Military Personnel
DOD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Face Implementation and Oversight Challenges Gao ID: GAO-08-924 August 29, 2008In 2004, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish a comprehensive policy to prevent and respond to sexual assaults involving servicemembers. Though not required to do so, the Coast Guard has established a similar policy. In response to congressional requests and Senate Report No. 110-77, GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD and the Coast Guard (1) have developed and implemented policies and programs to prevent, respond to, and resolve sexual assault incidents involving servicemembers; (2) have visibility over reports of sexual assault involving servicemembers; and (3) exercise oversight over reports of sexual assault involving servicemembers. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed legislative requirements and DOD and Coast Guard guidance; analyzed sexual assault incident data; and obtained through surveys and interviews the perspective on sexual assault matters of more than 3,900 servicemembers.
DOD and the Coast Guard have established polices and programs to prevent, respond to, and resolve reported sexual assault incidents involving servicemembers; however, implementation of the programs is hindered by several factors. GAO found that (1) DOD's guidance may not adequately address some important issues, such as how to implement its program in deployed and joint environments; (2) most, but not all, commanders support the programs; (3) required sexual assault prevention and response training is not consistently effective; and (4) factors such as a DOD-reported shortage of mental health care providers affect whether servicemembers who are victims of sexual assault can or do access mental health services. Left unchecked, these challenges can discourage or prevent some servicemembers from using the programs when needed. GAO found, based on responses to its nongeneralizable survey administered to 3,750 servicemembers stationed at military installations in the United States and overseas and a 2006 DOD survey, the most recent available, that occurrences of sexual assault may be exceeding the rates being reported, suggesting that DOD and the Coast Guard have only limited visibility over the incidence of these occurrences. At the 14 installations where GAO administered its survey, 103 servicemembers indicated that they had been sexually assaulted within the preceding 12 months. Of these, 52 servicemembers indicated that they did not report the sexual assault. GAO also found that factors that discourage servicemembers from reporting a sexual assault include the belief that nothing would be done; fear of ostracism, harassment, or ridicule; and concern that peers would gossip. Although DOD has established some mechanisms for overseeing reports of sexual assault, and the Coast Guard is beginning to do so, neither has developed an oversight framework--including clear objectives, milestones, performance measures, and criteria for measuring progress--to guide its efforts. In compliance with statutory requirements, DOD reports data on sexual assault incidents involving servicemembers to Congress annually. However, DOD's report does not include some data that would aid congressional oversight, such as why some sexual assaults could not be substantiated following an investigation. Further, the military services have not provided data that would facilitate oversight and enable DOD to conduct trend analyses. While the Coast Guard voluntarily provides data to DOD for inclusion in its report, this information is not provided to Congress because there is no requirement to do so. To provide further oversight of DOD's programs, Congress, in 2004, directed the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services to conduct an examination of matters relating to sexual assault in the Armed Forces. However, as of July 2008, the task force had not yet begun its review. Without an oversight framework, as well as more complete data, decision makers in DOD, the Coast Guard, and Congress lack information they need to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-924, Military Personnel: DOD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Face Implementation and Oversight Challenges
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2008:
Military Personnel:
DOD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Programs Face Implementation and Oversight Challenges:
GAO-08-924:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-924, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2004, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish
a comprehensive policy to prevent and respond to sexual assaults
involving servicemembers. Though not required to do so, the Coast Guard
has established a similar policy. In response to congressional requests
and Senate Report No. 110-77, GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD and
the Coast Guard (1) have developed and implemented policies and
programs to prevent, respond to, and resolve sexual assault incidents
involving servicemembers; (2) have visibility over reports of sexual
assault involving servicemembers; and (3) exercise oversight over
reports of sexual assault involving servicemembers. To conduct this
review, GAO reviewed legislative requirements and DOD and Coast Guard
guidance; analyzed sexual assault incident data; and obtained through
surveys and interviews the perspective on sexual assault matters of
more than 3,900 servicemembers.
What GAO Found:
DOD and the Coast Guard have established polices and programs to
prevent, respond to, and resolve reported sexual assault incidents
involving servicemembers; however, implementation of the programs is
hindered by several factors. GAO found that (1) DOD‘s guidance may not
adequately address some important issues, such as how to implement its
program in deployed and joint environments; (2) most, but not all,
commanders support the programs; (3) required sexual assault prevention
and response training is not consistently effective; and (4) factors
such as a DOD-reported shortage of mental health care providers affect
whether servicemembers who are victims of sexual assault can or do
access mental health services. Left unchecked, these challenges can
discourage or prevent some servicemembers from using the programs when
needed.
GAO found, based on responses to its nongeneralizable survey
administered to 3,750 servicemembers stationed at military
installations in the United States and overseas and a 2006 DOD survey,
the most recent available, that occurrences of sexual assault may be
exceeding the rates being reported, suggesting that DOD and the Coast
Guard have only limited visibility over the incidence of these
occurrences. At the 14 installations where GAO administered its survey,
103 servicemembers indicated that they had been sexually assaulted
within the preceding 12 months. Of these, 52 servicemembers indicated
that they did not report the sexual assault. GAO also found that
factors that discourage servicemembers from reporting a sexual assault
include the belief that nothing would be done; fear of ostracism,
harassment, or ridicule; and concern that peers would gossip.
Although DOD has established some mechanisms for overseeing reports of
sexual assault, and the Coast Guard is beginning to do so, neither has
developed an oversight framework”including clear objectives,
milestones, performance measures, and criteria for measuring
progress”to guide its efforts. In compliance with statutory
requirements, DOD reports data on sexual assault incidents involving
servicemembers to Congress annually. However, DOD‘s report does not
include some data that would aid congressional oversight, such as why
some sexual assaults could not be substantiated following an
investigation. Further, the military services have not provided data
that would facilitate oversight and enable DOD to conduct trend
analyses. While the Coast Guard voluntarily provides data to DOD for
inclusion in its report, this information is not provided to Congress
because there is no requirement to do so. To provide further oversight
of DOD‘s programs, Congress, in 2004, directed the Defense Task Force
on Sexual Assault in the Military Services to conduct an examination of
matters relating to sexual assault in the Armed Forces. However, as of
July 2008, the task force had not yet begun its review. Without an
oversight framework, as well as more complete data, decision makers in
DOD, the Coast Guard, and Congress lack information they need to
evaluate the effectiveness of the programs.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is suggesting that Congress consider requiring the Coast Guard to
submit data to Congress on reported sexual assaults involving its
members. GAO is also making a total of 11 recommendations to improve
implementation of DOD‘s and the Coast Guard‘s programs, such as by
reviewing and evaluating guidance and training, and to improve
oversight of the programs. DOD and the Coast Guard concurred with our
recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-924]. For more
information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or
farrellb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Implementation of Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Is
Hindered by Inconsistent Support, Training That Is Not Consistently
Effective, and Limitations on Access to Mental Health Services:
Survey Data Suggest That Occurrences of Sexual Assault May Exceed Rates
Reported:
DOD and the Coast Guard Have Established Some Mechanisms for Overseeing
Reports of Sexual Assault, but Lack an Oversight Framework, and DOD
Lacks Key Information from the Services:
Conclusions:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Comments from the Coast Guard:
Appendix IV: Disposition of Sexual Assaults in DOD and the Coast Guard:
Appendix V: DOD and Coast Guard Data on Reported Sexual Assault
Incidents for Fiscal Year 2007:
Appendix VI: Survey Administered at Installations in the United States:
Appendix VII: Survey Administered at Installations Overseas:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Percentage of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Having
Received or Having Not Received Required Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Training in the Preceding 12 Months:
Table 2: Percentage of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Having
Received or Having Not Received Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Training Prior to Deploying:
Table 3: Percentage of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Receiving
Required Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Training and Also
Reporting They Would Not Know or Were Not Sure of How to Report a
Sexual Assault Using the Restricted Reporting Option:
Table 4: Percentage of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Having
Received Required Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Training, by
Format of the Training:
Table 5: Number of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Having been
Sexually Assaulted During the Preceding 12 Months:
Table 6: Number of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Experiencing a
Sexual Assault within the Preceding 12 Months by Type of Reporting
Option Used:
Table 7: Number of Surveys Administered, by Location and Gender:
Table 8: Dispositions of Alleged Offenders Resulting from
Investigations Completed in Fiscal Year 2007, as of September 30, 2007:
Table 9: Reasons Commanders Did Not Take Action Against Alleged
Offenders in Investigations Completed during Fiscal Year 2007:
Table 10: Dispositions of Alleged Offenders Resulting from
Investigations Completed in Fiscal Year 2007, as of September 30, 2007:
Table 11: Number of Unrestricted Reports of Sexual Assault in DOD Made
by Victims Who Were Either Servicemembers or Nonservicemembers and by
Gender during Fiscal Year 2007:
Table 12: Number of Investigations of Unrestricted Reports of Sexual
Assault in DOD by Type of Offense during Fiscal Year 2007:
Table 13: Number of Sexual Assaults by Type of Initial Allegation and
Gender of Victims for Investigations Completed during Fiscal Year 2007
as of March 15, 2007:
Table 14: Number of Restricted Reports of Sexual Assault in DOD by Type
of Offense and Gender during Fiscal Year 2007:
Table 15: Number of Investigations of Unrestricted Reports of Sexual
Assault in the Coast Guard by Type of Offense during Fiscal Year 2007:
Table 16: Number of Alleged Offenders and Victims in Reported Sexual
Assault Incidents Involving Coast Guard Members during Fiscal Year
2007:
Table 17: Number of Sexual Assaults by Type of Initial Allegation and
Gender of the Alleged Victim for Unrestricted Reports Made during
Fiscal Year 2007 in the Coast Guard:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EAPC: Employee Assistance Program Coordinator:
SARC: Sexual Assault Response Coordinator:
UCMJ: Uniform Code of Military Justice:
VA: Department of Veterans Affairs:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
August 29, 2008:
Congressional Requesters:
Sexual assault is a crime that contradicts the core values that the
Department of Defense (DOD), the military services,[Footnote 1] and the
Coast Guard expect servicemembers to follow, such as treating their
fellow members with dignity and respect. Within DOD and the Coast
Guard, sexual assault also presents a force protection challenge and
can negatively affect units' readiness and cohesion. In 2004, following
a series of high-profile sexual assault cases involving servicemembers,
Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive
policy for DOD on the prevention of and response to sexual assaults
involving servicemembers, including an option that would enable
servicemembers to confidentially disclose an incident of sexual
assault. Since July 2005, active duty servicemembers have had two
options for reporting an alleged sexual assault: (1) restricted, which
allows victims of sexual assault to disclose a sexual assault incident
to specific individuals and receive medical care and other victim
advocacy services without initiating a criminal investigation; and (2)
unrestricted, which entails notification of the chain of command and
may trigger a criminal investigation. Although these requirements do
not apply to the Coast Guard, which is overseen by the Department of
Homeland Security, the Coast Guard has adopted similar reporting
options.
To help inform congressional deliberations on these issues, in August
2006, Congressman Christopher Shays, then Chairman of the House
Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, asked GAO to examine
sexual assault prevention and response programs at the military
academies as well as at military installations within DOD and the Coast
Guard and during deployments. In August 2007, Congressmen John Tierney,
in his new position as Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs, signed on to the original request submitted by Congressman
Shays. In response, we issued a report in January 2008 reviewing
programs to address sexual assault and sexual harassment at the
military and Coast Guard academies.[Footnote 2] That report found that,
while the academies have taken steps to prevent, respond to, and
resolve sexual assault and sexual harassment incidents, such incidents
may be underreported, suggesting that the academies may not have full
visibility over all sexual assault and sexual harassment incidents and
that greater federal oversight of their efforts is needed. In that
report, we made a number of recommendations to DOD to improve its
visibility and oversight of reported incidents of sexual assault and
sexual harassment at the military academies, and to the Coast Guard to
improve its oversight of reported incidents of sexual assault and
sexual harassment at the Coast Guard Academy. In commenting on that
report, both DOD and the Coast Guard concurred or partially concurred
with our recommendations and specified actions they would take to
address them. For example, DOD stated that it was in the initial stages
of identifying servicewide performance metrics to help assess the
academy's programs, while the Coast Guard noted that it had recently
published additional guidance and would work with DOD to help improve
oversight of its program.
Subsequent to receiving the congressional request, the Senate Armed
Services Committee directed GAO to review sexual assault prevention and
response programs at DOD military installations and during deployments
overseas.[Footnote 3] In addition, several individual senators
requested that we examine issues surrounding mental health concerns
that can result from sexual assault. On July 31, 2008, we testified
before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, on our
preliminary observations of DOD's and the Coast Guard's sexual assault
prevention and response programs.[Footnote 4] This report expands upon
the preliminary observations we discussed at that hearing and addresses
sexual assault prevention and response programs in the active
components of DOD and the Coast Guard, including during deployments.
Specifically, it evaluates the extent to which DOD and the Coast Guard
(1) have developed and implemented policies and programs to prevent,
respond to, and resolve sexual assault incidents involving
servicemembers; (2) have visibility over reports of sexual assault
involving servicemembers; and (3) exercise oversight over reports of
sexual assault involving servicemembers.
For our first objective, we reviewed legislative requirements; obtained
and analyzed DOD's, the military services', and the Coast Guard's
guidance and requirements for the prevention, response, and resolution
of sexual assault; analyzed DOD's annual reports to Congress for
calendar years 2004, 2005, 2006, and fiscal year 2007; interviewed
knowledgeable officials about implementation of the programs; and
visited 15 military installations in the United States and overseas to
assess implementation of the programs. At the installations we visited,
we met with sexual assault prevention and response program
coordinators, victim advocates, judge advocates, medical and mental
health personnel, criminal investigative personnel, law enforcement
personnel, and chaplains. We also met with various military commanders,
[Footnote 5] including company and field grade officers, and senior
enlisted servicemembers. We also obtained the perspective of more than
3,900 servicemembers by administering a total of 3,750 confidential
surveys to a nonprobability sample of randomly selected servicemembers
and conducting more than 150 one-on-one, structured interviews with
randomly selected servicemembers at 14 of the 15 installations we
visited. Our survey is the first since 2006 to obtain the perspectives
of selected servicemembers in each military service and the Coast Guard
on sexual assault issues and the first to assess sexual assault issues
in the Coast Guard since the restricted reporting option became
available in December 2007. Because we did not select survey and
interview participants using a statistically representative sampling
method, our survey results and the comments provided during our
interview sessions are nongeneralizable and therefore cannot be
projected across DOD, a service, or any single installation we visited.
However, the survey results and comments provide insight into the
command climate and implementation of sexual assault prevention and
response programs at each location at the time of our visit. For our
second objective, in addition to analyzing our confidential surveys and
one-on-one structured interviews, we reviewed the results of surveys
conducted by DOD and the Army and Navy since 2004; reviewed DOD's
annual reports to Congress; and obtained and analyzed data for reported
sexual assaults in both DOD and the Coast Guard for fiscal year 2007.
We assessed the reliability of the reported sexual assault data by
interviewing DOD and Coast Guard officials to understand the processes
and databases used to collect and record the data, existing data
quality control procedures, and known limitations of the data. We found
these data were sufficiently reliable to present an overall description
of reported incidents of sexual assault. For our third objective, we
interviewed knowledgeable officials; obtained and analyzed various
pertinent documents, such as meeting minutes for DOD's Sexual Assault
Advisory Council; reviewed reports issued by the services' inspector
generals and examined DOD's and the Coast Guard's responses to
recommendations from prior related studies; and analyzed all DOD and
Coast Guard installation-level data for reported sexual assaults for
fiscal year 2007. Further details about our scope and methodology,
including the development and administration of our survey and the one-
on-one structured interviews, can be found in appendix I. In addition,
copies of our survey questionnaires can be found in appendices VI and
VII.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through August 2008
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
DOD has taken positive steps to respond to congressional direction by
developing and implementing policies and programs to prevent, respond
to, and resolve reported sexual assault incidents involving
servicemembers, and the Coast Guard has on its own initiative taken
similar steps. However, DOD's guidance may not adequately address some
important issues, and implementation of the programs is hindered by
several factors. To their credit, DOD and the Coast Guard have issued
guidance for preventing and responding to reports of sexual assault and
have established offices to oversee sexual assault matters. The
military services and the Coast Guard have also established and staffed
key positions to manage programs at installations and require
servicemembers to receive periodic training on their respective sexual
assault prevention and response programs. However, DOD's guidance may
not adequately address some important issues, such as how to implement
the program when operating in deployed or joint environments. Further,
we identified a number of factors that hinder implementation of the
programs, including the following:
* While most commanders support the programs, some do not: At the
installations we visited, we found that commanders--that is, company
and field grade officers--had taken actions to address incidents of
sexual assault and were generally supportive of sexual assault
prevention and response programs; however, at some of the installations
we visited we found evidence that not all commanders supported the
programs. Further, we found that implementation of the programs may be
hindered at installations where key program coordinator positions are a
collateral duty. DOD's guidance calls for commanders and other leaders
to advocate a strong sexual assault prevention and response program,
and the Coast Guard's guidance similarly calls for commanders and other
leaders to ensure compliance with the Coast Guard's policies and
procedures. However, at three of the installations we visited, program
officials told us of meeting with resistance from commanders when
attempting to advertise, in barracks and work areas, the programs or
the options for reporting a sexual assault. Program officials also told
us that they lacked the resources to promote the programs and raise
servicemembers' awareness of sexual assault matters. Further, some key
program coordinators, such as Sexual Assault Response Coordinators or
Employee Assistance Program Coordinators, lack the time and resources
to devote to the programs. Neither DOD nor the Coast Guard has
performed a systematic analysis to evaluate their processes for
staffing key program coordinator positions, and thus both are hindered
in their ability to ensure that key installation-level program
officials can effectively perform their duties in implementing the
programs.
* Training is not consistently effective: Although DOD and the Coast
Guard require that all servicemembers receive periodic training on
their respective sexual assault prevention and response programs, our
nongeneralizable survey, interviews, and discussions with
servicemembers and program officials revealed that a majority but not
all servicemembers are receiving the required training, and that some
who have received it still would not know or were not sure how to
report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting option. We also
found that neither DOD nor the Coast Guard has systematically evaluated
the effectiveness of the training provided to date. Servicemembers who
have not received the required training or who have received training
that is not effective may not know how to mitigate the possibility of
being sexually assaulted or how to seek assistance if needed, or risk
reporting the assault in a way that limits their option to seek
treatment while maintaining confidentiality.
* Access to mental health services may be limited: DOD and the Coast
Guard require that sexual assault victims be made aware of available
mental health services, and in 2007, DOD's Mental Health Task Force
recommended that DOD take action to address factors that may prevent
some servicemembers from seeking mental health care. However, we found
that several factors, including a DOD-reported shortage of mental
health care providers, the logistical challenges of operating overseas
or in geographically remote locations, and servicemembers' perceptions
of a stigma associated with mental health care, can affect whether
servicemembers who are victims of sexual assault can or do access
mental health services, and we could find no indication that DOD or the
Coast Guard have performed an analysis to aid in addressing barriers to
mental health care specifically for victims of sexual assault. To their
credit, DOD and the Coast Guard screen servicemembers for mental health
concerns, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, which can afflict
victims of sexual assault.
We found, based on responses to our survey and a 2006 DOD survey, the
most recent available, that occurrences of sexual assault may be
exceeding the rates being reported, suggesting that DOD and the Coast
Guard have only limited visibility over the incidence of these
occurrences. We recognize that the precise number of sexual assaults
involving servicemembers is not possible to determine, and that studies
suggest sexual assaults are generally underreported in the United
States. Nonetheless, our findings indicate that some servicemembers may
choose not to report sexual assault incidents for a variety of reasons,
including the belief that nothing would be done or that reporting an
incident would negatively impact their careers. In fiscal year 2007,
DOD received 2,688 reports of alleged sexual assault, brought with
either the restricted or unrestricted reporting option, involving
servicemembers as either the alleged offenders or victims. The Coast
Guard, which did not offer the restricted reporting option during
fiscal year 2007, received 72 reports of alleged sexual assault brought
with the unrestricted reporting option during that time period.
However, servicemembers told us that they were aware of alleged sexual
assault incidents involving other servicemembers that were not reported
to program officials, and a 2006 Defense Manpower Data Center survey
found that of the estimated 6.8 percent of women and 1.8 percent of men
who experienced unwanted sexual contact[Footnote 6] during the prior 12
months, the majority chose not to report it. Notably, respondents to
our survey as well as to that and other DOD surveys identified common
factors that discouraged servicemembers from reporting a sexual assault
incident, including the belief that nothing would be done; concern that
reporting an incident would negatively impact their careers or unit
morale; or concern that a report made using the restricted reporting
option would not remain confidential.
While DOD and the Coast Guard have established some mechanisms for
overseeing reports of sexual assault involving servicemembers, both
lack an oversight framework, and DOD lacks key information needed to
evaluate the effectiveness of the department's sexual assault
prevention and response program. DOD's instruction charges the Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office (within the Office of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Plans) with identifying and managing
trends and establishing program evaluation, quality improvement, and
oversight mechanisms to evaluate the effectiveness of the sexual
response prevention and response program. Our prior work has
demonstrated the importance of outcome-oriented performance measures to
successful program oversight, and that an effective plan for
implementing initiatives and measuring progress can help decision
makers determine whether initiatives are achieving their desired
results.[Footnote 7] However, neither DOD nor the Coast Guard has
developed an oversight framework that includes clear objectives,
milestones, performance measures, or criteria for measuring progress.
Congress also lacks visibility over the incidence of sexual assaults
involving Coast Guard members, because the Coast Guard is not required
to provide these data to Congress. Further, because of a lack of
clearly defined data collection elements, some data included in DOD's
annual reports to Congress could be misinterpreted or may not provide
information needed to facilitate congressional oversight or
understanding of victims' use of the reporting options. Because the
military services are not providing DOD with the installation-and case-
specific data beyond what is statutorily required for inclusion in the
department's annual report, DOD lacks the means to fully execute its
oversight role. Furthermore, to provide oversight of DOD's program, in
2004 Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to establish the
Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services to
undertake an examination of matters relating to sexual assault in which
members of the Armed Forces are either victims or offenders. As of July
2008, however, the task force has yet to begin its review, although DOD
considers its work to be an important oversight element. Without an
oversight framework, as well as more complete data, decision makers in
DOD, the Coast Guard, and Congress lack information they need to
evaluate and oversee the programs.
We are suggesting that Congress may wish to improve oversight of sexual
assault incidents in the Coast Guard by requiring the Coast Guard to
submit to Congress sexual assault incident and program data annually
that are methodologically comparable to those required of DOD. We are
also making a number of recommendations to improve implementation of
sexual assault prevention and response programs and improve oversight
of the programs in DOD and the Coast Guard. With regard to DOD, to
improve implementation of the program we are recommending that DOD
review and evaluate its guidance for the prevention and response of
sexual assault to ensure that adequate guidance is provided to
effectively implement the program in deployed and joint environments;
evaluate its processes for staffing and designating key installation-
level program positions to ensure that these individuals have the
ability and resources to fully carry out their responsibilities; review
and evaluate its training to ensure the military services are meeting
requirements and to enhance training effectiveness; systematically
evaluate any factors that may prevent or discourage servicemembers from
accessing mental health services following a sexual assault; and
emphasize to all levels of command their responsibility for supporting
the program, and review the extent to which resources are available to
raise servicemembers' awareness of sexual assault matters. To enhance
oversight of the program, we are recommending that DOD develop an
oversight framework to guide continued program implementation and
evaluate program effectiveness; take specific steps to improve the
usefulness of its annual report to Congress as an oversight tool;
direct the service secretaries to provide installation-level incident
data to the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office; and direct
the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services to
begin its examination immediately, now that all members of the task
force have been appointed. With regard to the Coast Guard, we are
recommending that it evaluate its processes for staffing key
installation-level program positions to ensure that these individuals
have the ability and resources to fully carry out their
responsibilities, and that it develop an oversight framework to guide
continued program implementation and evaluate program effectiveness. In
written comments on a draft of this report, both DOD and the Coast
Guard concurred with all of our recommendations. DOD's comments are
reprinted in appendix II, and the Coast Guard's comments are reprinted
in appendix III.
Background:
In October 2004, Congress included a provision in the Ronald W. Reagan
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 that required
the Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive policy for DOD on
the prevention of and response to sexual assaults involving members of
the Armed Forces.[Footnote 8] The legislation required that the
department's policy be based on the recommendations of the Department
of Defense Task Force on Care for Victims of Sexual Assaults and on
such other matters as the Secretary considered appropriate.[Footnote 9]
Among other things, the legislation required DOD to establish a
standardized departmentwide definition of sexual assault; establish
procedures for confidentially reporting sexual assault incidents; and
submit an annual report to Congress on reported sexual assault
incidents involving members of the Armed Forces.
In October 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 6495.01,[Footnote 10] which
contains its comprehensive policy for the prevention of and response to
sexual assault, and in June 2006 it issued DOD Instruction 6495.02,
[Footnote 11] which provides guidance for implementing its policy.
DOD's directive defines sexual assault as "intentional sexual contact,
characterized by the use of force, physical threat or abuse of
authority or when the victim does not or cannot consent. It includes
rape, nonconsensual sodomy (oral or anal sex), indecent assault
(unwanted, inappropriate sexual contact or fondling), or attempts to
commit these acts. Sexual assault can occur without regard to gender or
spousal relationship or age of victim. "Consent" shall not be deemed or
construed to mean the failure by the victim to offer physical
resistance. Consent is not given when a person uses force, threat of
force, coercion, or when a victim is asleep, incapacitated, or
unconscious."
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has the
responsibility for developing the overall policy and guidance for the
department's sexual assault prevention and response program. Under the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (within the Office
of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans) serves as the
department's single point of responsibility for sexual assault policy
matters.[Footnote 12] These include providing the military services
with guidance, training standards, and technical support; overseeing
the department's collection and maintenance of data on reported sexual
assaults involving servicemembers; establishing mechanisms to measure
the effectiveness of the department's sexual assault prevention and
response program; and preparing the department's annual report to
Congress.
In DOD, active duty servicemembers have two options for reporting a
sexual assault: (1) restricted, and (2) unrestricted. The restricted
reporting option permits a victim to confidentially disclose an alleged
sexual assault to select individuals and receive care without
initiating a criminal investigation. A restricted report may only be
made to a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC), victim advocate,
or medical personnel. Because conversations between servicemembers and
chaplains are generally privileged, a victim may also confidentially
disclose an alleged sexual assault to a chaplain. In contrast, the
unrestricted reporting option informs the chain of command of the
alleged sexual assault and may initiate an investigation by the
military criminal investigative organization of jurisdiction.
Prior to December 2007, the Coast Guard only offered an option that
would enable servicemembers to confidentially disclose an incident of
sexual assault at the Coast Guard Academy. However, since then the
Coast Guard has employed Coast Guard-wide a definition of sexual
assault similar to DOD's as well as similar options for reporting a
sexual assault in its guidance, Commandant Instruction
1754.10C.[Footnote 13] Under the Coast Guard's instruction, however, if
the chain of command learns of an alleged sexual assault they are
required to notify the Coast Guard's criminal investigative
organization, the Coast Guard Investigative Service, which will
initiate an investigation or inquiry.
At the installation level, the coordinators of the sexual assault
prevention and response programs are known as SARCs in DOD and as
Employee Assistance Program Coordinators (EAPC) in the Coast Guard.
Other responders include victim advocates, judge advocates, medical and
mental health providers, criminal investigative personnel, law
enforcement personnel, and chaplains.
Implementation of Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Is
Hindered by Inconsistent Support, Training That Is Not Consistently
Effective, and Limitations on Access to Mental Health Services:
DOD has taken positive steps to respond to congressional direction by
establishing policies and a program to prevent, respond to, and resolve
reported sexual assault incidents involving servicemembers and the
Coast Guard, on its own initiative, has taken similar steps; however,
DOD's guidance may not address some important issues. Further,
implementation of the programs is hindered by several factors,
including (1) inconsistent support for the programs, (2) training that
is not consistently effective, and (3) limited access to mental health
services.
DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Respond to Congressional Direction, and the
Coast Guard on Its Own Initiative Has Made Similar Progress:
In response to statutory requirements and recommendations from the
Department of Defense Care for Victims of Sexual Assaults Task Force,
DOD has established a program to prevent, respond to, and resolve
sexual assaults involving servicemembers. DOD's policy and implementing
guidance for its program are contained in DOD Directive 6495.01 and DOD
Instruction 6495.02, respectively. Specific steps that DOD has taken
include:
* establishing a standardized departmentwide definition of sexual
assault;
* establishing a confidential option to report sexual assault
incidents, known as restricted reporting;
* establishing a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to serve
as the single point of accountability for sexual assault prevention and
response;
* requiring the military services to develop and implement their own
policies and programs, based on DOD's policy, to prevent, respond to,
and resolve sexual assault incidents;
* establishing training requirements for all servicemembers on
preventing and responding to sexual assault; and:
* reporting data on sexual assault incidents to Congress annually.
Although not explicitly required by statute, the Coast Guard has had a
sexual assault prevention and response program in place since 1997. In
December 2007, the Coast Guard on its own initiative updated its
instruction to mirror DOD's policy and to include a restricted option
for reporting sexual assaults.
In DOD, each of the military services has also established a Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office with responsibility for
overseeing and managing sexual assault matters within that military
service.[Footnote 14] The Coast Guard's Office of Work Life (within the
Health, Safety and Work Life Directorate, which is under the Assistant
Commandant for Human Resources), is responsible for overseeing and
managing sexual assault matters within the Coast Guard.
DOD's Directive and Instruction May Not Adequately Address Some
Important Issues:
While the establishment of DOD's program represents a noteworthy step,
DOD's directive and instruction may not adequately address some
important issues, such as how to implement the program when operating
in a deployed environment or in joint environments. Program officials
we met with overseas told us that DOD's guidance does not sufficiently
take into account the realities of operating in a deployed environment,
in which unique living and social circumstances can heighten the risks
for sexual assault and program resources are more widely dispersed than
they are in the United States, which can make responding to a sexual
assault challenging. One program official we met with overseas told us
that his area of responsibility includes six to seven installations
spread out over an area the size of New Jersey, constituting a
geographic challenge in terms of responding to sexual assaults. At
another installation, we found no criminal investigative presence, and
program officials told us that it can take 48 hours or longer for the
criminal investigative organization with jurisdiction to respond to
some sexual assaults. Similarly, program officials told us there is a
need for better coordination of resources when a sexual assault occurs
in a joint environment. At one overseas installation we visited, Coast
Guard members told us that they were confused about which program they
fell under--DOD's or the Coast Guard's--and thus who they should report
an alleged sexual assault to. We also found that installations can have
multiple responders responsible for responding to an assault,
potentially leading to further confusion. Concerns over implementing
the sexual assault prevention and response program in joint
environments are also highlighted in the department's fiscal year 2007
annual report.[Footnote 15] For example, DOD noted the need to address
challenges that arise in environments wherein two or more services are
operating together, while the Army noted that challenges with joint
environments have often resulted in unnecessary duplication of services
and inconsistent application of policy with regard to sexual assault
matters.
Implementation of Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Is
Hindered by Inconsistent Support from Commanders and Limited
Effectiveness of Program Coordinators for Whom Program Management Is a
Collateral Duty:
Commanders in DOD and the Coast Guard have taken actions to address
incidents of sexual assault and are generally supportive of sexual
assault prevention and response programs; however, we found evidence
that some commanders do not support the programs. In addition,
implementation of the programs may be hindered at installations where
key program coordinator positions are a collateral duty because
servicemembers must balance their duties with mission-related
priorities, especially in deployed environments.
While Most Commanders Support the Programs, Some Do Not:
While commanders--that is, company and field grade officers--in DOD and
the Coast Guard have taken actions to address incidents of sexual
assault, we found evidence that some commanders do not support the
programs. According to DOD's instruction, commanders and other leaders
are responsible for advocating a strong program and effectively
implementing sexual assault prevention and response policies. The Coast
Guard's instruction similarly requires that commanders and other
leaders ensure compliance with the Coast Guard's policies and
procedures. At the installations we visited, we found that commanders
were supportive of addressing incidents of sexual assault. For example,
commanders told us that they set a zero tolerance policy for incidents
of sexual assault, communicated the respective policies at command
briefings, understood their roles and responsibilities in supporting
the programs, and understood the need to protect victims. The results
of a nongeneralizable survey we conducted support these statements. For
example, at the 14 installations where we administered our survey, the
percentage of servicemembers who indicated they thought their direct
supervisor (military or civilian) would address sexual assault, should
it occur at their current location, ranged from 91 to 98 percent.
However, we found evidence that some commanders do not support the
programs. For example, at three of the installations we visited program
officials told us of meeting with resistance from commanders when
attempting to place, in barracks and work areas, posters or other
materials advertising the program or the options for reporting a sexual
assault. A victim advocate at one Navy installation we visited told us
that her command did not support the program and that her command did
not feel that servicemembers in the unit should be able to utilize
DOD's restricted reporting option. According to the individual, the
command demonstrated its resistance by routinely taking down any
posters advertising the unit's victim advocates or DOD's reporting
options. In some cases, commanders we spoke with told us that they
supported the programs but did not like the restricted reporting option
because they felt it hindered their ability to protect members of the
unit or discipline alleged offenders.
Some program officials told us that some commanders do not support the
programs because they do not understand them or do not consider sexual
assault matters to be a priority in the military. The following are
some examples of what we found:
* At some of the installations we visited, commanders we spoke with
were unfamiliar with the options for reporting a sexual assault,
mistakenly believing that servicemembers could use the restricted
option and still report a sexual assault to them--that is, without
their being obligated to then initiate an investigation.
* Army unit victim advocates at one location we visited told us that
senior enlisted leaders tend to ignore sexual assault matters until
they become public knowledge and affect the morale of the unit.
* Marine Corps unit victim advocates at one location we visited told us
that some commanders do not want to hear from them or from junior
enlisted Marines about sexual assault matters.
* At some of the installations we visited, program officials told us
that some commanders of all-male units do not believe that sexual
assault matters are a problem for their units or that the programs are
relevant to their units. For example, a SARC at one installation we
visited told us that some commanders from all-male units have prevented
her from providing required training to the units.
Commanders who do not emphasize and prioritize sexual assault
prevention and response programs--including those in all-male units--or
who do not understand the policies and procedures effectively limit
servicemembers' knowledge about the program and ability to exercise
their reporting options. Consequently, sexual assault prevention and
response program coordinators' efforts to raise awareness at these
installations may also be limited.
Program officials told us they need sufficient resources to
appropriately implement sexual assault prevention and response
programs. However, there is no direct funding for sexual assault
prevention and response programs at military installations. To fund the
programs, funds from other installation programs need to be utilized.
At some of the installations we visited, SARCs and other program
officials told us that they lacked sufficient funding to promote the
programs, train servicemembers, or otherwise raise servicemembers'
awareness of sexual assault matters. In such instances, program
officials told us that they had to find creative ways to implement the
programs. One Army SARC told us that because of limited funding she
could not bring in any outside speakers during Sexual Assault Awareness
Month and had to rely on donations from units to print posters
advertising the program. Similarly, SARCs we met with in the Navy and
Marine Corps told us that they had only limited resources to train
servicemembers. In the Coast Guard, program officials told us that they
were expected to comply with the Coast Guard's instruction to provide
training to victim support personnel and servicemembers. However, they
were not provided with funding and did not know how they were going to
meet the new requirements. Program coordinators who are not provided
sufficient funding by their commands cannot ensure that their program
is appropriately implemented.
At the installations we visited, we found that commanders have taken
action against alleged sexual assault offenders. In both DOD and the
Coast Guard, commanders are responsible for discipline of misconduct,
including sexual assault, and they have a variety of judicial and
administrative options at their disposal. Commanders' options are
specified in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Manual
for Courts-Martial and include (1) trial by courts-martial, (2)
nonjudicial punishment, and (3) administrative actions. At the
installations we visited, commanders told us that they were supportive
of the need to dispose of sexual assault cases and were generally
familiar with the options available to them. For further information on
the disposition of sexual assaults in DOD and the Coast Guard, see
appendix IV.
Program Coordinators Are Challenged in Providing Program Management as
a Collateral Duty:
To implement the sexual assault prevention and response program at
military installations, DOD and the services rely largely on SARCs.
DOD's instruction directs the military services to establish the
position of the SARC and criteria for selecting them. However, DOD's
instruction leaves to the military services' discretion whether these
positions are filled by military members, DOD civilian employees, or
DOD contractors, and thus whether SARCs perform their roles as full-
time or collateral duties. We found that the military services are
using a variety of models for staffing the SARC position. For example,
at the installations we visited in the United States, the Army, Navy,
and Air Force were using full-time civilian or contractor employees,
while the Marine Corps was using both civilian and military
servicemembers for whom the duty was collateral. At the installations
we visited overseas, we found that the Army assigned this position to
servicemembers as a collateral duty, the Navy assigned it to a full-
time civilian employee, and the Air Force assigned it to servicemembers
as a full-time duty. We found that the time and resources dedicated to
implementing the sexual assault prevention and response program are
more constrained where program coordinator positions are staffed by
servicemembers for whom these duties are collateral. Program officials
with whom we spoke told us that SARCs' ability to effectively implement
DOD's program depended on whether they served in full-time or
collateral-duty positions. For example, Army SARCs overseas told us
that in addition to the sexual assault prevention and response program
they are also responsible for supporting the Army's Equal Opportunity
program, and that when they handled an equal opportunity complaint or
had other mission requirements, those became their full-time job. As a
result, they had less time to support the sexual assault prevention and
response program. DOD has not systematically evaluated its policy for
staffing SARCs; however, without evaluating its policy and the
services' processes for filling the SARC position, DOD is hindered in
its ability to ensure that the SARCs can effectively perform their
function in managing the sexual assault prevention and response
program.
The 13 EAPC positions in the Coast Guard are staffed by full-time
federal civilian employees who are responsible for simultaneously
managing multiple work-life programs, including sexual assault
prevention and response, for a designated geographic region. Officials
in the Coast Guard's Office of Work Life as well an EAPC with whom we
met acknowledged that because of the number of programs they are
responsible for managing, the EAPCs do not have the time to effectively
launch and implement the Coast Guard's sexual assault prevention and
response program. As a result, these officials believe they will not be
able to train servicemembers on the Coast Guard's program, including
the new restricted reporting option, while also providing assistance to
victims and managing other work-life programs. Officials at Coast Guard
headquarters estimate that they need an additional 13 EAPCs across the
Coast Guard to address their workload requirements. Without evaluating
its processes for staffing these positions, the Coast Guard is hindered
in its ability to ensure that its sexual assault prevention and
response program is effectively implemented.
Training Is Not Consistently Effective:
Although DOD and the Coast Guard require servicemembers to receive
periodic training on their respective sexual assault prevention and
response programs, our nongeneralizable survey and interviews and
discussions with servicemembers and program officials revealed that not
all servicemembers are receiving the required training, and some
servicemembers who have received it nevertheless may not understand how
to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting option. To
date, neither DOD nor the Coast Guard has evaluated the effectiveness
of the training provided. Additionally, the military services are not
consistently meeting DOD's requirements for presenting training in
specified formats to enable servicemembers to understand the nature of
sexual assaults. Some servicemembers told us that the training they
received was not engaging and, therefore, they did not pay attention;
others told us that servicemembers do not always take the training
seriously.
Not All Servicemembers Receive Required Training:
Both DOD and the Coast Guard require that servicemembers receive sexual
assault prevention and response training annually; however, our survey
and discussions with servicemembers revealed that not all
servicemembers are receiving this training. In response to statutory
requirements,[Footnote 16] DOD has established requirements for
servicemembers to receive periodic sexual assault prevention and
response training. Specifically, DOD's instruction requires
servicemembers to receive sexual assault prevention and response
training both annually and prior to deploying to locations outside of
the United States. Although not statutorily required to do so, the
Coast Guard has developed its instruction largely to reflect DOD's
policies, and also requires its members to receive training annually.
DOD's and the Coast Guard's annual training is required to provide all
servicemembers with information on their options for reporting a sexual
assault and sexual assault issues, such as the meaning of consent,
offender accountability, and victim care.
At the seven installations where we administered our survey in the
United States, our survey revealed that a majority, but not all,
servicemembers are receiving required annual training on their
respective sexual assault prevention and response programs.
Specifically, as table 1 shows, the percentage of servicemembers we
surveyed at seven installations in the United States who indicated they
had received the required training in the preceding 12 months ranged
from 61 to 88 percent.
Table 1: Percentage of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Having
Received or Having Not Received Required Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Training in the Preceding 12 Months:
United States Installation: Camp Lejeune;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required annual training: 76;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required annual training: 20.
United States Installation: Fort Bliss;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required annual training: 79;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required annual training: 19.
United States Installation: Fort Drum;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required annual training: 86;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required annual training: 11.
United States Installation: Integrated Support Command Portsmouth[A];
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required annual training: 85;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required annual training: 11.
United States Installation: Lackland Air Force Base;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required annual training: 88;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required annual training: 9.
United States Installation: Marine Corps Base Quantico;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required annual training: 61;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required annual training: 34.
United States Installation: Naval Station Norfolk;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required annual training: 77;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required annual training: 21.
Source: GAO.
Note: This table does not show the percentage of servicemembers who
responded that they did "do not know" whether they received the
required training. Therefore, the percentages in the table may not
total to 100 percent for each installation.
[A] Includes servicemembers from Yorktown Training Center, Virginia.
[End of table]
Our interviews and discussions with servicemembers and program
officials also revealed that not all servicemembers had received the
required annual training within the preceding 12 months. Such
servicemembers incur the risks of not knowing how to mitigate the
possibility of being sexually assaulted or how to seek assistance if
needed, or risk reporting the assault in a way that limits their option
to seek treatment while maintaining confidentiality. In some instances,
we found that these servicemembers were aware that the training was
required annually, but had not attended or received training within the
preceding 12 months. For example, a junior officer at a Marine Corps
installation told us that he had last received the required training 2
years earlier while stationed overseas, when the Marine Corps' program
was initially rolled out. He said that he had not received any
subsequent training because he had likely "slipped through the cracks."
As another example, a junior enlisted servicemember at an Army
installation told us that he had not received the required training
within the preceding 12 months because he was on temporary duty
assignment when his unit conducted the training. In other cases, we
found that servicemembers were not familiar with the programs or had
never received the required training. Program officials at the
installations we visited told us that they face challenges in ensuring
that all servicemembers receive the required training. For example, a
SARC at an Army installation told us that while she informally tracks
information on whether units have received required annual sexual
assault prevention and response training, she has no way of knowing how
many servicemembers within a unit have received it. She noted that
tracking whether servicemembers have received required training is a
unit-level responsibility. Her goal, which she noted is arbitrary, is
to ensure that at least 80 percent of units have received this
training.
According to DOD's instruction, military commanders, supervisors, and
managers are responsible for the effective implementation of the
services' respective sexual assault prevention and response programs.
However, we found evidence that not all commanders had received the
required training or were familiar with the options for reporting a
sexual assault. A senior officer at an Air Force installation told us
that he had never received sexual assault prevention and response
training, was not familiar with DOD's options for reporting a sexual
assault, and would encourage his servicemembers to address sexual
assault matters by notifying their chain of command. Similarly, a
senior officer at an Army installation we visited told us that he did
not know about any other option for reporting a sexual assault other
than by notifying their chain of command. With their commanders thus
uninformed, servicemembers under their command might not be fully aware
of their options for reporting a sexual assault. Also, at more than
half of the installations we visited servicemembers and program
officials told us that they believe commanders and other senior leaders
do not always receive the required training, or if they do, do not
understand the programs. For example, victim advocates at a Navy
installation we visited told us that they do not believe many senior
leaders receive required sexual assault prevention and response
training. According to the victim advocates, leaders cannot support the
program if they do not understand it.
Servicemembers and program officials we spoke with also told us that
problems occur when commanders and other senior leaders have not
received the required training or are not familiar with the programs.
For example, the SARC at one installation we visited told us that it is
important that commanders receive the required training so that they
understand what they can and cannot do with regard to sexual assault
matters. According to the official, commanders who have not received
training and are not informed about the program sometimes take
incorrect actions, such as initiating their own investigations of
allegations of sexual assault made using the restricted reporting
option.
In addition to its annual training requirement, DOD, though not the
Coast Guard, requires that servicemembers receive sexual assault
prevention and response training prior to deploying to locations
outside of the United States. However, our survey revealed that not all
servicemembers are receiving this training. Specifically, as table 2
shows, at the seven installations where we administered our survey
overseas, the percentage of servicemembers who indicated they had
received training prior to deploying ranged from 52 to 90 percent,
while the percentage of servicemembers indicating they had not received
training prior to deploying ranged from 6 to 42 percent.
Table 2: Percentage of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Having
Received or Having Not Received Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Training Prior to Deploying:
Overseas Installation: Al Udeid Air Base;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training prior to deploying: 68;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required training prior to deploying: 21.
Overseas Installation: Balad Air Base;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training prior to deploying: 72;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required training prior to deploying: 19.
Overseas Installation: Camp Arifjan;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training prior to deploying: 75;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required training prior to deploying: 21.
Overseas Installation: Camp Ramadi;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training prior to deploying: 76;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required training prior to deploying: 17.
Overseas Installation: Camp Stryker;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training prior to deploying: 80;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required training prior to deploying: 13.
Overseas Installation: Logistics Support Area Anaconda;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training prior to deploying: 90;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required training prior to deploying: 6.
Overseas Installation: Naval Support Activity Bahrain[A];
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training prior to deploying: 52;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having not received
required training prior to deploying: 42.
Source: GAO.
Note: This table does not show the percentage of servicemembers who
responded that they did "do not know" whether they received the
required training. Therefore, the percentages in the table may not
total to 100 percent for each installation.
[A] Includes Coast Guard members under the operational command of U.S.
Central Command.
[End of table]
Our interviews with individual servicemembers also revealed that not
all servicemembers had received the required sexual assault prevention
and response training prior to deploying. The SARC at one installation
we visited told us that he believes many servicemembers are deploying
overseas without having received the required predeployment training
because too many servicemembers with whom he interacts are not familiar
with the program. In some instances, we found that servicemembers may
not be receiving the required training because DOD's predeployment
training requirements are not always enforced. For example, a general
officer we met with in Iraq told us that as units are preparing to
deploy commanders may not emphasize all predeployment training
requirements, including those pertaining to sexual assault prevention
and response. As a result, according to the general officer,
servicemembers who have not received this training may not take sexual
assault matters seriously during deployment. Such servicemembers may
also not understand how to obtain assistance if a sexual assault were
to occur. Though servicemembers may not receive required sexual assault
prevention and response training prior to deploying, we found that some
steps are being taken to provide the training to servicemembers once
they arrive in a deployed location. For example, at the installations
we visited overseas we found that SARCs and victim advocates were
actively publicizing the program and providing training to
servicemembers and units upon their arrival.
Some Servicemembers Do Not Understand How to Use the Restricted
Reporting Option:
The majority of respondents to our survey indicated that they had
received required sexual assault prevention and response training and
would know how to report a sexual assault using the restricted
reporting option. However, as table 3 shows, the percentage of
servicemembers we surveyed who indicated that they would not know or
were not sure of how to report a sexual assault using the restricted
reporting option, despite having received the training, ranged from 13
to 43 percent for the seven installations where we administered our
survey in the United States and from 13 to 28 percent for the seven
installations where we administered our survey overseas.
Table 3: Percentage of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Receiving
Required Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Training and Also
Reporting They Would Not Know or Were Not Sure of How to Report a
Sexual Assault Using the Restricted Reporting Option:
United States Installation: Camp Lejeune;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 68;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 32.
United States Installation: Fort Bliss;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 81;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 19.
United States Installation: Fort Drum;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 84;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 16.
United States Installation: Integrated Support Command Portsmouth[A];
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 60;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 40.
United States Installation: Lackland Air Force Base;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 87;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 13.
United States Installation: Marine Corps Base Quantico;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 57;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 43.
United States Installation: Naval Station Norfolk;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 78;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 22.
Overseas Installation: Al Udeid Air Base;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 85;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 15.
Overseas Installation: Balad Air Base;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 82;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 18.
Overseas Installation: Camp Arifjan;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 83;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 17.
Overseas Installation: Camp Ramadi;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 87;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 13.
Overseas Installation: Camp Stryker;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 72;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 28.
Overseas Installation: Logistics Support Area Anaconda;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 82;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 18.
Overseas Installation: Naval Support Activity Bahrain[B];
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would know how to report a
sexual assault using the restricted reporting option: 78;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training and also reporting they would not know or were not
sure how to report a sexual assault using the restricted reporting
option: 22.
Source: GAO.
[A] Includes servicemembers from Yorktown Training Center, Virginia.
[B] Includes Coast Guard members under the operational command of U.S.
Central Command.
[End of table]
Similarly, our interviews with servicemembers also revealed that some
servicemembers who had received the required training were confused or
unfamiliar with DOD's options for reporting a sexual assault, as
illustrated by the following examples:
* A junior enlisted servicemember at an Army installation told us that
although he had received sexual assault prevention and response
training as part of his annual training requirement, he did not believe
that the Army allowed a report of sexual assault to be made without a
formal investigation.
* A junior officer at an Air Force installation told us that his
predeployment training covered sexual harassment and human trafficking
but he was uncertain whether the training covered sexual assault
matters or DOD's reporting options.
* A senior enlisted servicemember in Iraq told us that while she
received sexual assault prevention and response training prior to
deploying, the training focused on how females could protect themselves
and did not cover DOD's reporting options.
The Military Services Do Not Consistently Meet Training Format
Requirements:
To help servicemembers understand the nature of sexual assaults, DOD's
instruction requires that sexual assault prevention and response
training be scenario-based, using real-life situations to demonstrate
the entire cycle of reporting, response, and accountability procedures.
DOD's instruction also requires that training for junior servicemembers
include group participation and interaction. However, our survey
revealed that the military services are not consistently meeting DOD's
requirements for the format of the training. During the course of our
review, we found that the services are utilizing a variety of formats,
including instructor-led or computer-or web-based training, to provide
servicemembers with required sexual assault prevention and response
training. However, as table 4 shows, at 9 of the 14 locations where we
administered our survey, more than half of the servicemembers indicated
that the training they received did not include a participatory or
scenario-based component.
Table 4: Percentage of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Having
Received Required Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Training, by
Format of the Training:
United States Installation: Camp Lejeune;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 43;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 54.
United States Installation: Fort Bliss;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 56;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 42.
United States Installation: Fort Drum;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 60;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 38.
United States Installation: Integrated Support Command Portsmouth[A,B];
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 27;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 69.
United States Installation: Lackland Air Force Base;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 37;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 60.
United States Installation: Marine Corps Base Quantico;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 39;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 57.
United States Installation: Naval Station Norfolk;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 32;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 66.
Overseas Installation: Al Udeid Air Base;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 21;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 72.
Overseas Installation: Balad Air Base;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 19;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 75.
Overseas Installation: Camp Arifjan;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 52;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 44.
Overseas Installation: Camp Ramadi;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 62;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 31.
Overseas Installation: Camp Stryker;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 56;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 36.
Overseas Installation: Logistics Support Area Anaconda;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 41;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 51.
Overseas Installation: Naval Support Activity Bahrain[C];
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was participatory or scenario-based: 29;
Percentage of selected servicemembers who reported having received
required training that was not participatory or scenario-based: 69.
Source: GAO.
Notes: This table does not show the percentage of servicemembers who
responded that they were "not sure" whether they received the required
training and whether they received participatory or scenario-based
training. Therefore, the percentages in the table may not total to 100
percent for each installation.
[A] The Coast Guard's instruction does not include a requirement that
sexual assault prevention and response training include a participatory
or scenario-based component.
[B] Includes servicemembers from Yorktown Training Center, Virginia.
[C] Includes Coast Guard members under the operational command of U.S.
Central Command.
[End of table]
The Coast Guard's instruction does not specify any requirements for the
format of its sexual assault prevention and response training. However,
according to an official in the Coast Guard's Office of Work Life, the
Coast Guard is in the process of reviewing its training requirements,
including those for the format of the training. Further, the Coast
Guard is considering establishing a requirement that sexual assault
prevention and response training be interactive.
Servicemembers' Perceptions of Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Training Varies:
At the installations we visited, servicemembers' perceptions of the
required training they received varied. For example, one junior
enlisted servicemember told us the training she received was very
helpful and covered everything she would want to know about sexual
assault matters, including the meaning of consent, the difference
between sexual assault and sexual harassment, what one should do if
sexually assaulted, and the differences between DOD's restricted and
unrestricted reporting options. However, at about half the
installations we visited, servicemembers and program officials told us
the training relied heavily on power point briefings and some said that
participants were not engaged. Victim advocates, who along with SARCs
provide the required training, told us at one installation we visited
that the training they provide to units does rely heavily on power
point briefings, the material is not engaging, and many servicemembers
do not pay attention during the training sessions. At more than half
the installations we visited, servicemembers and program officials we
spoke with told us that the training is not taken seriously and some
described it as a vehicle for units to "check the box" indicating that
they met the training requirement.
Servicemembers and program officials also told us that the training
provided to junior personnel is not always interactive. Several
servicemembers told us that junior servicemembers receive the same
training as senior enlisted members and officers. The Deputy Commander
at an Army installation we visited overseas described this training as
aimed at a very broad spectrum of servicemembers and ranks and not very
in-depth. Similarly, a senior enlisted servicemember at a Navy
installation told us that the training she has attended includes both
junior and senior servicemembers, which can be intimidating for junior
servicemembers, who are consequently less likely to speak up or ask
questions. The SARC at one installation we visited said that the
training she provides units encompasses about 800 personnel at a time,
which can make it difficult to allow for interaction or individual
questions from any of the participants.
Several Factors May Hamper Servicemembers' Access to Mental Health
Care, Though DOD and the Coast Guard Screen for Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder:
DOD and the Coast Guard both require that sexual assault victims be
made aware of the available mental health services. However, several
factors, including a DOD-reported shortage of mental health care
providers, difficulty in accessing mental health services overseas or
in geographically remote locations, and servicemembers' perceptions of
stigma associated with seeking mental health care, affect
servicemembers' access to mental health care, and we could find no
indication that DOD or the Coast Guard have performed an analysis to
aid in addressing barriers to mental health care specifically for
victims of sexual assault. To their credit, both DOD and the Coast
Guard are taking steps to screen servicemembers for mental health
disorders, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, which mental health
providers in DOD with whom we spoke identified as one of the most
common mental health concerns following a sexual assault.
Access to Mental Health Services May Be Limited:
Both DOD and the Coast Guard require that servicemembers who are
victims of sexual assault be made aware of mental health services, such
as counseling. DOD's instruction requires SARCs to coordinate medical
and counseling services between military installations and deployed
units for victims of sexual assault and collaborate with local
community crisis counseling centers, as necessary, in order to augment
or enhance DOD's program. Similarly, the Coast Guard's instruction
requires that a health care professional ensure that any victim who
reports a sexual assault be informed of his or her psychiatric care or
counseling options. At the installations we visited, we found that
program officials generally took steps to ensure that servicemembers
who are sexually assaulted are made aware of their options for seeking
mental health care and are able to access it, if desired. However, at
some of the installations we visited we found instances in which
program officials had not taken steps to ensure that servicemembers
were aware of their options for seeking mental health care or otherwise
had limited access to mental health care following a sexual assault.
For example, at one installation we found that servicemembers had
access only to the limited mental health services provided on base, and
that the SARC did not know whether any memoranda of understanding were
in place with local resources or practitioners in the community to
provide servicemembers with additional options for accessing mental
health care. With their SARC thus uninformed, any servicemember
assaulted at the installation could be limited in his or her options
for accessing mental health care if needed.
Though both DOD and the Coast Guard require that servicemembers who are
victims of sexual assault be made aware of mental health services,
neither knows how many servicemembers have sought or received mental
health services following a sexual assault because there is no
requirement to collect or track such information. According to
knowledgeable officials within DOD, doing so could be challenging
because servicemembers may seek treatment from civilian providers who
are not required to report any information to DOD. Both DOD and the
Coast Guard collect limited information on the number of sexual assault
victims who are referred for counseling. However, the information DOD
collects is limited to the initial referral for each restricted report
of a sexual assault; it does not indicate whether the victim actually
received the counseling to which he or she was referred. Similarly, the
information the Coast Guard collects is limited to only whether the
victim was offered counseling. Officials at the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) told us VA collects data on the cumulative number of
veterans to whom it has provided mental health care for conditions
resulting from military sexual trauma--which includes both sexual
harassment and sexual assault--during their military career.[Footnote
17] However, because DOD and VA collect different data, comparisons
cannot be made.
Shortages of Mental Health Providers Can Diminish Access to Mental
Health Services:
Although DOD and the Coast Guard require that servicemembers who are
victims of sexual assault be made aware of available mental health
services, a DOD-reported shortage of health care providers--
specifically mental health care providers--can hinder servicemembers'
access to receiving such care. Such concerns are not new to DOD. For
example, in 2007, the congressionally mandated DOD Task Force on Mental
Health reported that the military health system lacks the fiscal
resources and fully trained personnel needed to fulfill its mission to
support psychological health in peacetime or to fulfill the enhanced
requirements imposed during times of conflict. During the course of our
review we found that concerns over a shortage of mental health
providers persist. For example, officials at some of the installations
we visited told us that one barrier to ensuring that victims of sexual
assault receive mental health care if they desire it is the lack of
adequate resources and staff at some installations. Similarly, mental
health officials with the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery told us
that the Navy does not have enough medical or mental health
professionals to staff all allotted positions. However, during the
course of our review we did find that the military services were taking
steps to address this challenge. For example, DOD has established a
memorandum of understanding with the Public Health Service to enable
its uniformed providers to work in military treatment facilities.
Accessing Mental Health Services Is More Difficult Overseas or in
Geographically Remote Locations:
Servicemembers deployed overseas or based at geographically remote
installations in the United States or overseas typically have more
difficulty in obtaining mental health services because of inherent
challenges associated with such locales. For example, servicemembers
deployed to small forward operating bases in Afghanistan or Iraq may
have to travel or be transported to other military installations in the
region. Program officials told us that this process typically involves
the servicemember notifying his or her commander, who is responsible
for the use of transportation assets, which may require that the
servicemember disclose the reason for seeking mental health care.
However, disclosing that reason could jeopardize the member's ability
to use the restricted reporting option and keep the sexual assault
incident confidential. Servicemembers stationed in geographically
remote locations may also have limited access to mental health care. At
one installation we visited in the United States, officials told us
that they had faced challenges hiring additional mental health
providers given the installation's geographically remote location.
However, they noted that recent hires of psychologists had reduced
servicemembers' waiting time for counseling appointments at the
installation from about 7 weeks to 2 days. Navy and Coast Guard members
told us that access to mental care on ships is limited and that
servicemembers must wait until they can be transported to another ship
with mental health assets, or until their ship arrives in port to
access mental health services. Servicemembers also told us that it can
be difficult to leave their ships in order to receive such care.
Some mental health care officials we spoke with overseas said that the
shortage of providers can make it even more difficult to seek mental
health care, for any reason, when deployed overseas or in
geographically remote locations in the United States or overseas. For
example, at one installation we visited in Southwest Asia we found that
servicemembers had access to only one mental health provider for only
about 4 hours each week. In February 2008, the Army reported that such
concerns remained largely unaddressed. Specifically, the Army's Mental
Health Advisory Team reported that in 2007, soldiers who were deployed
in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were reporting more
difficulty in accessing behavioral health care than they had reported
in 2006, and that behavioral health personnel were reporting a shortage
of assets and an increase in burnout rates.
Perceptions of Stigma May Inhibit Servicemembers from Seeking Mental
Health Services:
Perceptions of stigma associated with seeking mental health care may
also discourage servicemembers from doing so following a sexual
assault. In 2007, the congressionally mandated DOD Task Force on Mental
Health reported that stigma in the military associated with seeking
mental health services remains a pervasive and critical barrier to
accessing needed psychological care. Similarly, the Army's Mental
Health Advisory Team reported in 2008 that stigma continues to be a
major issue in the willingness of servicemembers to seek care. DOD
officials told us that servicemembers often do not seek mental health
care for this reason or because they believe doing so could negatively
impact their careers, such as by affecting their ability to obtain a
security clearance.
DOD recently took steps that may encourage servicemembers who require
mental health care to seek professional help by successfully advocating
a revision to Standard Form 86, Questionnaire for National Security
Positions.[Footnote 18] Under the revision, applicants no longer need
to disclose certain noncourt-ordered mental health care that they may
have received in the preceding 7 years that was (1) strictly marital,
family, or grief related, as long as it was not related to violence
committed by the servicemember; or (2) strictly related to adjustments
from service in a military combat environment. Further, in an April
2008 memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, DOD noted that
professional care for mental health issues should not be perceived as
jeopardizing an individual's security clearance.[Footnote 19] However,
officials with DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office told
us that it is unclear whether these steps will encourage servicemembers
who are victims of sexual assault to seek mental health care, or
whether these revisions apply to servicemembers who have been sexually
assaulted and seek mental health care.
DOD and the Coast Guard Screen Servicemembers for Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder Resulting from Traumatic Events That May Include Sexual
Assault:
Mental health providers in DOD told us that post-traumatic stress
disorder is one of the most common mental health concerns following a
sexual assault. However, mental health officials told us that because
the onset for post-traumatic stress disorder varies--a victim may
develop post-traumatic stress disorder immediately, or it can be
delayed--victims of sexual assault who seek care after the assault are
treated for symptoms such as depression and anxiety at the time of
their visit. Similarly, Coast Guard medical officials told us that the
EAPC will ensure that a victim of sexual assault meets with a health
care provider, who may evaluate and treat the patient for anxiety,
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, or other conditions, and
refer the patient to the appropriate mental health specialist for acute
and chronic care.
DOD screens for mental health concerns, including post-traumatic stress
disorder, as part of its system to assess the medical condition of
servicemembers before and after deploying to locations outside the
United States. The elements of DOD's system include the use of a
predeployment health assessment, a postdeployment health assessment,
and a postdeployment health reassessment. During these assessments, a
servicemember completes a form that includes questions used to screen
for mental health concerns, including post-traumatic stress disorder,
but not specifically for sexual assault. As we previously reported,
post-traumatic stress disorder can develop following exposure to
combat, natural disasters, terrorist incidents, serious accidents, or
violent personal assaults like rape.[Footnote 20]
DOD's deployment health assessment questionnaires do not focus on a
specific type of event, such as sexual assault; instead, the
questionnaires ask servicemembers to self-report general health
information that allows health care providers to screen for medical and
mental health concerns. The postdeployment health assessment
questionnaire contains a number of questions to screen respondents for
depression, suicidal thoughts, acute stress, and post-traumatic stress
disorder. For example:
Have you ever had any experience that was so frightening, horrible, or
upsetting that, in the past month you:
* have had any nightmares about it or thought about it when you did not
want to?
* tried hard not to think about it or went out of your way to avoid
situations that remind you of it?
* were constantly on guard, watchful, or easily startled?
* felt numb or detached from others, activities or your surroundings?
A health care provider reviews the completed form and may refer the
servicemember for further evaluation if necessary. Further, within 30
days of redeployment, servicemembers are required to meet with a
trained health care provider to discuss their responses to the
postdeployment health assessment and any mental health or psychosocial
issues that may be associated with the deployment.[Footnote 21]
According to officials with DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Office, a minimum of 4 weeks is needed to diagnose post-
traumatic stress disorder, differentiating it from acute stress.
In the Coast Guard, officials told us that EAPCs are responsible for
informing sexual assault victims of their psychiatric care or
counseling options. During such meetings, health care providers screen
and treat servicemembers for mental health disorders, including post-
traumatic stress disorder, and refer them to mental health specialists
for additional acute or chronic care as appropriate.
Survey Data Suggest That Occurrences of Sexual Assault May Exceed Rates
Reported:
We found, based on responses to our nongeneralizable survey and a 2006
DOD survey, the most recent available, that occurrences of sexual
assault may be exceeding the rates being reported, suggesting that DOD
and the Coast Guard have only limited visibility over the incidence of
these occurrences. We recognize that the precise number of sexual
assaults involving servicemembers is not possible to determine, and
that studies suggest sexual assaults are generally underreported in the
United States. Nevertheless, our findings indicate that some
servicemembers may choose not to report sexual assault incidents for a
variety of reasons including the belief that nothing would be done or
that reporting an incident would negatively impact their careers.
In fiscal year 2007, DOD received 2,688 reports of alleged sexual
assault made with either the restricted or unrestricted reporting
option involving servicemembers as either the alleged offenders or
victims. The Coast Guard, which did not offer the restricted reporting
option during fiscal year 2007, received 72 reports of alleged sexual
assault made using the unrestricted reporting option during this same
time period. For additional information on reported sexual assault
incidents in DOD and the Coast Guard for fiscal year 2007, see appendix
V.
At the 14 installations where we administered our survey, 103
servicemembers indicated that they had been sexually assaulted within
the preceding 12 months, as shown in table 5. Of these, the number of
servicemembers who indicated that they had been sexually assaulted
within the preceding 12 months ranged from 3 to 11 per installation.
Due to the transient nature of servicemembers, the alleged sexual
assaults may not have occurred at the locations where we administered
our survey.
Table 5: Number of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Having been
Sexually Assaulted During the Preceding 12 Months:
Location: United States;
Male: 10;
Female: 40;
Gender not provided: 2;
Total: 52;
Total surveyed: 2,187.
Location: Overseas;
Male: 4;
Female: 45;
Gender not provided: 2;
Total: 51;
Total surveyed: 1,563.
Location: Total;
Male: 14;
Female: 85;
Gender not provided: 4;
Total: 103;
Total surveyed: 3,750.
Source: GAO.
Note: Some servicemembers did not indicate their gender. Therefore, the
number of males and females does not always sum to the total number of
respondents who indicated they were sexually assaulted within the
preceding 12 months.
[End of table]
Of the 103 servicemembers who responded to our survey indicating that
they had been sexually assaulted within the preceding 12 months, 52
indicated that they did not report the sexual assault incident. The
number who indicated they did not report the sexual assault ranged from
1 to 6 servicemembers per installation. Table 6 provides information on
the number of respondents to our survey who reported experiencing a
sexual assault within the preceding 12 months.
Table 6: Number of Selected Servicemembers Who Reported Experiencing a
Sexual Assault within the Preceding 12 Months by Type of Reporting
Option Used:
Location: United States;
Total number of selected servicemembers who indicated that they were
sexually assaulted within the preceding 12 months[A]: 52;
Number of selected service members who: Used restricted reporting
option: Males: 2;
Number of selected service members who: Used restricted reporting
option: Females: 5;
Number of selected service members who: Used restricted reporting
option: Gender not provided[B]: 1;
Number of selected service members who: Used unrestricted reporting
option: Males: 1;
Number of selected service members who: Used unrestricted reporting
option: Females: 5;
Number of selected service members who: Used unrestricted reporting
option: Gender not provided[B]: 0;
Number of selected service members who: Did not recall the reporting
option used: Males: 1;
Number of selected service members who: Did not recall the reporting
option used: Females: 12;
Number of selected service members who: Did not recall the reporting
option used: Gender not provided[B]: 0;
Number of selected service members who: Did not report the sexual
assault incident: Males: 5;
Number of selected service members who: Did not report the sexual
assault incident: Females: 16;
Number of selected service members who: Did not report the sexual
assault incident: Gender not provided[B]: 1.
Location: Overseas;
Total number of selected servicemembers who indicated that they were
sexually assaulted within the preceding 12 months[A]: 51;
Number of selected service members who: Used restricted reporting
option: Males: 1;
Number of selected service members who: Used restricted reporting
option: Females: 4;
Number of selected service members who: Used restricted reporting
option: Gender not provided[B]: 1;
Number of selected service members who: Used unrestricted reporting
option: Males: 0;
Number of selected service members who: Used unrestricted reporting
option: Females: 8;
Number of selected service members who: Used unrestricted reporting
option: Gender not provided[B]: 1;
Number of selected service members who: Did not recall the reporting
option used: Males: 0;
Number of selected service members who: Did not recall the reporting
option used: Females: 4;
Number of selected service members who: Did not recall the reporting
option used: Gender not provided[B]: 0;
Number of selected service members who: Did not report the sexual
assault incident: Males: 4;
Number of selected service members who: Did not report the sexual
assault incident: Females: 26;
Number of selected service members who: Did not report the sexual
assault incident: Gender not provided[B]: 0.
Location: Total;
Total number of selected servicemembers who indicated that they were
sexually assaulted within the preceding 12 months[A]: 103;
Number of selected service members who: Used restricted reporting
option: Males: 3;
Number of selected service members who: Used restricted reporting
option: Females: 9;
Number of selected service members who: Used restricted reporting
option: Gender not provided[B]: 2.
Number of selected service members who: Used unrestricted reporting
option: Males: 1;
Number of selected service members who: Used unrestricted reporting
option: Females: 13;
Number of selected service members who: Used unrestricted reporting
option: Gender not provided[B]: 1;
Number of selected service members who: Did not recall the reporting
option used: Males: 1;
Number of selected service members who: Did not recall the reporting
option used: Females: 16;
Number of selected service members who: Did not recall the reporting
option used: Gender not provided[B]: 0;
Number of selected service members who: Did not report the sexual
assault incident: Males: 9;
Number of selected service members who: Did not report the sexual
assault incident: Females: 42;
Number of selected service members who: Did not report the sexual
assault incident: Gender not provided[B]: 1.
Source: GAO.
[A] Totals do not sum to the total number of respondents that indicated
that they were sexually assaulted in the past 12 months because some
respondents did not indicate if or how they reported the assault.
[B] Some respondents did not indicate their gender.
[End of table]
Servicemembers also told us that they were aware of alleged sexual
assault incidents involving other servicemembers that were not reported
to program officials. DOD's fiscal year 2007 annual report and a Coast
Guard program official with whom we spoke further support the view that
servicemembers are not reporting all sexual assault incidents, as does
the Defense Manpower Data Center's 2006 Gender Relations Survey of
Active Duty Members[Footnote 22] administered between June and
September 2006. Issued in March 2008, the Defense Manpower Data Center
survey found that of the estimated 6.8 percent of women and 1.8 percent
of men in DOD who experienced unwanted sexual contact[Footnote 23]
during the prior 12 months, the majority (an estimated 79 percent of
women and 78 percent of men) chose not to report it.[Footnote 24] The
Defense Manpower Data Center did not include data for the Coast Guard
in its report. However, at our request, the Defense Manpower Data
Center provided information on the Coast Guard that shows that an
estimated 3 percent of female and 1 percent of male respondents
reported experiencing unwanted sexual contact during the prior 12
months.[Footnote 25] According to a Defense Manpower Data Center
official, additional information about respondents in the Coast Guard
who chose not to report experiences about unwanted sexual contact is
not available because the number of Coast Guard members who indicated
they experienced unwanted sexual contact is very low and unreliable due
to high margins of error.
Earlier surveys conducted by some of the military services also
indicated that servicemembers may not have been reporting all incidents
of sexual assault. The Navy conducted a survey of its members in 2005
to assess, among other things, the likelihood that servicemembers would
report a sexual assault incident to Navy authorities, and while the
majority of both enlisted members and officers responding indicated
they would report a sexual assault if they were the victim, as many as
an estimated 10 percent of enlisted sailors and 10 percent of officers
responded that they were unlikely to do so.[Footnote 26] Similarly, a
voluntary nonprobability survey conducted by the Naval Inspector
General in 2004 through early 2005 determined that 57 percent of
victims who were sexually assaulted at some point in their Navy career
did not report the incident.[Footnote 27] Further, the Army noted as
part of DOD's fiscal year 2007 annual report that recent Army survey
data, which are not generalizable, indicate that as many as 70 percent
of female soldiers who said they had experienced a sexual assault
within the previous 12 months had not reported the incident.[Footnote
28]
While the survey results suggest a disparity between the actual number
of sexual assault incidents and the number of those reported, this is
largely an expected result of anonymous surveys. Whereas formal
reports, whether restricted or unrestricted, involve some level of
personal identification and therefore a certain amount of risk on the
part of the victim, the risks and incentives for servicemembers making
anonymous reports are very different. Hence, anonymous survey results
tend to produce higher numbers of reported incidents. Another factor
obscuring the visibility that DOD and Coast Guard officials can have
over the incidence of sexual assault is the fact that many of the
individuals to whom the assaults may be reported, including clergy and
civilian victim care organizations, civilian friends, or family, are
not required to disclose these incidents. As a result, while DOD and
the Coast Guard strive to capture an accurate picture of the incidence
of sexual assault, their ability is necessarily limited.
Our survey data revealed a number of reasons why servicemembers who
experienced a sexual assault during the preceding 12 months did not
report the incident. Commonly cited reasons by survey respondents at
the installations we visited included: (1) the belief that nothing
would be done; (2) fear of ostracism, harassment, or ridicule by peers;
and (3) the belief that their peers would gossip about the incident.
Survey respondents also commented that they would not report a sexual
assault because of concern about being disciplined for collateral
misconduct, such as drinking when not permitted to do so; not knowing
to whom to make a report; concern that a restricted report would not
remain confidential; the belief that an incident was not serious enough
to report; or concern that reporting an incident would negatively
impact their career or unit morale. The following are some examples of
comments from survey respondents:
* A senior enlisted female commented that "many individuals do not come
forward in the military out of fear of punishment because they have
done something (i.e., drinking) that they could also get in trouble
for."
* A senior enlisted female commented that "most females are afraid to
say anything to anyone in their chain of command because that person
will go back and tell everyone in this command and it will get around
to the whole entire unit as well as Brigade."
* A junior enlisted male commented that "some servicemembers might feel
like there is no point in telling anyone, especially if that person is
higher rank than you because they might believe the higher ranking
person would be believed over the lower ranking person."
* A senior enlisted male commented that "peer pressure and
embarrassment is a huge factor in why sexual assault is not always
reported."
* A male servicemember commented that he did not believe a sexual
assault incident he experienced was "serious or offensive enough" to
warrant reporting.
* A junior enlisted male commented that "just because a member of the
service might have all the resources they need to report an assault
without fear of reprisal doesn't mean that all of them [will]. I
believe many are afraid [the incident will be made] public, making the
victim seem ... loose with their sexual actions."
* Several servicemembers observed that reporting a sexual assault is
perceived as something that can ruin a reputation. One junior enlisted
female commented that "there are a lot of females who feel that an
issue like sexual assault can ruin their reputation with other male
soldiers or their unit."
The 2006 Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members identified
similar reasons why servicemembers did not report unwanted sexual
contact, including concern that reporting an incident could result in
denial of promotions and professional and social retaliation. However,
servicemembers also reported favorable results after reporting unwanted
sexual contact to military authorities, including being offered
counseling and advocacy services, medical and forensic services, legal
services, and action being taken against alleged offenders. Respondents
to our survey indicated they were supportive of the restricted
reporting option as well. For example:
* A junior enlisted female observed that in her opinion servicemembers
will be more likely to report an incident anonymously, commenting "I'm
glad the [reporting] options are there."
* A female senior officer commented that "giving the victim a choice of
making a [restricted] or [unrestricted] report is a positive change and
allows that person the level of privacy they require."
* A male senior officer observed that as awareness of SARCs increases,
there has been a corresponding increase in reporting, commenting that
he believes "word is getting out and reports are beginning to filter
in, troops seem to be gaining confidence to report incidents."
DOD and the Coast Guard Have Established Some Mechanisms for Overseeing
Reports of Sexual Assault, but Lack an Oversight Framework, and DOD
Lacks Key Information from the Services:
While DOD and the Coast Guard have established some mechanisms for
overseeing reports of sexual assaults involving servicemembers, they
lack an oversight framework, and DOD lacks key information from the
services needed to evaluate the effectiveness of the department's
sexual assault prevention and response program. Also, DOD and the Coast
Guard lack an oversight framework because they have not established a
comprehensive plan that includes such things as clear objectives,
milestones, performance measures, and criteria for measuring progress,
nor have they established evaluative performance measures with clearly
defined data elements with which to analyze sexual assault incident
data. DOD and the military services provide information on reports of
alleged sexual assaults annually to Congress in accordance with
statutory requirements, but the effectiveness of these reports for
informing Congress about incidents of sexual assault in the military
services is limited by DOD's lack of a consistent methodology for
reporting incidents, and the means of presentation for some of the data
is misleading. Further, DOD lacks access to data needed to conduct
comprehensive cross-service analyses over time. Finally, the
congressionally directed Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the
Military Services has yet to begin its review, although DOD considers
its work to be an important oversight element. Without an oversight
framework, as well as more complete data, decision makers in DOD, the
Coast Guard, and Congress lack information they need to evaluate and
oversee the programs.
DOD and the Military Services Have Established Some Oversight
Mechanisms:
DOD's instruction establishes oversight mechanisms for the department's
sexual assault prevention and response program and assigns oversight
responsibility to DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office
(within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans).
[Footnote 29] DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office is
responsible for:
* developing programs, policies, and training standards for the
prevention, reporting, response, and program accountability of sexual
assaults involving servicemembers;
* developing strategic program guidance and joint planning objectives;
* collecting and maintaining sexual assault data;
* establishing institutional evaluation, quality improvement, and
oversight mechanisms to periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the
department's program;
* assisting with identifying and managing trends; and:
* preparing the department's annual report to congress.
To help oversee implementation of its sexual assault prevention and
response program, in 2006 DOD established a Sexual Assault Advisory
Council comprised of representatives from DOD's Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Office, the military services, and the Coast
Guard. The Sexual Assault Advisory Council's responsibilities include
advising the Secretary of Defense on the department's sexual assault
prevention and response policies, coordinating and reviewing the
department's policies and program, and monitoring progress. During the
course of our review, the Sexual Assault Advisory Council began to
develop preliminary baseline performance measures and evaluation
criteria for assessing program implementation. However, DOD has not yet
established time frames for completing and implementing these measures.
DOD is also working with the military services to develop standards to
assess program implementation and response during site visits planned
for 2008.
While the military services have developed mechanisms to collect data,
efforts to systematically review and assess implementation of their
programs are limited and vary by military service. The following are
examples of what we found:
* The Army, in response to recommendations made by its Inspector
General, has developed a plan that includes specific actions to be
taken and time frames for completion to improve its program. In
addition, the Army has developed and implemented a Sexual Assault Data
Management System to track reported incidents and associated
demographic information about victims and alleged offenders.
* The Navy is reviewing sexual assault incident reports received from
Navy installations, and program officials told us they proactively
contact installations that have not reported any sexual assault
incidents during the reporting period. Further, each installation's
Fleet and Family Support Center conducts accreditation visits every 3
years to provide quality assurance and identify and resolve potential
problems. For example, they have found that some servicemembers may not
be aware of the reporting options and, in the past, some commands had
not supported the program. While the Navy has not yet developed a
database to track sexual assault incident data, program officials told
us they plan to do so before the end of fiscal year 2008.
* Commanders in the Marine Corps use commanders' protocols for
responding to allegations of sexual assault to ensure they are
accomplishing the intent of the program without overlooking any
aspects. Further, the Marine Corps uses its Automated Inspection
Reporting System to assess management and administration of the program
at the installation level.
* Program officials in the Air Force told us they rely on SARCs to
proactively provide feedback about the program through their chain of
command and during monthly teleconferences. While Air Force officials
acknowledge that they have not conducted either official or formal
institutional reviews or assessments of the Air Force's program, they
have asked the Air Force's Inspector General to review its first
responder training and other aspects of the program to ensure
compliance with DOD's policy. The Air Force collects and maintains
information about reported sexual assault incidents using multiple
databases.
DOD Does Not Have an Oversight Framework in Place to Evaluate the
Effectiveness of Its Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program:
Though DOD has established some oversight mechanisms, it has not
established an oversight framework, which is necessary to ensure the
effective implementation of its sexual assault prevention and response
program. Our prior work has demonstrated the importance of outcome-
oriented performance measures to successful program oversight and shown
that having an effective plan for implementing initiatives and
measuring progress can help decision makers determine whether
initiatives are achieving their desired results.[Footnote 30] DOD has
not established an oversight framework because it has not established a
comprehensive plan that includes such things as clear objectives,
milestones, performance measures, and criteria for measuring progress,
nor has it established evaluative performance measures with clearly
defined data elements with which to analyze sexual assault incident
data. Because DOD's sexual assault prevention and response program
lacks an oversight framework, its program, as currently implemented,
does not provide decision makers with the information they need to
evaluate the effectiveness of the program, determine the extent to
which the program is helping to prevent sexual assault from occurring,
or ensure that servicemembers who are victims of sexual assault receive
the care they need.
As discussed above, DOD's directive assigns oversight responsibility to
DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office. However, this
office has yet to establish metrics to facilitate program evaluation
and assess effectiveness. For example, it has not developed specific
metrics to:
* determine the frequency with which victims were precluded from making
a confidential report using the restricted reporting option or reasons
that precluded them from doing so; or:
* track information on whether units have received required annual
sexual assault prevention and response training, including how many
servicemembers within a unit have received the training.
Additionally, DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office has
yet to establish performance goals--for example, a goal specifying the
percentage of servicemembers within a unit who should receive required
training. In the absence of such measures, Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response Office officials told us that they currently determine the
effectiveness of DOD's program based on how well the military services
are complying with program implementation requirements identified by
DOD. While they acknowledged that to date their focus has been on
program implementation as opposed to program evaluation, these
officials noted that the Sexual Assault Advisory Council is in the
initial stages of developing performance measures and evaluation
criteria to assess program performance and identify conditions needing
attention. Presently, DOD is working with the military services to
develop guidelines to permit, among other uses, consistent assessment
of program implementation during site visits conducted by DOD's Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office as well as by the military
services at other times. However, time frames for developing and
implementing these measures have not yet been established, and without
such a plan and evaluative measures, the program does not provide
decision makers with the information they need to evaluate the
effectiveness and efficiency of the military services' efforts.
Without an oversight framework to guide program implementation, DOD
risks that the military services will not collect all of the
information needed to provide insight into the effectiveness of their
programs. For example, officials have recognized that they will need
additional data on sexual assault incidents both for purposes of
oversight and to respond effectively to congressional inquiries as the
program matures. However, the military services have encountered
challenges in providing requested data because the request came after
the start of the collection period. For example, with the exception of
the Army, none of the military services was able to provide data as
part of the fiscal year 2007 annual report to Congress on sexual
assaults involving civilian victims, such as contractors and government
employees. Without an oversight framework that includes clearly defined
data collection elements, DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Office risks not being able to respond effectively to congressional
requests or to oversee the program appropriately.
The Coast Guard Lacks an Oversight Framework and Congress Has No
Visibility of Sexual Assault Incidents Involving Coast Guard Members:
Oversight by the Coast Guard headquarters of its sexual assault
prevention and response program is limited to the collection and
maintenance of incident data and, like DOD, the Coast Guard has not
established an oversight framework to guide implementation of its
program. Although the Coast Guard recently revised its instruction to
incorporate a restricted reporting option and to generally mirror DOD's
sexual assault prevention and response program, according to Coast
Guard officials their focus to date has been on program implementation
as opposed to program evaluation. Like DOD, the Coast Guard has not
developed an oversight framework that includes clear objectives,
milestones, performance measures, and criteria for measuring progress,
nor has the Coast Guard developed performance measures to assess its
program. Coast Guard program officials told us that they plan to
conduct reviews of their program for compliance and quality in the
future and will continue to review reported incident data, and they
plan to leverage any metrics developed by DOD to assess their program.
Further, the Coast Guard Investigative Service has begun to conduct
limited trend analysis on reported incidents, including the extent to
which alcohol or drugs were involved in alleged sexual assaults.
However, like DOD, the Coast Guard is not able to fully evaluate the
results achieved by its efforts, and it is unclear whether its program
is achieving its goals.
While there is no statutory reporting requirement for the Coast Guard,
the Coast Guard voluntarily participates in DOD's annual reporting
requirement by submitting data to DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Office. The Coast Guard Investigative Service collects data on
unrestricted reports as part of its investigative responsibilities and
shares these data with the Coast Guard Office of Work Life, which
collects data on alleged assaults received using the restricted
reporting option. The Coast Guard shares aggregate reported data with
DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office. However, DOD does
not include these data in its annual report and the Coast Guard does
not provide these incident data to Congress because neither is required
to do so. As a result, Congress does not have visibility over the
extent to which sexual assaults involving Coast Guard members occur.
DOD Data Reported to Congress Could Be Misinterpreted:
DOD's annual reports to Congress may not effectively characterize
incidents of sexual assault in the military services because the
department has not clearly articulated a consistent methodology for
reporting incidents, and because the means of presentation for some of
the data does not facilitate comparison. DOD's annual reports to
Congress include data on the total number of restricted and
unrestricted reported incidents of sexual assault; however, meaningful
comparisons of the data cannot be made because the respective offices
that provide the data to DOD measure incidents of sexual assault
differently. For example, in the military services, SARCs, who focus on
victim care, report data on the number of sexual assault incidents
alleged using the restricted reporting option based on the number of
victims involved. In contrast, the criminal investigative
organizations, which report data on the number of sexual assault
incidents alleged using the unrestricted reporting option, report data
on a per "incident" basis, which may include multiple victims or
alleged offenders. Thus, the lack of a common means of presentation for
reporting purposes has prevented users of the reports from making
meaningful comparisons or drawing conclusions from the reported
numbers.
Further, while we identified some improvements in the fiscal year 2007
report in the way DOD discusses some data, DOD's annual report lacks
certain data that we believe would facilitate congressional oversight
or understanding of victims' use of the reporting options. For example,
while DOD's annual report provides Congress with the aggregate numbers
of investigations during the prior year for which commanders did not
take action against alleged offenders, those aggregated numbers do not
distinguish between cases in which evidence was found to be
insufficient to substantiate an alleged assault versus the number of
times a victim recanted an accusation or an alleged offender died.
Also, though DOD's annual report documents the number of reports that
were initially brought using the restricted reporting option and later
changed to unrestricted, DOD's annual report includes these same
figures in both categories--that is, the total number of restricted
reports and the total number of unrestricted reports. An official in
DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office told us that
because the military services do not provide detailed case data to DOD,
the department is not able to remove these reports from the total
number of restricted reports when providing information in its annual
report. However, we believe that double listing the figures is
confusing.
Also, while DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office has
collected and reported incident data since calendar year 2004, the
department lacks a baseline for conducting trend analysis over time
because of changes in the way data are reported. Comparisons among data
reported during calendar years 2005 and 2006 are difficult to make
because the restricted reporting option was not available during the
entirety of calendar year 2005. Significantly, direct comparisons
cannot be made between fiscal year 2007 and prior years because of
inconsistencies in the reporting periods. For example, changes to
sections of the UCMJ dealing with sexual assault that took effect on
October 1, 2007, led DOD to change the period of data collection from
calendar year to fiscal year. Consequently, incident data reported in
DOD's calendar year 2006 annual report to Congress overlap with data
reported in its fiscal year 2007 annual report for the months of
October, November, and December 2006. However, because the military
services provide incident data to DOD that are aggregated for each
service, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office officials told
us they cannot adjust the calendar year data to a fiscal year basis to
facilitate trend analysis. Officials noted that each military service
would need to manually adjust previously reported calendar year data to
a fiscal year basis, and such an undertaking would be time intensive.
Moreover, a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office official told
us that these changes, which led DOD to revise the standard definition
of sexual assault, will also prevent comparisons between fiscal year
2007 data and data in future years, except in general terms.
Consequently, the way in which sexual assault incident data are
collected and reported will change in the fiscal year 2008 annual
report to Congress and, until investigations of sexual assault
incidents reported prior to fiscal year 2008 are completed, both DOD's
original and revised standard definitions of sexual assault will be in
use. Finally, DOD has not conducted its own analysis of the information
contained in the military services' annual reports or provided its
assessment of their programs prior to forwarding these reports to
Congress, in part because it is not explicitly required to include this
type of assessment in its annual report. Without a firm baseline and
consistent data collection, DOD will not be able to conduct trend
analysis over time that provides insight into incident data collected,
except in the most general terms.
DOD Lacks Access to Data to Conduct Comprehensive Cross-Service
Analysis Over Time:
DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office is not able to
conduct comprehensive cross-service trend analysis of sexual assault
incidents because it does not have access to installation-or case-level
data that would facilitate such analyses. DOD officials told us that
the military services do not provide installation-or case-level
incident data beyond those that are aggregated at the military-service
level. These data are generally limited to information needed to meet
statutory requirements for inclusion in the annual report to Congress.
Service officials told us they do not want to provide installation-or
case-level data to DOD because they are concerned that (1) data may be
misinterpreted, (2) even nonidentifying data about the victim may erode
victim confidentiality, and (3) servicemembers may not report sexual
assaults if case-level data are shared beyond the service-level.
However, without access to such information, DOD does not have the
means to identify those factors, and thus to fully execute its
oversight role, including assessing trends over time. For example,
without case-level data, DOD cannot determine the frequency with which
sexual assaults are reported in each of the geographic combatant
commands. Since 2004, DOD has required the Joint Staff to provide
periodic information on sexual assaults reported in the U.S. Central
Command's area of responsibility because of the significant impact
sexual assault has on mission readiness. However, DOD does not know the
rate of reported sexual assault incidents in U.S. Central Command's
area of responsibility as compared with the rate in other geographic
combatant commands, because the department does not require the Joint
Staff to provide such information.
Furthermore, installation-and case-level data may be useful to identify
installations that over periods of time continue to have high rates of
reported alleged sexual assault incidents as a percentage of the total
population. For example, in analyzing the services' installation-level
data we identified, for one of the military services, three
installations with higher reporting rates for sexual assaults than
other installations. Continuation of such trends at these installations
over time could indicate best practices, such as supportive command
climates, that encourage victims to report sexual assaults. Conversely,
such trends may identify installations or units where additional
training and resources to prevent sexual assaults may be needed. Such
information, if available, could better inform decisions by officials
in DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to select
installations within each service to visit for program assessments and
identify factors to consider when making programmatic corrections.
Congressionally Directed Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the
Military Services Has Not Yet Begun Its Review:
To provide further oversight of DOD's sexual assault prevention and
response program, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2005[Footnote 31] required the Defense Task Force
on Sexual Assault in the Military Services to conduct an examination of
matters relating to sexual assault in cases in which members of the
Armed Forces are either victims or offenders.[Footnote 32] As part of
its examination, the law directs the task force to assess, among other
things, DOD's reporting procedures, collection, tracking, and use of
data on sexual assaults by senior military and civilian leaders, as
well as DOD's oversight of its sexual assault prevention and response
program. The law does not require an assessment of the Coast Guard's
program. Senior officials within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness have stated that they plan to use
the task force's findings to evaluate the effectiveness of DOD's sexual
assault prevention and response program. However, as of July 2008 this
task force has yet to begun its review.
Senior task force staff members we spoke with attributed the delays to
challenges in appointing the task force members and member turnover. As
of July 2008, however, they told us that all 12 task force members had
been appointed, and that their goal was to hold their first open
meeting, and thus begin their evaluation, in August 2008. They also
told us that they estimate that by the end of fiscal year 2008 DOD will
have expended about $15 million since 2005 to fund the task forces'
operations. According to senior task force staff members, much of this
funding has gone towards the task forces' operational expenses,
including salaries for the civilian staff members, contracts, travel,
and rent. The law directs that the task force submit its report to the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force no later than 1 year after beginning its examination. If such a
goal were met, the task force's evaluation could be complete by August
2009.[Footnote 33] However, as of the time of our review, it was
uncertain whether the task force will be able to meet this goal.
Conclusions:
DOD and the Coast Guard have taken positive steps to prevent, respond
to, and resolve reported incidents of sexual assault. However, a number
of challenges--such as limited guidance for implementing DOD's policies
in certain environments, some commanders' support and limited resources
for the programs, training that is not consistently effective, and
limited access to mental health services--could undermine the
effectiveness of some of their efforts. Left unchecked, these
challenges could undermine DOD's and the Coast Guard's efforts by
eroding servicemembers' confidence in the programs or decreasing the
likelihood that sexual assault victims will turn to the programs for
help when needed. Also, although DOD and the Coast Guard have
established some oversight mechanisms, without an oversight framework
with specific goals, measures, and milestones for assessing results,
DOD and the Coast Guard are limited in their ability to measure the
success of their efforts. Further, without information on the incidence
of sexual assault in the Coast Guard, Congress' visibility over the
extent to which sexual assaults involving Coast Guard members occur is
limited. Finally, without a firm baseline and consistent data
collection, DOD will not be able to conduct trend analysis over time
that enables it to determine where its program is working and where it
is not, and therefore may have difficulty judging the overall
successes, challenges, and lessons learned from its program. As a
result, congressional decision makers may not have the visibility they
need of the incidence of sexual assault reports involving
servicemembers.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
To improve oversight of sexual assault incidents involving
servicemembers in the Coast Guard, Congress may wish to consider
requiring the Coast Guard to submit to Congress sexual assault incident
and program data annually that are methodologically comparable to those
required of DOD.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following nine
actions:
* To improve implementation of the sexual assault prevention and
response program in DOD, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to:
- Review and evaluate the department's policies for the prevention and
response of sexual assault to ensure that adequate guidance is provided
to effectively implement the program in deployed environments and joint
environments.
- Evaluate the military services' processes for staffing and
designating key installation-level program positions, such as SARCs, at
installations in the United States and overseas, to ensure that these
individuals have the ability and resources to fully carry out their
responsibilities.
- Review and evaluate sexual assault prevention and response training
to ensure the military services are meeting training requirements and
to enhance the effectiveness of the training.
- Systematically evaluate and develop an action plan to address any
factors that may prevent or discourage servicemembers from accessing
mental health services following a sexual assault.
* To ensure that the sexual assault prevention and response program has
the strong support of military commanders and other senior leaders
necessary for implementation, direct the service secretaries to
emphasize to all levels of command their responsibility for supporting
the program, and review the extent to which commanders support the
program and resources are available to raise servicemembers' awareness
of sexual assault matters.
* To enhance oversight of the sexual assault prevention and response
program in DOD, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to:
- Require the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to develop
an oversight framework to guide continued program implementation and
evaluate program effectiveness. At a minimum, such a framework should
contain long-term goals, objectives, and milestones; performance goals;
strategies to be used to accomplish goals; and criteria for measuring
progress.
- Improve the usefulness of the department's annual report as an
oversight tool both internally and for congressional decision makers by
establishing baseline data to permit analysis of data over time, and
reporting data so as to distinguish cases in which (1) evidence was
insufficient to substantiate an alleged assault, (2) a victim recanted,
or (3) the allegations of sexual assault were unfounded.
* To enhance oversight of the military services' sexual assault
prevention and response programs, direct the service secretaries to
provide installation-level incident data to the Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Office annually or as requested to facilitate
analysis of sexual assault-related data and better target resources
over time.
* To help facilitate the assessment and evaluation of DOD's sexual
assault prevention and response program, direct the Defense Task Force
on Sexual Assault in the Military Services to begin its examination
immediately, now that all members of the task force have been
appointed, and to develop a detailed plan with milestones to guide its
work.
We recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in order to
improve implementation and enhance oversight of the Coast Guard's
sexual assault prevention and response program, take the following two
actions:
* Evaluate its processes for staffing key installation-level program
positions, such as the EAPC, to ensure that these individuals have the
ability and resources to fully carry out their responsibilities.
* Develop an oversight framework to guide continued program
implementation and evaluate program effectiveness. At a minimum, such a
framework should contain long-term goals, objectives, and milestones;
performance goals; strategies to be used to accomplish goals; and
criteria for measuring progress.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, both DOD and the Coast
Guard concurred with all of our recommendations. DOD's comments are
reprinted in appendix II, and the Coast Guard's comments are reprinted
in appendix III. The Coast Guard also provided technical comments which
we incorporated where appropriate.
In concurring with our first recommendation, that the department should
review and evaluate its policies for the prevention of and response to
sexual assault to ensure that adequate guidance is provided to
effectively implement the program in deployed and joint environments,
DOD asserted that it had originally brought this issue to our
attention. We disagree with DOD's characterization of this issue. As
noted in our report, program officials with whom we met overseas
informed us of their concerns that DOD's guidance does not address some
important issues--such as how to implement the program when operating
in a deployed environment. In some instances, the military services
also informed us of their concerns over the adequacy of DOD's guidance.
However, officials with DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Office did not express any such concerns to us during the course of our
review, nor did they indicate that they were taking any actions to
address them. Nonetheless, DOD in its written comments cited several
positive actions it is taking take to meet the intent of our
recommendation, such as its use of Policy Assistance Team visits to
ensure that all challenges have been identified.
In concurring with our recommendations aimed at improving
implementation of the department's sexual assault prevention and
response program--including that DOD should (1) evaluate the military
services' processes for staffing key installation-level program
positions, (2) review and evaluate sexual assault prevention and
response training; and (3) systematically evaluate and develop an
action plan to address any factors that may prevent or discourage
servicemembers from accessing mental health services following a sexual
assault--DOD commented that several efforts are currently underway or
are planned to address these issues. For example, DOD stated that the
department is currently utilizing Policy Assistance Team site visits to
evaluate the effectiveness of SARCs as implemented by each of the
military services, and to elicit feedback from servicemembers about
training content, frequency, media, and effectiveness. We commend DOD
for taking immediate steps in response to our recommendations, such as
including a review of the military services' implementation of the SARC
position and training as part of its Policy Assistance Team site
visits. As DOD noted in its comments, additional efforts to address our
recommendations are planned. We believe it is important for the
department to continue to emphasize taking positive actions with regard
to our recommendations.
In its concurrence with our recommendation that the department should
emphasize to all levels of command their responsibility for supporting
the program and should review the extent to which support and resources
are available to raise servicemembers' awareness of sexual assault
matters, DOD noted that a letter from the Secretary of Defense is
currently in draft for dissemination to the service secretaries
emphasizing commander involvement and support for the program. DOD
further noted that it will examine whether there is a need to update
commanders' training to enhance their understanding and support of the
program. However, DOD offered no specific information with regard to
the steps it will take to review the extent to which commanders support
the program and resources are available to raise servicemembers'
awareness of sexual assault matters. We continue to believe that
conducting such an assessment is critical to understanding the extent
to which commanders actually support the program.
In its concurrence with our recommendations for enhancing oversight of
the department's sexual assault prevention and response program--
including that DOD should (1) develop an oversight framework to guide
continued program implementation and evaluate program effectiveness,
and (2) establish baseline data to facilitate analysis of data over
time--DOD noted that it had established its sexual assault prevention
and response program very rapidly to meet an emergent need, but that
now that the program is established it must transition to a mature
program with long-term goals, objectives, milestones, and criteria for
measuring progress. We commend the department for committing to develop
an oversight framework for its program.
In its concurrence with our recommendation that DOD should direct the
military services to provide installation-level incident data to the
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office annually or as requested,
DOD noted that U.S. Central Command, the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force all have expressed concerns regarding the reporting of this
installation-level data. However, DOD also acknowledged--as we note in
our report--that access to installation-level data by DOD's Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office is critical for oversight and
visibility over alleged sexual assault incidents and stated it is
drafting a letter for the Secretary of Defense's signature ordering the
military services to provide installation-level data to DOD's Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office.
Finally, in its concurrence with our recommendation that the department
should direct the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military
Services to begin its examination immediately and to develop a detailed
plan with milestones to guide its work, DOD noted that the task force's
first meeting was held during mid-August 2008. Further, DOD provided
additional information on the steps the task force plans to take to
assess DOD's program as part of its evaluation, including conducting
site visits and meeting with servicemembers and first responders.
However, DOD provided no information regarding the milestones that will
guide the task force's work. We continue to assert the importance of
this key element of the plan the task force needs.
The Coast Guard also concurred with our recommendations aimed at
improving implementation and enhancing oversight of its sexual assault
prevention and response program--including that the Coast Guard should
(1) evaluate its process for staffing key installation-level program
positions and (2) develop an oversight framework to guide continued
program implementation and evaluate program effectiveness. We commend
the Coast Guard for its planned initiatives, including ensuring that
program experts have the resources to fully conduct their duties and
responsibilities, working with DOD to align its goals, strategies, and
measurements for consistency and improved reporting, and seeking to
coordinate an integrated approach and programmatic view to improve its
program. However, we note that as part of these efforts it is important
that the Coast Guard's efforts include an oversight framework with long-
term goals, objectives, milestones, and criteria for measuring
progress.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
members and staff; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps;
and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix VIII.
Signed by:
Brenda S. Farrell:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Requesters:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Christopher S. Bond:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Barbara Boxer:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tom Harkin:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Claire McCaskill:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patty Murray:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Barack Obama:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bernard Sanders:
United States Senate:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the Coast Guard have developed and implemented policies and programs to
prevent, respond to, and resolve sexual assault incidents involving
servicemembers, we reviewed legislative requirements and obtained and
analyzed DOD's, the military services', and the Coast Guard's guidance
and requirements for the prevention, response, and resolution of sexual
assault. We also interviewed officials in DOD, the Army, the Air Force,
the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Department of Homeland Security and
the Coast Guard to obtain a comprehensive understanding of their
efforts to implement programs to prevent and respond to reported
incidents of sexual assault. We also obtained and analyzed DOD's annual
reports to Congress for calendar years 2004, 2005, 2006, and fiscal
year 2007 and compared the statutory requirements for DOD's annual
report to Congress to the data included in the annual reports. In
addition, we visited 15 military installations in the United States and
overseas where we met with program officials and responders to discuss
their experiences preventing and responding to incidents of sexual
assault and the challenges they face implementing sexual assault
prevention and response programs. The locations we visited were
selected based on a number of factors, including units' mission,
availability of personnel given training or mission requirements, and
recent deployment histories. We focused our overseas efforts on
military installations located in the U.S. Central Command's area of
responsibility because of past congressional concerns about the
prevalence of sexual assaults in deployed locations and combat zones.
At the installations we visited, we met with Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators and victim advocates in DOD; Employee Assistance Program
Coordinators in the Coast Guard; and judge advocates, medical and
mental health personnel, criminal investigative personnel, law
enforcement personnel, and chaplains in DOD and the Coast Guard. We
also met with military commanders, including company and field grade
officers, and senior enlisted servicemembers to discuss the steps they
have taken to establish a command climate that discourages sexual
assault from occurring, as well as their personal experiences
responding to and resolving reported incidents of alleged sexual
assault in their units. We also obtained servicemembers' perspectives
on issues regarding command support, training, and access to medical
and mental health services by administering a nonprobability survey to
selected servicemembers and conducting one-on-one structured interviews
with servicemembers at 14 of the 15 installations we visited. To
understand how commanders dispose of sexual assault cases, we reviewed
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts-Martial and
reviewed data reported by DOD for fiscal year 2007. To obtain an
understanding of the processes used to treat mental health disorders,
we met with knowledgeable officials from DOD, the military services,
the Coast Guard, and the Department of Veterans Affairs.
To determine the extent to which DOD and the Coast Guard have
visibility over reports of sexual assault involving servicemembers, we
obtained and analyzed data for reported sexual assaults in both DOD and
the Coast Guard for fiscal year 2007. To assess the reliability of the
reported sexual assault data, we discussed these data with officials in
DOD and the Coast Guard as well as with officials in the military
services to gain an understanding of the processes and databases used
to collect and record incident data, and to understand existing data
quality control procedures and known limitations of the data. In
comparing sexual assault data we received directly from DOD
installation(s) with installation-level data we received from the
services, we found some discrepancies that officials were not able to
explain. Even with these discrepancies, we found these data were
sufficiently reliable to present an overall description of reported
incidents of sexual assault. While we also reviewed DOD's annual
reports to Congress for calendar years 2004, 2005, and 2006, changes in
the way DOD collects and reports incident data preclude direct
comparisons and analysis across calendar and fiscal years. To
understand why servicemembers may not report sexual assault incidents,
we obtained servicemembers' perspectives on issues regarding sexual
assault prevention and response programs in the military services and
the Coast Guard through our survey and one-on-one structured interviews
of servicemembers at 14 of the 15 installations we visited. We also
reviewed the results of surveys conducted by DOD and the military
services since 2004. In reviewing the survey documentation provided by
the Defense Manpower Data Center and the Army and the Navy, we found
these data were sufficiently reliable and we present these survey
results to illustrate that multiple survey research sources indicate
that there may be underreporting by those who experience sexual
assaults.
To determine the extent to which DOD and the Coast Guard exercise
oversight over reports of sexual assault involving servicemembers, we
interviewed key officials with DOD's and the military services'
respective Sexual Assault Prevention and Response offices and the Coast
Guard's Office of Work Life to obtain a comprehensive understanding of
the processes, procedures, and controls used for monitoring and
overseeing the programs. We also interviewed representatives of the
Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services, which is
statutorily required to undertake an examination of sexual assault
matters in the Armed Forces, to discuss the task force's progress. We
reviewed various pertinent documents, including meeting minutes for
DOD's Sexual Assault Advisory Council, federal internal control
standards,[Footnote 34] and prior GAO reports on the use of performance
measures to evaluate programmatic efforts. We also reviewed reports
issued by the services' inspector generals and examined DOD's and the
Coast Guard's responses to recommendations from prior related studies.
In addition, we analyzed installation-level data for reported sexual
assaults in both DOD and the Coast Guard for fiscal year 2007.
To obtain servicemembers' perspectives on issues regarding sexual
assault prevention and response programs in DOD and the Coast Guard, we
administered a total of 3,750 confidential surveys to a nonprobability
sample of randomly selected servicemembers and conducted more than 150
one-on-one, structured interviews with randomly selected servicemembers
at 14 of the 15 locations we visited. In the United States, the
locations we visited included Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Fort Bliss,
Texas; Fort Drum, New York; Integrated Support Command Portsmouth,
Virginia; Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; Marine Corps Base Quantico,
Virginia; and Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. Overseas, the locations
we visited included Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar; Balad Air Base, Iraq;
Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; Camp As Saliyah, Qatar; Camp Ramadi, Iraq; Camp
Stryker, Iraq; Logistics Support Area Anaconda, Iraq; and Naval Support
Activity, Bahrain. We did not administer our survey or conduct one-on-
one structured interviews at Camp As Saliyah at the request of the Army
because many of the servicemembers stationed there are on rest and
relaxation tours during their overseas deployment. Of the 3,750
confidential surveys we administered, 711 surveys were administered in
Iraq; 852 in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain collectively; and 2,187 at
locations across the United States. We considered conducting surveys of
servicemembers using probability samples that would allow generalizing
the results to all servicemembers at each installation we visited.
However, because of the difficulties in identifying accurate and
complete lists of servicemembers present at an installation as of a
specific date from which to draw samples, particularly for
installations outside the United States, and the administrative burden
it would have placed on the installation commands, we did not pursue
this. Instead, we conducted nonprobability surveys with randomly
selected servicemembers to reflect all ranks and both men and women at
14 of the 15 installations we visited. Table 7 provides information on
the number of servicemembers we surveyed at each location.
Table 7: Number of Surveys Administered, by Location and Gender:
Installation: U.S. Army; Camp Arifjan, Kuwait;
Males: 234;
Females: 194;
Gender not provided: 5; Total: 433.
Installation: U.S. Army; Camp As Saliyah, Qatar[A];
Males: n/a;
Females: n/a;
Gender not provided: n/a;
Total: n/a.
Installation: U.S. Army; Camp Stryker, Iraq;
Males: 64;
Females: 64;
Gender not provided: 1;
Total: 129.
Installation: U.S. Army; Fort Bliss, Texas;
Males: 165;
Females: 128;
Gender not provided: 9;
Total: 302.
Installation: U.S. Army; Fort Drum, New York;
Males: 89;
Females: 94;
Gender not provided: 10;
Total: 193.
Installation: U.S. Army; Logistics Support Area Anaconda, Iraq;
Males: 113;
Females: 85;
Gender not provided: 2;
Total: 200.
Installation: U.S. Air Force; Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar;
Males: 124;
Females: 132;
Gender not provided: 0;
Total: 256.
Installation: U.S. Air Force; Balad Air Base, Iraq;
Males: 78;
Females: 72;
Gender not provided: 1;
Total: 151.
Installation: U.S. Air Force; Lackland Air Force Base, Texas;
Males: 207;
Females: 168;
Gender not provided: 8; Total: 383.
Installation: U.S. Navy; Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia[B];
Males: 131;
Females: 114;
Gender not provided: 6;
Total: 251.
Installation: U.S. Navy; Naval Support Activity Bahrain[C];
Males: 108;
Females: 52;
Gender not provided: 3;
Total: 163.
Installation: U.S. Marine Corps; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina;
Males: 179;
Females: 167;
Gender not provided: 14;
Total: 360.
Installation: U.S. Marine Corps; Camp Ramadi, Iraq;
Males: 137;
Females: 92;
Gender not provided: 2;
Total: 231.
Installation: U.S. Marine Corps; Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia;
Males: 160;
Females: 138;
Gender not provided: 7;
Total: 305.
Installation: U.S. Coast Guard; Integrated Support Command Portsmouth,
Virginia;
Males: 218;
Females: 170;
Gender not provided: 5;
Total: 393.
Installation: Total;
Males: 2,007;
Females: 1,670;
Gender not provided: 73;
Total: 3,750.
Source: GAO.
[A] We did not administer our survey at Camp As Saliyah at the request
of the Army because many of the servicemembers stationed there are on
rest and relaxation tours during their overseas deployment.
[B] Includes servicemembers from Yorktown Training Center, Virginia.
[C] Includes Coast Guard members under the operational command of U.S.
Central Command.
[End of table]
To select the participants for our surveys and one-on-one structured
interviews, we requested that the locations we visited provide us with
a list of available personnel. To the extent possible, we requested
that this list not include personnel who were deployed, on temporary
duty status, or otherwise not available to attend our survey sessions
at the time of our visit. From the lists provided we randomly selected
participants based on gender and rank. Participants were categorized
according to the following ranks: junior enlisted (encompassing the
ranks of E1-E4); mid-enlisted (encompassing the ranks of E5-E6); senior
enlisted (encompassing the ranks of E7-E9); warrant officers and
company grade officers (encompassing the ranks of W1-W5 and O1-O3); and
field grade officers (encompassing the ranks of O4-O6).
To ensure maximum participation by selected servicemembers, we provided
the locations we visited with lists of primary and alternate selections
for both the survey sessions and one-on-one structured interviews.
Because of the sensitivity of the information we were seeking, we took
several steps to help assure a confidential environment during our
survey sessions. First, we did not document the names of participants
in any of our sessions. Further, we surveyed participants separately
based on rank and gender; for instance, junior enlisted men were
surveyed separately, as were junior enlisted women. We used this same
approach for mid-and senior enlisted servicemembers; warrant and
company grade officers; and field grade officers. Finally, we had male
GAO analysts survey male servicemembers and female GAO analysts survey
female servicemembers. Similarly, in an attempt to encourage an open
discussion during our one-on-one structured interviews, but still
protect the confidentiality of the servicemembers, we did not document
their names. Because we did not select survey and interview
participants using a statistically representative sampling method, our
survey results and the comments provided during our interview sessions
are nongeneralizable and therefore cannot be projected across DOD, a
service, or any single installation we visited. However, the survey
results and comments provide insight into the command climate and
implementation of sexual assault prevention and response program at
each location at the time of our visit.
To develop our survey questions, we reviewed several DOD surveys and
studies of issues such as command climate and sexual harassment and
sexual assault in the military. We also reviewed the military services'
and the Coast Guard's policies and training materials for programs to
prevent and respond to incidents of sexual assault. Because the scope
of our review included focusing on military installations in the United
States and the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, we
developed two survey questionnaires--the first focusing on the
perspective of a servicemember stationed in the United States (see app.
VI) and the second on that of a servicemember deployed outside the
United States (see app. VII). We worked with social science survey
specialists to develop our survey questionnaires. Because these were
not sample surveys, there are no sampling errors. However, the
practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors,
commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, differences in
how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources of information
that are available to respondents, or how the data are entered into a
database can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We
took steps in the development of the questionnaires, the data
collection, and data analysis to minimize these nonsampling errors. For
example, prior to administering the survey, we pretested the content
and format of the questionnaire with servicemembers at Marine Corps
Base Quantico, Virginia and Fort Meade, Maryland to determine whether
(1) the survey questions were clear, (2) the terms used were precise,
(3) respondents were able to provide the information we were seeking,
and (4) the questions were unbiased. We made changes to the content and
format of our final questionnaires based on the results of our
pretesting.
We administered our surveys and conducted our one-on-one structured
interviews at the locations we visited between September 2007 and March
2008. Because our surveys and questions asked participants to consider
the frequency with which some things, such as training, have occurred
over the past 12 months, participants' responses may cover the period
between September 2006 and March 2008.
We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review:
Department of Defense:
* Defense Manpower Data Center, Arlington, Virginia:
* Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services,
Alexandria, Virginia:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness:
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans, Washington,
D.C.
- Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Office, Washington,
D.C.
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs,
Falls Church, Virginia:
- Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic
Brain Injury, Rosslyn, Virginia:
* U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida:
Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:
* J-1, Manpower and Personnel, Washington, D.C.
* J-4, Logistics, Washington, D.C.
Department of the Army:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Crystal City, Virginia:
* Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 Personnel:
- Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Office, Rosslyn,
Virginia:
* Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Judge Advocate General, Rosslyn, Virginia:
* Office of the Provost Marshall General, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Surgeon General, Fort Sam Houston, Texas:
* Army Central Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia:
* Army Combat Readiness Center, Fort Rucker, Virginia:
* Army Criminal Investigation Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia:
* Army Family and Morale, Welfare and Recreation Command, Alexandria,
Virginia:
* Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia:
* Army Medical Command, Fort Sam Houston, Texas:
* Army Research Institute, Arlington, Virginia:
* Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia:
- Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri:
* Camp Arifjan, Kuwait:
* Camp As Saliyah, Qatar:
* Camp Stryker, Iraq:
* Fort Bliss, Texas:
* Fort Drum, New York:
* Fort Meade, Maryland:
* Logistics Support Area Anaconda, Iraq:
Department of the Air Force:
* Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington,
D.C.
* Office of the Inspector General, Arlington, Virginia:
* Office of the Judge Advocate General, Washington, D.C.
* Office of Special Investigations, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland:
* Office of the Surgeon General, Falls Church, Virginia:
* Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Office, Washington,
D.C.
* Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas:
* Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar:
* Balad Air Base, Iraq:
* Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas:
Department of the Navy:
* Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Washington, D.C.
* Bureau of Naval Personnel, Millington, Tennessee:
* Commander, Navy Installation Command, Washington, D.C.
- Fleet and Family Support Program, Counseling, Advocacy, and
Prevention Program, Washington, D.C.
* Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Washington, D.C.
* Naval Education Training Command, Pensacola, Florida:
- Center for Personal and Professional Development, Virginia Beach,
Virginia:
* Navy Medical Manpower Personnel Training and Education Command,
Bethesda, Maryland:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower and Reserve
Affairs, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Naval Inspector General, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Chief of Navy Chaplains, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Judge Advocate General, Washington, D.C.
* Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia:
* Naval Support Activity, Bahrain:
United States Marine Corps:
* Criminal Investigative Division, Arlington, Virginia:
* Manpower and Reserve Affairs:
* Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, Quantico, Virginia:
* Office of the Chaplains, Arlington, Virginia:
* Office of the Judge Advocate Division, Arlington, Virginia:
* Camp Lejeune, North Carolina:
* Camp Ramadi, Iraq:
* Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia:
Department of Homeland Security:
* Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Washington, D.C.
Coast Guard:
* Coast Guard Investigative Service, Arlington, Virginia:
* Health and Safety Directorate, Office of Work Life, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Chaplain of the Coast Guard, Washington, D.C.
* Office of Civil Rights, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Coast Guard Headquarters Chaplain, Washington, D.C.
* Office of Military Justice, Washington, D.C.
* Fifth District, Sector Hampton Roads:
- Integrated Support Command Portsmouth, Portsmouth, Virginia:
- Yorktown Training Center, Yorktown, Virginia:
* Patrol Forces Southwest Asia, Naval Support Activity, Bahrain:
Department of Veterans Affairs:
* Veteran's Health Administration:
- National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, White River
Junction, Vermont:
- Women Veteran's Health Division, Washington, D.C.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through August 2008
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Under Secretary Of Defense:
Personnel and Readiness:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
August 18, 2008:
Ms. Brenda S. Farrell:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Farrell:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-08-924, "Military Personnel: DoD's and the Coast Guard's
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Face Implementation and
Oversight Challenges," dated July 18, 2008 (GAO Code 351062). I
appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the draft GAO
report.
The Department concurs with the overall draft report as written.
However, specific responses for each of the nine recommendations have
been provided as Enclosure (1) to support each position and for your
consideration.
There are no technical changes noted.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David S. C. Chu:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated July 18, 2008:
GAO CODE 351062/GAO-08-924:
"Military Personnel: DoD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Programs Face Implementation and Oversight
Challenges"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
review and evaluate the Department's policies for the prevention and
response of sexual assault to ensure that adequate guidance is provided
to effectively implement the program in deployed environments and joint
environments.
DOD Response: Concur.
* It should be noted that the Department brought this issue to the
GAO's attention. OSD SAPR in the coordination with the Service SAPR
programs, CENTCOM and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J-1 have been working
to address the very complex challenges involved with a multi-pronged
approach.
- This issue is being addressed both the policy and training
subcommittees of the Department Sexual Assault Advisory Council (SAAC),
which are examining general policy guidance and specific training
requirements respectively. Any proposed modifications will be
incorporated into policy.
- Issues regarding joint environments are being addressed in a new
draft of our Response Standards. DoD is working with CENTCOM and JCS J-
1 to ensure that our response standards provide adequate guidance.
- DoD is utilizing Policy Assistance Team (PAT) visits and Office Calls
to Combatant Commands to ensure that all challenges have been
identified. A PAT visit to USPACOM was completed in August 2008. Office
calls to USSOCOM J-1 and USCENTCOM J-1 were held in July 2008. DoD is
currently planning travel to other Combatant Commands in FY09 to
further address this recommendation.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
evaluate the Military Services' processes for staffing and designating
key installation-level program positions, such as Sexual Assault
Response Coordinators, at installations in the United States and
overseas, to ensure that these individuals have the ability and
resources to fully carry out their responsibilities.
DOD Response: Concur.
* PAT visits and Command Office Calls are currently being used to
evaluate the effectiveness of SARCs as implemented by each of the
military services. Personnel status (contractor, civilian, military),
funding, and mission effectiveness are items of interest for the PAT
visits and Office Calls.
* The Defense Task Force - Sexual Assault in the Military Services (DTF-
SAMS) will be evaluating the effectiveness of staffing configurations
and will likely make recommendations on this topic.
* The Army non-concurred on this recommendation, indicating that it
believes that this is an operational matter beyond the scope of DoD
policy. The Department recognizes that each Military Service has
operational requirements that drive certain staffing models of Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) personnel. However, the
Department has an oversight responsibility in the recommended
evaluation to ensure consistency of excellence across the Services.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
review and evaluate sexual assault prevention and response training to
ensure the Military Services are meeting training requirements and to
enhance the effectiveness of the training.
DOD Response: Concur.
* Policy Assistance Visits are soliciting feedback from Service Members
about training content, frequency, media, and effectiveness.
* DoD's Prevention Strategy will recommend best practices for effective
prevention education, and suggest metrics for program evaluation.
* For FY2008 Report to Congress, OSD plans to request a summary of
training and education programs from each service.
* OSD further plans to request each Military Service review training
programs at each level (Accession, Professional Military Education,
First Responder, etc) to ensure maximum compliance with the
requirements described in Department policy. OSD also will require each
Military Service to provide outcome metrics demonstrating efficacy of
training and educational programs.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
systematically evaluate and develop an action plan to address any
factors that may prevent or discourage Service members from accessing
mental health services following a sexual assault.
DOD Response: Concur.
* Work in this area is already underway as part of the Department's
response to the recommendations of the DoD Mental Health Task Force.
The Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health and
Traumatic Brain Injury is the focal point for improvements to military
mental healthcare. One of DCoE's missions is to address factors that
may prevent or discourage Service members from accessing mental health
services for any purpose. DCoE is enhancing the military's campaign to
reduce the stigma of seeking help through partnerships with the
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, National
Institutes of Health, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Agency, DoD coalition partners, and
others in the public and private sectors. The Department believes that
an important part of reducing stigma is education. The DCoE will be
proposing a standardized curriculum for psychological health and TBI
education for leaders, Service members, and family members. In the
interim, each Service will implement training that adheres to the
Department's overarching principles and is adaptable to the culture of
its own Service.
* DoD tracks Restricted Reporting and service referrals in the Annual
Report to Congress, and will encourage the Military Services to
continue to publicize the benefits of Restricted Reporting, which
include confidential referral and access of mental healthcare.
* DoD will review whether SAPR commander training across the Services
needs to be updated to encourage assistance seeking by all under their
command. In addition, SAPRO will continue to work with DCoE to ensure
that sexual assault victims are appropriately considered in all
upcoming initiatives to decrease stigma and improve command climate for
help seeking.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Service Secretaries to emphasize to all levels of command
their responsibility for supporting the program, and review the extent
to which commanders support the program and resources are available to
raise Service members' awareness of sexual assault matters.
DOD Response: Concur.
* A letter from SECDEF is currently in draft for dissemination to
Service Secretaries, emphasizing commander involvement and support of
the SAPR program.
* DoD will also examine whether we need to update training products for
commanders to enhance their understanding and support of SAPR.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
require the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to develop an
oversight framework to guide continued program implementation and
evaluate program effectiveness. At a minimum, such a framework should
contain long-term goals, objectives, and milestones; performance goals;
strategies to be used to accomplish goals; and criteria for measuring
progress.
DOD Response: Concur.
* Policy Assistance Visits arc currently underway to assess program
implementation and effectiveness. \
* DoD was required to stand up its SAPR programs very rapidly to meet
an emergent need. Now that the programs are established, we must
transition to a mature program. As part of that transition, DoD will
develop an oversight framework with long-term goals, objectives,
milestones and criteria to measure progress.
* DoD agrees with USCENTCOM's comment that development of an oversight
framework should include JCS and Service Headquarters, and clearly
identify the reporting chain for training status and achievement of
goals and milestones.
Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to improve the usefulness of the Department's annual report
as an oversight tool both internally and for congressional decision
makers by establishing baseline data to permit analysis of data over
time, and reporting data so as to distinguish cases in which (1)
evidence was insufficient to substantiate an alleged assault, (2) a
victim recanted, or (3) the allegations of sexual assault were
unfounded.
DOD Response: Concur.
* DoD believes a comprehensive data collection and analysis is vital to
policy analysis and program implementation. Thus, a Department-wide
sexual assault database initiative is currently underway. DoD provided
feedback to Congress on a draft of FY09 NDAA that would mandate the
improvement of data collection.
* In addition, the Legal and Investigative working group of the SAAC
policy subcommittee is meeting on August 20 regarding the issue of how
case outcomes are distinguished. The goal is to ensure that data
reporting requirements are clearly articulated and that common
terminology is used.
* DoD concurs with USCENTCOM comment and will review the reporting
chain to ensure that it is clear, particularly in joint and deployed
environments.
Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Service Secretaries to provide installation-level incident
data to the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office annually or
as requested to facilitate analysis of sexual assault related data and
better target resources over time.
DOD Response: Concur.
* In order to conduct comprehensive analysis of the program, DoD
believes installation-level data must be provided to SAPRO annually or
as requested. The Department is currently drafting a letter for SECDEF
signature, ordering the Military Services to provide installation data
to SAPRO.
* DoD recognizes that USCENTCOM, Army, Navy and Air Force expressed
concerns regarding reporting installation level data but we believe it
is necessary for accurate oversight and visibility of sexual assault
incidents. It is the Department's plan to build a robust analysis
system that addresses the concerns of the Military Services, as well as
considers the contextual implications and limitations of such data.
* DoD is working to secure funding for a database that will improve
Department data collection. This database will be designed by OSD
working in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as well as the Services. In addition, DoD does not believe that methods
of protecting the installation level data must be put in place to
address the concerns raised. The Department concurs that the data
should not be released outside of DoD.
Recommendation 9: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military
Services to begin its examination immediately, now that all members of
the task force are appointed, and to develop a detailed plan with
milestones to guide its work.
DOD Response: Concur.
The Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services
(DTFSAMS) was initially the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and
Violence at the Military Academies (DTFSHVMA). It was created by the
NDAA for FY04 and issued its report in June 2005. That Task Force was
extended by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY05. After
DTFSHVMA completed its mission, its name was changed to DTF SAMS and
the mission was changed to an examination of sexual assault in the
Armed Forces. It will assess and make recommendations on key areas in
sexual assault prevention and response. DTF SAMS is comprised of
subject matter experts representing the Department of Defense as well
as the private sector. The Task Force held its first administrative
meeting in May. The first official meeting is scheduled for 11-15
August. During the course of its work, DTF SAMS will visit a number of
installations in the continental United States and the Combat Theater
to evaluate policies, program execution and measures of effectiveness.
Specifically, the Task Force will focus on active duty military service
members assigned to training bases such as Basic Training, Advanced
Skill Training and Instructor Trainers. Recruiting bases will also be
of high interest to the Task Force. Additionally, at each installation,
Task Force members will conduct interviews with commanders, officers
and enlisted personnel, as well as the first response personnel who
provide services and treatment to the victim and the offender to ensure
there is an effective and coordinated approach to sexual assault
prevention and response. Sexual assault response coordinator and victim
advocates, as well as law enforcement personnel, military criminal
investigators, JA officers, healthcare professionals, and chaplains are
among the key first response personnel the Task Force will meet with to
determine how well our SAPR programs are being implemented. We welcome
the work of the Task Force and the recommendations it will propose at
the conclusion of its work. It is important for us to know whether the
policies and programs we have put in place are working; if they can be
improved and if there are things that we missed. We will carefully
evaluate every recommendation of the Task Force and make necessary
changes in a timely manner.
DoD agrees with USCENTCOM comment that Combatant Commands, Joint
Commands and forward deployed JTFs are unique and should be examined
separately as they may require different milestones.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Coast Guard:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]:
August 25, 2008:
Ms. Brenda S. Farrell:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Farrell:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO's) draft report entitled Military
Personnel: DOD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Programs Face Implementation and Oversight Challenges (GAO-08-
924). Technical comments have been provided under separate cover.
The United States Coast Guard concurs with the two GAO recommendations
directed to the Commandant and appreciates the efforts of GAO in
documenting areas for improvement. The Coast Guard is currently is
taking corrective actions to address these recommendations.
Recommendation 1: Evaluate its processes for staffing key installation-
level program positions, such as the Employee Assistance Program
Coordinators (EAPCs), to ensure that these individuals have the ability
and resources to fully carry out their responsibilities.
Response: The Coast Guard will evaluate and analyze its processes to
ensure that program experts have the resources to fully conduct their
duties and responsibilities.
Recommendation 2: Develop an oversight framework to guide continued
program implementation and evaluate program effectiveness. At a
minimum, such a framework should contain long-term goals, objectives,
and milestones; performance goals; strategies to be used to accomplish
goals; and criteria for measuring progress.
Response: The Coast Guard will work with DoD to align goals and
strategies as well as measurements for consistency and improved
reporting. Our newly appointed Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
program manager at Coast Guard headquarters will be responsible for
coordinating an integrated approach and programmatic view to improve
the sexual assault prevention and response program. We would also
welcome Coast Guard participation in the Defense (Armed Forces) Task
Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services to leverage resources
and best practices.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Disposition of Sexual Assaults in DOD and the Coast Guard:
In both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Coast Guard, commanders
are responsible for discipline of misconduct, including sexual assault,
and they have a variety of judicial and administrative options at their
disposal. Commanders' options are specified in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Manual for Courts-Martial[Footnote 35]
and include:
* Trial by courts-martial, the most severe disposition option, which
can lead to many different punishments including death, prison time,
forfeiture of pay and allowances, reduction in rank, and punitive
separation from military service.
* Nonjudicial punishment, pursuant to Article 15 of the UCMJ, which
allows for a number of punishments such as reducing a members' grade,
forfeiture of pay, adding extra duty, and imposing restrictions on
freedom.
* Administrative actions, which are corrective measures that may result
in a variety of actions such as issuing a reprimand, admonition,
counseling, extra military instruction, or the administrative
withholding of privileges. Other actions include rehabilitation and
reassignment, administrative reduction for inefficiency, bar to
reenlistment, and administrative separation.
Commanders may also elect to take no action if evidence of an offense
is not sufficient.
In determining punishment, commanders may elect to utilize many
administrative options in conjunction with courts-martial convictions
or nonjudicial punishments. The use of such actions can have
significant negative career and employment repercussions for the
accused, both within the military and in the civilian community.
The Manual for Courts-Martial provides a list of factors that
commanders should consider when determining how to dispose of a
criminal offense. These factors include:
* the character and military service of the accused,
* the nature of and circumstances surrounding the offense and the
extent of harm caused,
* the appropriateness of the authorized punishment to the particular
accused or offense,
* possible improper motives of the accuser,
* reluctance of the victim or others to testify,
* cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of
others,
* the availability and likelihood of prosecution by another
jurisdiction and the existence of jurisdiction over the accused and the
offender, and:
* the availability and admissibility of evidence.
Ordinarily, the immediate commander of an individual accused or
suspected of committing an offense is responsible for determining how
to dispose of the offense. However, the immediate commander who lacks
sufficient authority to take action may forward the matter to a
superior commander for disposition. A decision by a lower-level
commander does not prevent a different disposition by a superior
commander. Further, commanders' decisions are typically made after
consulting with the supporting legal office (e.g., judge advocate).
Disposition of Investigations of Sexual Assault within DOD:
DOD collects and reports data in its annual report to Congress on the
disposition of reported sexual assault incidents in the military.
Investigations of sexual assaults and the outcomes of these cases may
cross reporting periods, and commanders may not always have
jurisdiction to take actions against some alleged offenders. DOD
reported that there were 1,955 completed investigations of reported
sexual assault cases in fiscal year 2007 resulting from all
unrestricted reports of alleged sexual assault incidents made during or
prior to fiscal year 2007. These 1,955 completed investigations
involved 2,212 alleged offenders including servicemembers who fall
under a military commander's legal authority and nonservicemembers,
such as civilians or foreign nationals, who may not be subject to
military law. Some cases had multiple alleged offenders, victims, or
both. Of the 2,212 alleged offenders resulting from all investigations
completed in fiscal year 2007, commanders had sufficient evidence of a
crime to support taking actions against 600 (27 percent) of these
alleged offenders. Action against 572 alleged offenders was still
pending as of September 30, 2007; once these dispositions are
completed, commanders will have taken action against a total of 1,172
alleged offenders (53 percent). As shown in table 8, as of September
30, 2007, slightly more than half of these alleged offenders received
command actions consisting of courts-martial, nonjudicial punishment,
or other administrative actions or discharges. Judge advocates told us
that commanders almost always dispose of rapes through courts-martial.
Table 8: Dispositions of Alleged Offenders Resulting from
Investigations Completed in Fiscal Year 2007, as of September 30, 2007:
Type of command action taken against alleged offenders: Courts-martial;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made: prior to fiscal year 2007: 78;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made: during fiscal year 2007: 103;
Total number of completed dispositions during fiscal year 2007: 181.
Type of command action taken against alleged offenders: Nonjudicial
punishment;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made: prior to fiscal year 2007: 81;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made: during fiscal year 2007: 120;
Total number of completed dispositions during fiscal year 2007: 201.
Type of command action taken against alleged offenders: Administrative
actions or discharges;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made: prior to fiscal year 2007: 92;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made: during fiscal year 2007: 126;
Total number of completed dispositions during fiscal year 2007: 218.
Type of command action taken against alleged offenders: Total command
actions taken against alleged offenders;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made: prior to fiscal year 2007: 251;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made: during fiscal year 2007: 349;
Total number of completed dispositions during fiscal year 2007: 600.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
As shown in table 9, commanders did not take direct action against
1,040 alleged offenders for a variety of reasons. For example, some of
these alleged offenders were not subject to military law, other alleged
offenders could not be identified, and in some instances the alleged
sexual assault was unsubstantiated, unfounded, or there was
insufficient evidence that an offense occurred.
Table 9: Reasons Commanders Did Not Take Action Against Alleged
Offenders in Investigations Completed during Fiscal Year 2007:
Reasons commanders did not take action against an alleged offender:
Under civilian court action or foreign authority;
Number of alleged offenders against whom commanders did not take action
in reports made: Prior to fiscal year 2007: 41;
Number of alleged offenders against whom commanders did not take action
in reports made: During fiscal year 2007: 70;
Total: 111.
Reasons commanders did not take action against an alleged offender:
Unidentified alleged offender;
Number of alleged offenders against whom commanders did not take action
in reports made: Prior to fiscal year 2007: 32;
Number of alleged offenders against whom commanders did not take action
in reports made: During fiscal year 2007: 100;
Total: 132.
Reasons commanders did not take action against an alleged offender:
Unsubstantiated, unfounded, lacked sufficient evidence, victim
recanted, or alleged offender died;
Number of alleged offenders against whom commanders did not take action
in reports made: Prior to fiscal year 2007: 265;
Number of alleged offenders against whom commanders did not take action
in reports made: During fiscal year 2007: 532;
Total: 797.
Reasons commanders did not take action against an alleged offender:
Total;
Number of alleged offenders against whom commanders did not take action
in reports made: Prior to fiscal year 2007: 338;
Number of alleged offenders against whom commanders did not take action
in reports made: During fiscal year 2007: 702;
Total: 1,040.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
Although DOD does not track information about indirect actions
commanders may take against offenders who are not subject to military
law, judge advocates at installations we visited overseas told us that
commanders could bar a foreign national or contractor who commits a
crime from the installation, but were otherwise limited in actions they
could take against alleged offenders who are not subject to the UCMJ.
They told us that generally, commanders must rely on foreign
governments to prosecute foreign nationals who commit crimes. Officials
also stated that because there is no formal system to track individuals
barred from installations, it is not possible to ensure that foreign
nationals barred from one base are barred from all bases in a
geographic region. Commanders also have limited avenues to address
misconduct or crimes committed by contractors.
Disposition of Investigations of Sexual Assault within the Coast Guard:
During fiscal year 2007, the Coast Guard Investigative Service
completed investigations for 62 of the 72 sexual assault incidents
reported during fiscal year 2007. For these 62 completed
investigations, the Coast Guard identified 67 alleged offenders
including servicemembers who are under a military commander's legal
authority as well as nonservicemembers who may not be subject to
military law. Of the 67 alleged offenders, commanders had sufficient
evidence of a crime to support taking action against 19 alleged
offenders (see table 10).
Table 10: Dispositions of Alleged Offenders Resulting from
Investigations Completed in Fiscal Year 2007, as of September 30, 2007:
Type of command action taken against alleged offenders: Courts-martial;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made during fiscal year 2007: 7.
Type of command action taken against alleged offenders: Nonjudicial
punishment;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made during fiscal year 2007: 5.
Type of command action taken against alleged offenders: Discharge in
lieu of courts-martial;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made during fiscal year 2007: 1.
Type of command action taken against alleged offenders: Discharge in
lieu of disciplinary actions;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made during fiscal year 2007: 2.
Type of command action taken against alleged offenders: Other
administrative actions;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made during fiscal year 2007: 4.
Type of command action taken against alleged offenders: Total command
actions taken against alleged offenders;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made during fiscal year 2007: 19.
Type of command action taken against alleged offenders: Number of
pending dispositions;
Number of alleged offenders against whom action was taken in reports
made during fiscal year 2007: 23.
Source: Coast Guard Investigative Service.
[End of table]
Actions against 23 alleged offenders were still pending as of April 30,
2008. Commanders did not take action against 25 alleged offenders
because evidence was unsubstantiated, unfounded, insufficient, the
victim recanted, or the alleged offender died; the alleged offender was
not identified; or the alleged offender was a nonservicemember who was
not subject to the UCMJ.
[End of section]
Appendix V: DOD and Coast Guard Data on Reported Sexual Assault
Incidents for Fiscal Year 2007:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is required by law[Footnote 36] to
collect and report data on sexual assault incidents involving
servicemembers in active duty status[Footnote 37] to Congress annually.
The Coast Guard collects similar data, but does not report these data
to Congress because it is not statutorily required to do so.[Footnote
38] Servicemembers on active duty in DOD may report an alleged sexual
assault using either the unrestricted or restricted reporting options.
As previously discussed, an unrestricted report of an alleged sexual
assault incident is provided to the chain of command or law enforcement
for investigation. The military criminal investigative organizations
within each military service and the Coast Guard are responsible for
investigating crimes, including sexual assaults in which servicemembers
are either alleged offender(s) or victim(s) and for documenting case
data including information on alleged offenders and victims and the
disposition of cases. A restricted report is a confidential report of
an alleged sexual assault that can be made without initiating an
investigation or notifying the chain of command. Within DOD, a
restricted report may be made to either a Sexual Assault Response
Coordinator (SARC) or a victim advocate at an installation; within the
Coast Guard, a restricted report may be made to the Employee Assistance
Program Coordinator (EAPC) or victim support person; and within both
DOD and the Coast Guard a restricted report may also be made to medical
personnel. When a restricted report is made, a commander is usually
notified by the SARC or EAPC that an assault has occurred; however, the
commander should not be informed of the victim's identity or any other
information that could lead to identification, such as gender or rank.
The SARC in DOD or the EAPC in the Coast Guard generally collects
limited data about the alleged victim and the alleged incident because
the purpose of the restricted reporting option is to provide assistance
to victims rather than collect incident-related statistics. In DOD,
SARCs provide these data to their service-level Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Office, whereas in the Coast Guard the EAPC
provides similar data to the Office of Work Life. Regardless of the
reporting option used, victims in both DOD and the Coast Guard can
receive medical care, advocacy, and counseling services. At any time,
an alleged victim may choose to change from a restricted report to an
unrestricted report and participate in an investigation.
Unrestricted Reports Made during Fiscal Year 2007 in DOD:
Of the 2,688 reports of sexual assault incidents that DOD received
during fiscal year 2007, 2,085 were made using the unrestricted
reporting option. However, a number of these reports were not
substantiated as of September 30, 2007, when DOD compiled data for
inclusion in its fiscal year 2007 annual report to Congress. According
to DOD officials, a case may not be substantiated for a number of
reasons. For example, a victim may recant an accusation, thus
preventing an investigation from proceeding; evidence may be found
insufficient to substantiate the alleged assault; or the alleged
offender may have died. As of September 30, 2007, DOD reported that
about 36 percent (741) of investigations of alleged sexual assault were
ongoing. According to DOD's fiscal year 2007 annual report, in 72
percent (1,511) of the 2,085 unrestricted reports of alleged sexual
assault, the alleged victims were servicemembers; in the remaining 28
percent (574) of unrestricted reports the alleged victims were
nonservicemembers, such as civilians or foreign nationals. About 60
percent of these reports involved an alleged rape and about one-third
involved alleged indecent assaults. DOD also reported that about 9
percent (133) of all sexual assaults reported during fiscal year 2007
using the unrestricted reporting option were made by males who were
either servicemembers or nonservicemembers. Table 11 shows the number
of servicemembers and victims by gender who reported a sexual assault
incident during fiscal year 2007 using the unrestricted reporting
option.
Table 11: Number of Unrestricted Reports of Sexual Assault in DOD Made
by Victims Who Were Either Servicemembers or Nonservicemembers and by
Gender during Fiscal Year 2007:
Gender: Male;
Servicemember: 129;
Nonservicemember: 4;
Total: 133.
Gender: Female;
Servicemember: 941;
Nonservicemember: 367;
Total: 1,308.
Gender: Total;
Servicemember: 1,070;
Nonservicemember: 371;
Total: 1,441.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Table 12 shows the number of investigations of reports of alleged
sexual assault made during fiscal year 2007 by type of alleged offense
and whether the victim was a servicemember or nonservicemember. Because
reported data are incident-based and a single sexual assault may
involve more than one subject or victim, the numbers of investigations
and reports in table 12 do not necessarily reflect the number of actual
alleged victims or offenders.
Table 12: Number of Investigations of Unrestricted Reports of Sexual
Assault in DOD by Type of Offense during Fiscal Year 2007:
Number of investigations with: Servicemember as alleged victim;
Type of offense: Rape: 868;
Type of offense: Sodomy (forcible): 91;
Type of offense: Indecent assault: 551;
Type of offense: Attempts to commit these offenses: 1;
Total number of unrestricted reports: 1,511.
Number of investigations with: Nonservicemember as alleged victim;
Type of offense: Rape: 391;
Type of offense: Sodomy (forcible): 33;
Type of offense: Indecent assault: 150;
Type of offense: Attempts to commit these offenses: 0;
Total number of unrestricted reports: 574.
Number of investigations with: Total;
Type of offense: Rape: 1,259;
Type of offense: Sodomy (forcible): 124;
Type of offense: Indecent assault: 701;
Type of offense: Attempts to commit these offenses: 0;
Total number of unrestricted reports: 2,085.
Source: DOD.
Note: Some of these cases may be reports of incidents that occurred
prior to military service or before fiscal year 2007.
[End of table]
According to DOD's fiscal year 2007 annual report, these 2,085 reports
involved 2,243 alleged victims, of whom 1,620 were servicemembers and
623 were nonservicemembers. The 2,085 unrestricted reports involved
1,908 alleged offenders who were servicemembers and 92 who were
nonservicemembers. The identities of 305 alleged offenders were
unknown.
DOD reported that about 8 percent of victims for all investigations
completed during fiscal year 2007 were males. Table 13 shows the number
of completed investigations by type of sexual assault and gender of
victim.
Table 13: Number of Sexual Assaults by Type of Initial Allegation and
Gender of Victims for Investigations Completed during Fiscal Year 2007
as of March 15, 2007:
Gender: Male;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Rape: 4;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Sodomy: 33;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Indecent assault: 55;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Total sexual assaults: 92.
Gender: Female;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Rape: 661;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Sodomy: 45;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Indecent assault: 374;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Total sexual assaults: 1,080.
Gender: Total;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Rape: 665;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Sodomy: 78;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Indecent assault: 429;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
servicemembers and nonservicemembers: Total sexual assaults: 1,172.
Source: GAO analysis and summary of qualitative data provided by DOD
for fiscal year 2007.
Note: These data are as of March 15, 2008. These numbers may not be
precise because they are based on manually coded data that DOD compiles
from individual cases. These numbers were not independently verified by
the military services. Investigations completed after March 15, 2007,
are not included in these data.
[End of table]
Restricted Reports Made during Fiscal Year 2007 in DOD:
During fiscal year 2007, DOD reported that servicemembers initially
made 705 reports of alleged sexual assault using the restricted
reporting option. However, in 102 of these instances, victims chose to
change from a restricted to unrestricted report.[Footnote 39] According
to DOD, about 69 percent (489) of the 705 restricted reports involved
an alleged rape and almost 18 percent (125) involved alleged indecent
assaults. Table 14 shows the number of alleged reports of sexual
assault made using the restricted reporting option by type of alleged
offense during fiscal year 2007.
Table 14: Number of Restricted Reports of Sexual Assault in DOD by Type
of Offense and Gender during Fiscal Year 2007:
Number of reports with: Male as alleged victim;
Number of reported: Rapes: 3;
Number of reported: Sodomy (forcible): 21;
Number of reported: Indecent assaults: 10;
Number of reported: Attempts to commit these offenses: 3;
Number of reported: Unknown types of offenses: 4;
Total number of restricted reports: 41.
Number of reports with: Female as alleged victim;
Number of reported: Rapes: 478;
Number of reported: Sodomy (forcible): 19;
Number of reported: Indecent assaults: 112;
Number of reported: Attempts to commit these offenses: 27;
Number of reported: Unknown types of offenses: 14;
Total number of restricted reports: 650.
Number of reports with: Gender of alleged victim unknown;
Number of reported: Rapes: 8;
Number of reported: Sodomy (forcible): 0;
Number of reported: Indecent assaults: 2;
Number of reported: Attempts to commit these offenses: 0;
Number of reported: Unknown types of offenses: 4;
Total number of restricted reports: 14.
Number of reports with: Total number servicemembers as alleged victims;
Number of reported: Rapes: 489;
Number of reported: Sodomy (forcible): 40;
Number of reported: Indecent assaults: 124;
Number of reported: Attempts to commit these offenses: 30;
Number of reported: Unknown types of offenses: 22;
Total number of restricted reports: 705.
Source: DOD.
Note: Some of these cases may be reports of incidents that occurred
prior to military service or prior to fiscal year 2007.
[End of table]
According to a DOD official, because the military services do not
provide case-level data to DOD, the department is not able to determine
the type of offense for the 102 restricted reports that were changed to
unrestricted reports. DOD reported that male servicemembers made almost
7 percent (41) of the 705 initial reports of sexual assaults using the
restricted reporting option during fiscal year 2007. Because no
investigation is conducted when a victim reports a sexual assault using
the restricted reporting option, the numbers of reports in table 14
reflect the number of actual alleged victims.
Sexual Assault Incidents in the Coast Guard:
Since January 2004, the Coast Guard has voluntarily collected data on
sexual assaults involving its members as either the alleged offender or
victim, although it is not subject to the same statutory requirements
as DOD for collecting these data or reporting such information to
Congress. The Coast Guard, which did not offer a restricted reporting
option until December 2007, documented 72 total reports of alleged
sexual assaults involving Coast Guard members during fiscal year 2007.
As shown in table 15, the majority of these reports were for alleged
rape and the majority of alleged victims were Coast Guard members.
However, not all of these reported alleged sexual assaults have been
substantiated because investigations may have been ongoing, evidence
was found to be insufficient to substantiate the allegation, or victims
may have recanted accusations. For example, the Coast Guard reported 10
investigations of alleged sexual assaults were ongoing as of April
2008.
Table 15: Number of Investigations of Unrestricted Reports of Sexual
Assault in the Coast Guard by Type of Offense during Fiscal Year 2007:
Number of investigations with: Servicemember as alleged victim;
Type of offense: Rape: 22;
Type of offense: Sodomy: 3;
Type of offense: Indecent assault: 26;
Type of offense: Attempts to commit these offenses: 2;
Total number of unrestricted reports: 53.
Number of investigations with: Nonservicemember as alleged victim;
Type of offense: Rape: 18;
Type of offense: Sodomy: 0;
Type of offense: Indecent assault: 1;
Type of offense: Attempts to commit these offenses: 0;
Total number of unrestricted reports: 19.
Number of investigations with: Total;
Type of offense: Rape: 40;
Type of offense: Sodomy: 3;
Type of offense: Indecent assault: 27;
Type of offense: Attempts to commit these offenses: 2;
Total number of unrestricted reports: 72.
Source: Coast Guard Investigative Service.
Note: All alleged assaults involved Coast Guard members as alleged
victims.
[End of table]
Because data are incident-based and a single assault may involve more
than one alleged offender or victim, the number of reports in table 15
does not necessarily reflect the number of actual alleged offenders or
victims. The Coast Guard Investigative Service determined that 78
alleged offenders and 78 alleged victims were involved in the 72
incidents reported during fiscal year 2007. The majority of alleged
offenders and victims were Coast Guard members, as shown in table 16.
Table 16: Number of Alleged Offenders and Victims in Reported Sexual
Assault Incidents Involving Coast Guard Members during Fiscal Year
2007:
Affiliation of alleged offenders and victims: Servicemember[A];
Number of alleged offenders: 66;
Number of alleged victims: 57.
Affiliation of alleged offenders and victims: Nonservicemember;
Number of alleged offenders: 5;
Number of alleged victims: 21.
Affiliation of alleged offenders and victims: Unknown;
Number of alleged offenders: 7;
Number of alleged victims: 0.
Affiliation of alleged offenders and victims: Total;
Number of alleged offenders: 78;
Number of alleged victims: 78.
Source: GAO presentation of Coast Guard data.
[A] Servicemembers include Coast Guard members as well as those members
affiliated with the other military services, such as the Army and Navy.
All investigations completed during fiscal year 2007 involved Coast
Guard members as alleged offenders except for two cases that in which
the alleged offenders were affiliated with the Army and Navy.
[End of table]
The Coast Guard identified 67 victims in the completed investigations,
51 of whom were servicemembers in the Coast Guard or another military
service and 16 of whom were not servicemembers. All but one victim in
the completed investigations were female. Table 17 shows the number of
completed investigations by type of sexual assault and gender of the
victim.
Table 17: Number of Sexual Assaults by Type of Initial Allegation and
Gender of the Alleged Victim for Unrestricted Reports Made during
Fiscal Year 2007 in the Coast Guard:
Gender: Male;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Rape: 0;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Attempted rape: 0;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Sodomy: 1;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Indecent assault: 0;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Total number of
alleged sexual assault victims: 1.
Gender: Female;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Rape: 41;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Attempted rape: 2;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Sodomy: 2;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Indecent assault:
32;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Total number of
alleged sexual assault victims: 77.
Gender: Total;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Rape: 41;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Attempted rape: 2;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Sodomy: 3;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Indecent assault:
32;
Number of sexual assaults by type of initial allegation and gender for
unrestricted reports made during fiscal year 2007: Total number of
alleged sexual assault victims: 78.
Source: Coast Guard Investigative Service.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Survey Administered at Installations in the United States:
[End of section]
Appendix VII Survey Administered at Installations Overseas:
United States Government Accountability Office:
For Internal Use Only:
Sexual Assault in the Military Services:
Purpose:
This survey is part of a review the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO)”an agency of the Congress”is conducting of sexual assault
prevention and response programs in the military services. The purpose
of this survey is to provide insight into the effectiveness of each
service‘s sexual assault policies, training, procedures, and response
capabilities. Findings will be used in reports and testimony to
Congress.
Providing information on this survey is voluntary and anonymous. Al
responses are strictly confidential, and no individual responses will
be reported. Please do not write your name on this questionnaire. We
appreciate you taking the time to complete this important survey.
Directions for Completing This Survey:
We encourage you to answer each question as completely as possible.
Before choosing an answer, please read the full question and all
response choices carefully. There are no right or wrong answers.
Rather, you should answer each question the way that best reflects your
personal opinions and experiences. The survey should take approximately
25-30 minutes to complete.
This survey asks about both sexual harassment and sexual assault. When
reading the questions, please note whether we are referring to
experiences with sexual harassment or sexual assault.
Command Climate toward Sexual Harassment:
As a reminder, DOD defines sexual harassment as follows:
Sexual harassment - a form of sexual discrimination that involves
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature when submission to such conduct
is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a
person‘s job, pay, or career, or submission to or rejection of such
conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment
decisions affecting that person, or such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual‘s work
performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment (DODD 1350.2)
1. At your current location, do you think your direct supervisor
(military or civilian) creates a climate that discourages sexual
harassment from occurring?
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
2. If sexual harassment should occur at your current location, do you
think your direct supervisor (military or civilian) would address it?
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Unit”Command or operational unit to which you are assigned.
Deployed location”Stationed at a location other than your home station.
Temporary Duty (TDY)/Temporary Additional Duty (TAD)”Travel in which
personnel remain under the direct control of their parent organizations
(e.g., meetings, conferences, attendance at school or course of
instruction).
Home station”The permanent location of active duty units and Reserve
Component units. This location may be either inside or outside the
Continental United States.
3. In your opinion, is sexual harassment a problem in the following?
My unit:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Deployed locations:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
When TDY or TAD:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Home station:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
4. How much do your concerns about sexual harassment incidents in the
military impact your intention to remain in the military once your
commitment is met?
A great deal:
Somewhat:
Not at all:
As a reminder DOD defines sexual assault as follows:
Sexual assault - intentional sexual contact, characterized by use of
force, physical threat or abuse of authority or when the victim does
not or cannot consent. It includes rape, nonconsensual sodomy (oral or
anal sex), indecent assault (unwanted, inappropriate contact or
fondling), or attempts to commit these acts. Sexual assault can occur
without regard to gender or spousal relationship or age of victim.
’Consent“ shall not be deemed or construed to mean the failure by the
victim to offer physical resistance. Consent is not given when a person
uses force, threat of force, coercion, or when the victim is asleep,
incapacitated or unconscious. (DODD 6495.01)
5. At your current location, do you think your direct supervisor
(military or civilian) creates a climate that discourages sexual
assault from occurring?
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
6. If sexual assault should occur at your current location, do you
think your direct supervisor (military or civilian) would address it?
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
7. At your current location, how likely would you be to report a sexual
assault of another servicemember?
Extremely likely:
Very likely:
Moderately likely:
Somewhat likely:
Not at all likely:
8. Would you report a personal experience of sexual assault to the
following authorities, individuals, or organizations at your current
location?
Officer in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Staff noncommissioned officer (NCO) in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Noncommissioned officer (NCO) in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Civilian hospital personnel:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Military criminal investigative organizations (e.g., OSI, CID, NCIS,
CGIS):
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Military police (e.g., Provost Marshall, Master of Arms):
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Civilian law enforcement:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Chaplain:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Military lawyers:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Family member, friend:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Other (please specify):
9. How safe do you feel at your current location from being sexually
assaulted in the following places?
At work/on duty:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
In barracks/living and sleeping area on installation grounds:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
On installation grounds, in other areas:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
Off installation grounds:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
10. In your opinion, is sexual assault a problem in the following?
My unit:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Deployed locations:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
When TDY or TAD:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Home station:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
11. How much do your concerns about sexual assault incidents in the
military impact your intention to remain in the military once your
commitment is met?
A great deal:
Somewhat:
Not at all:
12. Do you agree or disagree with the statement: ’Tolerance for sexual
harassment creates a perception that sexual assault may be acceptable.“
Strongly agree:
Agree:
Neither agree nor disagree:
Disagree:
Strongly disagree:
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Training:
13. Have you attended training that addressed sexual assault issues at
any time during the past 12 months?
Yes:
No: Skip to 15 on page 8;
Don‘t know: Skip to 15 on page 8.
14. Was the sexual assault-related training you received during the
past 12 months in the following formats?
Presentation by an instructor, such as SARC:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Written materials provided without presentation:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Video:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Computer-based, including web-based or internet training:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Participatory training (scenario-based training, skits):
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
15. Would you know how to do the following at your current location?
Report a sexual assault using the restricted (confidential) reporting
option:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Report a sexual assault using the unrestricted reporting option:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Avoid situations that might increase the risk of sexual assault:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Obtain medical care following a sexual assault:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Obtain counseling or mental health care following a sexual assault:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Contact your sexual assault response coordinator (SARC):
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Contact your victim advocate (VA):
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Obtain additional resources or information on the areas above:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Personal Experiences with Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault in the
Military:
We understand that this is a very difficult subject. We would like to
reiterate that all responses are confidential, and no individual‘s
information is identifiable.
16. How much of a problem are the following situations at your current
location?
Sexual stories or jokes that were offensive to you:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Others referring to people of your gender in insulting or offensive
terms:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Unwelcome attempts to draw you into a discussion of sexual matters
(e.g., attempts to discuss or comment on your sex life):
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Offensive remarks about your appearance, body, or sexual activities:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Gestures or body language of a sexual nature that embarrassed or
offended you:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Bribes or some kind of reward for special treatment to engage in sexual
behavior:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Threats of retaliation or revenge for not being sexually cooperative
(such as by mentioning an upcoming review or evaluation):
Touching in a way that made you feel uncomfortable, such as attempts to
stroke, fondle, or kiss you:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Implications of better assignments or better treatment if you were
sexually cooperative:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Bad treatment for refusing to have sex:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
17. If you were sexually assaulted and could obtain medical and/or
mental health care while (a) remaining anonymous and (b) being certain
that there would not be an investigation, would you report the incident?
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
18. Were you sexually assaulted during the past 12 months while in the
military?
Yes:
No: Skip to 30 on page 14.
19. In which of the following locations did the incident occur?
At home installation inside the United States:
At home installation outside the United States:
At a deployed location:
While TDY or TAD:
20. Did you report the incident in any of the following ways to any
authorities, individuals, or organizations?
I used restricted (confidential) reporting:
I used unrestricted reporting:
I reported it, but I‘m not sure whether I used restricted
(confidential) or unrestricted reporting:
I did not report the incident: Skip to 22 on page 12.
21. To which authorities, individuals, or organizations did you report
the incident?
Officer in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Staff noncommissioned officer (NCO) in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Noncommissioned officer (NCO) in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Civilian hospital personnel:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Military criminal investigative organizations (e.g., OSI, CID, NCIS,
CGIS):
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Military police (e.g., Provost Marshall, Master of Arms):
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Civilian law enforcement:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Chaplain:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Military lawyers:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Family member, friend:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Other (please specify):
Please Skip to Question 23 on page 12 after completing Question 21:
22. For which of the following reason(s) did you not report the
incident?
Feared ostracism, harassment, or ridicule by peers:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I thought I would be labeled a troublemaker:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I thought nothing would be done:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Embarrassment or shame:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Threatened with some form of retaliation or revenge:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not threatened with retaliation or revenge, but feared some form of
retaliation or revenge:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Pressured by someone in a position of authority:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Feared I would be punished for infractions/violations:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I did not want people gossiping about the assault:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I did not want to affect my unit:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I thought people would not believe me:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not aware of reporting procedures:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Fear of assault being repeated:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Did not want to get offender in trouble:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I thought my experience was common:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I had a previous negative experience reporting an incident:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Other (please specify):
23. Did you receive medical care as a result of the incident?
I received medical care:
I did not receive medical care because care was not available: Skip to
27 on page 13;
I did not seek medical care: Skip to 27 on page 13.
24. Where did you receive medical care for the incident?
Military treatment facility (MTF):
Civilian hospital:
Other (please specify):
25. How satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the quality of medical
care you received?
Very satisfied:
Satisfied:
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied:
Dissatisfied:
Very dissatisfied:
26. Why were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the quality of medical
care you received?
27. Did you receive counseling or mental health care as a result of the
incident?
I received counseling or mental health care:
I did not received counseling or mental health care because assistance
was not available: Skip to 30 on page 14;
I did not seek counseling or mental health care: Skip to 30 on page 14.
28. How satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the quality of
counseling or mental health care you received?
Very satisfied:
Satisfied:
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied:
Dissatisfied:
Very dissatisfied:
29. Why were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the quality of mental
health care or counseling you received?
Deployment:
30. Have you served away from your home station at any time during the
past 12 months?
Yes:
No: Skip to 41 on page 18.
31. Which of the following location(s) did you serve in during the past
12 months?
On Land:
Afghanistan:
Yes:
No:
Albania:
Yes:
No:
Bahrain:
Yes:
No:
Bosnia:
Yes:
No:
Djibouti:
Yes:
No:
Iraq:
Yes:
No:
Jordan:
Yes:
No:
Kosovo:
Yes:
No:
Kuwait:
Yes:
No:
Kyrgyzstan:
Yes:
No:
Oman:
Yes:
No:
Pakistan:
Yes:
No:
Philippines:
Yes:
No:
Qatar:
Yes:
No:
Saudi Arabia:
Yes:
No:
Syria:
Yes:
No:
Tajikistan:
Yes:
No:
United Arab Emirates:
Yes:
No:
Uzbekistan:
Yes:
No:
Yemen:
Yes:
No:
At Sea:
Persian/Arabian Gulf (Arabian Sea North of 10 degrees north latitude
and west of 68 degrees east longitude, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman,
Persian Gulf, or Red Sea:
Yes:
No:
Kosovo Area (Adriatic Sea or Ionian Sea North of the 39th Parallel):
Yes:
No:
Other:
Another location not listed above(please specify):
32. Of the locations you indicated above, where did you serve the
longest amount of time?
33. From which installation did you deploy:
34. Did you receive pre-deployment training that addressed sexual
assault?
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Experiences at Home Station versus When Deployed:
Unit”Command or operational unit to which you are assigned.
Home station”The permanent location of active duty units and Reserve
Component units. This location may be either inside or outside the
Continental United States.
Deployed”Stationed at a location other than your home station.
Please Answer The Following Questions From The Perspective Of The
Location You Indicated In Question 32.
35. Do you think sexual harassment incidents are taken more or less
seriously when at home station or when deployed?
More seriously when at home station:
Equally seriously when at home station as when deployed:
Less seriously when at home station:
36. Do you think sexual assault incidents are taken more or less
seriously at home station or when deployed?
More seriously when at home station:
Equally seriously when at home station as when deployed:
Less seriously when at home station:
37. Do you think servicemembers in your unit would be more or less
likely to report a sexual assault of another servicemember when at home
station or when deployed?
More likely at home station:
Equally likely at home station as when deployed:
Less likely at home station:
Not sure:
38. How safe did you feel from being sexually assaulted at the
following times and locations while you were deployed?
At work/on duty:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
In barracks/living and sleeping area on installation grounds:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
On installation grounds, in other areas:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
Off installation grounds:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
39. Do you believe the risk for a sexual assault to occur is less or
greater when at home station versus when deployed?
The risk is less when at home station:
The risk is the same at home station as when deployed: Skip to 41 on
page 18;
The risk is greater at home station:
40. Why do you believe the risk of a sexual assault occurring differs
when at home station versus when deployed?
Temporary Duty (TDY)/Temporary Additional Duty (TAD)”Travel in which
personnel remain under the direct control of their parent organizations
(e.g., meetings, conferences, attendance at school or course of
instruction).
41. Have you been TDY or TAD at any time during the past 12 months?
Yes:
No: Skip to 44 on page 19.
42. Do you believe the risk for a sexual assault to occur is less or
greater when at home station versus when TDY or TAD?
The risk is less when at home installation:
The risk is the same at home installation as when TDY or TAD: Skip to
44 on page 19;
The risk is greater at home installation:
43. Why do you believe the risk of a sexual assault differs when at
home station versus when TDY or TAD? Please explain.
Demographics:
44. What is your current pay grade?
E1 to E4:
E5 to E9:
W1 to W5:
O1 to O3:
O4 to O6:
45. What is your branch of service?
Army:
Navy:
Marine Corps:
Air Force:
Coast Guard:
46. What is your component?
Active duty:
Reserve:
National Guard:
47. What is your age range?
18 to 24:
25 to 30:
31 to 35:
36 to 40:
41 to 45:
46 and over:
48. What is your gender?
Male:
Female:
General Comments:
49. With respect to the military services‘ sexual assault prevention
and response programs, what message would you have us (GAO) take back
to Congress?
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Survey Administered at Installations Overseas:
Sexual Assault in the Military Services:
Purpose:
This survey is part of a review the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO)”an agency of the Congress”is conducting of sexual assault
prevention and response programs in the military services. The purpose
of this survey is to provide insight into the effectiveness of each
service‘s sexual assault policies, training, procedures, and response
capabilities. Findings will be used in reports and testimony to
Congress.
Providing information on this survey is voluntary and anonymous. Al
responses are strictly confidential, and no individual responses will
be reported. Please do not write your name on this questionnaire. We
appreciate you taking the time to complete this important survey.
Directions for Completing This Survey:
We encourage you to answer each question as completely as possible.
Before choosing an answer, please read the full question and all
response choices carefully. There are no right or wrong answers.
Rather, you should answer each question the way that best reflects your
personal opinions and experiences. The survey should take approximately
25-30 minutes to complete.
This survey asks about both sexual harassment and sexual assault. When
reading the questions, please note whether we are referring to
experiences with sexual harassment or sexual assault.
Command Climate toward Sexual Harassment:
As a reminder, DOD defines sexual harassment as follows:
Sexual harassment - a form of sexual discrimination that involves
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature when submission to such conduct
is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a
person‘s job, pay, or career, or submission to or rejection of such
conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment
decisions affecting that person, or such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual‘s work
performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment (DODD 1350.2)
1. At your current location, do you think your direct supervisor
(military or civilian) creates a climate that discourages sexual
harassment from occurring?
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
2. If sexual harassment should occur at your current location, do you
think your direct supervisor (military or civilian) would address it?
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Unit”Command or operational unit to which you are assigned.
Deployed location”Stationed at a location other than your home station.
Temporary Duty (TDY)/Temporary Additional Duty (TAD)”Travel in which
personnel remain under the direct control of their parent organizations
(e.g., meetings, conferences, attendance at school or course of
instruction).
Home station”The permanent location of active duty units and Reserve
Component units. This location may be either inside or outside the
Continental United States.
3. In your opinion, is sexual harassment a problem in the following?
My unit:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Deployed locations:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
When TDY or TAD:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Home station:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
4. How much do your concerns about sexual harassment incidents in the
military impact your intention to remain in the military once your
commitment is met?
A great deal:
Somewhat:
Not at all:
As a reminder DOD defines sexual assault as follows:
Sexual assault - intentional sexual contact, characterized by use of
force, physical threat or abuse of authority or when the victim does
not or cannot consent. It includes rape, nonconsensual sodomy (oral or
anal sex), indecent assault (unwanted, inappropriate contact or
fondling), or attempts to commit these acts. Sexual assault can occur
without regard to gender or spousal relationship or age of victim.
’Consent“ shall not be deemed or construed to mean the failure by the
victim to offer physical resistance. Consent is not given when a person
uses force, threat of force, coercion, or when the victim is asleep,
incapacitated or unconscious. (DODD 6495.01)
5. At your current location, do you think your direct supervisor
(military or civilian) creates a climate that discourages sexual
assault from occurring?
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
6. If sexual assault should occur at your current location, do you
think your direct supervisor (military or civilian) would address it?
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
7. At your current location, how likely would you be to report a sexual
assault of another servicemember?
Extremely likely:
Very likely:
Moderately likely:
Somewhat likely:
Not at all likely:
8. Would you report a personal experience of sexual assault to the
following authorities, individuals, or organizations at your current
location?
Officer in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Staff noncommissioned officer (NCO) in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Noncommissioned officer (NCO) in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Civilian hospital personnel:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Military criminal investigative organizations (e.g., OSI, CID, NCIS,
CGIS):
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Military police (e.g., Provost Marshall, Master of Arms):
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Civilian law enforcement:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Chaplain:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Military lawyers:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Family member, friend:
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
Not applicable:
Other (please specify):
9. How safe do you feel at your current location from being sexually
assaulted in the following places?
At work/on duty:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
In barracks/living and sleeping area on installation grounds:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
On installation grounds, in other areas:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
Off installation grounds:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
10. In your opinion, is sexual assault a problem in the following?
My unit:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Deployed locations:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
When TDY or TAD:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Home station:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
11. How much do your concerns about sexual assault incidents in the
military impact your intention to remain in the military once your
commitment is met?
A great deal:
Somewhat:
Not at all:
12. Do you agree or disagree with the statement: ’Tolerance for sexual
harassment creates a perception that sexual assault may be acceptable.“
Strongly agree:
Agree:
Neither agree nor disagree:
Disagree:
Strongly disagree:
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Training:
13. Have you attended training that addressed sexual assault issues at
any time during the past 12 months?
Yes:
No: Skip to 15 on page 7;
Don‘t know: Skip to 15 on page 7.
14. Was the sexual assault-related training you received during the
past 12 months in the following formats?
Presentation by an instructor, such as SARC:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Written materials provided without presentation:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Video:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Computer-based, including web-based or internet training:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Participatory training (scenario-based training, skits):
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
15. Have you attended training that addressed sexual assault issues
since you arrived at your current location?
Yes:
No: Skip to 17 on page 8;
Don‘t know: Skip to 17 on page 8.
16. Was the sexual assault-related training you received at your
current location in the following formats?
Presentation by an instructor, such as SARC:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Written materials provided without presentation:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Video:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Computer-based, including web-based or internet training:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Participatory training (scenario-based training, skits):
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
17. Would you know how to do the following at your current location?
Report a sexual assault using the restricted (confidential) reporting
option:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Report a sexual assault using the unrestricted reporting option:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Avoid situations that might increase the risk of sexual assault:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Obtain medical care following a sexual assault:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Obtain counseling or mental health care following a sexual assault:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Contact your sexual assault response coordinator (SARC):
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Contact your victim advocate (VA):
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Obtain additional resources or information on the areas above:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Personal Experiences with Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault in the
Military:
We understand that this is a very difficult subject. We would like to
reiterate that all responses are confidential, and no individual‘s
information is identifiable.
18. How much of a problem are the following situations at your current
location?
Sexual stories or jokes that were offensive to you:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Others referring to people of your gender in insulting or offensive
terms:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Unwelcome attempts to draw you into a discussion of sexual matters
(e.g., attempts to discuss or comment on your sex life):
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Offensive remarks about your appearance, body, or sexual activities:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Gestures or body language of a sexual nature that embarrassed or
offended you:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Bribes or some kind of reward for special treatment to engage in sexual
behavior:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Threats of retaliation or revenge for not being sexually cooperative
(such as by mentioning an upcoming review or evaluation):
Touching in a way that made you feel uncomfortable, such as attempts to
stroke, fondle, or kiss you:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Implications of better assignments or better treatment if you were
sexually cooperative:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
Bad treatment for refusing to have sex:
Serious problem:
Moderate problem:
Minor problem:
Not a problem:
19. If you were sexually assaulted and could obtain medical and/or
mental health care while (a) remaining anonymous and (b) being certain
that there would not be an investigation, would you report the incident?
Yes:
No:
Not sure:
20. Were you sexually assaulted during the past 12 months while in the
military?
Yes:
No: Skip to 32 on page 14.
21. In which of the following locations did the incident occur?
At home installation inside the United States:
At home installation outside the United States:
At a deployed location:
While TDY or TAD:
22. Did you report the incident in any of the following ways to any
authorities, individuals, or organizations?
I used restricted (confidential) reporting:
I used unrestricted reporting:
I reported it, but I‘m not sure whether I used restricted
(confidential) or unrestricted reporting:
I did not report the incident: Skip to 24 on page 12.
23. To which authorities, individuals, or organizations did you report
the incident?
Officer in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Staff noncommissioned officer (NCO) in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Noncommissioned officer (NCO) in your chain of command:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Civilian hospital personnel:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Military criminal investigative organizations (e.g., OSI, CID, NCIS,
CGIS):
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Military police (e.g., Provost Marshall, Master of Arms):
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Civilian law enforcement:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Chaplain:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Military lawyers:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Family member, friend:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not Applicable:
Other (please specify):
Please Skip to Question 25 on page 12 after completing Question 23:
24. For which of the following reason(s) did you not report the
incident?
Feared ostracism, harassment, or ridicule by peers:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I thought I would be labeled a troublemaker:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I thought nothing would be done:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Embarrassment or shame:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Threatened with some form of retaliation or revenge:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not threatened with retaliation or revenge, but feared some form of
retaliation or revenge:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Pressured by someone in a position of authority:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Feared I would be punished for infractions/violations:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I did not want people gossiping about the assault:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I did not want to affect my unit:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I thought people would not believe me:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Not aware of reporting procedures:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Fear of assault being repeated:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Did not want to get offender in trouble:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I thought my experience was common:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
I had a previous negative experience reporting an incident:
Yes:
No:
Not Sure:
Other (please specify):
25. Did you receive medical care as a result of the incident?
I received medical care:
I did not receive medical care because care was not available: Skip to
32 on page 14;
I did not seek medical care: Skip to 32 on page 14.
26. Where did you receive medical care for the incident?
Military treatment facility (MTF):
Civilian hospital:
Other (please specify):
27. How satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the quality of medical
care you received?
Very satisfied:
Satisfied:
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied:
Dissatisfied:
Very dissatisfied:
28. Why were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the quality of medical
care you received?
29. Did you receive counseling or mental health care as a result of the
incident?
I received counseling or mental health care:
I did not received counseling or mental health care because assistance
was not available: Skip to 32 on page 14;
I did not seek counseling or mental health care: Skip to 32 on page 14.
30. How satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the quality of
counseling or mental health care you received?
Very satisfied:
Satisfied:
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied:
Dissatisfied:
Very dissatisfied:
31. Why were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the quality of mental
health care or counseling you received?
At Home Station:
Home station”The permanent location of active duty units and Reserve
Component units. This location may be either inside or outside the
Continental United States.
32. Have you served at your home station at any time during the past 12
months?
Yes:
No: Skip to 40 on page 17.
33. What is your home station?
Experiences At Your Current Location versus At Your Home Station:
Unit”Command or operational unit to which you are assigned.
Home station”The permanent location of active duty units and Reserve
Component units. This location may be either inside or outside the
Continental United States.
Deployed”Stationed at a location other than your home station.
Please Answer The Following Questions From The Perspective Of The
Location You Indicated In Question 33.
34. Do you think sexual harassment incidents are taken more or less
seriously at your current location or when at home station?
More seriously at current location:
Equally seriously at current location as when at home station:
Less seriously current:
35. Do you think sexual assault incidents are taken more or less
seriously at your current location or when at home station?
More seriously at current location:
Equally seriously at current location as when at home station:
Less seriously current location:
36. Do you think servicemembers in your unit would be more or less
likely to report a sexual assault of another servicemember at your
current location or when at home station?
More likely at current location:
Equally likely at current location as when at home station:
Less likely at current location:
Not sure:
37. How safe did you feel from being sexually assaulted at the
following times and locations while you were deployed?
At work/on duty:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
In barracks/living and sleeping area on installation grounds:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
On installation grounds, in other areas:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
Off installation grounds:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
38. Do you believe the risk for a sexual assault to occur is less or
greater when at home station versus when deployed?
The risk is less when at home station:
The risk is the same at home station as when deployed: Skip to 41 on
page 18;
The risk is greater at home station:
39. Why do you believe the risk of a sexual assault occurring differs
when at home station versus when deployed?
Experiences At Your Current Location versus Other Locations:
Unit”Command or operational unit to which you are assigned.
40. Not including your home station, have you served at another
location at any time during the past 12 months?
Yes:
No: Skip to 49 on page 20.
41. Excluding your current location, which of the following location(s)
did you serve in during the past 12 months?
On Land:
Afghanistan:
Yes:
No:
Albania:
Yes:
No:
Bahrain:
Yes:
No:
Bosnia:
Yes:
No:
Djibouti:
Yes:
No:
Iraq:
Yes:
No:
Jordan:
Yes:
No:
Kosovo:
Yes:
No:
Kuwait:
Yes:
No:
Kyrgyzstan:
Yes:
No:
Oman:
Yes:
No:
Pakistan:
Yes:
No:
Philippines:
Yes:
No:
Qatar:
Yes:
No:
Saudi Arabia:
Yes:
No:
Syria:
Yes:
No:
Tajikistan:
Yes:
No:
United Arab Emirates:
Yes:
No:
Uzbekistan:
Yes:
No:
Yemen:
Yes:
No:
At Sea:
Persian/Arabian Gulf (Arabian Sea North of 10 degrees north
latitude and west of 68 degrees east longitude, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of
Oman, Persian Gulf, or Red Sea:
Yes:
No:
Kosovo Area (Adriatic Sea or Ionian Sea North of the 39th Parallel):
Yes:
No:
42. Of the locations you indicated above, where did you serve the
longest amount of time?
Please Answer The Following Questions From The Perspective Of The
Location You Indicated In Question 42.
43. Do you think sexual harassment incidents are taken more or less
seriously at your current location or the other location?
More seriously at current location:
Equally seriously at current location as the other location:
Less seriously current location:
44. Do you think sexual assault incidents are taken more or less
seriously at your current location or the other location?
More seriously at current location:
Equally seriously at current location as the other location:
Less seriously at current location:
45. Do you think servicemembers in your unit would be more or less
likely to report a sexual assault of another servicemember at your
current location or the other location?
More likely at current location:
Equally likely at current location as the other location:
Less likely at current location:
Not sure:
46. How safe did you feel from being sexually assaulted at the
following times and locations at the other location?
At work/on duty:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
In barracks/living and sleeping area on installation grounds:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
On installation grounds, in other areas:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
Off installation grounds:
Extremely safe:
Very safe:
Moderately safe:
Somewhat safe:
Not at all safe:
Not applicable:
47. Do you believe the risk for a sexual assault to occur is less or
greater at your current location versus the other location?
The risk is less at current location:
The risk is the same at current location as as the other location: Skip
to 49 on page 20;
The risk is greater at current location:
48. Why do you believe the risk of a sexual assault occurring differs
at your current location versus the other location?
Demographics:
49. What is your current pay grade?
E1 to E4:
E5 to E9:
W1 to W5:
O1 to O3:
O4 to O6:
50. What is your branch of service?
Army:
Navy:
Marine Corps:
Air Force:
Coast Guard:
51. What is your component?
Active duty:
Reserve:
National Guard:
52. What is your age range?
18 to 24:
25 to 30:
31 to 35:
36 to 40:
41 to 45:
46 and over:
53. What is your gender?
Male:
Female:
General Comments:
54. With respect to the military services‘ sexual assault prevention
and response programs, what message would you have us (GAO) take back
to Congress?
[End of section]
Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Marilyn K. Wasleski (Assistant
Director), Krislin Bolling, Joanna Chan, Pawnee A. Davis, Konstantin
Dubrovsky, K. Nicole Harms, Wesley A. Johnson, Ronald La Due Lake,
Stephen V. Marchesani, Ayeke P. Messam, Amanda K. Miller, and Cheryl A.
Weissman made significant contributions to the report. In addition,
Sara G. Cradic, Kim Mayo, Sharon Reid, and Norris Smith III provided
assistance during site visits.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For purposes of this report, we use the term "military services" to
refer collectively to the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.
While the Coast Guard is a military service, it generally falls under
the control of the Department of Homeland Security and not DOD.
Therefore, we address the Coast Guard separately from the other
military services.
[2] GAO, Military Personnel: The DOD and Coast Guard Academies Have
Taken Steps to Address Incidents of Sexual Harassment and Assault, but
Greater Federal Oversight Is Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-296] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2008).
[3] Sen. Rep. No. 110-77 at 345 (2007).
[4] GAO, Military Personnel: Preliminary Observations on DOD's and the
Coast Guard's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1013T]
(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008).
[5] For purposes of this report, we use the term "commanders" to refer
to company grade officers (encompassing the ranks of 01-03) and field
grade officers (encompassing the ranks of 04-06).
[6] The 2006 Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members defines
unwanted sexual contact to include rape, nonconsensual sodomy (oral or
anal sex) or indecent assault (unwanted, inappropriate sexual contact
or fondling) that can occur regardless of gender, age, or spousal
relationship.
[7] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July
2, 2003).
[8] Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 577 (2004).
[9] In February 2004, the Secretary of Defense directed the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to undertake a 90-day
review to assess sexual assault policies and programs in DOD and the
services and recommend changes to increase prevention, promote
reporting, enhance the quality and support provided to victims
especially within combat theaters, and improve accountability for
offender actions. Among the recommendations of the task force was that
DOD establish a single point of accountability for all sexual assault
policy matters within the department.
[10] Department of Defense Directive 6495.01, Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response (SAPR) Program (Oct. 6, 2005).
[11] Department of Defense Instruction 6495.02, Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Program Procedures (June 23, 2006).
[12] Except for legal processes provided under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and Manual for Courts-Martial, and criminal
investigative policy matters that are assigned to the Judge Advocates
General of the military services and DOD's Inspector General,
respectively.
[13] Commandant Instruction 1754.10C, Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Program (SAPRP) (Dec. 20, 2007).
[14] Except for the Navy, which refers to its program as Sexual Assault
Victim Intervention, each of the military services refers to its
program as Sexual Assault Prevention and Response.
[15] Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2007 Report on Sexual Assault
in the Military (Mar. 15, 2008).
[16] Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 577 (2004).
[17] The Secretary of Veterans Affairs is required to operate a program
to provide counseling and treatment for veterans suffering from sexual
trauma under 38 U.S.C. §1720D. Veterans Health Administration Directive
2005-015, Military Sexual Trauma Counseling (Mar. 25, 2005), contains
guidance on the documentation that is to be maintained on screening,
referral, and treatment services provided to veterans under this
program.
[18] The Standard Form 86, Questionnaire for National Security
Positions, is a governmentwide form applicable not only to DOD
servicemembers and civilians who occupy sensitive positions but to
individuals who occupy sensitive positions across the federal
government.
[19] Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Policy Implementation--Mental
Health Question, Standard Form (86), Questionnaire for National
Security Positions" (Apr. 18, 2008).
[20] GAO, DOD Health Care: Mental Health and Traumatic Brain Injury
Screening Efforts Implemented but Consistent Pre-Deployment Medical
Record Review Policies Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-615] (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2008).
[21] DOD defines a "trained health care provider" as a physician,
physician assistant, nurse practitioner, advanced practice nurse,
independent duty corpsman, independent duty medical technician, or
Special Forces medical sergeant.
[22] Defense Manpower Data Center, 2006 Gender Relations Survey of
Active Duty Members (DMDC Report No. 2007-022 (March 2008). The
weighted response rate was 30 percent.
[23] The survey defines unwanted sexual contact to include rape,
nonconsensual sodomy (oral or anal sex), or indecent assault (unwanted,
inappropriate sexual contact, or fondling) that can occur regardless of
gender, age, or spousal relationship.
[24] For the DOD female population, this is an estimate of 6.8 percent
with a margin of error of +/-1 percent. For the male population, this
is an estimate of 1.8 percent with a margin of error of +/-0.6 percent.
The margins of error are calculated with a 95 percent confidence
interval.
[25] For the Coast Guard female population, this is an estimate of 3
percent with a margin of error of +/-3 percent. For the male
population, this is an estimate of 1 percent with a margin of error of
+/-1 percent. The margins of error are calculated with a 95 percent
confidence interval.
[26] The Navy's survey was based on a statistical random sample where
the estimates were weighted to represent the full population of
enlisted and officer men and women.
[27] The Naval Inspector General's survey was based on a voluntary
nonprobability sample that cannot be generalized to the full population
of enlisted and officer men and women.
[28] The Army's survey was based on a stratified random sample where
the estimates were not weighted to represent the full population of
enlisted and officer men and women.
[29] DOD's instruction requires the Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Office to serve as the single point of responsibility for
sexual assault policy matters, except for legal processes provided
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts-
Martial, and criminal investigative policy matters that are assigned to
the Judge Advocates General of the military services and DOD's
Inspector General, respectively.
[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669].
[31] Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 576 (2004).
[32] The Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services
is an extension of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and
Violence at the Military Service Academies established by the Secretary
of Defense pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 526 (2003). The Ronald W.
Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 directed
that the task force studying the academies be renamed and begin
carrying out the new functions required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 once it had completed its duties
under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 also allowed
the Secretary of Defense to change the composition of the task force
after it completed its work related to the academies and before it
began to carry out its new functions. The Defense Task Force on Sexual
Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies submitted its
report on June 30, 2005.
[33] Section 576 of Pub. L. No 108-375 (2004) directs the Defense Task
Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services to provide a report on
the activities of DOD and the Armed Forces to respond to sexual assault
and to include any recommendations for changes to policy and law that
the task force considers appropriate to the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force no later than 1 year
after initiating its examination. In addition, the law also directs
that 90 days after receiving the report the Secretary of Defense submit
the report, along with the Secretary's evaluation of the report, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of
Representatives.
[34] See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999) and Internal Control Management and
Evaluation Tool, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-
1008G] (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).
[35] In October 2004, Congress included a provision in the Ronald W.
Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.
No. 108-375, § 571 (2004) that required the Secretary of Defense to
review the UCMJ and Manual for Courts-Martial "with the objective of
determining what changes are required to improve the ability of the
military justice system to address issues relating to sexual assault
and to conform the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial more closely
to other Federal laws and regulations that address such issues." The
Secretary was required to submit a report including recommendations for
revisions to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House
of Representatives following his review. Congress then amended Article
120 of the UCMJ in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552 (2006). This change included
consolidating criminal sex offenses into Article 120 and became
effective October 1, 2007.
[36] Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 577 (2004). Additional reporting
requirements are included in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No 109-163, § 596 (2006) and the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No 109-
364, § 583 (2006).
[37] DOD's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office provides two
separate annual reports to Congress. One report provides information on
sexual assault incidents involving cadets at the military academies.
The second report provides incident data for reported sexual assaults
involving all servicemembers on active duty, including cadets at the
military academies. See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-296] for information on sexual assaults involving the
military academies and the Coast Guard Academy.
[38] Data collected by DOD and the Coast Guard on alleged sexual
assault incidents are not comparable to data published by the Federal
Bureau of Investigations' Uniform Crime Reporting program for sexual
assaults. The Uniform Crime Reporting Program records founded cases of
rape and attempted rape against women, while DOD tracks all reports of
sexual assault including rapes, nonconsensual sodomy, indecent assault,
and attempts thereof, against both men and women. Moreover, while the
Uniform Crime Reporting Program deletes reports of rape and attempted
rape that are later proven to be unfounded, DOD does not.
[39] These 102 reports are included in the total number of reports made
using the unrestricted reporting option. DOD also includes these 102
cases as part of the total number of restricted reports made during
fiscal year 2007 when reporting data in its annual report.
[End of section]
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