Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq
Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed Gao ID: GAO-08-1021T July 23, 2008In January 2007, the President announced a new U.S. strategy to stem the violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi government foster conditions for national reconciliation. In The New Way Forward, the Administration articulated near-term goals to achieve over a 12- to 18-month period and reasserted the end state for Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. To support this strategy, the United States increased its military presence and financial commitments for Iraq operations. This testimony discusses (1) progress in meeting key security, legislative, and economic goals of The New Way Forward; and (2) past and current U.S. strategies for Iraq and the need for an updated strategy. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, MNF-I, the UN, and the Iraqi government. GAO also had staff stationed in Baghdad. Since 2003, GAO has issued about 140 Iraq-related products, which provided baseline information for this assessment.
The United States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated in The New Way Forward. Looking forward, many challenges remain, and an updated strategy is essential. In the security area, violence--as measured by the number of enemy-initiated attacks--decreased about 80 percent from June 2007 to June 2008, trained Iraqi security forces have increased substantially, and many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, as of July 2008, 8 of 18 provincial governments do not yet have lead responsibility for security in their provinces, and DOD reported that, in June 2008, less than 10 percent of Iraqi security forces were at the highest readiness level and therefore considered capable of performing operations without coalition support. The security environment remains volatile and dangerous. In the legislative area, Iraq has enacted key legislation to return some Ba'athists to government, grant amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define provincial powers. The unfinished Iraqi legislative agenda includes enacting laws that will provide the legal framework for sharing oil revenues, disarming militias, and holding provincial elections. On economic and infrastructure issues, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for its reconstruction efforts between 2005 and 2007. Although crude oil production improved for short periods, the early July 2008 average production capacity of about 2.5 million barrels per day was below the U.S. goal of 3 million barrels per day. In addition, while State reports that U.S. goals for Iraq's water sector are close to being reached, the daily supply of electricity in Iraq met only slightly more than half of demand in early July 2008. Since 2003, the United States has developed and revised multiple strategies to address security and reconstruction needs in Iraq. The New Way Forward responded to failures in prior U.S. plans and the escalating violence that occurred in 2006. However, this strategy and the military surge that was central to it end in July 2008, and many agree that the situation remains fragile. GAO recommends an updated strategy for Iraq for several reasons. First, much has changed in Iraq since The New Way Forward began in January 2007. Violence is down, U.S. surge forces are leaving, and the United States is negotiating a security agreement with Iraq to replace the expiring UN mandate. Second, The New Way Forward only articulates U.S. goals and objectives for the phase that ends in July 2008. Third, the goals and objectives of The New Way Forward are contained in disparate documents rather than a single strategic plan. Furthermore, the classified MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Joint Campaign Plan is not a strategic plan; it is an operational plan with limitations that GAO will discuss during the closed portion of the hearing.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-1021T, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed
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Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, July 23, 2008:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq:
Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed:
Statement of Gene L. Dodaro:
Acting Comptroller General of the United States:
GAO-08-1021T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-1021T, a testimony before the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In January 2007, the President announced a new U.S. strategy to stem
the violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi government foster conditions
for national reconciliation. In The New Way Forward, the Administration
articulated near-term goals to achieve over a 12- to 18-month period
and reasserted the end state for Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal
Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and is an ally in the
war on terror. To support this strategy, the United States increased
its military presence and financial commitments for Iraq operations.
This testimony discusses (1) progress in meeting key security,
legislative, and economic goals of The New Way Forward; and (2) past
and current U.S. strategies for Iraq and the need for an updated
strategy.
GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies,
MNF-I, the UN, and the Iraqi government. GAO also had staff stationed
in Baghdad. Since 2003, GAO has issued about 140 Iraq-related products,
which provided baseline information for this assessment.
What GAO Found:
The United States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated
in The New Way Forward. Looking forward, many challenges remain, and an
updated strategy is essential.
* In the security area, violence”as measured by the number of enemy-
initiated attacks”decreased about 80 percent from June 2007 to June
2008, trained Iraqi security forces have increased substantially, and
many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, as of
July 2008, 8 of 18 provincial governments do not yet have lead
responsibility for security in their provinces, and DOD reported that,
in June 2008, less than 10 percent of Iraqi security forces were at the
highest readiness level and therefore considered capable of performing
operations without coalition support. The security environment remains
volatile and dangerous.
* In the legislative area, Iraq has enacted key legislation to return
some Ba‘athists to government, grant amnesty to detained Iraqis, and
define provincial powers. The unfinished Iraqi legislative agenda
includes enacting laws that will provide the legal framework for
sharing oil revenues, disarming militias, and holding provincial
elections.
* On economic and infrastructure issues, Iraq spent only 24 percent of
the $27 billion it budgeted for its reconstruction efforts between 2005
and 2007. Although crude oil production improved for short periods, the
early July 2008 average production capacity of about 2.5 million
barrels per day was below the U.S. goal of 3 million barrels per day.
In addition, while State reports that U.S. goals for Iraq‘s water
sector are close to being reached, the daily supply of electricity in
Iraq met only slightly more than half of demand in early July 2008.
Since 2003, the United States has developed and revised multiple
strategies to address security and reconstruction needs in Iraq. The
New Way Forward responded to failures in prior U.S. plans and the
escalating violence that occurred in 2006. However, this strategy and
the military surge that was central to it end in July 2008, and many
agree that the situation remains fragile.
GAO recommends an updated strategy for Iraq for several reasons. First,
much has changed in Iraq since The New Way Forward began in January
2007. Violence is down, U.S. surge forces are leaving, and the United
States is negotiating a security agreement with Iraq to replace the
expiring UN mandate. Second, The New Way Forward only articulates U.S.
goals and objectives for the phase that ends in July 2008. Third, the
goals and objectives of The New Way Forward are contained in disparate
documents rather than a single strategic plan. Furthermore, the
classified MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Joint Campaign Plan is not a strategic
plan; it is an operational plan with limitations that GAO will discuss
during the closed portion of the hearing.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommended that DOD and State, in conjunction with relevant U.S.
agencies, develop an updated strategy for Iraq. DOD and State
disagreed, asserting that The New Way Forward remains valid and that
the Joint Campaign Plan guides U.S. efforts in Iraq.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1021T]. For more
information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's recent report on U.S.
efforts to secure, stabilize and rebuild Iraq.[Footnote 1] This report
addressed (1) progress in meeting key security, legislative, and
economic goals of The New Way Forward; and (2) past and current U.S.
strategies for Iraq and the need for an updated strategy.
In January 2007, the President announced a new U.S. strategy to stem
the high levels of violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi government
foster conditions for national reconciliation. In The New Way Forward,
the Administration articulated near-term goals to achieve over a 12-to
18-month period and reasserted the long-term goal or end state for
Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and
sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. In support of this
new strategy, the United States increased its military presence and
financial commitments for operations in Iraq. In April 2008, the U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General of the Multinational
Force-Iraq (MNF-I) testified that significant progress had been made
toward achieving U.S. goals but that progress was fragile and
reversible.
From fiscal year 2001 through July 2008, Congress provided more than
$800 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Global War on
Terrorism.[Footnote 2] The majority of this amount has been for
military operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Moreover,
since fiscal year 2003, about $48 billion has been provided to U.S.
agencies for stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq,
including developing Iraq's security forces, enhancing Iraq's capacity
to govern, and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electricity, and water sectors,
among others.[Footnote 3]
To complete our work, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials
from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; MNF-I and its
subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National
Intelligence Council; and the United Nations (UN). We also reviewed
translated copies of Iraqi documents. In support of this work, we
extensively utilized staff stationed in Baghdad from January through
March 2008. Since 2003, we have issued about 140 Iraq-related reports
and testimonies, which provided baseline information for our
assessment.[Footnote 4] We performed this work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
The United States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated
in The New Way Forward. For example, overall violence in Iraq has
declined. Iraq has also enacted key legislation to return some
Ba'athists to government and give amnesty to detained Iraqis. However,
we agree with assessments that progress made in Iraq is fragile and
many unmet goals and challenges remain. Future U.S. strategies should
build on recent security and legislative gains and address the
remaining challenges for the near and long term.
* In the security area, violence--as measured by enemy-initiated
attacks--decreased about 80 percent from June 2007 to June 2008, the
number of trained Iraqi security forces has increased substantially,
and many Iraqi units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However,
as of July 2008, 8 of 18 provincial governments must still assume lead
responsibility for security in their provinces. In addition, DOD
reported that, in June 2008, less than 10 percent of Iraqi security
forces were at the highest readiness level and therefore considered
capable of performing operations without coalition support[Footnote 5].
The security environment remains volatile and dangerous. DOD reports
that the United States has not achieved its goal of defeating al Qaeda
in Iraq, local security forces (such as Sons of Iraq) have not
reconciled with the central government, and the cease-fire agreement
with the Mahdi Army remains tenuous.
* In the legislative area, Iraq has enacted key legislation to return
some Ba'athists to government, grant amnesty to detained Iraqis, and
define provincial powers. However, questions remain about how the laws
will be implemented and whether the intended outcomes can be achieved.
Additionally, Iraq has not yet passed legislation that will provide the
legal framework for sharing oil revenues, disarming militias, and
holding provincial elections. The Iraqi government also faces
logistical and security challenges in holding the scheduled 2008
provincial elections--a key element of reconciliation for Sunnis.
Finally, the government has not completed its constitutional review to
resolve issues such as the status of disputed territories and the
balance of power between federal and regional governments.
* On economic and infrastructure issues, Iraq spent only 24 percent of
the $27 billion it budgeted for reconstruction efforts between 2005 and
2007. Although oil production improved for short periods, the July 2008
average crude oil production capacity of about 2.5 million barrels per
day[Footnote 6] was below the U.S. goal of 3.0 million barrels per day.
[Footnote 7] In addition, while State reports that U.S. goals for
Iraq's water sector are close to being reached, the daily supply of
electricity in Iraq met slightly more than half of demand in early July
2008.[Footnote 8]
Since 2003, the United States has developed and revised multiple
strategies and plans to address security and reconstruction needs in
Iraq. The current strategy--The New Way Forward--responded to failures
in prior U.S. plans that prematurely transferred security
responsibilities to Iraqi forces or belatedly responded to growing
sectarian violence. The New Way Forward was developed to address the
escalating violence in 2006. However, this strategy and the military
surge that was central to it are planned to end at the end of this
month. Moreover, the UN mandate authorizing MNF-I to maintain security
and stability in Iraq expires December 31, 2008.[Footnote 9] The United
States and Iraq are conducting negotiations to provide the legal basis
for the United States and its coalition partners to continue operations
to support the Iraqi government after the UN mandate ends. Accordingly,
we recommended that the Departments of State and Defense develop an
updated strategy for how the United States will help Iraq achieve key
security, legislative, and economic goals. This strategy should build
on recent security and legislative gains, address unmet near-and long-
term goals, and clearly articulate future goals, objectives, roles,
responsibilities, and resources needed. The departments stated that
they will review and refine the current strategy as necessary but
asserted that The New Way Forward remains valid. DOD also stated that
the classified Joint Campaign Plan provides a comprehensive, government-
wide plan to guide U.S. efforts in Iraq.
We affirm the need for an updated strategy for several reasons. First,
much has changed in Iraq since January 2007, when the President
announced The New Way Forward. Violence is down, U.S. surge forces are
leaving, and a new framework for the U.S. presence in Iraq needs to be
agreed upon beyond the UN mandate. Second, The New Way Forward only
articulates U.S. goals and objectives for the phase that ends in July
2008. Third, the goals and objectives of The New Way Forward and the
phase that follows it are contained in disparate documents rather than
a single strategic plan. Furthermore, the classified Joint Campaign
Plan[Footnote 10] is not a strategic plan; it is an operational plan
with limitations that we will discuss during the closed portion of this
hearing.
Some Gains Made; Certain Security, Legislative, and Economic Challenges
Remain:
The United States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated
in The New Way Forward; many challenges remain.
Progress Made in Improving Security Conditions and Building Iraqi
Security Forces, but Security Issues Still Need to be Addressed:
Establishing a basic level of security is a key component of The New
Way Forward. As we reported last month, overall violence fell from
about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 45 attacks per day in
May 2008--primarily due to decreases in violence in Baghdad and Anbar
provinces.[Footnote 11] Since that report, the average number of enemy-
initiated attacks decreased to 30 per day in June 2008, representing
the lowest level of violence since March 2004. (See fig. 1.) DOD,
State, and UN reports attribute the reduction in violence to (1) the
increase in U.S. combat forces that allowed a change in tactics; (2)
the creation of nongovernmental security forces, such as Sons of Iraq;
and (3) the Mahdi Army's declaration of a cease-fire. DOD had planned
to withdraw U.S. surge forces and draw down U.S. forces to 140,000 by
the end of July 2008. DOD reported that the number of U.S. forces in
Iraq was about 153,300 as of June 1, 2008.
Figure 1: Average Daily Attacks, May 2003 to June 2008:
Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Month, May 2003 to May 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Attacks on:
Coalition;
Civilians;
Iraqi security forces;
Total attacks.
Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data,
May 2008.
[End of figure]
The New Way Forward also set the goal of developing capable Iraqi
security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi
government. Since 2003, the United States has provided more than $20
billion to develop Iraqi security forces. The number of trained Iraqi
forces increased from about 323,000 in January 2007 to about 478,500 as
of April 30, 2008. DOD reports that about 65 percent of Iraqi army
battalions are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, the
number of units at the highest readiness level, as assessed by DOD,
accounts for less than 10 percent of total units (see fig. 2). The
development of independent Iraqi security forces was a benchmark
established by Congress and derived from commitments made by the Iraqi
government. The number of independent Iraqi security forces as measured
by Operational Readiness Assessments (ORA) level 1 continues to be an
important measure of the capabilities of Iraqi security forces. In late
June 2008, DOD reported that 12 Iraqi army battalions were capable of
planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations (ORA
level 1) in January 2007 and April 2008.
Figure 2: Iraqi Security Force Operational Readiness, January 2007 and
March 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a combination of two stacked vertical bar graphs
depicting the number of battalions in each of four categories indicating
the Iraqi Security Force Operational Readiness Levels for the National
Police and Iraqi Army:
ORA level 1 - capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
counterinsurgency operations;
ORA level 2 - capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
counterinsurgency operations with Iraqi security force or coalition
force assistance;
ORA level 3 - partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency
operations in conjunction with coalition units;
ORA level 4 - forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency
operations.
Source: GAO analysis of data presented in testimony by the Commanding
General of MNF-I and MNC-I documents.
[End of figure]
Several factors have complicated the development of capable Iraqi
security forces, including the lack of a single unified force,
sectarian and militia influences, continued dependence on U.S. and
coalition forces for logistics and combat support, and training and
leadership shortages.
The New Way Forward also stated that the Iraqi government would take
responsibility for security in all 18 provinces by November 2007.
However, as of mid-July 2008, 8 provincial governments do not yet have
lead responsibility for security in their provinces. According to the
MNF-I Commanding General, the coalition continues to provide planning,
logistics, and other assistance even after security responsibilities
have transferred to provincial Iraqi control.
Security conditions remain volatile and dangerous. In June 2008, DOD
reported that the influence and areas of operation of al Qaeda in Iraq
have been degraded, but the terrorist group remains a dangerous and
adaptable enemy capable of carrying out high-profile attacks. Thus, the
United States has not achieved its goal of defeating al Qaeda in Iraq
and ensuring that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq. In addition,
Sons of Iraq have not reconciled with the Iraqi government and the
cease-fire agreement with the Mahdi Army is tenuous.[Footnote 12]
According to MNF-I, various Sons of Iraq groups total at least 105,000
members while the Mahdi Army has 25,000 to 40,000 active members.
Violence also has displaced many Iraqis from their homes. The UN
estimates that 2.7 million people have been displaced in Iraq and 2
million additional Iraqis have fled the country, primarily to Jordan
and Syria.
Iraq Has Enacted Legislation to Promote Reconciliation, but Critical
Laws Are Still Being Debated:
To facilitate national reconciliation, The New Way Forward identified
legislation that the Iraqi government committed to enact with U.S.
support and set a goal for enacting all key legislation by December
2007. In early 2008, the Iraqi government enacted laws to return some
Ba'athists to government service, give amnesty to certain detainees in
Iraq's justice system, and define provincial powers. However, questions
remain about how these laws will be implemented and whether the
intended outcomes can be achieved. For example, the government has not
established the commission needed to reinstate former Ba'athists in the
government or released most of the 20,000 prisoners and detainees
approved for release.
Three additional laws considered critical for national reconciliation
have not been enacted. These include laws that set the rules for Iraq's
provincial elections, define the control and management of Iraq's oil
and gas resources, and provide for disarmament and demobilization of
Iraq's armed groups. The Iraqi government also faces logistical and
security challenges in holding the scheduled 2008 provincial elections--
a key element of reconciliation for Sunnis. UN and IFES reports
estimate that it would take about 8 months to prepare for the
elections, while State estimates that elections could be held 4 to 5
months after an elections law is passed.[Footnote 13] Finally, the
government has not completed its constitutional review to resolve
issues such as the status of disputed territories and the balance of
power between federal and regional governments.
Iraq Has Made Limited Progress in Spending Its Capital Investment
Budgets and Has Not Met Oil Production Goals or Demand for Electricity:
The New Way Forward emphasized the need to build capacity in Iraq's
ministries and help the government execute its capital investment
budget; this is particularly important as the $48 billion in U.S.
funding for Iraq reconstruction and stabilization efforts is almost 90
percent obligated. However, expenditure data from Iraq's Ministry of
Finance show that, between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of
the $27 billion it budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts.
As displayed in figure 3, total government spending for capital
investments increased from 23 percent in 2005 to 28 percent in 2007.
[Footnote 14] However, Iraq's central ministries, responsible for
security and essential services, spent only 11 percent of their capital
investment budgets in 2007[Footnote 15]--a decline from similarly low
spending rates of 14 and 13 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively.
Spending rates for central ministries critical to the delivery of
essential services varied from the 41 percent spent by the Water
Resources Ministry to the less than 1 percent spent by the Ministries
of Oil and Electricity in 2007. Iraq is expected to have additional
resources to spend on reconstruction projects in 2008. As of May 2008,
Iraqi crude oil was selling at about $104 per barrel, higher than the
$57 per barrel used to develop Iraq's 2008 budget.[Footnote 16]
Figure 3: Iraqi Budget Execution Ratios for Total Government and
Selected Ministries, 2005 to 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Total government:
Budget execution ratio, 2005: 23%;
Budget execution ratio, 2006: 19%;
Budget execution ratio, 2007: 28%.
Central ministries:
Budget execution ratio, 2005: 14%;
Budget execution ratio, 2006: 13%;
Budget execution ratio, 2007: 11%.
Water resources:
Budget execution ratio, 2005: 65%;
Budget execution ratio, 2006: 46%;
Budget execution ratio, 2007: 41%.
Oil:
Budget execution ratio, 2005: 4%;
Budget execution ratio, 2006: 5%;
Budget execution ratio, 2007: 0.03%.
Electricity:
Budget execution ratio, 2005: 48%;
Budget execution ratio, 2006: 23%;
Budget execution ratio, 2007: 0.06%.
Source: GAO analysis of official Ministry of Finance budget and
expenditure data.
[End of figure]
U.S. government, coalition, and international agencies have identified
a number of factors that challenge the Iraqi government's efforts to
fully spend its budget for capital projects. These challenges include
violence and sectarian strife, a shortage of trained staff, and weak
procurement and budgeting systems.
Developing competent and loyal Iraqi ministries is critical to
stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. In 2005 and 2006, the United States
provided about $169 million for programs to help build the capacity of
key civilian ministries and the Ministries of Defense and Interior. As
part of The New Way Forward, the Administration sought an additional
$395 million for these efforts in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. We found
that multiple U.S. agencies were leading individual efforts and
recommended that Congress consider conditioning future appropriations
on the completion of an integrated strategy for U.S. capacity
development efforts.[Footnote 17] In June 2008, State noted that the
embassy was in the process of implementing GAO's recommendation.
Providing essential services to all Iraqi areas and communities and
helping Iraq maintain and expand its oil exports are key goals of The
New Way Forward. Overall crude oil production has increased or improved
for short periods; however, the early July 2008 average crude oil
production capacity of about 2.5 million barrels per day has not
reached the U.S. goal of 3 million barrels per day.[Footnote 18]
Meanwhile, the daily supply of electricity met only 54 percent of
demand in early July 2008.[Footnote 19]
The State Department reports that U.S. goals for Iraq's water sector
are close to being reached. Since April 2006, U.S. efforts have focused
on producing enough clean water to reach up to an additional 8.5
million Iraqis. As of March 2008, State reported that U.S.-funded
projects had provided an additional 8 million Iraqis with access to
potable water. Several factors present challenges in delivering
essential services, including an unstable security environment,
corruption, a lack of technical capacity, and inadequate strategic
planning. Our May 2007 report recommended that U.S. agencies work with
the Iraqi government to develop an integrated energy strategy for the
oil and electricity sectors.[Footnote 20] In June 2008, State indicated
that it was encouraging the Iraqi government to develop an integrated
energy strategy.
Need for Updated U.S. Strategy in Iraq:
Since late 2003, the United States has employed numerous strategies and
plans to address the security and reconstruction needs of Iraq. For
example, the multinational force's security transition plan called for
Iraqi security forces to assume security responsibilities on an
accelerated basis during spring 2004. This attempt failed when Iraqi
security forces performed poorly during an insurgent uprising. Further,
a series of campaign plans and a strategy document attempted to
integrate U.S. military and civilian efforts in Iraq but did not
anticipate the escalation in violence during 2006. To address the high
levels of violence, the administration announced The New Way Forward
strategy in January 2007. While the documents that comprise The New Way
Forward and the phase that follows clearly state the importance the
Administration places on continued U.S. support for Iraq, they
represent an incomplete strategic plan because they only articulate
goals and objectives for the near-term phase that ends in July 2008.
The United States Has Used Several Strategies to Address Security and
Reconstruction Challenges in Iraq:
In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan
for transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces.[Footnote
21] The plan's objective was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition
forces first in conjunction with the neutralization of Iraq's
insurgency and second with the development of Iraqi forces capable of
securing their country.[Footnote 22] Citing the growing capability of
Iraqi security forces, MNF-I attempted to shift responsibilities to
them in February 2004 but did not succeed in this effort. Iraqi police
and military units performed poorly during an escalation of insurgent
attacks against the coalition in April 2004.
After the collapse of the Iraqi security forces in early 2004, the
Administration completed three key documents that outlined the evolving
U.S. strategy for Iraq. First, during the summer of 2004, MNF-I
completed a campaign plan that elaborated on and refined the original
strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces at
the local, regional, and national levels. Further details on this
campaign plan are classified.[Footnote 23] Second, in November 2005,
the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President's existing strategy for
achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. The
administration prepared this strategy document in response to a study
of the U.S. mission that found, among other things, that no unified
strategic plan existed to effectively integrate U.S. government
political, military, and economic efforts.[Footnote 24] Third, in April
2006, MNF-I and the U.S. embassy in Baghdad issued the first joint
campaign plan, which attempted to integrate U.S. political, military,
and economic efforts in Iraq. Further details of this campaign plan are
classified.[Footnote 25]
In July 2006, we reported that the NSVI represented an incomplete
strategy.[Footnote 26] The NSVI's purpose and scope were clear because
the strategy identified U.S. involvement in Iraq as a vital national
interest and Iraq as a central front in the war on terror. The strategy
also discussed the threats and risks facing the coalition forces and
provided a comprehensive description of U.S. political, security, and
economic goals and objectives in Iraq over the short, medium, and long
term. However, the NSVI only partially identified the agencies
responsible for implementing it, the current and future costs of U.S.
involvement in Iraq, and Iraq's contribution to its future needs.
The NSVI did not anticipate that security conditions in Iraq would
deteriorate as evidenced by the increased numbers of attacks that
followed the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners
increased through October 2006 and remained at high levels through the
end of the year. During 2006, according to State and UN reports,
insurgents, death squads, militias, and terrorists increased their
attacks against civilians, largely on a sectarian basis.
Current Strategic and Operational Plans for Iraq:
In response to the escalating violence, the President in January 2007
announced The New Way Forward, which established a new phase in U.S.
operations in Iraq. The strategy altered the administration's
assumptions regarding the security and political conditions in Iraq and
their effect on the achievement of U.S. goals. The administration,
however, has not revised its strategic plan for Iraq to include U.S.
goals and objectives for The New Way Forward, which ends this month, or
for the phase that follows. Instead, according to State and DOD
officials, the administration is relying on a set of 8 documents to
explain U.S. strategic goals and objectives for Iraq (see table 1).
[Footnote 27] Four documents defined the original strategic goals and
objectives of The New Way Forward phase. The administration believed
the strategy's goals and objectives were achievable by the end of a 12
month-to 18 month-long phase, which ends in July 2008. Four different
documents describe the phase that follows The New Way Forward.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Table 1: Documents That Explain the Current U.S. Strategy for Iraq:
New Way Forward phase (January 2007 through July 2008):
* Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, NSC, January 2007;
* The President's address to the nation, January 10, 2007;
* Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq, January 10, 2007;
* Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials, Office of the
Press Secretary, White House, January 10, 2007;
"Way Forward" Phase (begins July 2008):
* The President's address on Iraq, September 13, 2007;
* The President's address on Iraq, April 10, 2008;
* Fact Sheet: "The Way Forward in Iraq," April 10, 2008;
* The testimony of the Secretary of Defense, April 10, 2008.
Source: Information from State and DOD officials.
[End of table]
We found that the documents for the phase that follows The New Way
Forward do not specify the administration's strategic goals and
objectives in Iraq or how it intends to achieve them, although they
clearly state the importance the administration places on continued
U.S. involvement in and support for Iraq. Further, while they predict
continued progress in the security, political, and economic areas, they
do not address the remaining challenges to achieving either unmet U.S.
goals and objectives or the desired U.S. end state for Iraq.[Footnote
28]
Moreover, the current UN mandate for the multinational force in Iraq,
under Security Resolution 1790, will expire December 31, 2008, without
further UN action. This resolution reaffirmed MNF-I's authority to take
all necessary measures to maintain security and stability in Iraq, in
accordance with the Iraqi government's request for the continued
presence of MNF-I. The United States and Iraq are negotiating an
agreement to provide the United States and its coalition partners with
the legal basis necessary to conduct operations to support the Iraqi
government after the UN mandate ends.
State and DOD cite the classified MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Joint Campaign
Plan as providing a roadmap for future U.S. operations in Iraq.
[Footnote 29] According to a May 2008 State Department report, the
Joint Campaign Plan supports the implementation of U.S. efforts in Iraq
along four lines of operation: political, security, economic, and
diplomatic. The plan recognizes the importance of enhancing security
and protecting the Iraqi population and of advancing the political line
of operation to help Iraqis establish legitimate, representative
governance in their country at both the national and provincial levels.
A campaign plan, however, is an operational, not a strategic plan,
according DOD's doctrine for joint operation planning.[Footnote 30] A
campaign plan must rely on strategic guidance from national authorities
for its development. For example, the April 2006 MNF-I/U.S. embassy
Baghdad Joint Campaign Plan relied on the NSC's prior strategic plan,
the NSVI, as a basis for the plan's development.[Footnote 31]
Activities at the strategic level include establishing national and
multinational military objectives, as well as defining limits and
assessing risks for the use of military and other instruments of
national power. In contrast, activities at the operational level
establish objectives that link tactics on the ground to high-level
strategic objectives. The development of a campaign plan, according to
doctrine, should be based on suitable and feasible national strategic
objectives formulated by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--with appropriate
consultation with additional NSC members, other U.S. government
agencies, and multinational partners.
Joint doctrine also states that effective planning cannot occur without
a clear understanding of the end state and the conditions that must
exist to end military operations and draw down forces. According to
doctrine, a campaign plan should provide an estimate of the time and
forces required to reach the conditions for mission success or
termination. Our review of the classified Joint Campaign Plan, however,
identified limitations in these areas, which are discussed in a
classified GAO report.[Footnote 32] We will provide more information on
the Joint Campaign Plan in the closed portion of this hearing.
Recommendation:
The New Way Forward and the military surge that was central to it end
in July 2008. Moreover, the UN mandate authorizing MNF-I to maintain
security and stability in Iraq expires December 31, 2008; the United
States and Iraq are negotiating the legal framework to allow the United
States and its coalition partners to conduct operations to support the
Iraqi government after the UN mandate ends. Given these uncertainties,
the decreasing levels of enemy-initiated attacks, and weaknesses in
current DOD and State plans, an updated strategy is needed for how the
United States will help Iraq achieve key security, legislative, and
economic goals. Accordingly, we recommend that DOD and State, in
conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated strategy
for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and
addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern,
defend, and sustain itself. This strategy should build on recent
security and legislative gains, address the remaining unmet goals and
challenges for the near and long term, clearly articulate goals,
objectives, roles and responsibilities, and the resources needed, as
well as address prior GAO recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
questions that you or other Members have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please call Joseph A.
Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, on (202) 512-
8979. Other key contributors to this statement include Audrey Solis,
Assistant Director; Judith McCloskey, Assistant Director; Ashley Alley;
Monica Brym; Daniel Chen; Lynn Cothern; Leah DeWolf; Walker Fullerton;
Tetsuo Miyabara; and Kathleen Monahan. Edward George, Jr.; Andrea
Miller; Jena Sinkfield; and Cynthia Taylor provided technical
assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report:
Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-837] (Washington, D.C.: June
23, 2008).
[2] This figure includes appropriations for domestic and overseas
military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, such as
Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, as well as stabilization and reconstruction appropriations for
Iraq and Afghanistan. Of this amount, $65.9 billion will be available
October 1, 2008.
[3] This amount includes $2 billion appropriated in June 2008 for
reconstruction and stabilization activities in Iraq in the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-252. This amount does
not include $1.1 billion appropriated in the same Act for similar
activities in Iraq after October 1, 2008. About $20 billion for
improving Iraqi security forces included in this amount is also
included in DOD's reporting of Global War on Terrorism appropriations.
[4] To see GAO reports on Iraq, click on [hyperlink,
http://GAO.gov/docsearch/featured/oif.html].
[5] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008,
Section 9010,P L. 109-289 (Washington, D.C.: June 2008).
[6] Department of State/Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Iraq Weekly
Status Report, July 9, 2008.
[7] This is the U.S. goal as stated in Secretary of the Army Update,
Gulf Regional Division, Iraq, April 3, 2008.
[8] Iraq Weekly Status Report, July 9, 2008.
[9] UN Security Council Resolution 1790 (Dec. 18, 2007); S/RES/1790
(2007); S/RES/1546 (2004).
[10] GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Should Identify and Prioritize the
Conditions Necessary for the Continued Drawdown of Forces in Iraq,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-700C] (Washington,
D.C.: June 2008).
[11] According to DIA, the incidents captured in military reporting do
not account for all violence throughout Iraq. For example, they may
underreport incidents of Shi'a militias fighting each other and attacks
against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq and other areas with few
or no coalition forces. DIA officials stated, however, that they
represent a reliable and consistent source of information that can be
used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security
situation.
[12] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008,
Section 9010, P.L.109-289 (Washington, D.C.: March and June 2008).
[13] IFES, formally known as the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems, is an international election assistance organization. In
Iraq's 2005 elections, IFES provided election assistance to the Iraqi
government. IFES is also providing support for Iraq's upcoming
provincial elections.
[14] The total government budget includes the central government
ministries, provinces, and Kurdistan region. The central government
ministries include the ministries of oil, water, electricity, public
works, health, housing and construction, defense, interior, and other
spending units.
[15] The central government ministries include the ministries of oil,
water, electricity, public works, health, housing and construction,
defense, interior, and other spending units. We use the term
"investment budgets" to refer to capital goods and capital projects.
[16] GAO will issue a separate report on Iraq's estimated unspent and
projected oil revenues from 2003 through 2008.
[17] GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity
Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide
Efforts and Manage Risk, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-117 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.1, 2007).
[18] This is the U.S. goal as stated in Secretary of the Army Update,
Gulf Regional Division, Iraq, April 3, 2008.
[19] Iraq Weekly Status Report, July 9, 2008.
[20] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help
Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-677] (Washington, D.C.: May
15, 2007).
[21] See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges
in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-431T] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005).
[22] For more information on this security transition plan, see GAO,
Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services,
and Oversight Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
04-902R] (Washington, D.C: June 28, 2004).
[23] See GAO's classified report, Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should
Link Economic, Governance, and Security Indicators to Conditions for
Stabilizing Iraq, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-
868C] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005).
[24] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed
to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006).
[25] See GAO's classified report, Plans for Stabilizing Iraq,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-152C] (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 18, 2006).
[26] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-788]. The
desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy are
purpose, scope, and methodology; detailed discussion of problems,
risks, and threats; the desired goal, objectives, activities, and
outcome-related performance measures; description of future costs and
resources needed; delineation of U.S. government roles,
responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms; and a description of the
strategy's integration among and with other entities.
[27] DOD also identified the testimonies of the current and prospective
Commanding Generals of MNF-I, May 22, 2008, as articulating future U.S.
goals and objectives. However, DOD did not provide written statements
for either officer's testimony.
[28] These documents also discuss the ongoing drawdown of U.S. troops
in Iraq that will end in July 2008 and generally describe the U.S.
military transition that would occur in Iraq over an unspecified period
of time in the future. The U.S. military would continue to (1) conduct
combat operations; (2) train, equip, and support Iraqi security forces;
(3) transfer security responsibilities to them as provinces become
ready; and (4) over time move into an overwatch role. In this role,
U.S. forces would increasingly focus on targeted raids against the
terrorists and extremists, continue to train Iraqi forces, and be
available to help Iraq's security forces if required.
[29] State Department, Report to Congress: Submitted Pursuant to U.S.
Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227(c) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163), as amended by
Section 1223 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 (P.L. 110-181); May 2008.
[30] DOD, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning, Dec. 26,
2006.
[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-788].
[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-700C].
[End of section]
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