term planning of the ORS concept.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. Integration of ORS capabilities into
current processes and architectures will depend upon the value provided
by the current processes and architectures. In many cases, it may he
the current systems that preclude responsive support to the Joint Force
Commanders. ORS is intended to use and exploit existing processes and
architectures if they can meet the Joint Force Commanders' needs.
Integration into existing systems will be considered by the ORS Office
as a matter of course in the solutions development phase. Personnel
assigned to the ORS Office come from organizations across the
Department of Defense and intelligence community; these individuals
bring a wealth of knowledge and experience which will help to identify
ways to selectively integrate ORS capabilities into current systems,
when appropriate, in order to streamline delivery of products to the
customers.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D‘Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St James, Assistant
Director; Grace Coleman; Jane Ervin; Amy Higgins; Enemencio Sanchez;
Kimberly Seay; Jay Spaan; Matthew Tabbert; Karen Thornton; and Amy Ward-
Meier made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] With the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in
2005, the Secretary of Defense now coordinates such activities with the
DNI.
[2] A satellite bus can be thought of as the spacecraft vehicle. It
provides the physical and electrical architecture to support the
payload. The satellite payload is the sensor or experiment being
carried by the bus.
[3] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 913(b).
[4] The national security space community is composed of DOD and
intelligence community members that are involved in U.S. national
security space activities.
[5] GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs a Departmentwide Strategy for
Pursuing Low-Cost, Responsive Tactical Space Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-449] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
14, 2006).
[6] GAO, Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy
Needed to Guide Future DOD Space Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-431R] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
27, 2008).
[7] GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Making Progress to Rapidly Deliver
Low Cost Space Capabilities, but Challenges Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-516] (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
25, 2008).
[8] According to the ORS Initial Concept of Operations, ORS needs and
requirements development will operate within the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) framework to the maximum
extent possible. Tier-1 solutions, using existing systems, should not
normally require JCIDS activity. Since Tier-2 and Tier-3 solutions will
be within the Force Enhancement and Space Control mission areas (such
as ISR, communications, and space situational awareness), Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated requirements most
likely exist for the requested capability.
[9] Air Force Space Command delivers space and missile capabilities to
the warfighting commands.
[10] The Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center develops,
demonstrates, acquires, fields, and sustains space and missile
capabilities for the joint warfighter.
[11] Joint Functional Component Commands are responsible for the day-to-
day planning and execution of U.S. Strategic Command‘s primary mission
areas: space; global strike and integration; ISR; network warfare;
integrated missile defense; and combating weapons of mass destruction.
[12] The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act required DOD to submit
a Plan for Operationally Responsive Space within 120 days of the
enactment of the act. DOD provided the plan to Congress in April 2007,
and the plan identified a general approach for establishing the ORS
concept.
[13] The Initial Concept of Operations was written by U.S. Strategic
Command and approved in May 2007. According to U.S. Strategic Command
officials, the concept of operations was written to help define and
scope the ORS concept in response to those in the community who were
asking for initial guidance on ORS.
[14] Department of Defense Directive 3100.10, Space Policy (July 9,
1999).
[15] The Space Commission is a congressionally chartered commission
that reviewed the management and organization of national security
space activities. The Space Commission issued a report in January 2001
that made recommendations to DOD to improve coordination, execution,
and oversight of the department‘s space activities.
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