Space Acquisitions
DOD's Goals for Resolving Space Based Infrared System Software Problems Are Ambitious Gao ID: GAO-08-1073 September 30, 2008In 1996, DOD initiated the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to replace the nation's current missile detection system, and to provide expanded missile warning capability. Since then, SBIRS has been restructured several times to stem cost increases and schedule delays, including revising program goals in 2002, 2004, and 2005. These actions were partly due to the challenges of developing sophisticated technologies and software. In 2007, SBIRS had a major setback when flight software for the first satellite underwent testing and failed, a failure caused by design issues. DOD developed a plan for resolving these issues, and revised its cost and schedule goals. GAO has assessed (1) the approach used to mitigate the problems, and (2) the cost and schedule risks and challenges of that approach. To conduct our work, GAO has contacted, met with, and performed detailed work at numerous DOD and contractor offices; and reviewed technical documents on flight software.
To mitigate the SBIRS flight software problems, DOD has assessed various alternatives and developed a way to implement the software redesign and oversee its development. In April 2008, DOD approved the redesign effort, which addressed problems with the original design that affected the timing of stored programs, distribution of control between processors, and failure at the hardware interface level. Six review teams comprised of 70 personnel in all evaluated the designs to ensure the technical solutions, development approach, and readiness of test facilities were adequate. DOD and its contractor are now implementing the simplified architecture, developing new software, and testing elements critical to the integration and test of systems. DOD is also improving its program oversight and better managing the SBIRS development, by acting on the recommendations of an Independent Program Assessment; addressing weaknesses in management responsibility, accountability and organizational structure; and establishing a central execution team. DOD has estimated that the SBIRS program will be delayed by 15 months and cost $414 million in funding to resolve the flight software problems, but these estimates appear optimistic. For example, confidence levels--based on the program's ability to develop, integrate, and test software in time to meet the schedule goal--have been assessed as low. Further, the review teams who approved the designs to start coding software report that the program's aggressive schedule is a major challenge because it allows "little margin for error." DOD has also introduced risk by granting waivers to streamline the software development processes to meet the aggressive schedule. These allow the program to deviate from disciplined processes in order to compress the schedule and meet the goal. In addition, some software elements are behind schedule, and thousands of software activities and deliverables remain to be integrated. Delay by these other programs could create unintended consequences for the SBIRS launch goal. If DOD should need additional time or encounter problems beyond what was planned for, more funds will be needed and launch of the first satellite in December 2009 could be jeopardized.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-1073, Space Acquisitions: DOD's Goals for Resolving Space Based Infrared System Software Problems Are Ambitious
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2008:
Space Acquisitions:
DOD's Goals for Resolving Space Based Infrared System Software Problems
Are Ambitious:
GAO-08-1073:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-1073, a report to Congressional Committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 1996, DOD initiated the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to
replace the nation‘s current missile detection system, and to provide
expanded missile warning capability. Since then, SBIRS has been
restructured several times to stem cost increases and schedule delays,
including revising program goals in 2002, 2004, and 2005. These actions
were partly due to the challenges of developing sophisticated
technologies and software. In 2007, SBIRS had a major setback when
flight software for the first satellite underwent testing and failed, a
failure caused by design issues. DOD developed a plan for resolving
these issues, and revised its cost and schedule goals. GAO has assessed
(1) the approach used to mitigate the problems, and (2) the cost and
schedule risks and challenges of that approach. To conduct our work,
GAO has contacted, met with, and performed detailed work at numerous
DOD and contractor offices; and reviewed technical documents on flight
software.
What GAO Found:
To mitigate the SBIRS flight software problems, DOD has assessed
various alternatives and developed a way to implement the software
redesign and oversee its development. In April 2008, DOD approved the
redesign effort, which addressed problems with the original design that
affected the timing of stored programs, distribution of control between
processors, and failure at the hardware interface level. Six review
teams comprised of 70 personnel in all evaluated the designs to ensure
the technical solutions, development approach, and readiness of test
facilities were adequate. DOD and its contractor are now implementing
the simplified architecture, developing new software, and testing
elements critical to the integration and test of systems. DOD is also
improving its program oversight and better managing the SBIRS
development, by acting on the recommendations of an Independent Program
Assessment; addressing weaknesses in management responsibility,
accountability and organizational structure; and establishing a central
execution team.
DOD has estimated that the SBIRS program will be delayed by 15 months
and cost $414 million in funding to resolve the flight software
problems, but these estimates appear optimistic. For example,
confidence levels”based on the program‘s ability to develop, integrate,
and test software in time to meet the schedule goal”have been assessed
as low.
Table: Confidence Level to Produce Software in Time to Meet First
Satellite Launch Goal:
Confidence level: Less than 10 percent;
Contractors: Aerospace Corporation;
Estimated launch goal: December 2009.
Confidence level: 5 percent;
Contractors: Galorath, Inc.;
Estimated launch goal: December 2009.
Confidence level: 50 percent;
Contractors: Lockheed Martin;
Estimated launch goal: December 2009.
Source: U.S. Air Force (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
Further, the review teams who approved the designs to start coding
software report that the program‘s aggressive schedule is a major
challenge because it allows ’little margin for error.“ DOD has also
introduced risk by granting waivers to streamline the software
development processes to meet the aggressive schedule. These allow the
program to deviate from disciplined processes in order to compress the
schedule and meet the goal. In addition, some software elements are
behind schedule, and thousands of software activities and deliverables
remain to be integrated. Delay by these other programs could create
unintended consequences for the SBIRS launch goal. If DOD should need
additional time or encounter problems beyond what was planned for, more
funds will be needed and launch of the first satellite in December 2009
could be jeopardized.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense revise cost and schedule
goals commensurate with acceptable risk to increase the confidence of
success, and require the contractor to adhere to disciplined software
practices as a priority to reduce risk. DOD partially concurred with
the first recommendation to revise the cost and schedule estimates, and
concurred with the recommendation to prioritize adherence to software
practices.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1073]. For more
information, contact Cristina T. Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or
chaplainc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Software Problems, Including
Initiatives to Improve Program Oversight:
DOD's Plan for Resolving the Software Problem Is Optimistic:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology21:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense22:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments24:
Related GAO Products25:
Tables:
Table 1: Trade Study Options and Recommendations on Software
Architecture:
Table 2: IPA Findings, Recommendations, and Status of Implementation:
Table 3: Confidence Level to Produce Software to Meet GEO 1 Schedule:
Table 4: Weaknesses and Risks to Software Development:
Figures:
Figure 1: SBIRS Satellite:
Figure 2: Simplified Diagram of Original Flight Software Design:
Figure 3: Flight Software Development Process:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FFRDC: federally funded research and development center:
GEO: geosynchronous earth orbit:
HEO: highly elliptical orbit:
IPA: Independent Program Assessment:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
RFSW: reusable flight software:
SBIRS: Space Based Infrared System:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 30, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
In 1996, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Space Based
Infrared System (SBIRS), a satellite missile warning system, to replace
the nation's current missile detection system and to provide expanded
capabilities to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Since its inception, SBIRS has been burdened by underestimated software
and technical complexities, poor oversight, and other problems that
have resulted in cost overruns and years in schedule delays. DOD had
expected to field SBIRS by 2004 at a cost of $4.2 billion; however,
SBIRS is now estimated to cost over $10.4 billion, and the first
satellite launch is expected in 2009--a 7-year delay.
In 2006, you requested that we review the SBIRS program. In response,
we reported on an array of problems the program was still facing,
particularly with respect to software development, the expenditure of
management reserves, and deferred requirements.[Footnote 1] Subsequent
to our work, SBIRS experienced another major setback in January 2007
when the flight software for the first satellite underwent testing and
failed. The flight software controls and monitors the satellite's
health and status and is considered a critical component of the
satellite. In April 2007, DOD determined that the software failure was
caused by design issues that affected the timing of stored programs,
among other problems. DOD also developed a plan for resolving the
issues, and associated cost and schedule goals.
Given the importance of flight software to the first SBIRS satellite
and its cost and schedule impact on the SBIRS program, we agreed to
follow up on our work and assess the software management, development,
and mitigation efforts. Specifically, we (1) identified DOD's approach
to mitigate the SBIRS flight software problems, and (2) assessed the
cost and schedule risks and challenges of that approach.
To conduct our work for this report, we contacted the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), Air Force, and contractor offices. We also
conducted detailed work and held discussions with both the Air Force
and Lockheed Martin on their efforts to manage, mitigate, and redesign
the flight software that is to operate, control, and monitor the
satellite's health, status, and safety. We reviewed technical software
plans, assessments, analyses, and independent reviews pertaining to the
flight software's redesign, and held discussions with key Air Force and
contractor officials on various aspects of the flight software
development for SBIRS. In addition, we drew from our body of past work
on weapon systems acquisitions practices and used disciplined software
practices as criteria.[Footnote 2] We conducted this performance audit
from April 2008 to August 2008 in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix I further discusses our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
DOD has assessed various alternatives for mitigating SBIRS' flight
software problems and developed a way forward to implement the
program's software redesign and oversee its development. In April 2008,
DOD approved the overall software redesign effort which was to address
problems with the original design that affected the timing of stored
programs, distribution of control between processors, and failure at
the hardware interface level. Review teams--comprised of personnel from
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics; Aerospace Corporation; Lockheed Martin
Corporate; Air Force Space and Missiles Systems Center Wing; and
Software Engineering Institute--evaluated the designs to ensure the
technical solutions, software requirements, development approach, and
readiness of the test facilities were of adequate quality. Currently,
DOD and the contractor are working to implement the simplified
architecture, develop additional software, and test elements critical
to the integration and test of systems. DOD has also undertaken several
initiatives to improve its program oversight and to help it better
manage the development, such as acting on several recommendations
identified in an Independent Program Assessment to address weaknesses
in management responsibility, accountability, and organizational
structure, and establishing a dedicated execution team with a focus on
managing the first satellite effort.
DOD has estimated that the SBIRS program will be delayed by 15 months
and cost $414 million in funding to resolve the flight software
problems, but these estimates appear too optimistic. For example, the
productivity estimates that are based on the program's ability to
develop, integrate, and test software in time to meet the schedule have
been assessed as low--by technical contractors--ranging from 5 to 50
percent in confidence for meeting the schedule goal. Further, the
review teams who approved the designs to start coding software report
that the program's aggressive schedule is a major challenge because it
allows "little margin for error." In addition, DOD has introduced
program risk by requesting and receiving waivers for the purpose of
streamlining important software development processes to meet the
aggressive schedule. The waivers will allow the program to deviate from
disciplined processes in order to compress the schedule and meet the
goal. Finally, some program elements are already behind schedule, and
thousands of software activities and deliverables remain that must be
integrated without significant consequence across the broad spectrum of
development elements, such as integration with ground, space, and
database systems. Also, the launch range needed by SBIRS to launch the
first satellite is scheduled for use by other satellite programs prior
to SBIRS. Delay in these other satellite programs could create
unintended consequences. Should DOD need additional time or encounter
problems beyond what was marginally planned for, more funds will be
needed and launch of the satellite in December 2009 could be in
jeopardy.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding the
development of realistic cost and schedule estimates commensurate with
acceptable program risk to increase the confidence of success, and
adherence to disciplined software practices. DOD partially concurred
with our recommendation to revise the cost and schedule estimates based
on more realistic assumptions, and concurred with our recommendation to
require the contractor to make adherence to disciplined practices a
priority. On the recommendation to develop realistic cost and schedule
estimates, DOD stated that the current goals are executable on the
basis of available management reserve and schedule margin, as well as
additional funds that have been approved by Congress in the event of
any unforeseeable problems or delays. DOD further stated it would
consider modifying the cost and schedule goals based on the results of
an ongoing flight software assessment. While DOD's plan to assess
software and its willingness to revise the cost and schedule goals
appear plausible, we believe this approach falls well short of a more
reasonable approach to revise the estimates based on realistic
assumptions to increase the confidence of success. In light of the
program's risks, poor performance history, and technical challenges
expected during integration, we maintain that developing goals based on
realistic assumptions would place DOD in a position to achieve cost and
schedule goals with greater confidence.
Background:
DOD initiated the SBIRS program to meet all military infrared
surveillance requirements through a single, integrated system, and to
provide better and timelier data to the Unified Combatant Commanders,
U.S. deployed forces, U.S. military strategists, and U.S. allies. SBIRS
is to replace the existing infrared system, the Defense Support
Program, which has provided early missile warning information since the
1970s. The SBIRS program was originally conceived as having high-and
low-orbiting space-based components and a ground segment for mission-
data processing and control to improve current capabilities. In 2001,
the SBIRS Low component was transferred from the Air Force to the
Missile Defense Agency and renamed the Space Tracking and Surveillance
System. The Air Force continued developing SBIRS High (herein referred
to as "SBIRS"). It, along with its associated ground segment, is one of
DOD's highest priority space programs.
The SBIRS program originally consisted of four satellites to operate in
geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), plus one spare, an infrared sensor
placed on two host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO)--known
as "HEO sensors"--and a ground segment for mission-data processing and
control.
The SBIRS GEO satellite is designed to support two infrared sensors--a
scanning sensor and a staring sensor. The first GEO satellite is
commonly referred to as GEO 1. Figure 1 shows the GEO satellite that is
to operate in space.
Figure 1: SBIRS Satellite:
[See PDF for image]
Illustration of the SBIRS Satellite.
Source: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, Sunnyvale, California. ©
2007 Lockheed Martin Corporation.
[End of figure]
As a result of past technical and program difficulties experienced
during sensor and satellite development, the SBIRS program has
encountered cost and schedule increases. These difficulties have led
DOD to restructure the program multiple times, including revising
program goals in 2002, 2004, and 2005. For example, in 2002, the
program faced serious problems with software and hardware design
progress and, in the Conference Report accompanying the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, conferees recommended
cutting advance procurement funding due to concerns about program
developments and the unclear status of the SBIRS program. At that time,
the first satellite launch slipped from 2002 to 2006. In late 2005,
SBIRS was restructured for a third time which stemmed from a 160
percent increase in estimated unit cost, triggering a fourth Nunn-
McCurdy[Footnote 3] breach, which again postponed the delivery of
promised capabilities to the warfighter.
Flight Software:
The flight system software is expected to control the GEO satellite's
mission critical functions and activities. Unlike other software
programs that can be deferred and uploaded to the satellite after
launch, the flight software cannot be deferred because it is critical
to the satellite's operation and function. The flight software is
expected to operate, control, and monitor the GEO satellite's health,
status, and safety. Based on the original design, the flight software
was to operate on two of four computer processors onboard the satellite
and perform important functions and operations, such as telemetry,
thermal control, power management, and fault detection activities.
[Footnote 4] Figure 2 shows a simplified diagram of the original flight
software design.
Figure 2: Simplified Diagram of Original Flight Software Design:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a simplified diagram of original flight software design.
Source: Lockheed Martin (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
Origin and Chronology of Flight Software Events:
In 1996, development of the flight software began as an independent
research and development project by Lockheed Martin--referred to as
reusable flight software (RFSW)--to be used for multifunctional "bus"
purposes.[Footnote 5] In 2004, the RFSW was provided to the SBIRS
program for development as the flight system software to operate,
control, and monitor the GEO satellite's health, status, and safety. At
that time, the software needed to address 1261 requirements in order to
satisfy the specific flight software system needs for the GEO
satellite. From 2005 to 2006, the Air Force and Lockheed Martin
conducted detailed requirements reviews that resulted in the delivery
of flight software that was integrated into the satellite's computers.
In January 2007, the flight software underwent testing in a space
representative environment called thermal vacuum testing and
experienced a higher number of unexpected and unexplained failures. By
April 2007, in additional tests, the number of problems escalated well
beyond what was expected. At this time, Lockheed Martin notified DOD of
the seriousness of the problem. From April 2007 to July 2007, the Air
Force and Lockheed Martin analyzed the problems and developed two
options:
* modify the existing software or:
* redesign the software by simplifying the architecture, developing
more software, and increasing the robustness of the fault management
system.
The Air Force chose to redesign the software architecture and began its
work with Lockheed Martin on detailed software designs from September
2007 to December 2007. In March 2008, the new design underwent
Incremental Design Review Block 1 and was approved by the program
review board for the revised cost and schedule baseline.In April 2008,
six independent review teams examined the Block 2 design during the
Systems Engineering & Incremental Design Review and authorized the Air
Force and Lockheed to proceed with formal software coding under the
redesign.[Footnote 6]
DOD Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Software Problems, Including
Initiatives to Improve Program Oversight:
To mitigate the software problems, DOD has assessed various
alternatives and developed an approach for implementing the software
redesign effort and overseeing its development. DOD and the SBIRS
contractor are taking steps to address problems, among others, with the
original software architecture. DOD has redesigned the architecture,
and is in the midst of developing additional software, and testing
elements critical to the integration and test of systems. DOD has also
undertaken several initiatives to improve its program oversight and to
help it better manage the development, including addressing weaknesses
in program management responsibility, accountability, and other areas.
Steps Have Been Undertaken to Address Poor Software Architecture:
To address the software's poor architectural design that ultimately
resulted in the unexpected loss of telemetry and commanding for
extended periods and unexpected hardware errors, a trade study was
conducted by Lockheed Martin to examine options for redesign. Table 1
shows the trade study options considered, and recommendations made.
Table 1: Trade Study Options and Recommendations on Software
Architecture:
Option: Distributed applications (synchronous);
Recommendation: Not recommended due to complexity and risk.
Option: Distributed applications (asynchronous);
Recommendation: Not recommended due to complexity and risk; has the
highest impact to ground systems.
Option: All applications on processor "B";
Recommendation: Not recommended due to complexity and risk.
Option: All applications on processor "A";
Recommendation: Recommended as best fit with component and fault
management system designs.
Source: Lockheed Martin (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
As indicated in table 1, the trade study recommended a simplified
architecture that places all the software applications on a single
processor, processor "A", rather than using distributed applications
because it represents the best fit with system designs. Lockheed Martin
officials stated that the simplified software architecture will address
a number of areas that were problematic with the original design, such
as the timing of stored programs that failed during thermal vacuum
tests. Among other elements, the new design will involve the
development of additional software that will also increase the
robustness of the fault management system.
Major Redesign Approved for Coding Software:
Approved in April 2008, the new designs have undergone numerous
reviews, the last of which was subjected to comprehensive and detailed
examination involving six independent review teams. Teams comprised of
personnel--from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Aerospace Corporation, a
federally funded research and development center (FFRDC)[Footnote 7];
Lockheed Martin Corporate; Air Force Space and Missiles Systems Center
Wing; and the Software Engineering Institute[Footnote 8]--evaluated the
technical solutions, development approach, and readiness of the test
facilities, among other elements.
The objective of the design review was to authorize the start of formal
software coding. For the incremental design review, independent review
teams were provided detailed information about software issues on the
original design, including the severity of the issues and the status of
each. Other information included DOD's approach in managing risk,
resolution of critical issues, disposition of deficiency reports,
requirements volatility, and integration with ground systems. Technical
data included diagrams of the simplified architecture, operating system
interface design, and lines of software code that would be impacted
from earlier designs. Other information about the software included
designs of subsystems, schematics, integration and delivery schedules,
and productivity and sizing estimates.
Progress Is Being Made to Develop Software and Conduct Tests:
DOD is making progress to develop needed software and conduct tests of
elements that are critical to the first satellite system, called GEO 1.
For example, in June 2008, DOD held a design review on software for the
fault management system that elicited concurrence from external
stakeholders to proceed with coding activities. At the same time, they
held a space technical interchange meeting that provided consensus on
the methodology and a plan for complete space vehicle testing,
including the flight software. In July 2008, Lockheed Martin delivered
63,000 of the projected 67,000 source lines of code for the space
vehicle and ground software integration effort, including a database
that provided data so that development efforts could continue on ground
software and testing activities.
According to Lockheed Martin, software development efforts followed a
disciplined process, except in those cases where waivers were requested
and granted by the software engineering process group. Figure 2 shows
Lockheed Martin's process for developing and qualifying flight
software.
Figure 3: Flight Software Development Process:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the flight software development
process. Indicated in the illustration are development and
qualification. The following information is presented:
Development:
Architecture:
* Specification complete;
* Requirements allocated;
* Qualification plan complete.
Design:
* Requirement allocated;
* Qualification plan;
Coding:
* Code reviews complete.
Unit Testing:
* Unit test peer reviewed;
* Integration plan complete;
* Test environment ready.
Integration Testing:
* Test build complete.
Qualification:
Engineering Dry-Runs:
* Test cases documented;
* Test scripts validated;
* Formal reviews complete;
* Test set verified;
* Deficiency reports closed.
Formal Dry-Runs:
* Final test documents/scripts;
* Test set certified;
* Launch software build;
* Deficiency reports closed.
Run For Record:
* Test exit report complete.
Source: Lockheed Martin (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
Risks Reduced by Funding Additional Test Resources:
DOD has taken steps to fund critical test bed resources that are needed
to adequately test, model, analyze, and simulate software functions as
a means to reduce integration and test risks, in response to lessons
learned from the failed software that identified the need to add and
upgrade their simulation and test bed resources. For example, an
evaluation of the software problems found several contributory factors
that prevented them from identifying the software problems earlier.
These include:
* test beds that had matured in parallel with the flight software and
hardware, making it difficult to distinguish between test bed and
software issues;
* oversubscription of test beds and lack of simulation resources that
precluded them from checking out high-risk areas (timing, and stored
programs); and:
* insufficient modeling of timing, and analysis of stored program
implementation, which might have shed light earlier on lack of
robustness.
In May 2008, the additional test bed and simulator was brought online
and is currently in use.
Actions Have Been Undertaken to Address Program Weaknesses, and Improve
Oversight of GEO Development:
DOD and Lockheed Martin have undertaken several initiatives to address
areas of program risk, such as efforts to improve oversight of GEO 1
and flight software development. These include acting on
recommendations made in an Independent Program Assessment (IPA) that
was conducted to ensure the validity of the technical, cost, and
schedule baselines. As part of the assessment, the IPA study assessed
contractor performance, evaluated program risk areas, and made
recommendations on where program improvements could be made. In
November 2007, officials from the Air Force, Lockheed Martin, and
Aerospace Corporation reported the IPA findings. Table 2 shows the IPA
findings, recommendations, and status of implementation efforts.
Table 2: IPA Findings, Recommendations, and Status of Implementation:
Finding: 1. Lockheed Martin's program process discipline is poor;
Recommendation: Engage Lockheed Martin functional areas and ensure that
processes are being followed;
Implemented? (as of April 2008): Yes.
Finding: 2. Air Force has limited management control over SBIRS;
Recommendation: Amend contract to provide necessary management control;
Implemented? (as of April 2008): Yes.
Finding: 3. Adversarial relationships exist between Air Force and
Lockheed Martin;
Recommendation: Fix responsibility, accountability, and authority
disconnects;
Implemented? (as of April 2008): Yes.
Finding: 4. Government organizational structure is flawed because cost
and schedule responsibilities are separated;
Recommendation: Combine in a single office the review of contractor
cost and schedule data;
Implemented? (as of April 2008): Yes.
Finding: 5. Focal point for FSS completion is needed;
Recommendation: Designate a program manager within flight software
system; Establish giver/receiver relationships;
Implemented? (as of April 2008): Yes.
Source: Aerospace Corporation (data) and U.S. Air Force (data); GAO
(analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
As indicated in table 2, the Air Force and Lockheed Martin have taken
actions to address areas of risk. Among others, these actions included
deliberately emphasizing the software development process where
adherence to process disciplines was lacking, and enhancing the
interaction between cost and schedule functions where the Air Force
organization structure was found to be flawed because it did not mirror
the contractor's more traditional approach where these functions are
combined for better program control.
To improve the oversight and management of the GEO 1 satellite and
software development, the Air Force and Lockheed Martin established a
dedicated execution team with a focus on overseeing the test,
integration, and assembly of software and hardware, and ensuring
delivery of the GEO 1 satellite. The execution team is a joint effort
that includes the Air Force, Lockheed Martin, and Aerospace
Corporation. As part of the management approach, the execution team is
responsible for conducting daily meetings to review "inch stone"
metrics and to resolve issues. The execution team also meets weekly
with the Executive Program Management leadership to provide early
insight on issues and resolve organizational weaknesses, and conduct
monthly reviews with senior executives to provide consistent
communication and allow opportunity for guidance. According to DOD
officials, the execution team not only improved oversight of software
development and management of the GEO 1 effort, but also addressed
weaknesses identified in the IPA study. For example, these weaknesses
included, among others, the need to fix the program's responsibility,
accountability, and authority disconnects. Officials reported that the
execution team helped alleviate the strained relationships that had
existed between the Air Force and Lockheed Martin where adversarial
relationships and morale problems were evident.
DOD's Plan for Resolving the Software Problem Is Optimistic:
While DOD has estimated that the SBIRS program will be delayed by 15
months and cost $414 million to resolve the software problems, those
estimates appear too optimistic, given the cost and schedule risks
involved. For example, SBIRS contractors' report low confidence that
software can be produced in time to meet the December 2009 satellite
launch goal. Further, DOD and the contractor face significant
challenges and risks that could result in more time and money being
required to meet program goals, to include the bypassing of some
disciplined software practices that add risk to cost and schedule.
Finally, as of August 2008, DOD reported that SBIRS was already behind
schedule on some software development efforts, and thousands of
activities remain that must be integrated and tested across various
systems, with cost and schedule implications, if problems or unintended
consequences occur.
Low Confidence That Software Can Be Produced to Meet Cost and Schedule
Goals:
A major concern is the infeasibility of producing the software in time
to meet the estimated launch goal. For example, technical contractors-
-Aerospace Corporation, Galorath Inc., and Lockheed Martin--estimated
the confidence to be "low" that software can be developed within the
tight time frames. These estimates are based on widely accepted models
(System Evaluation and Estimation of Resources, Software Estimating
Model, and Risk Assessment) that take into account the effective size
of the software, staffing of the effort, complexity, volatility of
software requirements, and integration and risk of anticipated rework
and failure in system tests. Using DOD's self-imposed baseline schedule
goal, software productivity estimates show very low confidence levels
that the schedule goal can be met. Table 3 shows the confidence in
meeting the GEO 1 launch goal in December 2009 (various models used).
Table 3: Confidence Level to Produce Software to Meet GEO 1 Schedule:
Confidence level: Less than 10 percent;
Contractors: Aerospace Corporation;
Estimated launch goal: December 2009.
Confidence level: 5 percent;
Contractors: Galorath, Inc.;
Estimated launch goal: December 2009.
Confidence level: 50 percent;
Contractors: Lockheed Martin;
Estimated launch goal: December 2009.
Source: U.S. Air Force (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
As indicated in table 3, one estimate shows only a 5 percent confidence
that the software can be produced in time to meet the schedule goal,
while the other estimate shows a less than 10 percent confidence level.
Lockheed's own software productivity estimate shows a 50 percent
confidence level in meeting the December 2009 launch schedule, but its
estimate assumes (1) a higher productivity than has been demonstrated,
and (2) the software will require less effort, which has not been the
program's experience. According to DOD's Cost Analysis Improvement
Group, if productivity on software does not materialize, or problems
occur during testing and integration beyond what was marginally planned
for, then it could cost an additional $400 million for each year of
schedule slippage.
Major Challenge and Risks to the Redesign and Development Effort Still
Exist:
Based on an April 2008 review of the revised software designs and
software development approach, the independent review teams--comprised
of personnel from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Aerospace Corporation; Lockheed
Martin Corporate; Air Force Space and Missiles Systems Center Wing; and
the Software Engineering Institute--concluded that the program should
proceed with formal software coding, but also expressed concern about
the ambitious schedule. Specifically, the review teams cited the
program's aggressive schedule as a major challenge because it allows
"little margin for error" and concluded the program faces high risk of
not meeting the schedule. Table 4 shows the weaknesses and risks to
software development.
Table 4: Weaknesses and Risks to Software Development:
Weaknesses:
* Schedule pressure, and alignment of code and designs.
* Code complexity impacting unit testing.
* Late integration with ground software.
* Significant amount of work remaining.
Risks:
* Concurrent systems engineering and software development.
* Code development requiring more labor than estimated.
* Additional system or software testing required beyond plans.
* Qualification of test products behind schedule.
* Systems engineering completion may require more effort.
Source: Lockheed Martin (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
Although the Air Force and Lockheed Martin are committed to the effort
and have built in a 120-day margin to fix unexpected and unforeseeable
problems, a computer engineer from the Defense Contract Management
Agency who is familiar with the program believes that the margin is
insufficient because the planned schedule considers only routine
development activities, and that additional time will likely be needed
to address any unanticipated problems.
Bypassing Disciplined Software Practices Adds Risk:
Further, to meet the cost and schedule goals, the program is using
approaches that will increase program risk. These risks stem from
waivers, which were requested by Lockheed Martin, as specified by
software provisions in the program's software development process. In
following the SBIRS Software Development Plan, for Flight Software
System 1.5, waivers were generated and approved by a software
engineering process group so that developers could deviate from the
established processes. These deviations from the disciplined
development process allowed the program to shortcut important processes
in order to meet the ambitious schedule goal, rather than follow a
disciplined process to develop software. For example, a waiver was
granted for software design to be done in parallel with the software
specification activity. However, according to DOD, the risk is that
requirements could be rejected and that rework may be required in
coding or design. Another waiver was granted for software unit
integration testing to be done in parallel with formal unit testing.
According to DOD, the risk is that formal unit testing may find
problems that were not identified during prior informal (developer)
unit testing, thereby necessitating possible rework.
Cost and Schedule Goals Are at Risk Because Some Software Elements Are
Behind Schedule, and Complex Integration and Other Activities Remain:
Some of the flight software's elements are already behind schedule and
a significant amount of activities remain to be done, posing concern to
DOD. For example, DOD reported that, as of August 2008, the software
qualification test case and script development effort was already a
month behind schedule. Also, final delivery of the Block 2 flight
software is now forecasted to be at least 2 weeks late. Other problems
that could set back SBIRS are the thousands of integration and
coordination activities that must take place as they ramp up. For
example, Lockheed Martin reports that the schedule has more than 14,500
tasks that will occur, beginning in January 2008, across multiple
systems. This means that the flight software test activities and
integration efforts must all be integrated in a "single-flow" without
consequence across a broad spectrum of systems, such as integration
with ground, space, and database systems, among others. Software
experts, independent reviewers, and government officials acknowledged
that the aggressive schedule, when combined with the significant amount
of work that remains, is the biggest challenge facing the program.
Still, there are external factors that could create schedule impacts
for meeting the SBIRS schedule goal. For example, DOD reports that the
GEO 1 satellite launch could be affected by other satellites scheduled
to launch prior to the SBIRS launch. Essentially, these launch
activities use the same launch range resources that will be required to
launch the GEO 1 satellite, and delays in any of these events could
create unintended consequences to the SBIRS GEO 1 launch goal.
Conclusions:
Given the technical complexity of the program and SBIRS' poor program
history, it is unwise for DOD to pursue such ambitious goals for
resolving the flight software problem. More than 12 years after its
inception, the SBIRS program continues to face major challenges that
have proven technically challenging and substantially more costly than
originally envisioned. The testing failure of the flight software is
further proof that sophisticated technology and inherent complexities
related to software continue to be underestimated. To its credit, DOD
has instilled greater discipline by involving outside experts,
regaining control of development activities, and dealing with the poor
relationships that had existed for some time. To ensure that such steps
can lead to success, adherence to disciplined software practices should
be made a priority over steps or measures taken to compress the
schedule for the sake of meeting the self-imposed launch goal.
Prioritizing such disciplines will improve efforts to acquire a better
product, increase executability of the program, and reduce program
risk. In turn, establishing goals that are synchronized with such
priorities will allow DOD to achieve expectations and program
deliverables with greater reliability. Essentially, these will position
the leadership to better direct investments by establishing goals with
greater confidence that they can be achieved.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To better ensure that SBIRS can meet the cost and schedule goals for
resolving the flight software problems as well as launch the first
satellite on schedule, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:
* revise the cost and schedule estimates based on more realistic
assumptions to increase the confidence of success, and:
* require that the contractor make adherence to disciplined software
practices a priority to reduce program risk.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. DOD
partially concurred with our recommendation to revise the cost and
schedule estimates based on more realistic assumptions, and concurred
with our recommendation to require the contractor to make adherence to
disciplined practices a priority. DOD's comments appear in appendix II.
In its comments, DOD partially concurred with the recommendation that
the cost and schedule estimates be revised based on more realistic
assumptions to increase the confidence of success. DOD noted that the
current goals are executable on the basis of available management
reserve and schedule margin. In the event that the program encounters
any unforeseeable problems that may cause further delays, DOD stated
that Congress has approved an additional $45 million in funding to
mitigate any future launch delays. The department pointed out that OSD
is working with the SBIRS program to hold a more specific review of the
flight software. Based on the results of this review, DOD stated it
would consider them in any decision to modify the cost and schedule
estimates. DOD expects these assessments to be complete by the end of
the 2008 calendar year.
As indicated in our report, SBIRS has been restructured several times
because it underestimated the technical complexity and inherent
challenges associated with software, among other technical elements.
Neither the software assessment conducted to determine the confidence
of producing software nor the independent reviewers who examined the
redesign approach indicated that the current goals were executable.
Rather, as we noted, software experts, independent reviewers, as well
as the government officials we interviewed expressed concern over the
aggressive schedule and questionable schedule margin, which the Defense
Contract Management Agency believes is insufficient. Moreover, as we
previously reported and noted in this report, the expenditure of
management reserves has been particularly problematic because these
funds were being rapidly spent. Further, while OSD's plan to assess
software and its willingness to revise the cost and schedule goals
appear plausible, we believe this approach falls well short of a more
reasonable approach to increase the confidence of success for the
reasons we cited. In light of the program's risks, poor performance
history, and technical challenges expected during integration, we
maintain that establishing goals that are based on more realistic
assumptions would place DOD in a better position to achieve cost and
schedule goals with greater confidence.
DOD concurred with the second recommendation stating that adherence to
disciplined software development processes improves the quality and
predictability of the software development while reducing the amount of
rework. DOD further states that the program office and the contractor
jointly accepted two process waivers to streamline the process, but
that these waivers have had no adverse impact on the software
development effort. In order to keep the focus on quality software
deliveries, DOD noted that the program would disapprove any waivers
which might compromise the team's ability to complete the development.
We are encouraged by DOD's efforts to adhere to disciplined software
processes to improve the quality and predictability of development. In
this endeavor, DOD states that it would disapprove any waivers that
could compromise the development effort. However, it is unclear exactly
what criteria DOD will use to determine whether a waiver will
compromise development efforts. Without this, there is no mechanism to
ensure that any waivers that are granted will not have a material
effect on software development.
We also received technical comments from DOD which have been addressed
in the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics; the Secretary of the Air Force; and the Director, Office
of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others
on request. In addition, the report will be made available at no charge
on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you, or your staff, have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-4589. Contact points for our offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. The major contributors are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Bill Nelson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Sessions:
Ranking Member:
Strategic Forces Subcommittee:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ellen Tauscher:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Terry Everett:
Ranking Member:
Strategic Forces Subcommittee:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify the Space Based Infrared System's (SBIRS) approach to
mitigate the flight software problems, we reviewed the plans and
alternatives the Department of Defense (DOD) put in place to mitigate
the software problem. We also interviewed Air Force, Defense Contract
Management Agency, and Lockheed Martin officials who were responsible
for management and oversight of the software development effort. We
also examined technical reports, studies, and analyses about the
factors that contributed to the flight software problems, as well as
planning documents and alternatives that were considered in fixing the
software problem.
To assess the cost and schedule risks and challenges of the way
forward, we held discussions with both the DOD and Lockheed Martin on
their efforts to assess the program risks and challenges, including
their approach to manage, mitigate, and redesign the flight software
that is to operate, control and monitor the satellite's health, status,
and safety. We also reviewed schedules, risk reports, analyses, program
assessments, and independent review reports pertaining to the flight
software's redesign, and selected assessments by independent sources
that were used, in part, as basis for selecting December 2009 as the
launch goal for the GEO 1 satellite. We also interviewed Air Force and
contractor officials responsible for developing and executing the
redesign, including a contractor hired for their expertise in
estimating software productivity.
We conducted this performance audit at the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Washington D.C.; Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles
Air Force Base, California; and Lockheed Martin and the Defense
Contract Management Agency, Sunnyvale, California from April to August
2008 in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition, we
drew from our body of past work on weapon systems acquisition practices
and disciplined software practices. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition Technology and Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
SEP 29 2008:
Ms. Cristina Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-08-1073, "Space Acquisitions: DoD's Goals for Resolving
Space Based Infrared System Software Problems Are Ambitious," dated
August 22, 2008, (GAO Code 120761). Detailed comments on the two report
recommendations are enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Joshua T. Hartman:
Director:
Space & Intelligence Capabilities:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated August 22, 2008:
GAO-08-1073 (GAO Code 120761):
"Space Acquisitions: DOD'S Goals For Resolving Space Based Infrared
System Software Problems Are Ambitious"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense,
revise the cost and schedule estimates based on more realistic
assumptions to increase the confidence of success. (Page 17/GAO Draft
Report)
DOD Response: Partially concur. While the current contractor cost and
schedule baseline is aggressive and contains risks, we believe the
remaining Flight Software Subsystem (FSS) development is still
executable within the available management reserve and schedule margin.
Congress has approved an additional $45M in Omnibus funding to provide
mitigation against a future launch date delay as a result of any
unforeseen program problems, to include Flight Software development and
qualification delays. The Wing has recently completed an integrated
baseline review of the program. In addition, the program office is
working with OSD to hold a more specific review of the FSS effort.
These results will be considered in any decision to modify FSS cost and
schedule estimates. These assessments will be complete by the end of
the calendar year.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require that the contractor make adherence to disciplined software
practices a priority to reduce program risk. (Page 17/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The DoD agrees adherence to disciplined software
development processes, as outlined in the SBIRS Software Development
Plan, improves the quality and predictability of the software
development while reducing the amount of rework. To date, the program
office has jointly, with the contractor, accepted the two minor process
waivers mentioned in the report to streamline the development process
and reduce the schedule risk associated with the December 2009
projected launch date. Those waivers have had no adverse impacts to the
FSS development. To keep focus on quality software deliveries in
support of space vehicle testing and operations, the program office
will disapprove any waivers which compromise the team's ability to
complete the development.
[End of section]
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Contact:
Cristina T. Chaplain, (202) 512-4859 or chaplainc@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Arthur Gallegos, Assistant
Director; John M. Ortiz Jr.; Claire A. Cyrnak; Madhav S. Panwar; Bob S.
Swierczek; and Alyssa B. Weir made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Space Acquisitions: Major Space Programs Still at Risk for Cost and
Schedule Increases. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
08-552T]. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2008.
Space Acquisitions: Space Based Infrared System High Program and Its
Alternative. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
1088R]. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-406SP].
Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain Use of Best
Practices. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-730T].
Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address
Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-96] (Date?):
Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisitions
and Keys to Achieving Them. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-626T]. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and Investment
Planning Needed to Address Continuing Problems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-891T]. Washington, D.C.: July
12, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to
Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-393. Washington, D.C.: March
1, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Risks Posed by DOD's New Space Systems
Acquisition Policy. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
04-0379R]. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisition
Policy to Optimize Growing Investment in Space. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-253T]. Washington, D.C.:
November 18, 2003.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-01-288]. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2001.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Space Based Infrared System High Program
and its Alternative, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
07-1088R] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2007).
[2] CMMI® (Capability Maturity Model® Integration) is a collection of
best practices that helps organizations improve their processes. It was
initially developed by product teams from industry, government, and the
Software Engineering Institute for process improvement in the
development of products and services covering the entire product life
cycle from conceptualization through maintenance and disposal.
Following the success of CMMI models for development organizations, a
CMMI model that addresses the acquisition environment was developed;
and can be found within Guidelines for Successful Acquisition and
Management of Software-Intensive Systems: Weapon Systems Command and
Control Systems Management Information Systems, Department of the Air
Force, Software Technology Support Center, (Condensed version)
(February 2003).
[3] 10 U.S.C. § 2433, commonly known as "Nunn-McCurdy," generally
requires DOD to review programs and report to Congress whenever certain
unit cost growth thresholds are reached.
[4] Satellites primarily consist of the payload and the bus. Currently,
DOD's buses are custom-made for each space program.
[5] The bus is the platform that provides the power, attitude,
temperature control, and other support to the satellite in space.
[6] FSS v1.5 Block 2 Systems Engineering & Incremental Design Review,
Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, Sunnyvale, California.
[7] FFRDCs are unique independent nonprofit entities sponsored and
funded by the. government to meet specific long-term technical needs
that cannot be met by existing in house or contractor resources. The
Aerospace Corporation's FFRDC is sponsored by the Air Force, and
provides objective technical analyses and assessments for space
programs that serve the national interest. As the FFRDC for nation-
security space, Aerospace supports long-term planning and the immediate
needs of our nation's military and reconnaissance space programs.
[8] The Software Engineering Institute is a FFRDC that works closely
with defense and government organizations, industry, and academia to
continuously improve software intensive systems. The Institute's core
purpose is to help organizations to improve their software engineering
capabilities and to develop or acquire the right software, defect free,
within budget and on time.
[End of section]
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