Military Base Realignments and Closures
Army Is Developing Plans to Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain Gao ID: GAO-08-1010R August 13, 2008In September 2005, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) close Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and realign most of its technical functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, as one of 182 recommendations in the 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) round. DOD must complete the closure and realignment actions specified in the recommendation within the statutory 6-year implementation period ending September 15, 2011. Representatives from communities surrounding Fort Monmouth, as well as elected officials, raised concerns during hearings before the BRAC Commission that a number of current employees would not move to Aberdeen Proving Ground, leading to a loss of expertise that could negatively affect ongoing support for military operations, including the Global War on Terrorism. The Secretary of the Army pledged that the Army would not allow the transfer of functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground to affect this ongoing support. Although some of the BRAC commissioners shared the concern about the potential loss of expertise, the commission concluded in its report that DOD could mitigate the adverse effects of moving existing programs over the implementation period. However, to ensure that future leaders understood this concern, the commission report included language recommending that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to Congress that the movement of functions from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground would be accomplished without disruption to their support to the Global War on Terrorism or other critical contingency operations. DOD issued its report in December 2007, which concluded that the department could accomplish the move without disruption to ongoing support efforts. Fort Monmouth currently hosts organizations that perform research, development, and acquisition of the Army's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. About one-third of the current C4ISR workforce consists of scientists and engineers, the largest single group, with logistics, contracting, and business occupations constituting most of the remaining federal government civilian workforce. Clerks and administrative assistant positions constitute about 5 percent of the workforce. This workforce is further supplemented by about 1,600 embedded contractor employees and more than 1,000 contractor employees located off the installation. This review is one in a series of reviews that we have undertaken on the implementation of the 2005 BRAC round recommendations.
The Army is in the process of developing and implementing plans to transfer C4ISR functions from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground. The Army faces some significant challenges and has started to identify mitigation strategies that, if implemented as intended, may lessen the mission-disruption risks associated with the transfer. With about 3 years remaining before the planned closure of Fort Monmouth, the Army has developed high-level plans that are outlined in DOD's December 2007 report to Congress, which identified approaches to completing the transfer and general risk-mitigation strategies. However, DOD's December 2007 report did not include detailed plans for how the Army intends to complete the transfer. As planning efforts have evolved, the C4ISR organizations have started to develop detailed plans to manage the transfer and continue support for ongoing DOD missions. By its very nature, the BRAC process is complex. As such, the Army faces several significant challenges in completing the transfer, which officials have recognized, and the Army is developing strategies designed to lessen the associated risks. First, the Army is facing human capital challenges in hiring a projected 3,700 federal government civilian employees to fully reconstitute its expected workforce authorization of about 5,100 civilians at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 2011, which includes a large number of scientists and engineers with technical expertise. At the time of our review, the Army's request for direct hire authority was under review within DOD, but had not yet been submitted to the Office of Personnel Management, which grants the authority. To help mitigate the effects of the potentially smaller and less experienced workforce at Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Army has identified strategies, including focusing on the highest-priority workload and deferring some portions of the C4ISR workload, temporarily transferring some of the workload to other DOD organizations, or hiring additional contractors. Second, the Army faces challenges in obtaining personnel security clearances for nearly all of its newly hired employees in a timely manner. Third, the Army faces infrastructure challenges in completing the construction of facilities to accommodate C4ISR personnel and relocation of personnel and equipment to Aberdeen Proving Ground by the end of the BRAC implementation period. Finally, the Army faces challenges in funding the increasing costs of the transfer. These challenges are significant but are not unique to the closure of Fort Monmouth, as we have previously reported on similar challenges as they relate to the implementation of other BRAC recommendations. While the Army has begun to identify and implement mitigation strategies designed to lessen the risks associated with each of the challenges, it is too early to determine the effectiveness of these strategies in ensuring continued support to military missions. DOD plans to continue ongoing oversight of the implementation of this BRAC recommendation at the installation level, Army headquarters, and DOD, and to revise plans, as appropriate, which may also lessen potential mission-disruption risks.
GAO-08-1010R, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain
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August 13, 2008:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing
Plans to Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain:
In September 2005, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) close Fort Monmouth,
New Jersey, and realign most of its technical functions to Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland, as one of 182 recommendations in the 2005
base realignment and closure (BRAC) round. DOD must complete the
closure and realignment actions specified in the recommendation within
the statutory 6-year implementation period ending September 15,
2011.[Footnote 1] Representatives from communities surrounding Fort
Monmouth, as well as elected officials, raised concerns during hearings
before the BRAC Commission that a number of current employees would not
move to Aberdeen Proving Ground, leading to a loss of expertise that
could negatively affect ongoing support for military operations,
including the Global War on Terrorism. The Secretary of the Army
pledged that the Army would not allow the transfer of functions to
Aberdeen Proving Ground to affect this ongoing support. Although some
of the BRAC commissioners shared the concern about the potential loss
of expertise, the commission concluded in its report that DOD could
mitigate the adverse effects of moving existing programs over the
implementation period. However, to ensure that future leaders
understood this concern, the commission report included language
recommending that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to Congress
that the movement of functions from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving
Ground would be accomplished without disruption to their support to the
Global War on Terrorism or other critical contingency operations. DOD
issued its report in December 2007, which concluded that the department
could accomplish the move without disruption to ongoing support
efforts.[Footnote 2]
Fort Monmouth currently hosts organizations that perform research,
development, and acquisition of the Army's command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. These organizations include the
Logistics and Readiness Center; the Communications-Electronics
Acquisition Center; the Software Engineering Center; the Program
Executive Office for Command, Control, and Communications Tactical; the
Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and
Sensors; the Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and
Engineering Center; and the headquarters element of the Communications
and Electronics Command. The C4ISR functions performed by these
organizations are the primary mission activity at Fort
Monmouth[Footnote 3] and currently involve about 4,400 federal
government civilian positions and about 200 military positions. Almost
all of the authorized C4ISR positions are transferring to Aberdeen
Proving Ground as part of the BRAC recommendation.[Footnote 4] About
one-third of the current C4ISR workforce consists of scientists and
engineers, the largest single group, with logistics, contracting, and
business occupations constituting most of the remaining federal
government civilian workforce. Clerks and administrative assistant
positions constitute about 5 percent of the workforce. This workforce
is further supplemented by about 1,600 embedded contractor employees
and more than 1,000 contractor employees located off the installation.
This review is one in a series of reviews that we have undertaken on
the implementation of the 2005 BRAC round recommendations. As with most
of our BRAC-related work, we prepared this report under the Comptroller
General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own
initiative[Footnote 5] because of broad-based congressional interest
and are reporting the results to facilitate congressional oversight of
DOD's infrastructure and the BRAC program. This report discusses the
status of the Army's planning efforts to transfer C4ISR functions to
Aberdeen Proving Ground, implementation challenges associated with the
transfer, and strategies in place to mitigate mission-disruption risks.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the status of the Army's planning efforts and the
challenges and associated mitigation strategies, we reviewed and
analyzed documentation and interviewed officials representing the
following offices and organizations:
DOD Office of General Counsel, Arlington, Virginia;
* Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Environment), BRAC office, Arlington, Virginia;
* Army Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation
Management, Arlington, Virginia;
* Army BRAC Division, Arlington, Virginia;
* Army Materiel Command BRAC office, Fort Belvoir, Virginia;
* Army Corps of Engineers Headquarters, Washington, D.C;
* BRAC office, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland;
* BRAC Relocation Task Force, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and:
* the C4ISR organizations, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey;
- Communications-Electronics Acquisition Center,
- Logistics and Readiness Center,
- Software Engineering Center,
- Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering
Center,
- Program Executive Office for Command, Control, and Communications
Tactical, and:
- Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and
Sensors.
We reviewed the BRAC Commission's September 2005 report to determine
the commission's intent for DOD's report to Congress. We reviewed DOD's
December 2007 report, which represented a point-in-time assessment of
the funding and authorities that Fort Monmouth command officials
determined were needed to successfully transfer the C4ISR functions to
Aberdeen Proving Ground. We assessed the information included in the
report to determine whether the content included was consistent with
our understanding of what was recommended by the BRAC Commission. We
met with officials from Fort Monmouth's BRAC relocation task force to
determine how they developed DOD's December 2007 report. Additionally,
we met with officials from various Army headquarters-level offices, as
well as DOD's BRAC office, and reviewed draft versions of DOD's report
to determine these organizations' roles in developing the report.
Because plans continue to evolve as more information becomes available,
we subsequently reviewed Fort Monmouth's overarching plan and documents
related to organization-specific approaches to completing the transfer.
We spoke with Fort Monmouth and Aberdeen Proving Ground officials to
determine the processes used to develop and revise the plans and the
status of these efforts. We met with officials representing DOD's BRAC
office, the Army's Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Installation Management and BRAC office, the Army Corps of Engineers,
the Army Materiel Command, Fort Monmouth, and Aberdeen Proving Ground
to obtain and analyze additional information on the Army's planning
efforts. Additionally, we reviewed the minutes from the Army's senior
oversight group meetings from February 2008 through April 2008; minutes
for the May 2008 meeting were not available as of July 2008.
Through our review of the Army's plans and related documents and
interviews, we identified some challenges that the Army faces in
implementing this BRAC recommendation, along with associated mitigation
strategies. We discussed these challenges and mitigation strategies
with officials representing DOD's BRAC office, the Army's Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management and BRAC office,
the Army Corps of Engineers, the Army Materiel Command, Fort Monmouth,
and Aberdeen Proving Ground. We analyzed data provided by Fort Monmouth
officials related to their hiring projections. We assessed the
reliability of these projections by reviewing the assumptions used in
developing the projections and discussing the projections with the
officials who developed them. We found these projections to be
reasonable for planning purposes. We reviewed the Army's business plan
for implementing this recommendation and the Army's BRAC budget request
for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to determine the Army's facility
construction and relocation schedules and current cost estimates. We
also reviewed our prior work to determine the extent to which the
challenges that the Army is facing are challenges for the
implementation of other BRAC recommendations.[Footnote 6]
Additionally, because detailed planning efforts and the transfer of
C4ISR functions were ongoing at the time of our review, we focused on
the best data available at the time, which represent a point in time
and are based on a series of assumptions that are subject to change as
plans are updated and implementation proceeds. Also, our review
included only those aspects of the BRAC Commission's Fort Monmouth
closure recommendation that pertained to transferring C4ISR functions
to Aberdeen Proving Ground because these functions were the primary
focus of the recommendation and were addressed in DOD's December 2007
report.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to August 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
The Army is in the process of developing and implementing plans to
transfer C4ISR functions from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground.
The Army faces some significant challenges and has started to identify
mitigation strategies that, if implemented as intended, may lessen the
mission-disruption risks associated with the transfer. With about 3
years remaining before the planned closure of Fort Monmouth, the Army
has developed high-level plans that are outlined in DOD's December 2007
report to Congress, which identified approaches to completing the
transfer and general risk-mitigation strategies. However, DOD's
December 2007 report did not include detailed plans for how the Army
intends to complete the transfer. As planning efforts have evolved, the
C4ISR organizations have started to develop detailed plans to manage
the transfer and continue support for ongoing DOD missions. By its very
nature, the BRAC process is complex. As such, the Army faces several
significant challenges in completing the transfer, which officials have
recognized, and the Army is developing strategies designed to lessen
the associated risks. First, the Army is facing human capital
challenges in hiring a projected 3,700 federal government civilian
employees to fully reconstitute its expected workforce authorization of
about 5,100 civilians at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 2011, which
includes a large number of scientists and engineers with technical
expertise. The Army expects that about 2,200 of these new employees
will not be hired until after the slated closure of Fort Monmouth and
transfer of functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground in 2011. Officials
project that the workforce will be fully reconstituted in 2016. Fort
Monmouth officials project that direct hire authority would expedite
the hiring process and would allow them to reconstitute the C4ISR
workforce at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 2014, 2 years sooner than
current projections. At the time of our review, the Army's request for
direct hire authority was under review within DOD, but had not yet been
submitted to the Office of Personnel Management, which grants the
authority. To help mitigate the effects of the potentially smaller and
less experienced workforce at Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Army has
identified strategies, including focusing on the highest-priority
workload and deferring some portions of the C4ISR workload, temporarily
transferring some of the workload to other DOD organizations, or hiring
additional contractors. While many of the expected vacancies can be
attributed to the BRAC recommendation, the Army expected to hire a
number of employees in the next few years regardless of whether Fort
Monmouth closed because of increases in the authorized personnel levels
and an anticipated surge in retirements as about one-half of the
current C4ISR workforce becomes eligible to retire by 2011. Second, the
Army faces challenges in obtaining personnel security clearances for
nearly all of its newly hired employees in a timely manner. Third, the
Army faces infrastructure challenges in completing the construction of
facilities to accommodate C4ISR personnel and relocation of personnel
and equipment to Aberdeen Proving Ground by the end of the BRAC
implementation period. Finally, the Army faces challenges in funding
the increasing costs of the transfer. These challenges are significant
but are not unique to the closure of Fort Monmouth, as we have
previously reported on similar challenges as they relate to the
implementation of other BRAC recommendations.[Footnote 7] While the
Army has begun to identify and implement mitigation strategies designed
to lessen the risks associated with each of the challenges, it is too
early to determine the effectiveness of these strategies in ensuring
continued support to military missions. Plans in and of themselves
cannot ensure a successful transition due to inherent uncertainties
that may arise over time, the need to revise plans as circumstances
change, and the need to effectively execute the plans. Therefore, it is
critical that the Army continue to monitor the execution of its
transfer plans and take corrective actions to lessen the risk of
operational disruptions. DOD plans to continue ongoing oversight of the
implementation of this BRAC recommendation at the installation level,
Army headquarters, and DOD, and to revise plans, as appropriate, which
may also lessen potential mission-disruption risks. Because DOD has
oversight mechanisms in place to continue its implementation monitoring
efforts, we are not making recommendations at this time.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment stated that DOD agrees that
the challenges of implementing the BRAC recommendation to close Fort
Monmouth are not unique and that the department has strategies in place
to mitigate these challenges. DOD's written comments are reprinted in
enclosure I. Additionally, DOD provided technical comments on a draft
of this report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is currently
implementing its fifth round--the 2005 round.[Footnote 8] In May 2005,
the Secretary of Defense made public his recommendations for the 2005
BRAC round. These recommendations were forwarded to the BRAC
Commission, which was established by law as an independent entity to
evaluate DOD's recommendations.[Footnote 9] The commission subsequently
presented its findings and recommendations to the President on
September 8, 2005. The President approved the commission's
recommendations in their entirety and forwarded them to Congress on
September 15, 2005. The recommendations became effective on November 9,
2005, and DOD has until September 15, 2011, to complete the
implementation of all of the BRAC recommendations.
The 2005 BRAC round is different from previous BRAC rounds in several
respects. We have previously reported that the 2005 BRAC round is the
biggest, most complex, and costliest BRAC round ever, in part because,
unlike prior rounds, the Secretary of Defense viewed the 2005 round as
an opportunity to not only achieve savings, but also assist in
transforming the department.[Footnote 10] DOD plans to execute more
than 800 closure and realignment actions as part of the 182
recommendations from the 2005 BRAC round, which is more than twice the
number of actions completed in the four prior rounds combined.
Additionally, unlike prior BRAC rounds, which were implemented in times
of declining defense budgets, DOD is implementing the 2005 BRAC round
during a time of conflict when many military capabilities are surging
and DOD is implementing other worldwide transformation initiatives.
Transferring the C4ISR organizations to Aberdeen Proving Ground is the
largest portion of the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth. In
recommending the closure of Fort Monmouth and transfer of C4ISR
functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, DOD intended to consolidate
research, development and acquisition, and test and evaluation
functions onto fewer installations and hoped to achieve efficiencies
and synergy at a lower cost than would be required at multiple sites.
In addition to the C4ISR functions transferring from Fort Monmouth to
Aberdeen Proving Ground, this recommendation also provides for the
relocation of some C4ISR functions from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, to Aberdeen Proving Ground; a portion of the
Army Research Institute from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Aberdeen Proving
Ground; some C4ISR functions from Fort Monmouth to Fort Belvoir and
Defense Supply Center, Columbus, Ohio; and the U.S. Military Academy
Preparatory School from Fort Monmouth to West Point, New York.
Army Is Developing and Implementing Plans to Transfer Functions, but
Several Significant Challenges Remain:
The Army is in the process of developing and implementing plans to
transfer C4ISR functions from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground,
and while several significant challenges remain, the Army has started
to identify mitigation strategies that, if implemented as intended, may
lessen the mission-disruption risks associated with the transfer. With
about 3 years remaining before the planned closure of Fort Monmouth,
the Army has developed high-level plans, and the C4ISR organizations
are developing detailed organization-level plans. The Army faces
challenges related to (1) recruiting and hiring a significant number of
employees to reconstitute the workforce at Aberdeen Proving Ground, (2)
obtaining security clearances for new employees in a timely manner, (3)
completing the construction of C4ISR facilities at Aberdeen Proving
Ground and relocation of personnel and equipment before the end of the
BRAC implementation period, and (4) fully funding the increasing costs
of the transfer. While the Army has begun developing and implementing
strategies intended to lessen the risks associated with these
challenges, it is too early to determine the effectiveness of these
strategies. Additionally, DOD intends to continue its ongoing oversight
efforts related to the implementation of this BRAC recommendation,
which may also lessen potential mission-disruption risks.
Army Has Developed High-Level Plans and Is Developing Detailed
Organization-Level Plans:
With about 3 years remaining before the planned closure of Fort
Monmouth, the Army has developed high-level plans for the transfer of
C4ISR functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground and is in the process of
developing detailed organization-level plans. Fort Monmouth officials
began their planning efforts shortly after the closure of Fort Monmouth
was announced in 2005 when a group of Fort Monmouth officials
representing each of the C4ISR organizations and key staff offices met
to develop a general approach to transferring the C4ISR functions to
Aberdeen Proving Ground. The general approach evolved into two high-
level plans--DOD's December 2007 report to Congress and an overarching
plan to guide the transfer--which describe the Army's overall approach
to transferring C4ISR functions from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving
Ground and general strategies to mitigate the risks associated with the
transfer.
The high-level plans focus on four critical risk areas--human capital,
information technology, facilities, and relocation phasing--that Fort
Monmouth officials determined they would need to address when
developing plans to transfer the C4ISR functions. The high-level plans
were based on other ongoing planning efforts and data.
* In the human capital risk area, the officials relied, in part, on
ongoing efforts to address an expected surge in future retirements to
develop BRAC plans and mitigation strategies. More than one-half of
current employees at Fort Monmouth will be eligible to retire,
including those eligible for early retirement, by 2011. Officials have
been aware of and planning to address this potential loss of expertise
since 2000 and used some of the strategies previously designed to
address this issue in developing their BRAC plans. For example, in
2000, officials developed a commandwide workforce plan that identified
potential skill or experience gaps in the workforce due to retirements
and strategies to fill these gaps. Since the BRAC decision was
announced in 2005, Fort Monmouth officials have included information on
projected skill or experience gaps that may occur due to employees
choosing not to relocate to Aberdeen Proving Ground and strategies to
address these gaps in the annual updates to the workforce plan. The
human capital risk-mitigation strategies identified in DOD's December
2007 report focus on obtaining the funding and authorities needed to
address hiring needs by allowing C4ISR organizations to hire more
employees, as well as hiring employees more quickly.
* In the information technology critical risk area, Fort Monmouth
officials determined overall information technology requirements for
the C4ISR functions through a room-by-room inventory of the current
equipment and capabilities. Officials compared those requirements to
the current capacity at Aberdeen Proving Ground to determine the
necessary infrastructure upgrades. Fort Monmouth officials identified
obtaining sufficient funding as the key strategy to mitigate risks
related to the information technology critical risk area in DOD's
December 2007 report to Congress.
* In the facilities critical risk area, Fort Monmouth officials
determined requirements for the size and configuration of needed
facilities at Aberdeen Proving Ground to accommodate the C4ISR
personnel. Officials intentionally placed many of the functions that
have complex laboratory or equipment requirements in the facilities
that are scheduled to be completed first to allow more time to
relocate, test, and calibrate the necessary equipment before Fort
Monmouth closes. Strategies to mitigate risks related to the facilities
critical risk area in DOD's December 2007 report to Congress focused on
obtaining sufficient funding.
* In the relocation phasing critical risk area, Fort Monmouth officials
identified three general approaches for how organizations would
transfer specific functions: creating redundant (or duplicate)
capabilities at Aberdeen Proving Ground and fully transferring the
function before closing facilities at Fort Monmouth, splitting the
workload between the two sites until the entire function is completely
transferred, and temporarily outsourcing work to other organizations
until the full workload can be performed at Aberdeen Proving Ground.
Fort Monmouth officials identified obtaining sufficient funding as the
key strategy to mitigate risks related to the relocation phasing
critical risk area in DOD's December 2007 report to Congress.
While DOD's December 2007 report to Congress identified critical risk
areas and general risk-mitigation strategies, our analysis showed that
the report did not fully provide details for how the Army would
complete the transfer without disrupting ongoing support to military
missions. For example, the report identifies general relocation phasing
strategies that could be used to transfer C4ISR functions, but does not
provide details regarding equipment and personnel transfer plans.
Additionally, the December 2007 report does not explain how key
conclusions were drawn, particularly that the transfer could be
completed without affecting their support to the Global War on
Terrorism or other critical contingency operations. Fort Monmouth
officials said that identifying specific support to the Global War on
Terrorism for DOD's December 2007 report was a challenge. For example,
the officials said that each C4ISR organization contributes to
operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, but not all of
the organizations can separate out which personnel are critical to
these operations because employees who perform work related to the
Global War on Terrorism also perform work related to other operations
that are nonetheless critical to other DOD missions. Additionally,
officials told us that while they have general plans that estimate
future programs and projects, it is difficult to precisely determine
their future workload, particularly what portion may support the Global
War on Terrorism, due to the evolving nature of the work. Thus,
officials told us that their planning efforts are focused on the entire
C4ISR mission and not just those functions related to the Global War on
Terrorism.
In addition to DOD's report to Congress, in December 2007, Fort
Monmouth officials developed an overarching plan to guide the transfer
that included strategic goals, subordinate objectives, and specific
initiatives that detail actions needed to complete the transfer. The
goals identified in the plan align with the four critical risk areas
discussed in DOD's December 2007 report. As in that report, much of the
plan focuses on human capital issues, particularly as they relate to
ensuring mission continuity. The plan provides some detail lacking in
DOD's report in that it provides information about how the Army intends
to implement the mitigation strategies. According to Fort Monmouth
officials, the plan is a "living document" that will continue to be
revised and updated as implementation of the transfer continues.
While high-level plans have been completed, the C4ISR organizations are
in the process of developing detailed, organization-specific transfer
plans. According to Fort Monmouth officials, much of the detail related
to how specific functions, including personnel and equipment, will be
transferred are going to be included in organization-specific plans
and, at the time of our review, each of the C4ISR organizations was
developing such plans. These plans focus largely on the human capital
and relocation phasing critical risk areas. Each of the C4ISR
organizations has collected data on its workforce to inform its plans.
Since DOD issued its December 2007 report to Congress, each C4ISR
organization has completed a human capital assessment to obtain
individual-level data on which personnel plan to relocate to Aberdeen
Proving Ground. To complete the assessment, leaders from each C4ISR
organization spoke with each employee to identify person-by-person who
is planning to relocate to Aberdeen Proving Ground. Officials plan to
update these assessments periodically. These assessments are in
addition to commandwide workforce surveys, in which officials have
collected data across the C4ISR organizations every 6 months since the
closure was announced to help refine their estimates across the command
as to the number of current employees planning to relocate to Aberdeen
Proving Ground.
Since DOD's December 2007 report, each C4ISR organization has also
reviewed its specific functions and determined the appropriate
relocation strategies required to transfer the functions for each
facility or laboratory without affecting ongoing support to military
missions as part of the organization-level plans. Most organizations
are using a combination of the identified approaches (redundant
capabilities, split-based operations, and outsourcing work to other
locations) to transfer personnel and equipment. Fort Monmouth officials
said that the next step is for the C4ISR organizations to add
additional detail to plans and determine how individual pieces of
equipment will be relocated. These efforts were under way at the time
of our review.
Army Faces Several Significant Challenges, but Mitigation Strategies
and Continued Oversight May Lessen Risk:
The Army is facing several significant challenges in transferring C4ISR
functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, and officials have begun to
identify mitigation strategies that, if implemented as intended, may
lessen the risks associated with the transfer. Key challenges remain in
(1) recruiting and hiring a significant number of employees to
reconstitute the workforce at Aberdeen Proving Ground, (2) obtaining
security clearances for new employees in a timely manner, (3)
completing the construction of C4ISR facilities at Aberdeen Proving
Ground and relocation of personnel and equipment before the end of the
BRAC implementation period, and (4) fully funding the increasing costs
of the transfer. These challenges are significant but are not unique to
the closure of Fort Monmouth, as we have previously reported on similar
challenges as they relate to the implementation of other BRAC
recommendations.[Footnote 11] The Army has begun to develop and
implement mitigation strategies to address these challenges; however,
it is too early to determine the effectiveness of these strategies.
Additionally, officials at several levels, including the installation
level, the Army, and DOD, intend to continue their ongoing oversight of
the transfer, which may lessen potential mission-disruption risks.
Army Faces Human Capital Challenges, but Has Begun to Identify and
Implement Mitigation Strategies:
Recruiting and hiring a significant number of employees to reconstitute
the C4ISR workforce at Aberdeen Proving Ground will likely be the most
challenging aspect of transferring the C4ISR functions to Aberdeen
Proving Ground, and the Army has begun to identify and implement
strategies intended to lessen the risks associated with this challenge.
While there are about 4,400 government civilian employees currently
performing the C4ISR workload at Fort Monmouth, the number of
authorized positions is expected to increase to about 5,100 by 2011 due
to an increase in the C4ISR workload. Fort Monmouth officials project
that about 30 to 40 percent of the current federal government civilian
workforce will relocate to Aberdeen Proving Ground and the Army will
need to hire about 3,700 employees to fully reconstitute the workforce
at Aberdeen Proving Ground, which officials project will occur in 2016.
Officials plan to hire about 1,500 employees prior to the closure of
Fort Monmouth in 2011, leaving about 2,200 positions vacant at that
time. These vacancies are expected across all occupations and
experience levels in each of the C4ISR organizations.
While many of the expected vacancies can be attributed to the BRAC
recommendation, the Army expected to hire a number of employees in the
next few years regardless of whether Fort Monmouth closed. First, the
C4ISR workload currently performed at Fort Monmouth is expected to
increase over the next few years, leading to an increase of about 700
positions from the current level of 4,400 to about 5,100 positions.
Additionally, as previously discussed, more than one-half of the
current federal government civilian employees in the C4ISR workforce
would be eligible to retire by 2011, leading to a potential loss of
expertise even in the absence of a decision to close Fort Monmouth.
Fort Monmouth officials expected that there would be a surge in
retirements between 2015 and 2018 in the absence of BRAC, but these
officials anticipate that the closure will accelerate the time frame
during which eligible employees choose to retire, leading to vacancies
that will need to be filled earlier than originally anticipated.
Although these positions would need to be filled regardless of whether
Fort Monmouth closed, Fort Monmouth officials count the hiring required
to meet increases in authorized levels and expected retirements in
their BRAC vacancy projections because the positions need to be filled
at the same time the C4ISR functions are transferring to Aberdeen
Proving Ground.
Fort Monmouth officials project that as the closure of the installation
nears, the size of the C4ISR workforce will gradually decrease from the
fiscal year 2008 authorized level of about 4,400 positions as employees
who choose not to relocate to Aberdeen Proving Ground find other jobs
or choose to retire, leaving some positions unfilled. The officials
expect the size of the workforce will reach its lowest level in 2011
when Fort Monmouth closes and the C4ISR functions are fully transferred
to Aberdeen Proving Ground, leaving approximately 2,200 positions
unfilled. As new employees are hired, the officials expect that the
size of the workforce will gradually increase after 2011 until it
reaches authorized levels of about 5,100--to include the 700 additional
authorized positions--which officials project will occur in 2016. Fort
Monmouth officials project that they could reconstitute the C4ISR
workforce at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 2014--2 years sooner--if the
C4ISR organizations were given direct hire authority.[Footnote 12] At
the time of our review, the Army's request for direct hire authority
was under review within DOD, but it had not yet been submitted to the
Office of Personnel Management. When fully reconstituted, the workforce
may be less experienced than the current workforce at Fort Monmouth due
to experienced employees at Fort Monmouth choosing not to relocate to
Aberdeen Proving Ground and the likelihood that a portion of newly
hired employees will be less experienced than the current workforce.
Army officials estimate that it could take 3 to 8 years, depending on
the occupation and an individual's experience, for a newly hired entry-
level employee to reach full proficiency in a position. These officials
told us that they expect to hire more-experienced employees, to the
extent they are available, and fill the remaining positions with entry-
level employees. Figure 1 illustrates notionally, based on Fort
Monmouth officials' projections, the gradual decrease and
reconstitution of the C4ISR workforce in terms of filling positions and
the potential time required for entry-level employees to reach full
proficiency in those positions. It is important to note that, to the
extent that the Army is successful in hiring a greater number of
experienced employees, the number of employees that are fully
proficient could be higher than depicted in figure 1 because the
graphic illustrates the time required for entry-level employees to
reach full proficiency in a position and assumes that all of the
employees hired are entry-level employees. According to Fort Monmouth
officials, it would take less time for a more-experienced employee to
reach full proficiency in a position than an entry-level employee.
Figure 1: Notional Illustration of the Potential Staffing Level and
Estimated Time Required for Entry-Level Federal Government Civilian
Employees in the C4ISR Workforce to Reach Full Proficiency Based on DOD
Projections:
This figure is a notional illustration of the potential staffing level
and estimated time required for entry-level federal government civilian
employee in the C4ISR workforce to reach full proficiency based on DOD
projections.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: This figure is intended to illustrate generally the staffing
level of the C4ISR workforce and the time required for newly hired
entry-level employees to reach full proficiency based on projections by
Fort Monmouth officials. The estimated number of employees in the
workforce is based on the number of employees currently in the
workforce, the year that officials project the workforce will reach its
lowest level and the size of that workforce, and the year that
officials project that the number of employees in the workforce will
reach authorized levels. Similarly, the shaded area represents the
variation in time that may be required for a newly hired entry-level
employee to reach full proficiency in the positions based on Fort
Monmouth officials' estimate that it takes about 3 to 8 years,
depending on the occupation and an individual's experience, for a newly
hired entry-level employee to reach full proficiency in a position.
However, officials said that they expect to hire more-experienced
employees, to the extent that they are available, and fill the
remaining positions with entry-level employees, which may lessen the
overall time required for employees to reach full proficiency to the
extent the Army is successful in hiring relatively more-experienced
employees. Finally, while the number of authorized C4ISR positions
varies from year to year, this figure represents authorized C4ISR
positions as a steady number using fiscal year 2011 data because that
is the year that Fort Monmouth is scheduled to close and the C4ISR
mission is scheduled to be fully transferred to Aberdeen Proving
Ground.
[End of figure]
Current hiring plans and projections are based on a number of planning
assumptions that, according to Fort Monmouth officials, were based on
the best information available at the time. However, if the assumptions
do not prove to be accurate, then the number of vacancies may be
different than projected. Two key assumptions that could affect the
projected vacancies are the number of current employees who will
relocate and the number of employees who can be hired before Fort
Monmouth closes. Fort Monmouth officials assume that about 30 to 40
percent of the current workforce will relocate to Aberdeen Proving
Ground based on employee responses to workforce surveys and human
capital assessments, as well as anecdotal estimates of the percentage
of employees that relocated in previous BRAC rounds. If the number of
employees who choose to relocate is lower than is assumed in the plans,
then there will be more vacancies than projected; conversely, if more
people move than is assumed in the plans, then the number of vacancies
will be lower than projected. Additionally, the projection of 2,200
vacancies at Aberdeen Proving Ground after Fort Monmouth closes is
based on the assumption that the Army will be able to hire almost 1,500
employees before the closure. Fort Monmouth officials recognize that
hiring this many employees before the installation closes is ambitious
and may not be feasible, in part because the number of employees that
can be hired at Aberdeen Proving Ground is limited by the availability
of facilities leading up to 2011. If the Army is unable to meet its
hiring goals before Fort Monmouth closes, then the number of vacancies
at Aberdeen Proving Ground after the closure would be greater than the
2,200 projected vacancies. Conversely, if the Army exceeds its hiring
goals, then there would be fewer than the 2,200 projected vacancies.
As in the case of the government workforce, the Army may also face a
loss of experience in its contractor workforce, which constitutes a
substantial portion of the workforce for some C4ISR organizations. Fort
Monmouth officials said that contractor companies currently are not
required to develop relocation plans, but plans that detail how the
company will continue to support the C4ISR functions before, during,
and after the transfer will be required when contracts are renewed or
new contracts are awarded. According to Fort Monmouth officials, almost
all of the current support contracts will expire before Fort Monmouth
closes. Contractors are required to continue to provide the services
included in the contract; however, that support is not required to be
provided by the personnel currently providing the service, according to
Fort Monmouth officials. Therefore the Army could experience a loss of
experienced contractor personnel if a large number of current
contractor personnel choose not to relocate to Aberdeen Proving Ground.
Fort Monmouth officials are aware of and are starting to develop and
implement strategies to address this challenge. Specifically, Fort
Monmouth officials are initiating discussions with contractor companies
at periodic performance meetings to determine the companies' plans to
continue support after the C4ISR functions relocate, which provide
officials in the C4ISR organizations near-term insight into the
contractors' approaches to providing continued support after the
transfer.
Based on Fort Monmouth officials' plans and projections, the workforce
at Aberdeen Proving Ground is likely to be smaller and less experienced
than the current C4ISR workforce for several years after the closure of
Fort Monmouth. Fort Monmouth officials recognize this potential risk
and have started developing and implementing mitigation strategies that
focus on two general areas: (1) retaining or hiring the necessary
personnel to fully reconstitute the workforce at Aberdeen Proving
Ground and (2) managing the functions by identifying and focusing on
the highest-priority workload and deferring some portions of the C4ISR
workload, temporarily transferring some of the workload to other DOD
organizations, or hiring additional contractors.
Officials have started developing and implementing risk-mitigation
strategies related to retaining existing employees and hiring new
employees to reconstitute the federal government civilian workforce.
First, the C4ISR organizations are developing or plan to develop
targeted training programs and hiring strategies so that the
organization will have the right mix of skills when the workforce is
reconstituted at Aberdeen Proving Ground. For example, officials from
some of the C4ISR organizations have identified the critical skills or
positions in their organizations and used the results of their human
capital assessment to determine whether employees who possess the
critical skills or currently occupy the critical positions plan to
relocate to Aberdeen Proving Ground. For those skills or positions in
which incumbents do not intend to relocate, officials identified a
number of employees currently in the organization that could, through
training and additional experience, assume these critical roles and are
working to provide the needed training and experience to such
employees. As a result, organizations may be able to fill some critical
positions with current employees, allowing organizations to hire and
fill less-critical positions with entry-level applicants, who may be
easier to recruit and hire and thus may lessen the risk to critical
missions. Additionally, some C4ISR organizations have begun outreach
efforts with colleges and universities near Aberdeen Proving Ground,
advertising available positions with professional organizations, and
participating in job fairs to attract candidates. For example, in June
2008, a C4ISR job fair at Aberdeen Proving Ground attracted over 1,500
potential applicants, many of whom were experienced candidates,
according to Fort Monmouth officials. Officials are just beginning to
implement targeted training and hiring plans and the results of these
efforts remain to be seen.
Army officials also have started to identify strategies to manage the
C4ISR workload with a potentially smaller and less-experienced
workforce, including prioritizing the workload, temporarily outsourcing
some work to other DOD locations, or hiring additional contractors.
First, officials from each of the C4ISR organizations said that
prioritizing the workload will be a key strategy in completing the most-
critical work after the C4ISR functions transfer to Aberdeen Proving
Ground and, in some cases, the officials expect that some less-
critical work will have to be deferred in order to complete the most-
critical work in a timely manner. These officials noted that they
currently have to prioritize their workload and that this
prioritization would become even more essential with a smaller
workforce. Second, some organizations may be able to temporarily
outsource some of their workload to other DOD locations until the
workforce is reconstituted at Aberdeen Proving Ground. For example,
officials from the Communications-Electronics Acquisition Center expect
that some work could temporarily be performed by another acquisition
center until the workforce is reconstituted if the workforce at
Aberdeen Proving Ground cannot initially complete all of the work.
Finally, officials from some organizations said that they may hire
additional contractors to help continue the work until the workforce is
reconstituted. Fort Monmouth officials said that they generally know
about future programs and projects, but the planned C4ISR workload for
2011 and beyond may change over time, making it difficult to develop
specific strategies now to complete the workload with a smaller
workforce. Officials plan to continue to develop, monitor, revise, and
refine plans and strategies to mitigate the risk of a smaller and less-
experienced workforce on the ability to complete the C4ISR workload as
more information is known about the workload and the workforce
capability after the transfer. It is too early to determine the extent
to which these strategies will be effective; however, these mitigation
strategies, if implemented as intended, should lessen the risks
associated with human capital challenges.
Additionally, Army officials are monitoring progress in implementing
human capital plans and strategies and revising plans as needed. For
example, based on some early difficulties in hiring new employees, Fort
Monmouth officials recently revised their hiring projections to
decrease the number of employees hired before the transfer and increase
the number hired after the transfer, thus increasing the projected
number of unfilled positions immediately after the transfer. Along with
the revised projections, Fort Monmouth officials are in the process of
determining how, if at all, hiring plans and strategies need to be
revised.
Although these human capital challenges may be difficult to address,
they are not unique to the C4ISR functions transferring to Aberdeen
Proving Ground. We first raised potential human capital challenges
related to the 2005 BRAC round in our July 2005 testimony before the
BRAC Commission, in which we broadly stated that DOD could face
challenges in planning to address the loss of human capital skills to
provide for uninterrupted operations as BRAC recommendations are
implemented, particularly for those skills requiring extensive
education, training, and experience.[Footnote 13] More specifically, we
reported in March 2008 that DOD was facing a challenge in managing
human capital issues for two supply-related recommendations.[Footnote
14] As in the case of the transfer of C4ISR functions to Aberdeen
Proving Ground, military service officials involved in implementing two
supply-related recommendations expressed doubts at that time about the
willingness of current experienced personnel to transfer to the Defense
Logistics Agency. We also identified workforce challenges in our June
2007 report on the BRAC recommendation to establish fleet readiness
centers in the Navy.[Footnote 15]
Army Faces Challenges in Obtaining Security Clearances in a Timely
Manner, but Has Begun to Identify and Implement Mitigation Strategies:
The Army also faces challenges in obtaining the necessary security
clearances for the large number of newly hired employees in a timely
manner, and officials have begun to identify and implement strategies
intended to mitigate the risk associated with this challenge. Fort
Monmouth officials report that almost all of its C4ISR positions
require at least a secret clearance and about 20 percent of the current
federal civilian government C4ISR employees and military personnel who
have a clearance have a top secret clearance. DOD's December 2007
report identified the need to obtain security clearances quickly as a
factor in its ability to successfully transfer the C4ISR functions to
Aberdeen Proving Ground without affecting ongoing support to Army
missions.
Because the number of clearances to be processed for new C4ISR
employees is relatively small compared to the large number of
clearances that the Office of Personnel Management and DOD currently
process and the fact that the employees will be added over a number of
years, processing clearances for the new C4ISR employees will not
likely place a significant strain on the overall clearance
program.[Footnote 16] Long-standing delays and backlogs in determining
clearance eligibility and other clearance challenges led us to
designate DOD's personnel security clearance program as a high-risk
area since January 2005.[Footnote 17] We identified this as a high-risk
area because problems in the clearance program can negatively affect
national security. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 established specific timeliness standards to be phased in over
5 years for completing the end-to-end adjudication of security
clearances. The act states that, in the initial period that ends in
2009, authorized adjudicative agencies are to make a determination on
at least 80 percent of all applications for a security clearance within
an average of 120 days after the receipt of the application by an
authorized investigative agency, with no longer than 90 days allotted
for the investigation and 30 days allotted for the
adjudication.[Footnote 18] We are currently reviewing DOD's progress in
meeting these requirements across its personnel security clearance
program.
While the number of clearances that may be required for new C4ISR
employees is relatively small compared to the total number of
clearances that DOD and the Office of Personnel Management process, the
proportion of employees who need clearances within an organization at a
given time could be significant. Irrespective of whether DOD can meet
its timeliness goals for processing clearances, the time required to
grant clearances could affect C4ISR employees' ability to fully perform
their jobs, particularly considering the large number of employees who
may require clearances. If the Army cannot obtain the necessary
clearances in a timely manner, then employees may be unable to fully
perform their jobs until they obtain clearances.
To help mitigate this risk, Army officials plan to seek interim secret
security clearances for qualified personnel, as needed. Interim secret
security clearances can be obtained much more quickly than secret
security clearances because a full investigation is not required. By
obtaining interim secret security clearances, employees could begin to
perform work that requires such a clearance, limiting downtime for the
employee and increasing the number of employees available to perform
the required work. However, by granting an interim secret clearance,
the Army assumes additional risk because the employee has not undergone
a full background investigation. If the background investigation
subsequently turns up disqualifying evidence, then the individual would
be denied a permanent clearance after having had access to classified
information. According to Army officials, nearly 25 percent of Fort
Monmouth's C4ISR employees with a secret clearance currently have an
interim secret clearance. Army officials also plan to expedite
processing security clearances for the new C4ISR personnel by
participating in an ongoing pilot program at Aberdeen Proving Ground.
According to Army officials, the early results of the pilot program are
promising in terms of expediting the time required to obtain a security
clearance. It is too early to determine the effectiveness of these
strategies; however, these mitigation strategies, if implemented as
intended, should lessen the risks associated with security clearance
challenges.
Issues related to obtaining security clearances in a timely manner are
not unique to the transfer of C4ISR functions to Aberdeen Proving
Ground. In May 2007, we reported that some Air National Guard officials
expressed concerns that the lengthy process to obtain security
clearances for about 3,000 individuals converting to new missions could
delay when personnel were able to perform their missions.[Footnote 19]
Army Faces Challenges in Completing Needed Facilities and Relocations
and Has Begun to Identify and Implement Mitigation Strategies:
The Army also faces challenges in completing the construction of some
of the facilities at Aberdeen Proving Ground and completing the
relocations before the end of the 6-year statutory implementation
period, and officials have begun to identify and implement strategies
to mitigate the risks associated with these challenges. DOD's December
2007 report identified the need to have facilities available in
sufficient time to allow for an orderly, phased move as a factor in its
ability to successfully transfer the C4ISR functions to Aberdeen
Proving Ground. Currently, the Army expects that facility construction
for the first C4ISR buildings, which will accommodate the majority of
C4ISR positions, will be completed in the fall of 2010 and construction
for the rest of the C4ISR buildings will be completed in March 2011.
This would allow about a year for organizations that are moving into
the first set of buildings to relocate and about 5 months for
organizations that are moving into the later facilities. During
relocation, organizations will have to disassemble, relocate,
reassemble, and calibrate equipment in the new facilities as well as
transfer personnel to Aberdeen Proving Ground. However, delays in
construction could place at risk the Army's ability to complete this
relocation by September 15, 2011.
While the Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for managing facility
construction, Fort Monmouth officials said that they are monitoring
progress in this area because timely completion of facilities is
critical to the successful transfer of the C4ISR mission. Fort Monmouth
officials plan to mitigate risk in the facilities area by continuing to
monitor construction progress and raise issues as necessary. Similarly,
Army Corps of Engineers officials said that they are aware of the tight
time frames to complete BRAC construction projects and plan to
continuing monitoring and working with officials from the Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, the Army Materiel
Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, and Fort Monmouth to determine
courses of action as issues arise. For example, Army officials
originally planned to renovate some facilities occupied by the Ordnance
Center and School at Aberdeen Proving Ground for some C4ISR employees.
The Ordnance Center and School is scheduled to move to Fort Lee,
Virginia, through another BRAC action; however, Army Corps of Engineers
officials said that they would be unable to complete the new facilities
at Fort Lee on time, which in turn would delay the renovation of the
facilities for the incoming C4ISR employees. Army Corps of Engineers
officials worked with officials from the Office of the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Installation Management, Aberdeen Proving Ground, and Fort
Monmouth to identify a solution. According to officials, the Army has
decided to incur additional BRAC construction costs of about $17
million and build a new facility for the C4ISR employees at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, rather than take the risk that the facility renovations
could not be completed in time for the C4ISR functions to relocate into
the renovated facility. Army officials said that the buildings vacated
by the Ordnance Center and School may be renovated and used by other
Aberdeen Proving Ground tenants outside of the BRAC process.
Additionally, officials expect that the early transfer of about 1,400
positions--about 900 employees relocating from Fort Monmouth and about
500 hired at Aberdeen Proving Ground--and the necessary equipment to
Aberdeen Proving Ground through the advance teams may ease the
transition and mitigate potential mission-disruption risks. Moreover,
officials expect that the relocation phasing approaches that each
organization has developed--redundant capabilities, split-based
operations, and outsourcing work to other locations--will be critical
in mitigating mission-disruption risks, particularly for functions that
will be located in the last facilities to be completed.
Infrastructure challenges are not unique to this BRAC recommendation.
We have previously raised similar infrastructure challenges in
implementing the 2005 BRAC recommendations. Specifically, in December
2007 we reported on challenges related to completing facilities in time
to move people and equipment into the facilities and on recommendations
being dependent on the completion of other recommendations.[Footnote
20]
Army Faces Challenges in Funding Increasing Costs of the Transfer, but
Has Begun to Identify and Implement Mitigation Strategies:
The Army also faces challenges in funding the increasing costs to
transfer C4ISR functions from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground,
and officials have begun to identify and implement mitigation
strategies. In December 2007, we reported that the recommendation to
close Fort Monmouth was one of the costliest recommendations from the
2005 BRAC round.[Footnote 21] Based on the Army's fiscal year 2009
budget estimates, the estimated onetime cost to implement the
recommendation has increased to about $1.6 billion, which is more than
double the BRAC Commission's estimate in 2005.[Footnote 22]
Since the Army submitted its fiscal year 2009 BRAC budget request to
Congress, officials identified additional costs for the transfer,
largely for implementing the mitigation strategies identified in DOD's
December 2007 report, including renovating facilities at Aberdeen
Proving Ground for the advance team and obtaining redundant
capabilities for some critical functions. According to Army officials,
funding for these additional costs has been obtained or programmed
outside of the BRAC account. For example, an Aberdeen Proving Ground
official estimated that the Army spent about $3.8 million, which
includes about $3.2 million in sustainment funding for the renovations
and about $600,000 in base operating support funding for information
technology needs, to renovate facilities at Aberdeen Proving Ground to
temporarily accommodate the advance team arriving there in fiscal year
2008. At the time of our review, Army officials had not yet determined
which facilities at Aberdeen Proving Ground would be used to
temporarily accommodate the advance team scheduled to arrive in 2009,
which would likely require additional funding to renovate existing
facilities or to lease temporary facilities off of the installation.
Furthermore, the Army has programmed funding outside of the BRAC
account to obtain redundant capabilities for some laboratories or
functions that officials determined must remain operational throughout
the transfer to Aberdeen Proving Ground, such as some of the equipment
used by the Joint Satellite Communications Engineering Center. Army
officials estimate that the cost of redundant capabilities will total
about $75 million, based on current plans.
Additionally, Army Corps of Engineers officials expect that
construction costs for some of the C4ISR facilities, for which a
construction contract has not yet been awarded, are likely to increase.
The Army Corps of Engineers plans to award the contract for the second
phase of construction projects for the C4ISR functions in early 2009.
Army officials currently estimate that the second phase of projects
will cost about $325 million. According to Army Corps of Engineers
officials, construction costs are likely to increase due to the
increased cost of fuel, as well as the increased demand for
construction workers, subcontractors, and supplies from the large
number of military construction projects currently planned or under way
in the region. However, these potential cost increases are not included
in current construction estimates and Army Corps of Engineers officials
said that they cannot fully estimate the cost of the second phase of
facilities until the construction contract is awarded.
DOD's December 2007 report indicates that the Army's ability to
successfully transfer the C4ISR functions from Fort Monmouth to
Aberdeen Proving Ground is contingent upon receiving the funding
necessary to implement the mitigation strategies identified in the
report. As we have previously reported, the Army has many priorities--
including other infrastructure requirements; force structure changes,
such as increasing the end strength of the Army's active and reserve
forces; and ongoing military missions--competing for limited funding.
If the Army cannot fully fund the increasing costs associated with the
transfer, to include costs funded outside of the BRAC budget request,
then there is an increased risk that the Army may be unable to complete
the transfer without affecting ongoing support to its military
missions.
To address this challenge, the Army has monitored and plans to continue
monitoring the implementation of this BRAC recommendation. The Army
established a senior oversight group at the headquarters level, made up
of representatives from the key staff offices, including personnel and
logistics; the Army Materiel Command; the Office of the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Installation Management; and the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. The
group met from February 2008 through May 2008 to determine whether and
how to provide the authority and funding identified in DOD's December
2007 report. According to an Army official involved with the oversight
group, the group determined which office would be responsible for
handling policy and funding decisions related to the mitigation
strategies identified in DOD's report. While the group does not
currently plan to continue meeting, an official involved with the group
said that the oversight group could meet if there were future issues
that the group needed to address. In the meantime, officials said that
the BRAC offices at Army Headquarters and Army Materiel Command, as
well as DOD's BRAC office, plan to continue monitoring the cost
increases and potential funding shortfalls for this recommendation, as
the offices do for all BRAC recommendations with relevance to these
organizations. For example, officials from DOD's BRAC office said that
they review whether the implementation of the recommendation is fully
funded as part of their program review, which occurs twice each year.
Cost increases are not unique to the transfer of C4ISR functions to
Aberdeen Proving Ground. For example, in December 2007, we reported
that the estimated onetime costs for about 20 percent of the 2005 BRAC
recommendations had each increased by at least $50 million, based on
DOD's fiscal year 2008 budget documents.[Footnote 23] We have also
reported that the cost estimates for two supply-related
recommendations, a recommendation to establish fleet readiness centers,
and several reserve and National Guard component recommendations had
increased over the BRAC Commission's estimates in 2005.[Footnote 24] We
are currently reviewing DOD's fiscal year 2009 BRAC budget request and
plan to issue a report in early 2009, in accordance with the direction
from the House Armed Services Committee to report annually on DOD's
implementation of the 2005 BRAC recommendations,[Footnote 25] that will
discuss estimated implementation costs, among other issues.
DOD's Continued Oversight May Lessen Risks:
In addition to the mitigation strategies discussed above, DOD plans to
continue its ongoing oversight of the implementation of BRAC plans,
which may lessen potential mission-disruption risks. This oversight is
occurring at many levels within DOD, from the individual C4ISR
organizations to DOD's BRAC office. Such oversight may allow officials
to identify potential problems early and develop and implement
solutions, which may lessen mission-disruption risks during the
transfer. Plans in and of themselves cannot ensure a successful
transition due to inherent uncertainties that may arise over time, the
need to revise plans as circumstances change, and the need to
effectively execute the plans. Therefore, it is critical that the Army
continue to monitor the execution of its transfer plans and take
corrective actions to lessen the risk of operational disruptions.
Because DOD has oversight mechanisms in place and intends to continue
its monitoring efforts and revision of plans throughout implementation,
we are not making recommendations at this time.
First, each C4ISR organization has established a BRAC unit within the
organization to manage the development of detailed, organization-level
plans; monitor the implementation of these plans; and revise plans as
needed. For example, officials from some of the C4ISR organizations
plan to monitor and review the results of the 2008 advance team's
transition from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground and revise
plans for the 2009 advance team, as well as the transfer of remaining
employees in 2010 and 2011, based on lessons learned.
Additionally, Fort Monmouth's BRAC relocation task force, made up of
representatives from each of the C4ISR organizations and key staff
offices, including personnel, logistics, and operations and plans, has
been managing planning efforts across the C4ISR organizations and
monitoring the implementation of these plans. The group has met
regularly over the past year to discuss implementation issues and
identify problems and potential solutions. The group has raised
unresolved issues to higher levels, as needed, according to task force
officials. Additionally, the group has developed numerous planning
documents, including a schedule of the near-term tasks needed to
complete the transfer with estimated starting and completion dates.
Officials expect that the task force will be dissolved by the end of
fiscal year 2008 and replaced with an implementation group, made up of
representatives from key staff offices. The implementation group's role
is to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize all efforts associated
with the transfer. Representatives from the C4ISR organizations will
provide assistance to the implementation group, as needed, according to
Fort Monmouth officials.
Moreover, the BRAC offices at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Army Materiel
Command, and Army headquarters are also monitoring the implementation
of the BRAC recommendation, as they routinely monitor the
implementation of all recommendations with relevance to their
organizations. For example, an official in Aberdeen Proving Ground's
BRAC office noted that the office is monitoring progress on
construction projects for the C4ISR facilities, as well as all of the
other construction on the installation, to ensure that the projects are
completed on schedule. Additionally, as previously discussed, the Army
established a headquarters-level senior oversight group.
Finally, as with the other BRAC offices, DOD's BRAC office is
monitoring the implementation of this BRAC recommendation, as it
routinely monitors the implementation of all of the BRAC
recommendations. For example, to facilitate its oversight role, DOD's
BRAC office required the military departments and defense agencies
responsible for implementing BRAC recommendations to submit a detailed
business plan for each recommendation and to update these plans twice
each year. These business plans include detailed information, including
a listing of all actions needed to implement the recommendation,
schedules for personnel movements between installations, updated cost
and savings estimates, and implementation completion time frames. DOD's
BRAC office considers the business plans to be living documents that
are updated throughout the implementation period. Officials from DOD's
BRAC office said that they plan to continue reviewing the business
plans as part of their comprehensive, centrally managed oversight of
the BRAC program.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment stated that DOD agrees that
the challenges of implementing the BRAC recommendation to close Fort
Monmouth are not unique and that the department has strategies in place
to mitigate these challenges. Nonetheless, as we stated in this report,
plans and mitigation strategies in and of themselves cannot ensure a
successful transition due to inherent uncertainties that may arise over
time, the need to revise plans as circumstances change, and the need to
effectively execute the plans. DOD's written comments are reprinted in
enclosure I. Additionally, DOD provided technical comments on a draft
of this report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other congressional committees
and members, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will
be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this
report are listed in enclosure II.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosures - 2:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
August 8, 2008:
Mr. Brian J. Lepore:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability OFfice:
441 G. Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Mr. Lepore,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-08-1010R, "Military
Realignments and Closures: Army is Developing Plans to Transfer
Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland, but Challenges Remain," dated August 4, 2008 (GAO Code
351127).
The Department fully agrees with the report's recognition that the
challenges of implementing this recommendation are not unique and the
Department has the necessary strategies in place to mitigate these
challenges. The Department's success in implementing equally complex
recommendations in the previous rounds and its actions to date in this
round demonstrates its commitment to ensuring this recommendation will
be implemented efficiently and effectively in order to expeditiously
realize its benefits.
The Department appreciates the thorough review conducted by the GAO and
the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Wayne Arny:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment):
[End of section]
Enclosure II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, James R. Reifsnyder,
Assistant Director; Michael Kennedy, Assistant Director (retired);
Hilary Benedict; Rich Hung; Ron La Due Lake; Julie Matta; Stephanie
Moriarty; Jay Smale; and Karen Werner made significant contributions to
this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower Savings
Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC Recommendations.
GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations
Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R.
Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have Increased
and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T. Washington, D.C.:
December 12, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased
and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159. Washington, D.C.:
December 11, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,
Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute
of Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,
and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics
Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial
Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor
Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers.
GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the
2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers
Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and
Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29,
2007.
Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641.
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental
Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.
GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.
Military Bases: Observations on DOD's 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. Washington, D.C.:
July 18, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.
Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended by Pub. L. No. 107-107,
Title XXX (2001).
[2] Department of Defense, Report to Congress, 2005 Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission Report, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey,
Recommendation #5 (Washington, D.C.: December 2007).
[3] Other Army tenants on the installation include the United States
Military Academy Preparatory School and Patterson Army Health Clinic.
[4] A small number of the C4ISR positions--a total of about 300
civilian positions and 50 military positions--are transferring to Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, and the Defense Supply Center, Columbus, Ohio. The
Army does not plan to eliminate any of the C4ISR positions by
implementing this BRAC recommendation.
[5] 31 U.S.C. § 717.
[6] A list of our prior reports on the implementation of the 2005 BRAC
round is included at the end of this report.
[7] A list of our prior reports on the implementation of the 2005 BRAC
round is included at the end of this report.
[8] The four prior rounds took place in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995.
[9] Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX (1990); 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note.
[10] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have
Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve, GAO-08-159 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 11, 2007).
[11] A list of our prior reports on the implementation of the 2005 BRAC
round is included at the end of this report.
[12] The Office of Personnel Management can give federal agencies
direct hire authority to fill vacancies when a critical hiring need or
severe shortage of candidates exists. The use of direct hire authority
allows an agency to hire any qualified applicant after public notice is
given. According to the Office of Personnel Management, direct hire
authority expedites hiring by eliminating some hiring requirements,
including competitive rating and ranking and veteran's preference.
[13] GAO, Military Bases: Observations on DOD's 2005 Base Realignment
and Closure Selection Process and Recommendations, GAO-05-905
(Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005).
[14] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and
Lower Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC
Recommendations, GAO-08-315 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2008).
[15] GAO, Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet
Readiness Centers Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual
Savings and Overcome Certain Challenges, GAO-07-304 (Washington, D.C.:
June 29, 2007).
[16] The Office of Management and Budget reported that in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2008, the Office of Personnel Management
completed more than 100,000 initial investigations and DOD adjudicated
more than 85,000 clearances for DOD military and civilian personnel.
See Office of Management and Budget, Report of the Security Clearance
Oversight Group Consistent With Title III of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Washington, D.C.: February 2008).
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has
responsibility for determining eligibility for clearances for
servicemembers, DOD civilian employees, industry personnel performing
work at DOD and 23 other federal agencies, and employees in the federal
legislative branch. That responsibility includes obtaining background
investigations, primarily through the Office of Personnel Management.
DOD is responsible for adjudicating clearances for servicemembers, DOD
civilian employees, and industry personnel.
[17] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007), and High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2005). The areas on our high-risk list receive their
designation because they are major problems and operations that need
urgent attention and transformation in order to ensure that our
national government functions in the most economical, efficient, and
effective manner possible.
[18] Pub. L. No. 108-458.
[19] GAO, Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to
Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations, GAO-07-641
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007).
[20] GAO-08-159.
[21] GAO-08-159.
[22] Cost projections include all actions in the recommendation and not
only those actions to transfer the C4ISR functions from Fort Monmouth
to Aberdeen Proving Ground.
[23] GAO-08-159.
[24] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to
Monitor Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve
Centers, GAO-07-1040 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2007); GAO-08-315;
GAO-07-641; and GAO-07-304.
[25] H.R. Rep. No. 110-146, at 514 (2007).
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