Defense Acquisitions
Department of Defense Needs Framework for Balancing Investments in Tactical Radios Gao ID: GAO-08-877 August 15, 2008The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent an estimated $12 billion on the development and production of tactical radios over the last 5 years--about as much as was spent producing Virginia Class submarines ($10.8 billion) in the same period. Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on superior information and communication capabilities. DOD is counting on the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) to deliver the breakthroughs in this area. At the same time as it is developing JTRS, DOD wants to ensure that current forces are equipped with sufficient legacy radios. To address Subcommittee concerns regarding DOD's approach to meeting current and future radio needs, GAO examined this subject. In response, this report addresses (1) how planned investments in key tactical radio systems changed over the last 5 years, (2) why these changes occurred, and (3) the challenges ahead. To assess these topics, GAO's work included reviewing 2003 through 2007 budget requests, legacy radio procurements, and the status of the JTRS program; and interviewing officials from DOD organizations.
Over the past 5 years, DOD investments in key tactical radios have shifted dramatically, both in size and composition. In 2002, when JTRS first began system development, DOD planned to invest close to $3 billion in JTRS over fiscal years 2003-2007. However, as shown below, actual investments more than doubled and shifted to producing thousands more legacy radios. Compared with the $3.2 billion that was slated to be spent on JTRS and the Army and Marine Corps legacy radios, about $8.3 billion was actually spent. Of this, about $5.7 billion was spent on the legacy radios, while $2.5 billion was spent on JTRS development. The change in tactical radio investments was brought about by (1) delays in the development and production of JTRS and (2) urgent demands for more radios to equip current forces. JTRS has encountered significant cost, schedule, and performance problems, causing some users to buy more legacy radios instead. Moreover, the military services' demand for tactical radios soared because of combat operations, the need to equip Guard and Reserve forces with modern radios, and to add more radios per combat unit. Supplemental funding of $5.5 billion paid for most of these legacy radios. Over the next 5 years, DOD faces several challenges in providing needed tactical communications capabilities to the warfighter, including: (1) overcoming technology hurdles, size and power constraints, and security architecture issues to complete JTRS development; (2) managing investments within defined fiscal constraints. A legacy vehicle radio costs about $20,000, while its more capable JTRS replacement is estimated to cost up to 10 times more; and (3) phasing in JTRS without prematurely retiring a relatively young inventory of legacy radios. DOD does not have a strategy to meet these challenges and thus runs the risk of having its future communications capabilities decided ad hoc.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-877, Defense Acquisitions: Department of Defense Needs Framework for Balancing Investments in Tactical Radios
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2008:
Defense Acquisitions:
Department of Defense Needs Framework for Balancing Investments in
Tactical Radios:
GAO-08-877:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-877, a report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent an estimated $12 billion on
the development and production of tactical radios over the last 5
years”about as much as was spent producing Virginia Class submarines
($10.8 billion) in the same period. Survivability and lethality in
warfare are increasingly dependent on superior information and
communication capabilities. DOD is counting on the Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) to deliver the breakthroughs in this area. At the same
time as it is developing JTRS, DOD wants to ensure that current forces
are equipped with sufficient legacy radios. To address Subcommittee
concerns regarding DOD's approach to meeting current and future radio
needs, GAO examined this subject. In response, this report addresses
(1) how planned investments in key tactical radio systems changed over
the last 5 years, (2) why these changes occurred, and (3) the
challenges ahead.
To assess these topics, GAO‘s work included reviewing 2003 through 2007
budget requests, legacy radio procurements, and the status of the JTRS
program; and interviewing officials from DOD organizations.
What GAO Found:
Over the past 5 years, DOD investments in key tactical radios have
shifted dramatically, both in size and composition. In 2002, when JTRS
first began system development, DOD planned to invest close to $3
billion in JTRS over fiscal years 2003-2007. However, as shown below,
actual investments more than doubled and shifted to producing thousands
more legacy radios. Compared with the $3.2 billion that was slated to
be spent on JTRS and the Army and Marine Corps legacy radios, about
$8.3 billion was actually spent. Of this, about $5.7 billion was spent
on the legacy radios, while $2.5 billion was spent on JTRS development.
Figure: Planned and Actual Spending on Tactical Radios, 2003-07:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a horizontal bar graph depicting the following data:
Development and Procurement of Tactical Radios, fiscal years 2003 and
2007:
Planned:
Legacy: $0.24 billion;
JTRS: $2.93 billion.
Actual:
Legacy: $5.72 billion;
JTRS: $2.54 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of service and JTRS annual budget requests.
[End of figure]
The change in tactical radio investments was brought about by (1)
delays in the development and production of JTRS and (2) urgent demands
for more radios to equip current forces. JTRS has encountered
significant cost, schedule, and performance problems, causing some
users to buy more legacy radios instead. Moreover, the military
services‘ demand for tactical radios soared because of combat
operations, the need to equip Guard and Reserve forces with modern
radios, and to add more radios per combat unit. Supplemental funding of
$5.5 billion paid for most of these legacy radios.
Over the next 5 years, DOD faces several challenges in providing needed
tactical communications capabilities to the warfighter, including:
* Overcoming technology hurdles, size and power constraints, and
security architecture issues to complete JTRS development.
* Managing investments within defined fiscal constraints. A legacy
vehicle radio costs about $20,000, while its more capable JTRS
replacement is estimated to cost up to 10 times more.
* Phasing in JTRS without prematurely retiring a relatively young
inventory of legacy radios.
DOD does not have a strategy to meet these challenges and thus runs the
risk of having its future communications capabilities decided ad hoc.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive
investment strategy for tactical radios and take actions to improve
oversight of their acquisition. In commenting on a draft of this report
DOD agreed with these recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-877]. For more
information, contact Paul Francis at (202) 512-4841 or
francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Investment in Key Tactical Radio Systems Has Shifted Dramatically in
Both Size and Composition:
Dramatic Change in Tactical Radio Investments Is Due Primarily to
Delays with JTRS and Near-Term Operational Needs:
Strategy for Acquiring Tactical Radios over Next Several Years in Flux:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Characteristics of Selected Tactical Radios:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Comparison of Frequency Band, Nominal Channel Bandwidth, and
Data Rates for Selected Legacy Waveforms and New Wideband Waveforms:
Table 2: JTRS Procurement Quantities:
Figures:
Figure 1: Comparison of Planned and Actual Spending for Tactical
Radios:
Figure 2: Impact of Restructuring on JTRS Schedules:
Figure 3: Army's Total Authorized Acquisition Objective for SINCGARS:
Figure 4: Funding for Army and Marine Corps Tactical Radios:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 15, 2008:
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jim Saxton:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent an estimated $12 billion on
the development and production of tactical radios over the last 5
years. To put this investment in context, the amount spent on tactical
radios is comparable to the estimated investments made in the Army's
Future Combat Systems ($10.4 billion) and the Navy's production of
Virginia Class submarines ($10.8 billion) during the same period.
Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on
smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information
and communication capabilities. Moving this information--including
bandwidth-intensive data and video--to, from, and across the
battlefield requires breakthroughs in radio technology. DOD's existing
or "legacy" radios lack the capacity and flexibility necessary to
achieve and maintain this level of information superiority. DOD is
counting on the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), a development
program begun in 1997, to deliver the needed breakthrough. JTRS relies
on networked communications to improve information sharing,
collaboration, and situational awareness, thus enabling more rapid and
effective decision making and execution on the battlefield. It is
intended to provide the bandwidth volume to handle the information
traffic, emulate different legacy radios, and function as a router for
tactical networks. The design of some new weapon systems, such as the
Future Combat Systems, depends on a JTRS-equipped network.
At the same time DOD is developing JTRS for future forces, it is
striving to ensure that current forces are equipped with legacy radios
to carry out assigned missions. DOD is confronted with the challenge of
balancing the investment in both current and future radios--a dynamic
proposition given that current needs change and future capabilities do
not necessarily proceed predictably. To determine whether DOD and the
military services are acquiring radios in the most cost-efficient and
effective manner and have developed a strategy to balance near-and long-
term requirements, address capability gaps, and determine funding
needs, the Subcommittee requested that GAO study how effectively DOD
and the military services are managing the acquisition of radio
systems. Specifically we (1) examined how the services' planned
investments in key tactical radio systems have changed over the last 5
years, (2) determined why these changes occurred, and (3) identified
challenges that will confront the services as they plan tactical radio
investments to provide desired future capabilities.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to July 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
To assess tactical radio investments and risks, we reviewed fiscal year
2003 through 2007 budget[Footnote 1] requests, procurements of legacy
radios for that time period, the current status of the JTRS program,
and JTRS migration plans. We interviewed agency officials from various
DOD and service organizations and reviewed plans and reports produced
by Defense organizations. More details about our scope and methodology
are in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Over the past 5 years, DOD investments in key tactical radios have
shifted dramatically, both in size and composition. In 2002, when the
JTRS program began system development, DOD planned to invest close to
$3 billion in JTRS over fiscal years 2003-2007--about $1 billion to
develop and test the radios and another $2 billion to start procuring
them. Investment in legacy radios was expected to be relatively small
and diminish almost entirely as JTRS became available. For example, the
Army and Marine Corps planned to spend only about $235 million between
2003 and 2007 on legacy radios for ground vehicles and soldiers/
marines. However, actual investments more than doubled and shifted away
from planning to produce JTRS to producing thousands more legacy
radios. Compared with the $3.2 billion that was slated to be spent on
JTRS and the Army and Marine Corps legacy radios, about $8.3 billion
was actually spent. Of this, about $5.7 billion was spent on the legacy
radios, while $2.5 billion was spent on JTRS development. Other than
fielding an enhanced legacy handheld radio, no JTRS networking radios
were produced or fielded during this time.
The change in tactical radio investments was brought about by two
primary factors: (1) delays in the development and production of JTRS
and (2) urgent demands for additional radios to equip current forces.
JTRS encountered significant cost, schedule, and performance problems
early in its development. The program was restructured in 2006,
resulting in the deferral of some capabilities and the addition of much
more time and funding to complete development. While prudent, the
restructuring delayed the fielding of the first JTRS Ground Mobile
Radios by 5 years to 2010. Because of the delay, some users who were
depending on JTRS such as Army helicopter programs had to buy more
legacy radios instead. At the same time, however, the military
services' demand for tactical radios soared--a demand that was met by
buying tens of thousands of legacy radios. The demand was fueled by
combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need to equip Guard and
Reserve forces with modern radios, and a change in the Army and Marine
Corps' concept of operations that calls for more radios per combat
unit. The resultant investments in legacy radios have evolved from year
to year, as the services reacted to needs that cropped up, and were
largely enabled by supplemental funding, which supplied most--an
estimated $5.5 billion--of the additional funds. Because DOD developed
the supplemental budgets relatively quickly and without the level of
review and oversight normally required through the regular annual
budget process, there was limited visibility into the services' plans
for acquiring tactical radios. In addition, a waiver/notification
process established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to help
manage the transition from legacy radios to JTRS has not been effective
in tracking the nature and extent of tactical radio investments.
Over the next 5 years, DOD faces several challenges in providing needed
tactical communications capabilities to the warfighter: completing JTRS
development, managing investments within tighter fiscal constraints,
and developing a fielding strategy for tactical radios. While JTRS is
making progress, the program must still overcome technology hurdles,
size and power constraints, and security architecture issues to avoid
further delays. The high cost of JTRS has also become an increasing
concern. Currently, a legacy vehicle radio costs about $20,000, while
its JTRS replacement, albeit significantly more capable, is estimated
to cost up to 10 times more. In addition, the cost of integrating JTRS
with existing weapons systems is expected to be substantial in some
cases. Thus, the decision to put more radios in each combat unit may
not be sustainable with the more costly JTRS. In fact, the military
services have begun to scale back the number of JTRS radios they plan
to buy and rethink how JTRS capabilities will be fielded. Since the
recently purchased legacy radios are expected to have a useful life of
10-15 years, fielding JTRS without phasing out legacy radios
prematurely will necessitate striking a balance between capability and
cost. For example, DOD may have to consider whether the investment
priority for JTRS should be on network-dependent systems, like the
Army's Future Combat Systems, or for replacing legacy radios. Available
funding, absent continued high levels of supplemental budgets, will
likely not support meeting both sets of needs. However, DOD does not
have a strategy for balancing its future tactical radio investments, as
previous plans are outdated.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense develop an investment
strategy that establishes priorities to guide resource decisions on
legacy radios, upgraded radios, and the new generation of radios that
JTRS represents. We are also recommending that such a strategy provide
discipline to bound investment decisions, such as a reinvigorated
notification/waiver process, as well as a back-up plan in the event
that JTRS does not provide the desired capabilities on time. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with these
recommendations.
Background:
Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on
smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information
and communication capabilities. DOD's existing tactical radio systems
lack the functionality and flexibility necessary to achieve and
maintain information superiority or to support the rapid mobility and
interoperability desired by armed forces. Most of these radios were
designed with mutually exclusive architectures to perform specific
tasks and can only interoperate with like radios. Their functions are
largely governed by their hardware components. In addition, they
operate at low to medium data rates, have limited networking
capabilities, and are not capable of simultaneous voice, data, and
video operations. Furthermore, the radios have many unique components
and parts that require specialized support and create a logistics
burden.
The military services use many different types of tactical radios,
including some that were developed decades ago. The Single Channel
Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) is the primary means of
command and control for Army combat and support units. Different
variants of the radio are used in vehicles, aircraft, and as "manpack"
radios carried by soldiers. The radios provide voice and limited data
capabilities. The Marine Corps also uses SINCGARS, but also relies on
the AN/VRC-110 and the AN/VRC-111 radios for its vehicles. These radios
have multiple waveforms,[Footnote 2] including the SINCGARS waveform,
and can be pulled out of vehicles and used as handheld radios. The Navy
and Air Force use a variety of radios for their airborne platforms; one
of the most common is the AN/ARC-210, a single-channel radio which
provides voice and data communications over a variety of waveforms. To
meet its fixed station and maritime needs, the Navy uses the Digital
Modular Radio, which operates on multiple waveforms and provides voice
and data capabilities, and other radios. Appendix II provides a more
complete list of selected tactical radios currently in use and their
capabilities.
To support new operational and mission requirements, DOD determined
that the large number and diversity of legacy radios in use would
require wholesale replacement or expensive modifications. The JTRS
program was initiated in 1997 to exploit advancements in software-
defined radio technology and provide superior communications and
networking capabilities to the warfighter. Software-defined radios such
as JTRS use software rather than hardware to control how the radio
works and, as a result, offer significant flexibility to meet a wide
variety of needs. Rather than developing radios that are built to
different standards and operate on different frequencies as was the
case in the past, DOD will develop JTRS as a single, interoperable
family of radios based on a common set of standards and applications.
The radios are expected to not only satisfy the requirements common to
the military's three operational domains--air, sea, and ground--but be
able to communicate directly with many of DOD's existing tactical
radios.
In addition to supporting interoperability, JTRS is intended to
contribute to DOD's goal of network-centric warfare operations by
introducing new wideband networking waveforms that dramatically
increase the amount of data and speed at which the data can be
transmitted. The wideband networking waveform being developed for
ground vehicles, for example, is expected to provide data rates of up
to 5 megabits per second or more which is at least ten times faster
than legacy radio systems--akin to upgrading from a "dial-up" modem to
a broadband connection. As such, the waveforms would facilitate the use
of maps, imagery, and video to support the decision making of tactical
commanders at all echelons. Table 1 compares the frequency band,
nominal channel bandwidth, and data rates of selected legacy waveforms
and new wideband waveforms.
Table 1: Comparison of Frequency Band, Nominal Channel Bandwidth, and
Data Rates for Selected Legacy Waveforms and New Wideband Waveforms:
Waveform: Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS);
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 30 - 88;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 25;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Voice: 16; Data:
.075 - 16.
Waveform: Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS);
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 420 - 450;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 3,000;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Data: Up to 1,000.
Waveform: High Frequency;
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 2 - 30;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 3/6/12;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Voice and Data: 11
distinct data rates between .075 - 9.6.
Waveform: Have Quick;
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 225 - 400;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 25;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Voice: 16; Data:
.075 - 16.
Waveform: Tactical Data Information Link-Joint (TADIL-J);
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 960 - 1,215;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 3,000;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Voice: 2.4 and 16;
Data: 28.8 - 1,137.
Waveform: Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications Demand Assigned
Multiple Access (UHF SATCOM DAMA);
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 225 - 400;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 5 and 25;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Voice and Data: .075 -
56, or 64.
New: Wideband Networking[A];
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 2 - 2,000;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 25 - 30,000;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Data: up to 5,000.
New: Soldier Radio[A];
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 2 - 2,000;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 13,000;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Data: up to 1,000.
New: Joint Airborne Network - Tactical Edge;
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 2 - 2,000;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): To be determined;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): To be determined.
Source: GAO analysis of April 2003 JTRS Operational Requirements
Document, Annex E.
[A] The Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform are
actually families of waveforms. The Wideband Networking Waveform family
consists of four different waveforms and the Soldier Radio Waveform
family consists of three different waveforms.
[End of table]
In addition to providing new wideband waveforms, individual JTRS radios
would have the capability to support multiple services (e.g., voice,
data, and video) and operate on multiple channels simultaneously. For
example, a four-channel JTRS radio set intended for a ground vehicle
could be programmed to have channels dedicated to SINCGARS, EPLRS, the
Wideband Networking Waveform, and the Soldier Radio Waveform. All four
channels could be operating simultaneously. Data could also be
transferred from one channel (or network) to another through a
"gateway" device implemented with hardware and software. Furthermore,
since JTRS is expected to operate as a mobile network, each multi-
channel JTRS set will function as a router, meaning that it is
responsible for passing along information (voice, data, and video) from
other JTRS radios.
To manage JTRS' development, DOD established a joint program office,
and service-led product offices clustered by requirements. In 2006, all
the JTRS programs were realigned under the authority of a single JTRS
Joint Program Executive Officer (JPEO). The JPEO established an
organizational structure for JTRS that includes three domains: (1)
ground radios; (2) air, maritime, and fixed station; and (3) network
enterprise services and a program for special radios.
In an effort to manage the transition of tactical radios to JTRS, in
1998, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence issued a memorandum directing
all Component efforts to develop and acquire any radio system be held
in abeyance. Service, command, or agency acquisition executives could
submit requests for exceptions through the JTRS Joint Program Office
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration.[Footnote 3] The request for exceptions (or waiver policy)
was amended in May 2005. The amended policy suspended the waiver
process and only required that notifications of plans to acquire radios
be provided to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration.
Investment in Key Tactical Radio Systems Has Shifted Dramatically in
Both Size and Composition:
Over the past 5 years, investments in key tactical radios systems have
exceeded planned investments by more than double and shifted
dramatically in scope. In 2003, DOD and the services planned to invest
mainly in the development and production of JTRS. At the same time,
investment in legacy radios was expected to be relatively small and
diminish almost entirely as JTRS became available. However, actual
spending on tactical radios turned out to be very different. Not only
did spending between fiscal years 2003 and 2007 increase significantly,
from about $3.2 billion to about $8.3 billion, it shifted away from
procuring JTRS to procuring tens of thousands of additional legacy
radios. See figure 1.
Figure 1: Comparison of Planned and Actual Spending for Tactical
Radios:
[See PDF for image]
Development and Procurement of Tactical Radios, fiscal years 2003 and
2007:
Planned:
Legacy: $0.24 billion;
JTRS: $2.93 billion.
Actual:
Legacy: $5.72 billion;
JTRS: $2.54 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of service and JTRS annual budget requests.
[End of figure]
In 2003, DOD and the services planned to spend approximately $3 billion
on JTRS over the next 5 years--$1 billion for research and development,
and $2 billion to procure the first JTRS radios. The Army and Marine
Corps planned to spend approximately $235 million for legacy radios
between 2003 and 2007. The Army planned to spend approximately $140
million to procure SINCGARS and handheld and "manpack" radios; the
Marine Corps planned to spend about $98 million to procure a variety of
tactical communications systems.
In actuality, DOD and the services invested over twice as much as
planned to develop JTRS capabilities--about $2.5 billion--while no JTRS
networking radios were produced during this time. Legacy radio
spending, on the other hand, ballooned to approximately $5.7 billion,
about 24 times what was planned. Of this, the Army spent approximately
$4.1 billion, including $2.3 billion on SINCGARS radios and $1.8
billion on handheld and manpack radios. The Marine Corps spent $1.6
billion on a variety of tactical communication systems.
Dramatic Change in Tactical Radio Investments Is Due Primarily to
Delays with JTRS and Near-Term Operational Needs:
The dramatic change in the size and scope of tactical radio investments
over the last 5 years is due to two primary factors. First, cost,
schedule, and performance problems delayed development of JTRS
capabilities by several years. Second, combat operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq have significantly increased the demand for tactical radios--
a demand that could only be met by buying legacy radios. The demand was
driven by a desire to equip deploying units with modern radios and a
change in concept of operations that calls for more radios per unit.
The resultant investment in legacy radios evolved from year to year as
needs arose and was largely enabled by the availability of supplemental
funding. Although a notification process was established to help manage
the transition from legacy radios to JTRS, it was not effective in
tracking the extent of investments in legacy radios that occurred.
Development and Production of JTRS Delayed by Several Years:
As we have previously reported, developing JTRS has proven to be a
significant technical and management challenge.[Footnote 4] A few years
into system development, the program experienced considerable cost and
schedule overruns and performance shortfalls, necessitating a major
restructuring of the program in 2006. As a result, considerably more
time and funding were added to complete the first increment of JTRS.
The revised schedules for each of the JTRS program components expanded
development times by several years (see Fig. 2).
Figure 2: Impact of Restructuring on JTRS Schedules:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the impact of restructuring on JTRS
schedules, as follows:
Ground Mobile radios: Low-rate production decision;
Original: 2005;
New: 2010.
Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit: Low-rate production decision;
Original: 2008;
New: 2010.
Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Station radios: System development and
demonstration decision;
Original: 2006;
New: 2008.
Source: GAO analysis of JTRS JPEO data.
[A] The pre-and post restructuring components of the Handheld, Manpack,
and Small Form Fit program did not lend themselves to a direct
comparison. For figure 2, we compared the two components that were the
closest in scope. The pre restructuring component was Spiral 2, which
consisted of 1-and 2-channel Handhelds, an enhanced 2-channel Manpack,
and Small Form Fit variants A through L. The post restructuring
component was Phase 2, which consists of a 2-channel Handheld, 2-
channel Manpack, and Small Form Fit variants B, C, D, I, and J.
[End of figure]
The production decision for the Ground Mobile Radio variants, for
example, was delayed by 5 years, from 2005 to 2010. In addition, the
start of system development for the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed
Station radios was delayed by 2 years. Although the Airborne, Maritime,
and Fixed Station program went through a presystem development phase to
reduce technical risks associated with developing airborne networking
capabilities, the program was delayed from starting until costs and
production quantities could be worked out. Overall, the estimated cost
to develop JTRS and its various program components increased from about
$3.5 billion to almost $6 billion through fiscal year 2011.
Problems encountered with JTRS were largely the result of starting
system development with immature technologies, unstable requirements,
and aggressive schedules. The Army-led JTRS program for ground vehicles
and helicopters,[Footnote 5] for example, began system development in
2002 with none of its 20 critical technologies sufficiently matured,
requirements not clearly defined, and a compressed development schedule
that allowed too little time for testing. As a result, the program
struggled to mature and integrate technologies to meet size, weight,
and power constraints and evolving security requirements for the
radios, and was forced to make design changes to address these issues.
Meeting requirements in the JTRS Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit
radio program also proved to be challenging, given the smaller size,
weight, and power needs for these radios.
DOD restructured the JTRS program to reduce risk and establish a more
incremental approach to developing JTRS capabilities. In restructuring
JTRS, DOD deferred several requirements and radio features to later
program increments. For example, DOD reduced the number of radio
variants by half (26 to 13) and the number of waveforms by about two-
thirds (32 to 11). The original intent of JTRS was to allow most
waveforms to operate on most of the radio variants. By reducing the
number of waveforms per radio variant, DOD expected to reduce costly
porting efforts--software development needed to make a waveform work on
different radio variants--and more readily address size, weight, and
power constraints.
Although JTRS will deliver radios significantly later than initially
planned, the program is still intended to meet the needs of key users
such as the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. FCS, which is a large
and complex effort by the Army to develop a suite of new weapon systems
and vehicles linked by a new information network, is depending on
several JTRS variants and wideband waveforms to provide critical
communications and networking capabilities. However, as we have
reported over the past several years, the FCS program has struggled to
define requirements and mature critical technologies, and is at risk of
incurring further cost and schedule delays.[Footnote 6]
Several other users depending on JTRS have had to invest in legacy
radio systems to meet their needs because of the delays with the
program. For example:
* Army Aviation, which needed JTRS to provide the required
interoperability capability for Future Force and Joint Force
operations, was planning to buy JTRS radios for its helicopters
starting in fiscal year 2006. Several Army helicopter systems, such as
the Longbow Apache (AH-64D), are being modernized and the Army planned
to integrate JTRS sets into these aircraft. According to the Army, the
aircraft modernization work could not be delayed until JTRS becomes
available and the aircraft would not be mission capable without a
communications package. As a result, the Army decided to buy an
alternative legacy radio system to fulfill this need. According to Army
estimates, it will spend approximately $310 million between 2005 and
2013 to procure the alternate radio system for various helicopter
programs.
* The Air Force and Navy also had to procure legacy communications
systems for various aircraft systems and ships that were either in
production or being upgraded. The Air Force, for example, requested AN/
ARC-210 radios for the Global Hawk, F-15E, F-16 Block 40/42, and A-10
aircraft while the Navy requested Digital Modular Radios for new ship
construction in support of the National Defense Sealift Fund.
* The Navy is modernizing the AN/ARC-210 radio in part because of the
need to add certain capabilities that will not be filled by the first
increment of JTRS. For example, it is adding the capability to host a
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System waveform to the AN/ARC-210.
The new approach and landing system, which is intended to provide more
accurate Global Positioning System (GPS)-based landing guidance for
aircraft during all weather conditions, has been in development in DOD
for several years. The Navy is also modernizing the AN/ARC-210 to
address National Security Agency (NSA) requirements for cryptographic
obsolescence in legacy radio systems.[Footnote 7] According to Navy
officials, the Navy plans to spend approximately $50 million in
research and development for the modernization of the AN/ARC-210 radio.
Combat Operations and Force Modernization Requirements Have Increased
the Demand for Tactical Legacy Radios:
Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have also been a key reason
for the huge increase in spending on legacy radios by the Army and
Marine Corps. With the build-up of the war, tactical radios have become
critical to conducting operations. According to the Army and Marine
Corps, legacy radios were purchased to ensure units being deployed had
modern communications capabilities. In some cases, newer versions of
legacy radios were purchased to replace older radios and to ensure
units were equipped to wartime readiness levels. This included, for
example, replacing several thousand Vietnam-era radios that still
existed in certain Army National Guard and Reserve units with SINCGARS
radios. In addition, as we have previously reported,[Footnote 8] some
Army National Guard units were equipped at less than wartime readiness
levels (often at 65 to 75 percent of requirements) under the assumption
that there would be sufficient time for Guard forces to obtain
additional equipment prior to deployment. While the Army was able to
transfer equipment from non-deploying units to deploying units to
compensate for some of these shortages in the near term, the large
number of units needed for deployment required the purchase of
additional communications equipment.
According to Marine Corps officials, before combat operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan started, the Marine Corps had envisioned keeping many
of its aging legacy radios until the introduction of JTRS radios could
replace them. However, as operations got under way, the Marine Corps
began modernizing its inventory of radios, replacing them with newer
legacy radios that provided improved on-the-move and over-the-horizon
communications capabilities. The Marine Corps, for example, replaced
older versions of SINCGARS and other manpack radios with newer multi-
band radios that allow a marine to operate a single radio in either
VHF, UHF line-of-site, or UHF SATCOM modes of operation. In addition,
the Army and Marine Corps needed radios to replace combat losses and to
equip new force protection vehicles being procured, such as up-armored
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled vehicles and, more recently, the
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles.
The Army and Marine Corps have also increased the number of radios to
combat and support units based on lessons learned from combat
operations. As a result of attacks against combat and support vehicles
that did not have sufficient communications capabilities, the services
have been pursuing a strategy to equip virtually every vehicle being
used in combat operations with a radio. For example, very few trucks in
logistics units were supplied with tactical radios; however, the threat
to supply convoys made providing these units with radios more critical.
Furthermore, the services have expanded communications to platoon and
squad levels of the force, purchasing handheld and intra-squad radios
for soldiers who previously had no radios. For example, a typical
Marine Corps rifle company, which consists of about 180 marines, was
equipped with 9 tactical radios prior to the war in Iraq. The same
rifle company is now equipped with about 225 radios, most of which are
intended for intra-squad communications.
Moreover, since 2004, the Army has also been going through a major
force restructuring--referred to as modularity--that has driven
requirements to field more tactical radios to lower echelon units. In
restructuring the force, the Army has established modular Brigade
Combat Teams and Support Brigades that are designed, equipped, and
staffed differently than the units they replace. The new brigades are
intended to be more self-sustainable, agile, and deployable through the
introduction of key enablers such as enhanced military intelligence and
communications capabilities. In September 2004, the Army estimated it
would need an additional 66,166 SINCGARS receiver/transmitter units to
support the modularity initiative. Without additional tactical radios,
the Army could not achieve its intended design objectives for these
brigade units.
According to Army officials, increased demands for equipment, like
radios, are translated into specific quantities the Army refers to as
authorized acquisition objectives. The acquisition objective
establishes the total quantity of a piece of equipment needed to supply
and sustain the force and is not intended to be constrained in terms of
available resources. In the Army, acquisition objectives are derived
from force structure reviews that analyze threat, operational
conditions, and force readiness. As shown in figure 3, since 2002, the
Army's acquisition objective for SINCGARS ground radios increased
steadily, from about 232,000 radio receiver/transmitter units[Footnote
9] in fiscal year 2002 to more than 526,000 units in 2007, reflecting
the emergence of new requirements for radios. The Army bought 244,780
SINCGARS between 2003 and 2007 to meet this objective.
Figure 3: Army's Total Authorized Acquisition Objective for SINCGARS:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a line graph depicting the following data:
Army's Total Authorized Acquisition Objective for SINCGARS:
Fiscal year: 2002;
Number of radio units: 232,411.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Number of radio units: 327,655.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Number of radio units: 472,567.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of radio units: 526,192.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Number of radio units: 581,000.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of figure]
Investment in Tactical Radios Evolved From Year to Year as Supplemental
Funding Became Available:
The increased demand for legacy radios was largely facilitated through
the availability of supplemental funding, which provided the vast
majority of funding to procure these radios. Between 2003 and 2007,
supplemental funding supplied an estimated 90 percent--$5.5 out of $6.1
billion--of the funding the Army and Marine Corps received to procure
legacy radios (see figure 4). DOD and the services requested a
relatively small proportion of funding through the regular budget
process.
Figure 4: Funding for Army and Marine Corps Tactical Radios:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Year: 2003;
Base budget: $122 million;
Supplemental budget: 0.
Year: 2004;
Base budget: $109 million;
Supplemental budget: $225 million.
Year: 2005;
Base budget: $133 million;
Supplemental budget: $1273 million.
Year: 2006;
Base budget: $111 million;
Supplemental budget: $2273 million.
Year: 2007;
Base budget: $114 million;
Supplemental budget: $1754 million.
Source: GAO analysis of Service budget data.
[End of figure]
The reliance on supplemental budgets to acquire tactical radios
continued in fiscal year 2008, with the Army and Marine Corps
requesting an additional $3.3 billion in October 2007. Although
Congress did not act on the budget request, DOD resubmitted the request
in February 2008. In March 2008, however, the Army informed Congress
that it had overstated its request for SINCGARS funding by $1.7
billion; the Army had requested funds for 170,756 more SINCGARS, when
only 56,000 were needed to meet its authorized acquisition objective.
Because DOD's regular budget process is lengthy--it takes 18 months to
plan, develop, and complete an annual budget submission to Congress--
the services should identify potential offsets when seeking additional
funding in excess of budget-year guidance levels. Supplemental budgets
provided an opportunity for the services to respond to emerging needs
relatively quickly and to request funding without having to trade
against other ongoing or planned weapon system investments. However,
because supplemental budgets were developed quickly and as one-time
requests to address immediate needs, they offered little visibility
into the services plans for acquiring tactical radios.
The huge increase in legacy radio investments was also facilitated by
the suspension of a JTRS waiver process. In 1998, DOD instituted a
waiver policy in order to control the acquisition of legacy radios in
anticipation of JTRS capabilities becoming available. In May 2005, in
response to delays with the delivery of JTRS products, DOD suspended
the waiver policy for tactical radios. However, in order to maintain
visibility into legacy procurement activities, DOD still required the
services to notify the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration (Office) prior to any procurement
actions to buy tactical radios. In notifying the Office of procurement
actions, the services were required to identify the requirements
necessitating the procurement and whether any operational impacts would
result if the request was disapproved. According to data the Office has
collected through federal contract announcements and other means,
notifications from the services have been inconsistent and do not
reflect all tactical radio procurements that took place over the past
several years. In addition, according to a representative of the
Office, notifications that were submitted by the services did not
provide sufficient detail to understand why radios were being procured
or how the procurement actions fit in with other procurements.
Strategy for Acquiring Tactical Radios over Next Several Years in Flux:
DOD's original strategy for acquiring tactical radios centered on JTRS
as a replacement for legacy radios and a means to achieve new
networking capabilities. While JTRS has made progress in developing
radio products and waveforms, it must still resolve key technical
hurdles that could lead to further delays in the program. When JTRS
actually becomes available, however, the strategy of replacing legacy
radios as previously envisioned may no longer be an option in view of
(1) the potentially smaller market for JTRS given the large,
unanticipated purchase of legacy radios that have many years of life
left and (2) the need to manage investments within reasonable funding
expectations. In addition, while JTRS radios may offer significant new
capabilities, they are much costlier than legacy radios and in some
cases additional large investments are required to fully integrate them
into existing military platforms. These costs may run counter to recent
decisions to significantly increase the numbers of radios issued to
each unit. The high costs of JTRS radios have led to the services to
scale back their plans for acquiring the radios and have also led to
recent efforts to seek lower cost alternatives. Fielding JTRS
expeditiously while making the most out of the large investment in
legacy radios will necessitate striking a balance--both in terms of
capability and cost. DOD, however, does not yet have a strategy for
guiding the services' acquisition of tactical radios over the next
several years.
JTRS Program Must Still Resolve Technology Issues:
The JTRS program has made progress since being restructured. Early
prototypes of JTRS ground radio variants and networking waveforms have
been developed and some JTRS capabilities have been demonstrated in a
laboratory environment and, to a lesser extent, during recent field
experiments. However, significant technological challenges remain that
place completion of JTRS development at risk. In particular, designing
JTRS radios that meet operational requirements within required size,
weight, and power constraints has proven to be particularly challenging
for several of the JTRS radio configurations. Moreover, the transition
from legacy radios that operate at a single level of security and have
their functionality defined in hardware to networked radios that
operate at multiple levels of security and have their functionality
defined in software has raised new concerns about tactical radios'
security architecture--concerns that were not fully appreciated when
the JTRS program began. Whether or not these technical challenges can
be overcome will not be known until major test and evaluation events
are conducted in the next few years.
JTRS radios require significant amounts of memory and processing power,
particularly to run the new transformational networking waveforms that
will enable network-centric operations. The processing power required
to run these networking waveforms rapidly consumes electric power in
the radios and generates a significant amount of heat, which must be
dissipated to keep the electronic components of the radio operating at
a safe temperature. Dissipating heat often requires increasing the size
and weight of the radio. However, keeping size, weight, and power
consumption to an absolute minimum is a critical operational
requirement for JTRS and particularly for the Handheld, Manpack, and
Small Form Fit variants. For example, the JTRS program is attempting to
develop a 2-channel handheld radio weighing no more than 3.8 pounds
that is capable of running the Soldier Radio Waveform, as well as key
legacy waveforms. The challenge of meeting these design constraints has
prompted the program manager to identify size, weight, and thermal
management as high-risk elements for the JTRS 2-channel handheld radio
development. Although the recently started Airborne, Maritime, and
Fixed-Station program should benefit from the system development
experiences of the earlier JTRS programs, its size, weight, power, and
thermal issues are currently seen as a key program risk.
JTRS radios must address stringent security architecture requirements
established by the NSA and must be certified through a multistage
process during their design and development. Certification is a
rigorous and potentially time-consuming process, and consequently must
be factored into the schedule for each radio's system development.
While JTRS developers must be concerned with traditional security
issues affecting all tactical radios, the unique characteristics of
JTRS radios have introduced new complexities into the certification
process. First, because much of the functionality of JTRS radios is
defined in software rather than in hardware, developers must be
prepared to incorporate the features commonly required for computer
security. Second, JTRS is required to operate in a networked
environment, at multiple levels of security, and consequently allows
greater access to other networks. Because this access increases the
number of potential users and the likelihood of threats to the network,
developers must be prepared to implement additional features required
to maintain network security. According to NSA representatives, JTRS's
open networking capability has raised the bar for ensuring that its
security architecture is sound.
The JPEO continues to identify security certification requirements as a
significant risk element for the development of each variant of JTRS
radios. For example, following the preliminary design review of the
Ground Mobile Radio in July 2007, NSA informed the JPEO that certain
aspects of the radio's security architecture did not meet the agency's
standards. In response to these concerns, the JPEO is assessing
potential design modifications to the radio and hopes to have an
implementation plan in place later this year. The difficulties
encountered in meeting security requirements also contributed to a
significant Nunn-McCurdy unit-cost breach for the Ground Mobile Radio
program that was declared in November 2007.[Footnote 10] The breach
reflected an increase in the program acquisition unit cost of about 24
percent above the current program cost baseline established in 2002. In
addition, the need to address NSA security requirements has recently
delayed the Multifunctional Information Distribution System-JTRS
program. Although NSA concurred with the design of the system, the
program encountered difficulties in meeting the requirements for
security verification testing. This contributed to a program schedule
slip of almost 12 months.
Services Reconsidering Commitments to JTRS Because of High Costs and
Continued Need for Legacy Radios:
While JTRS radios are intended to provide a significant increase in
communications and networking capabilities, they will be significantly
more costly than the legacy radios they will replace. Depending on the
JTRS product, estimated unit costs will range from an average of about
$27,000[Footnote 11] for the Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit
radios to more than $1 million for the much larger maritime/fixed
station radios. For some of the JTRS products, the costs are several
times more than the legacy systems they will replace. For example, a
fully configured vehicular version of the Army's SINCGARS radio costs
about $20,000 and the Army's Enhanced Position Location Reporting
System costs about $20,000 to $33,000 depending upon its configuration.
In contrast, the average cost of the 4-channel vehicular configuration
of the JTRS Ground Mobile Radio--which will be able to perform the
function of both of these legacy radios and will add a transformational
networking capability--is about $220,000. Similarly, according to
AN/ARC-210 program office representatives, the latest generation of the
1-channel AN/ARC-210 radio costs about $80,000, with most aircraft
configured with two of the radios. In contrast, the average unit cost
of the 2-channel airborne configuration of the JTRS radio is about
$480,000.
Moreover, to take full advantage of the new capabilities JTRS can
provide, it must be integrated into existing military platforms.
Integration costs, which are in addition to the cost of the JTRS radio
itself, are borne by the integrating program and, according to Navy
representatives, are most significant when attempting to fully
integrate the networking capabilities of the JTRS radio into the
mission avionics of legacy aircraft. Unlike ships, these aircraft do
not have the computer architecture to easily incorporate modern
networking capabilities. Consequently, fully integrating JTRS into
legacy aircraft will require major modifications to both the hardware
and software of the aircraft's mission avionic systems, as well as
extensive testing and evaluation to ensure that the airworthiness of
the aircraft has not been adversely affected. According to Navy
representatives, the cost to retrofit and fully integrate JTRS
networking capabilities into four Naval aircraft--the F/A-18E/F, EA-
18G, E-2C, and E-2D--has been estimated to be about $868 million. Air
Force representatives agreed that full integration of JTRS onto legacy
aircraft would be very expensive. They noted, however, that as long as
integration of JTRS occurs in conjunction with major modifications or
modernization of these aircraft--during which mission avionic systems
are upgraded and extensive airworthiness must be carried out--the
incremental costs of integrating JTRS would be much less.
While JTRS was originally intended to replace virtually all legacy
radios, this is no longer a practical or affordable investment strategy
for DOD and the services. JTRS is still critical to networking the
force but the strategy of a wholesale replacement of radios is being
reconsidered in light of the cost and availability of JTRS radios, the
recent large investment in legacy radios, and the need to continue
acquiring legacy radios in the near term. According to the services,
the legacy radios purchased in the past several years provide effective
communications capabilities to meet current operational demands. As
these radios are expected to have an operating life of 10-15 years, the
services expect to use a large proportion of them for many years to
come. Absent JTRS radios, the services plan to continue purchasing
legacy radios over the next several years because of continuing combat
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to implement plans to increase
the size of the force. In January 2007, the President announced a
permanent increase in the size of the Army and Marine Corps to enhance
overall U.S. forces, reduce stress on deployable personnel, and provide
more forces for the Global War on Terrorism. The planned expansion will
add more than 74,000 soldiers to the Army by 2013 and 27,000 marines to
the Marine Corps by 2011.
DOD and the services have scaled back the number of JTRS radios they
plan to buy (see table 2). For example, the total planned quantity of
JTRS Ground Mobile Radios was recently reduced from 108,086 radios to
86,512, a 20 percent decrease. While a portion of this decrease is due
to the fact that several Army helicopter systems were originally to
have received the Ground Mobile Radio variant but will now receive the
Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Station radio variant, the decrease is
also due to the Marine Corps reducing its requirement to only 210
radios. According to Marine Corps officials, they plan to continue
investing in legacy radios and defer spending on fully capable JTRS
radios until later. In addition, the total planned quantity of JTRS
Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit radios was recently reduced from
an original baseline of 328,514--established in May 2004--to just
95,551, a 71 percent decrease.
Table 2: JTRS Procurement Quantities:
JTRS products: Ground Mobile Radio;
Initial approved procurement quantities (Milestone B): 108,086;
Procurement quantities identified when program restructured (2006):
138,913;
Current procurement quantities (2008): 86,512;
Current procurement quantities by service: Army: 86,209;
Current procurement quantities by service: Air Force: 93;
Current procurement quantities by service: Navy: 0;
Current procurement quantities by service: USMC: 210.
JTRS products: Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit;
Initial approved procurement quantities (Milestone B): 328,514;
Procurement quantities identified when program restructured (2006):
164,137;
Current procurement quantities (2008): 95,551;
Current procurement quantities by service: Army: 74,512;
Current procurement quantities by service: Air Force: 10,680;
Current procurement quantities by service: Navy: 1,477;
Current procurement quantities by service: USMC: 8,882.
JTRS products: Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Station;
Initial approved procurement quantities (Milestone B): n/a;
Procurement quantities identified when program restructured (2006):
17,007;
Current procurement quantities (2008): 11,040;
Current procurement quantities by service: Army: 5,845;
Current procurement quantities by service: Air Force: 4,725;
Current procurement quantities by service: Navy: 470;
Current procurement quantities by service: USMC: 0.
JTRS products: Total;
Initial approved procurement quantities (Milestone B): 436,600;
Procurement quantities identified when program restructured (2006):
320,057;
Current procurement quantities (2008): 193,103;
Current procurement quantities by service: Army: 166,566;
Current procurement quantities by service: Air Force: 15,498;
Current procurement quantities by service: Navy: 1,947;
Current procurement quantities by service: USMC: 9,092.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by JPEO.
Note: Excludes procurement quantities for the Multifunctional
Information Distribution System--JTRS program.
[End of table]
Also, although the JTRS Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed-Station program
was only recently approved to start system development, the number of
required radios identified by the services is significantly lower than
the number they initially identified when JTRS was restructured in
2006--11,040 versus 17,007 radios. Part of this reduction is due to the
Navy and Marine Corps no longer identifying a requirement for airborne
radios and only a modest requirement for maritime/fixed station radios.
According to Navy officials, the requirement for these radios has been
deferred because of the high cost of the radios and because the
airborne radio currently being developed will not include all the
requirements desired by the Navy. The officials indicated that the JTRS
restructuring in 2006 resulted in a scaled-down version of the airborne
radio--with fewer channels and waveforms--that will not include voice
capabilities. Voice is essential for pilots to be able to talk with
other pilots and with ground control. Navy officials pointed out that
while the JTRS airborne radios would provide enhanced networking
capabilities, the lack of voice capabilities would necessitate keeping
a legacy radio (e.g., the AN/ARC-210) in the aircraft and there would
not be space for both radios. The Air Force plans to install the JTRS
airborne radio primarily in larger aircraft that have space for
multiple radios.
The Joint Program Executive Office has begun to look at other options
to acquire less expensive JTRS radios and other tactical radios. These
efforts include:
* The JTRS "Rifleman" Radio. This radio is being planned to meet an
emerging Army need for a low-cost handheld soldier networking radio
that can support intra-squad communications and provide position
location information. The radio will be part of the JTRS small form
factor family. Specifically, it will be acquired as a less expensive
stand-alone variant of the small form factor "C" radio. Like the basic
small form factor "C" radio, it is intended to be a 1-channel JTRS-
compliant radio with networking capabilities that will support
unclassified communications. However, to achieve significant cost
savings, it is intended to rely on commercial (GPS) services, instead
of military GPS services. The preliminary unit cost estimate for the
radio is about $2,000, which is significantly less than the $8,700 unit
cost of the small form factor "C" radio using military GPS. The Army
has proposed an initial requirement for 100,000 or more of these
radios.[Footnote 12] The Joint Program Executive Office hopes to begin
production of the radio in 2009.
* A 2-channel JTRS Ground Mobile Radio. Although the Army still needs
the 4-channel Ground Mobile Radio for its Future Combat Systems, senior
Army leadership has expressed concern about the high cost of JTRS
Ground Mobile Radios for other components of the force. According to
the Joint Program Executive Office, discussions are now under way with
the Army about potential requirements trades that could be made,
leading to a less expensive 2-channel Ground Mobile Radio variant.
* An enhanced legacy 1-channel handheld radio. To address the services'
need for near-term radios, the JPEO began offering an enhanced legacy
handheld radio in 2007 that is capable of running multiple legacy
waveforms, including SINCGARS, and meets NSA security modernization
requirements. However, it does not provide the networking capabilities
intended for JTRS handheld radios. The JPEO established a consolidated
contract that provides two competing versions of the radio built by
different contractors. In addition, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration
reinstated the waiver process for handheld radio procurements,
requiring the services to obtain a waiver for purchasing radios outside
of the consolidated contract. By consolidating purchases across the
services in one contract and using competitively awarded delivery
orders, the cost of these radios is lower than handheld radios
purchased separately by each of the services.[Footnote 13] Furthermore,
to meet the services' demand for manpack radios, the JPEO is now
planning to acquire an enhanced manpack radio and provide it to the
services through a consolidated contract with features similar to the
contract for 1-channel handheld radios.
DOD and the Services Lack a Comprehensive Strategy for Investments in
Tactical Radios:
Fielding JTRS judiciously without prematurely phasing out legacy radios
will necessitate striking a balance between communications capabilities
and available funding. DOD and the services, however, do not have a
strategy to guide decisions on how best to proceed in acquiring
tactical radios over the next several years--one that prioritizes
capability needs, reconciles needs with bounded funding levels, defines
an effective approach to fielding and sustaining tactical radios, and
identifies contingencies for problems that may occur. Five years ago,
DOD and the services had a migration strategy that was relatively
straightforward--replace legacy radios as JTRS became available. Now,
however, the market for new tactical radios is quite different and the
services must balance the continued need for legacy radios with the
desire to acquire the advanced networking capabilities expected with
JTRS. In addition, whereas supplemental funding was readily available
in the past to meet the demand for the huge increase in legacy radios,
funding in the future may be more constrained. While supplemental
budgets may be around for as long as operations continue in Afghanistan
and Iraq, there is mounting pressure to bring non-war related spending
into the normal budget process.
In October 2003, shortly after JTRS was approved to begin system
development, DOD and the services developed a joint migration plan for
the transition from legacy radios to JTRS. The plan articulated key
objectives for the program. It also identified the initial quantities
of radios that the services planned to procure each year for fiscal
years 2003 through 2012, and for 2013 and beyond, and the platform
systems that would use JTRS. However, the plan was an interim document
and contained numerous gaps, which the department planned to fill
through refinement and periodic updating. For example, the plan
provided very limited data linking needs to available and expected
funding, and said nothing about associated integration costs. DOD had
envisioned that the migration plan would be a "living and evolving
document," which would be updated on a continuing basis and reviewed
annually. As the plan became progressively more detailed, the
department believed it would help to identify deficiencies where
additional purchases of legacy systems might be required, and
ultimately become a comprehensive roadmap for transitioning DOD to JTRS-
based networked communications. However, despite the department's plans
to maintain a living document and the more complex environment that has
arisen since it was put in place, the migration plan has not yet been
updated.
Each of the services has taken some steps to update its JTRS migration
plan. Except for the Air Force, however, these efforts are either
outdated or fall short in helping to identify how the services plan to
achieve desired capabilities, balance near-and long-term needs, and
prioritize funding.
* The 2004 Navy migration plan provided detailed information on the
legacy radios that would be replaced by JTRS sets, the platforms that
those legacy radios supported, the number of legacy radios fielded, the
estimated number of JTRS channels needed to replace the legacy radios,
and yearly acquisition milestones from 2003 to 2020. The Navy plan also
provided an estimate of how long legacy radios would be sustained.
* The Air Force completed a relatively extensive JTRS migration plan in
January 2007. In developing the plan, the Air Force used a
prioritization scheme that assessed the availability, operational
status, and suitability of various aircraft platforms for JTRS. The
plan also identified near-term, mid-term, and long-term phases for
achieving needed communications capabilities in terms of specific
platforms, taking into account integration costs and planned
procurement funding.
* The Marine Corps' August 2007 Strategic Radio Plan provides high-
level information on plans to evolve from legacy to network-capable
radios, but does not discuss specific quantities or platforms for
migration into JTRS or funding that will be needed.
* The Army has not yet developed a JTRS migration plan, but is in the
process of doing so. Specifically, the basis of issue for the Army's
JTRS requirements is currently being developed and is scheduled for
completion later this year. According to Army officials, the basis of
issue will map out the distribution of JTRS products, by type, for each
brigade-sized unit within the Army.
DOD has also begun to lay the foundation for an updated and more
comprehensive JTRS fielding plan. Specifically, in May 2007 the Joint
Staff's director for Command, Control, Communication, and Computer
systems approved the first version of the Tactical Wireless Joint
Network concept of operations. The network concept of operations seeks
to evolve the JTRS concept of operations into an overarching concept
document that will articulate the department's expectations for
operational and tactical wireless capabilities. The first version
primarily focuses on JTRS, but future versions are expected to
incorporate additional joint programs and concepts in more detail. The
development of the network concept of operations is an important first
step, and is in line with our September 2006 recommendation [Footnote
14] that the Secretary of Defense develop JTRS migration and fielding
plans that are consistent with a well-developed concept of operations
for using JTRS networking capabilities.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration has also recently begun to develop a new JTRS
migration and fielding plan and has requested each of the services to
provide detailed information on JTRS and legacy radio requirements. The
plan is intended to provide visibility into the migration to JTRS, as
well as the status of the services' legacy radio inventories and
related legacy radio procurements. The fielding plan would also serve
as a data point for reporting to Congress, a tool for the Joint Staff's
assessment of the supportability of the JTRS concept of operations, and
a means to assess the services' compliance with the DOD radio
acquisition policy. However, according to representatives from the
Office of the Assistant Secretary, the input provided by the services
has not been linked to operational architectures that define the
communications and networking tasks and functions that are needed on
the battlefield to enable simultaneous, interoperable operations. In
addition, the services' input has lacked sufficient detail regarding
current and future requirements, and funding priorities. As such, a
comprehensive plan that balances needs with available resources,
targets where investments in JTRS should be made, identifies
contingencies in the event JTRS encounters further delays, and provides
central direction for acquiring tactical radios over the next several
years is still lacking.
Conclusions:
While weapon system investments are normally associated with major
platforms such as aircraft and ships, DOD's investment in radios rivals
the cost of some of its largest acquisition programs. As DOD looks
ahead at its tactical radio investments over the next 5 years, it faces
a less ambitious, yet more complicated undertaking than it did in 2003.
DOD hopes to complete development and begin production of JTRS within
the next few years. Yet, this is a down sized JTRS program that
initially offers less capability than originally planned. Instead of
being able to phase out old legacy radios as planned, DOD now faces a
much larger inventory of relatively new legacy radios and improved
interim radios with much useful life left in them. Phasing out these
radios will necessarily be more deliberate given the huge costs already
expended and the expected high price of JTRS sets. While much of the
increased investment in radios since 2003 has been ad hoc, reactionary,
and enabled by large supplemental budgets, this may have been
unavoidable. However, this does not mean that the next 5 years should
follow suit. Rather, DOD needs to regain control over tactical radio
investments so that the best mix of capabilities can be procured with a
judicious expenditure of funds. Having an investment strategy that
establishes priorities, discipline, and contingency plans will be
essential to making good decisions, particularly when predictability is
elusive. While DOD and the services are making a series of decisions on
a case-by-case basis to reconcile JTRS investments with lower-cost
alternatives and relatively young legacy radio inventories, this
approach could make future capabilities a product of such decisions
rather than the strategic choice it should be. DOD does not have such a
strategy today, and its previous migration plans and its waiver/
notification process have been overtaken by events.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve DOD's ability to plan for and manage the development and
fielding of tactical radios across the department, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense:
* develop a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for making
sound investment decisions for tactical radios that:
- is based on operational architectures that define the communications
and networking functions needed on the battlefield,
- assesses and prioritizes the capabilities and requirements needed in
the near-and long-term,
- sets bounds for the funding that will be committed to address these
needs,
- lays out an effective migration and fielding plan for delivering
capabilities to the warfighter, and:
- identifies contingencies in case there are further problems and
delays with JTRS.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense:
* reinvigorate the tactical radio notification/waiver process to
provide department wide insight into the continued procurement of
legacy and interim radios. In doing so, consideration should be given
to ensuring clear guidance and procedures are developed and
communicated across the department.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In its letter commenting on the draft of our report, DOD agreed with
our recommendations. DOD's letter is reprinted in appendix III. DOD
noted that our report recommendations are consistent with the measures
taken by the department to develop a comprehensive strategy and plan
for optimizing investments in future systems, such as JTRS, while
balancing the need for further investment in current systems. As we
point out in the report, DOD has recently taken steps to develop a new
migration and fielding plan for tactical radio systems. However, DOD
did not provide any additional information on the measures it is taking
that are consistent with our recommendations. It is important that the
additional measures the Department does take provide a strategic basis
for making investment decisions on tactical radios in the future.
Specifically, the Department's plan needs to be linked to operational
architectures, prioritize capability needs, set funding bounds, and
identify contingencies to address potential delays with JTRS.
DOD also provided detailed comments, which we incorporated where
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that
have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will also
send copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air
Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any
questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess how the services‘ planned investments in key tactical radio
systems changed over the last 5 years, we compared the services‘ fiscal
year 2003 to 2007 tactical radio procurement plans to actual
procurements. To calculate the Army‘s spending plans for tactical
radios, we utilized the SINCGARS and Improved High Frequency Family of
Radios budget line items. It is important to note that the Improved
High Frequency Family of Radios budget line began in fiscal year 2005;
prior to this date, the Army had been utilizing a combination of budget
lines to procure handheld and manpack radios. To calculate Marine Corps
plans for tactical radios we utilized the Radio Systems budget line,
which includes a variety of radios. To determine the actual procurement
of legacy radios between 2003 and 2007, we sent out a data call to
service acquisition officers. For the Army, we obtained actual
procurement information from the Program Manager Tactical Radio
Communications System (PMO TRCS) in Fort Monmouth, N.J. For the Marine
Corps, we obtained more accurate information from Headquarters Marine
Corps Command, Control, Communications and Computers in Washington,
D.C. through comments to our draft report. We were unable to obtain
plans or actual procurement information from the Navy or Air Force.
According to Navy and Air Force officials, these services do not
centrally procure radios.
To assess why tactical radio procurement plans changed, we reviewed and
analyzed samples of tactical radio procurement waivers/notifications
submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration (ASD NII) by the services. These waivers and
notifications provide information as to why the procurements were
needed. In addition, we interviewed officials from: Navy‘s Program
Executive Office Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence (PEO C4I) San Diego, California; Air Combat Electronics
Program Office (PMA 209) Patuxent River, Md.; Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations , Directorate for Communication Networks, Arlington,
Va.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va.; Marine
Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va.; Army Aviation, Arlington, Va.;
Office of the Army‘s Deputy Chief of Staff, Arlington, Va.; Office of
the Army‘s Chief Information Officer, Washington, D.C.; Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Rosslyn, Va.; and
the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington, Va.
To determine what challenges will confront the services as they plan
tactical radio investments to provide future capabilities, we obtained
and analyzed briefings from JTRS program managers, reviewed the JTRS
Board of Directors quarterly reports for the first and second quarters
of fiscal year 2008, the 2003 JTRS joint migration plan, as well as
service migration plans for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps;
reviewed the services‘ estimates for future JTRS procurements and
interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the National Security
Agency; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration; Office of the Army‘s Deputy Chief of Staff (G-8); and the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Directorate for Air Warfare.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to July 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Characteristics of Selected Tactical Radios:
Handheld radios:
Radio: AN/PRC-148 JEM;
Output Power: 5 Watts;
Range: 5 miles (environment dependent);
Frequency: 30-512 MHz;
Waveforms: AM, FM, HAVEQUICK I/II, SINCGARS SC, ANDVT (PSK); P25;
Manufacturer: Thales.
Radio: AN/PRC-152;
Output Power: 5 Watts;
Range: 5 miles (environment dependent);
Frequency: 30-512 MHz;
Waveforms: AM, FM, HAVEQUICK I/II, SINCGARS FH, ANDVT (PSK), P25, HPW;
Manufacturer: Harris.
Radio: PRC-153 (Integrated Intra Squad Radio);
Output Power: 1-5 Watts;
Range: 1 km;
Frequency: 136-520 MHz;
Waveforms: VHF/UHF;
Manufacturer: Motorola.
Manpack Radios:
Radio: AN/PRC-117F (COTS);
Output Power: 20 Watts;
Range: SATCOM/DAMA = 5,000 miles; LOS = 50 miles;
Frequency: 30-512MHz ;
Waveforms: (VHF) SINCGARS, LOS 30 to 512MHz, CTCSS, (UHF) SATCOM DAMA,
IW 1a, HAVEQUICK, Maritime Frequencies, HPW;
Manufacturer: Harris.
Radio: AN/PRC-150
Output Power: 20 Watts;
Range: 1 to 150 miles or more (environment dependent);
Frequency: 2 to 60 MHz;
Waveforms: LSB, USB, AME, CW, VHF-FM;
Manufacturer: Harris.
Radio: AN/PSC-5D;
Output Power: 20 Watts;
Range: SATCOM/DAMA = 5,000 miles; LOS = 10 Km (terrain dependent);
Frequency: 30-512MHz;
Waveforms: (VHF) SINCGARS, CNR, LOS 30 to 512MHz, CTCSS (UHF)SATCOM
DAMA, IW1a, HAVEQUICK, Maritime Mode, LMR, JSTARS Interoperable
Waveform;
Manufacturer: Raytheon.
Airborne Radios:
Radio: AN/ARC-210;
Output Power: 10-23 Watts;
Range: LOS and SATCOM;
30-512 MHz;
Waveforms: HAVEQUICK I & II, SATURN, SINCGARS (V), ESIP, SATCOM DAMA,
IW 1a, Link 4A, Link 11, JPALS data link capable, among others;
Manufacturer: Rockwell Collins .
Radio: AN/ARC-201D (Airborne SINCGARS);
Output Power: 10W;
Range: 40 statute miles at 1200‘ AGD;
Frequency: 30 – 87.975 MHz;
Waveforms: SINCGARS;
Manufacturer: ITT.
Radio: AN/ARC-231;
Output Power: 125 Watts (Power Amplified;
Range: SATCOM/DAMA = 5,000 miles; LOS = 50 miles;
30-512 MHz;
Frequency: (VHF) SINCGARS, CNR, ATC, LOS 30 to 512 MHz, CTCSS, (UHF)
Waveforms: SATCOM, DAMA, IW a, HAVEQUICK, Maritime Mode, LMR;
Manufacturer: Raytheon.
Ground Radios:
Radio: EPLRS;
Output Power: 100 W (max);
Range: Ground to ground: 10 Km; Ground to air: 40 Km;
Frequency: 420-450 MHz;
Waveforms: EPLRS;
Manufacturer: Raytheon.
Radio: SINCGARS;
Output Power: 5 W and 50 W (with an external Power Amplifier);
Range: 5W – 5-10 Km (voice); 50W – 10-40 Km (voice);
Frequency: 30 – 87.975 MHz;
Waveforms: SINCGARS;
Manufacturer: ITT.
Radio: AN/VRC-110 Vehicular adapter for PRC-152;
Output Power: 20-50 Watts;
Range: 20 miles (environment dependent);
Frequency: 30-512 MHz;
Waveforms: AM, FM, HAVEQUICK I/II, SINCGARS FH, ANDVT (PSK), P25, HPW;
Manufacturer: Harris.
Radio: AN/VRC-111 Vehicular adapter for PRC-148;
Output Power: 20-50 Watts;
Range: 20 miles (environment dependent);
Frequency: 30-512 MHz;
Waveforms: AM, FM, HAVEQUICK I/II, SINCGARS FH, ANDVT (PSK), P25;
Manufacturer: Thales.
Radio: AN/VRC-104 Vehicular adapter for PRC-150;
Output Power: 20-150 Watts;
Range: 1 to 2,000 mi. or more (environment dependent);
Frequency: 2 to 60 MHz;
Waveforms: LSB, USB, AME, CW, VHF-FM;
Manufacturer: Harris.
Radio: AN/VRC 103 Vehicular adapter for PRC-117;
Output Power: 50 Watts (LOS + SATCOM);
Range: SATCOM/DAMA = 5,000 miles; LOS = 25 Km (terrain dependent)
Frequency: 30-512 MHz;
Waveforms: (VHF) SINCGARS, LOS 30 to 512MHz, CTCSS, (UHF)SATCOM, DAMA,
IW a, HAVEQUICK, Maritime Frequencies, HPW;
Manufacturer: Harris.
Maritime Radios:
Radio: DMR;
Output Power: Depending on power amplifiers;
Range: [Empty];
Frequency: 2 MHz- 2 GHz;
Waveforms: HAVEQUICK I/II, SINCGARS, Link-11, among others;
Manufacturer: General Dynamics.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Networks And Information Integration:
6000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-6000:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition Sourcing and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-08-877, 'Defense Acquisitions: Department of Defense Needs
Framework for Balancing Investments in Tactical Radios,' dated July 10,
2008. (GAO Code 120669). The Department has forwarded additional
comments on the report's statement of facts in a separate
correspondence.
The Department concurs with both of the GAO recommendations, as
reflected in the attachment. The GAO report and recommendations are
consistent with the measures taken by the Department to develop a
comprehensive strategy and plan for optimizing investments in future
systems, such as JTRS, while balancing the need for further investment
in current systems.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report. We
appreciate the ongoing dialogue between the GAO and the Department, and
look forward to further interaction to ensure the Department's
investment in tactical radios supports the best interests of the
warfighter and the nation.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Ronald C. Jost:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3, Space and Spectrum):
Attachment: As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated July 10, 2008:
GAO-08-877 (GAO Code 120669):
"Defense Acquisitions: Department Of Defense Needs Framework For
Balancing Investments In Tactical Radios"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
develop a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for making
sound investment decisions for tactical radios that:
a. is based on operational architectures that define the communications
and networking functions needed on the battlefield;
b. assesses and prioritizes the capabilities and requirements needed in
the near-and long-term;
c. sets bound for the funding that will be committed to address these
needs;
d. lays out an effective migration and fielding plan for delivering
capabilities to the warfighter; and;
e. identifies contingencies in case there are further problems and
delays with Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). (p. 27/GAO Draft
Report)
DOD Response: Concur
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
reinvigorate the tactical radio notification/waiver process to provide
department-wide insight into the continued procurement of legacy and
interim radios. In doing so, consideration should be given to ensuring
clear guidance and procedures are developed and communicated across the
department. (p. 28/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur.
Attachment:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Paul L. Francis, Director, (202) 512-4841:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, Greg Campbell, John Oppenheim,
Guisseli Reyes-Turnell, Jeffrey Rose, Jay Tallon, Hai Tran, Alyssa
Weir, and Paul Williams made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] We were only able to identify tactical radio investments in Army
and Marine Corps budget documents; we were unable to identify tactical
radio investments for the Air Force and Navy as these services do not
centrally procure radios.
[2] In general usage, a waveform is the representation of a signal and
the characteristics of a radio that includes the frequency, (VHF, HF,
and UHF), modulation type (FM, AM), message format, and/or transmission
system. Most of the radios used by the military services operate with a
single waveform and can only interoperate with similar radios. However,
several military radios have been developed in recent years that
operate multiple waveforms. Thus, for example, if three waveforms are
built into a radio, that single radio can emulate three different
radios and be compatible with other radios that have these waveforms.
[3] The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration is the successor organization to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence.
[4] GAO, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio
System Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-
879R] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003); GAO, Defense Acquisitions:
Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges
Remain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-955]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2006).
[5] When JTRS began, DOD structured it into several programs clustered
by requirements. The JTRS Cluster 1 program was intended to develop
ground vehicle and helicopter radios as well as most of the waveforms
to be used in JTRS.
[6] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Significant Challenges Ahead in
Developing and Demonstrating Future Combat System‘s Network and
Software, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-409]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2008); GAO, Defense Acquisitions: 2009 Is a
Critical Juncture for the Army‘s Future Combat System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-408] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
7, 2008).
[7] According to Navy documentation, requirements for cryptographic
devices with their end-of-life dates, including devices in the AN/ARC-
210 radio, are identified in Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction and Notice 6510.
[8] GAO, Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More
Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation
Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-745]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[9] A SINCGARS ground vehicle radio configuration typically includes
two receiver/transmitter units.
[10] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 requires the Secretary concerned to report to
Congress when a program‘s acquisition unit cost increases by at least
15 percent over the current baseline estimate or increases by at least
30 percent over the original baseline estimate.
[11] Average procurement unit cost for all Handheld, Manpack, and Small
Form Fit radios over the life of the program as reported in the
December 2007 Selected Acquisition Report. The unit cost for these
radios will vary significantly by form factor from about $6,000 for the
least expensive small form fit radio, to about $38,000 for the Manpack
radio.
[12] This quantity is not reflected in the ’Current Procurement
Quantities“ column in table 2.
[13] An upgrading of the 1-channel radio is also under way to meet
DOD‘s revised standard for UHF satellite communications. In 2006, DOD
established a requirement that the services migrate legacy UHF
satellite communication systems from the Demand Assigned Multiple
Access waveform to the more efficient Integrated Waveform. Efforts are
now under way to add the Integrated Waveform to the 1-channel handheld
radio.
[14] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk,
but Significant Challenges Remain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-955] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2006).
[End of section]
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