Defense Acquisitions
DOD's Requirements Determination Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-08-1060 September 25, 2008Increasing combat demands and fiscal constraints make it critical for the Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure that its weapon system investments not only meet the needs of the warfighter, but make the most efficient use of available resources. GAO's past work has shown that achieving this balance has been a challenge and weapon programs have often experienced cost growth and delayed delivery to the warfighter. In 2003, DOD implemented the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to prioritize and ensure that the warfighter's most essential needs are met. In response to Senate Report 109-69, GAO reported in March 2007 that DOD lacks an effective approach to balance its weapon system investments with available resources. This follow-on report focuses on (1) whether the JCIDS process has achieved its objective to prioritize joint warfighting needs and (2) factors that have affected DOD's ability to effectively implement JCIDS. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed JCIDS guidance and capability documents and budgetary and programming data on major weapon systems, and interviewed DOD officials.
The JCIDS process has not yet been effective in identifying and prioritizing warfighting needs from a joint, departmentwide perspective. GAO reviewed JCIDS documentation related to proposals for new capabilities and found that most--almost 70 percent--were sponsored by the military services, with little involvement from the joint community--including the combatant commands (COCOMs), which are largely responsible for planning and carrying out military operations. By continuing to rely on capability proposals that lack a joint perspective, DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities and reduce the duplication of capabilities in some areas. In addition, virtually all capability proposals that have gone through the JCIDS process since 2003 have been validated--or approved. DOD continues to have a portfolio with more programs than available resources can support. For example, the remaining costs for major weapon system programs in DOD's portfolio went from being about four times greater to almost six times greater than annual funding available during fiscal year 2000 through 2007. The JCIDS process has also proven to be lengthy--taking on average up to 10 months to validate a need--which further undermines efforts to effectively respond to the needs of the warfighter, especially those that are near-term. DOD lacks an analytical approach to prioritize joint capability needs and determine the relative importance of capability proposals submitted to the JCIDS process. Further, the functional capabilities boards, which were established to manage the JCIDS process and facilitate the prioritization of needs, have not been staffed or resourced to effectively carry out these duties. Instead, the military services retain most of DOD's analytical capacity and resources for requirements development. The Joint Staff recently initiated a project to capture the near-, mid-, and long-term needs of the services and other defense components, and to synthesize them with the needs of the COCOMs. However, DOD officials told us that determining how best to integrate COCOM and service capability perspectives will be challenging because of differences in roles, missions, and time frames. Efforts have also begun to streamline the process and reduce the time it takes to validate proposals.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-1060, Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities
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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2008:
Defense Acquisitions:
DOD's Requirements Determination Process Has Not Been Effective in
Prioritizing Joint Capabilities:
GAO-08-1060:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-1060, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Increasing combat demands and fiscal constraints make it critical for
the Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure that its weapon system
investments not only meet the needs of the warfighter, but make the
most efficient use of available resources. GAO‘s past work has shown
that achieving this balance has been a challenge and weapon programs
have often experienced cost growth and delayed delivery to the
warfighter.
In 2003, DOD implemented the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) to prioritize and ensure that the
warfighter‘s most essential needs are met. In response to Senate Report
109-69, GAO reported in March 2007 that DOD lacks an effective approach
to balance its weapon system investments with available resources.
This follow-on report focuses on (1) whether the JCIDS process has
achieved its objective to prioritize joint warfighting needs and (2)
factors that have affected DOD‘s ability to effectively implement
JCIDS. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed JCIDS guidance and capability
documents and budgetary and programming data on major weapon systems,
and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found:
The JCIDS process has not yet been effective in identifying and
prioritizing warfighting needs from a joint, departmentwide
perspective. GAO reviewed JCIDS documentation related to proposals for
new capabilities and found that most”almost 70 percent”were sponsored
by the military services, with little involvement from the joint
community”including the combatant commands (COCOMs), which are largely
responsible for planning and carrying out military operations. By
continuing to rely on capability proposals that lack a joint
perspective, DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint
warfighting capabilities and reduce the duplication of capabilities in
some areas. In addition, virtually all capability proposals that have
gone through the JCIDS process since 2003 have been validated”or
approved. DOD continues to have a portfolio with more programs than
available resources can support. For example, the remaining costs for
major weapon system programs in DOD‘s portfolio went from being about
four times greater to almost six times greater than annual funding
available during fiscal year 2000 through 2007. The JCIDS process has
also proven to be lengthy”taking on average up to 10 months to validate
a need”which further undermines efforts to effectively respond to the
needs of the warfighter, especially those that are near-term.
Figure: Major Defense Acquisition Program Costs Remaining versus Annual
Appropriations, from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2007 (Dollars
in billions):
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data:
Fiscal year: 2000;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $94;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $403.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $104;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $338.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $111;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $367.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $137;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $716.
Fiscal year: 2004 (start of JCIDS implementation); Annual RDTE and
procurement appropriations: $148;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $780.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $165;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $910.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $157;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $998.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $160;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $927.
Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
DOD lacks an analytical approach to prioritize joint capability needs
and determine the relative importance of capability proposals submitted
to the JCIDS process. Further, the functional capabilities boards,
which were established to manage the JCIDS process and facilitate the
prioritization of needs, have not been staffed or resourced to
effectively carry out these duties. Instead, the military services
retain most of DOD‘s analytical capacity and resources for requirements
development. The Joint Staff recently initiated a project to capture
the near-, mid-, and long-term needs of the services and other defense
components, and to synthesize them with the needs of the COCOMs.
However, DOD officials told us that determining how best to integrate
COCOM and service capability perspectives will be challenging because
of differences in roles, missions, and time frames. Efforts have also
begun to streamline the process and reduce the time it takes to
validate proposals.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending actions aimed at improving DOD‘s ability to
prioritize joint capability needs. DOD generally concurred, but
believes that current processes and resources in the department are
sufficient for doing this.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1060]. For more
information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or
sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
JCIDS Is Not Meeting Its Objective to Prioritize Joint Warfighting
Needs:
DOD Has Faced Challenges in Implementing JCIDS but Has Efforts Under
Way to Improve the Prioritization of Joint Needs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Functional Capabilities Boards:
Appendix III: Combatant Commands:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Table:
Table 1: Functional Capabilities Boards:
Figures:
Figure 1: Relationship between JCIDS Documentation and Key Milestones
in the Defense Acquisition System:
Figure 2: Sponsorship of DOD Requirements Documents:
Figure 3: Status of "JROC Interest" Capability Proposals Submitted to
JCIDS Process since 2003:
Figure 4: Costs Remaining versus Annual Appropriations for DOD Major
Defense Acquisitions from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2007
(Billions of Then-Year Dollars):
Figure 5: Average JCIDS Staffing Days Required for "JROC Interest"
Capability Documents:
Figure 6: Combatant Commands with Geographic Responsibilities:
Abbreviations:
CDD: capability development document:
COCOM: combatant command:
CPD: capability production document:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FCB: functional capabilities board:
ICD: initial capabilities document:
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System:
JNN-N: Joint Network Node-Network:
JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council:
JUON: Joint Urgent Operational Need:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 25, 2008:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Department of Defense (DOD) expects the cost to develop and procure
the major weapon systems in its current portfolio to total $1.6
trillion--$335 billion of which is expected to be spent over the next 5
years. Increasing combat demands and escalating fiscal constraints make
it critical for DOD to ensure that its weapon system investments not
only meet the needs of the warfighter but make the most efficient use
of the department's substantial resources. Our past work has shown that
achieving this balance has been a challenge for DOD and that the
department has pursued more programs than its resources can support.
Our work has also shown that DOD has had difficulty translating needs
into executable programs, which has often led to cost growth and
delayed delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter.
In 2003, DOD implemented the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS)--a requirements generation system intended
to prioritize and ensure that the most essential needs of the
warfighter are met.[Footnote 1] Through JCIDS, needs are expected to be
determined from a joint capabilities perspective, rather than from an
individual service or program perspective, which can lead to stovepiped
solutions. In fiscal year 2006, you directed that GAO review how DOD's
requirements and resource allocation processes can better support
program stability in major weapon systems acquisition.[Footnote 2] In
March 2007, we reported that DOD lacks an effective, integrated
approach to balance its weapon system investments with available
resources. This follow-on report, also done in response to the fiscal
year 2006 direction, focuses on requirements management as embodied in
the JCIDS process.[Footnote 3] Specifically, we (1) determined whether
the JCIDS process has achieved its objective to prioritize joint
warfighting needs and (2) identified any factors that have affected
DOD's ability to effectively implement JCIDS.
To conduct our work, we reviewed DOD, Joint Staff, and military service
guidance documents on JCIDS and other interdependent processes;
budgetary and programming data on major weapon systems; and Joint Staff
information on the status and sponsorship of capability proposal
documents submitted to the JCIDS process for review. We also reviewed
the findings of prior research on DOD requirements by audit agencies
and DOD-sponsored organizations. We interviewed requirements officials
from the Joint Staff, DOD's functional capabilities boards, several
combatant commands (COCOMs),[Footnote 4] and the Army, Navy, and Air
Force. We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to August 2008
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more information on our
scope and methodology, see appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The JCIDS process has not yet met its objective to identify and
prioritize warfighting needs from a joint capabilities perspective.
Instead, capabilities continue to be driven primarily by the individual
services--which sponsored 67 percent of initial capabilities proposals
submitted since 2003--with little involvement from the COCOMs, which
are largely responsible for planning and carrying out military
operations. By continuing to rely on capability proposals that lack a
joint perspective, DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint
warfighting capabilities and reduce the duplication of capabilities in
some areas. In addition, proposals for new capability needs and system
solutions are not systematically prioritized across capability and
mission areas, and virtually all proposals that have gone through JCIDS
have been validated. The JCIDS process has also proven to be lengthy,
taking on average up to 10 months to validate a need. Such a protracted
process further undermines the department's efforts to effectively
respond to the needs of the warfighter, especially those that are near
term.
DOD lacks an analytic framework to prioritize capability proposals
submitted by component sponsors to the JCIDS process. To date, JCIDS
largely responds to proposals on a case-by-case basis, rather than
assessing them from a departmentwide or joint perspective. Further, the
functional capabilities boards (FCBs), which were established to manage
the JCIDS process and facilitate the prioritization of needs, have not
been staffed or resourced to effectively prioritize and address joint
needs. Instead, the military services retain most of DOD's analytical
capacity and resources for requirements development. DOD has recently
taken steps aimed at improving the JCIDS process. For example, the
Joint Staff recently initiated a project to capture the near-, mid-,
and long-term needs of the military services and other defense
components and to synthesize them with the needs of the COCOMs.
According to DOD officials, however, it will be a challenge to develop
appropriate criteria and measures for identifying capability gaps and
determining the relative importance and resource commitment of one gap
against another--particularly given that the COCOM and service
capability perspectives are based on different roles, missions, and
time frames. Efforts are also under way to streamline the JCIDS process
and reduce the time it takes to validate proposals.
We are recommending DOD take two actions aimed at ensuring that the
JCIDS process achieves its objective to identify and prioritize joint
warfighting needs: (1) develop an analytical approach within JCIDS to
better prioritize capability needs and (2) determine and allocate
appropriate resources for joint capabilities development planning. DOD
partially concurred with the first and concurred with the second
recommendation. Generally, in responding to these recommendations, DOD
stated that several current processes and initiatives, both within and
outside of JCIDS, contribute to the department's total prioritization
effort and that resources are sufficiently allocated for capabilities
development planning. However, we believe that the department's
processes are not well integrated with JCIDS and that the joint
community--the COCOMs and FCBs--lack the resources to play a stronger
role in determining joint capability needs.
Background:
Historically, new weapon systems have been developed by the military
services to counter specific threats. Under DOD's Requirements
Generation System, the precursor to JCIDS, requirements frequently grew
out of the military services' unique strategic visions and often lacked
clear linkages to the national military strategy[Footnote 5] and the
needs of the joint force commanders, who are responsible for carrying
out military operations. This service-centric, stovepiped approach
often created weapon systems that lacked interoperability,[Footnote 6]
were duplicative, or did not fill critical gaps. In a 2002 memo, the
Secretary of Defense expressed dissatisfaction with the requirements
system and commented that the system "continues to require things that
ought not to be required, and does not require things that need to be
required."
As part of its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD determined that the
department needed to shift from threat-based defense planning to a
capabilities-based model that focuses more on how an adversary might
fight than who the adversary might be or where a war might be fought.
[Footnote 7] JCIDS was established to provide the department with an
integrated, collaborative process to identify and guide development of
a broad set of new capabilities that address the current and emerging
security environment. Through JCIDS, capabilities are to be developed
from national military strategy and should relate to joint concepts
that describe how the strategy will be implemented. JCIDS is also
intended to ensure a strong voice for warfighters and identify needs
from a joint perspective to ensure that current and future warfighters
are provided the capabilities they need to accomplish assigned
missions. Furthermore, JCIDS emphasizes that needs be derived in terms
of capabilities instead of specific system solutions.
The JCIDS process is overseen by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC)[Footnote 8] and supports the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, who is responsible for advising the Secretary of
Defense on the priorities of military requirements in supporting the
national military strategy. Within JCIDS, FCBs--headed by a general or
an admiral and made up of military and civilian representatives from
the military services, joint staff, COCOMs, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense--manage different capability area portfolios.
[Footnote 9] The FCBs are intended to support the JROC by evaluating
capability needs, recommending enhancements to capabilities
integration, examining joint priorities, assessing program
alternatives, and minimizing duplication of effort across the
department.
The JCIDS process requires that gaps in military capabilities be
identified and potential materiel and nonmateriel solutions for filling
those gaps be developed based on formal capability assessments. The
results of these capability assessments are formally submitted as
initial capabilities documents (ICD)--a capability proposal--by a
military service, defense agency, COCOM, FCB, or other sponsor. ICDs
are intended to document a specific capability gap or set of gaps that
exist in joint warfighting functions and propose a prioritized list of
various solutions to address the gap(s). When a capability proposal is
submitted, a Joint Staff "gatekeeper" conducts an initial review to
determine what level of joint interest and review there should be and
which FCB should take the lead. Capability proposals deemed to have a
significant impact on joint warfighting, such as those involving
potential major defense acquisition programs, are designated as "JROC
interest" and must be validated or approved by the JROC.[Footnote 10]
A JROC-validated ICD provides the basis for starting a major weapon
system acquisition. Specifically, it should lead to an analysis of
alternatives,[Footnote 11] a concept refinement phase, and a decision
on a preferred system concept. Before a weapon system program is
approved to begin system development, the sponsor is required to submit
a capability development document (CDD)--which defines a specific
solution as identified in the analysis of alternatives--through JCIDS
for approval by the JROC. The CDD defines the system's key performance
parameters or attributes against which the delivered increment of
capability will be measured. Finally, the sponsor prepares a capability
production document (CPD) to address the production elements of an
acquisition program prior to the program starting production.[Footnote
12] Figure 1 shows how the documentation relates to the major
milestones for a weapon system program in the Defense Acquisition
System.
Figure 1: Relationship between JCIDS Documentation and Key Milestones
in the Defense Acquisition System:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the relationship between JCIDS
Documentation and Key Milestones in the Defense Acquisition System. The
following information is depicted:
Capabilities assessment:
* Initial capabilities document;
* Concent decision;
Analysis of alternative:
* Milestone A;
Technology development:
* Capability development document;
* Milestone B;
System development:
* Capability production document;
* Milestone C;
Production:
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
JCIDS Is Not Meeting Its Objective to Prioritize Joint Warfighting
Needs:
While JCIDS is intended to determine needs from a joint, departmentwide
perspective, capability needs continue to be proposed and defined
primarily by the military services, with little involvement from the
joint community--including the COCOMs, which plan and implement
military operations. This can lead to stovepiped and duplicative
solutions that do not necessarily support a joint force on the
battlefield. In addition, virtually all of the proposals for new
capability needs and weapon system solutions completing the JCIDS
process since 2003 have been validated. The JCIDS process has also
proven to be lengthy, taking on average up to 10 months to validate a
need. Such a protracted process further undermines the department's
efforts to effectively respond to the needs of the warfighter,
especially those that are near term.
The Services, Not the Joint Warfighting Community, Continue to Sponsor
Most JCIDS Proposals:
Our review of the documentation associated with 90 "JROC interest" ICDs
submitted to JCIDS since 2003 showed that 60 proposals, or 67 percent,
were sponsored by a military service, and 23, or 26 percent, were
sponsored by a COCOM, an FCB, or the Joint Staff. (See fig. 2.)
Figure 2: Sponsorship of DOD Requirements Documents:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains a pie-chart and sub-chart depicting the following
data:
90 Capability proposals, July 2003-May 2008 (initial capabilities
documents:
Service: 60;
Other DOD agency: 7;
Joint military community: 23;
- COCOM: 12;
- Joint staff: 8;
- FCB: 3.
Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
JCIDS is intended to encourage collaboration among the services,
COCOMs, and other DOD organizations to identify joint solutions to
capability gaps, and there are some cases where this has occurred. For
example, the Navy submitted a capability proposal through JCIDS to get
a precision and landing system in place to avoid delays in delivering
its aircraft carriers in development. The lead FCB reviewed the Navy's
proposal and recognized that it was similar to a need identified by the
Air Force and determined that the Air Force's needs could be met under
the same proposal. However, according to JCIDS officials, FCB, COCOM,
and other stakeholder reviews have had little influence in promoting
joint solutions.
Past studies have also raised concerns that the services and the COCOMs
do not routinely collaborate to identify possible joint solutions. For
example, in 2006 the Army Audit Agency recommended that the Army
improve collaboration with the joint community early in the
capabilities planning process to improve the quality of its
capabilities documents and facilitate more timely reviews of proposals
that are submitted into the JCIDS process.[Footnote 13] In January
2006, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Panel concluded
that JCIDS resulted in capabilities that did not meet warfighter needs
in a timely manner and recommended that JCIDS be replaced with a COCOM-
led requirements process in which the services and defense agencies
compete to provide solutions.[Footnote 14] The Defense Science Board
similarly reported that JCIDS has not provided for increased warfighter
influence, but instead actually suppresses joint needs in favor of
military service interests, and recommended an increase in the formal
participation role of the COCOMs in the JCIDS process.[Footnote 15] The
Center for Strategic and International Studies has also pointed out
that while the services are responsible for supplying operationally
capable armed forces, the COCOMs are responsible for responding to
threats and executing military operations.[Footnote 16] Therefore, it
recommended that the Joint Forces Command take the lead in conducting
capabilities development planning for the COCOMs and become a formal
member of the JROC.
By continuing to rely on stovepiped solutions to address capability
needs, DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint warfighting
capabilities and reduce the duplication of capabilities in some areas.
In January 2006, we reported that military operations continue to be
hampered by the inability of communication and weapon systems to
operate effectively together on the battlefield.[Footnote 17] In May
2007, we reported that while the military services have successfully
planned and fielded a number of unmanned aerial vehicle systems over
the past several years, DOD has struggled to coordinate the development
of these systems across the services and ensure that they complement
one another and avoid duplicating capabilities.[Footnote 18]
Specifically, despite similarities in proposed capabilities between two
key unmanned aerial vehicle systems--the Air Force's Predator program
and the Army's Warrior program--the Army awarded a separate development
contract to the same contractor producing the Predator. By taking
separate tracks to developing these two systems, the Air Force and the
Army missed an opportunity to identify potential similarities in their
requirements and thereby avoid redundant or non-interoperable systems.
Although the Army and Air Force agreed to consider cooperating on the
acquisition of the two systems, the services are struggling to agree on
requirements.
Virtually All Capability Proposals That Have Completed the JCIDS
Process Are Validated:
JCIDS is intended to support senior decision makers in identifying and
prioritizing warfighting capability needs. As such, it is meant to be
an important tool in maintaining a balanced portfolio of acquisition
programs that can be executed within available resources. However, the
vast majority of proposals completing the JCIDS process are approved--
or validated. Adding to a portfolio that already contains more programs
than resources can support is likely to perpetuate instability and poor
outcomes in weapon system programs.
Of the 203 JROC-interest capability proposals (ICDs and CDDs) we
reviewed, 140 completed the JCIDS process and were validated. Of the
remaining proposals, 57 are still under review, and 6 are considered
inactive (see fig. 3). According to a Joint Staff representative, some
proposals are returned to sponsors for modifications because the
supporting documentation lacked sufficient analysis to justify the
capability gap and solutions being presented, or because reviewers
raised other technical concerns that needed to be resolved. Returned
proposals are usually modified and resubmitted to the JCIDS process.
The 6 proposals that are considered inactive were not resubmitted by
the sponsors.
Figure 3: Status of "JROC Interest" Capability Proposals Submitted to
JCIDS Process since 2003:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
203 Capabilities proposals (initial capabilities documents and
capability development documents):
Validated: 140;
In-process: 57;
Inactive: 6.
Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
According to JCIDS officials, proposals are not prioritized across
capability and mission areas. Instead, the extent to which any
prioritization has occurred within JCIDS has been limited to the key
performance parameters or requirements within individual capability
proposals. For example, the Special Forces Command wanted to add
capabilities to a Navy-sponsored JCIDS proposal--described in a CDD--
for a high-speed intratheater surface lift capability to transport
military units and supplies into shallow and remote areas. However,
addressing a key capability requested by the Special Forces Command--to
land a V-22 aircraft on the surface ship--would have necessitated a
major redesign for the proposed Navy ship and delayed providing
capabilities to the warfighter by several years. While the JROC agreed
that the Special Forces Command's requirement was valid, it decided to
approve the Navy capability proposal without the Special Forces Command
requirement and requested that a study be undertaken to identify how
this requirement could be addressed in the future.
The lack of early prioritization of capability needs through JCIDS
makes it difficult for DOD to balance its portfolio of weapons
programs. Validated proposals tend to gain momentum and win approval to
become formal weapon system programs--in part because other reviews are
not conducted prior to the start of system development and
demonstration, or Milestone B. In prior work,[Footnote 19] we found
that 80 percent of the programs we reviewed entered the acquisition
system at Milestone B without a Milestone A or other prior major
review.[Footnote 20] By this time, the military services have already
established a budget and formed a constituency for their individual
capability needs. Successful commercial companies we have reviewed
value and use a disciplined approach to prioritize needs early and
often--one that views potential product development programs as related
parts of a companywide portfolio.[Footnote 21] These companies make
tough decisions to defer or say no to proposed products and achieve a
balanced portfolio--one that matches requirements with resources and
weighs near-and long-term needs.
Since JCIDS was implemented, the number of major defense acquisition
programs in DOD's portfolio has increased from 77 to 93, or by 21
percent. This increase is likely to exacerbate an already sizable
disparity between what programs are expected to cost and available
funding. The estimated acquisition costs remaining for major weapon
system programs increased 130 percent from fiscal year 2000 through
fiscal year 2007, while the annual funding for these programs increased
by a more modest 67 percent (see fig. 4). During the same time frame,
the remaining costs for the major weapon systems in DOD's portfolio
went from being about four times greater to almost six times greater
than annual funding.
Figure 4: Costs Remaining versus Annual Appropriations for DOD Major
Defense Acquisitions from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2007
(Billions of Then-Year Dollars):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data:
Fiscal year: 2000;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $94;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $403.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $104;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $338.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $111;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $367.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $137;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $716.
Fiscal year: 2004 (start of JCIDS implementation); Annual RDTE and
procurement appropriations: $148;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $780.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $165;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $910.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $157;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $998.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $160;
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $927.
Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
Shortfalls as significant as this are likely to be fiscally
unsustainable. As we recently reported, to compensate for funding
shortfalls, DOD has made unplanned and inefficient program adjustments-
-including shifting funding between programs, deferring work and
associated costs into the future, or cutting procurement quantities.
[Footnote 22] Such reactive practices contribute to the instability of
many programs and undesirable acquisition outcomes.
JCIDS Has Proven to Be a Lengthy Process:
The JCIDS process may lack the efficiency and agility needed to respond
to warfighter needs--especially those that are near term--because the
review and validation of capability proposals can take a significant
amount of time. A proposal submitted to JCIDS can go through several
review and comment resolution phases before consensus is reached on the
proposal, and through several levels of approval before the JROC
validates the proposal. Our review of capability proposals submitted to
JCIDS from fiscal years 2003 through 2008 found that review and
validation takes on average 8 to 10 months (see fig. 5). JCIDS and
service officials also indicated that prior to submitting a JCIDS
proposal, the sponsor can take a year or more to complete a
capabilities-based assessment and get a proposal approved. In other
words, 2 years or more can elapse from the time a capability need is
identified by a sponsor to the time the capability is validated by the
JROC.
Figure 5: Average JCIDS Staffing Days Required for "JROC Interest"
Capability Documents:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple horizontal bar graph depicting the following
data:
Status of capability proposals: Validated proposals;
ICD: 319 days;
CDD: 242 days.
Status of capability proposals: In-process proposals;
ICD: 433 days;
CDD: 476 days.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Given the size and complexity and level of funding that will be
committed to many of these capability needs, the length of the process
may be warranted. However, concerns have been raised by officials
within the department about how responsive JCIDS can be--concerns that
may prompt some sponsors to bypass the process. According to some
department officials, too much time is spent reviewing individual
capability proposals with little evidence of increased attention to
prioritization or jointness. Senior COCOM officials we spoke with also
stated that the JCIDS process is not conducive to addressing near-term
requirements--the primary focus of the COCOMs--and that the lengthy
nature of the JCIDS process makes it difficult to adjust to emerging
needs. In one case, the Army used extraordinary measures, going outside
DOD's normal requirements, acquisition, and budgeting process to
acquire and field the Joint Network Node-Network (JNN-N)--a $2 billion,
commercial-based system designed to improve satellite communication
capabilities for deployed military units in Afghanistan and Iraq.
[Footnote 23] While JNN-N provided enhanced capability for the
warfighter, the work-around allowed the Army to bypass the management
and oversight typically required of DOD programs of this magnitude.
[Footnote 24]
In 2005, DOD established the Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON)
process to respond to urgent needs associated with combat operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq and the war on terror.[Footnote 25] The JUON
process is intended to prevent mission failure or loss of life and is
generally considered to be more efficient than JCIDS for meeting urgent
needs. However, short-term needs that do not qualify as urgent
operational needs--such as JNN-N--must still go through JCIDS.
DOD Has Faced Challenges in Implementing JCIDS but Has Efforts Under
Way to Improve the Prioritization of Joint Needs:
DOD lacks the necessary framework for more effective implementation of
JCIDS. The department has not yet developed a structured, analytical
approach to prioritize capability proposals submitted to the JCIDS
process. Additionally, the FCBs, which were established to manage the
JCIDS process, do not have the capacity to effectively take the lead in
prioritizing capability needs. Without an approach and entity in charge
to determine what capabilities are needed, all proposals tend to be
treated as priorities within the JCIDS process. The Joint Staff has
recently taken steps to improve the prioritization of capability needs
across DOD.
DOD Lacks an Effective Structure to Facilitate the Prioritization of
Capability Needs:
DOD's failure to prioritize capability needs through the JCIDS process
is due in part to the lack of an analytic framework to determine and
manage capability needs from a departmentwide perspective. To date,
JCIDS largely responds to capability proposals that are submitted by
component sponsors on a case-by-case basis. Lacking a more proactive
approach, JCIDS has been ineffective at integrating and balancing needs
from the military services, COCOMs, and other defense components. DOD
has several different approaches to identify capability needs but they
do not appear to be well integrated with JCIDS. For example, each COCOM
submits annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff an
integrated priority list, which defines the COCOM's highest-priority
capability gaps for the near term, including shortfalls that may
adversely affect COCOM missions. However, it is unclear to what extent
integrated priority lists or other approaches, such as JUONs and
lessons learned from recent and ongoing military operations, inform the
JCIDS process. According to officials from several COCOMs, needs
identified through integrated priority lists are not typically
developed into JCIDS capability proposals. These officials indicated
that to be successful in getting a need addressed, they have to build a
coalition with one or more services that may have similar needs.
At the same time, the military services continue to drive the
determination of capability needs, in part because they retain most of
DOD's analytical capacity and resources for requirements development.
According to Air Force and Army officials, they have several hundred
staff involved in capabilities planning and development. In contrast,
the FCBs are relatively small, with the majority having 12 or fewer
staff members. FCB officials noted that the assessments that must be
conducted to support a capability proposal can cost several million
dollars and require several staff years of effort. Consequently, the
FCBs only sponsored five capability development proposals over the last
5 years and generally devote most of their time and effort to reviewing
documents submitted by sponsors and providing recommendations on them
to the JROC. In March 2008, we reported that the FCB responsible for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities lacked
sufficient resources to engage in early coordination with sponsors and
review the sponsors' capability assessments.[Footnote 26]
Representatives from several of the FCBs also indicated that they lack
the expertise to effectively weigh in on the technical feasibility and
costs of sponsors' capability proposals and identify trade-offs that
may be needed to modify proposals. A study performed under contract for
the Joint Staff in July 2007 also found that some FCBs were under
resourced for performing their duties.[Footnote 27]
COCOMs, particularly the regional commands, also lack analytic capacity
and resources to become more fully engaged in JCIDS--either by
developing their own capability assessments or participating in reviews
and commenting on proposals submitted to JCIDS. Some COCOM officials
pointed out that because of their limited resources, they must pick and
choose capability proposals to get involved in. Several studies have
recommended that DOD increase joint analytic resources for a less
stovepiped understanding of warfighting needs.[Footnote 28]
Efforts Under Way to Improve Prioritization and Streamline the JCIDS
Process:
In 2006, the JROC developed a most pressing military issues list in an
effort to identify the most important high-level issues facing the
department and thereby provide better guidance to sponsors and FCBs on
what capability assessments to focus on. In addition, the JROC directed
the FCBs to develop and implement an approach to synthesize the COCOMs'
annual integrated priority lists and bring greater focus to
prioritizing joint capability needs. This resulted, in 2007, in a
consolidated list of capability needs. The JROC has also increased its
involvement with the COCOMs through regular trips and meetings to
discuss capability needs and resourcing issues. According to joint
staff officials, these efforts have helped the JROC gain an increased
understanding of the COCOMs' needs as well as provided the COCOMs with
a forum for communicating their needs. Officials from several COCOMs
noted that many of the near-term needs reflected in their integrated
priority lists are now being addressed more effectively through annual
budget adjustments and force structure changes.
At the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff
has also recently begun a project to provide a more systematic approach
to prioritizing capability areas and gaps that need to be addressed
across the department. This effort is intended to identify the near-,
mid-, and long-term needs of the military services and other defense
components and synthesize them with the needs of the COCOMs. The
project's first step, which is expected to be completed by the Joint
Staff by the end of 2008, focuses on establishing what capabilities are
most important to carrying out military operations either now or in the
future. Capability areas will then be assessed to identify and
prioritize where deficiencies or gaps in capabilities exist, and where
additional capabilities may or may not be needed. The framework being
used in the project is similar to one that the Institute for Defense
Analysis developed with the U.S. Pacific Command a few years ago to
strengthen the analytical basis for the integrated priority lists. The
framework used by U.S. Pacific Command links capability needs to
elements of the operational plans that the command is responsible for
executing. Capability needs are determined by consolidating the views
of operational planners, capability developers, and other subject
matter experts from within the command.
If the project achieves expected results, the FCBs--and ultimately, the
JROC--would be able to screen new capabilities proposals during the
JCIDS review process while having knowledge of the capacity and
sufficiency of existing requirements. According to Joint Staff
officials, however, there are key challenges to implementing the
project and coming up with a credible prioritization of capability
needs. A major challenge will be to determine how best to integrate
service and COCOM capability perspectives that are typically based on
different roles, missions, and time frames. The military services tend
to address capabilities in terms of defense planning scenarios that
identify the mid-and long-term challenges the department must be
prepared to handle. This has led to the development of capability
proposals that advocate the need for the "next generation" of weapon
system capability. In contrast, the COCOMs tend to address capabilities
in terms of being able to execute operational plans they have developed
for assigned missions in their geographic areas of responsibility. As
such, the COCOMs' focus has been on current and near-term needs. The
Center for Strategic and International Studies and others have
advocated that mid-and long-term capability planning capacity is needed
for COCOMs and that the functional COCOMs should perhaps play a
stronger role in representing the regional COCOMs. Another challenge
will be in developing appropriate criteria and measures for identifying
capability gaps and determining the relative importance of these needed
capabilities. Such criteria and measures have generally been lacking in
the JCIDS process.
Adjustments have also been made to try to streamline the JCIDS process
to reduce the time it typically takes to validate capability proposals.
One recent change to the process means a sponsor does not have to
submit a CPD if the program is on track and there are no changes since
the CDD was validated. In addition, the Joint Staff has been tracking
the amount of time it takes to get through the various review and
comment phases of JCIDS and implemented measures to speed up the
adjudication of reviewers' comments on capability proposals. As a
result, there has been some improvement in reducing the time it takes
to validate capability proposals. For example, we found that capability
proposals (ICDs and CDDs) took about 9.5 months to be validated during
2003 to 2005 compared to about 8 months during 2006 to 2008. The Joint
Staff has also recognized that the definitions used to determine what
capability proposals must be brought to the JROC for approval is too
broad and some proposals could be delegated to other authorities for
validation. The definitions are being modified in part to focus JROC
oversight on proposals that may truly warrant JROC involvement.
Furthermore, the JROC is considering delegating authority for some JROC-
interest capability proposals to lower levels, such as the Joint
Capabilities Board and the FCBs.
Conclusions:
By establishing JCIDS, DOD has, to some extent, recognized the need to
better ensure that joint warfighting needs can be addressed within
fiscal resource constraints. However, the process has not proven to be
an effective approach to increase the level of joint participation or
to prioritize the capability needs of the services, COCOMs, and other
DOD components. While DOD has begun initiatives to improve JCIDS, the
department continues to lack an analytic approach and an appropriate
alignment of resources to balance competing capability needs.
Consequently, DOD continues to start more weapons programs than current
and likely future financial resources can support and miss
opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities. Until JCIDS
evolves from a service-centric process to a process that balances
service and joint near-, mid-, and long-term capability needs, DOD will
continue to contend with managing a portfolio that does not match
available resources and risk failing to provide joint capabilities
needed by the warfighter.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop an analytic approach within JCIDS to
better prioritize and balance the capability needs of the military
services, COCOMs, and other defense components. The Joint Staff should
consider whether current efforts--particularly, the capabilities
prioritization project--should be adopted as a framework for this
approach. The approach should also establish appropriate criteria and
measures for identifying capability gaps and determining the relative
importance of near-, mid-, and long-term capability needs. Ultimately,
the approach should provide a means to review and validate proposals
more efficiently and ensure that the most important capability needs of
the department are being addressed.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense determine and allocate
appropriate resources for joint capabilities development planning. In
so doing, the Secretary should consider whether the responsibility and
capacity of the COCOMs and FCBs to conduct joint capabilities
development planning should be increased, whether one or more of the
functional COCOMs should be given the responsibility and capacity to
conduct joint capabilities development planning, and whether resources
currently residing within the military services for capabilities
development planning should be shifted to the COCOMs and FCBs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our first recommendation and concurred with the second
recommendation. DOD's partial concurrence with our first
recommendation--that an analytic approach be developed within JCIDS to
better prioritize and balance the capability needs of the military
services, COCOMs, and defense components--is based on the premise that
prioritization occurs through several existing processes in the
department, and that JCIDS is not intended to be the primary means of
prioritizing. DOD's concurrence with our second recommendation--to
determine and allocate appropriate resources for joint capabilities
development planning--is based on its position that resources are
adequate and have been allocated appropriately. The department's
response to both of our recommendations leads us to conclude that it
does not see a need to improve its ability to prioritize and balance
joint capability needs.
In commenting on our first recommendation, DOD pointed out that
identifying, prioritizing, and balancing joint capability needs occurs
through multiple processes both within and outside of JCIDS, such as
COCOM integrated priority lists and JUONs, as well as through the
department's budgeting and acquisition systems. We acknowledge that
these DOD processes play a role in delivering capabilities to the
warfighter; however, as we note in our report, these processes do not
appear to be well integrated with JCIDS. Regardless, DOD established
JCIDS as the principal process to support senior decision makers in
identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint warfighting needs. The
process was intended to move the department away from a service-
centric, stovepiped approach to a joint approach that helps ensure that
COCOMs are provided the capabilities needed to carry out military
operations. However, many of the COCOMs do not believe that their needs
are sufficiently addressed through JCIDS and there is no evidence that
the process has achieved its intended goals. In fact, capability
proposals submitted through JCIDS are not prioritized and largely
continue to reflect insular interests. Unless an analytic approach to
prioritize and balance the capability needs of the services, COCOMs,
and other defense components is established, DOD will continue losing
opportunities to strengthen joint warfighting capabilities and
constrain its portfolio of weapon system programs. Given that JCIDS was
established for this purpose, it seems logical to build such an
approach within JCIDS.
In concurring with our second recommendation, DOD asserts that the
resources currently allocated for joint capabilities development
planning are appropriate. However, while the FCBs may be sufficiently
resourced to review capability proposals submitted by sponsors into
JCIDS, they lack the resources and capacity to play a leading role in
defining and prioritizing joint capability needs for their functional
capability areas. In addition, while the JCIDS process provides
opportunities for their participation, the COCOMs lack the resources
and analytic capacity to conduct their own capability assessments or
review proposals submitted by other sponsors. Several other recent
studies[Footnote 29] similarly indicated that the COCOMs are
underrepresented in the department's efforts to determine joint
capabilities. We continue to believe that a better alignment of
resources for conducting joint capabilities planning--among the
services, FCBs, and COCOMs--would help the department to more
effectively prioritize and balance competing capability needs.
DOD also provided information about recent initiatives that are being
implemented to improve the JCIDS, budgeting, and acquisition processes,
and to strengthen the involvement of the joint community in determining
capability needs. For example, since completing our draft report, the
JROC moved to give the COCOMs a greater voice in the JCIDS process by
delegating responsibility for validating requirements in the command
and control functional area to the Joint Forces Command. While this
initiative and others appear promising, as DOD notes, it is too early
to determine whether the full benefits of these initiatives will be
realized.
In addition, DOD commented that our report did not sufficiently
recognize the extent of joint participation that occurs through the
JCIDS process. DOD stated that many of the services' proposals are in
direct response to capability gaps identified by the COCOMs and that
the JCIDS process is structured to provide the joint community multiple
opportunities and time to review proposals and ensure that they
correctly state the needs of the joint warfighter. While we agree that
some proposals submitted to JCIDS do address joint needs, the services
still largely drive the vast majority of capability needs that are
pursued in the department. Furthermore, once proposals are submitted to
JCIDS, there is little evidence of increased attention to
prioritization or jointness that results from the review of these
proposals.
DOD's letter, with its written comments and description of new
initiatives, is reprinted in appendix IV.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget. We will provide copies to others on
request. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report or need additional
information, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors
to this report were John Oppenheim, Assistant Director; John Krump;
Sean Seales; Karen Sloan; and Don Springman.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine whether the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System process has achieved its objective to prioritize joint
warfighting needs, we analyzed information and capability documents
contained in the Joint Staff's Knowledge Management/Decision Support
tool[Footnote 30] compiled since the inception of JCIDS. First, we
determined how many capability documents--initial capabilities
documents (ICD) and capability development documents (CDD)--were
designated "JROC-interest," which are defined as all Acquisition
Category (ACAT) I programs and other programs whose capabilities have a
significant impact on joint warfighting. We identified a total of 203
capability documents--90 ICDs and 113 CDDs. We then analyzed and
determined whether the capability documents were sponsored by the joint
community, military services, and other Department of Defense (DOD)
agencies. In addition, we determined which documents had completed the
JCIDS process and been validated, which had completed the process and
are inactive, and which are still under review. We also determined the
amount of time required for capability documents to complete the JCIDS
process and the amount of time other documents have remained in the
process. We also reviewed Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
memorandums validating requirements documents to determine if
requirements were assigned a priority upon validation. Further, we
reviewed budgeted and projected program costs for major defense
acquisitions reported by DOD's Selected Acquisition Report summary
tables for the years 2000 to 2007, covering periods before and after
the inception of JCIDS.
To identify factors affecting DOD's ability to effectively implement
JCIDS, we analyzed the existing structure of the JCIDS process and
evaluated the sufficiency of the Joint military community workforce for
preparing and reviewing JCIDS requirements documents. We provided
written questionnaires to functional capability boards (FCB) to
determine staffing and resource levels. We also evaluated recent DOD
initiatives designed to improve the JCIDS process.
In researching both of our primary objectives, we interviewed officials
from the Joint Staff; DOD's FCBs; U.S. Special Operations Command; U.S.
Joint Forces Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Central Command;
Department of the Air Force; Department of the Navy; and Department of
the Army. We reviewed statements made by DOD officials in prior
congressional testimony. We reviewed prior GAO and other audit reports
as well as DOD-sponsored studies related to JCIDS that were conducted
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute
for Defense Analyses, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment
Project, the Defense Science Board, and Booz Allen Hamilton. We
reviewed guidance and regulations issued by the Joint Staff, the
military services, and DOD, as well as other DOD-produced documentation
related to JCIDS.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to August 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Functional Capabilities Boards:
Nine FCBs have been established by the JROC to evaluate issues
impacting their respective functional areas and provide subject matter
expertise to the JROC. The assigned functional areas and sponsoring
organizations of the FCBs are shown in table 1. FCBs assist the JROC in
overseeing capabilities development within JCIDS, to include assessment
of ICDs, CDDs, and CPDs. FCBs can only make recommendations, and are
not empowered to approve or disapprove of proposals.
Table 1: Functional Capabilities Boards:
FCB: Battlespace Awareness;
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate for Intelligence (J-2);
Capability: Understand dispositions and intentions as well as the
characteristics and conditions of the operational environment that bear
on national and military decision making.
FCB: Building Partnerships;
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate for Strategic Plans and
Policy (J-5);
Capability: Set the conditions for interaction with partner,
competitor, or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant
populations by developing and presenting information and conducting
activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and
capabilities.
FCB: Command and Control;
Sponsoring agency: U.S. Joint Forces Command;
Capability: Exercise authority and direction by a properly designated
commander or decision maker over assigned and attached forces and
resources in the accomplishment of the mission.
FCB: Corporate Management and Support;
Sponsoring agency: Vice Director of the Joint Staff;
Capability: Provide strategic senior-level, enterprisewide leadership,
direction, coordination, and oversight through a chief management
officer function.
FCB: Force Application;
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate of Force Structure,
Resources and Assessment (J-8);
Capability: Integrate the use of maneuver and engagement in all
environments to create the effects necessary to achieve mission
objectives.
FCB: Force Support;
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate of Force Structure,
Resources and Assessment (J-8);
Capability: Establish, develop, and maintain capable installation
assets across the total force to ensure that needed capabilities are
available to support national security.
FCB: Logistics;
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate of Logistics (J-4);
Capability: Project and sustain a logistically ready joint force
through the deliberate sharing of national and multinational resources
to effectively support operations, extend operational reach, and
provide the joint force commander the freedom of action necessary to
meet mission objectives.
FCB: Net Centric;
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate for C-4 Systems (J-6);
Capability: Provide a framework for full human and technical
connectivity and interoperability that allows all DOD users and mission
partners to share the information they need, when they need it, and in
a form which they can understand it and act on it with confidence, and
protects information from those who should not have it.
FCB: Protection;
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate of Force Structure,
Resources and Assessment (J-8);
Capability: Prevent and mitigate adverse effects of attacks on
personnel and physical assets of the United States and its allies and
friends.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Combatant Commands:
There are currently 10 unified combatant commands (COCOM) serving as
DOD's operational commanders--6 with geographic responsibilities and 4
with functional responsibilities. The 6 COCOMs with geographic
responsibilities are U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S.
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S.
Southern Command. Their geographic areas of responsibility are shown in
figure 6.
Figure 6: Combatant Commands with Geographic Responsibilities:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the world depicting the georgraphical
boundaries of the six Combatant Commands.
Source: GAO presentation of DOD data.
Note: In February 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced that DOD
will establish a sixth COCOM with geographic responsibilities-
-the U.S. Africa Command--which is expected to become operational by
September 2008.
[End of figure]
The four functional COCOMs are U.S. Joint Forces Command, which engages
in joint training and force provision; U.S. Special Operations Command,
which trains, equips, and deploys special operations forces to other
COCOMs and leads counterterrorist missions worldwide; U.S. Strategic
Command, whose missions include space and information operations,
missile defense, global command and control, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, strategic deterrence, and integration
and synchronization of DOD's departmentwide efforts in combating
weapons of mass destruction; and U.S. Transportation Command, which
provides air, land, and sea transportation for DOD.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
September 17, 2008:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
The enclosed is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO
Draft Report, GAO-08-1060, "Defense Acquisitions: DoD's Requirements
Determination Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint
Capabilities," dated August 5, 2008 (GAO Code 120653).
DoD appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report. After reviewing the draft report, DoD partially concurs with
the first recommendation and concurs with the second. The enclosed
information provides amplifying comments for clarification.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James M. Durham:
Director:
Joint Advanced Concepts:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated August 5, 2008:
GAO-08-1060 (GAO Code 120653):
"Defense Acquisitions: Dod's Requirements Determination Process
Has Not Been Effective In Priortizing Joint Capabilities"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff to develop an analytic
approach within Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS) to better prioritize and balance the capability needs of the
military services, COCOMs, and other defense components.
DoD Response: Partially Concur. JCIDS is not intended to be the primary
means of prioritizing and balancing the DoD investment portfolios.
Additional processes that contribute the total DoD prioritization
effort include contributions from:
* Strategic Guidance;
* The Analytic Agenda;
* Joint Concepts and Experimentation;
* Defense Acquisition System;
* Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) System;
* Capability Portfolio Management;
* Materiel Development Decision.
Adopting the recommendation to develop an approach `within JCIDS' would
foster a narrow approach that would not reflect the richness of inputs
and analyses from multiple Joint participants that is now in effect.
The following paragraphs provide details on the methods DoD uses to
identify, prioritize, and balance the needs of the Services, COCOMs and
other defense components.
Identification of Joint Capability Needs. Within DoD, multiple venues
exist to identify the capability needs of the joint warfighter. These
venues exist both within and outside the JCIDS process. In accordance
with the Chairman's Manual for the "Operation of the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System," CJCSM 3170.01C, the primary means
within JCIDS to identify one or more joint capability needs is the
Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA). The CBA also identifies potential
materiel and non-materiel approaches to address those needs.
Outside the JCIDS process, capability needs maybe identified by COCOMs,
Services, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
other defense agencies through a variety of means that may ultimately
enter into the JCIDS process. These methods include, but are not
limited to, COCOM Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), Joint Capability
Technology Demonstration (JCTD), Lessons Learned and Joint Urgent
Operation Needs (JUONs).
Prioritization of Joint Capability Needs. The GAO report recommends the
development of an analytic approach to better prioritize the capability
needs of the military Services. Prioritization is essential. The
Department's resources have limits, and the needs of today must be
balanced with our future needs. Prioritization, however, does not occur
in a single forum or process. It is the result of multiple analytic
efforts that occur in the capability development system, the
acquisition system, and the Planning Programming and Budgeting System.
The Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), for example, are an important
statement of COCOM priorities. The Chairman submits a Chairman's
Program Assessment (CPA) to the Secretary of Defense which reflects his
assessment of service Program Objectives Memorandum (POMs) as judged by
his personal strategic review. The Functional Capabilities Boards
(FCBs) prioritize capability needs by their assessment of needs across
their domains.
Recently, the Department has introduced Capability Portfolio Management
(CPM). CPM creates horizontal assessments of all Service programs in
given functional areas, such as Command and Control. Within that
portfolio, the CPM team (co-chaired by COCOM or Joint Staff Flag
Officers, representatives from the FCBs, and OSD senior executives)
prioritizes programs, recommends the addition or removal of resources,
and presents their findings as recommendations to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense. This is a new and potentially powerful prioritization tool
that is highly complementary with JCIDS. The acquisition system
continually prioritizes within its domain, balancing cost, schedule,
and performance against the stated requirements of the warfighter. The
POM represents each Service's statements of priorities across all the
functional areas. JCIDS contributes to these prioritization efforts by
complementing both the acquisition system and PPBS.
Balancing Capability Needs of COCOMs, Services, and other Defense
Components. The GAO report states that "JCIDS has been ineffective at
integrating and balancing needs from the military Services, COCOMs, and
other defense components (pg 15/GAO)." COCOMs and Services have
different perspectives based upon their statutory requirements. COCOMs
identify capability needs based upon current operational tasks assigned
to them by the President and Secretary of Defense. Services are
responsible for manning, training and equipping the joint force
required to meet COCOM needs. Due to the time it takes to develop the
joint force, Services must look to future needs of COCOMs in order to
provide a balance of joint capabilities. The JCIDS process allows
multiple venues for COCOMs and Services to provide inputs on capability
needs in order to achieve a proper balance. Additionally, other DoD
processes, such as the Analytic Agenda, PPBE, and Strategic Guidance
carefully examine and adjust the balance between the needs of the
COCOMs and Services.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
determine and allocate appropriate resources for joint capabilities
development planning.
DoD Response: Concur. In order to be an effective participant in the
identification and development of fiscally informed joint capabilities,
participating commands/organizations must be properly resourced (i.e.,
sufficient people equipped with appropriate skill sets and decision
support tools). At present, the competency for the JCIDS analyses (and
the majority of the resources for this function) resides in the
Services. Each Service fulfills this function as a component of a
combatant command. Shifting the responsibility to the COCOM staff could
impact COCOM focus on assigned mission sets if they are not
appropriately resourced.
The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
presently determine and allocate resources for joint capabilities
development planning. The FCBs, by design, are matrixed organizations
with representation from the Services, COCOMs, Joint Staff, OSD, and
other defense agencies. When necessary, these participating
organizations contribute resources to support FCB assessments in order
to ensure their organizational requirements are adequately addressed.
Annually, the FCBs present to the Vice Director, Joint Staff J-8 their
contract man-year equivalent requirements to perform the core JCIDS
responsibilities outlined in the Chairman's Instruction on the FCBs,
CJCSI 3137.O1C. Based upon the restructuring of Joint Capability Areas
(JCAs) in February 2008, J-8 fully funded each FCB's request based upon
realignment of capability portfolios. In addition, FCBs, Services and
COCOMs may request additional funding, as necessary, to support
unplanned analysis required by the JROC.
Additional DoD Comments:
Overall comments to the draft report can be summarized in the following
3 points:
1) Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is
Only One of Multiple Elements:
The DoD uses three key processes that are aligned to identify, fund,
and deliver joint warfighting capabilities: the JCIDS process is used
to determine the shortfalls in capabilities across the Department; the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process is used to
prioritize and allocate resources; and the focus of the Acquisition
process is cost-effective delivery of the capability. Efforts to
address any shortcomings of the JCIDS process would be best addressed
in the context of the entire acquisition reform effort now underway at
DoD. There is concern that undue focus on one process will lead to an
unbalanced solution. For example, even if the requirements process
could produce/provide justifiable documentation in less than 6 months,
present acquisition and budgeting processes are not flexible/agile
enough to rapidly place new capabilities into the hands of the
warfighter. A useful approach might be to identify JCIDS reform
recommendations as part of a bigger solution set.
Additionally, the JCIDS process alone does not prioritize capabilities,
but is one of several processes the DoD uses to prioritize warfighting
needs. Additional comments on this particular issue are detailed in the
response to Recommendation 1.
2) Progress Not Documented in the Report:
While refinement of the requirements process is certainly needed, it is
important to identify and leverage the progress that has been made to
date. Since the GAO report was initiated, a number of reforms have been
implemented, and the JCIDS process described in the report does not
fully reflect the current process. Realizing the full benefits of these
reforms will require a completed cycle of development, but we would
like to here enumerate the works in progress.
We also would like to highlight that the current process of joint
requirements development attempts to strike a balance between
development time and performance of delivered capabilities. While the
report acknowledges some improvement in reducing JCIDS timelines (from
10 to 8 months), it does not reflect the improvement over the
Requirements Generation Process (predecessor to JCIDS), which on
average took 18 months. Nor does the report recognize the leadership's
current focus on initiatives and experiments to improve the process.
The following initiatives are reflective of this progress:
a) Since completion of the GAO report the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) moved to give COCOMs (JFCOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM, SOCOM)
a greater voice in the requirements process. A first step will be for
JFCOM to review proposed new capabilities within the Command and
Control functional area. This step represents a demonstrable shift in
authority for requirement validation from the JROC to a Combatant
Commander. Additional examples of Functional COCOMs acting on behalf of
the JROC to assess proposed requirements in their designated domains
are most likely to follow.
b) Recently, the Department introduced Capability Portfolio Management
(CPM). CPM creates horizontal assessments of all Service programs
across functional areas, such as Command and Control. Within a
portfolio, the CPM team (co-chaired by COCOM or Joint Staff Flag
Officers, representatives from the FCBs, and OSD senior executives)
prioritizes programs, recommends the addition or removal of resources,
and presents their findings as recommendations to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense. This is a new and potentially powerful prioritization
process that is highly complementary with JCIDS. The acquisition system
continually prioritizes within its domain, balancing cost, schedule,
and performance against the stated requirements of the warfighter. The
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) represents each Service's statements
of priorities across all the functional areas. JCIDS contributes to
these prioritization efforts by complementing both the acquisition
system and Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS).
c) The acquisition system is also evolving in concert with changes to
the JCIDS process. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)-initiated
Concept Decision Initiative (CDI) assessed alternative processes for
analysis and review to increase the effectiveness of the CJCSI 3170
capability development process and the DoDI 5000.2 acquisition
processes. The CDI pilot effort resulted in a number of key "Lessons
Learned." The outcome was creation of a new decision point in the
acquisition system called the Materiel Development Decision (MDD).
Formerly known as the Concept Decision, MDD capitalizes on Lessons
Learned from the CDI and provides an early, formal opportunity to weigh
capability gaps relative to technology opportunities and resourcing. At
the MDD, which is the mandatory formal entry point into the acquisition
process for all programs, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)
determines what analysis must be conducted to assess the range of
alternatives necessary to meet the joint capability need. The MDA's
determination is formally captured in an Acquisition Decision
Memorandum and the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) study guidance that
informs succeeding acquisition decisions.
This approach places a new emphasis on the AoA and employs it more
effectively as a decision support tool to inform acquisition decision-
making. The result of the analysis is recommendation of one or more
proposed materiel solution(s) that reflects maturity of key
technologies, as well as any risks of integration and manufacturing.
This information serves as the foundation for any follow-on development
activity. This use of the MDD is designed to reduce programmatic risk
and ensure stable and predictable acquisition programs.
3) Lack of Recognition of Joint Processes for Requirements Development:
The process of identifying joint capabilities is, of necessity, a
balancing of current needs against investment for future needs. The DoD
must meet the immediate needs of our warfighting commanders, yet there
also must be sufficient investment in future capabilities to ensure our
long-term security. No single player in the. capabilities determination
process has the perspective required to make the best judgment.
Capabilities determination is a collaborative process amongst the Joint
Staff, the Services, and the Combat Support Agencies. This thoroughly
joint process is both top-down, emanating from Joint Operations
Concepts and Service assessments of future requirements - as well as
bottom-up, derived from assessments conducted by the Combatant
Commanders. In the past, the Services, with their considerable
analytical capacity and budget authority, have been the most powerful
players in the process. This is correctly identified in the draft GAO
report. However, our current process, aided by improvements the JROC
has recently initiated, reduces this imbalance by leveraging the
Services capacity to focus on Joint capability priorities.
The draft report argues that the lack of joint participation in the
requirements process is evidenced by the fact that most new proposals
for joint capabilities were sponsored by the Services. The Services
have a statutory responsibility to man, equip, and train the joint
force required to meet COCOM needs. In recognition of this requirement,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCSI 3170 series) directs
development of capability documents to be the responsibility of the
acquisition authority as sponsor. Since Services/Agencies possess 95+%
of those funds, it is perhaps not surprising that 67% of Initial
Capabilities Documents (ICDs) are developed by the Services. This
statistic alone does not reflect that many of the Services' proposals
are in direct response to capability gaps identified by the COCOMs. Nor
does it reflect the influence that COCOM-developed Joint Capability
Documents (JCDs) have on shaping ICDs. As the Services refine their
requirements, COCOMs and the rest of the joint community have multiple
opportunities for input. Indeed, part of the criticism in the report -
the time required to validate new requirements - exists for this exact
reason. Every member of the joint community has the right and
obligation to scrutinize proposal requirements to ensure that they
correctly state the needs of the joint warfighter.
In addition, the following are responses to specific GAO statements
within the report:
I) "Capabilities continue to be driven primarily by the individual
Services - which sponsored 67 percent of initial capability proposals
submitted since 2003 - with little involvement from the COCOMs, which
are largely responsible for planning and carrying out military
operations (pg 2/GAO)."
1. Joint perspective is captured as COCOMs and defense agencies provide
inputs and are involved in key decisions for capability proposals
within their areas of interest.
2. Often capability needs fall solely within the functional domain of a
single service. The Services, as the force provider components of the
COCOMs, have the functional expertise in these areas and are thereby
assigned as sponsors of these capability proposals in fulfillment of
their statutory obligations.
3. Programs that truly require a joint approach are developed through
joint teams comprised of representatives from the COCOMs, Services,
Joint Staff and other defense agencies (e.g., Joint Strike Fighter,
Joint High Speed Vessel).
II) "Vast majority of proposals completing JCIDS are approved (pg
9/GAO)."
1. Only valid capability needs complete the JCIDS process.
2. All proposals go through an extensive commenting and review process
that includes the COCOMs, Services and OSD before being briefed to the
FCB and JCB. Through this comment and review process, changes are made
in the documents to ensure they meet the needs of the joint warfighter
prior to their approval by the JROC.
3. There are a significant number of instances in which valid
capability needs are not entered into JCIDS because there are
sufficient, existing means to address the gap, the technology required
is not sufficiently developed or it is decided to accept risk
associated with the capability gap.
III) "JCIDS proposals are not prioritized across capability and mission
areas. Instead, the extent to which any prioritization has occurred
within JCIDS has been limited to the key performance parameters or
requirements individual capability proposals (pg 10/GAO)."
1. During the conduct of a CBA, joint concepts are evaluated against
the current and programmed force across one or more mission areas.
Capability needs identified during the CBA are then prioritized.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] DOD's weapon system investments are based on JCIDS and two other
decision-making processes: the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Execution system, for allocating financial resources, and the Defense
Acquisition System, for managing product development and procurement.
[2] S. Rep. No. 109-69 at 343-346 (2005).
[3] We also issued a report recently examining the impact of DOD's
resource allocation process on major weapon system programs. See GAO,
Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve
Major Weapon System Program Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-619] (Washington, D.C.: July
2, 2008).
[4] COCOMs are DOD's operational commanders. There are six COCOMs with
geographic responsibilities and four with functional responsibilities.
See app. III for more information on COCOMs.
[5] The national military strategy describes the Armed Forces' plan to
achieve military objectives in the near term and is intended to provide
the vision for ensuring that they remain decisive in the future.
[6] When weapon systems are interoperable, information can be directly
exchanged and used.
[7] The Quadrennial Defense Review is a major DOD review done every 4
years that is designed to provide a comprehensive examination of the
national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans,
infrastructure, and budget plans.
[8] The JROC consists of the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the four military service vice chiefs.
[9] Currently, there are nine FCBs--made up of representatives from the
military services, COCOMs, and other DOD entities--established within
JCIDS: Battlespace Awareness, Building Partnerships, Command and
Control, Corporate Management and Support, Force Application, Force
Support, Logistics, Net Centric, and Protection. See app. II for more
information on FCBs.
[10] Other capability proposals that are determined to have less joint
impact do not have to go through the full JCIDS process and are usually
validated and approved by the sponsoring organization.
[11] An analysis of alternatives is typically developed by the
acquisition community and is an evaluation of the performance,
effectiveness, suitability, and estimated costs of alternative systems
to meet a capability.
[12] Depending on the capability being acquired, not all documents may
be required. For example, when a capability is being completely
delivered through a commercial-off-the-shelf solution with no
development or significant integration required, a CDD is not typically
required.
[13] Army Audit Agency, Army's Capabilities Determination Process, A-
2006-0224-ALA (Sept. 27, 2006).
[14] Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment
Project for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Defense Acquisition
Performance Assessment Report (January 2006).
[15] Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transformation: A Progress
Assessment (February 2006).
[16] Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater
Nichols, Department of Defense Acquisition and Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution Reform, Phase III Report (Washington, D.C.:
August 2006), and Invigorating Defense Governance: A Beyond Goldwater-
Nichols Phase IV Report (Washington, D.C.: March 2008).
[17] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes
Not Well-Suited to Support Development of the Global Information Grid,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-211] (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 30, 2006).
[18] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-578] (Washington, D.C.: May
17, 2007).
[19] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to
Experience Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD's Revised Policy,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-368] (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 13, 2006).
[20] It should be noted that as of March 2008, if a major defense
acquisition program has a Milestone A review it may not receive
Milestone A approval to begin a technology development program until
the Milestone Decision Authority certifies to Congress that (1) the
system fulfills an approved initial capabilities document; (2) the
system is being executed by an entity with a relevant core competency
as identified by the Secretary of Defense; (3) if the system duplicates
a capability already provided by an existing system, the duplication
provided by such system is necessary and appropriate; and (4) a cost
estimate for the system has been submitted. DOD is currently revising
its policy and guidance for conducting and certifying Milestone A
reviews. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-181, § 943, (2008).
[21] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-388] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007).
[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-619].
[23] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: The Army Faces Challenges in Developing
a Tactical Networking Strategy, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-10SU] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2006).
[24] In 2005, DOD's Office of General Counsel determined that the
amount of funding for JNN-N exceeded the threshold for establishing a
major defense acquisition program and that it must comply with
applicable laws and DOD policies. The Army subsequently had a
capability document validated through the JCIDS process and established
JNN-N as a formal program in 2007, by absorbing it into the first
increment of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical program.
[25] A JUON is an urgent operational need identified by a COCOM
involved in an ongoing military operation. The purpose of the JUON
process is to gain Joint Staff validation and funding, usually within
days or weeks, to meet high-priority COCOM needs. The scope of a JUON
is limited to needs that (1) fall outside of the established military
service processes and (2) if not addressed immediately, will seriously
endanger personnel or pose a major threat to ongoing operations. The
proposed solution to this type of COCOM need is not supposed to involve
the development of a new technology or capability.
[26] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can
Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of
Future ISR Requirements, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-374] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2008).
[27] Booz Allen Hamilton, Follow-up to Chief, JCD Functional
Capabilities Board Analytic Assessment Final Report Brief, study done
for the Joint Staff (July 9, 2007).
[28] Institute for Defense Analyses, Improving Integration of
Department of Defense Processes for Capabilities Development and
Planning (September 2006); Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic
Era, Phase I Report (March 2004); and Joint Defense Capabilities Study
Team (DOD), Joint Defense Capabilities Study: Improving DOD Strategic
Planning, Resourcing, and Execution to Satisfy Joint Capabilities,
Final Report (January 2004).
[29] Institute for Defense Analyses, Improving Integration of
Department of Defense Processes for Capabilities Development and
Planning (September 2006); Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic
Era, Phase I Report (March 2004); and Joint Defense Capabilities Study
Team (DOD), Joint Defense Capabilities Study: Improving DOD Strategic
Planning, Resourcing, and Execution to Satisfy Joint Capabilities,
Final Report (January 2004).
[30] This system is designed to track the status of capability proposal
documents--ICDs, CDDs, CPDs, and other documents---submitted to the
JCIDS process for review. It is the key system that the Joint Staff and
other DOD components use to review and comment on proposals. To assess
the reliability of the data system, we interviewed Joint Staff
officials knowledgeable about the system. We determined that the data
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
[End of section]
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