Defense Infrastructure
Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of Future Overseas Planning Reports and Factors Affecting the Master Planning Effort for the Military Buildup on Guam Gao ID: GAO-08-1005 September 17, 2008The Department of Defense (DOD) continues its efforts to reduce the number of troops permanently stationed overseas and consolidate overseas bases. The Senate and conference reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to develop and GAO to monitor DOD's overseas master plans and to provide annual assessments. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to review DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual reviews. This report examines (1) the changes and challenges described in the fiscal year 2009 master plans, the extent the plans address GAO's prior recommendations, and the plans' timeliness and (2) the status of DOD's master planning efforts for the proposed buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam. GAO reviewed the plans and other relevant documents, and visited three overseas combatant commands, various installations, and Guam organizations.
While the fiscal year 2009 master plans generally reflect recent changes in U.S. overseas basing strategies and the challenges DOD faces as well as address GAO's prior recommendations, DOD provided Congress the plans in May 2008, well after the February budget submission when the Senate and conference reports require DOD to issue the plans. This year's plans contain information on current overseas basing strategies and infrastructure requirements and the challenges that DOD faces implementing the plans. The plans also generally address GAO's recommendations except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not provide an update of the Air Force's training challenges in South Korea, despite GAO's prior recommendation that it should describe the challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and funding requirements. DOD officials said that since last year the South Korean government and the U.S. Air Force have taken several steps to address these training challenges. According to DOD officials, efforts to incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects and the lengthy review and approval process have contributed to the fiscal year 2009 plans' lateness. While the congressional requirement for the overseas master plans expired with the fiscal year 2009 plans, DOD said that it intends to provide Congress annual updates of its global defense posture through 2014 and that these updates would replace the master plans as DOD's overseas planning report to Congress. Since DOD will continue to provide annually updated global defense posture reports, it has an opportunity to reexamine its timeline for producing future reports earlier to provide Congress with time for review. DOD has developed a basic framework for the military buildup on Guam but has not issued the congressionally required master plan that was initially due in December 2006, and which Congress later extended to September 2008. The Joint Guam Program Office, which is planning and managing the proposed military buildup, is coordinating the multi-service development of a working-level plan for DOD that is to be submitted to Congress by the 2008 deadline. However, this is a onetime requirement, and DOD officials said that the plan will be a snapshot of the status of the planning process and will not be considered a comprehensive master plan for several reasons. First, while the required environmental impact statement and the resulting record of decision will influence many key decisions about the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam, these documents are not expected to be completed until January 2010. Also, officials of the Joint Guam Program Office said that they expect to complete a comprehensive master plan within 90 days after these required documents are finalized. Second, plans for the detailed force composition of units relocating to Guam, associated facility requirements, and implications for other services' realignments on Guam continue to be refined. Third, additional time is needed to fully address the challenges related to funding uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam's economic and infrastructure requirements. However, without a comprehensive master plan, Congress may have limited data on requirements on which to make informed appropriation decisions and to carry out its oversight responsibilities.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-1005, Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of Future Overseas Planning Reports and Factors Affecting the Master Planning Effort for the Military Buildup on Guam
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2008:
Defense Infrastructure:
Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of Future Overseas Planning
Reports and Factors Affecting the Master Planning Effort for the
Military Buildup on Guam:
GAO-08-1005:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-1005, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) continues its efforts to reduce the
number of troops permanently stationed overseas and consolidate
overseas bases. The Senate and conference reports accompanying the
fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD
to develop and GAO to monitor DOD‘s overseas master plans and to
provide annual assessments. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal
year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to
review DOD‘s master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual
reviews. This report examines (1) the changes and challenges described
in the fiscal year 2009 master plans, the extent the plans address
GAO‘s prior recommendations, and the plans‘ timeliness and (2) the
status of DOD‘s master planning efforts for the proposed buildup of
military forces and infrastructure on Guam. GAO reviewed the plans and
other relevant documents, and visited three overseas combatant
commands, various installations, and Guam organizations.
What GAO Found:
While the fiscal year 2009 master plans generally reflect recent
changes in U.S. overseas basing strategies and the challenges DOD faces
as well as address GAO‘s prior recommendations, DOD provided Congress
the plans in May 2008, well after the February budget submission when
the Senate and conference reports require DOD to issue the plans. This
year‘s plans contain information on current overseas basing strategies
and infrastructure requirements and the challenges that DOD faces
implementing the plans. The plans also generally address GAO‘s
recommendations except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not
provide an update of the Air Force‘s training challenges in South
Korea, despite GAO‘s prior recommendation that it should describe the
challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and funding
requirements. DOD officials said that since last year the South Korean
government and the U.S. Air Force have taken several steps to address
these training challenges. According to DOD officials, efforts to
incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects and the
lengthy review and approval process have contributed to the fiscal year
2009 plans‘ lateness. While the congressional requirement for the
overseas master plans expired with the fiscal year 2009 plans, DOD said
that it intends to provide Congress annual updates of its global
defense posture through 2014 and that these updates would replace the
master plans as DOD‘s overseas planning report to Congress. Since DOD
will continue to provide annually updated global defense posture
reports, it has an opportunity to reexamine its timeline for producing
future reports earlier to provide Congress with time for review.
DOD has developed a basic framework for the military buildup on Guam
but has not issued the congressionally required master plan that was
initially due in December 2006, and which Congress later extended to
September 2008. The Joint Guam Program Office, which is planning and
managing the proposed military buildup, is coordinating the multi-
service development of a working-level plan for DOD that is to be
submitted to Congress by the 2008 deadline. However, this is a onetime
requirement, and DOD officials said that the plan will be a snapshot of
the status of the planning process and will not be considered a
comprehensive master plan for several reasons. First, while the
required environmental impact statement and the resulting record of
decision will influence many key decisions about the buildup of
military forces and infrastructure on Guam, these documents are not
expected to be completed until January 2010. Also, officials of the
Joint Guam Program Office said that they expect to complete a
comprehensive master plan within 90 days after these required documents
are finalized. Second, plans for the detailed force composition of
units relocating to Guam, associated facility requirements, and
implications for other services‘ realignments on Guam continue to be
refined. Third, additional time is needed to fully address the
challenges related to funding uncertainties, operational requirements,
and Guam‘s economic and infrastructure requirements. However, without a
comprehensive master plan, Congress may have limited data on
requirements on which to make informed appropriation decisions and to
carry out its oversight responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop the global defense posture reports
earlier each year to coincide with the budget submissions and (2)
provide Congress annual updates of the Guam working-level plan until a
comprehensive master plan is finalized and provided to Congress. DOD
agreed with the second recommendation and partially agreed with the
first, which was clarified in response to comments.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1005]. For more
information, contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or
leporeb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Overseas Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes, Challenges, and Our
Prior Recommendations, but Could Be More Timely:
DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Buildup on Guam but Has
Yet to Develop the Congressionally Required Master Plan:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Figure:
Figure 1: U.S. Pacific, European, Central, and Africa Commands'
Proposed Areas of Responsibility on September 30, 2008:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 17, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
In its ongoing global realignment of U.S. forces and installations, the
Department of Defense (DOD) plans to reduce the number of troops
permanently stationed overseas and consolidate overseas bases.
Realigning the U.S. overseas posture involves closing obsolete and
redundant bases, constructing new facilities costing billions of
dollars, and ensuring that other needed infrastructure is in place to
support realigned forces and missions. For example, the U.S.-Japan
Defense Policy Review Initiative[Footnote 1] established a framework
for U.S. force structure in Japan that relocates U.S. military units
from Japan to other areas, including Guam. As a part of this
initiative, DOD tentatively plans to move about 8,000 Marines and their
estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by 2014.
The Senate report and subsequent conference report accompanying the
fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD
to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans to ensure that
infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each
overseas regional command's area of responsibility[Footnote 2]
reflected DOD's global realignment of U.S. forces and installations.
[Footnote 3] The Senate report also directed us to provide assessment
reports on these master plans each year to the congressional defense
committees. Subsequently, the conference report accompanying the 2004
military construction appropriation bill also directed the department
to prepare comprehensive master plans with yearly updates through
fiscal year 2009. In July 2006, the Senate report accompanying the
fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD
to submit a master plan for the military buildup in Guam by December
29, 2006.[Footnote 4] This deadline was later extended to September 15,
2008.[Footnote 5] The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007
military construction appropriation bill also directed us to review
DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of our annual review of
the overseas master plans. DOD considers the master plan for Guam as
separate from the overseas master plans because Guam is a U.S.
territory.
This is our fifth report responding to the requirements contained in
the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill
report and our second report responding to the reporting requirements
on the Guam military buildup contained in the fiscal year 2007 Senate
military construction appropriation bill report.[Footnote 6] This
report examines (1) the changes and challenges described in this year's
overseas master plans, the extent to which they address our prior
recommendations,[Footnote 7] and the plans' timeliness and (2) the
status of DOD's master planning efforts for the proposed buildup of
military forces and infrastructure on Guam. This report is our final
report to fulfill the congressional mandates, which expired with DOD's
May 2008 fiscal year 2009 report.[Footnote 8]
In conducting our work, we visited three overseas regional combatant
commands--U.S. Pacific Command, including U.S. Forces Korea and U.S.
Forces Japan; U.S. European Command; and U.S. Central Command.[Footnote
9] We observed selected installation and military construction projects
and interviewed command officials to understand the challenges the
commands face in implementing the master plans. After DOD issued its
fiscal year 2009 plans, we reviewed them to determine how they had
changed since last year, how they address the challenges to their
implementation, and to what extent they addressed the congressional
reporting requirements and responded to our prior recommendations. We
assessed whether the fiscal year 2009 plans were in compliance with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) most recent guidance on
overseas master plans.[Footnote 10] We generally concluded that the
master plans addressed the congressional reporting requirements if the
plans included details on base categories (i.e., military population on
main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security
locations),[Footnote 11] host nation funding levels, facility
requirements and costs, environmental remediation issues, and other
challenges affecting implementation of the plans. To identify the
challenges and determine the status of planning efforts for the
proposed buildup on Guam, we met with the Governor of Guam, the Guam
Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, and officials from U.S.
Pacific Command, Marine Forces Pacific, Third Marine Expeditionary
Force, the Navy Joint Guam Program Office,[Footnote 12] the Guam
legislature, the Mayors' Council of Guam, and various Guam community
groups. At these meetings, we discussed the challenges to the military
buildup, the planning framework for the military buildup, the schedule
and development of the Guam master plan, and the status of the
environmental impact study required by the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969.[Footnote 13] We visited Naval Base Guam; Andersen
Air Force Base, Guam; and potential Marine Corps basing locations to
directly observe existing installations and future military
construction sites. We also analyzed available reports and documents
that described ongoing and proposed military activities and the
challenges that may affect DOD's development and implementation of a
master plan for the proposed military buildup on Guam.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 through August
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See
appendix I for more information on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
While the fiscal year 2009 overseas master plans generally reflect
recent changes in U.S. basing strategies and the challenges DOD faces
in their implementation, as well as address most of our prior
recommendations, DOD provided the plans to Congress in May 2008, 3
months after the February 2008 budget submission, even though both the
Senate and conference reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004
military construction bill require DOD to issue the plans with the
military construction budget submission. The master plans contain
information on current defense basing strategies and infrastructure
requirements overseas and the challenges that DOD faces in
implementation of the plans. The plans also generally address our prior
recommendations except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not
provide details of training challenges for the Air Force in South
Korea, despite our prior recommendation that it should describe these
challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and funding
requirements. DOD officials said that since last year the South Korean
government and the U.S. Air Force have taken several steps to address
these training challenges. However, DOD has submitted the plans to
Congress after the annual budget submissions even though the
congressional reporting requirement directed DOD to provide updates of
the master plans with each yearly military construction budget
submission. According to DOD officials, OSD's most recent efforts to
incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects
contributed to providing Congress the fiscal year 2009 plans 3 months
late. Further, overseas command officials commented that the lengthy
review and approval process among the commands and OSD also contributed
to the plans' lateness. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD said
that it intends to replace the overseas master plans, which are no
longer mandated, with annual updates of its global defense posture as
the department's overseas planning report to Congress through 2014.
Since the department will continue to report on its overseas planning
to Congress, it has an opportunity to reexamine its timeline for
producing these reports to provide them with the administration's
annual budget submission to provide Congress with adequate time for
review.
DOD has developed a basic framework for the military buildup in Guam
but has not issued its congressionally required comprehensive master
plan that was initially due in December 2006, and which Congress later
extended to September 2008. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command in
coordination with the Joint Guam Program Office is developing a working-
level plan for DOD that is to be submitted to Congress by the 2008
deadline. The plan will address the realignment of Marine Corps forces
in the context of other DOD proposed actions on Guam, including the
Navy's plan to enhance its infrastructure, logistics capabilities, and
waterfront facilities and the Army's plan to place a ballistic missile
defense task force on Guam. However, this is a onetime requirement, and
DOD officials said that this plan will be a snapshot of the status of
the planning process at that time and will not be considered a master
plan for several reasons. First, the required environmental impact
statement and resulting record of decision are not expected to be
completed until December 2009 and January 2010, respectively.[Footnote
14] DOD officials said that the results of these documents will
influence many key decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of
the military infrastructure development on Guam. According to Joint
Guam Program Office officials, they expect to complete a comprehensive
master plan within 90 days after the record of decision is finalized.
Second, plans for the detailed force composition of units relocating to
Guam, associated facility requirements, and implications for other
services' realignments on Guam continue to be refined. Third,
additional time is needed to fully address the challenges related to
funding uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam's economic
and infrastructure requirements. Without a comprehensive master plan
for Guam, Congress may have limited data on funding requirements on
which to base its decisions about appropriations.
We are recommending that DOD (1) initiate a process of developing its
global defense posture updates earlier each year so that it can provide
Congress the department's overseas planning report with the
administration's annual budget submission and (2) provide Congress with
annual updates of the Guam working-level plan until the department
finalizes a comprehensive master plan. In written comments on a draft
of this report, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to
initiate a process of developing overseas master plans earlier each
year so that it can provide Congress the master plans with the
administration's annual budget submission, but noted that it plans to
replace the master plans with annual updates of its global defense
posture as DOD's overseas planning report to Congress. Since the Senate
report accompanying the fiscal year 2009 military construction
appropriation bill requires that these updates include data similar to
those presented in prior master plans and explains that the timely
filing of mandated reports is essential to the ability of the committee
to exercise its oversight responsibilities,[Footnote 15] we continue to
believe that our recommendation still has merit but have revised our
recommendation to reflect DOD's approach since it meets the intent of
our original recommendation. DOD agreed with our recommendation to
provide Congress with annual updates of the Guam working-level plan
until the department finalizes a comprehensive master plan for the
military buildup on Guam. DOD's comments are discussed in more detail
in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section and are reprinted in
appendix II.
Background:
In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation that has been
described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military
forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. The realignment is to
improve the U.S. military's flexibility to address conventional and
terrorist threats worldwide. As part of this restructuring, DOD created
new bases in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, downsized the U.S.
presence in Germany, and realigned forces in South Korea and Japan.
In 2004, the United States and Japan began a series of sustained
security consultations aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan security
alliance to better address the rapidly changing global security
environment. The resulting U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative
established a framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in
Japan and is to facilitate a continuing presence for U.S. forces in the
Pacific theater by relocating units to other areas, including Guam. As
a result of this and other DOD realignments planned on Guam, the total
military and related infrastructure buildup is estimated to increase
Guam's current population of 171,000 by an estimated 25,000 active duty
military personnel and dependents. The population could swell further
because these estimates do not include DOD civilians, contractors, or
transient personnel from a Navy aircraft carrier that is planned to
conduct periodic visits to Guam in the future. The total cost of all
services' realignments on Guam is estimated to be more than $13
billion, although additional costs are anticipated for other DOD
activities and the local Guam community. Realignment costs for the
Marine Corps move from Okinawa are to be shared by the United States
and Japan.
Overseas Master Plans:
DOD uses military construction appropriations to plan, design,
construct, alter, and improve military facilities worldwide. The
military construction budget submission for fiscal year 2009 includes
approximately $24.4 billion for military construction and family
housing, of which nearly $1.1 billion (4.7 percent) is designated for
specific overseas locations. Most of these funds are to enhance and
support enduring installations, rather than for new or emerging
requirements outside existing basing structures.[Footnote 16]
In 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed concern about
the use of military construction budget authority for projects at bases
that may become obsolete because of force realignments.[Footnote 17]
Consequently, in Senate Report 108-82, the Senate Appropriations
Committee directed DOD to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans
for the changing infrastructure requirements at U.S. military
facilities in each of its overseas regional commands. According to the
Senate report, at a minimum, the plans were to identify precise
facility requirements, the status of properties being returned to host
nations, funding requirements, and the respective cost-sharing
responsibilities of the United States and the host nations. The Senate
report also directed DOD to provide a report to congressional defense
committees on the plans' status and implementation with each yearly
military construction budget request. The Senate report directed us to
provide the congressional defense committees an annual assessment of
the plans. Subsequently, the conference report accompanying the fiscal
year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed that DOD
update its overseas master plans annually through fiscal year 2009.
[Footnote 18]
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics responded to these congressional reporting requirements and
assigned the overseas regional combatant commands responsibility for
preparing comprehensive master plans for their respective areas of
responsibility. U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for DOD activities
in East Asia and South Asia; U.S. European Command is responsible for
DOD activities in Eastern and Western Europe; and U.S. Central Command
is responsible for DOD activities in the Middle East and Central Asia.
In February 2007, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to
establish a new geographic combatant command to consolidate the
responsibility for DOD activities in Africa that have been shared by
U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Central Command
(see fig. 1).[Footnote 19] U.S. Africa Command was officially
established on October 1, 2007, with a goal to reach full operational
capability as a separate, independent geographic combatant command by
September 30, 2008. DOD officials said that U.S. Africa Command will
issue a plan for its area of responsibility next year.
Figure 1: U.S. Pacific, European, Central, and Africa Commands'
Proposed Areas of Responsibility on September 30, 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map depicting the geographical boundaries of each of
the noted Commands.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
[End of figure]
Master Planning Effort for Guam:
In 2004, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense began a
series of sustained security consultations aimed at strengthening the
U.S.-Japan security alliance and addressing the changing global
security environment. The resulting U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review
Initiative established a framework for the future of the U.S. force
structure in Japan designed to reduce the U.S. military's burden on
Japanese communities and create a continuing presence for U.S. forces
in the Pacific theater. The initiative's goal of moving about 8,000
Marines and 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 is one of
several current proposals to build up military forces and
infrastructure on Guam. In addition to the initiative, the Navy plans
to enhance its infrastructure, logistics capabilities, and waterfront
facilities to support transient nuclear aircraft carriers, combat
logistics force ships, submarines, surface combatants, and high-speed
transport ships at the Naval Base Guam. The Air Force plans to develop
a global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strike hub at
Andersen Air Force Base in Guam by hosting various types of aircraft,
such as fighters, bombers, tankers, and Global Hawk systems, on a
permanent and rotational basis. The Army plans to place a ballistic
missile defense task force on Guam.
U.S. Pacific Command was responsible for the initial planning for the
movement of forces to Guam. In August 2006, OSD directed the Navy to
establish the Joint Guam Program Office to facilitate, manage, and
execute requirements associated with the rebasing of U.S. assets from
Okinawa, Japan, to Guam. Specifically, the office was tasked to lead
the coordinated planning efforts of all of DOD's components and other
stakeholders to consolidate, optimize, and integrate the existing
military infrastructure on Guam. In addition, the office is to
integrate the operational support requirements; develop, program, and
synchronize the services' respective realignment budgets; oversee
military construction; and coordinate government and business
activities. The office is also expected to work closely with Congress,
U.S. agencies, the government of Guam, and the government of Japan to
manage this effort and develop a master plan.
As initiatives for expanding the U.S. military presence on Guam began
to emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted the ambitiousness
of the military construction program and the need for a well-developed
master plan to efficiently use the available land and infrastructure.
The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military
construction appropriation bill directed DOD to submit a master plan
for the military buildup in Guam by December 29, 2006.[Footnote 20] The
Senate report also directed us to review DOD's master planning effort
for Guam as part of our annual review of DOD's overseas master plans.
The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2008 military
construction appropriation bill extended the due date for the Guam
master plan to September 15, 2008.[Footnote 21]
Prior Reviews of the Overseas Master Plans and the Master Planning
Effort for Guam:
We previously reported that while DOD's overseas master plans generally
exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress,
opportunities existed for the plans to provide more complete, clear,
and consistent information and to present a more definitive picture of
future requirements.[Footnote 22] In our 2007 report on DOD's overseas
master plans, we suggested that Congress consider requiring the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that the overseas master plans include
information on residual value compensation[Footnote 23] and training
limitations for U.S. Pacific Command, which are discussed later in this
report.[Footnote 24] We also suggested that Congress consider requiring
the Secretary of Defense to report periodically to the defense
committees on the status of the department's planning efforts for Guam
to help ensure the best application of federal funds and leveraging of
options for supporting the military buildup until DOD finalizes a
comprehensive master plan. In our May 2008 testimony on the Guam
military buildup master planning effort, we reported that while DOD had
established a framework for the military buildup on Guam, many key
decisions remain and both DOD and the government of Guam faced
significant challenges.[Footnote 25] We also reported that Guam's
efforts to address infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup were
in their initial stages and that existing uncertainties contributed to
the difficulties in developing precise plans.
Overseas Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes, Challenges, and Our
Prior Recommendations, but Could Be More Timely:
The fiscal year 2009 master plans generally reflect recent changes in
the U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements and
current challenges that DOD faces in implementation. The plans also
reflect DOD's responses to the recommendations we made in our previous
reports except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not provide the
status of the Air Force's training challenges in South Korea, despite
our prior recommendation that it should describe the challenges and
their potential effects on infrastructure and funding requirements. DOD
officials said that since last year South Korea and the U.S. Air Force
have taken steps to address these training challenges. In addition, DOD
has submitted the plans to Congress several months after the annual
budget submissions even though the Senate and conference reports
accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation
bill directed DOD to provide updates of the master plans with its
military construction budget submissions. Without timely access to the
plans, the congressional defense committees may not have the
information needed at the appropriate time to prepare the annual
defense and military construction legislation and to carry out their
oversight responsibilities.
Plans Update the Evolution of Overseas Basing Strategies and
Requirements:
The fiscal year 2009 master plans incorporated recent changes
associated with the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing
strategies and requirements. Generally, major force structure
realignments that were discussed in the fiscal year 2009 master plans
had already been mentioned last year. However, for fiscal year 2009,
several changes identified in the overseas master plans included
updated information involving realignment initiatives in South Korea
and Japan, DOD's efforts to establish missile defense sites in the
Czech Republic and Poland, and the ongoing development of U.S. Africa
Command.
The U.S. Pacific Command plan discussed the progress of realignment
initiatives, which will relocate military personnel and facilities in
Japan and South Korea. Specifically, the command reported that the U.S.-
Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative has served as an effective
framework to manage alliance transformation and realignments in Japan
and that planning and execution efforts are ongoing to achieve one of
the largest changes in recent history to U.S. force posture in the
Pacific. Also, as part of the initiative, the command described the
importance of relocating 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam and of
consolidating the remaining U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa to
reduce the impact on local communities. It also included information on
U.S. Forces Japan's efforts to return to the government of Japan U.S.
facilities and more than 14,000 acres of land on Japan and Okinawa.
Also, U.S. Pacific Command updated the status of the U.S.-South Korea
Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan,[Footnote 26]
including its efforts to reduce major U.S. installations from 41 to 10
(76 percent) in South Korea. The command also provided information
regarding almost 3,000 acres of land acquisitions, including the
expansion of Army Garrison Humphreys (formerly known as Camp Humphreys)
and other sites.
The U.S. European Command plan updated the network of forward operating
sites and cooperative security locations in Eastern Europe. For
example, the plan provided details on the mission, planned
capabilities, equipment and aircraft, population, and facility
requirements for Novo Selo Training Area in Bulgaria and Mihail
Kogalniceanu Air Base in Romania. It also described recent efforts to
proceed with formal negotiations with the governments of Poland and the
Czech Republic on establishing missile defense sites and facility
requirements to support this effort. For example, it identified over
$284 million in facility requirements to support the ballistic missile
defense program in the Czech Republic. U.S. European Command also
explained the establishment of U.S. Africa Command and that its future
mission is to conduct military-to-military programs, military-
sponsored activities, and other operations.
The U.S. Central Command plan reflected a long-term planning vision for
the development of required infrastructure in the region to achieve its
missions. The command also reported a need for an increase in both U.S.
military construction and host nation support funding. For example, the
command identified a goal of $1.7 billion in host nation funding, which
it considered reasonable since the infrastructure may also be used by
the host nation. Also, the command's plan provides detailed
descriptions of each forward operating site by providing information on
its mission (such as providing logistical support), the units it could
host, and its role in the region (such as supporting the war against
terrorism or strengthening capabilities for rapid and flexible response
in the Central Asian states), as well as identifying the requirements
for equipment and facilities at the site.
Plans Generally Reflect Challenges:
This year's master plans discuss a number of challenges, such as
uncertainties with host nation relations and environmental concerns,
which DOD faces in the implementation of the plans. They also provide
more detailed descriptions of these challenges than prior years' plans.
This Year's Plans Provided More Complete Descriptions of Host Nation
Relations:
All of the regional commands describe to varying degrees the status of
recent negotiations and agreements with host nations in their fiscal
year 2009 master plans. In our review of the overseas master plans in
2005, we found that none of the commands fully explained the (1) status
of or (2) challenges to finalizing host nation agreements and
recommended that the commands briefly explain the status of
negotiations with host nations to provide more complete and clearer
plans. These agreements depend largely on the political environment and
economic conditions in host nations and can affect the extent of host
nation support--access to facilities or funding--to U.S. forces.
Accordingly, the resulting agreements may increase or decrease U.S.-
funded costs for future infrastructure changes. For example, this year:
* The U.S. Pacific Command plan updates information on the results of
the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative. The plan describes the
planned arrival of the USS George Washington, a nuclear aircraft
carrier, at Naval Base Yokosuka to replace the USS Kitty Hawk, a
conventional aircraft carrier. The plan also describes how the funding
for the Japanese Facilities Improvement Program, historically the
source of major construction on U.S. facilities in Japan, has been
decreasing. For example, the command noted that the funding for this
program has decreased from an estimated $1 billion in 1993 to $242
million. U.S. Forces Japan anticipates that the government of Japan
will continue to reduce these funds because of Japan's commitment to
provide several other forms of host nation support (i.e., utilities and
Japanese labor force) and funding for the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy
Review Initiative under which the Marine Corps forces are moving from
Okinawa to Guam. Several DOD officials believe that these financial
commitments and other constraints may result in U.S. facilities in
Japan receiving less host nation support, which in turn would require
more financial support from the U.S. government than in the past. In
addition, the U.S. Pacific Command plan provided details on current
realignment efforts regarding the delayed move from Yongsan Army
Garrison in Seoul to Army Garrison Humphreys south of Seoul. Originally
expected to be completed by December 2008, the plan stated that the
move may not be completed until 2012. According to the plan, early
challenges with land procurement and bilateral funding negotiations
have now been overcome and the relocation is moving forward. The plan
also recognized that any future constraints on host nation funding or
U.S. military construction funds could further delay the Yongsan
Relocation Plan.
* The U.S. European Command plan provided a status of ongoing
realignments in Europe. It also described the rationale for the
realignments and listed the facilities returned to the host nations.
Specifically, the plan provided information on efforts to return
installations in Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Turkey, and
several classified locations in Europe. It further reported that while
supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Army Europe
returned nearly 20,000 soldiers and their families, including parts of
the 1st Infantry Division, back to the United States. U.S. Army Europe
has also prepared three military communities in Wuerzburg, Hanau, and
Dermstadt for return to the government of Germany. Also, the plan
discussed the relocation of U.S. Army Europe headquarters from
Heidelberg to Wiesbaden, Germany, to become the 7th Army deployable
headquarters by fiscal year 2012. The plan also discussed the Army's
efforts to keep U.S. Army Garrison Baumholder as an enduring base
because without it the five other Army main operating bases (i.e.,
Grafenwoehr/Vilseck/Hohenfels complex, Stuttgart, Ansbach,
Kaiserslautern, and Wiesbaden) in Germany would be filled beyond
capacity. It also explained how U.S. European Command's transformation
depends on host nation negotiations, political-military considerations,
base realignment and closure in the United States, and fiscal
limitations.
* The U.S. Central Command plan discussed efforts to solicit
contributions from host nations and to obtain the coordination and
support that are needed from DOD, the Department of State, and host
nations. It discussed the challenges of ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the command's intention to sustain long-term access to
locations across its area of responsibility. The plan described how
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have increased the basing
footprint by using contingency construction funding, although the
command expects to work with DOD and Congress to transition from using
contingency funding to support its sites. For the future, the command
will focus on transitioning from current contingency operations to
developing plans for more a fixed posture, in terms of forces and
infrastructure.
Most of This Year's Plans Provided Descriptions of Environmental
Challenges:
Most of the commands addressed the extent of their environmental
challenges in this year's master plans. In contrast, during our review
of the overseas master plans in 2005, none of the commands identified
environmental remediation and restoration issues. This year, U.S.
Pacific Command provided information on the removal of underground
storage tanks with host nation funding on U.S. installations in various
locations in South Korea. Also, U.S. Forces Korea identified one base
that was closed for which environmental information had been exchanged;
however, the command was still in the process of returning the base to
the government of South Korea. This year, U.S. European Command
included information on the progress of the environmental cleanup of
contaminated sites at Rhein Main Air Base, Germany. The command
identified that some sites had been cleaned, others needed further
investigation, but all investigations are expected to be completed at
the earliest by the end of 2012. Because there were no environmental
issues in the command's area of responsibility, according to a command
official, U.S. Central Command did not report any environmental issues.
Overseas Master Plans Generally Address Our Prior Recommendations:
Over the years, OSD has modified its guidance for preparing the
overseas master plans in an effort to address our prior recommendations
related to the following topics:
* Facility requirements and costs. This year, all of the regional
commands identified their precise facility requirements and costs for
fiscal years 2009 through 2014, and reported estimated facility
sustainment and recapitalization costs for fiscal year 2009.
* Base categories. This year, all of the commands categorized their
installations into applicable base categories of main operating base,
forward operating site, and cooperative security location, which
provided users a clearer picture of the infrastructure plans and
requirements at these sites. The commands also supplemented the
information on base categories with detailed data on the installations'
capabilities, overall mission, population, and types of equipment and
facilities located at each site.
* End state date. This year, all of the commands identified a common
strategic end state date, which identifies the last fiscal year of the
construction time frame and thus provides users a more complete and
clearer basis for tracking progress in meeting the command
infrastructure objectives for their areas of responsibility.
* Host nation funding levels. This year, all of the commands reported
host nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal year 2009
and at the aggregate level for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, which
provided users a better basis to determine the extent to which U.S.
funding is needed for facility requirements.[Footnote 27]
* Effects of other defense activities. This year, all of the commands
described the effects of other defense activities on implementation of
their master plans. For example, both U.S. European Command and U.S.
Central Command described how the development of U.S. Africa Command
would affect their commands and the increased need to coordinate
efforts in the future.
Until this year, the overseas master plans have not discussed residual
value even though we have recommended that they should. In response to
this recommendation, OSD and command officials stated that residual
value could not be readily predicted and therefore should not be
assumed in the master plans.[Footnote 28] These officials also reported
that residual value is based on the reuse of property being turned over
to the host nation, which is limited for most categories of military
facilities and is often reduced by actual or anticipated environmental
remediation costs. However, we have always maintained that since these
issues vary by host nation and may not be clear to all users of the
plans, OSD should require commands, at a minimum, to explain the issues
with obtaining residual value in each host nation and report the
implications for U.S. funding requirements. This year, U.S. European
Command described the difficult and lengthy process to return and
negotiate the value of facilities to address our prior recommendation.
[Footnote 29] The command noted that attempting to forecast residual
value would not be prudent fiscal planning because of the uncertainties
in receiving residual value, such as the negotiated price to be paid.
After we received the U.S. European Command plan, command officials
provided data showing that the U.S. government has received
approximately $656 million in residual value and payment-in-kind
compensation since 1989. Payment-in-kind projects include installation
of water, sewer, electrical, and communication lines, and quality of
life projects, such as dormitories and neighborhood renovations.
No Recognition of the Training Challenges in South Korea:
While the overseas master plans have continued to evolve and have
provided more comprehensive data every year since fiscal year 2006, the
U.S. Pacific Command master plan does not describe the challenges the
command faces in addressing the U.S. Air Force's training limitations
in South Korea even though we have recommended that it should describe
the challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and
funding requirements. While DOD officials indicated that the Air
Force's training conditions have improved on the Korean peninsula, this
information was not provided in the U.S. Pacific Command's plan.
For several years, the government of South Korea has attempted to
relocate the Koon-Ni training range, which had served as the primary
air-to-ground range for the Seventh Air Force. The air and ground range
management of the Koon-Ni training range was transferred to the
government of South Korea, which closed the range in August 2005. While
there is an agreement with the government of South Korea to enable U.S.
forces to train at other ranges, according to senior Air Force and U.S.
Forces Korea officials, the other ranges do not provide electronic
scoring capabilities necessary to meet the Air Force's air-to-surface
training requirements and there is difficulty in obtaining access to
these ranges. In technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD
officials said that the South Korean government has increased the U.S.
Air Force's access to air-to-ground training ranges and improved one
training site. DOD also noted that newly agreed upon airspace
management practices are expected to facilitate more training
opportunities for U.S. Air Force pilots in South Korea. However, U.S.
Pacific Command did not discuss the progress made in addressing these
training challenges in its fiscal year 2009 overseas master plan.
Though it omits the training challenges and progress in South Korea,
the U.S. Pacific Command plan provides details on the training
limitations in Japan. The plan discussed training limitations on
carrier landing practice and the need for aircraft from Naval Air
Facility Atsugi to train at Iwo Jima, Japan, which is considered a
hardship due to the extra distance the aircraft need to fly to Iwo
Jima. Currently, the United States and government of Japan are
reviewing options that would provide the Naval Air Facility Atsugi
access to closer training ranges. The plan also discusses how noise and
land use sensitivities and maneuver area limitations in Okinawa require
U.S. forces to deploy to other Pacific locations to supplement their
training. It also describes efforts by U.S. Forces Japan and the
government of Japan to engage in bilateral discussions to address these
training shortfalls and explore solutions.
Overseas Master Plans Generally Have Been Submitted to Congress Late:
DOD has recently submitted the overseas master plans to Congress
several months after the annual budget submissions even though the
Senate and conference reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004
military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to provide
updates of the master plans with each yearly military construction
budget submission. Recently, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal
year 2009 military construction appropriations bill expressed concern
about DOD's frequent failure to comply with deadlines for submitting
congressionally mandated reports.[Footnote 30] According to the Senate
report, many of these mandated reports are planning documents, intended
to demonstrate that DOD is adequately coordinating its many ongoing
initiatives, such as the Global Defense Posture moves and the Grow the
Force initiative.[Footnote 31] The Senate report further noted that
these mandated reports are necessary to ensure proper congressional
oversight and to inform congressional decisions related to DOD's budget
requests.
Congressional staff members have stressed to us the importance of DOD
providing the defense committees the overseas master plans at the same
time as the annual budget submission. The President generally submits
the administration's budget submissions in February of each year.
[Footnote 32] However, DOD provided the defense committees the fiscal
year 2007 plans on April 27 and the fiscal year 2008 plans on March 28.
This year, DOD submitted the plans to Congress in mid-May, 3 months
after the fiscal 2009 military construction budget submission was
provided to Congress. According to DOD officials, OSD's most recent
efforts to incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects
contributed to providing Congress the plans months after the military
construction budget submission. In addition, overseas command officials
commented that the lengthy review and approval process among the
commands and OSD has contributed to the plans' lateness.
In comments on a draft of this report, DOD said that it intends to
replace the overseas master plans with annual updates of its global
defense posture as the department's overseas planning report to
Congress. Because of continued concern over the possibility of changes
to the global defense posture, the Senate report accompanying the
fiscal year 2009 military construction appropriation bill extended the
requirement for DOD to provide annually updated reports on the status
of its global basing initiative to the Committees on Appropriations of
both Houses of Congress.[Footnote 33] These global basing reports are
to be submitted with the administration's budget submissions each year
through fiscal year 2014 and should include, at a minimum, an overview
of the current overseas basing strategy and an explanation of any
changes to the strategy; the status of host nation negotiations; the
cost to date of implementing the military construction elements of the
strategy; an updated estimate of the cost to complete the construction
program; and an updated timeline for implementing the strategy. The
Senate report further noted that the timely filing of these reports is
essential to the ability of the committee to exercise its oversight
responsibilities, and it is therefore important that DOD adhere to the
schedule and provide these reports at the same time as the annual
budget submission. Since the department will continue to report on its
overseas planning to Congress, DOD has an opportunity to reexamine its
timeline for producing these reports and provide them to Congress with
the administration's annual budget submission to provide Congress with
adequate time for review. Without access to these reports on a timely
basis, congressional committees may not have the information needed at
the appropriate time to prepare the annual defense and military
construction legislation and to carry out oversight responsibilities of
DOD's global realignment of U.S. forces and installations overseas.
DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Buildup on Guam but Has
Yet to Develop the Congressionally Required Master Plan:
DOD has established various planning and implementation documents that
serve as a framework to guide the military realignment and buildup on
Guam. However, the department has not issued a comprehensive master
plan for the buildup that was initially due in December 2006, which
Congress later extended to September 2008. While the Joint Guam Program
Office is coordinating the development of a working-level plan for DOD
that is to be submitted to Congress by the 2008 deadline, this is a
onetime requirement, and DOD officials said that this plan will be a
snapshot of the status of the planning process at the time of its
completion and will not be considered a comprehensive master plan for
several reasons. First, the results of the environmental impact
statement and resulting record of decision on the proposed military
buildup, which are expected to be completed by January 2010, will
influence many key decisions about the military infrastructure
development on Guam. Also, Joint Guam Program Office officials estimate
that the office could complete a comprehensive master plan for Guam
within 90 days once these documents are completed. Second, plans for
the detailed force composition of units relocating to Guam, associated
facility requirements, and implications for other services'
realignments on Guam continue to be refined. Third, additional time is
needed to fully address the challenges related to funding
uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam's economic and
infrastructure requirements.
DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Realignment and Buildup:
DOD has established various planning and implementation documents that
serve as a framework to guide the military realignment and buildup on
Guam. Originally, the Marine Corps realignment was discussed in the
U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative, which established the
framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in Japan. The
Japan Ministry of Defense reported that based on bilateral meetings in
2005 and 2006, the government of Japan had decided to support the
United States in its development of necessary facilities and
infrastructure, including headquarters buildings, barracks, and family
housing, to hasten the process of moving Marine Corps forces from
Okinawa to Guam. In July 2006, U.S. Pacific Command developed the Guam
Integrated Military Development Plan to provide an overview of the
projected military population and infrastructure requirements.[Footnote
34] The plan is based on a notional force structure that was used to
generate land and facility requirements for basing, operations,
logistics, training, and quality of life involving the Marine Corps,
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations Forces in Guam. However,
this plan is not considered a master plan for the military buildup and
provides limited information on the expected effects of the military
buildup on the local community and off-base infrastructure.
The Joint Guam Program Office has completed its first phase of the Guam
planning process and developed basic facility requirements with general
cost estimates, mapping concepts, and land use plans with preferred
alternatives. Through an analysis of available land on the island and
DOD preliminary operational requirements, the joint office has
identified alternative sites for the Marine Corps main encampment,
family housing, and aviation operations and training and for the Navy
transient aircraft carrier pier. However, the office has not identified
its preferred sites for the ballistic missile defense task force and
firing and nonfiring training ranges. According to Joint Guam Program
Office officials, the second phase of planning is in progress and will
include more details, including more specific information on the
placement of buildings, roads, training facilities, and utilities
systems.
The Joint Guam Program Office is coordinating the multi-service
development of a working-level plan for DOD that is expected to be
submitted to congressional staff in September 2008. However, this is a
onetime requirement, and DOD officials said that this working-level
plan will not be considered a final comprehensive master plan.
According to Joint Guam Program Office officials, the working-level
plan will be a snapshot of the status of the planning process at the
time of its completion. It is being developed to provide DOD components
with an opportunity to review and provide input. Moreover, the plan
will address the realignment of Marine Corps forces in the context of
other DOD-proposed actions on Guam, including the Navy's plan to
enhance its infrastructure, logistics capabilities, and waterfront
facilities and the Army's plan to place a ballistic missile defense
task force on Guam.
Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision Are Needed to
Make Key Decisions but Will Not Be Completed until 2010:
Before the Joint Guam Program Office can finalize its Guam master plan
and finalize key decisions, it will need to complete the environmental
impact statement and the resulting record of decision required by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.[Footnote 35] DOD officials
said that the results of these documents will influence many key
decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military
infrastructure development on Guam. However, according to these
officials, the environmental impact statement and record of decision
are not expected to be completed until December 2009 and January 2010,
respectively. Joint Guam Program Office officials stated that
development of a comprehensive master plan for the military buildup on
Guam depended on the completion date of the record of decision and
estimated that the office could complete a master plan within 90 days
once the record of decision is finalized.
On March 7, 2007, the Navy issued a public notice of intent to prepare
an environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,[Footnote 36] as implemented
by the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations,[Footnote 37] and
Executive Order 12114. The notice of intent in the Federal Register
[Footnote 38] states that the environmental impact statement will:
* Examine the potential environmental effects associated with
relocating Marine Corps command, air, ground, and logistics units
(which comprise approximately 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000
dependents) from Okinawa to Guam. The environmental impact statement
will examine potential effects from activities associated with Marine
Corps units' relocation including operations, training, and
infrastructure changes.
* Examine the Navy's plan to enhance the infrastructure, logistic
capabilities, and pier/waterfront facilities to support transient
nuclear aircraft carrier berthing at Naval Base Guam. The environmental
impact statement will examine potential effects of the waterfront
improvements associated with the proposed transient berthing.
* Evaluate placing a ballistic missile defense task force
(approximately 630 soldiers and their estimated 950 dependents) in
Guam. The environmental impact statement will examine potential effects
from activities associated with the task force, including operations,
training, and needed infrastructure changes.
Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the regulations
established by the Council on Environmental Quality, an environmental
impact statement must include a purpose and need statement, a
description of all reasonable project alternatives and their
environmental effects (including a "no action" alternative), a
description of the environment of the area to be affected or created by
the alternatives being considered, and an analysis of the environmental
impacts of the proposed action and each alternative.[Footnote 39]
Further, accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and
public scrutiny are essential to implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. For example, federal agencies such as
DOD are required to ensure the professional integrity, including
scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses contained in the
environmental impact statement. Additionally, after preparing a draft
environmental impact statement, federal agencies such as DOD are
required to obtain the comments of any federal agency that has
jurisdiction by law or certain special expertise and request the
comments of appropriate state and local agencies, Native American
tribes, and any agency that has requested that it receive such
statements. Following the final environmental impact statement, DOD
will prepare a record of decision that will state what the decision is
for the proposed military buildup on Guam; identify alternatives
considered and specify those that are environmentally preferable; state
whether all practicable mitigation measures were adopted, and if not,
explain why; and commit to a monitoring and enforcement program to
ensure implementation of mitigation measures. Until an agency issues a
final environmental impact statement and record of decision, it
generally may not take any action concerning the proposal that would
either have adverse environmental effects or limit the choice of
reasonable alternatives.
DOD officials stated that performing these alternative site analyses
and cumulative effects analyses may delay the completion of a
comprehensive master plan and affect the construction schedule of the
required military facilities and infrastructure. DOD will submit its
fiscal year 2010 budget request to Congress for the first phase of
military construction projects prior to the completion of the
environmental impact statement. Thus, DOD may be asking Congress to
fund the military construction projects without the benefit of a
completed environmental impact statement or a final decision on the
full extent of its facility and funding requirements. DOD officials
said that this practice is consistent with the department's normal
planning, programming, and budgeting procedures routinely used for
large-scale construction projects. In such cases, construction projects
are not awarded and funds are not expended until after the record of
decision is completed. Joint Guam Program Office officials told us that
immediately after the environmental impact statement and record of
decision are completed, the department will commence construction of
facilities in efforts to meet the 2014 goal of moving Marines and their
dependents from Okinawa to Guam. However, some DOD and government of
Guam officials believe that this is an ambitious schedule considering
the possibility that the environmental impact statement could be
delayed, the complexities of moving thousands of Marines and dependents
from Okinawa to Guam, and the need to obtain funding from the United
States and Japan to support military construction projects.
Size and Makeup of Forces and Other Variables Are Not Yet Known:
Although the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative identifies
Marine Corps units to move to Guam, plans for the detailed force
composition of units relocating to Guam, associated facility
requirements, and implications for other services' realignments on Guam
continue to be refined. The U.S.-Japan realignment roadmap states that
approximately 8,000 Marines and their dependents will relocate to Guam.
These units include the Third Marine Expeditionary Force's command
element and its major subordinate command headquarters: the Third
Marine Division Headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Group
Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine
Regiment Headquarters. The Marine Corps forces remaining on Okinawa
will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements.
Marine Corps officials said that the Corps was reviewing its Pacific
force posture and associated requirements for training operations on
Guam in light of DOD's plan to increase the number of Marines under the
Grow the Force initiative. At this time, no decisions have been made on
whether to deploy additional forces to Guam under this initiative. If
such a decision is made, the government of Japan would have no
commitment to support such additional forces on Guam.
The type of missions to be supported from Guam is a key factor in the
planning for infrastructure capabilities. The operational, housing,
utilities, and installation support facilities needed on Guam depend on
the type, size, frequency, and number of units; units may be permanent,
rotational, or transient. Desired capabilities and force structure
define the training and facility requirements, such as the number and
size of airfield facilities, ranges, family housing units, barracks,
and schools and the capacity of the installation support facilities
needed to support operations and the military population. Accordingly,
Joint Guam Program Office officials said that the master plan they were
initiating will reflect efforts to build "flexible" infrastructure,
such as site preparation and utilities, that may operate on Guam.
DOD Has Not Yet Fully Addressed the Funding, Operational, and Local
Infrastructure Challenges of Relocating to Guam:
DOD faces several significant challenges associated with the military
buildup on Guam, including addressing funding and operational
challenges and community and infrastructure impacts, which could affect
the development and implementation of its planning efforts. First, DOD
has not identified all funding requirements and may encounter
difficulties in obtaining funding given competing priorities within the
department. Second, DOD officials need to address the operational and
training limitations on Guam, such as for sealift and airlift
capabilities, and training requirements for thousands of Marines.
Third, the increase in military personnel and their dependents on Guam
and the large number of construction workers needed to build the
required military facilities will create challenges for Guam's
community and civilian infrastructure.
Funding Requirements Are Not Fully Identified:
DOD officials have yet to fully identify the funding requirements to
support the military buildup on Guam. The military services'
realignments on Guam are estimated to cost over $13 billion; of that,
the Marine Corps buildup is estimated to cost $10.3 billion.
Additionally, the $13 billion estimate excludes the costs of all other
defense organizations that will be needed to support the additional
military personnel and dependents on Guam. For example, DOD agencies,
including the Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Commissary
Agency, will likely incur additional costs to execute their missions to
help support the services' influx of personnel, missions, and equipment
to Guam.
Recently, Marine Forces Pacific officials estimated that the Marine
Corps realignment on Guam alone will exceed $15 billion, which is
significantly higher than the original $10.3 billion estimate. These
additional operational costs include the cost of high-speed vessels
(procurement and maintenance) to move Marines to and from Guam;
training-related costs in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands; relocation costs for personnel, equipment, and material to
Guam; costs of facility furnishings, such as furniture and office
equipment; and real estate costs if additional land is required in Guam
or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. These officials
have also identified base operational and maintenance costs that will
be funded with U.S. appropriations after the move to Guam but are
currently reimbursed by the government of Japan through its host nation
funding programs like the Japan Facility Improvement Program and
special measures agreements that provide support for labor and utility
services for Marine Corps bases in Okinawa. In addition, cost estimates
for the relocation of forces to Guam do not include all costs
associated with the development of several training ranges for the
Marine Corps in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands--estimated to
cost $2 billion. Also, the Marine Corps estimates that the strategic
lift operating from Guam will cost an additional $88 million annually
as compared with operations from Okinawa.
Some uncertainties also exist in the cost-sharing arrangement with the
government of Japan. The government of Japan is expected to contribute
a total of $6.09 billion of which up to $2.8 billion would be in funds
without reimbursement for the construction of operational and support
infrastructure, such as barracks and office buildings. The government
of Japan is also expected to provide the remainder, another $3.3
billion, in loans and equity investments for installation support
infrastructure, such as on-base power and water systems, and military
family housing. Most of this $3.3 billion is planned to be recouped
over time by the government of Japan in the form of service charges
paid by the Marine Corps and in rents paid by U.S. servicemembers with
their overseas housing allowances provided by DOD using funds
appropriated by Congress. Also, according to DOD officials, several
conditions must be met before the government of Japan contributes some
or all of the $6.09 billion to the cost of the Marine Corps move.
First, the government of Japan has stipulated that its funds will not
be made available until it has reviewed and agreed to specific
infrastructure plans for Guam. Second, failure or delay of any
initiative outlined in the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative
may affect another, because various planning variables need to fall
into place in order for the initiatives to move forward. For example,
according to DOD, the commencement of facility construction on Guam in
fiscal year 2010 depends on the government of Japan showing progress in
the construction of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma replacement
facility. Finally, the government of Japan may encounter challenges in
funding its share of the Marine Corps move considering Japan's other
national priorities and its commitments associated with funding several
other major realignments of U.S. forces in Japan under the U.S.-Japan
Defense Policy Review Initiative.
Operational and Training Challenges:
DOD also has not fully addressed operational challenges, such as
providing appropriate mobility support and training capabilities to
meet Marine Corps requirements. According to Marine Forces Pacific
officials, the Marine Corps in Guam will depend on strategic military
sealift and airlift to reach destinations in Asia that will be farther
away than was the case when the units were based in Okinawa. For
example, in a contingency operation that requires sealift, the ships
may have to deploy from Sasebo, Japan, or other locations to collect
the Marines and their equipment on Guam and then go to the area where
the contingency is taking place, potentially risking a delayed arrival
at certain potential trouble spots since Guam is farther away from
these locations than Okinawa. According to Marine Corps officials,
amphibious shipping capability and airlift capacity are needed in Guam,
which may include expanding existing staging facilities and systems
support for both sealift and airlift.
Existing training ranges and facilities on Guam are not sufficient to
meet the training requirements of the projected Marine Corps force. A
DOD analysis of training opportunities in Guam concluded that no ranges
on Guam are suitable for the needs of the projected Marine Corps force
because of inadequacy in size or lack of availability. U.S. Pacific
Command is also in the process of conducting a training study that
covers Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands to see what options are
available for training in the region. Marine Forces Pacific officials
stated that live-fire artillery training, amphibious landings, and
tracked vehicle operations will be challenging because of the
combination of factors associated with the limited size of training
areas available and the environmental concerns on the Northern Mariana
Islands.
Increase in Military Presence Is Expected to Have Significant Impact on
the Local Community and Public Infrastructure:
The increase in military presence is expected to have a significant
impact on Guam's community and public infrastructure; however, these
potential effects have yet to be fully addressed. This undertaking is
estimated to increase the current Guam population of approximately
171,000 by an estimated 25,000 active duty military personnel and
dependents (or 14.6 percent) to 196,000. The Guam population could also
swell further because DOD's personnel estimates do not include defense
civilians and contractors who are also likely to move to Guam to
support DOD operations. DOD officials estimate that they will require
500 defense civilians and contractors to support the Marine Corps base
operations; however, they expect many of these jobs to be filled by
military spouses or the local population. This estimate does not
include personnel for other service realignments on Guam.
DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the increase in
construction due to the military buildup will exceed local capacity and
the availability of local workers. For example, DOD officials cite a
July 2008 study that estimated the annual construction capacity to be
approximately $1 billion to $1.5 billion and potentially $2.5 billion
with improvements to the port and road networks compared with the
estimated construction capacity of more than $3 billion per year needed
by DOD to meet the planned fiscal year 2014 completion date. In
addition, Guam currently faces a shortage of skilled construction
workers. Preliminary analysis indicates that 15,000 to 20,000
construction workers will be required to support the projected
development on Guam. One estimate is that Guam may be able to meet only
10 to 15 percent of the labor requirement locally. Nearby countries may
have workers willing to come to Guam to take jobs to construct needed
facilities, but these workers will have to enter the United States on
temporary nonagricultural workers visas.[Footnote 40] Joint Guam
Program Office officials cite the recently passed legislation that will
increase the cap of temporary workers in Guam from 2009 until 2014 as
addressing many of their concerns about temporary workers' visas.
[Footnote 41] At the same time, the government of Guam reports that the
influx of foreign workers would put a strain on local emergency care
services, medical facilities, public utilities, transportation
networks, and the availability of temporary housing.[Footnote 42]
In addition, as we recently testified, DOD and government of Guam
officials recognize that the island's infrastructure is inadequate to
meet the increased demand due to the military buildup.[Footnote 43] For
example:
* Guam's commercial port has capacity constraints with pier berthing
space, crane operations, and container storage locations.
* Guam's two major highways are in poor condition and, when ordnance
(ammunition and explosives) is unloaded from ships for Andersen Air
Force Base now and for the Marine Corps in the future, the ordnance
must be transported on one of these major roads that run through highly
populated areas.
* Guam's electrical system--the sole power provider on the island--is
not reliable and has transmission problems resulting in brownouts and
voltage and frequency fluctuations. The system may not be adequate to
deliver the additional energy requirements associated with the military
buildup.
* Guam's water and wastewater treatment systems are near capacity and
have a history of failure due to aged and deteriorated distribution
lines. The military buildup may increase demand by at least 25 percent.
* Guam's solid waste facilities face capacity and environmental
challenges as they have reached the end of their useful life.
Currently, the solid waste landfills in Guam have a number of
unresolved issues related to discharge of pollutants and are near
capacity.
Government of Guam officials stated that Guam will require significant
funding to address anticipated public infrastructure challenges;
however, these officials have not identified sufficient resources
necessary to support this buildup. In a recent congressional hearing,
the Governor of Guam testified that the government of Guam will need
$6.1 billion to address infrastructure upgrades, such as projects
regarding the port expansion, road enhancements, power and water
upgrades, education, and public health improvements.[Footnote 44] These
costs are separate from and in addition to DOD's cost estimates of the
military realignments on Guam.
Conclusions:
The evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and
infrastructure requirements continues, as reflected in the fiscal year
2009 overseas master plans, and many efforts to consolidate, realign,
and shift the U.S. military presence globally are still under way and
are years from completion. For the last 4 years, the overseas master
plans have been an important means for keeping Congress informed of the
challenges DOD faces and the costs associated with such efforts.
However, DOD has submitted the plans to the congressional defense
committees months after the annual budget submissions even though the
congressional reporting requirement directs that updates of the plans
be provided with each yearly budget submission. Recently, a
congressional committee report expressed concern about the department's
frequent failure to comply with deadlines for submitting mandated
reports and reiterated the importance of receiving the reports in a
timely manner.[Footnote 45] The timely filing of the department's
mandated reports was seen as essential to supporting the committee's
need for current information when making decisions related to DOD's
budget requests and to permit the committee to effectively exercise its
oversight responsibilities. Without having the mandated reports in a
timely manner, Congress is likely to be missing up-to-date information
needed for making funding decisions and carrying out its oversight
responsibilities. Since DOD intends to replace the overseas master
plans with annual updates of its global defense posture as DOD's
overseas planning report to Congress, the department has an opportunity
to reexamine its timeline for producing these reports to issue them
with the administration's annual budget submission to provide Congress
with adequate time for review.
With respect to the military buildup on Guam, it is likely that it will
be 2010 or later before DOD is able to complete a comprehensive master
plan for the military buildup. A comprehensive master plan is important
for Congress, as it helps to ensure that Congress has a complete
picture of facility requirements and associated costs in order to make
appropriate funding decisions and to assist DOD, federal departments
and agencies, the government of Guam, and other organizations in
addressing the challenges associated with the military buildup. At the
same time, it is reasonable to expect that until DOD has the results of
the environmental impact statement and record of decision required by
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, it will not be able to
finalize a comprehensive master plan for the reasons that we stated in
our report. Meanwhile, the Joint Guam Program Office is coordinating
the multi-service development of a working-level plan for DOD that is
to be submitted to Congress in September 2008. However, no requirement
exists to report periodically on the status of DOD's planning efforts
after this date. In our 2007 report, we suggested that Congress
consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to report periodically to
the defense committees on the status of the department's planning
efforts for Guam to help ensure the best application of federal funds
and leveraging of options for supporting the military buildup until DOD
finalizes a comprehensive master plan.[Footnote 46] Because of the
uncertainty in DOD's plans for the military buildup, we continue to
believe that this approach has merit and that the defense committees
would find annual updates of the Joint Guam Program Office's working-
level plan for Guam useful to inform congressional decisions and ensure
proper congressional oversight from September 2008 to the date on which
the office completes its comprehensive master plan, currently expected
no sooner than 2010.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To inform congressional decisions and ensure proper congressional
oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following two actions:
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to initiate a process of developing global defense posture
updates earlier each year so that DOD can provide the congressional
defense committees the overseas planning report with the
administration's annual budget submission.
* Direct the Executive Director of the Joint Guam Program Office to
provide the congressional defense committees with annual updates of the
Guam working-level plan until a comprehensive master plan is finalized
and submitted to Congress.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed
with our recommendation to initiate a process of developing future
overseas master plans earlier each year so that DOD can provide them to
the congressional defense committees with the administration's annual
budget submission, and agreed with our recommendation to provide the
congressional defense committees with annual updates of the Guam
working-level plan until a comprehensive master plan is finalized and
submitted to Congress. While DOD partially agreed with the first
recommendation, it also stated that it plans to replace the expired
requirements for the overseas master plans with annual updates of its
global defense posture as DOD's overseas planning report to Congress.
DOD further commented that the report development process will support
submission with the administration's annual budget request. Since the
Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2009 military construction
appropriation bill requires that these updates include data similar to
those presented in prior master plans and explains that the timely
filing of mandated reports is essential to the ability of the committee
to exercise its oversight responsibilities,[Footnote 47] we believe
that this effort to replace the overseas master plans with the global
defense posture updates will meet the intent of our original
recommendation. Therefore, we revised our recommendation to reflect
that DOD plans to replace the master plans with annual updates of its
global defense posture as the department's overseas planning report to
Congress.
DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report as
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of
the Marine Corps; the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; the Commander,
U.S. European Command; the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be made
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call
me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. The GAO staff members who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tim Johnson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Chet Edwards:
Chairman:
The Honorable Zach Wamp:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the fiscal year 2009 overseas master
plans have addressed changes since the last plans, the Department of
Defense's (DOD) challenges, and our prior recommendations, and to
examine their timeliness, we analyzed the overseas master plans and
compared them to the reporting requirements in the congressional
mandate and the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) guidance. We
compared and contrasted the fiscal years 2008 and 2009 overseas master
plans in order to identify improvements and updated challenges in the
plans. We also assessed the quantity and quality of the data describing
the base categories, host nation funding levels, facility requirements
and costs, environmental remediation issues, and other issues affecting
the implementation of the plans. To discuss the reporting requirements,
host nation agreements and funding levels, U.S. funding levels and
sources, environmental remediation and restoration issues, property
returns, residual value, and training requirements, we met with
officials from OSD; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Army Pacific; U.S.
Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Forces Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces;
U.S. Forces Korea; U.S. Eighth Army; Seventh Air Force; U.S. Naval
Forces Korea; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Far East District; U.S.
Forces Japan; U.S. Army Japan; U.S. Air Forces Japan; U.S. Naval Forces
Japan; U.S. Marine Forces Japan; Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Far East, Japan; U.S. European Command; U.S. Army Europe; U.S. Naval
Forces Europe; U.S. Air Force Europe; U.S. Central Command; and U.S.
Special Operations Command. We also analyzed available reports,
documents, policies, directives, international agreements, and guidance
to keep abreast of ongoing changes in overseas defense basing
strategies and requirements. To directly observe the condition of
facilities and the status of selected construction projects, we visited
and toured facilities at Garrison Wiesbaden and Garrison Grafenwoehr,
Germany; Camp Schwab, Camp Zama, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Yokota Air
Base, Japan; and Yongsan Army Garrison and Garrison Humphreys, South
Korea.
To determine the status of DOD's planning efforts for the Guam military
buildup, we met with officials from OSD, the Air Force, the Navy, U.S.
Pacific Command, and the Joint Guam Program Office. In general, we
discussed the current planning framework for the military buildup, the
schedule and development of a comprehensive master plan, and the status
of the environmental impact study required by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. In addition, we met with officials
from U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; U.S. Marine
Forces Japan; Third Marine Expeditionary Forces; U.S. Forces Japan;
U.S. Army Pacific; and Pacific Air Forces to discuss the challenges and
various factors that can affect U.S. infrastructure requirements and
costs associated with the military buildup, to determine if funding
requirements to accommodate the buildup have been identified, and to
identify operational and training challenges associated with the
buildup. We also visited Naval Base Guam; Andersen Air Force Base,
Guam; and other military sites in Guam to directly observe the
installations and future military construction sites. We analyzed
available reports, documents, and international agreements to keep
abreast of ongoing activities in Guam pertaining to challenges that may
affect DOD's development and implementation of a comprehensive master
plan for the military buildup. To identify the funding and local
infrastructure challenges, we met with the Governor and his staff, Guam
Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, and representatives from
the Guam legislature, the Mayors' Council of Guam, the Guam Chamber of
Commerce, Guam's Civilian Military Task Force, and community groups on
Guam.
We met with U.S. Special Operations Command officials; however, its
planning efforts were not specifically required for the overseas master
plans in response to the congressional mandates. In addition, we did
not include U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command in our
analysis because these commands have significantly fewer facilities
overseas than the other regional commands in the Pacific, Europe, and
Central Asia.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 through August
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
September 15, 2008:
Mr. Brian J. Lepore:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Lepore:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-08-1005, "Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve
the Timeliness of Future Overseas Master Plans and Factors Affecting
the Master Planning Effort for the Military Buildup on Guam", dated
August 11, 2008 (GAO Code 351100).
DoD's mandate to provide Overseas Master Plans (OMPs) was completed
with the submission of the FY09 plans to Congress. The Department
intends to provide updates on Global Defense Posture (GDP)
implementation annually as requested by Congress. These GDP updates
will replace the OMPs as DoD's overseas planning report to Congress.
The report development process will support submission with the annual
budget.
The Department agrees that a comprehensive Master Plan for Guam buildup
will not be complete until 2010, when the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) are scheduled for
completion. The Department is developing a report for Congress on DoD's
planning efforts for Guam.
The Department's comments regarding the specific recommendations are
outlined in the enclosure. Technical comments were provided separately
by my staff. My point of contact for this matter is Mr. Rick Flansburg,
(703) 571-9065, rick.flansburggosd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Wayne Arny:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment):
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated August 11, 2008:
GAO Code 351100 /GAO-08-1005:
"Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of Future
Overseas Master Plans and Factors Affecting the Master Planning Effort
for the Military Buildup on Guam"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics) to initiate a process of developing future overseas master
plans earlier each year so that DoD can provide the congressional
defense committees the plans with the administration's annual budget
submission. (Page 36/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Partially concurs. The Congressional mandate for DoD to
provide Overseas Master Plans (OMP) was completed with the submission
of the FY09 plans to Congress. Global Defense Posture (GDP) updates are
required annually through 2014. It is recommended that these GDP
updates replace the OMPs as DoD's overseas planning report to Congress.
The report development process will support submission with the annual
budget.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to provide the congressional defense
committees with annual updates of the Guam working-level plan until a
comprehensive master plan is finalized and submitted to Congress. (Page
36/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concurs. A final comprehensive Master Plan for Guam
buildup will not be complete until 2010, when the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) are scheduled for
completion. The Conference Report on H.R. 3043, November 2007 directs
the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on DoD's planning efforts
for Guam. The Department is developing this report for Congress.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant
Director; Nelsie Alcoser; Mae Jones; Kate Lenane; Julia Matta; and
Jamilah Moon made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Overseas Master Plans/Global Posture:
Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and
Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-947T]. Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD
Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military
Buildup on Guam. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
1015]. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007.
Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are
Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture
Restructuring. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-
852]. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.
DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-913R]. Washington,
D.C.: August 22, 2006.
Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing
U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-680R]. Washington, D.C.: June
27, 2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs
Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-609NI]. Washington, D.C.: July
15, 2004.
Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S.
Military Presence on Okinawa. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-66]. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 1998.
Community Growth Bases:
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-665]. Washington,
D.C.: June 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road
Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-602R]. Washington, D.C.: April
1, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial
Personnel Growth. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
1007]. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
U.S. Insular Areas:
Defense Logistics: Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a Plan to Ensure
That Voyage Repairs Are Available to Ships Operating near Guam when
Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-427].
Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military
Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many Challenges Yet
to Be Addressed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-
722T]. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2008.
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Pending Legislation Would
Apply U.S. Immigration Law to the CNMI with a Transition Period.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-466]. Washington,
D.C.: March 28, 2008.
U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Accountability
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-119].
Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2006.
U.S. Insular Areas: Multiple Factors Affect Federal Health Care
Funding. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-75].
Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2005.
Environmental Cleanup: Better Communication Needed for Dealing with
Formerly Used Defense Sites in Guam. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-02-423]. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Compact of Free Association: Negotiations Should Address Aid
Effectiveness and Accountability and Migrants' Impact on U.S. Areas.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-270T]. Washington,
D.C.: December 6, 2001.
Foreign Relations: Migration From Micronesian Nations Has Had
Significant Impact on Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-02-40]. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001.
U.S. Insular Areas: Application of the U.S. Constitution. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/OGC-98-5]. Washington, D.C.:
November 7, 1997.
Insular Areas Update. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-184R]. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 1996.
U.S. Insular Areas: Information on Fiscal Relations with the Federal
Government. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-GGD-95-
71]. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1995.
U.S. Insular Areas: Development Strategy and Better Coordination Among
U.S. Agencies Are Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-94-62]. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 1994.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] DOD officials refer to the results of the negotiations between the
United States and Japan to realign U.S. forces in Japan as the U.S.-
Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative.
[2] In fulfilling this requirement, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense asked the overseas regional combatant commands to prepare
comprehensive master plans for their areas of responsibility.
[3] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003) and H.R. Rep. No. 108-342, at
17 (2003) (Conf. Rep.)
[4] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006).
[5] H.R. Rep. No.110-424, at 437 (2007) (Conf. Rep.)
[6] See related GAO products at the end of this report.
[7] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving,
but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the
Military Buildup on Guam, GAO-07-1015 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12,
2007); DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-913R] (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 22, 2006); Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive
Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-680R] (Washington,
D.C.: June 27, 2005); and Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting
U.S. Infrastructure Costs Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive
Master Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-
609NI] (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004).
[8] Department of Defense, Comprehensive Master Plans at Department of
Defense Overseas Facilities (Washington, D.C.: May 2008). This year,
DOD submitted the overseas master plans to Congress on May 13, 2008,
and made them available to us on May 20, 2008.
[9] We did not include U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command
in our review because they have significantly fewer facilities outside
of the United States than the other regional commands. Also not
included were U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command,
U.S. Joint Forces Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. These
unified, functional commands have few facilities outside the United
States and have not issued master plans for changing U.S.
infrastructure overseas.
[10] Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, Update of Overseas Master Plans (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 1, 2007). The congressional requirement for annual updates
of the overseas master plans expired this year with DOD's fiscal year
2009 plans.
[11] Overseas master plans defined the base categories as the
following: (1) main operating base, a facility outside the United
States and U.S. territories with permanently stationed operating forces
and robust infrastructure and characterized by command and control
structures, enduring family support facilities, and strengthened force
protection measures; (2) forward operating site, a scalable location
outside the United States and U.S. territories intended for rotational
use by operating forces with limited U.S. military support presence and
possibly pre-positioned equipment; and (3) cooperative security
location, a facility located outside the United States and U.S.
territories with little or no permanent U.S. presence that is
maintained with periodic service, contractor, or host nation support.
Cooperative security locations provide contingency access, logistics
support, and rotational use by operating forces and can be a focal
point for security cooperation activities.
[12] In August 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the
Secretary of the Navy to establish the Joint Guam Program Office to
plan and execute the military services' buildup on Guam.
[13] The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to
serve as an action-forcing device to ensure that the policies and goals
defined in the National Environmental Policy Act are infused into the
ongoing programs and actions of the federal government. Regulations for
implementing the act established by the Council on Environmental
Quality specify that to the fullest extent possible, agencies shall
prepare draft environmental impact statements concurrently with and
integrated with other environmental impact analyses and related surveys
and studies required by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, the
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, and other environmental review laws and executive orders. See
40 C.F.R. § 1502.25.
[14] Following the final environmental impact statement, DOD will
prepare a record of decision that will state what the decision is for
the proposed military buildup on Guam; identify alternatives considered
and specify those that are environmentally preferable; state whether
all practicable mitigation measures were adopted, and if not, explain
why; and commit to a monitoring and enforcement program to ensure
implementation of mitigation measures.
[15] S. Rep. No. 110-428, at 10 (2008).
[16] In our estimate for military construction and family housing for
overseas locations, we included Guam and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands. However, we excluded worldwide classified and
unspecified appropriations from our total because these categories may
include domestic military construction and family housing.
[17] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13 (2003).
[18] H.R. Rep. No. 108-342, at 17 (2003) (Conf. Rep.)
[19] U.S. Africa Command's area of responsibility will include the
African continent and its island nations, with the exception of Egypt.
Egypt will remain within U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility.
These commands will have overlapping but distinct relationships with
Egypt, which will be addressed under separate memorandums of agreement.
[20] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006).
[21] H.R. Rep. No. 110-424, at 437 (2007) (Conf. Rep.)
[22] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015],
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-913R], [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-680R], and GAO-04-609NI.
[23] Residual value compensation is funding paid by the host nation to
the United States to compensate for the value of U.S.-funded
improvements to the base. The amount of compensation is negotiated
between the United States and the foreign country.
[24] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015].
[25] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed
Military Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many
Challenges Yet to Be Addressed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-722T] (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2008).
[26] With the provisions of the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan
Relocation Plan, U.S. Forces Korea intends to strengthen its overall
military effectiveness by consolidating installations north of Seoul,
including the Yongsan Army Garrison located in Seoul, into two major
hubs in the central and southern sections of South Korea. U.S. Forces
Korea expects the consolidation and relocation of thousands of soldiers
to increase readiness, efficiencies, and cost savings; enhance quality
of life; provide a less-intrusive presence; and increase training
opportunities.
[27] During our review of the fiscal year 2009 master plans, we found
that U.S. European Command had omitted $153 million in host nation
funding for 17 projects.
[28] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015].
[29] In U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility, there is no need
for international agreements to provide for residual value because host
nations generally provide replacement facilities. Arrangements vary by
country in U.S. Central Command, where six host nations have agreements
to allow for residual value negotiations and nine countries have no
such agreements.
[30] S. Rep. No. 110-428, at 12 (2008).
[31] In January 2007, the President announced an initiative, referred
to as Grow the Force, to increase the end strength in the Army by more
than 74,000 by 2013 and in the Marine Corps by 27,000 personnel by 2011
to enhance U.S. forces, reduce stress on deployable personnel, and
provide necessary forces for success in the Global War on Terrorism.
[32] The President is required to submit a budget for the following
fiscal year to Congress on or after the first Monday in January but not
later than the first Monday in February. See 31 U.S.C. § 1105.
[33] S. Rep. No. 110-428 at 10 (2008).
[34] U.S. Pacific Command, Guam Integrated Military Development Plan
(Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii: July 11, 2006).
[35] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347.
[36] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347.
[37] 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508.
[38] 72 Fed. Reg. 10186-7 (Mar. 7, 2007).
[39] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13-1502.16.
[40] This requirement would not apply to citizens from the freely
associated states of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau who
may enter the Under States, including Guam, to work without visas under
the terms outlined in each country's compact of free association with
the United States.
[41] Pub. L. No. 110-229 § 702 (2008).
[42] Civilian Military Task Force, Planning for Military Growth:
November 2007 Needs Assessment (Hagåtña, Guam: November 2007).
[43] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-722T].
[44] Governor of Guam statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, The United States Military Buildup on
Guam: Impact on the Civilian Community, Planning, and Response
(Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2008).
[45] S. Rep. No. 110-428, at 12 (2008).
[46] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015].
[47] S. Rep. No. 110-428.
[End of section]
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