Defense Critical Infrastructure
Adherence to Guidance Would Improve DOD's Approach to Identifying and Assuring the Availability of Critical Transportation Assets Gao ID: GAO-08-851 August 15, 2008The Department of Defense (DOD) established the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to assure the availability of mission-critical infrastructure, including surface, sea, and air transportation assets to carry out its missions. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the extent to which the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has identified, prioritized, and assessed critical transportation assets; (2) the extent to which DOD installation personnel have taken actions to help assure the availability of critical transportation assets, both within and independent of DCIP; and (3) how DOD is funding critical transportation asset assurance. GAO examined a nonprojectable sample of 22 critical transportation assets, reviewed relevant DOD guidance and documents, and interviewed cognizant officials.
TRANSCOM has taken some actions to identify, prioritize, and assess its critical transportation assets but, according to officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]), its methodology for doing so, until recently, has been inconsistent with the intent of DOD's various DCIP guidance and with the approach adopted by some of the other combatant commands and military services. TRANSCOM considers entire installations--military air bases, seaports, and commercial airports--as critical assets, rather than identifying assets with greater specificity, such as individual runways, navigation aids, and fuel storage facilities. This methodology diminishes the reliability of the critical transportation asset list, a condition that impedes DOD's ability to prioritize its critical assets departmentwide and effectively target spending on risk-reduction efforts. Further, TRANSCOM was using its vulnerability assessments to identify specific critical transportation assets on the installations. This practice conflicts with DOD's DCIP guidance not to use vulnerability assessments to identify critical assets. Though TRANSCOM officials stated that they now plan to discontinue this practice, they were unable to provide ASD(HD&ASA) or GAO with any documentation to confirm that this decision had occurred officially. Further, TRANSCOM's memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff to participate as transportation subject matter experts on the Joint Staff's vulnerability assessments with a DCIP module is still in draft. In May 2008, TRANSCOM officials told GAO that they now plan to use the draft DCIP critical asset identification process to reevaluate its 300 identified critical transportation assets; however, a timeline to complete this has not yet been determined. DOD installation personnel at the 22 sites GAO visited have taken actions to help assure the availability of critical transportation assets; however, these actions have routinely occurred independent of DCIP. Consequently, they do not consider the full spectrum of threats and hazards and they tend to focus on preventing mass personnel casualties instead of critical asset assurance. DCIP's impact at the installations where the assets are located was negligible because of the lack of service-specific guidance. This gap in guidance hinders installation personnel's ability to make informed risk management decisions based on asset criticality. Coordination efforts between installation personnel and non-DOD owners of critical transportation assets and supporting public works infrastructure were substantial, but have been focused on the protection of people and not on asset assurance. DOD has allocated approximately $283 million for DCIP from fiscal years 2004 to 2008, including $8.6 million to TRANSCOM for its combatant command and defense sector responsibilities. Critical infrastructure assurance efforts also have been funded through other DOD complementary programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, and through foreign government contributions. Although existing DCIP funding does not include funding for remediating asset vulnerabilities, remediation has been funded from these other sources.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-851, Defense Critical Infrastructure: Adherence to Guidance Would Improve DOD's Approach to Identifying and Assuring the Availability of Critical Transportation Assets
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2008:
Defense Critical Infrastructure:
Adherence to Guidance Would Improve DOD's Approach to Identifying and
Assuring the Availability of Critical Transportation Assets:
Defense Critical Infrastructure:
GAO-08-851:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-851, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) established the Defense Critical
Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to assure the availability of mission-
critical infrastructure, including surface, sea, and air transportation
assets to carry out its missions. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the
extent to which the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has
identified, prioritized, and assessed critical transportation assets;
(2) the extent to which DOD installation personnel have taken actions
to help assure the availability of critical transportation assets, both
within and independent of DCIP; and (3) how DOD is funding critical
transportation asset assurance. GAO examined a nonprojectable sample of
22 critical transportation assets, reviewed relevant DOD guidance and
documents, and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found:
TRANSCOM has taken some actions to identify, prioritize, and assess its
critical transportation assets but, according to officials from the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas‘ Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]), its methodology for doing so,
until recently, has been inconsistent with the intent of DOD‘s various
DCIP guidance and with the approach adopted by some of the other
combatant commands and military services. TRANSCOM considers entire
installations”military air bases, seaports, and commercial airports”as
critical assets, rather than identifying assets with greater
specificity, such as individual runways, navigation aids, and fuel
storage facilities. This methodology diminishes the reliability of the
critical transportation asset list, a condition that impedes DOD‘s
ability to prioritize its critical assets departmentwide and
effectively target spending on risk-reduction efforts. Further,
TRANSCOM was using its vulnerability assessments to identify specific
critical transportation assets on the installations. This practice
conflicts with DOD‘s DCIP guidance not to use vulnerability assessments
to identify critical assets. Though TRANSCOM officials stated that they
now plan to discontinue this practice, they were unable to provide
ASD(HD&ASA) or GAO with any documentation to confirm that this decision
had occurred officially. Further, TRANSCOM‘s memorandum of
understanding with the Joint Staff to participate as transportation
subject matter experts on the Joint Staff‘s vulnerability assessments
with a DCIP module is still in draft. In May 2008, TRANSCOM officials
told GAO that they now plan to use the draft DCIP critical asset
identification process to reevaluate its 300 identified critical
transportation assets; however, a timeline to complete this has not yet
been determined.
DOD installation personnel at the 22 sites GAO visited have taken
actions to help assure the availability of critical transportation
assets; however, these actions have routinely occurred independent of
DCIP. Consequently, they do not consider the full spectrum of threats
and hazards and they tend to focus on preventing mass personnel
casualties instead of critical asset assurance. DCIP‘s impact at the
installations where the assets are located was negligible because of
the lack of service-specific guidance. This gap in guidance hinders
installation personnel‘s ability to make informed risk management
decisions based on asset criticality. Coordination efforts between
installation personnel and non-DOD owners of critical transportation
assets and supporting public works infrastructure were substantial, but
have been focused on the protection of people and not on asset
assurance.
DOD has allocated approximately $283 million for DCIP from fiscal years
2004 to 2008, including $8.6 million to TRANSCOM for its combatant
command and defense sector responsibilities. Critical infrastructure
assurance efforts also have been funded through other DOD complementary
programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, and through foreign
government contributions. Although existing DCIP funding does not
include funding for remediating asset vulnerabilities, remediation has
been funded from these other sources.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends TRANSCOM (1) implement established criteria to identify
critical transportation assets, and develop a timeline for doing so,
(2) discontinue its use of vulnerability assessments as its primary
tool for identifying its critical assets, and (3) finalize an agreement
with the Joint Staff to participate as transportation experts on Joint
Staff DCIP vulnerability assessments, and that the military services
develop and implement service-specific DCIP guidance. DOD partially
concurred with the recommendations. GAO modified one recommendation on
vulnerability assessments, in response to agency comments.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-851]. For more information,
contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
TRANSCOM Efforts to Identify, Prioritize, and Assess Critical
Transportation Assets Have Been Inconsistent with Guidance:
Most Installations Took Some Steps to Assure the Availability of
Critical Transportation and Public Works Assets but Were Unaware of
Asset Criticality and Lacked a DCIP Focus:
Critical Transportation Asset Assurance Has Received Some Funding
through DCIP and Has Benefited from Other Sources of Funding:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Table:
Table 1: Number of Critical Transportation Assets Selected by Asset
Category and Geographic Combatant Command Area of Responsibility:
Figures:
Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility:
Figure 2: DOD Guidance for Risk Management:
Figure 3: TRANSCOM's Efforts Prior to Implementing DCIP's Asset
Identification Process:
Figure 4: Representative Types of Critical Transportation Assets:
Figure 5: TRANSCOM's DCIP Funding Trend, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2013:
Figure 6: GAO Critical Transportation Asset Selection Methodology:
Abbreviations:
ASD(HD&ASA): Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs:
DCIP: Defense Critical Infrastructure Program:
DOD: Department of Defense:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
TRANSCOM: U.S. Transportation Command:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 14, 2008:
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz:
Chairman:
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable W. Todd Akin:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a global network of critical
surface, sea, and air transportation infrastructure--such as roads,
railways, seaports, military air bases, and commercial airports--to
carry out its missions. The incapacitation or destruction of one or
more of the assets constituting this network of critical infrastructure
could have a debilitating effect on DOD's ability to project, support,
and sustain its forces and operations worldwide. DOD's critical
transportation infrastructure is owned by both DOD and non-DOD
entities, including private companies, state and local governments, and
foreign governments. Because of its importance to DOD operations, this
critical infrastructure represents an attractive target to adversaries,
and may also be vulnerable to a host of natural disasters and
accidents. DOD has recognized and emphasized the importance of assuring
the availability of mission-critical infrastructure in the most recent
versions of the National Military Strategy[Footnote 1] and the
Quadrennial Defense Review.[Footnote 2] Critical assets in the
Transportation Defense Sector depend on public works infrastructure
that provides the utilities needed for many transportation critical
assets to remain operational.[Footnote 3] To identify and help assure
the availability of mission-critical infrastructure, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security
Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]) was assigned responsibility for the risk-based
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) in September 2003.
ASD(HD&ASA) subsequently issued guidance in August 2005 articulating
the roles and responsibilities for DOD organizations involved in the
program.[Footnote 4]
Under DCIP, DOD created 10 functionally based defense sectors and
designated a Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agent (sector lead
agent) for each sector.[Footnote 5] The U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM) is the sector lead agent for the Transportation Defense
Sector. DOD Directive 3020.40 assigns the sector lead agent
responsibility for, in collaboration with other DCIP stakeholders,
identifying the interdependencies among infrastructure that crosses DOD
sector boundaries, and for maintaining a characterization of sector
support functions, systems, assets, and dependencies as they relate to
identified operational capabilities and assets. Because TRANSCOM also
is a combatant command, it is responsible for preventing and mitigating
the loss of DOD-owned critical assets, within its assigned area of
responsibility, and for coordinating with the military services and
other sector lead agents in identifying and assessing critical assets.
In addition to DCIP, DOD has established several other complementary
programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, that predate DCIP but
contribute indirectly to the protection and assurance of critical
assets.
You requested that we review a number of issues related to DOD's
mission-critical infrastructure. To date, we have issued four reports
in response to that request. Our first report examined the extent to
which DOD has developed a comprehensive management plan for DCIP and
the actions needed to identify, prioritize, and assess defense critical
infrastructure.[Footnote 6] The second report examined DOD's efforts to
implement a risk management approach for defense industrial base
critical assets.[Footnote 7] The third report examined the extent to
which DOD included highly sensitive assets in its critical
infrastructure program.[Footnote 8] Finally, the fourth report focused
on threats and vulnerabilities affecting intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance operations at Creech Air Force Base,
Nevada.[Footnote 9] As agreed with your offices, we plan to issue two
additional reports later this year. The first report evaluates DOD's
efforts to assure the availability of critical infrastructure in the
Space; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and Global
Information Grid Defense Sectors.[Footnote 10] The other report
examines the extent to which DOD has trained key personnel and
developed expertise to assist DOD organizations across five defense
sectors in assuring the availability of critical infrastructure and has
incorporated the assurance of critical infrastructure into exercises.
In 2007, we reported that DCIP implementation at the department,
military service, and combatant command headquarters levels was
relatively immature.[Footnote 11] To understand what impact this was
having on the availability of mission-essential transportation and
supporting public works assets,[Footnote 12] this report focuses on DOD
and non-DOD (i.e., foreign) installations where the critical
transportation assets are located. Specifically, we evaluated (1) the
extent to which TRANSCOM has identified, prioritized, and assessed its
critical transportation assets; (2) the extent to which DOD
installation personnel have taken actions to help assure the
availability of critical transportation assets, both within and
independent of DCIP; and (3) how DOD is funding critical transportation
asset assurance.
Critical asset tiers:
Tier 1--An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could
result in mission (or function) failure at the DOD, military
department, combatant command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or
defense infrastructure sector level.
Tier 2--An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could
result in mission (or function) degradation at the DOD, military
department, combatant command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or
defense infrastructure sector level.
Tier 3--An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could
result in mission (or function) failure below the military department,
combatant command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or defense
infrastructure sector level.
We drew a nonprobability sample[Footnote 13] of critical transportation
assets in the United States and abroad, using draft critical asset
lists developed by the Joint Staff, each of the four military services,
and TRANSCOM. We selected assets based on (1) overlap among the various
critical asset lists; (2) geographic dispersion among geographic
combatant commands' areas of responsibility; (3) representation from
each military service; and (4) representation in the three asset
categories--air bases, seaports, and commercial airports--TRANSCOM
identified in the continental United States, and in the European,
Middle Eastern, and Pacific regions. Through this methodology, we
selected 22 assets for review, including two of the four Tier 1
critical transportation assets.[Footnote 14] Tier 1 assets represent
those assets that are most critical for carrying out combatant command
missions.
Figure 1 shows the areas of responsibility for each geographic
combatant command.
Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility:
This figure is a map of the combatant commands' areas of
responsibility.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO presentation of DOD data.
[A] The state of Alaska is assigned to the U.S. Northern Command's area
of responsibility. Forces based in Alaska, however, may be assigned to
multiple commands.
[B] The U.S. Africa Command was officially established in October 2007
with a goal to reach full operational capability as a geographic
combatant command by September 30, 2008, assuming responsibility for
U.S. military activities in Africa.
[End of figure]
Further, we assessed relevant planning documents, including continuity
of operations and emergency management plans for assets we selected for
review and for the associated public works assets that support them. We
reviewed Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments that
focus on critical infrastructure, when available, for those DOD and
foreign installations we visited. Also, we analyzed relevant Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), military service, and combatant command
guidance and funding data. Within DOD, we interviewed officials from
OSD, the Joint Staff, defense agencies, the military services,
combatant commands, subcomponent commands, sector lead agents, and
installation-level organizations in the United States and abroad. In
addition, we interviewed officials at the Department of Homeland
Security, at three U.S. embassies and three commercial airports; host
nation officials; and officials in both the private sector and
academia. (Throughout this unclassified report, we do not identify
specific assets, their locations or installations, or combatant command
or others' missions that the assets support because that information is
classified.) We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 through
July 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. To assess
the reliability of data, we interviewed appropriate officials and
reviewed relevant documentation. We found the data provided by DOD to
be sufficiently reliable for representing the nature and extent of the
DCIP funding. A more thorough description of our scope and methodology
is provided in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Although TRANSCOM has taken some actions to identify, prioritize, and
assess its critical transportation assets, its methodology for doing
so, until recently, has been, according to ASD(HD&ASA) officials,
inconsistent with the intent of DCIP guidance and with the approach
adopted by some of the other combatant commands and military services.
TRANSCOM has identified entire installations--military air bases,
seaports, and commercial airports--as critical assets, rather than
identifying critical assets with greater specificity, such as
individual runways, navigation aids, and fuel storage facilities.
TRANSCOM officials identified entire installations based on their
interpretation of the definition of an asset as outlined in DOD
Directive 3020.40 and because these types of installations constitute
the worldwide Defense Transportation System necessary to carry out
TRANSCOM's missions. This methodology of identifying critical assets
diminishes the reliability of the critical transportation asset list, a
condition that impedes DOD's ability to prioritize its critical assets
and effectively target spending for risk reduction efforts. TRANSCOM
was using its Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments
to identify specific critical transportation assets on the
installations, a practice that conflicts with DOD's DCIP guidance not
to use vulnerability assessments for this purpose. Though TRANSCOM
officials stated that they now plan to discontinue this practice, they
were unable to provide ASD(HD&ASA) or us with any documentation to
confirm that this decision had occurred officially. Further, TRANSCOM's
memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff to participate as
transportation subject matter experts on the Joint Staff's
vulnerability assessments with a DCIP module is still in draft. In May
2008, TRANSCOM officials told us that they now plan to use the draft
DCIP critical asset identification process to reevaluate its critical
transportation assets. TRANSCOM officials believe that this will result
in a "significant reduction" in the number of assets it identifies as
critical; however, TRANSCOM has not yet set a timeline to begin and
complete this reevaluation.
DOD installation personnel have taken actions to help assure the
availability of critical transportation assets. However, because the
vast majority of these actions have occurred outside of DCIP, their
actions do not consider the full spectrum of threats and hazards, and
tend to focus on preventing mass personnel casualties instead of
assuring asset availability. Although DOD established DCIP to help
assure the availability of critical infrastructure--including
transportation assets--departmentwide, DCIP's impact at the 22
installations we visited where the assets were located was negligible.
For 18 of the 22 critical transportation assets we examined, we found
that (1) installation personnel were often unaware of the criticality
of their assets for TRANSCOM's missions and (2) coordination efforts
between installation personnel and DOD and non-DOD owners of critical
transportation assets and their supporting public works infrastructure
were substantial, but again tended to focus on the protection of people
and not on ensuring the availability of critical assets. DCIP guidance
instructs the military departments to allocate resources for an
organizational program supporting DCIP, including the implementation of
risk management decisions. Further, it requires combatant commands to
coordinate with other combatant commands, the military services, and
sector lead agents in identifying and assessing critical assets and
associated infrastructure interdependencies and to act to prevent or
mitigate loss or degradation of critical assets. However, at 20 of the
22 installations we visited, critical assets were not incorporated into
installations' emergency management, continuity of operations, or risk
management plans. Further, installation personnel attributed their
unfamiliarity with DCIP to the military services not yet having issued
DCIP implementing guidance as well as the frequent rotations of
installation commanders. As a result, this gap hindered installation
personnel's ability to make informed risk management decisions, such as
remediation priorities, because installation personnel at the sites we
visited were not aware of what assets were more critical than others.
DOD has allocated approximately $283 million in budgeted and
supplemental appropriations for critical asset assurance through DCIP
from fiscal years 2004 to 2008, including about $8.6 million to
TRANSCOM. DCIP guidance requires combatant commands and sector lead
agents to provide adequate resources to implement their DCIP
responsibilities. To this end, TRANSCOM has allocated approximately
$5.7 million for its combatant command DCIP responsibilities and $2.9
million for its Transportation Defense Sector DCIP responsibilities
during this 5-year period to identify and assess its critical assets.
Additionally, asset owners have funded critical asset initiatives
through other DOD programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, as well
as benefited from funding from foreign government payments in countries
where DOD has identified critical transportation assets. Although
existing DCIP funding does not include funding for remediation of
critical asset vulnerabilities, some remediation has occurred through
these other complementary programs.
We are recommending that TRANSCOM fully implement the criteria,
methodology, and process in the draft DOD Critical Asset Identification
Process manual to reevaluate and update the identification of all
critical transportation assets, and develop a timeline for doing so;
discontinue the use of Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability
Assessments as its primary tool for identifying its critical assets;
and finalize the memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff to
enable TRANSCOM transportation subject matter experts to participate in
the DCIP module of a Joint Staff vulnerability assessment. Also, we are
recommending that the military departments develop and implement
service-specific guidance based on published DOD DCIP guidance.
GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD in July 2008 with three
draft recommendations for its review and comment. In written comments
on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our
recommendations. Based on DOD's agency comments, we modified one
recommendation (making it two recommendations rather than one) to
reflect the distinction between the separate issues of finalizing the
memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff and discontinuing the
use of Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments as the
primary tool to identify critical assets. Also, TRANSCOM and U.S.
Central Command provided us with technical comments, which we
incorporated in the report as appropriate. DOD's response is reprinted
in appendix II.
Background:
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,[Footnote 15] issued in
December 2003, designates the Secretary of Homeland Security as the
principal federal official responsible for leading, integrating, and
coordinating the overall national effort to protect the nation's
critical infrastructure and key resources. Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 also requires all federal departments and
agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of
critical infrastructure and key resources from terrorist attacks.
ASD(HD&ASA), within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, serves as the principal civilian advisor and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the principal military advisor to
the Secretary of Defense on critical infrastructure protection.
The Transportation Defense Sector is made up of a worldwide network of
DOD and non-DOD surface, sea, and air assets that the U.S. military
relies on to move personnel and equipment. Currently, the
Transportation Defense Sector consists of 300 critical air bases,
seaports, and commercial airports worldwide and owned by DOD, other
U.S. governmental organizations, private companies, and foreign
governments. According to TRANSCOM officials, the Transportation
Defense Sector is highly resilient because of significant redundancy
among the various modes of transportation, particularly as it relates
to surface transportation. For example, the size and capabilities of
the U.S. rail and highway networks afford ability to reroute shipments
via alternate roads and rail lines in the event of disruptions, a key
reason why surface transportation assets were not identified as
critical.
In addition to DCIP, DOD has established other complementary programs
that help assure critical assets, including the Antiterrorism
Program[Footnote 16] and the Defense Continuity Program.[Footnote 17]
The Antiterrorism Program is intended to establish protection standards
for DOD assets against terrorist attacks. The Defense Continuity
Program is intended to ensure that DOD mission-essential functions
continue under all circumstances, such as a man-made or natural
disaster. DCIP supports a risk-management process that seeks to ensure
defense critical infrastructure availability. The risk-management
process is comprised of a risk assessment component that identifies
critical assets and infrastructure interdependencies that support DOD
missions. Applicable follow-on threat and vulnerability assessments are
then conducted on those assets to complete the risk assessment. The
risk response component ensures that limited resources are optimally
allocated towards those assets deemed most important to overall mission
success for DOD, and for which it has been determined that the
identified level of risk is unacceptable.
Several DOD organizations have key roles in helping assure the
availability of DOD's transportation critical assets. The military
services, defense agencies, and the combatant commands are responsible,
in coordination with the sector lead agents, for identifying and
assessing critical assets. The military departments, in their role as
executive agent for the combatant commands, provide funding and
resources for combatant command critical infrastructure programs. DOD
Directive 3020.40 also states that sector lead agents are responsible
for collaborating with other defense sector lead agents and DOD DCIP
stakeholders to identify cross-sector interdependencies.
TRANSCOM Efforts to Identify, Prioritize, and Assess Critical
Transportation Assets Have Been Inconsistent with Guidance:
According to ASD(HD&ASA) officials, TRANSCOM's methodology for
identifying, prioritizing, and assessing its critical transportation
assets is inconsistent with the intent of DOD's DCIP guidance and with
the approach adopted by some of the other combatant commands and
military services. TRANSCOM officials stated in May 2008 that they now
plan to leverage the draft DOD Critical Asset Identification Process
manual to reevaluate its currently identified critical transportation
assets; however, a timeline to complete this reevaluation has not yet
been established. Further, until recently, TRANSCOM relied on its
vulnerability assessments to identify critical transportation assets,
an action that also conflicted with established DOD guidance and
practice. While TRANSCOM officials stated that they will discontinue
the use of vulnerability assessment for identification purposes, they
were unable to provide any documentation to ASD(HD&ASA) or us to
confirm this decision officially. Moreover, its memorandum of
understanding with the Joint Staff to participate as transportation
subject matter experts on Joint Staff DCIP vulnerability assessments is
still in draft.
TRANSCOM's Asset Identification Efforts Are Inconsistent with Intent of
DCIP Guidance and Practice:
At the time of our review, TRANSCOM had identified 300 Tier 1 and Tier
2 critical transportation assets linked to its global mobility mission.
TRANSCOM officials told us that they identified larger systems of
assets--categorized as air bases, seaports, and commercial airports--
based on their interpretation of the definition of an asset as outlined
in DOD Directive 3020.40.[Footnote 18] TRANSCOM officials explained
that these types of installations are part of its worldwide Defense
Transportation System that is necessary to carry out TRANSCOM's
missions. This broad list of assets has been submitted to the Joint
Staff for inclusion in DOD's overall draft critical asset list. Because
of TRANSCOM's interpretation of the guidance, its critical asset list
lacks the specificity of the critical asset lists prepared by some of
the other combatant commands and military services. Moreover, according
to ASD(HD&ASA) officials, TRANSCOM's decision to identify entire
installations was inconsistent with the intent of DCIP guidance. While
TRANSCOM is not the only combatant command or military service to
identify an entire installation as critical, it is the only
organization that has done so for its entire list. DOD guidance
requires combatant commands to first identify their missions, the
critical assets that support those missions, and the threats and
hazards to those critical assets, and then assess the vulnerability of
the critical assets to the threats and hazards identified (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: DOD Guidance for Risk Management[Footnote 19]
This figure is a flow chart showing the steps of DOD guidance for risk
management.
Step 1: Identify Combatant Command Missions;
Step 2: Identify Critical Assets;
Step 3: Identify Threats and Hazards to Critical Assets;
Step 4: Conduct Vulnerability.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
TRANSCOM skips steps two and three listed in figure 2 and instead has
been using Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments to
identify specific critical assets. According to TRANSCOM officials, the
identification of threats and hazards to critical assets (step 3) is
incorporated in the conduct of vulnerability assessments (step 4),
since Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments
specifically address vulnerability to all threats and hazards.
ASD(HD&ASA) officials stated that when they began developing an overall
DOD critical asset list, they told the combatant commands and military
services that stopping the identification process for critical assets
at the installation level is insufficient for the purposes of DCIP. As
a result of continued submission of entire installations as critical
assets, ASD(HD&ASA) published in March 2008 the Strategy for Defense
Critical Infrastructure[Footnote 20] to reiterate the need for greater
specificity in critical asset identification. Further, ASD(HD&ASA) is
developing the DOD Critical Asset Identification Process manual, which
is still in draft, but also notes that stopping the asset
identification process at the system level (e.g., an air base, seaport,
or commercial airport) does not meet the needs of DCIP, and that rarely
is an entire system essential to mission success. For example, it is
insufficient to identify an air base as a critical asset; rather, more
specific assets, such as a runway, should be identified as appropriate.
Figure 3 illustrates the DCIP critical asset identification process and
where TRANSCOM's previous efforts have stopped.
Figure 3: TRANSCOM's Efforts Prior to Implementing DCIP's Asset
Identification Process:
This figure is a flowchart of TRANSCOM's efforts prior to implementing
DCIP's asset identification process.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
TRANSCOM officials stated that because the DOD Critical Asset
Identification Process manual was still in draft, they had initially
chosen not to implement its contents until its formal publication.
According to TRANSCOM officials, beginning in May 2008, TRANSCOM began
the process to develop coordination methods to facilitate the use of
the criteria in the draft DOD Critical Asset Identification Process
manual for the identification and validation of assets prior to
submitting them to the Joint Staff. TRANSCOM has recognized that this
process will require time to complete a meaningful critical
transportation asset list; however, a timeline to complete this process
has not yet been established.
Complicating the process of identifying and prioritizing critical
assets has been TRANSCOM's use of Transportation Infrastructure
Vulnerability Assessments. Though contrary to DCIP guidance,[Footnote
21] TRANSCOM has been using its vulnerability assessments to identify
specific critical assets rather than using the process outlined in DCIP
guidance to identify specific critical assets. As a result, TRANSCOM
officials could not tell us what specific transportation assets at a
given site were critical, stating that in the absence of a
Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment it could be,
though not necessarily, assumed that what was identified as critical at
one location might be critical at another. For example, if a
Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment identified
specific critical assets (such as a runway, navigation aids, or a fuel
depot) at an air base as critical, it could be reasonably assumed that
the same assets would probably be critical at other air bases. However,
while TRANSCOM officials have stated that they will discontinue the use
of vulnerability assessment for identification purposes, they were
unable to provide any documentation to ASD(HD&ASA) or us to confirm
this decision officially. Additionally, TRANSCOM's memorandum of
understanding with the Joint Staff to serve as transportation subject
matter experts for the enhanced DCIP module to the Joint Staff's
Integrated Vulnerability Assessment when transportation assets are
assessed remains in draft.
At the behest of ASD(HD&ASA) in 2006, the Joint Staff began the process
of creating a list of Tier 1 critical assets based on assets nominated
and submitted by DOD organizations, including the combatant commands
and the military services using DCIP-approved criteria. The Joint
Staff's list has gone through several iterations and a subset of Tier 1
critical assets, known as Defense Critical Assets, will be selected by
ASD(HD&ASA).[Footnote 22] These Defense Critical Assets are of such
extraordinary importance to DOD operations in peace, crisis, and war
that their incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious,
debilitating effect on the ability of DOD to fulfill its missions.
TRANSCOM has not yet established a timeline to reevaluate critical
transportation assets using the approved DCIP methodology. Until this
reevaluation is completed, ASD(HD&ASA)'s ability to formulate a
comprehensive Defense Critical Asset list that includes transportation
assets and effectively targets spending for risk reduction efforts will
be impeded.
Figure 4 illustrates the types of specific critical transportation
assets that TRANSCOM could identify below the installation (air base,
seaport, and commercial airport) level.
Figure 4: Representative Types of Critical Transportation Assets:
This figure is a combination of four pictures showing types of critical
transportation assets.
The pictures are of:
Cargo handling equipment at a U.S. air base;
Fuel transfer pipeline;
A refueling pier critical to sealift port operations;
and Mobile control tower; a backup capability for continuity of air
operations.
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
TRANSCOM plans to reevaluate its critical asset list using the DCIP-
approved criteria, which is expected to result in a "significant
reduction" of critical transportation assets.
Most Installations Took Some Steps to Assure the Availability of
Critical Transportation and Public Works Assets but Were Unaware of
Asset Criticality and Lacked a DCIP Focus:
Although DOD established DCIP to help assure the availability of
mission-critical infrastructure--including transportation assets--
installation personnel were often unfamiliar with DCIP and unaware of
the critical role specific transportation assets play in TRANSCOM's
missions. This lack of awareness contributed to a singular focus on
protecting personnel and did not consider mission-critical assets.
Installation Officials Often Are Unaware of Asset Criticality:
Installation officials responsible for critical transportation assets
at the 22 sites we visited were often unaware of asset criticality
because they were unfamiliar with DCIP and thus DCIP's impact at these
installations was negligible. While some efforts have been made to
coordinate with both DOD and non-DOD entities, including the private
sector, state and local governments, and foreign governments to assure
the availability of critical transportation assets at home and abroad,
these coordination efforts have been conducted despite a lack of
service-specific DCIP implementation guidance. According to officials
at 17 of the 22 installations we visited, efforts at installations have
mostly focused on protecting people through such actions as
antiterrorism protection rather than focusing on specific mission-
critical transportation assets.
At 18 of the 22 installations we visited, we found numerous
complementary programs, such as the Antiterrorism and Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive Programs;
and continuity of operations and emergency management planning.
Officials responsible for assuring the availability of critical
transportation assets at 20 of the 22 installations we visited, told us
that they had not heard of DCIP prior to our visit because (1) there is
an absence of service-specific guidance that explains how to implement
DCIP and (2) the frequent rotation of installation commanders
(typically every 2 years), which can limit leadership continuity over
DCIP at the installation level. Officials at 16 of the 22 installations
we visited told us that they would have more vigorously advocated for
resources to fund protection of critical assets had they been aware of
an asset's criticality to TRANSCOM's mission. Without service-specific
guidance to ensure that mission-critical assets are being protected,
installations rely on other complementary programs in lieu of the all-
hazards approach[Footnote 23] that DCIP requires.
Installation Coordination Efforts Have Been Extensive, but Often Do Not
Focus on the Assurance of Mission-Critical Assets:
Nearly all of the installations (18 of 22) we visited had coordinated
with both DOD and non-DOD entities, including the private sector, state
and local governments, and foreign governments to help assure the
availability of critical transportation assets at home and abroad.
However, these coordination efforts have been performed independent of
DCIP and, therefore, focus on protecting people and not on assuring the
availability of mission-critical transportation assets. DOD DCIP
guidance requires the combatant commands to coordinate with one another
and with the military services and sector lead agents to identify and
assess critical assets. At 21 of the 22 sites we visited, installation
officials had taken steps to coordinate such efforts with DOD
organizations on the installation and/or with the private sector, state
and local communities, or with host nation officials. For example, at
one air base we visited in Europe, installation officials conducted
joint security patrols with host nation military officials and trained
jointly with military and civilian firefighting personnel. Further, at
10 DOD installations we visited in the Pacific region, installation
officials routinely coordinated with state, local, and foreign
governments on emergency management planning or scenarios, such as
typhoons and earthquakes. Such coordination efforts, however, do not
directly assure the availability of specific critical assets in the
wake of a natural or man-made disaster.
Installations Have Taken Steps to Mitigate the Potential Disruption of
Public Works:
To mitigate public works disruptions, personnel at 18 of the 22
installations we visited were coordinating with DOD organizations on
the installation, as well as local, state, or host nation officials.
Specifically, these installations had developed resiliency in
supporting public works infrastructure, such as fuel and electric power
sources, so that critical transportation assets remained operational in
the event of an installation-wide disruption. For example, 18 of these
installations have developed backup or alternative capabilities to
mitigate the loss of electricity and fuel. For 17 of the 22 critical
transportation assets we visited, installation personnel were
coordinating with DOD tenant organizations on the installation and with
host governments to maintain and sustain public works support for its
assets located on the facility. Most of the installations we visited
(17 of 22) had emergency management plans and continuity of operations
plans that accounted for the loss or degradation of supporting public
works infrastructure located on or within the installation, although
none of the plans specifically identified the critical transportation
assets as high-priority assets vis-à-vis the installation's other
assets. We also found that installation personnel at 18 of the 22
locations we visited frequently tested and maintained backup fuel and
electric power sources and often included them in their emergency
management planning exercises. Seventeen of these installations had
developed prioritized facilities lists to determine which facilities or
assets would receive priority for power restoration when power to the
installation was interrupted.
Critical Transportation Asset Assurance Has Received Some Funding
through DCIP and Has Benefited from Other Sources of Funding:
DOD has allocated approximately $283.3 million for critical asset
assurance through DCIP from fiscal years 2004 to 2008. DCIP guidance
requires combatant commands and sector lead agents to provide adequate
resources to implement their DCIP responsibilities. TRANSCOM has
received approximately $8.6 million over this period to carry out its
DCIP responsibilities, both as a combatant command and as a sector lead
agent for the Transportation Defense Sector. In addition to these
funds, critical transportation assets also have benefited indirectly
from other DOD programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, and from
funding from foreign governments in countries where the United States
maintains a military presence.
Of the $8.6 million TRANSCOM has received in total DCIP funding from
fiscal years 2004 to 2008, approximately $5.7 million has been used for
carrying out its combatant command responsibilities and approximately
$2.9 million has been used for implementing its transportation defense
sector responsibilities.
TRANSCOM, which is funded by the Air Force, as TRANSCOM's executive
agent, has requested DCIP funding for fiscal years 2009 to 2013
totaling $9.4 million for its combatant command responsibilities and
$4.1 million[Footnote 24] for its defense sector responsibilities.
Although the Air Force has not established a dedicated funding account
for DCIP for itself,[Footnote 25] according to TRANSCOM officials, the
Air Force has budgeted DCIP funding for TRANSCOM to perform its
combatant command and defense sector responsibilities. Figure 5 depicts
TRANSCOM's DCIP allocated and planned funding for its combatant command
and defense sector responsibilities from fiscal years 2004 to 2013.
Figure 5: TRANSCOM's DCIP Funding Trend, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2013:
This figure is a combination line graph showing TRANSCOM's DCIP funding
trend, fiscal years 2004 to 2013. The X axis represents the fiscal
year, and the Y axis represents the dollars (in millions). The lines
represent the sector allocated, which becomes sector budgeted. The
other line represents and turns to TRANSCOM budgeted.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Sector allocated: [Empty];
TRANSCOM allocated: 2.2.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Sector allocated: 0.552;
TRANSCOM allocated: 0.552.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Sector allocated: 0.413;
TRANSCOM allocated: 0.631.
Fiscal year: 2007
Sector allocated: 0.413;
TRANSCOM allocated: 0.631.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Sector budgeted: 1.5;
TRANSCOM budgeted: 1.7.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Sector budgeted: 1.2;
TRANSCOM budgeted: 1.8.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Sector budgeted: 0.72;
TRANSCOM budgeted: 1.8.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Sector budgeted: 0.72;
TRANSCOM budgeted: 1.8.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Sector budgeted: 0.72;
TRANSCOM budgeted: 2.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Sector budgeted: 0.72;
TRANSCOM budgeted: 2.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] Sector-specific funding data are unavailable for fiscal year 2004.
[End of figure]
The assurance of critical transportation assets also benefits,
indirectly, from other DOD sources, such as the Antiterrorism Program
and the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund. Among other
things, the Antiterrorism Program provides a source of funding for
installations to remediate vulnerabilities to transportation assets.
Typically, remediation actions, such as improved security at entry
control points or the hardening of a building to withstand an explosive
blast, are done to counter a perceived terrorist threat--and do not
explicitly consider other threats and hazards. Nonetheless, critical
assets located within the installation or within a hardened building
will benefit as a result of these other efforts. Further, the Combating
Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund provides another mechanism to fund
antiterrorism measures, which tangentially affects the assurance of
critical transportation assets.
In addition to other DOD programs, foreign countries that host the U.S.
military fund initiatives that indirectly help assure critical
transportation assets. For example, U.S. embassy officials estimate
that one country we visited in U.S. Central Command's area of
responsibility provides over $1 billion annually and one country we
visited in U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility contributes
about $4.1 billion annually in support of the U.S. military presence in
its country. In both instances, a portion of the funding contributed by
these countries is used to safeguard installations containing critical
transportation assets.
Conclusions:
Until now, TRANSCOM's practice of designating entire air bases,
seaports, and commercial airports as critical transportation assets has
been inconsistent with DCIP guidance and the approach adopted by some
of the other combatant commands and military services to identify
specific mission-critical assets. Recently, however, TRANSCOM decided
to discontinue its current critical asset identification process in
favor of the draft critical asset identification methodology.
TRANSCOM's decision will necessitate reevaluating the approximately 300
installations on its existing critical asset list--an undertaking that
could potentially delay ASD(HD&ASA)'s issuance of the department's
approved Defense Critical Asset List. Consequently, it is important for
TRANSCOM to establish a timeline and key dates associated with the
reevaluation process so that ASD(HD&ASA) can account for transportation
assets in future iterations of the Defense Critical Asset List. Once
this process is completed, ASD(HD&ASA) should have greater visibility
over the full complement of mission-critical infrastructure and be
better positioned to effectively remediate vulnerabilities to its most
critical assets. While TRANSCOM officials have stated that they will
discontinue the practice of using Transportation Infrastructure
Vulnerability Assessments to identify specific critical transportation
assets on the installations, they were not able to provide ASD(HD&ASA)
or us with any documentation to confirm this decision officially.
Lastly, until TRANSCOM finalizes its memorandum of understanding with
the Joint Staff, it will not be able to define the roles and
responsibilities of transportation subject matter experts to
participate in the Joint Staff vulnerability assessments with a DCIP
module.
Although OSD issued department-wide guidance on critical infrastructure
in 2005, knowledge of the program at the installation level--where
critical transportation assets are located--is minimal because the
military services have not yet developed their own implementation
guidance. This lack of awareness has led installation officials to rely
on other, more established programs to protect critical assets. While
programs, such as DCIP and the Antiterrorism Program, do share some
precepts, there are significant differences in the types of threats and
hazards each program focuses on and in their emphasis on protection,
resilience, and restoration of operations and assets. Until the
military services issue guidance that installation personnel can use to
implement local critical infrastructure programs, mission-critical
assets may incur unintended risk.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making the following four recommendations to help assure the
availability of critical assets in the Transportation Defense Sector.
To enable decision makers within DOD to more effectively prioritize and
target limited resources to reduce critical asset vulnerabilities and
allow ASD(HD&ASA) to formulate a complete and accurate list of Defense
Critical Assets, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, through
ASD(HD&ASA) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the
Commander of TRANSCOM to take the following three actions:
* Fully implement the criteria, methodology, and process in the draft
DOD Critical Asset Identification Process manual to reevaluate and
update the identification of all critical transportation assets, and
develop a timeline for doing so.
* Discontinue the use of Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability
Assessments as its primary tool for identifying its critical assets.
* Finalize its memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff to
enable TRANSCOM transportation subject matter experts to participate in
the DCIP module of a Joint Staff vulnerability assessment.
To facilitate DCIP implementation at the installation level, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the secretaries of the
military departments to develop and implement service-specific guidance
based on published DOD DCIP guidance.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, which included three
draft recommendations, DOD partially concurred with our
recommendations. Also, TRANSCOM and U.S. Central Command provided us
with technical comments, which we incorporated in the report where
appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II.
In its written comments, DOD stated that it partially concurred with
our recommendation that TRANSCOM fully implement the criteria,
methodology, and processes outlined in the draft DOD Critical Asset
Identification Process manual to reevaluate and update the
identification of all critical transportation assets, and develop a
timeline for doing so. DOD agreed with the recommendation and noted
that TRANSCOM already has initiated implementation of the current draft
manual as a means to reevaluate identification of critical
transportation assets. DOD stated that, consequently, TRANSCOM does not
require additional ASD(HD&ASA) direction to do so. However, while
TRANSCOM officials agreed during our review to begin reevaluating their
critical assets using established criteria in the draft manual, our
recommendation also calls for TRANSCOM to develop a timeline for
completing this action. DOD acknowledged in its written comments that
while the draft manual provides a process for critical asset
identification, it has not yet provided timelines for the various
milestones. DOD's comments stated that ASD(HD&ASA) will work with the
various components to establish timelines, but estimated that the
manual will require approximately 1 year to complete, and will require
timely cooperation and participation by numerous stakeholders. We
believe that establishing these timelines is essential so that TRANSCOM
can reevaluate and update the identification of all critical
transportation assets in a timely manner.
DOD partially concurred with our draft recommendation that TRANSCOM
finalize the memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff to
discontinue the use of Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability
Assessments as its primary tool for identifying its critical assets. In
its written comments, DOD noted that this recommendation contained two
separate issues: (1) the discontinuation of the Transportation
Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments as means to identify critical
assets and (2) the finalization of a memorandum of understanding
between TRANSCOM and the Joint Staff. DOD noted in its written comments
that the purpose of the memorandum of understanding is to define the
roles and responsibilities of transportation subject matter experts to
augment the enhanced DCIP module rather than to discontinue the use of
the Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments. In
response to DOD's comments and to reflect this distinction, we made
this two recommendations rather than one. DOD also stated that no
additional direction on ASD(HD&ASA)'s part is required because TRANSCOM
has already taken steps to address both of these issues. As noted in
our report, however, TRANSCOM officials were unable to provide
ASD(HD&ASA) or us with any documentation to confirm that they have
discontinued the use of the Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability
Assessments. TRANSCOM's discontinuation of the Transportation
Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments as a means of identifying
critical transportation assets and its adoption of the manual's
methodology are both key to TRANSCOM's ability to provide DOD with an
accurate list of critical transportation assets. Further, while we
recognize that TRANSCOM has taken steps to coordinate with the Joint
Staff to define its roles and responsibilities for the DCIP module to
the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment, the memorandum of
understanding remains in draft. Timely completion of the draft
memorandum of understanding is important so that TRANSCOM's expertise
can be adequately leveraged on future vulnerability assessments of
critical transportation infrastructure. Therefore, we believe this
recommendation remains valid.
Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop and
implement service-specific guidance based on published DOD DCIP
guidance. In its written response, DOD stated that the Army has already
developed and is implementing service-specific guidance, and it noted
that the military departments prefer to wait for the official
publication of the draft DOD Critical Asset Identification Process
manual before implementing service-specific guidance. We acknowledge
the Army's efforts and recognize that other military services may
prefer to wait until the manual is published before they implement
service-specific guidance. However, our recommendation is based on the
entire body of DOD's DCIP guidance--not just the draft DOD Critical
Asset Identification Process manual, which is focused primarily on
identification of critical assets and will take at least another year
to complete. In our view, service-specific DCIP guidance should be
issued promptly based on DOD Directive 3020.40 and DOD Instruction
3020.45, which have been finalized at the OSD level. In the absence of
timely service-specific DCIP guidance, installation personnel will
continue to rely primarily on antiterrorism plans instead of on an all-
hazards approach to remediate, mitigate, or otherwise reduce the
vulnerabilities to critical transportation infrastructure.
As agreed with your offices, we are sending copies of this report to
the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations, Senate and House Committees on Armed Services, and
other interested congressional parties. We also are sending copies of
this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Homeland
Security; the Secretary of State; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the
Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Combatant Commanders of the
functional and geographic combatant commands; the Commander, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.
We will also make copies available to others upon request.
If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or . Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To conduct our review of the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to
assure the availability of critical assets in the Transportation
Defense Sector, we obtained relevant documentation and interviewed
officials from the following DOD organizations:[Footnote 26]
Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer:
* Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]):
Joint Staff, Directorate for Operations, Antiterrorism and Homeland
Defense:
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Combat Support Assessments Division:
Military Services:
* Department of the Army, Asymmetric Warfare Office, Critical
Infrastructure Risk Management Branch:
* Department of the Navy:
- Office of the Chief Information Officer:
- Mission Assurance Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren
Division, Dahlgren, Virginia:
* Department of the Air Force, Air, Space and Information Operations,
Plans, and Requirements, Homeland Defense Division:
* Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Security Division, Critical
Infrastructure Protection Office:
Combatant Commands:
* Headquarters, U.S. Central Command, Critical Infrastructure Program
Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida:
* Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Critical Infrastructure
Protection Program Office, Patch Barracks, Germany:
* Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, Antiterrorism and Critical
Infrastructure Division, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii:
- U.S. Forces Japan:
Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Critical
Infrastructure Program, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois:
* Headquarters, Air Mobility Command, Homeland Defense Branch, Scott
Air Force Base, Illinois:
* Headquarters, Military Sealift Command, Force Protection Office:
* Headquarters, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, Scott Air
Force Base, Illinois:
* Headquarters, Transportation Engineering Agency, Scott Air Force
Base, Illinois:
Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agents:
* Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command, Critical Infrastructure
Program, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois:
* Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Directorate of Military
Programs:
Selected critical assets in the continental United States, Hawaii, the
U.S. Territory of Guam, Germany, Greece, Kuwait and another country in
U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, and Japan:
We also met with officials from the Department of Homeland Security,
Infrastructure Information Collection Division, to discuss the extent
to which DOD was coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security
on the protection of non-DOD-owned defense critical assets in the
Transportation and Public Works Defense Sectors. Further, to become
more familiar with additional work being conducted on defense critical
infrastructure, we met in Arlington, Virginia, with officials from the
George Mason University School of Law's Critical Infrastructure
Protection Program and in Washington, D.C., with the Congressional
Research Service (Resources, Science, and Industry Division).
We drew a nonprobability sample of critical transportation assets
located in the United States and abroad, using several critical asset
lists developed by the Joint Staff, each of the four military services,
and TRANSCOM. The assets we selected for review were initially drawn
from the Joint Staff's list of Tier 1[Footnote 27] critical
transportation assets; however, the list includes only 4 Tier 1
critical transportation assets worldwide.[Footnote 28] To increase the
size of our sample, we used TRANSCOM's Tier 1[Footnote 29] and Tier 2
critical asset lists, which together total 300 critical assets.
Further, we analyzed critical asset lists from each of the four
military services for overlap with TRANSCOM's critical asset list. From
this, we selected 22 assets for review that included geographic
dispersion among two countries in each geographic region (Europe, the
Middle East, and the Pacific). We also selected assets from each
military service and that were representative of the three principal
types of assets identified by TRANSCOM--air base, seaport, commercial
airport. Our cases for review included two of the four Tier 1 critical
transportation assets. The specific assets we reviewed, their
locations, and the missions that they support are omitted from this
appendix, since that information is classified. Figure 6 shows the
methodology we used to select the critical transportation assets for
review.
Figure 6: GAO Critical Transportation Asset Selection Methodology:
This figure is a flowchart detailing GAO Critical Transportation Asset
Selection methodology.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Table 1 shows a breakout of critical transportation assets selected by
geographic combatant command.
Table 1: Number of Critical Transportation Assets Selected by Asset
Category and Geographic Combatant Command Area of Responsibility:
Geographic Combatant Command: U.S. Northern Command;
Air base: 2;
Seaport: 1;
Commercial airport: 1[A].
Geographic Combatant Command: U.S. European Command;
Air base: 2[B];
Seaport: 0[B];
Commercial airport: 0.
Geographic Combatant Command: U.S. Central Command;
Air base: 2;
Seaport: 3;
Commercial airport: 1.
Geographic Combatant Command: U.S. Pacific Command[C];
Air base: 4;
Seaport: 4;
Commercial airport: 2.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Selected but not visited.
[B] One of the installations we visited in Europe identified by
TRANSCOM is both an air base and a seaport.
[C] U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility includes Hawaii and
the U.S. Territory of Guam.
[End of table]
Because the Joint Staff list of Tier 1 critical assets does not include
critical assets from the Public Works Defense Sector, for the purposes
of this report, we are treating public works assets as supporting
infrastructure. For the critical transportation assets that we
selected, we also spoke with the asset owners and operators about their
reliance on public works assets that support the critical assets.
To evaluate TRANSCOM's identification and assessment efforts of its
critical transportation assets, we reviewed documentation and guidance
and met with officials from ASD(HD&ASA), the Joint Staff, the military
services, and TRANSCOM. We analyzed critical asset identification
criteria and guidance and compared the guidance with current asset
identification efforts. In addition, we spoke with DOD installation and
U.S. embassy personnel to discuss their involvement with various DOD
critical asset data calls and other efforts they participated in to
identify critical assets. We reviewed TRANSCOM's Transportation
Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments for assets we selected for
review to determine if specific critical transportation assets below
the installation level were identified. We also attempted to match
these critical assets identified through the TRANSCOM's vulnerability
assessments with assets listed on TRANSCOM's critical asset list.
To determine the extent to which DOD installation personnel have taken
actions to help assure the availability of critical transportation
assets, both within and independent of DCIP, we reviewed DOD guidance
on risk management and other complementary programs. In addition, we
reviewed and analyzed installation emergency management plans and
continuity of operations plans to determine how, if at all, critical
assets were incorporated. We also interviewed combatant command,
subcomponent, and installation personnel responsible for assuring the
availability of critical transportation assets to ascertain the
adequacy of guidance, assessments, inspections, funding, and other
processes to enhance asset availability. Finally, we assessed the
supporting public works infrastructure for the 22 assets we selected
for review to determine their impact on the availability of the
critical asset.
To determine how DOD is funding critical transportation asset
assurance, we reviewed and analyzed DCIP funding data and we
interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer. Additionally, we interviewed
officials from ASD(HD&ASA) and TRANSCOM to verify that the funding data
were comprehensive and reflected DCIP funding from all sources.
Further, we interviewed installation officials; personnel from U.S.
Forces Japan, U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S.
Pacific Command; and U.S. embassy officials in Kuwait and another
country in U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, and Japan
regarding other sources of funding. These sources include funding from
other complementary programs or host nation contributions that provide
an indirect contribution to the assurance of critical transportation
assets. We found the data provided by DOD to be sufficiently reliable
for representing the nature and extent of the DCIP funding.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 through July 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
2600 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2600:
Homeland Defense & Americas Security Affairs:
August 11, 2008:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-08-851, "Defense Critical Infrastructure: Adherence to
Guidance Would Improve DoD's Approach to Identifying and Assuring the
Availability of Critical Transportation Assets," (GAO Code 351124). DoD
partially concurs with the three recommendations in the report. Our
response to your recommendations is enclosed.
Our point of contact for this action is Mr. Antwane Johnson, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs, (703) 602-5730, extension 143 or
Antwane.Johnson@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul McHale
[End of section]
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report – Dated July 18, 2008 GAO Code 351124/GAO-08-851
"Defense Critical Infrastructure: Adherence to Guidance Would Improve
Doll's Approach to Identifying and Assuring the Availability of
Critical Transportation Assets":
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs (ASD (HD&ASA) and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, direct the Commander of the U.S. Transportation
Command to fully implement the criteria, methodology, and process in
the DoD Critical Asset Identification Process Manual to reevaluate and
update the identification of all critical transportation assets, and
develop a timeline for doing so.
DOD Response: Partially concur. ASD (HD&ASA) agrees with the
recommendation to fully implement the criteria, methodology, and
process in Critical Asset Identification Process (CAIP) Manual and to
reevaluate and update the identification of all critical transportation
assets. However, as noted in the report, the U.S. Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM) already has initiated implementation of the
current draft CAIP Manual as a means to reevaluate identification of
transportation-related Task Critical Assets (TCAs); consequently
USTRANSCOM does not require additional ASD (HD&ASA) direction to do so.
While the draft CAIP Manual provides a process for critical asset
identification, it has not yet provided timelines for the various
milestones. ASD (HD&ASA) will work with Components to establish
timelines. The CAIP requires close coordination between mission and
asset owners, and given the complexity of interaction among the many
participants in the process, we anticipate it will require
approximately 1 year to complete the CAIP, and will require timely
cooperation and participation by numerous stakeholders. Since the
Defense Critical Asset (DCA) List is dynamic, as TCAs are identified in
accordance with the Manual, they will be submitted into Strategic
Mission Assurance Data System (SMADS) and may then be considered by the
Joint Staff and the ASD (HD&ASA) as DCA candidates.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs (ASD (HD&ASA) and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, direct the Commander of the U.S. Transportation
Command to finalize the memorandum of understanding with the Joint
Staff to discontinue the use of Transportation Infrastructure
Vulnerability Assessments as its primary tool for identifying its
critical assets.
DOD Response: Partially concur. ASD (HD&ASA) agrees with the
recommendation to finalize the memorandum of understanding with the
Joint Staff and to discontinue the use of Transportation Infrastructure
Vulnerability Assessments (TIVAs) as the primary tool to identify
critical assets. However, those are two separate issues.
To accurately reflect the issues in the recommendation, request the
recommendation be re- worded to read as follows: "The GAO recommends
that the Secretary of Defense through the ASD (HD&ASA) and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM) to discontinue the use of TIVAs as its primary
tool for identifying its critical assets and continue discussions with
the Joint Staff to finalize the memorandum of understanding for
USTRANSCOM CIP transportation subject matter experts to augment the
enhanced DCIP module to the Joint Staff's Integrated Vulnerability
Assessment when transportation assets are assessed." As currently
written, this GAO recommendation implies the purpose of the memorandum
of understanding is to discontinue the execution of TIVAs. In fact, the
memorandum is being developed to define the roles and responsibilities
of transportation subject matter experts to augment the enhanced DCIP
module. A memorandum of understanding for the discontinuance of TIVAs
is not required. This discontinuance, a USTRANSCOM initiative started
on June 27, 2008, has already been taken in coordination with the Joint
Staff; consequently USTRANSCOM does not require additional ASD (HD&ASA)
direction to do so.
As discussed in the July 1, 2008 Exit Teleconference, USTRANSCOM has
already discontinued the planning and execution of its TIVAs. Assets
will be identified in accordance with the Critical Asset Identification
Process Manual methodology and in coordination with other Mission
Owners and Resource Providers.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments to develop and
implement Service-specific guidance based on published DoD Defense
Critical Infrastructure Program guidance.
DOD Response: Partially concur. Although the Army has developed Service-
specific guidance (AR 525-26) and HQDA Implementation Letter (in final
staffing) and is executing that guidance along with DoD Directive
3020.40 and DoD Instruction 3020.45, the Military Departments prefer to
await official publication of the Critical Asset Identification Process
prior to implementing Service-specific guidance.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Mark A. Pross, Assistant
Director; Jon K. Bateman; Gina M. Flacco; James P. Krustapentus; Kate
S. Lenane; Danielle Pakdaman; Terry L. Richardson; Marc J. Schwartz;
John S. Townes; Cheryl A. Weissman; and Alex M. Winograd made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Critical Infrastructure: Additional Air Force Actions Needed at
Creech Air Force Base to Ensure Protection and Continuity of UAS
Operations. GAO-08-469RNI. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2008 (For
Official Use Only).
Defense Critical Infrastructure: DOD's Risk Analysis of Its Critical
Infrastructure Omits Highly Sensitive Assets. GAO-08-373R. Washington,
D.C.: April 2, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Management Actions Needed to Ensure
Effectiveness of DOD's Risk Management Approach for the Defense
Industrial Base. GAO-07-1077. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Guide DOD's Efforts to
Identify, Prioritize, and Assess Its Critical Infrastructure. GAO-07-
461. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United
States of America: A Strategy for Today: A Vision for Tomorrow
(Washington, D.C.: 2004). The National Military Strategy is the Joint
Chiefs of Staff's document on the strategic direction of the armed
forces, which establishes three military objectives: (1) protect the
United States against external attacks and aggression, (2) prevent
conflict and surprise attack, and (3) prevail against adversaries.
[2] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 2006). The Quadrennial Defense Review is a
comprehensive internal review of DOD's forces, resources, and programs.
[3] The purpose of public works infrastructure, according to the draft
DOD Critical Asset Identification Process manual, is to provide and
maintain utilities and real property and provide emergency services.
[4] DOD Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
(DCIP) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2005).
[5] The 10 defense sectors are the Defense Industrial Base; Financial
Services; Global Information Grid; Health Affairs; Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Logistics; Personnel; Public Works;
Space; and Transportation.
[6] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Guide DOD's Efforts
to Identify, Prioritize, and Assess Its Critical Infrastructure, GAO-07-
461 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007).
[7] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Management Actions Needed to Ensure
Effectiveness of DOD's Risk Management Approach for the Defense
Industrial Base, GAO-07-1077 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2007).
[8] GAO, Defense Critical Infrastructure: DOD's Risk Analysis of Its
Critical Infrastructure Omits Highly Sensitive Assets, GAO-08-373R
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2008).
[9] GAO, Defense Critical Infrastructure: Additional Air Force Actions
Needed at Creech Air Force Base to Ensure Protection and Continuity of
UAS Operations, GAO-08-469RNI (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2008) (For
Official Use Only).
[10] GAO, Defense Critical Infrastructure: DOD's Evolving Assurance
Program Has Made Progress but Leaves Critical Space, Intelligence, and
Global Communications Assets at Risk, GAO-08-828NI (For Official Use
Only), forthcoming.
[11] GAO-07-461.
[12] While public works is one of the 10 defense sectors identified by
ASD(HD&ASA) in DOD Directive 3020.40, assets in this defense sector did
not rise to the same level of criticality as assets in other sectors.
Because the Joint Staff list of Tier 1 critical assets does not include
critical assets from the Public Works Defense Sector, for the purposes
of this report, we are treating public works assets as supporting
infrastructure.
[13] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[14] At the time of our sample selection, only four transportation
assets had been identified as Tier 1 critical assets; however, TRANSCOM
subsequently identified four more, raising the total to eight Tier 1
critical transportation assets. Of these eight assets, two were
included in our sample.
[15] Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
17, 2003).
[16] DOD Directive 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 13, 2007).
[17] DOD Directive 3020.26, Defense Continuity Program (DCP)
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2007).
[18] DOD Directive 3020.40 defines an asset as a distinguishable
network entity that provides a service or capability. Assets are
people, physical entities, or information located either within or
outside the United States and owned or operated by domestic, foreign,
public, or private sector organizations.
[19] DOD Instruction 3020.45, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
(DCIP) Management, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2008).
[20] DOD, ASD(HD&ASA), Strategy for Defense Critical Infrastructure
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2008).
[21] DOD Instruction 3020.45.
[22] According to DOD Instruction 3020.45, ASD(HD&ASA) is responsible
for issuing a list of Defense Critical Assets based on nominations from
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[23] An all-hazards approach looks not only at intentional threats,
such as hostile or terrorist attack, but also non-intentional hazards,
such as accidents, weather events, and natural disasters.
[24] According to TRANSCOM officials, ASD(HD&ASA) will continue to fund
the Transportation Defense Sector at an average of $720,000 per year
until fiscal year 2013 at which time TRANSCOM will be required to seek
funding for its defense sector responsibilities from the Air Force,
TRANSCOM's executive agent.
[25] A February 2006 memorandum from the Principal Deputy for
ASD(HD&ASA) stated that beginning in fiscal year 2008, each service
should allocate $2.4 million per year and each combatant command,
through its executive agent, should allocate $1.8 million per year to
carry out their assigned DCIP responsibilities.
[26] DOD organizations are located in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area unless otherwise indicated.
[27] Critical assets are categorized into three tiers based on their
relative criticality. The loss, incapacitation, or disruption of a Tier
1 asset could result in mission (or function) failure at the DOD,
military department, combatant command, sub-unified command, defense
agency, or defense infrastructure sector level. The loss,
incapacitation, or disruption of a Tier 2 asset could result in mission
(or function) degradation at the DOD, military department, combatant
command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or defense infrastructure
sector level. The loss, incapacitation, or disruption of a Tier 3 asset
could result in mission (or function) failure below the military
department, combatant command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or
defense infrastructure sector level.
[28] At the time of our sample selection, only four transportation
assets had been identified as Tier 1 critical assets; however, TRANSCOM
subsequently identified four more, raising the total to eight Tier 1
critical transportation assets. Of these assets, two were included in
our sample.
[29] TRANSCOM's Tier 1 critical asset list is synonymous with the Joint
Staff's Tier 1 critical transportation asset list.
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