Defense Acquisitions
Challenges in Aligning Space System Components Gao ID: GAO-10-55 October 29, 2009The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to spend more than $50 billion to develop and procure eight major space systems. Typically, the systems have two main components: satellites and ground control systems. Some also have a third component--user terminals--that can allow access from remote locations. If the delivery of these three components is not synchronized, there can be delays in providing full capabilities to the warfighter, and satellites on orbit can remain underutilized for years. Given preliminary indication of uncoordinated deployment, GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which satellite, ground control, and user terminal deployments are aligned; (2) the reasons deployments have not always been well coordinated; (3) actions being taken to enhance coordination; and (4) whether enhancements to ground systems could optimize the government's investment. To accomplish this, GAO analyzed plans for all major DOD satellite acquisitions and interviewed key officials.
Satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals in most of DOD's major space system acquisitions are not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized satellites and limited capability provided to the warfighter. Of the eight major space system acquisitions we studied, three systems anticipated that their satellites will be launched well before their associated ground control systems are fully capable of operating on-orbit capabilities. Furthermore, for five of the eight major space systems GAO reviewed, user terminals were to become operational after their associated satellites reach initial capability--in some cases, years after. When the deployments of satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals are not well synchronized, problems arise that can affect both the warfighter and the space systems themselves. When capabilities are delayed because of lack of alignment between satellite and ground control systems or user terminals, the warfighter may develop short-term solutions, often at diminished capability and added cost. In addition, according to DOD testing officials, when the deployment of space system components is not properly timed, components may be ready for system testing at different times. This means that the space system may not be tested as a whole, connected system. DOD has inherent challenges in aligning its satellite and ground control systems. However, long-standing acquisition problems, a tendency to shift funds from ground control system development to satellite development when satellite development problems arise and the underestimation of software complexity on several major space systems have exacerbated the problem. The primary cause for user terminals not being well synchronized with their associated space systems is that user terminal development programs are typically managed by different military acquisition organizations than those managing the satellites and ground control systems. DOD does have several efforts in place to help achieve better synchronization. The Air Force has also made some attempts to improve acquisition management and increase oversight of contractors by separating the acquisition of satellites and their ground control systems. However, the outcomes of these efforts are still pending. Moreover, there is a lack of guidance needed to help plan for and coordinate the development of satellite and ground systems and a lack of transparency into costs for ground control systems and user terminals. DOD representatives in the satellite acquisition community agree that opportunities exist for DOD to transition to a more common type of architecture for satellite ground control systems in order to achieve additional efficiencies, capabilities, and a higher degree of information sharing among space systems, ultimately resulting in increased capability to the warfighter. All of the officials GAO spoke with agreed that ground control systems can be developed to provide data and information to other systems, and expect the same in return, to potentially enhance the flow and timeliness of information and better exploit satellite capabilities.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-10-55, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System Components
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2009:
Defense Acquisitions:
Challenges in Aligning Space System Components:
GAO-10-55:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-55, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to spend more than $50 billion
to develop and procure eight major space systems. Typically, the
systems have two main components: satellites and ground control
systems. Some also have a third component”user terminals”that can allow
access from remote locations. If the delivery of these three components
is not synchronized, there can be delays in providing full capabilities
to the warfighter, and satellites on orbit can remain underutilized for
years. Given preliminary indication of uncoordinated deployment, GAO
was asked to examine (1) the extent to which satellite, ground control,
and user terminal deployments are aligned; (2) the reasons deployments
have not always been well coordinated; (3) actions being taken to
enhance coordination; and (4) whether enhancements to ground systems
could optimize the government‘s investment. To accomplish this, GAO
analyzed plans for all major DOD satellite acquisitions and interviewed
key officials.
What GAO Found:
Satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals in most of DOD‘s
major space system acquisitions are not optimally aligned, leading to
underutilized satellites and limited capability provided to the
warfighter. Of the eight major space system acquisitions we studied,
three systems anticipated that their satellites will be launched well
before their associated ground control systems are fully capable of
operating on-orbit capabilities. Furthermore, for five of the eight
major space systems GAO reviewed, user terminals were to become
operational after their associated satellites reach initial capability”
in some cases, years after. When the deployments of satellites, ground
control systems, and user terminals are not well synchronized, problems
arise that can affect both the warfighter and the space systems
themselves. When capabilities are delayed because of lack of alignment
between satellite and ground control systems or user terminals, the
warfighter may develop short-term solutions, often at diminished
capability and added cost. In addition, according to DOD testing
officials, when the deployment of space system components is not
properly timed, components may be ready for system testing at different
times. This means that the space system may not be tested as a whole,
connected system.
DOD has inherent challenges in aligning its satellite and ground
control systems. However, long-standing acquisition problems, a
tendency to shift funds from ground control system development to
satellite development when satellite development problems arise and the
underestimation of software complexity on several major space systems
have exacerbated the problem. The primary cause for user terminals not
being well synchronized with their associated space systems is that
user terminal development programs are typically managed by different
military acquisition organizations than those managing the satellites
and ground control systems.
DOD does have several efforts in place to help achieve better
synchronization. The Air Force has also made some attempts to improve
acquisition management and increase oversight of contractors by
separating the acquisition of satellites and their ground control
systems. However, the outcomes of these efforts are still pending.
Moreover, there is a lack of guidance needed to help plan for and
coordinate the development of satellite and ground systems and a lack
of transparency into costs for ground control systems and user
terminals.
DOD representatives in the satellite acquisition community agree that
opportunities exist for DOD to transition to a more common type of
architecture for satellite ground control systems in order to achieve
additional efficiencies, capabilities, and a higher degree of
information sharing among space systems, ultimately resulting in
increased capability to the warfighter. All of the officials GAO spoke
with agreed that ground control systems can be developed to provide
data and information to other systems, and expect the same in return,
to potentially enhance the flow and timeliness of information and
better exploit satellite capabilities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take a variety of actions
to help ensure that DOD space systems provide more capability to the
warfighter through better alignment and increased commonality, and to
provide increased insight into ground asset costs. DOD generally agreed
with these recommendations. Previous GAO recommendations have focused
on improving acquisition problems.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-55] or key
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202)
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Most Major Space Systems Are Not Aligned with Delivery of Ground
Assets, User Assets, or Both:
Acquisition and Other Problems Contribute to a Lack of Space System
Component Alignment:
Efforts Are Being Made to Achieve Better Alignment of Satellite, Ground
Control System, and User Terminal Deliveries, but They Are Limited by
Lack of Guidance and Cost Data:
Opportunities Exist to Enhance the Capabilities of Satellite Ground
Systems:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Summary of Synchronization Issues Affecting Testing:
Appendix III: Synchronization Issues between Satellites and User
Terminals:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Current and Planned DOD Space Systems by Mission and
Associated Cost:
Table 2: Alignment of Space System Acquisitions:
Table 3: Space System Program Costs Showing Separate Costs for
Satellites and Ground Control Systems:
Figure:
Figure 1: Notional Representation of Space System Components
(Satellites, Ground Control Systems, and User Terminals) That Are Not
Well Synchronized:
Abbreviations:
AEHF: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite:
AEP: Architecture Evolution Plan:
CENTCOM: Central Command:
CNPS: Consolidated Network Planning Software:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOT&E: Director of Operational Test and Evaluation:
FAB-T: Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals:
GEO: geosynchronous earth orbit satellite:
GPS: Global Positioning System:
JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council:
JTEO: Joint Terminal Engineering Office:
JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System:
M-code: modernized military signal:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
MILSATCOM: Military Satellite Communications:
MUOS: Mobile User Objective System:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NPOESS: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System:
NRO: National Reconnaissance Office:
NSA: National Security Agency:
OSD: Office of Secretary of Defense:
SAR: Selected Acquisition Reports:
SBIRS: Space Based Infrared System High:
SBSS: Space-Based Space Surveillance:
SMC: United States Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center:
SOCOM: Special Operations Command:
STRATCOM: United States Strategic Command:
STSS: Space Tracking and Surveillance System:
TT&C: Tracking, telemetry, and commanding:
WGS: Wideband Global SATCOM:
WIN-T: Warfighter Information Network - Tactical:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 29, 2009:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to spend over $50 billion to
develop and procure eight major space systems. These systems are
intended to provide military communications, global positioning and
navigation information, weather monitoring data, and missile warning
information. Typically, space system acquisitions consist of two main
components: satellites and ground control systems. Satellites use
sensors to collect data or provide communications capabilities, while
ground control systems receive and often process and transmit data from
the satellites. Space systems often include a third component, user
terminals, which allow the combatant commands,[Footnote 1] also known
as the warfighters, to use the space systems' capabilities in the
field. While the costs associated with the ground control systems and
user terminals can be much less than the costs of the satellites, space
systems often require all three components--satellites, ground control
systems, and user terminals--to work together to be fully utilized.
The majority of major space acquisition programs in DOD's space
portfolio, however, have experienced problems during the past two
decades that have delayed deployment and driven up cost. Many programs
are experiencing significant schedule delays--as much as 7 years--
resulting in potential capability gaps in areas such as positioning,
navigation, and timing; missile warning; communications; and weather
monitoring. We recently estimated that costs for major space
acquisition programs have increased by about $11.0 billion from initial
estimates of $11.4 billion for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. This
investment risk is compounded because the development of satellite
ground systems and user terminals sometimes lags considerably behind
the development of satellites, even when the satellite development has
faced considerable delay. This means that mission-capable satellites
may be in orbit for months or years, but warfighters and others would
be unable to use the full complement of the satellites' capabilities.
The extent to which this problem is likely to occur is not well known.
Satellite development problems typically represent a greater risk to
the program and may therefore receive more attention. Ground system
development problems may not be as visible as those facing satellite
developments partially because the oversight and management of these
development efforts is often intertwined. Moreover, while many DOD,
congressional, and GAO studies have focused on the causes of satellite
development delays and cost increases, few have focused on the delivery
of ground control systems and user terminals, which are just as
critical to optimizing the investment in space.
For these reasons, you asked us to determine (1) the extent to which
the deployment of satellite, ground control systems, and user terminals
is aligned, or "synchronized," so that the delivery of these assets
optimizes investments in space; (2) the reasons satellites, ground
control systems, and user terminals are not always aligned; (3) actions
being taken to enhance coordination in the development of these assets;
and (4) whether opportunities exist to enhance ground systems to better
optimize the government's investment in space, given recent trends in
information technology and networking.
To assess the coordination of satellite and ground system deployment,
we analyzed current and future testing and fielding plans for
corresponding satellite and ground assets (control systems and user
terminals) of all major DOD space system acquisitions: the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF), NAVSTAR Global Positioning
System (GPS), Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), Space
Based Infrared System (SBIRS), Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS),
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), and Wideband Global
SATCOM[Footnote 2] (WGS). In making determinations about whether space
system acquisition programs had synchronization issues, we compared the
fielding dates of satellites, ground systems, and user terminals to
determine whether there were gaps in the delivery of capabilities
associated with these three components. We assessed user terminals to
be not synchronized if a small percentage of terminals were scheduled
to be delivered at the time of satellite and ground system delivery.
Programs without gaps between fielding dates of satellites and ground
system capabilities, and that had higher percentages of user terminals
scheduled to be fielded, were determined to be synchronized. We also
examined four of these programs in greater detail to better understand
the causes of less-than-optimal synchronization. Further, we discussed
ground control system and user terminal development with combatant
commanders (warfighters) to help determine the effect(s) that
synchronization issues have on the users of the space system
capabilities. We also interviewed various space officials within DOD,
including program management officials of the satellite programs we
reviewed. To determine whether enhancements can be made to ground
systems to increase utility of satellite capabilities, we interviewed
high-level DOD representatives of various offices in the satellite
acquisition community, officials in the intelligence community, and
staff at ground control system facilities.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 to September
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more
information on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
Background:
DOD's major space system acquisition programs are intended to perform a
wide variety of functions, including communications, missile warning,
navigation, tracking space objects, and even providing weather
information. Communication satellites provide DOD the ability to
communicate along narrowband, wideband, and secure and protected
bandwidths. Narrowband communications use lower (slower) rates to
process data and give the warfighter the ability to communicate better
while on the move, and also work better in disadvantaged environments,
such as in forests, where conventional frequencies might be less
effective. Wideband communications use higher data rates and work
better for stationary locations in addition to allowing more
warfighters to use this type of bandwidth. Secure and protected
bandwidths allow warfighters to communicate when other satellites are
disabled because of enemy jamming measures and allow a wider use of
terminals deployed on backpacks, submarines, airborne assets, and other
means. Missile detection satellites allow DOD to identify launches and
initially track ballistic missiles and provide early warnings to
warfighters. Positioning and navigation satellites give DOD the ability
to pinpoint a location, enabling soldiers to call for precise air
support and lowering the risk of accidents. Satellites that track space
objects and debris help keep satellites safe in space. Finally, weather
satellites allow the warfighter to directly receive weather and climate
information for more effective military operations. The satellites DOD
is developing have finite useful lives that range from about 5 to15
years. Some space systems under development, such as AEHF, are intended
to replace older legacy systems with upgraded and more robust
capabilities--such as increasing the volume of data transmitted per
second. Table 1 shows the various missions of current and planned DOD
satellite programs.
Table 1: Current and Planned DOD Space Systems by Mission and
Associated Cost (Fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Mission: Communications;
Total mission costs (RDT&E and procurement): $19,012.4;
Space systems: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite; Mobile User
Objective System; Wideband Global SATCOM.
Mission: Missile warning and tracking;
Total mission costs (RDT&E and procurement): $12,554.4;
Space systems: Space Based Infrared System; Space Tracking and
Surveillance System.
Mission: Positioning, navigation, and timing;
Total mission costs (RDT&E and procurement): $9,423.5;
Space systems: NAVSTAR Global Positioning System[A].
Mission: Space object tracking;
Total mission costs (RDT&E and procurement): $514.1;
Space systems: Space-Based Space Surveillance.
Mission: Terrestrial and near-space weather;
Total mission costs (RDT&E and procurement): $11,068.9;
Space systems: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System.
Source: GAO presentation of DOD data.
Legend: RDT&E = research, development, test, and evaluation.
[A] Includes Block IIR/IIR-M, Block IIF, Operational Control Segment,
and military user equipment.
[End of table]
Most space systems consist of satellites, ground control systems, and
user terminals, though some space systems only require ground control
systems to provide capability to users. Ground control systems are
generally used to (1) download and process data from satellite sensors
and disseminate this information to warfighters and other users and (2)
maintain the health and status of the satellites, including steering
the satellites and ensuring that they stay in assigned orbits.
User terminals, typically procured by the military services and managed
separately from associated satellites and ground control systems, can
range from equipment hosted on backpacks to terminals mounted on
Humvees, airborne assets, or ships. Terminals can be used to help the
warfighter determine longitude, latitude, and altitude via GPS
satellites, or securely communicate with others via AEHF satellites.
Some user terminals are not solely dedicated to delivering capability
from a specific satellite system. For example, the Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) is the primary user terminal associated with the MUOS
program, but the system is also designed to be the next generation of
tactical radios, allowing extensive ground-to-ground communication as
well.
Most Major Space Systems Are Not Aligned with Delivery of Ground
Assets, User Assets, or Both:
For six of DOD's eight major space system acquisitions, DOD has not
been able to align delivery of space assets with ground assets, user
assets, or both. Of the eight major space system acquisitions, five
ground control system efforts are optimally aligned to deliver
capability with their companion satellites, while three are not
optimally aligned. For the five space systems requiring user terminals,
none were aligned. In some cases, capability gaps resulting from delays
in the fielding of ground control systems or user terminals are 4 or
more years. When space system acquisitions are not aligned, satellite
capability is available but underutilized, though in some cases, work-
around efforts can help compensate for the loss or delay of capability.
Moreover, when ground systems, user terminals, or both are not aligned
with satellites, there are significant limitations in the extent to
which the system as a whole can be independently tested and verified.
Table 2 provides a summary of alignment between space systems and
corresponding ground control systems or user terminals.
Table 2: Alignment of Space System Acquisitions:
Space system: AEHF;
Gap exists between delivery of satellites and full ground control
capabilities, user terminal capabilities, or both: Yes;
Gap between delivery of satellites and full ground control system
capabilities: No[A];
Gap between delivery of satellites and fully fielded user terminals:
Yes.
Space system: GPS;
Gap exists between delivery of satellites and full ground control
capabilities, user terminal capabilities, or both: Yes;
Gap between delivery of satellites and full ground control system
capabilities: Yes;
Gap between delivery of satellites and fully fielded user terminals:
Yes.
Space system: MUOS;
Gap exists between delivery of satellites and full ground control
capabilities, user terminal capabilities, or both: Yes;
Gap between delivery of satellites and full ground control system
capabilities: No;
Gap between delivery of satellites and fully fielded user terminals:
Yes.
Space system: NPOESS;
Gap exists between delivery of satellites and full ground control
capabilities, user terminal capabilities, or both: Yes;
Gap between delivery of satellites and full ground control system
capabilities: No;
Gap between delivery of satellites and fully fielded user terminals:
Yes.
Space system: SBIRS;
Gap exists between delivery of satellites and full ground control
capabilities, user terminal capabilities, or both: Yes;
Gap between delivery of satellites and full ground control system
capabilities: Yes;
Gap between delivery of satellites and fully fielded user terminals:
N/A[B].
Space system: SBSS;
Gap exists between delivery of satellites and full ground control
capabilities, user terminal capabilities, or both: No;
Gap between delivery of satellites and full ground control system
capabilities: No;
Gap between delivery of satellites and fully fielded user terminals:
N/A[B].
Space system: STSS;
Gap exists between delivery of satellites and full ground control
capabilities, user terminal capabilities, or both: No;
Gap between delivery of satellites and full ground control system
capabilities: No;
Gap between delivery of satellites and fully fielded user terminals:
N/A[B].
Space system: WGS;
Gap exists between delivery of satellites and full ground control
capabilities, user terminal capabilities, or both: Yes;
Gap between delivery of satellites and full ground control system
capabilities: Yes;
Gap between delivery of satellites and fully fielded user terminals:
Yes.
Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.
[A] According to program officials, recent unplanned delays in the
launch dates of AEHF satellites have allowed the program to become
better synchronized with ground control system capabilities.
[B] This indicates that the space system does not include user
terminals; capability is exacted through the ground system.
[End of table]
In making determinations about whether space system acquisitions were
aligned, we examined whether there were gaps between fielding dates of
satellite capabilities compared to ground control system capabilities
and whether lower percentages of user terminal types were planned to be
fielded by the space system acquisitions' planned initial capability.
We generally only considered aspects of a space acquisition unaligned
if there was a gap of years, rather than months, between the fielding
dates of significant capabilities. Regarding user terminals, we only
considered these unaligned compared to satellite capabilities when user
terminals did not meet DOD's measure of synchronization for military
satellite communications space acquisitions. This measure, established
by U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), a primary user of DOD space
systems, asserts that 20 percent of any type of user terminal should be
fielded by a space system acquisition's initial capability date and 85
percent should be fielded by its full capability date.[Footnote 3]
Notwithstanding the fact that alignment gaps are undesirable, several
factors provide insight into the inherent challenges associated with
managing alignment. First, alignment may be relatively easier to
achieve in some programs than in others. For example, some space
systems may require only a ground system or few user terminals and may
even manage these acquisitions within one organization. By contrast,
other programs may require literally tens of thousands of terminals
that must be installed on a wide span of weapon systems, including
ships, planes, vehicles, and even other space systems--which are owned
and controlled by various military services. Second, an inherent
difficulty in aligning satellite launches with ground and user terminal
programs is the lead time needed to schedule satellite launches--about
2 years--which makes it difficult to hold back satellite deployment if
a ground or user terminal is experiencing a considerable delay.
Nevertheless, there is a consensus that investments in space are not
optimized when satellites are in orbit and user terminals or ground
systems are many months or years away from being delivered.
Third, it is difficult to measure the extent to which warfighters and
other users are being affected by delayed capability or even the extent
to which capability is delayed. As figure 1 depicts, satellites
themselves only offer initial capabilities until enough satellites have
been launched to provide the coverage needed to achieve full
capability. This process alone can take years and will vary system to
system as the number of satellites required to achieve full operational
capability depends on mission requirements and coverage offered by
satellites, among other factors. At the same time, ground control
systems can be delivered in phases, the first of which may focus solely
on controlling and maintaining the health of the satellite, with
subsequent phases delivering software that can collect and process
sensor data. User terminals can take years to install as they can span
a broad spectrum of weapon systems and their installation is usually
done along side other upgrades.
Figure 1: Notional Representation of Space System Components
(Satellites, Ground Control Systems, and User Terminals) That Are Not
Well Synchronized:
[Refer PDF for image: illustrated timeline]
Satellite capability:
Period when the first satellite is launched and ground control and user
terminals first fielded: Year one; less capability;
Initial capability: Late in year one; moderate capability;
Full capability: Early year three; full capability.
Ground control systems:
Period when the first satellite is launched and ground control and user
terminals first fielded: Year one; less capability;
Initial capability: Mid-year two; moderate capability;
Full capability: Late year 3; full capability.
User terminals:
Period when the first satellite is launched and ground control and user
terminals first fielded: Mid-year one; less capability;
Initial capability: Late year two; moderate capability;
Full capability: Late year 4; full capability.
Source: GAO analysis and Art Explosion (clip art).
[End of figure]
Alignment of Ground Control Systems and Satellites:
Ground systems deployment for three of DOD's major space system
acquisitions is lagging behind delivery of satellites. This means that
satellites either already are in space or will be in space, but are or
will be unable to deliver all of their planned capabilities. In one
case, the development of the ground system was completed in time, but
the system has not worked properly. In contrast, five major space
system acquisitions have largely aligned their satellites and
associated ground control systems acquisitions so that capabilities on
satellites are fielded at approximately the same time as on the ground.
In some of these instances, schedule slips in satellite development
allowed more time for ground control system development. Had the
satellites been delivered on their original schedules, the ground
control systems might not have aligned with satellite delivery. The
three instances where we identified gaps are described below.
* GPS achieved full operational capability in 1995 and currently is a
constellation of 31 active satellites of various generations used
extensively by the military for multiple applications worldwide. The
current GPS ground control system consists of the Operational Control
Segment and an upgrade under way called the Architecture Evolution
Plan. However, the plan and the capabilities it is being designed to
provide have been delayed and are significantly over budget. As a
result, some new capabilities are not now available to the warfighter
because the ground control system features needed to command and
operate the capabilities have not been completely delivered. For
example, updated user equipment possessing a capability to prevent
spoofing[Footnote 4] of navigation information started being delivered
to the warfighter in 2004. However, the Architecture Evolution Plan,
representing the current ground control system, is not capable of
providing two important aspects of this capability and is not expected
to do so until early fiscal year 2010.
* The first SBIRS satellite[Footnote 5] will carry scanning and staring
sensors designed to provide early missile warning capabilities.
However, DOD will not be able to fully utilize the data collected from
the staring sensor when this first satellite launches, currently
planned for September 2010, because the ground control software that is
to process the sensor's data is not planned to be fully functional
until at least 2014. This means that complete, usable data from the
staring sensor will not be available until about 4 years after the
satellite is on orbit.
* The first WGS satellite launched in October 2007, but its associated
ground mission planning software--the Consolidated Network Planning
Software--does not work properly. This planning software was designed
to compute required bandwidth for all users simultaneously accessing
WGS satellites. It would then disseminate that information to various
satellite operation and support stations located globally so that all
stations had a real-time view of the availability of WGS satellite
capabilities. However, because the development of the mission planning
software has had problems and is not well coordinated with WGS
satellite capability, the dissemination of information does not occur
as designed, and the information has to go through a time-consuming and
labor-intensive work-around through a single ground station before it
reaches the warfighter.
Alignment of User Terminals:
Five of the eight major space systems we reviewed had user terminals
scheduled to be delivered and become operational after, and in some
cases long after, their associated space systems achieved initial
capability. The other three space systems did not require user
terminals. It should be noted that in some cases--for example, AEHF,
GPS, and NPOESS--there is more than one type of terminal that will
serve a similar purpose. However, when we examined these programs we
also identified gaps across the programs. For AEHF specifically, the
most prominent gap existed in the terminal that will have the widest
use--Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T). Three
instances where we identified gaps are described below. Appendix III
contains more details.
* FAB-T. The Air Force's FAB-T program is designed to provide antijam
and protected communications for nuclear and conventional forces as
well as many airborne assets and ground command posts. As one of the
primary user terminal programs associated with AEHF, FAB-T has recently
experienced numerous problems and is not currently aligned with the
AEHF satellite program. Specifically, contractor performance problems,
which caused design teams to be restructured to improve performance and
efficiency, caused a delay in the start of initial production from
fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2010. In addition, design changes and
contract cost growth have more than tripled development costs since the
contract was first awarded. While AEHF will be able to provide
capability through other user terminals, current estimates show that
FAB-T will only have 2 percent of its terminals fielded when AEHF is
scheduled to reach its initial operating capability in 2011. Further,
estimates are that FAB-T will not have all of its terminals fielded
until fiscal year 2019.
* JTRS. JTRS is a family of interoperable, digital, modular, and
software-defined radios that is planned to provide the capability to
receive, transmit, and relay voice, data, and video. In the past,
tactical military radios could not work well with each other. The JTRS
radio is also being designed as the primary user terminal for the new
MUOS satellite capability to help the warfighter achieve information
superiority. Although MUOS will be able to provide capability through
other, legacy user terminals, DOD estimates that less than 20 percent
of JTRS terminals will be available to access the MUOS satellite when
it achieves operational on-orbit capability in December 2011. In 2014,
when MUOS is expected to reach full operational capability, 32 percent
of JTRS terminals are expected to be available to the warfighter. DOD
expects to field all the needed JTRS terminals by 2021--about 7 years
after MUOS is expected to be fully operational. In the past, we have
expressed concerns about the JTRS program because of problems with
requirements, technology development, and program management.[Footnote
6] A recent DOD independent program assessment concluded that the
interface between MUOS and the JTRS radios and satellite contained
unwarranted risk.[Footnote 7]
* Military GPS user equipment. DOD also plans to field extensive--both
in quantity and type--GPS user equipment and terminals to assist with
positioning and navigation on a variety of air, ground, and sea
platforms to utilize a modernized military signal (M-code), designed to
be secure and jam resistant. This signal is planned to reach its
initial operating capability on the GPS satellites and ground control
system by 2014. While user terminals will start to receive and process
the signal in 2014 as they are being fielded leading up to 2025, the
user equipment and terminals are not expected to be fully fielded and
operational until 2025. As a result, the military services' ability to
achieve a joint navigation capability, an essential element of
conducting future military operations, may not be fully realized until
2025. In a 2007 memo from United States Strategic Command
(STRATCOM)[Footnote 8] to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the combatant command expressed concern that new GPS
capabilities will not be realized in a timely manner because of the
lack of alignment between the major GPS components.
Implications on Warfighters and the Testing Community:
When space capabilities are not delivered in a coordinated manner or
are partially delivered, the warfighter will either not have certain
capabilities available when expected or may have to develop short-term
solutions while waiting for the expected capability. Officials from one
warfighting command (users of the capability) told us that because of
the 2-year gap between when all MUOS satellites reach on-orbit
capability and when the MUOS-capable user terminals (JTRS) first become
available, the MUOS satellites will have spent a portion of their
expected lifespan less than fully utilized. This issue concerns the
combatant command because MUOS is replacing the aging Ultra High
Frequency Follow-On space system, which currently serves more military
customers than it was originally designed to handle. While waiting for
the JTRS capability, the command will likely have to lease commercial
satellite capability and user terminals to increase bandwidth capacity
and improve the speed and effectiveness of information and
communication transfers.
The testing community is also significantly affected when satellite
delivery is not aligned with ground control systems and user terminals,
according to officials from the Office of the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).[Footnote 9] If all three space system
components--satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals--
are not working together, they essentially do not represent actual
system capability, thus requiring nonrepresentative equipment to be
used in testing and possibly yielding results that are not
characteristic of the actual system. Overall, DOT&E officials
identified alignment issues as the most significant obstacle to their
obtaining credible and useful test results. However, these officials
also noted that there have been recent efforts by some space system
programs to better synchronize satellite capabilities with their ground
systems. For example, MUOS will have production-representative
satellite and ground control systems available for testing, which will
facilitate optimal operational testing.
DOT&E officials identified GPS as a specific example of where delays in
delivery of ground assets have hampered testing. The GPS program office
has not yet fully developed the ground control software designed to
prevent spoofing of navigation information. The unavailability of this
software has delayed both the testing and the use of the antispoofing
capability by the warfighter. Had the needed ground system component
been fielded as scheduled, this capability could have been tested
shortly after user equipment started being delivered to the warfighter
in 2004. As it stands now, by the time testing of these functionalities
is conducted, the entire constellation of satellites will have been
launched. DOT&E officials told us that recently the GPS program has
undertaken efforts to align schedules to achieve a higher degree of
overall synchronization, which should facilitate more effective
testing.
Another example involved JTRS user terminals, which are 2 years behind
MUOS. While the MUOS satellite and ground control systems are ready for
testing with production-representative equipment, representative user
terminals are not. Because operational testing relies on production-
representative components, DOT&E officials will not be able to test the
overall system. For more examples of how less-than-optimal
synchronization issues can affect testing, see appendix II.
Acquisition and Other Problems Contribute to a Lack of Space System
Component Alignment:
Though there are inherent difficulties in aligning delivery of
satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals, the lack of
synchronization between segments of space acquisition programs is
largely the result of the same core issues that hamper acquisition in
general--requirements instability, funding instability, insufficient
technology maturity, underestimation of complexity, and poor contractor
oversight, among other issues. Previous GAO reports on DOD acquisitions
have consistently linked such problems to significant cost increases
and schedule delays. In addition, user terminals are not optimally
aligned because of a lack of coordination and effective oversight over
the many military organizations that either develop user terminals or
have some hand in development.
Acquisition Problems:
The satellite, ground system, and user terminal programs we studied
have had execution problems that have caused substantial delays in
schedule that in turn have made it more difficult to align delivery of
all three space system components. Most prominent are requirements
changes, technical problems resulting from underestimation of
complexity, and poor contractor oversight. The first satellite delivery
of SBIRS, for instance, has been delayed at least 7 years in part
because of poor oversight, technical complexities, and rework. The
first satellite delivery for NPOESS is over 4 years late. AEHF has
experienced delays of about 3 years for these reasons along with
requirements changes that occurred earlier in the program and
difficulties meeting information assurance requirements for its
satellite. The GPS IIF system has also had about a 3-year delay because
of technical and workmanship problems and requirements changes. Ground
systems and user terminals have experienced similar problems. JTRS, for
example, has experienced significant delays because of problems in
maturing critical technologies, and as noted earlier, FAB-T delays have
occurred because of contractor performance problems. Also, as noted
earlier, the WGS ground system has experienced technical problems that
have prevented it from working properly with WGS satellites now in
orbit.
We have previously reported that space acquisition problems are leading
to potential gaps in the delivery of critical capabilities, and that
with too many programs in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually
shift funds to and from programs. Additionally, DOD has preferred to
make fewer but more complex satellites, which has stretched technology
challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases, and vastly
increased the complexities related to software. Also, there is no way
to accurately estimate how long the design, development, and
construction of a satellite system will take when critical technologies
planned for that system are still in relatively early stages of
discovery and invention. These factors and more can contribute to the
inherent challenges in aligning delivery of space system components.
Underestimating software complexity has also been a problem. The
complexity of software on any system, including space systems, is often
denoted by the amount of software, or number of lines of software code.
Generally, the greater the number of lines of code, the more
complicated the software system development, and ground control systems
typically require significantly more software than the satellites. This
means that software development for ground control systems is
oftentimes the higher risk. In some cases, unanticipated software
complexity can lead to lack of synchronization between the satellite
and ground systems of space system acquisitions. For example, on the
AEHF space system, the prime contractor has experienced quality control
problems with the software for the mission planning element of the
ground control system. In testing so far, the government has identified
numerous significant software deficiencies and continues to find
deficiencies as testing continues. Ground control system fielding will
be delayed until the deficiencies are corrected. Also, our past work
has shown that the MUOS ground control software represented one of the
greatest risks to the program because of the size and complexity of the
design. On SBIRS, the total estimated lines of code on the ground
control system software grew from approximately 1.55 million in August
2004 to approximately 1.88 million in December 2008.
In at least one case, delays being experienced as a result of program
execution development difficulties in satellite programs may actually
offer a ground control or user terminal program some schedule relief.
For example, when the AEHF space system was forced to delay the launch
of its first two satellites because of issues that arose during vacuum
testing, the unplanned delay allowed time for ground control system and
user terminal capabilities to catch up to the revised satellite launch
dates so that they are now planned to be fielded closer together. At
the same time, however, these difficulties may ultimately require
changes in requirements or designs that can create disruptive changes
to ground control and user terminal programs.
We have made numerous recommendations over the past decade aimed at
reducing execution problems experienced in weapon system and space
system programs, many of which inherently make it more difficult to
align delivery of space system components and achieve better
synchronization. Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate
technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental path
toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program
start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make
decisions to move to next phases. We have also identified practices
related to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance,
technology transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition
program management that space systems could benefit from.
Funding Shifts:
Space system acquisition programs sometimes shift funds from the
development of ground control systems to their associated satellite
development efforts to meet unexpected obstacles--an action that can
create new problems. For example, when the GPS IIF satellite program
encountered development problems, the program shifted funds set aside
for the GPS ground control system to address the satellite problems,
causing a delay in the delivery of some ground control capabilities.
Similarly, SBIRS officials reallocated funding from the ground control
system to address satellite software issues, which may have contributed
to the system's initial inability to utilize the staring sensor data
from the first geosynchronous earth orbit satellite. Program officials
told us that they like the flexibility of being able to move funds from
ground control systems to the satellites if priorities warrant.
However, as we indicated above, this can put the development of ground
control systems at a disadvantage compared to development of the
satellites for space systems, for example, GPS and SBIRS.
Lack of Coordinated Planning among Organizations Involved in
Development:
DOD program office officials told us the primary reason that user
terminals are not optimally synchronized is a lack of coordination and
effective oversight over the many military organizations that either
develop user terminals or have some hand in the development. For some
systems, user terminal development could involve several different
organizations and a complex sequencing of events. For example, in the
case of GPS, the Air Force must first develop prototype electronic
modules and production-ready receiver hardware for selected platforms
within the space, air, ground, and maritime environments--a process
that can take several years. After this is done, each of the military
services will still need to procure the new user equipment and install
it on a range of other platforms. Given the breadth of equipment that
the terminals must be installed on and the need to coordinate
installations with existing maintenance schedules, the process of
realizing capability could take 10 or more years. Thus, user terminal
programs need to have timely funding and be well-coordinated.
In the case of GPS, this advance planning did not take place, and it is
likely that the installation of user equipment that can take advantage
of the satellites' modernized military signal (M-code), designed to be
secure and jam resistant, will not be completed until 2025. We
reported[Footnote 10] earlier this year that there was a lack of
coordination with GPS and that no single authority was responsible for
synchronizing GPS satellites and ground systems and user terminals.
Both the Defense Science Board[Footnote 11] and the U.S. Space
Commission identified the same problem in earlier reports. A January
2001 study by DOD's U.S. Space Commission[Footnote 12] noted that when
satellites and ground control systems are funded in one budget and user
terminals in another, the result can be a lack of synchronization in
the acquisition of satellites and their associated user terminals
because of this decentralized arrangement.
In another example, the responsibility for developing and acquiring the
MUOS satellite and associated ground control systems falls under the
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, but responsibility for
developing and acquiring JTRS user equipment and terminals associated
with MUOS falls under a joint program office with multiple services
involved. Under this structure, there is no single office or group
responsible for the coordination of these two interdependent program
offices to help achieve better synchronization. However, MUOS program
officials told us that in 2004 they began to recognize that their
program's success was tied to the JTRS program and there was a need to
coordinate and address synchronization and other issues. As a result, a
formal group was established to address systems engineering
coordination issues under both programs. While this group does not
constitute a single authority responsible for synchronizing MUOS and
JTRS, program officials stated that it has helped resolve coordination
issues.
Officials from a third program, AEHF, agreed that space system
synchronization challenges often result from the way the military
services are organized to manage the various space system components.
Officials told us that satellites and associated user terminals are
often not well synchronized because they are frequently managed by
different military services with different development contracts and
funding accounts. They said that they would like for all of the
terminals to be fielded at the same time, but because of the
independent nature of these programs and their complexity, they are
unable to synchronize them to a greater extent. These officials
acknowledged that it would help if there was one person or organization
that could oversee all the components of a satellite system, both
within a service and among services, to help ensure that satellites and
their user terminals are better synchronized. We recently reported
[Footnote 13] that DOD's acquisition process is not well designed to
manage across programs in part because the military services have
traditionally focused on developing and acquiring systems to meet their
own specific missions and have placed relatively less emphasis on
developing and acquiring the types of interoperable systems needed to
meet the demands of joint operations.
Finally, another factor contributing to user terminal delays is the
difficulties some programs have in anticipating security requirements
and gaining approval from the National Security Agency (NSA), which is
responsible for certifying a satellite system's information security.
In the past, we have reported on delays in obtaining NSA's
certification associated with the AEHF and MUOS space systems. In
addition, the risk of this potential delay is not always fully known at
program inception. For example, in the AEHF program, the changing
nature of security requirements placed stress on an already tight
schedule by adding a high level of complexity to the program's user
terminal efforts. In the case of MUOS, which is associated with the
JTRS user terminal, NSA determined that the user terminal's existing
security architecture was not adequate, and as a result, NSA declined
to certify the system until changes were made to its architecture.
Efforts Are Being Made to Achieve Better Alignment of Satellite, Ground
Control System, and User Terminal Deliveries, but They Are Limited by
Lack of Guidance and Cost Data:
There are efforts in place focused specifically at better aligning
delivery of satellite, ground system, and user terminals as well as
reducing the kinds of acquisition problems that contribute to delays
that make alignment difficult. However, it remains to be seen how
effective these will be. Moreover, improvements are likely to be
hampered by a lack of guidance to help plan for and coordinate the
development of satellite and ground systems and a lack of transparency
into the costs of ground control systems and user terminals.
In 2005, DOD's Joint Terminal Engineering Office (JTEO) began
monitoring the alignment of military satellite communication space
systems, including satellites, ground control systems, and user
terminals.[Footnote 14] JTEO analyzes program plans, schedules, and
budgets; identifies interdependent systems that are not aligned; and
analyzes the impact of systems that are not aligned and shares the
results of its analysis with a wide variety of organizations involved
with military communications satellites. JTEO uses guidance established
by STRATCOM to define basic and optimal synchronization to assess the
level of synchronization of military satellite communications space
systems. However, officials from both JTEO and STRATCOM acknowledged
that these definitions are somewhat arbitrary and do not really measure
what is most important--capability provided to the warfighter via a
certain level of synchronization related to a space system's
components. Further, JTEO only tracks synchronization of military
satellite communications space systems, not the space systems involved
with other space missions.
Also, the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, has recently been utilizing an advisory body called the
Narrowband SATCOM Systems Engineering Group to focus specifically on
the alignment of MUOS and JTRS given the extent of schedule gaps and
the importance of JTRS to MUOS. The advisory body seeks to anticipate
and identify the technical challenges between MUOS and JTRS and any
other interdependent systems.
In addition, the Air Force is attempting to mitigate some of the
contributing factors that create synchronization issues by separating
the acquisition of satellites and their ground control systems,
intending to ensure that ground systems receive increased oversight.
Specifically, the GPS program recently split the acquisition and
funding of the GPS IIIA satellites from its ground control system.
While both acquisitions remain under the same GPS program management,
GPS officials told us that they expect the funding separation to yield
greater government oversight of the contractor and increased control
over programmatic decisions. For example, if a satellite encounters a
problem during development, a contractor may be tempted to make changes
to the satellite's operating software. Such changes, which could add
time and rework to the ground control system's software development
effort, might not receive attention from the government. By acquiring
the satellites and ground system separately, GPS program officials
believe that acquisition changes will have to be approved through
program management, and that more generally, the ground programs would
receive more focused oversight than they receive now. Officials also
indicated that when programs use the same contractor to develop both
the satellite and ground control systems, the government can be
beholden to the single contractor to deliver some capability, even if
contractor performance falls below expectations.
Other actions have been taken to improve program execution within space
and other weapon programs that have the potential to improve DOD's
ability to align delivery of satellites with ground and user terminals.
For example, the Air Force is planning to conduct a review in November
2009 with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to enable better
management of GPS as an enterprise instead of as many individual
programs. Further, within the space community, the Air Force has been
emphasizing the use of an incremental development approach where it
will gradually meet the needs of its users, and it is requiring space
programs to make independent technology readiness assessments at
particular points in the acquisition process. For some newer space
programs, such as GPS III, the Air Force has taken actions to ensure
that requirements remain stable and to hold contractors more
accountable for their performance. The Office of Networks Information
and Integration within the Office of the Secretary of Defense has also
developed tools to enable better coordination among interdependent
programs, such as the Net-Centric[Footnote 15] Integrated Master
Schedule, an online software program designed to provide insight to
program schedules, key events, and most importantly cross-program
dependencies, to more effectively synchronize aspects of the net-
centric portfolio, including space system acquisitions. Moreover,
recently passed acquisition reform legislation also sets requirements
for space and other programs to increase emphasis on systems
engineering and developmental testing, preliminary design reviews, and
technology readiness assessments.[Footnote 16] We recently testified
that actions that the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense have been taking to address problems related to technology
development are good steps. However, there are still more significant
changes to processes, policies, and support needed to ensure that
reforms can take hold, including addressing the diffused leadership for
space programs, which hampers the ability of DOD to synchronize
delivery of space, ground, and user assets for space programs.
Limited Insight into Costs of Ground Systems and User Terminals Can
Hamper Oversight:
DOD's efforts to improve coordination of satellite, ground control
system, and user terminal efforts may be hampered by a lack of
transparency in the costs associated with ground control systems and
user terminals. To identify the costs associated with the poor
synchronization of space system components, we attempted to determine
development and procurement costs associated with ground control
systems. However, several of DOD's space system acquisitions do not
break out these costs through their standard reporting measures,
[Footnote 17] reporting instead combined satellite and ground system
costs. We asked the program offices to provide separate costs for their
ground control systems, and while most programs were able to provide
some information, officials with two programs--AEHF and GPS--told us
that they did not officially track cost information in this manner. The
next-generation GPS ground control system is being acquired under a
separate contract than the satellites which could allow the program to
separate cost information. Without better cost information on ground
control systems, congressional decision makers and appropriators have
limited insight into costs, and the possibility of cost overruns, for
ground control systems of major space systems.
Table 3 shows the six space systems that were able to provide cost
information that distinguished the development and procurement costs of
their satellites from the development and procurement costs of their
ground control systems. It also shows the two space systems, AEHF and
GPS, that were not able to officially break out and distinguish
development and procurement costs between satellites and their ground
control systems.
Table 3: Space System Program Costs Showing Separate Costs for
Satellites and Ground Control Systems (Fiscal year 2009 dollars in
millions):
Program: AEHF[A,B];
RDT&E: Satellite: Not available[A];
Ground: Not available[A];
Procurement: Total: $7,267.3;
Satellite: Not available[A];
Ground: Not available[A];
Total: $3,150.1;
Total RDT&E and procurement: $10,417.4.
Program: NAVSTAR GPS[A,B];
RDT&E: Satellite: Not available[A];
Ground: Not available[A];
Procurement: Total: $4,485.9;
Satellite: Not available[A];
Ground: Not available[A];
Total: $4,937.6;
Total RDT&E and procurement: $9,423.5.
Program: MUOS[B];
RDT&E: Satellite: $2,065.8;
Ground: $1,741.9;
Procurement: Total: $3,807.7;
Satellite: $2,536.3;
Ground: $135.1;
Total: $2,671.4;
Total RDT&E and procurement: $6,479.1.
Program: NPOESS[B];
RDT&E: Satellite: $6,661.3;
Ground: $1,464.2;
Procurement: Total: $8,125.5;
Satellite: $2,943.4;
Ground: 0.0;
Total: $2,943.4;
Total RDT&E and procurement: $11,068.9.
Program: SBIRS[C];
RDT&E: Satellite: 5,615.1;
Ground: $2,109.6;
Procurement: Total: $7,724.7;
Satellite: $2,522.7;
Ground: $133.0;
Total: $2,655.7;
Total RDT&E and procurement: $10,380.4.
Program: SBSS[C];
RDT&E: Satellite: $469.1;
Ground: $45.0;
Procurement: Total: $514.1;
Satellite: N/A[E];
Ground: N/A[E];
Total: N/A[E];
Total RDT&E and procurement: $514.1.
Program: STSS[D];
RDT&E: Satellite: $1,886.1;
Ground: $287.9;
Procurement: Total: $2,174.0;
Satellite: N/A[D];
Ground: N/A[D];
Total: N/A[D];
Total RDT&E and procurement: $2,174.0.
Program: WGS[C];
RDT&E: Satellite: $377.9;
Ground: N/A;
Procurement: Total: $377.9;
Satellite: $1,706.7;
Ground: $31.3;
Total: $1,738.0;
Total RDT&E and procurement: $2,115.9.
Program: Total;
RDT&E: Satellite: $17,075.3;
Ground: $5,648.6;
Procurement: Total: $34,477.1;
Satellite: $9,709.1;
Ground: $299.4;
Total: $18,096.2;
Total RDT&E and procurement: $52,573.3.
Source: GAO presentation of DOD and Missile Defense Agency data.
Legend:
RDT&E = research, development, test, and evaluation;
N/A = not applicable.
[A] The program office was not able to officially provide separate
satellite and ground control system costs.
[B] The program office provided cost data for the RDT&E and procurement
phases.
[C] The program office provided cost data through fiscal year 2013 or
2014.
[D] This program is a demonstration effort and DOD does not currently
have plans for a procurement phase.
[E] The original SBSS selected acquisition report did not include
procurement funding.
[End of table]
Although six programs were able to provide some information that
distinguished costs between satellites and ground control systems, the
programs did not report this information separately in their Selected
Acquisition Reports (SAR).[Footnote 18] DOD officials at one program
office told us that they do not break out these costs because they have
a combined contract for development of the satellites and ground
control systems. Officials at another program explained that when a
program uses one contractor for satellite and ground control system
development, it has flexibility to move funds between satellite and
ground control system development, as necessary. As a result, it can be
difficult to identify, track, and report separate cost information for
satellites and ground control systems. However, the Air Force
initiative to separate the acquisition of satellites and their ground
control systems might make it easier to track and report separate cost
information. In addition, the overall acquisition costs associated with
user terminal programs are also difficult to determine because
different DOD organizations often manage these acquisitions. Even
though user terminals are what allow for the day-to-day use of a
typical space system's capabilities by military services in the field,
the costs of user terminal programs are not usually reported along
with, or as part of, the total space system. This can result in a lack
of transparency regarding the total costs of all components of a space
system.
Opportunities Exist to Enhance the Capabilities of Satellite Ground
Systems:
DOD has typically developed and operated its ground systems in a
stovepiped manner. Specifically, each ground system's development is
dedicated to a particular satellite system for a specific mission area,
such as communications, missile warning, navigation, space object
tracking, or weather monitoring. As a result, ground systems generally
only receive and process data from the satellites for which they were
developed. They generally do not control and operate more than one type
of satellite and they generally do not share their data with other
ground systems. More important, there are few ground systems that are
capable of fusing data from multiple space systems to enhance military
and intelligence planning and operations.
In recent years, however, information technology has migrated toward
common architectures and systems that enabled systems that were
traditionally stovepiped to share or even fuse data to maximize their
value. There is a consensus among officials we spoke with--including
individuals from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council; National Reconnaissance Office; Office of the Secretary of the
Air Force; Air Force Space Command; and Lincoln Laboratory (a federally
funded research and development center)--that investments in ground
systems can be optimized in two ways. First, common ground systems can
be built to operate and control multiple satellite systems rather than
just one. Second, ground systems or other types of information
technology can be used to combine or fuse data from multiple space
assets to optimize planning and execution of military operations.
Several of the officials we spoke with in fact believe that including
air-, land-, and sea-based sensor data in addition to satellite data in
such systems or architectures could ultimately reduce the current level
of capability needed in space. We have also reported in the past that
designing systems with common subsystems and components and using an
open systems[Footnote 19] design approach can reduce production and
life cycle costs.[Footnote 20]
Several of these officials, however, also identified obstacles to such
commonality. These obstacles include getting agreement on a common
design, meaning whether it will be based primarily on the warfighter's
needs or cost savings, and overcoming the resistance of different DOD
organizations to sharing their data and trusting that the data will not
be misused.
Moreover, progress on building common ground systems or technology that
can fuse data from a variety of sensors in the military has been
limited. One satellite control facility operated by the Navy, known as
Blossom Point,[Footnote 21] does operate a ground system that can
control a variety of national security satellites. The facility uses a
common approach (architecture) to command and control the satellites as
well as receive and analyze data and information transmitted from the
satellites. The common approach allows the facility to reuse a large
percentage of the existing software across multiple satellites.
Typically, 80 percent of the software required on the ground to operate
the satellites can be reused and only about 20 percent is unique and
has to be created for that new system. However, the facility primarily
operates nonmilitary space systems and according to Blossom Point
officials, no major Navy or Air Force space system uses the facility
even though the capacity and capability exists. The Air Force has no
similar facility, opting instead to primarily develop unique ground
control systems for each satellite system.[Footnote 22] In addition,
there are efforts currently being planned at the Air Force's Space and
Missile Systems Center that will fuse early missile warning information
from SBIRS and information from the next generation of infrared missile
detection satellites. These efforts are aimed at eliminating the need
for the Air Force to develop separate dedicated ground control systems.
However, these efforts are in the planning stages.
In 2004, DOD established policy[Footnote 23] directing that data
collected by various means, including space systems, be made visible
and accessible to any potential user in DOD by making them available in
shared spaces, but again, according to the individuals we interviewed,
this has not made progress because of resistance to sharing data as
well as system design, development, and operation. Confirming these
views, in 2009, DOD's Defense Science Board[Footnote 24] reported that
while DOD has initiated some efforts to achieve interoperability, it is
a long way from achieving the desired level of interoperability in
several areas, including satellite communication.[Footnote 25]
Conclusions:
DOD's space systems continue to offer opportunities to enhance and
transform how the military conducts its operations. But such
opportunities are being limited or delayed because of problems in
synchronizing the delivery of space, ground, and user assets. While
synchronization is inherently difficult for space systems and complete
synchronization is practically unattainable, there are relatively
straightforward actions that can be taken to allow for better
synchronization. These include better coordination among the many
players involved with development and more transparency into and
awareness of program complexity, costs, consequences of delays, and
criteria to help planning and oversight. DOD has appropriately started
taking some of these actions, but expanding this effort could increase
cost transparency. Moreover, in response to previous recommendations,
DOD has taken actions to address long-standing acquisition problems and
ensure that development of the three space system components is
knowledge based. Without doing so, synchronization will not be achieved
even if coordination and guidance are strengthened. Because acquisition
improvements are still relatively recent, the success of these efforts
will not be known for some time. Lastly, there are opportunities to
increase the quality and usefulness of data collected from satellites
that DOD has been slow to take advantage of. In this case, technical
obstacles seem to be easier to overcome than cultural obstacles. DOD
has already issued policies to adopt approaches that would facilitate
data sharing and senior leaders have been encouraging such approaches,
but they have not been implemented. Resistance and lack of coordination
among the individual organizations that develop and use space systems
are seen by some as key factors. As such, it may be in DOD's best
interest to support small-scale demonstrations of new architectures and
technologies, such as DOD planned efforts to fuse missile warning
information, and find ways to incentivize programs to participate in
these demonstrations.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help DOD space systems provide more capability to the warfighter
through better synchronization and increased commonality, and to
provide increased insight into the costs associated with ground assets,
we are making five recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
* Define a basic level of expected synchronization during the
development of each space system acquisition based on delivering a
capability to the warfighter.
* Assess the value of designating an office with responsibility for
overseeing the relative progress of satellite, ground, and user
terminal programs with the aim of ensuring that problems that could
affect the ability to synchronize a space system are known and
addressed.
* Formulate guidance to better align space system components so that
all components are available to facilitate optimal operational testing.
* Develop DOD-wide guidance, specific to space systems, to allow for
the integration and consolidation, to the extent feasible, of DOD's
current and future satellite ground control systems via common ground
architecture or by other similar means.
* Provide annual documentation to Congress (in SARs or in other
documents) that specifically delineates the cost, and cost performance,
associated with (1) the satellites, (2) the ground control systems, and
(3) associated user terminals, and as a result, provides the total cost
of all planned components of each space system acquisition.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. DOD
concurred with four of our recommendations and partially concurred with
a fifth recommendation and identified actions it has taken or plans to
take to address them. The comments are reprinted in appendix IV.
In partially concurring with our recommendation to formulate guidance
to align space system components to better facilitate optimal
operational testing, the department noted that it had taken some steps
to better align space system oversight and noted that it did not want
to significantly delay providing the warfighter with needed space
system capabilities to optimize operational testing. We agree that any
efforts to optimize space system operational testing should not result
in significant delays in providing the warfighter with needed
capabilities. However, the purpose of operational testing is to ensure
a system's effectiveness and suitability for use by the warfighter. Not
being able to conduct operational testing with production-
representative equipment can yield results that are not characteristic
of the actual system. This can also negatively affect the warfighter.
Our recommendation seeks to achieve a more pragmatic balance. It seems
reasonable and even beneficial to the warfighter to have guidance that
endorses operational testing that includes all of a space system's
components, or at least as many components as can be feasibly tested
before delivery to the warfighter.
In concurring with our other recommendations, DOD identified actions it
has already taken that it believes will address our concerns. However,
we considered these actions in formulating our recommendations and
found that they did not go far enough to address the problems we
identified. For example, DOD cited a newly created Space and
Intelligence Office within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics as a means of enhancing
oversight for space programs. However, the office does not have
oversight authority over all user terminals. DOD also stated that total
cost information on each space system is provided to the Congress in
SARs. However, these reports do not currently capture satellite, ground
system, and related user terminal costs in a single document, which we
found was needed to provide more accessible and transparent data on
total costs for space programs. To improve synchronization and
commonality of space systems, we believe that DOD needs to go beyond
what it is already doing. This is the intent of our recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, and other interested parties. The
report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are provided in
appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)
manages the synchronization of capabilities between satellite and
ground components of satellite programs, we assessed eight DOD
satellite programs: the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite
(AEHF), NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), Mobile User Objective
System (MUOS), National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS), Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), Space-
Based Space Surveillance (SBSS), Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS), and Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS). We developed and sent data
requests to the respective program offices, and examined planned
deployment dates for satellites, ground systems, and user terminals to
determine if capabilities will be synchronized. In making
determinations about whether space system acquisitions had
synchronization issues, we examined whether there were gaps between
fielding dates of satellite capabilities compared to ground system
capabilities and whether lower percentages of user terminal types were
planned to be fielded by the space system acquisitions' planned initial
capability. Programs without gaps between fielding dates of satellite
capabilities and ground system capabilities and that had plans for
higher percentages of user terminal types to be fielded by their
associated space system's initial capability, were determined to be
synchronized. While there is no DOD standard by which to measure lack
of synchronization between satellite capabilities and ground system
capabilities, we generally only considered aspects of a space
acquisition unsynchronized if there was a gap of years, rather than
months, between the fielding dates of significant capabilities.
Regarding user terminals, we only considered these unsynchronized
compared to satellite capabilities when user terminals did not meet
DOD's measure of synchronization for military satellite communications
space acquisitions.[Footnote 26] This DOD measure of basic
synchronization, established by U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) says
that 20 percent of any type of user terminal should be fielded by a
space system acquisition's initial capability date and 85 percent
should be fielded by its full capability date.[Footnote 27] Although
DOD officials acknowledged that these definitions are somewhat
arbitrary and do not really measure what is most important--capability
provided to the warfighter via a certain level of synchronization--this
is the only DOD measure of space system synchronization.
We analyzed four programs (AEHF, GPS, MUOS, and SBIRS) in greater
detail to better understand the causes of less-than-optimal
synchronization. We also reviewed various reports and analyses that
identified factors contributing to a lack of synchronization. To
determine the effect(s) of space systems that are not synchronized, we
interviewed combatant commanders (in STRATCOM, Omaha, Nebraska; U.S.
Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida; and U.S. Central Command,
Tampa, Florida) and testing personnel from the Office of the Director
of Operational Testing and Evaluation, Washington, D.C., to determine
if programs are optimally synchronized for testing and the consequences
if they are not. We also analyzed cost data for the various programs to
determine how much money was allocated to the satellites versus the
ground control systems.
To determine whether enhancements could be made to ground control
systems and what challenges must be overcome to better utilize space
systems, we interviewed DOD and government personnel at the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, Washington, D.C.; Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
Washington, D.C.; National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia;
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.; United
States Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles,
California; the Navy's Blossom Point Tracking Facility, Maryland; and
RAND Corporation, Los Angeles, California.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 to September
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Summary of Synchronization Issues Affecting Testing:
Satellite system and description: AEHF. A communications satellite
intended to provide global, secure, jam-resistant communications
capability for strategic and tactical warfighters;
Synchronization issues and how testing is affected:
* The prime contractor has experienced significant software development
problems (issuing numerous deficiency reports) with an aspect of the
ground control system that controls mission planning. Ground control
system fielding will be delayed until the deficiencies are corrected
and verified by the government testers;
* The Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) command
post terminal for command and control (ability to "fly") of AEHF will
be delayed. As a result, an interim, non-production-representative
command and control terminal will have to be relied upon for testing
and initial support of AEHF. In order to determine that a space system
is operationally effective and suitable, production-representative
equipment for all components must be in place for operational testing.
Satellite system and description: MOUS. A communications satellite
designed to provide a worldwide, multiservice population of mobile and
fixed terminal users with narrow-band line of sight satellite
communications capability. MUOS will be capable of operating in adverse
weather conditions;
Synchronization issues and how testing is affected:
* Delays in the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) terminals mean that
these are not well synchronized with MUOS. As a result, there may be no
production-representative JTRS available for MUOS operational testing
scheduled for fiscal year 2010, which will affect the ability to test
several aspects of MUOS;
* Because of development delays, the majority of MUOS testing will be
conducted in a laboratory instead of an operational platform
environment. This will limit the capability to assess operational
effectiveness and suitability issues associated with satellites'
payload performance in their intended environment.
Satellite system and description: GPS. A navigation satellite with a
space-based radio-positioning system providing navigation and timing
data to military and civilian users worldwide;
Synchronization issues and how testing is affected:
* The development delays of a ground control system capable of
commanding several significant satellite capabilities, which are
designed to ensure that military GPS signals are secure, has delayed
both testing and operational use of the capabilities. These
capabilities could have been tested in 2005 if there had been no
delays, but now they most likely will not be tested until 2010. As a
result, by the time operational testing can be conducted for these
significant capabilities, the entire GPS constellation (Block IIR-M and
IIF satellites) will have already been launched, eliminating the
opportunity for operational testing to influence the development of
those satellites before they launch. Therefore, the overall lack of GPS
program synchronization limits the utility of operational testing.
Satellite system and description: SBIRS. A missile warning satellite
designed to meet requirements in the missile warning, missile defense,
technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization missions;
Synchronization issues and how testing is affected:
* The hardware for an important sensor capability was placed on the
first increment of SBIRS satellites, but because of problems, the
associated software to enable full utilization of the sensor data will
not be available. As a result, this sensor's data will be available
years before it can be fully utilized. From a testing standpoint, this
means that initial satellite capabilities cannot be tested in time to
affect the subsequent increment of satellites;
* There has also been instability in the plan for the ground control
system architecture because system requirements have continued to
change. These requirements changes have led to ground software
development delays and, from a test perspective, difficulties in
developing an efficient test strategy.
Satellite system and description: WGS. A communications satellite
designed to provide essential communications services to U.S.
warfighters, allies, and coalition partners during almost all levels of
conflict;
Synchronization issues and how testing is affected:
* The mission planning system does not work as intended. It was
acquired separately from the satellite, and its shortcomings affect the
ability of the Wideband Satellite Operations Center to perform its
missions. This affects the ability of testers to validate user
operations.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Synchronization Issues between Satellites and User
Terminals:
DOD program: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite System;
AEHF;
* Initial operational capability (IOC) 2011[A] (two satellites
fielded);
* Full operational capability (FOC) date not specified by program[A];
User terminal synchronization issues:
Air Force terminals:
* FAB-T Increment 1; Function: Provide voice and data military
satellite communications for nuclear and conventional forces as well as
airborne and ground command posts. Synchronization issue: Two percent
fielded by AEHF IOC (2011);
* Ground Element Minimum Essential Emergency Communication Network;
Function: Fixed and deployable communication for alerting aircrew of
emergencies on bombers, tankers, and reconnaissance aircraft.
Synchronization issue: Sixty-four percent fielded by AEHF IOC (2011);
* Minuteman Minimum Essential Emergency Communication Network Program --
Upgrade; Function: Provides 24/7 survivable, redundant communication
links for the reception of emergency action messages and command and
control of ICBM force. Synchronization issue: Fifty-two percent fielded
by AEHF IOC (2011);
* Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal; Function: Provide
worldwide, low probability of intercept/detection, jam-resistant,
survivable multichannel communications and robust operations.
Synchronization issue: Fifty-eight percent fielded by AEHF IOC (2011);
Navy terminal:
* Navy Multiband Terminal; Function: Next generation of maritime
satellite communication designed to enhance protected and survivable
satellite communications to naval forces. Synchronization issue: Only
14 percent fielded by AEHF IOC (2011).
DOD program: NAVSTAR Global Positioning System;
NAVSTAR GPS;
User terminal synchronization issues:
* Military GPS user equipment: DOD plans to field extensive GPS user
equipment and terminals to assist with positioning and navigation on a
variety of air, ground, and sea platforms. While we did not evaluate
plans to field the many types of GPS user equipment, we did examine
when user equipment would be able to utilize a modernized military
signal (M-code), designed to be secure and jam resistant;
Synchronization issue: The M-code signal is planned to reach its IOC on
the GPS satellites and ground control system by 2014. While user
terminals will start to receive and process the signal as they begin to
be fielded leading up to 2025, the user equipment and terminals are not
expected to be fully fielded and operational until that year.
DOD program: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System;
NPOESS;
* IOC 2014 (one satellite fielded);
* FOC 2017 (number of satellites not specified by program);
User terminal synchronization issues:
Navy terminals:
* AN-SMQ-11 - Navy Field Terminal; Function: Fielded primarily
shipboard, with some shore, depot, and training assets. It ingests,
processes, stores, and displays environmental data records (EDR) from
meteorology and oceanographic (METOC) satellite families.
Synchronization issue: System is currently fielded, but program
estimates that only 50 percent of population will be upgraded for
NPOESS compatibility by NPOESS IOC (2014);
* AN-FMQ-17 - Navy Field Terminal; Function: Fielded on shore only. It
ingests, processes, stores, and displays EDRs from METOC satellite
families. Synchronization issue: System is currently fielded, but
program estimates that only 67 percent of population will be upgraded
for NPOESS compatibility by NPOESS IOC (2014);
Marine terminal:
* Field Terminal Segment (FTS) Mobile; Function: Signal Processing
Element (SPE), Data Processing Element (DPE), and Mission Applications
Element (MAE). SPE receives, decrypts, and conducts basic RF
processing. DPE provides the data analysis algorithms that transform
the raw data into usable images and METOC data. MAE provides the
graphical user interface for the system, conducts postprocessing
analysis, and displays finished products. This capability is highly
desired in the FTS for size and weight considerations. Synchronization
issue: Twelve planned, but only 1 estimated to be available by NPOESS
IOC;
Air Force terminals:
* MARK IVB and RSS terminals; Function: Both types of terminals
designed to receive geostationary information. Synchronization issue:
Systems are currently fielded and work with legacy systems. Plans and
funding are in place to achieve NPOESS compatibility.
DOD program: Mobile User Objective System;
MUOS;
* IOC 2011 (one satellite fielded);
* FOC 2014 (when all five satellites are fielded);
User terminal synchronization issues:
Joint terminal: JTRS; Function: Software-defined radios that will
interoperate and increase communication and networking capabilities.
Synchronization issue: Less than 20 percent of MUOS-capable JTRS
terminals available by MUOS IOC (on orbit capability) in late 2011.
DOD program: Wideband Global SATCOM;
WGS;
* IOC 2009 (one satellite fielded);
* FOC 2013 (when all five satellites are fielded);
User terminal synchronization issues:
Army, Navy, and Air Force - several airborne intelligence surveillance
reconnaissance terminals; Synchronization issue: SADT for
Predator/Reaper UAV, FAB-T Increment 2, and the Aerial Common Sensor--
all zero percent fielded as of WGS IOC (2009).
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Legend: IOC = Initial Operational Capability; FOC = Full Operational
Capability.
[A] AEHF IOC (defined as two satellites fielded) is currently scheduled
for 2011 and there is no specified FOC date. However, there is a new
acquisition program baseline pending approval. If it is approved, IOC
will be delayed until 2013, and FOC is projected for 2019 (defined as
four satellites fielded) because of satellite development issues. If
the IOC date becomes 2013, this will alleviate several of the terminal
synchronization issues listed above. AEHF program management told us
that the satellite delays have been fortuitous in that they have
allowed the program to be more synchronized. Regardless, before this
unplanned delay in IOC, the program was being managed with
significantly less-than-optimal synchronization (as evidenced by the
information above).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Ms. Cristina Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report 10-55, "Defense Acquisitions: Challenges In Aligning Space
System Components," dated September 9, 2009 (GAO Code 120787). Detailed
comments on the report recommendations are enclosed.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to respond to your draft
report and look forward to working with you to ensure alignment of
Space System components.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Gil Klinger:
Director:
Space and Intelligence:
Enclosures: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated September 11, 2009:
GAO-10-55 (GAO Code 120787):
"Defense Acquisitions: Challenges In Aligning Space System Components"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
define a basic level of expected synchronization during the development
of each space system acquisition based on delivering a capability to
the warfighter. (p. 24/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The Department concurs that defining a basic
level of expected synchronization during development of new space-based
capabilities may better inform acquisition decision makers. As noted in
the report, the Department, through the Commander of Strategic Command,
has already established a synchronization measure for military
satellite communications (MILSATCOM) capabilities and a bi-annual
report is published on MILSATCOM synchronization based on Service
MILSATCOM terminal fielding plans. These data are included in each
Defense Acquisition Board MILSATCOM system review. In addition, as the
Net-Centric Capability Portfolio Manager the OASD(NII) periodically
reviews MILSATCOM capability fielding as a function of alignment
between satellite and terminal fielding. A similar measure might be
beneficially applied to other space systems. However, the delivery of
capabilities to the warfighter is dependent on military deployments and
the Combatant Commanders' need to respond swiftly to emerging
situations. To more-specifically define a level of synchronization
based on fielded warfighter capabilities would require tying dynamic
operational deployment plans to capability measures and acquisition
program schedules.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
assess the value of designating an office with responsibility for
overseeing the relative progress of satellite, ground, and user
terminal programs with the aim of ensuring that problems that could
affect the ability to synchronize a space system are known and
addressed. (p. 24/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The Department has already taken actions to
improve space system acquisition programs. In June 2008, to more
effectively conduct oversight of the space and intelligence enterprise,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics [USD(AT&L)] created the Space and Intelligence Office.
Additionally in 2008 and 2009, the USD(AT&L) approved several
recommendations from a Joint Analysis Team (JAT) that assessed the
effectiveness of the Department's various acquisition oversight bodies.
Two special boards were disestablished (Defense Space Acquisition Board
and Joint Tactical Radio System Board Of Directors) and all space and
intelligence programs were directed to be governed by the Defense
Acquisition Board. Additional acquisition effectiveness may be
available by assessing the Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT)
governance structure of space acquisition programs.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
formulate guidance to better align space system components so that all
components are available to facilitate optimal operational testing. (p.
24/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Partially Concur. The Department has already taken
several steps to better align and consolidate space system oversight,
as noted in the Department's response to recommendation 2. However, the
Department should not significantly further delay providing the
warfighter with needed space system capabilities in order to optimize
operational testing if a space system component is significantly
delayed. The Department in all cases will conduct adequate operational
testing of space systems.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
develop DoD-wide guidance, specific to space systems, to allow for the
integration and consolidation, to the extent feasible, of DoD's current
and future satellite ground control systems via common ground
architecture or by similar means. (p. 24/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The Department agrees that the integration and
consolidation of satellite ground control systems has many benefits.
For example, since March 2002 the Department has been pursuing this
capability with the Air Force's Command Control System ”Consolidated
(CCS-C). CCS-C has consolidated the satellite ground control systems
for Defense Satellite Communication Systems (DSCS), Milstar, and
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) Block I. By October, 2011, CCS-C will also
be controlling the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System as
well as WGS Block II. Although additional guidance may be needed,
existing guidance allows for the integration and consolidation of
satellite ground control systems as evidenced by as demonstrated by the
CCS-C program.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
provide annual documentation to Congress that specifically delineates
the cost, and cost performance, associated with (1) the satellites, (2)
the ground control systems, and (3) associated user terminals, and as a
result, provide the total cost of all planned components of each space
system acquisition. (p. 24/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The Department agrees that a report to Congress
that highlights the cost and cost performance of satellites, ground
control systems, and associated user equipment is valuable to informing
Congressional oversight. The Department already provides these data via
annual Select Acquisition Reports based on cost and cost performance
metrics contained in Acquisition Program Baselines.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cristina T. Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report
were Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Michael Aiken; Greg Campbell;
John Crawford; Claire Cyrnak; John Krump; and Don Springman.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] There are 10 unified combatant commands. Six combatant commands
have geographic responsibilities to plan and execute military
operations in their respective regions. Four combatant commands have
functional responsibilities, for example, providing transportation
services.
[2] SATCOM stands for satellite communications.
[3] It should be noted that while there are criteria for communications
satellites, there are no criteria available in DOD that determine the
optimum alignment or synchronization for the broader portfolio of
satellite programs. This is principally because of inherent differences
in satellite missions and their associated ground and user assets,
according to officials involved in space system development as well as
acquisition oversight.
[4] Spoofing is a process where an entity gains unauthorized access to
a system to disrupt the normal flow of information.
[5] That is, the first geosynchronous earth orbiting satellite to be
delivered by the SBIRS program, rather than a previously deployed
missile warning sensor that is now in orbit on two highly elliptical
orbiting satellites.
[6] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Department of Defense Needs Framework
for Balancing Investments in Tactical Radios, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-877] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15,
2008).
[7] Mobile User Objective System Independent Program Assessment Build
Approval, February 2008.
[8] STRATCOM is a combatant command with the functional responsibility
for space and information operations; missile defense; global command
and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; strategic
deterrence; and integration and synchronization of DOD's departmentwide
efforts in combating weapons of mass destruction.
[9] DOT&E is DOD's primary office responsible for the testing of
weapons, equipment, or munitions under operational, or realistic,
conditions for the purpose of determining their effectiveness and
suitability for use.
[10] GAO, Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges in
Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-325] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2009).
[11] Defense Science Board Task Force, The Future of the Global
Positioning System, (Washington, D.C., Oct. 28, 2005).
[12] Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization, January 2001.
[13] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes
Not Well-Suited to Support Development of Global Information Grid,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-211] (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 30, 2006).
[14] JTEO is an Air Force office that provides a DOD-wide view of
MILSATCOM synchronization.
[15] Net-centric refers to the capability to discover, access, trust
and use information within a complex community of people, devices,
information and services interconnected by a communications network to
achieve optimal benefit of resources.
[16] Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Public Law 111-23,
May 22, 2009.
[17] Selected Acquisition Reports, primary sources for cost information
on all major DOD acquisition programs (including space systems), for
example, do not show costs associated with the ground control systems,
but instead show the combined total costs of satellites and ground
control systems.
[18] These comprehensive, summary status reports on major defense
acquisition programs are required for periodic submission to the
Congress.
[19] Open systems allow the use of commercially available products from
multiple vendors, rather than developing unique components.
[20] GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: More Common Systems and Components
Could Result in Cost Savings, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-101] (Washington, D.C.: May
21, 1999).
[21] The Blossom Point Tracking Facility is located in Maryland near
Washington, D.C.
[22] The Air Force does have a similar capability specifically for
communications satellite constellations, but no capability to allow for
control of multiple space systems with different missions.
[23] DOD Directive 8320.02, December 2, 2004.
[24] The Defense Science Board is an advisory board within DOD that
provides independent advice to the Secretary of Defense.
[25] Defense Science Board Task Force, Creating an Assured Joint DOD
and Interagency Interoperable Net-Centric Enterprise, Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
(Washington, D.C., March 2009).
[26] DOD does not have a measure of synchronization for space
acquisitions with missions other than military satellite
communications.
[27] U.S. Strategic Command, SATCOM Mission Area Initial Capabilities
Document, August 2004. DOD also has a definition for optimal military
satellite communications user terminal synchronization of 50 percent of
a type of user terminal fielded by a space acquisition's initial
capability date and 95 percent by its' full capability date.
[End of section]
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