Homeland Defense
Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues Challenge DOD's Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Incidents Gao ID: GAO-10-123 October 7, 2009DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents, including providing capabilities to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's CBRNE consequence management plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal plans; (2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence management assistance; (3) DOD's CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) are prepared for their mission; and (4) DOD has CCMRF funding plans that are linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. GAO reviewed DOD's plans for CBRNE consequence management and documents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA. GAO also met with officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command, the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF units.
DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not integrated them with other federal plans because those federal entities have not completed all elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007. The system is to develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local levels. While the system's framework is established, the CBRNE concept and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly. However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans are complete, DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DOD's CCMRF will address potential gaps in capabilities. We previously recommended and DHS agreed that FEMA should develop a program management plan and schedule to complete the planning system. With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide needed capabilities, but its response times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges to its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units. Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve portions of CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD's ability to train and deploy forces in a timely manner is at risk. DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness of units assigned to the first CCMRF, increasing both individual and collective training focused on the mission and identifying the mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not conducted realistic full force field training to confirm units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands of overseas missions may distract from a unit's focus on the domestic mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals. These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify all requirements have not been completed, and funding responsibilities are spread across the department and are not subject to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority increased in the spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However, units did not have dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with funding also used for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over total funding requirements. Without an overarching approach to requirements and funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified and funded, DOD's ability to ensure that its forces are prepared to carry out this high-priority mission remains challenged.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-10-123, Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues Challenge DOD's Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Incidents
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2009:
Homeland Defense:
Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues Challenge DOD's Response to
Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield
Explosive Incidents:
GAO-10-123:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-123, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents,
including providing capabilities to save lives, alleviate hardship or
suffering, and minimize property damage. This report addresses the
extent to which (1) DOD‘s CBRNE consequence management plans and
capabilities are integrated with other federal plans; (2) DOD has
planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence
management assistance; (3) DOD‘s CBRNE Consequence Management Response
Forces (CCMRF) are prepared for their mission; and (4) DOD has CCMRF
funding plans that are linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE
capabilities. GAO reviewed DOD‘s plans for CBRNE consequence management
and documents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA.
GAO also met with officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command, the military services, the
National Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF units.
What GAO Found:
DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not
integrated them with other federal plans because those federal entities
have not completed all elements of the Integrated Planning System
mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007. The system is to
develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local
levels. While the system‘s framework is established, the CBRNE concept
and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD
has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly.
However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans
are complete, DOD‘s plans and those of other federal and state entities
will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DOD‘s CCMRF
will address potential gaps in capabilities. We previously recommended
and DHS agreed that FEMA should develop a program management plan and
schedule to complete the planning system.
With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic
CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide needed capabilities, but its
response times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack
sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges to
its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units.
Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve
portions of CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on
availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they
would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD‘s ability to
train and deploy forces in a timely manner is at risk.
DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the
readiness of units assigned to the first CCMRF, increasing both
individual and collective training focused on the mission and
identifying the mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not
conducted realistic full force field training to confirm units‘
readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands
of overseas missions may distract from a unit‘s focus on the domestic
mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals.
These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from
providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to
build cohesiveness.
DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and
equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to
identify all requirements have not been completed, and funding
responsibilities are spread across the department and are not subject
to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority increased in the
spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However, units did not have
dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with funding also used
for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over total funding
requirements. Without an overarching approach to requirements and
funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements
have been identified and funded, DOD‘s ability to ensure that its
forces are prepared to carry out this high-priority mission remains
challenged.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to DOD to improve the link between DOD
and other federal plans, match capabilities with requirements, increase
readiness, and improve oversight of CCMRF funding and resourcing. DOD
agreed or partially agreed with the recommendations and cited ongoing
or planned actions to implement them.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-123] or key
components. For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino at (202) 512-
5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Its Own CBRNE Consequence Management Plans in Place but is
Unable to Fully Integrate Them with Other Federal Plans, Which Are
Incomplete:
DOD's Planned Response to CBRNE Incidents May Be Insufficient:
DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness, but Training Gaps and
Conflicting Priorities May Degrade Performance:
CCMRF Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed, and Funding and
Oversight Are Decentralized:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Fifteen National Planning Scenarios Grouped into Eight
Scenario Sets:
Table 2: Status of Development for CBRNE-Related Plans Called for under
HSPD-8 Annex 1, Utilizing the Integrated Planning System (as of July
2009):
Table 3: Estimate of Potential Lifesaving Decontamination Requirements
Compared with Likely Capabilities for a 10 Kiloton Nuclear Detonation
in a Major Metropolitan City In the First 72 Hours after Incident:
Table 4: Selected CBRNE Individual Training Tasks:
Table 5: CCMRF Mission Costs and Funding Sources:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Organizations under Federal
and State Control:
Figure 2: Approximate Response Time Frames for Military CBRNE
Consequence Management:
Abbreviations:
CBIRF: Chemical Biological Incident, Response Force:
CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive:
CCMRF: CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive:
NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 7, 2009:
Congressional Requesters:
The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security highlighted the
continuing threat posed to the United States by the potential use of
weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations.[Footnote 1] In
addition to efforts focused on preventing such attacks, the strategy
highlights the need for a comprehensive capability to mitigate the
consequences of an attack involving weapons of mass destruction. Such a
capability is also a key pillar of the National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction.[Footnote 2] The Department of Defense
(DOD) characterizes weapons of mass destruction in terms of chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE)
materials. Incidents involving CBRNE could range in magnitude, from
such things as accidents like chemical spills that likely could be
addressed by local responders to catastrophic incidents such as
terrorist attacks involving nuclear material that could result in
extraordinary levels of casualties and property damage.
A catastrophic CBRNE-related incident occurring within the United
States would require a unified, national response, including action by
DOD. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for
coordinating federal disaster response planning, with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) serving as the primary federal
agency under DHS for coordinating federal assistance in response to an
incident. DOD would act in support of the primary federal agency. In
addition to establishing CBRNE response units in the National Guard,
including the Civil Support Teams and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force
Packages, DOD is establishing CBRNE Consequence Management Response
Forces (CCMRF). A CCMRF is roughly a brigade-sized force (approximately
4,500 troops) that provides federal military assistance when a CBRNE
incident exceeds local and state capabilities. DOD relies on its
existing force structure, which it refers to as "dual-capability
forces," to support the domestic CBRNE consequence management mission
as well as overseas missions.
In May 2006, we reported that the National Guard Weapons of Mass
Destruction Civil Support Teams were generally organized and prepared
for their mission, and we highlighted management challenges that needed
to be addressed.[Footnote 3] In response to your request that we assess
DOD's federal role in CBRNE consequence management efforts, we
initiated a review focusing on federal military planning and
preparedness efforts and CCMRF. Our objectives for this report address
the extent to which (1) DOD's plans and capabilities are integrated
with other federal government plans to address capability requirements,
(2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE
consequence management assistance, (3) DOD's CCMRF are prepared to
perform their mission, and (4) DOD has funding plans for CCMRF that are
linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. As agreed
with your offices, we will conduct a review of the operational
effectiveness of the National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force
Packages (commonly referred to as CERFP) as a follow-on effort.
To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for CBRNE consequence
management operations and has integrated its plans with other federal
government plans, we reviewed and compared current DOD operational-and
tactical-level plans for civil support and CBRNE consequence management
with existing FEMA and DHS planning efforts. We also met with officials
of DHS, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, and U.S Northern Command (NORTHCOM). We reviewed our prior
reports and worked with other GAO staff currently examining the overall
domestic homeland security planning integration process. To determine
how prepared CCMRF is to perform the mission, we compared existing DOD
policy and practices on readiness with the current process used to
prepare CCMRF units and report mission readiness. We also met with U.S.
Joint Forces Command and U.S. Army Forces Command--which are
responsible for providing ready forces to the combatant commands--to
discuss the manpower sourcing process followed for CCMRF. We obtained
readiness reports for CCMRF units from U.S. Northern Command and from
judgmentally selected units that were part of task force operations--
which contain most of the specialized capabilities. To determine CCMRF
funding planning and the linkage of funding to mission requirements, we
met with Army and U.S. Northern Command officials to obtain guidance on
the topic and to discuss mission requirements, funding needs, and
sources. We compared funding sources to known CBRNE consequence
management requirements and highlighted areas where funding was not
identified for key activities or areas relevant to unit preparedness.
We also met with the National Guard Bureau to discuss their current
capabilities, identified shortfalls, and approach to mitigating any
identified shortfalls.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to October 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
DOD has its own operational plans for CBRNE consequence management but
is unable to fully integrate them with other federal government plans
because other federal departments and agencies have not completed all
elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential
directive in December 2007. The Integrated Planning System is intended
to provide a framework to link the family of related U.S. preparedness
planning documents at the federal, regional, state, and local levels
and is to include strategic guidance statements, strategic plans,
concepts of operations, and operations plans related to the 15 National
Planning Scenarios.[Footnote 4] The Integrated Planning System's
framework is in place. However, many federal plans that would link with
DOD's plans are incomplete. DOD and NORTHCOM have had operational plans
in place and continue to review and revise these plans as part of DOD's
well-established joint planning process. However, until all federal
plans are complete and specific national guidance is issued, DOD plans
and those of other federal and state entities will not be integrated,
and it will remain unclear whether DOD's CCMRF will address potential
gaps in capabilities. While there are a number of efforts to develop
capability assessments at local, state, and federal levels, these
efforts are not yet sufficiently mature to provide DOD with complete
data to shape its CBRNE response. Additionally, DHS and FEMA face
challenges in obtaining complete and consistent data from the states.
We previously recommended and DHS agreed that FEMA should develop a
program management plan and schedule for completing the Integrated
Planning System process. We are recommending that in the absence of
completed and integrated plans, DOD work with DHS, FEMA, and other
interagency partners to agree on (1) interim goals, objectives, and
assumptions for DOD's role in responding to one or more simultaneously
occurring CBRNE incidents in the United States and (2) the specific
types and quantities of capabilities DOD is expected to contribute and
the time frames in which those capabilities are to be provided.
DOD has plans for providing the needed capabilities for CBRNE
consequence management, but its response may be insufficient because
(1) its planned time frames for responding may not meet incident
requirements, (2) the quantity of some key capabilities included in
CCMRF may be inadequate, and (3) challenges remain in force structure
plans and sourcing CCMRF. First, DOD's goal is to source three CCMRFs
and be able to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE incidents.
Its plans call for the first force to be capable of providing
consequence management support within 48-96 hours of being notified of
a CBRNE incident. However, multiple DOD estimates for some of the more
catastrophic scenarios, such as a nuclear detonation, suggest that
planned response times may not meet incident requirements. Second, even
after its arrival, DOD's planned force has limited quantities of some
needed life-saving capabilities, such as medical and decontamination
assets that can contribute to meeting incident requirements. DOD
recognizes it may need additional units to augment this force, but
specific units that would be needed to augment CCMRF have not been
identified. Unless these units are identified in advance and trained
for the mission, they may be unable to deploy rapidly. Finally, the
demands of overseas military operations and DOD's approach to aligning
units to the command responsible for carrying out CBRNE operations
present challenges for training, assembling, and deploying CCMRFs.
Whereas DOD originally intended CCMRFs to be composed entirely of
federal active military forces, it now plans to form the second and
third CCMRFs primarily with National Guard and Army Reserve units due
to the unavailability of sufficient number of active forces to meet
requirements. DOD and the governors are developing agreements to
address how to ensure that National Guard units will be available to
meet the federal requirements of CCMRF, but those agreements are not
all in place. DOD also recently reversed its previous decision and will
only place CCMRF units under NORTHCOM's direct authority in the event
of an incident or for specified training events, rather than assigning
them to NORTHCOM throughout the period that units are on the mission.
As a result, NORTHCOM will have less direct authority to control
domestic deployment availability, manage day-to-day training, and
monitor the readiness of the units responsible for carrying out the
CBRNE mission. The combination of these factors place DOD's ability to
organize, train, and deploy adequate forces to assist civil authorities
in the event of one or more major CBRNE incidents at risk. We are
recommending that (1) DOD align plans for all CCMRFs with stated
objectives, to include the extent to which existing CCMRF capabilities
contribute to identified response requirements and mission goals and
(2) DOD work with the state governors through the adjutants general and
the National Guard Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing CCMRF
and ensure that the agreements being established between DOD and state
governors include specific terms on National Guard force availability
and duty and response status.
In the last year, DOD has taken a number of actions to improve the
readiness of units that were assigned to the first CCMRF, including
increased training and priority for additional personnel and equipment.
Nevertheless, our review showed that CCMRF could be limited in its
ability to successfully conduct consequence management operations
because (1) it does not conduct realistic full-force field training to
confirm units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly,
and (2) conflicting priorities between the CCMRF mission and overseas
deployments affect some units' mission preparation and unit cohesion.
First, before designated units assume the CBRNE mission, they must be
certified that they are trained to perform that mission, but there is
no requirement to provide these units with a full-force tactical field
training exercise or to demonstrate that they will be able to meet the
required response times once they are assigned to the mission. Although
units generally conduct this type of training prior to an overseas
deployment and some elements of CCMRF have participated in field
exercises, these exercises often did not include some critical units or
were conducted several months after units had already been certified.
Without requirements to provide field training for the full CCMRF that
include an assessment of the ability to deploy on no-notice, as may be
the case for an actual CBRNE incident, DOD cannot be assured that
individual units that do not normally operate together will be able to
operate as a unified force. In addition, the shift away from assigning
CCMRF units directly to NORTHCOM exacerbates this problem, since the
NORTHCOM commander will have less direct oversight of the training and
readiness of the forces he will command in a CBRNE incident. Second,
while DOD has identified CCMRF as a high priority, competing demands
associated with follow-on overseas missions may distract from a unit's
focus on the domestic mission. For example, Army units are frequently
given the CCMRF mission when they return from an overseas deployment.
Because these units are in the "reset" or reconstitution phase of the
Army force generation model, they often lack personnel and equipment.
Other critical CCMRF units have been unable to meet the first CCMRF's
rotation goal, that is, remain on the mission for at least 12 months.
As a result, the replacement units that have finished out these
rotations have missed important joint training opportunities. These
training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing
the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build
cohesiveness. We are recommending that DOD (1) include in the CCMRF
training program requirements to ensure that the entire CCMRF conducts
a joint field training exercise as part of its mission validation and
that the entire CCMRF conduct at least one no-notice deployment
readiness exercise annually and (2) determine the time needed by units
to perform the necessary pre-mission CCMRF training and examine
sourcing options that would ensure that units have adequate time to
train prior to mission assumption.
DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and
equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to
identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its
approach to providing program funding has been fragmented and is not
subject to central oversight. In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority
for the CCMRF mission increased substantially within the department,
and more funding was provided. For example, NORTHCOM plans more than
$33 million for two major exercises in its fiscal year 2010 training
program, and the Army Reserve has planned over $37 million for fiscal
years 2009 and 2010 to fund additional full-time personnel and training
days that have been authorized to support the CCMRF mission. However,
the initial CCMRF established on October 1, 2008, did not have fully
defined funding requirements or the necessary dedicated resources to
effectively carry out the CCMRF mission in an integrated and consistent
manner. Moreover, other important requirements for this mission, such
as essential equipment requirements for unique nonstandard equipment,
have not been fully identified and funded. DOD officials told us they
are in the process of developing these requirements and hope to have
them for the next rotation that begins in October 2009. While the
military services have not always budgeted funds specifically for the
CCMRF mission, units have purchased mission equipment with funding from
other sources that may not be available in the future. Moreover, units
also fund their CCMRF-related training activities from their operations
and maintenance accounts, which are developed without considering the
CCMRF mission. As a result, unit officials sometimes reallocate funding
initially intended for other purposes to meet the CCMRF mission.
Because DOD has assigned funding responsibilities across the department
and much of the funding is being provided from existing operations and
maintenance accounts, DOD lacks visibility across the department for
the total funding requirements for this mission. Without an overarching
approach and funding strategy for linking requirements to funding and a
centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been
identified and fully funded, DOD's ability to ensure in advance that
its forces are prepared to carry out this high-priority mission
efficiently and effectively could be challenged. We are recommending
that DOD (1) determine the total requirements for CCMRF, including
unique nonstandard equipment requirements, and develop a plan on how
those requirements will be filled and (2) develop an overall funding
strategy for establishing, fielding, and exercising CCMRF and designate
a single focal point for coordinating this strategy.
DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report and provided
technical comments, which we incorporated into the final report as
appropriate. DOD agreed or partially agreed with all our
recommendations and described actions it is taking or plans to take to
implement them. A summary of DOD's comments and a summary of our
response to these comments follow the Recommendations for Executive
Action section of this report. DOD's written comments are reprinted in
appendix II. DHS also reviewed a draft of this report and provided
technical comments, which we incorporated into the final report as
appropriate.
Background:
DOD plays a support role in CBRNE consequence management, including
providing those capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship
or suffering, and minimize property damage caused by the incident. DOD
generally provides defense support of civil authorities only when (1)
state, local, and other federal resources are overwhelmed or unique
military capabilities are required; (2) assistance is requested by the
primary federal agency; or (3) NORTHCOM is directed to do so by the
President or the Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 5] DOD has designated
NORTHCOM[Footnote 6] to lead the federal military[Footnote 7] portion
of such a support operation in direct support of another federal
agency--most often FEMA. DOD could be the lead federal agency for CBRNE
consequence management or any other civil support mission only if so
designated by the President.[Footnote 8] To be effective, NORTHCOM's
efforts must support a wide range of federal departments and agencies--
including FEMA and the Departments of Health and Human Services and
Justice--in order to support 50 states, the District of Columbia, six
territories, and hundreds of city and county governments.
The National Response Framework establishes the principles that guide
all response partners in preparing for and providing a unified national
response to disasters. [Footnote 9] Under the Framework, disaster
response is tiered; local governments and agencies typically respond
immediately following an incident. When additional resources are
required, states may provide assistance with their own resources or may
request assistance from other states through interstate mutual
agreements or the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.[Footnote 10]
Localities and states usually respond within the first several hours of
a major incident. The federal government provides assistance to states
if they require additional capabilities and they request assistance. In
the event of a catastrophic incident, such as one involving CBRNE, the
framework also calls for federal response partners to anticipate the
need for their capabilities before their assistance is requested. The
framework lists 15 emergency support functions and designates federal
lead agencies in areas such as search and rescue, public health and
medical services, and transportation. DOD is a supporting agency for
all 15 emergency support functions but is also one of the primary
agencies for search and rescue and public works and engineering.
[Footnote 11] Additional tools to guide response efforts are provided
by The National Preparedness Guidelines, including National Planning
Scenarios, Target Capability Lists and Universal Target Lists, and
national priorities.
The federal government has a wide array of capabilities and resources
that can be made available to assist state and local agencies in
responding to incidents. NORTHCOM would command the federalized DOD
capabilities and coordinate the efforts of state controlled DOD
capabilities. Figure 1 shows the organizational structure of key DOD
CBRNE Consequence Management Organizations under federal and state
control.
Figure 1: DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Organizations under Federal
and State Control:
[Refer to PDF for image: organizational chart]
Top level: President of the United States:
Second level, reporting to President of the United States: Secretary of
Defense:
Third level, reporting to Secretary of Defense:
NORTHCOM:
National Guard Bureau (NORTHCOM provides coordination);
* State Adjutant Generals (NORTHCOM provides coordination);
* Joint Force Headquarters-State (NORTHCOM provides coordination);
* State Task Forces (NORTHCOM provides coordination).
Fourth level, reporting to NORTHCOM:
Fleet Forces Command/Joint Force Maritime Component Commander;
Marine Forces North;
Air Forces North/Joint Force Air Component Commander;
Army North/Joint Forces Land Component Commander:
* Joint Task Force Civil Support (also associated with Joint Force
Headquarters-State);
* Task Force Headquarters (also associated with State Task Forces);
- Task Force Operations coordination (Units designated for the CCMRF
would come under one of these task forces);
- Task Force Medical coordination (Units designated for the CCMRF would
come under one of these task forces);
- Task Force Aviation coordination (Units designated for the CCMRF
would come under one of these task forces).
Source: GAO analysis of NORTHCOM information.
[End of figure]
In framing its role in providing CBRNE consequence management
assistance, DOD has set its standard of preparedness as the ability to
prepare for and mitigate the effects of multiple, near-simultaneous
CBRNE events.[Footnote 12] DOD has significant capabilities that could
be used to augment a federal CBRNE response and also contributes to the
organization, training, and equipping of several state-controlled
military units focused on consequence management, including the
following.
* The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.
These 22-person units are composed of full time National Guard
personnel and are located in each state and territory.[Footnote 13]
Their mission is to assist civil authorities in responding to actual or
suspected CBRNE incidents by identifying agents and substances,
assessing consequences, advising civil authorities on response
measures, and assisting with requests for additional support. The teams
are under the control of the governors of their respective states and
territories unless they are activated for federal service, at which
time they would come under the control of DOD.
* The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages. Each of
these larger force packages (about 200 soldiers) is composed of
personnel from numerous existing National Guard units; these personnel
remain in the same status as most National Guard personnel and must be
mobilized for duty. Their mission is to provide follow-on assistance in
such areas as casualty search and extraction; patient decontamination;
and emergency medical triage, treatment, and stabilization. There are
currently 17 authorized response force packages, including at least one
in each of the 10 FEMA regions of the country. Like the Civil Support
Teams, the force packages are intended to be part of the state response
to an incident and therefore remain under the control of the respective
governors. States that do not have this capability can access these
force packages through preestablished agreements. In rare instances,
the force packages can also be federalized and placed under DOD
authority.
* The DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF). These
forces, when fully established, are intended to be three brigade-sized
forces (approximately 4,500) that provide federal military assistance
when a CBRNE incident exceeds local and state capabilities, including
the National Guard forces described previously. The CCMRFs are
comprised of many individual units that are of different types and
sizes (for example, platoons, companies, battalions, and brigades),
from multiple military services and DOD agencies, from the active,
reserve, and National Guard, and are geographically dispersed
throughout the United States. The response force is intended to provide
assistance in such areas as command and control, technical search and
rescue, explosive ordnance disposal, aviation evacuation, medical
response, and CBRNE detection and decontamination. DOD's stated
requirement is to have three of these forces. An important element of
the first CCMRF is the unique capabilities provided by the Chemical
Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), which is a U.S. Marine
Corps unit consisting of about 400 personnel that assist local, state,
or federal agencies and designated combatant commanders in the conduct
of CBRNE consequence management operations. CBIRF maintains
capabilities for agent detection and identification, casualty search,
rescue, personnel decontamination, and emergency medical care and
stabilization of contaminated personnel. Plans call for CBIRF to
respond as part of the lead element for the first of three CCMRFs. DOD
originally intended for all three to be comprised strictly of active
duty military units. However, DOD's current plan is to have the first
force, established October 1, 2008, be comprised predominately of
active duty military units. The second and third response forces, which
are scheduled to be fielded on October 1, 2009, and October 1, 2010,
respectively, are expected to be comprised mostly of National Guard and
Army Reserve units. DOD is currently working with the states and the
National Guard Bureau on incorporating these units into the structure
of the response forces.
Figure 2 shows the approximate time frames for response to a CBRNE
incident involving the forces discussed above.
Figure 2: Approximate Response Time Frames for Military CBRNE
Consequence Management:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
CBRNE Incident:
National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams Response (12-24 hours);
National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (48 hours);
DOD CCMRF (48-96 hours).
Source: GAO analysis of NORTHCOM information.
[End of figure]
With the exception of key specialized capabilities, such as the
National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, DOD
relies on its "dual-capability forces" to provide all other CBRNE
consequence management capabilities in addition to existing overseas
missions. The CCMRFs--the only force listed above that is not under the
control of state governors and adjutants general--is composed of forces
that will come under the operational control of NORTHCOM in the event
of an incident. The force is organized for a CBRNE incident under three
task forces:
* Task Force Operations, which is to coordinate with local emergency
responders; conduct decontamination operations; survey, monitor, and
mark incident sites; provide security for DOD forces; and command and
control of DOD general support operations, mortuary affairs, and
transportation.
* Task Force Medical, which is to provide triage and treatment,
definitive care, medical logistics, hospital augmentation,
epidemiological support, agent technical support, stress management,
preventative medicine, veterinary support, and prophylaxis and
immunization (primarily in support of CCMRF personnel).
* Task Force Aviation, which is to provide medical evacuation, medical
lift capability, air transport personnel, air transport supplies,
search and rescue, and limited aircraft maintenance.
The Joint Task Force Civil Support is the command element that provides
command and control for the first CCMRF. Joint Task Force Civil Support
is a subordinate command of U.S. Army North (also the Joint Force Land
Component Commander), which is the Army component command of NORTHCOM.
Joint Task Force Civil Support is a permanent standing task force that
has been in existence since 1999 and plans and integrates DOD support
to the designated lead federal agency for domestic CBRNE consequence
management operations. When directed by the NORTHCOM Commander, Joint
Task Force Civil Support will deploy to the incident site, establish
command and control of the first CCMRF or other designated DOD forces,
and direct military consequence management operations in support of
civil authorities. Additional command and control organizations are
being established for the second and third CCMRFs.
DOD Has Its Own CBRNE Consequence Management Plans in Place but is
Unable to Fully Integrate Them with Other Federal Plans, Which Are
Incomplete:
DOD has operational plans for CBRNE consequence management. However,
DOD has not integrated its plans with other federal government plans
because the concept and strategic plans associated with the Integrated
Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007
have not been completed.
DOD Has Developed Plans for CBRNE Consequence Management:
Unlike most federal agencies, DOD has had CBRNE consequence management
operational plans for over 10 years. DOD, NORTHCOM, and its components
have prepared individual plans that address CBRNE consequence
management following DOD's well-established joint operation planning
process.[Footnote 14] This process establishes objectives, assesses
threats, identifies capabilities needed to achieve the objectives in a
given environment, and ensures that capabilities (and the military
forces to deliver those capabilities) are distributed to ensure mission
success. Joint operation planning also includes assessing and
monitoring the readiness of those units providing the capabilities for
the missions they are assigned. DOD and NORTHCOM routinely review and
update their plans as part of DOD's joint planning system. For example,
the most recent NORTHCOM CBRNE consequence management plan was
completed in October 2008. DOD and NORTHCOM have also developed such
planning documents as execute orders that are key to linking immediate
action to those plans, as well as scenario-based playbooks to guide the
planning, operations, and command and control of military forces for
CBRNE efforts.
Governmentwide Integrated Planning System Is under Development but Not
Yet Complete:
DHS is leading a governmentwide effort to develop an Integrated
Planning System that would link the plans of all federal agencies
involved in incident response, including DOD's; however, this effort is
not yet complete.[Footnote 15] While much in the way of federal
guidance has been developed, to be most effective, policy documents
must be operationalized by further detailing roles and responsibilities
for each entity that may be involved in responding to high-risk or
catastrophic incidents.
In December 2007, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1,
mandated that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
the heads of other federal agencies with roles in homeland security,
develop an Integrated Planning System to provide common processes for
all of the entities developing response plans.[Footnote 16] The
Integrated Planning System is intended to provide a framework to link
the family of related U.S. preparedness planning documents at the
federal, regional, state, and local levels that are called for in the
directive, such as strategic plans, concepts of operations plans, and
operations plans related to the 15 National Planning Scenarios. DHS has
grouped the 15 national planning scenarios on which preparedness plans
are to be based into 8 scenario sets, of which 5 are CBRNE-related.
Each of the scenarios, listed in table 1, includes a description,
assumptions, and likely effects, so that entities at all levels can use
them to guide planning.[Footnote 17]
Table 1: Fifteen National Planning Scenarios Grouped into Eight
Scenario Sets:
Scenario set:
1. Explosives Attack--Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device;
National planning scenarios: Scenario 12: Explosives Attack--Bombing
Using Improvised; Explosive Device.
Scenario set:
2. Nuclear Attack;
National planning scenarios: Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation--Improvised
Nuclear Device.
Scenario set:
3. Radiological Attack--Radiological Dispersal Device;
National planning scenarios: Scenario 11: Radiological Attack--
Radiological Dispersal Device.
Scenario set:
4. Biological Attack--with annexes for different pathogens;
National planning scenarios: Scenario 2: Biological Attack--Aerosol
Anthrax; Scenario 4: Biological Attack--Plague; Scenario 13: Biological
Attack--Food Contamination; Scenario 14: Biological Attack--Foreign
Animal Disease.
Scenario set:
5. Chemical Attack--with annexes for different agents;
National planning scenarios: Scenario 5: Chemical Attack--Blister
Agent; Scenario 6: Chemical Attack--Toxic Industrial Chemicals;
Scenario 7: Chemical Attack--Nerve Agent; Scenario 8: Chemical Attack--
Chlorine Tank Explosion.
Scenario set:
6. Natural Disaster--with annexes for different disasters;
National planning scenarios: Scenario 9: Natural Disaster--Major
Earthquake; Scenario 10: Natural Disaster--Major Hurricane.
Scenario set:
7. Cyber Attack;
National planning scenarios: Scenario 15: Cyber Attack.
Scenario set:
8. Pandemic Influenza;
National planning scenarios: Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak--
Pandemic Influenza.
Source: DHS.
[End of table]
The directive required that the Integrated Planning System be submitted
to the President for approval within 2 months of the directive's
issuance in December 2007. As we have reported, the Integrated Planning
System was approved in January 2009 by former President Bush, but is
currently under review by the new administration, and no time frame for
its publication has been announced.[Footnote 18] The approval of the
CBRNE plans required under the directive (see table 2 below) would be a
step toward unifying and integrating the nation's planning efforts. For
example, for each National Planning Scenario, a strategic guidance
statement is intended to establish the nation's strategic priorities
and national objectives and to describe an envisioned end-state.
Strategic guidance statements will have corresponding strategic plans,
which are intended to define roles, authorities, responsibilities, and
mission-essential tasks. Under each strategic plan, a concept of
operations plan will be developed, and federal agencies are further
required to develop operations plans to execute their roles and
responsibilities under the concept of operations plan.
As of July 2009, strategic guidance statements have been approved for
all five CBRNE-related scenario sets. Four of the five required
strategic plans have also been completed. The remaining strategic plan
(chemical attack) was begun in June 2009 upon the approval of the
strategic guidance statement for that scenario. One of the five
required overall federal concept plans--that for terrorist use of
explosives attack--has been completed. Table 2 shows the status of
federal CBRNE strategy and plans called for under Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 Annex 1.
Table 2: Status of Development for CBRNE-Related Plans Called for under
HSPD-8 Annex 1, Utilizing the Integrated Planning System (as of July
2009):
Planning scenario: Terrorist Use of Explosives Attack;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic
guidance statement status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security,
August 2008;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic plan
status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, November 2008;
FEMA: Overall federal concept plan status: Approved by Secretary of
Homeland Security, May 2009;
Federal departments and agencies: Agency operational plans status: DOD
has approved plans. Other agencies started January 2009.
Planning scenario: Improvised Nuclear Device Attack;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic
guidance statement status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security,
September 2008;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic plan
status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, January 2009;
FEMA: Overall federal concept plan status: Under development;
interagency review/adjudication;
Federal departments and agencies: Agency operational plans status: DOD
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development; due 120 days
after Concept Plan.
Planning scenario: Biological Attack;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic
guidance statement status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security,
January 2009;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic plan
status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, July 2009;
FEMA: Overall federal concept plan status: Under development;
interagency review/adjudication; due 180 days after Strategic Plan;
Federal departments and agencies: Agency operational plans status: DOD
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development; due 120 days
after Concept Plan.
Planning scenario: Radiological Dispersion Device Attack;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic
guidance statement status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security,
January 2009;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic plan
status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, July 2009;
FEMA: Overall federal concept plan status: Awaiting development; due
180 days after Strategic Plan;
Federal departments and agencies: Agency operational plans status: DOD
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development; due 120 days
after Concept Plan.
Planning scenario: Chemical Attack;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic
guidance statement status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security,
June 2009;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic plan
status: Under development; started in June 2009;
FEMA: Overall federal concept plan status: Awaiting development; due
180 days after Strategic Plan;
Federal departments and agencies: Agency operational plans status: DOD
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development; due 120 days
after Concept Plan.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of table]
DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities cannot be
fully integrated until the supporting strategic and concept plans are
completed. As we have previously reported, apart from the sequential
timelines required in HSPD-8 Annex 1, FEMA and DHS have no schedule or
project plan for completing the guidance and plans. We have recommended
and DHS generally agreed that FEMA should develop a program management
plan in coordination with other federal entities to ensure completion
of key national preparedness policies and plans called for in such
sources as presidential directives and that the plan should, among
other things, define roles and responsibilities and planning processes,
as well as identify a schedule for completion.[Footnote 19]
Current Capability Assessments at Local, State, and Federal Levels May
Provide Insufficient Data for DOD to Shape Its Response to CBRNE
Incidents:
A number of efforts to develop capability assessments are under way at
local, state, and federal levels, but these efforts may not yet be
sufficiently mature to provide DOD with complete data that it can use
to shape its response plans for CBRNE-related incidents. For example,
in fiscal year 2007, FEMA developed its Gap Analysis Program, which
focuses on seven general capabilities that are often needed in the
aftermath of a hurricane. These are: evacuation, medical needs, debris
removal, commodity distribution, sheltering, interim housing, and fuel
availability. While these capabilities would be needed for most
scenarios, including CBRNE-related scenarios, the Gap Analysis Program
does not identify unique capabilities needed for CBRNE incidents, such
as decontamination assets or detection assets. In 2008, FEMA expanded
the program to include not only hurricane-prone states, but all states
and all hazards. However, FEMA officials stated that neither their
questionnaires--which were used to query states about potential gaps in
their capabilities--nor any of their other guidance specified how
states should identify requirements unique to a CBRNE-related incident.
FEMA also collects capability data by other means. However, none of
these efforts--either individually or in the aggregate--has provided a
comprehensive capability assessment. The Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) requires that FEMA
report to Congress on federal preparedness, in part by collecting
information on state capability levels; states receiving DHS federal
preparedness assistance must provide preparedness reports. FEMA also
requires these reports in order for states to qualify for its grant
funds.[Footnote 20] States, territories, and the District of Columbia
completed and submitted their first state preparedness reports to FEMA
in the spring of 2008 and have also submitted reports in the spring of
2009. However, as we have previously reported,[Footnote 21] the state
capability data that FEMA has collected do not provide a comprehensive
picture of national capability gaps, because they are incomplete and
the states do not use common metrics to assess their capabilities. FEMA
officials stated that in order to provide the comprehensive capability-
based assessment that Congress requires, the next National Preparedness
Report, which as of September 2009 is being drafting and reviewed, will
apply one, comprehensive, capability based analytical framework to meet
a series of preparedness reporting requirements. FEMA anticipates that
through this effort, it will be able to gain a more complete picture of
national preparedness.
As noted in DHS's January 2009 Federal Preparedness Report, several key
components of the national preparedness system are still works in
progress, and not all data required for the federal government to
assess its preparedness are available. As DHS also states in its
report, standards for reporting operational readiness are not fully
developed, and DHS does not possess the authority to compel the
submission of data from other federal homeland security partners.
Moreover, according to DOD and FEMA, even to the extent that states
have capability data available, their sensitivity about disclosing data
that highlight the state's capability gaps has limited the degree to
which they share these data with DOD or with entities responsible for
developing DOD's plans and related capabilities. DOD officials stated
that in the absence of a comprehensive capability assessment, they
continue to work with FEMA and continue to build relationships with
individual states to collect data on their capabilities.
DOD's Planned Response to CBRNE Incidents May Be Insufficient:
DOD has had plans to provide CBRNE consequence management support to
civil authorities since before 9/11 and in the last few years has set
higher goals in the expectation of being able to provide expanded
capabilities through its three CCMRFs. However, its ability to respond
effectively may be compromised because (1) its planned response times
may not meet the requirements of a particular incident, (2) it may lack
sufficient capacity in some key capabilities, and (3) it faces
challenges in adhering to its strategy for sourcing CCMRFs with
available units.
DOD's Planned Response Times May Be Too Long:
In 2005, DOD established a standard for itself that called for the
ability to respond to multiple, simultaneous catastrophic incidents,
[Footnote 22] and it initiated efforts to create three CCMRFs. For the
first 3 years, DOD did not regularly assign units to the CCMRF mission,
and this decreased DOD's ability to actually field any of the CCMRFs
within the timelines it had established. In October 2008 DOD sourced
the first CCMRF, primarily with active force units. A second CCMRF,
comprised primarily of reserve units, will assume the mission in
October 2009 and a third in October 2010. In the absence of national
guidance suggesting what level of response capability DOD should have
available within a specified time frame, DOD's plans use a phased
deployment to allow the first CCMRF to be able to provide consequence
management support to civilian authorities within 48-96 hours of being
notified of a CBRNE incident.[Footnote 23] The earlier phases of the
deployment will provide the lifesaving capabilities. However, multiple
DOD estimates for some of the more catastrophic scenarios, such as a
nuclear detonation, have identified significant gaps between the time
certain life saving and other capabilities would be needed and DOD's
planned response times. For example, victims of a nuclear attack would
require decontamination, which medical experts have established must be
provided as soon as possible after exposure. If DOD adheres to its
planned response times in such a scenario, the capabilities of early
responders such as local police and fire departments would likely be
overwhelmed before DOD arrived at the incident site. NORTHCOM's
assessment[Footnote 24] and other DOD estimates demonstrated that, for
a number of capabilities, DOD's response would not be timely. Table 3
shows one estimate of the potential shortfall in decontamination
capabilities that could result.
Table 3: Estimate of Potential Lifesaving Decontamination Requirements
Compared with Likely Capabilities for a 10 Kiloton Nuclear Detonation
in a Major Metropolitan City In the First 72 Hours after Incident:
Source of decontamination capability: Local;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 14,460;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 14,640;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 14,640.
Source of decontamination capability: State;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 1,350;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 5,400;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 10,800.
Source of decontamination capability: CCMRF Package 1;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 1,350;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 5,400;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 5,400.
Source of decontamination capability: CCMRF Package 2;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 0;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 0;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 2,880.
Source of decontamination capability: Self decontamination;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 8,000;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 8,000;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 8,000.
Source of decontamination capability: Other federal decontamination
capabilities;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 270;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 1,080;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 1,080.
Source of decontamination capability: Total decontamination
capabilities by time frame;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 25,610;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 34,520;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 42,800.
Source of decontamination capability: Total decontamination
requirement;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 138,000;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 112,390;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 77,870.
Source of decontamination capability: Unmet decontamination
requirement;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 112,390;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 77,870;
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 35,070.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
[End of table]
DOD has also identified several other areas where it may not be able to
provide the needed capabilities as quickly as required. These areas
included CBRNE search and rescue, transportation, mass care support,
and mortuary affairs.
DOD's efforts to determine the types and quantities of capabilities
that will likely be needed to augment local, state, and federal
response forces are based on general requirements and tasks spelled out
in federal guidance such as the National Response Framework and the
National Preparedness Guidelines. For example, CCMRF planning documents
indicate that the DHS Universal Task List, which is described in the
Guidelines, includes over 1,600 tasks that need to be performed in
order for entities to be prepared to address the National Planning
Scenarios. However, the task list is not prescriptive in determining
which agency should do which tasks, how they should be done, or when
they might be needed. Additionally, the Target Capability List, which
is a companion document to the Guidelines, contains 37 key
capabilities. As they relate to the CCMRF, key response capabilities
include emergency triage and prehospital treatment, weapons of mass
destruction and hazardous materials response and decontamination, and
medical surge. The NORTHCOM capability-based assessment suggests that
without a national, risk-based determination of DOD's share of the
federal capability requirements, DOD will be unable to determine
whether its planned response times should be adjusted.
DOD's Planned Force May Lack Sufficient Capacity in Some Key
Capabilities Needed for Catastrophic Incidents:
In addition to timeliness issues, DOD's planned force has limited
quantities of some of the needed life saving capabilities, such as
medical and decontamination services. For example, some nuclear
detonation scenarios project that hundreds of thousands could be
killed, injured, displaced, contaminated, or in need of medical care.
CCMRF would be able to provide only a small portion of the necessary
capability. Although a CCMRF is estimated, under optimal circumstances,
to be capable of decontaminating several thousand people per day, some
estimates project that the gap between needed decontamination
capabilities and what local, state, and other entities could provide
would be tens of thousands. DOD recognizes that it may need additional
units to augment CCMRF, and it has made some tentative estimates. For
example, DOD plans anticipate that in the case of a blister agent
event, an additional medical package would be needed beyond what is in
included in CCMRF. For a nerve agent incident, plans anticipate that an
additional mortuary affairs package would be needed. For a chlorine
tank explosion, additional packages for both medical and mortuary
affairs would be needed, beyond those that are included in CCMRF.
However, DOD has not designated specific units to augment CCMRF. Unless
these units are identified in advance and trained for the mission, they
may be unable to deploy rapidly. By not aligning CCMRF objectives with
the projected need for response capabilities and clearly delineating
national expectations for timely response, neither DOD nor other
entities involved in incident response can be certain that the CCMRFs
will be able to respond adequately to mitigate the consequences of a
catastrophic CBRNE incident.
DOD Faces Challenges in Adhering to Its Strategy for Sourcing CCMRFS
with Available Units:
In sourcing its three CCMRFs, DOD has encountered challenges in
implementing an approach that could enhance unit availability and
training and readiness oversight for forces that are not assigned to
NORTHCOM. DOD originally intended all three CCMRFs to be comprised
entirely of federal active military forces, but the two follow-on
CCMRFs will be sourced with large numbers of National Guard and Army
Reserve units. The demands of ongoing overseas operations have led DOD
to draw more and more heavily on Guard and Reserve forces to fulfill
civil support functions. Because National Guard units have
responsibilities in their respective states, a competition for
resources issue may arise between DOD and the states. For example,
while governors may need the same capabilities within the state or to
support mutual assistance agreements with other states as would be
needed to support a CCMRF, there is no clear understanding between the
governors and DOD to ensure that these units will be available promptly
if they are needed for a federal mission without being federalized.
Moreover, elements from a single unit can be spread over many states,
further complicating the task of coordinating between DOD and each of
the states. For example, one Army National Guard aviation company
belonging to one of the CCMRFs has elements in Arkansas, Florida, and
Alabama. Three different states would be required to make these
elements available to form the company. The potential rapid deployment
mission of CCMRF makes it imperative that specific agreements be
reached. However, the agreements that have been reached to date are
general in nature and do not specify how states are to ensure that
Guard units will be available for a CCMRF deployment.
Similar issues arise with the Army Reserve. The training demands of the
CCMRF mission have caused DOD to authorize additional training days,
but according to Army Reserve officials, reservists cannot be compelled
to attend training events beyond their annual training requirement.
They stated that, as a result, units must rely on the voluntary
participation of their personnel for training beyond the requirement,
which reduces their assurance that these personnel will be available
for other necessary CCMRF training. For example, one reserve company
was unable to fulfill all aspects of its mission requirements because
of low participation at a training event. Unit officials stated that
some of the unit's members had school or work obligations that
conflicted with this training. Moreover, reserve unit officials stated
that, unlike with active unit officials, they cannot restrict the
personal travel of unit members to ensure that they will be available
if they are needed to support an unexpected federal CBRNE incident
response. These challenges to sourcing the CCMRFs increase the risk
that DOD's ability to effectively respond to one or more major domestic
CBRNE incidents will be compromised. That risk can be mitigated by
plans that integrate the Active and Reserve Component portions of the
CCMRFs and agreements between DOD and the states on the availability of
National Guard units and the duty status under which they would respond
to a major incident requiring federal forces.
DOD's decision to change its approach to how NORTHCOM will routinely
interact with units designated for CCMRF will present additional
challenges. In 2008, DOD's sourcing approach was to assign the first
CCMRF (primarily active forces) to NORTHCOM and allocate the remaining
two CCMRFs (mix of Guard and Army Reserve) to NORTHCOM.[Footnote 25]
Beginning in October 2009, DOD will allocate the units from all three
CCMRFs to NORTHCOM, rather than assigning them to the NORTHCOM
commander outright. As a result, despite the fact that NORTHCOM's
commander is responsible for commanding the federal military domestic
CBRNE response in the continental United States, NORTHCOM will have no
CBRNE forces under its direct control. There are advantages to
assigning forces directly to NORTHCOM. For example, the command would
have direct authority over the units' day-to-day activities, including
training and exercise schedules, and would be better able to monitor
readiness. Additionally, there would be fewer administrative steps
required for the NORTHCOM commander to activate and deploy CCMRF units
in the event of an incident. This would be crucial for deploying the
critical initial response elements of the overall force. Under DOD's
current allocation approach, NORTHCOM would have authority over units
while they are participating in scheduled NORTHCOM training events, but
would have to coordinate with multiple commands to enable participation
from these units. Current guidance states that other commands should
make their units available for scheduled NORTHCOM exercises "to the
greatest extent possible." However, NORTHCOM cannot always be assured
that units will be available for these exercises. In addition, NORTHCOM
remains uncertain about the extent to which it will have oversight of
CCMRF units' day-to-day training activities and be able to confirm that
these units are ready to perform their mission even when they are under
the authority of another command.
DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness, but Training Gaps and
Conflicting Priorities May Degrade Performance:
DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the
readiness of the first fielded CCMRF. However, DOD faces challenges in
providing the training necessary to ensure readiness for the full
CCMRF. We found that CCMRF may be limited in its ability to
successfully conduct consequence management operations because (1) it
does not conduct realistic full-force field training to confirm its
readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly and (2)
conflicting priorities between the CBRNE mission and overseas
deployments affect some units' mission preparation and unit cohesion.
DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness:
The initial assignment of CCMRF to NORTHCOM in October 2008, and the
increased priority DOD has placed on the CBRNE consequence management
mission, have resulted in a number of improvements in the preparation
of the units that comprise the first fielded CCMRF. The Army, in
coordination with NORTHCOM and its subordinate commands, has
established guidance for both individual and collective training--
including joint mission essential task lists--for units designated for
CCMRF. Therefore, for the first time, identified units have been
conducting both individual and collective training focused on the CBRNE
mission. For example, at the individual level, soldiers were required
to be proficient in a number of skills, including skills related to
operating in a CBRNE environment. Individual soldiers were also
required to take online courses on operating in a domestic environment
supporting civil authorities. Table 4 shows examples of some CBRNE-
related training tasks that individuals should be able to perform
before assuming the CBRNE mission as part of CCMRF.
Table 4: Selected CBRNE Individual Training Tasks:
* Be able to protect yourself from CBRN injury/contamination with the
chemical-protective suit ensemble.
* Decontaminate yourself and individual equipment using chemical
decontaminating kits.
* Perform first aid for nerve agent injury.
* React to nuclear hazard/attack.
* React to chemical or biological hazard/attack.
* Be able to protect yourself from chemical and biological
contamination using your assigned protective mask.
* Detect chemical agents using chemical detector paper.
Source: U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM).
[End of table]
Also, key leaders such as brigade task force headquarters personnel and
battalion commanders are required to participate in a number of command
and control training events to gain an understanding of how to organize
and conduct operations in a complex interagency environment under
catastrophic disaster conditions. For example, commanders are required
to attend resident Defense Support to Civil Authorities courses and to
participate in a number of command and control training events, to
ensure that unit leaders are familiar with DHS's National Planning
Scenarios and with operating in a civil support role. These training
events that leaders participate in include tabletop exercises--which
provide participants opportunities to simulate interagency planning,
discuss simulated scenarios, and assess plans and procedures for CBRNE
consequence management--as well as command-post exercises. In order to
confirm CCMRF's readiness prior to mission assumption, U.S. Army North
conducted a command-post mission rehearsal exercise that included key
leaders from each of CCMRF's three task forces--Operations, Medical,
and Aviation. The goal of this exercise is to give the participants
experience in organizing and conducting operations in a complex
interagency environment in support of civil authorities under
catastrophic disaster conditions. The leadership simulates the full
participation of units through modeling. Under U.S. Army North's
current training guidance, this exercise validates CCMRF's pre-mission
readiness.
In addition, units are training on and reporting their proficiency to
perform CCMRF Joint Mission Essential Tasks. We had previously reported
that, in 2007, NORTHCOM had developed a list of joint mission-essential
tasks--including the major tasks that units are required to perform to
respond to potential domestic CBRNE incidents.[Footnote 26] These
include both tasks that units typically perform as part of their
wartime missions and some tasks that would be emphasized during or be
unique to a domestic CBRNE incident. For example, among other mission-
essential tasks, the Task Force Operations element of each CCMRF:
* commands and controls subordinate units;
* conducts nuclear, chemical, and biological route, zone, area, and
point reconnaissance;
* conducts agent detection, casualty search, technical rescue, hot zone
extraction, personnel decontamination, and time-critical medical care
and stabilization;
* conducts CBRNE incident response force operations;
* assesses tactical and operational situation;
* identifies nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards; and:
* conducts mortuary affairs operations.
Further, we previously reported that NORTHCOM and Joint Task Force
Civil Support officials had difficulties tracking the readiness of
units that were identified for the CBRNE consequence management
mission, because so few of the units were actually filled with the
necessary personnel and equipment.[Footnote 27] However, the increased
priority given to CCMRF in the spring of 2008 has led to designated
units receiving personnel and equipment ahead of many other units that
are not designated for CCMRF. Consequently, most units that assumed the
mission in October 2008 reported that they were prepared to perform the
mission and had been provided by their respective military service with
the personnel and equipment they needed to meet established guidance.
Lack of Sufficient Field Training Affects CCMRFs' Ability to Perform
Effectively:
Although individual units were certified as ready prior to assuming the
CBRNE mission in October 2008, it is unclear whether the full CCMRF can
effectively perform CBRNE consequence management operations throughout
the 1-year mission to which it is assigned, because the readiness of
the full CCMRF is not confirmed through a realistic field training
exercise before the force assumes the mission, nor have its rapid
deployment capabilities been fully assessed. Before individual units
designated for CCMRF assume the CBRNE mission, the military services
are required to certify that these units are trained to perform that
mission. However, there is currently no requirement for all of the
units that comprise CCMRF to participate together in a realistic full-
force field training exercise that could confirm that the full CCMRF
can perform its required tasks in an integrated manner before it takes
on the CBRNE consequence management mission. While other brigade-sized
units typically conduct this type of training prior to an overseas
deployment, and NORTHCOM and U.S. Army North[Footnote 28] (in its role
as Joint Force Land Component Commander) training officials have
discussed the desirability of such an exercise, the first fielded CCMRF
has not had the opportunity to have the entire force train together;
only a subset of CCMRF units have trained together in field exercises.
Further, these exercises were conducted several months after these
units had assumed the CCMRF mission and had already been certified as
trained to perform it.
Joint military guidance describes training as a key element of
readiness, which is defined in two parts--unit level and joint level
readiness. However, current DOD and NORTHCOM CCMRF guidance does not
require the full CCMRF to conduct a joint field exercise to confirm its
readiness prior to assuming the mission. Rather, DOD guidance requires
that NORTHCOM annually confirm that the designated headquarters
organizations can deploy operationally and employ their respective
CCMRF elements. While DOD's guidance further requires that supported
combatant commands, such as NORTHCOM, confirm unit readiness and the
ability to activate, deploy, employ, and command and control CCMRF
assets effectively, it does not specifically require that the full
CCMRF conduct a field training exercise to confirm readiness before
units assume the mission, as is the case with other missions such as
overseas deployments. Such training is a particularly important matter
for CCMRF, since this force does not exist as a standing unit that
typically operates together. Moreover, training officials at Joint Task
Force Civil Support, Army North, and NORTHCOM have cited the
desirability of such exercises, which could allow the full CCMRF to
demonstrate its ability to operate in an integrated manner in a
tactical environment. According to Joint Task Force training officials,
full-force field exercises could strengthen unit integration and
facilitate units' gaining familiarity with the different capabilities
comprising CCMRF. However, as previously stated, NORTHCOM confirms the
readiness of each CCMRF through a command-post exercise directed by
U.S. Army North, as the designated Joint Force Land Component
Commander, and these exercises do not include all of the personnel from
each unit. For example, less than 20 percent of CCMRF participated in
the 2008 mission readiness exercise that was used to confirm readiness.
While NORTHCOM's October 2008 mission execution order did not contain a
requirement for full-force pre-mission field training, it did include a
requirement for CCMRFs to conduct a full field training exercise during
the mission period--that is, after the units have already assumed the
mission. However, no full-force CCMRF training exercise was conducted
during fiscal year 2009. Rather, subsets of CCMRF have conducted field
exercises, but these exercises usually did not include all of the key
units with which they might work during an incident. For example,
members of the First Brigade Combat Team of the Third Infantry Division
conducted search and extraction exercises with the Marine Corps's
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) in November 2008.
No other units from Task Force Operations participated in this training
exercise. In addition, CBIRF participated in a number of other field
training exercises, and Army Reserve chemical companies--including
companies not designated for CCMRF--also participated in field training
events for tasks such as mass decontamination.
Further, in January 2009, officials from Task Force Operations--one of
the three CCMRF task forces--and the Joint Task Force-Civil Support
proposed that a field training exercise be conducted in March 2009 at a
training site in Florida. The exercise was approved by U.S. Army North
and NORTHCOM, and plans were put in place to include other units from
CCMRF. The exercise was successful in getting participation from about
1,500 personnel of the approximately 4,500 --about a third of the
personnel that comprise the full CCMRF, including 1,200 from Task Force
Operations. A Joint Task Force-Civil Support training official stated
that 2 months was an extremely short time frame in which to coordinate
exercise participation and that with such a short time frame not all
potential participants would be available. For example, the Army
Reserve chemical company that would provide decontamination and
reconnaissance resources was unable to attend the field training
exercise because, company officials stated, the unit was not notified
in time to program funding to attend the exercise and did not have
enough lead time for some of its soldiers to arrange leave from their
civilian employment. Their participation would have addressed a
previous recommendation from U.S. Army North that the chemical company
should conduct training in a realistic CBRNE environment with other
CCMRF units such as a medical support company and the Marine Corps
CBIRF, in part to observe other military units with similar technical
support capabilities and to obtain a better understanding of the
sequence of events in a joint collective training exercise. Absent a
directive for CCMRF to conduct a full-force exercise prior to units
assuming the mission, there is increased risk that units may have to
respond in support of an incident without prior experience or training
that simulated such conditions.
NORTHCOM is taking steps to train the full CCMRF through field
exercises in the future, but this training is not planned to take place
until at least several months after CCMRF assumes responsibility for
the CBRNE mission. For example, in March 2009, NORTHCOM provided
additional training guidance that has led to NORTHCOM and U.S. Army
North developing plans for all future CCMRFs to conduct field training
exercises beginning in fiscal year 2010. However, units will already
have been on the mission for at least 2 months--and as many as 8
months--before these exercises take place.
In addition to the importance of confirming the proficiency of the
entire CCMRF for conducting its mission, DOD has stated that its forces
must be available in a timely and reliable manner and must be able to
deploy rapidly. To accomplish this, units must demonstrate that they
will be able to meet the required CCMRF response times once they assume
the mission. However, neither NORTHCOM nor Army North has yet conducted
deployment readiness exercises for the full CCMRF, and it is not clear
if its plans for future CCMRFs will include such exercises. Officials
from various units that comprise the first CCMRF have expressed
concerns about being able to deploy rapidly from their home stations.
For example, Task Force Operations headquarters officials stated that
one of their primary challenges in conducting the CCMRF mission is
deploying rapidly from their home stations; these units are accustomed
to deploying overseas on established schedules and do not have
experience deploying on short notice. Deployment readiness exercises
are important because they test units' ability to ascertain how quickly
personnel can be notified and assembled, equipment prepared and loaded
to fit in potential transportation modes such as trucks and airplanes,
and both staff and equipment moved to the designated point of
departure. DOD has provided general guidance that supported commands,
such as NORTHCOM, should confirm the ability of CCMRF units to activate
and deploy. In addition, NORTHCOM has established guidance that directs
U.S. Army North (as the Joint Force Land Component Commander) to
conduct deployment readiness exercises when they are initiated by
NORTHCOM. These deployment exercises could be conducted to test all
processes and procedures needed for deployment or to test only those
process and procedures that do not involve unit movement. Moreover, the
NORTHCOM guidance does not specify whether these exercises should be
conducted with or without prior notice. U.S. Army North guidance
includes a requirement for two deployment exercises per year to confirm
the ability of CCMRF and Joint Task Force Civil Support to deploy
within time frames established by NORTHCOM. However, training officials
at both Joint Task Force headquarters and U.S. Army North said that
there have been no deployment readiness exercises for the full CCMRF or
for any of the CCMRF force packages. A Joint Task Force Civil Support
training official added that a no-notice readiness exercise was being
considered by NORTHCOM and U.S. Army North to test alert notification
and the deployment processes and procedures of the full CCMRF, but
officials were uncertain when such a deployment exercise would take
place. Training officials also expressed concern that it could become
more difficult in the future to have no-notice exercises when units
from all three CCMRFs are no longer under the direct authority of
NORTHCOM.
As was the case with field training exercises, individual units have
separately conducted deployment readiness exercises that involved all
phases of deployment preparation, including movement of personnel and
equipment. However, in these exercises, deployment was planned well in
advance. For example, staff from units in Task Force Operations that
incorporated a deployment exercise prior to conducting a March 2009
field exercise had up to 45 days to plan for the exercise. However,
many anticipated CBRNE incidents can occur without notice. With no
program in place to test the ability of all units in CCMRF to meet
specified response times on short notice, NORTHCOM and DOD will
continue to be unable to verify the ability of CCMRF units to deploy.
Units' Preparation for the CCMRF Mission and Efforts to Achieve Unit
Cohesion Are Affected by Other Missions:
The demands that other missions are placing on the Army also may put
the effectiveness of the CCMRF's mission at risk. DOD has identified
CCMRF as a high-priority mission; however, the Army has at times
designated units for CCMRF when they have just returned from overseas
missions. When units first return from overseas, they are in the
"reset" phase of the Army Force Generation process, over the course of
which they progress through three sequential readiness pools. The reset
phase is typically when units reconstitute by repairing equipment,
receiving new equipment, and assigning new personnel, and begin
training to achieve the capabilities necessary to enter the ready force
pool. Because these units are at the beginning of their reset phase,
they often lack personnel and equipment. Although the Army attempts to
accelerate the fill of personnel and equipment to these units, some
units may not receive their personnel and equipment in sufficient time
to allow them to meet all of the requirements of the CBRNE consequence
management mission before they assume it. In contrast, units are
deployed for overseas missions only when they have progressed to the
"ready" or "available" phase of the cycle. In most cases, units
reported having received the necessary personnel and equipment before
the October mission assumption date, but their personnel had not always
completed all of the CCMRF-related training before the assumption date.
Army Forces Command officials acknowledged that a number of units were
still receiving personnel and equipment while preparing for the
mission. For example, several units, while stating they were prepared
to perform the mission, still had key personnel that needed training
related to performing the CCMRF mission. In one instance, a medical
company that assumed the mission on October 1, 2008, did not complete
its post-deployment reconstitution until October 31, 2008. While the
company's assigned personnel had completed the required training at the
time of mission assumption, newly assigned personnel did not receive
the required training until November 2008. Another medical unit had
significant personnel turnover in July 2008 and stated that the
turnover affected its ability to conduct all CCMRF-related training
before its mission assumption date. Army Forces Command officials said
that its units are designated for CCMRF while in the reset phase
because there are not enough units in the available force pool to
sufficiently source CCMRF in addition to meeting other combatant
command requirements for overseas deployments. Moreover, many CCMRF
units will be deployed overseas after they have completed their CCMRF
rotations, and anticipating future deployment may distract them from
their CCMRF training. For example, officials from the Task Force
Operations headquarters said that they had conducted a number of field
exercises at the brigade and battalion levels at the beginning of these
units' CCMRF rotations. In contrast, CCMRF sustainment training in the
latter half of the year was conducted by telephone because the units
were focused on their upcoming overseas missions and were unavailable
for field training.
Moreover, unit cohesiveness and training proficiency have been affected
by the frequent turnover in units that were assigned to the first
fielded CCMRF in fiscal year 2009. While the goal has been to have
units assigned for at least 12 months and to have standard start and
end dates for each rotation,[Footnote 29] several critical units have
been unable to complete their full 1-year rotation in the fiscal year
2009 CCMRF, and other units will not be assigned on the same rotation
schedule for fiscal year 2010. For example, the brigade headquarters
for the aviation task force has changed three times, and the brigade
headquarters for the medical task force rotated out of the CBRNE
consequence management mission after only 6 months.
The pace of this turnover affects the ability of units and personnel to
both conduct initial training and sustain training. For example, the
medical brigade originally assigned to CCMRF participated in the
mission rehearsal exercise conducted in September 2008. The assignment
of a second medical brigade in February 2009 required the Joint Task
Force Civil Support to alter the focus of a planned command-post
exercise from rehearsing its processes and procedures and those of
subordinate task forces staff to confirming the readiness of Task Force
Medical, which was preparing to assume the mission in March 2009. Also,
while elements from the Aviation Task Force headquarters participated
in the same 2009 exercise, the Aviation Task Force currently assigned
to CCMRF did not participate in the field exercise because it had not
yet assumed the mission. Officials from another unit cited a challenge
associated with the frequent higher-level headquarters and other unit
rotations. These officials stated that the frequency of these rotations
means that units have to continuously dedicate both time and people to
learning the requirements of higher headquarters and adjacent units and
that turnover in headquarters leadership could cause the unit to change
its tactics, techniques, and procedures. The frequent rotations of
units could also result in the need for more frequent exercises, since
not all CCMRF units have had the opportunity to train with the full
CCMRF as an integrated force. DOD officials have acknowledged that
providing aviation and medical capabilities to the CCMRFs will continue
to be a challenge, due to the high demand for these capabilities for
other missions.
These training and force rotation issues have prevented DOD from
providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to
build cohesiveness. Because key leaders from units of the entire force
attend a mission rehearsal exercise prior to mission assumption, the
replacement of these units after only a few months negated much of the
value that was gained from these three task forces working together and
deprived the replacement task force leaders of having the same
opportunity.
CCMRF Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed, and Funding and
Oversight Are Decentralized:
DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and
equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to
identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its
approach to providing program funding has been fragmented because
funding responsibilities for CCMRF-related costs are dispersed
throughout DOD and are not subject to central oversight.
CCMRF Mission Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed:
The units initially designated for the CCMRF mission did not have fully
developed funding and equipment requirements. In addition, the recent
NORTHCOM Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based
Assessment report highlighted a number of systemic capability gaps that
need to be addressed and may generate additional funding requirements.
[Footnote 30] Moreover, other important requirements for this mission
have not been identified and funded. The Joint Forces Land Component
Commander (U.S. Army North) and the Joint Task Force Civil Support
[Footnote 31] are responsible for developing and approving service-
specific equipment unique to the CCMRF's Joint Mission Essential Tasks.
However, to date, mission-essential equipment requirements have not
been fully developed. While some equipment requirement lists have been
developed and are being reviewed by NORTHCOM, equipping officials said
that lists have not been developed for nonstandard equipment that units
may need in order to support civil authorities in a CBRNE environment.
As a result, some units in fiscal year 2009 have determined
requirements based on their own independent mission analyses. Unit
officials stated that filling some of the needs they identified--such
as the need for nonstandard communications equipment that is compatible
with civilian equipment--was difficult because the units lacked a
documented requirement for their planned acquisition. In addition, the
review process did not always include the command organizations that
are responsible for the mission. Thus, decisions on what to buy and in
what quantity were not consistently vetted to ensure standardization in
equipping various units. U.S. Army North officials stated that they
were in the process of developing mission-essential equipment lists and
hope to have them completed in time for the next rotation, which begins
in October 2009.
DOD's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support recognized the
importance of proper funding and budget oversight for the CBRNE
consequence management mission and noted that the mission's funding is
not accounted consistently. However, provision of funding for the
mission is fragmented and is not monitored centrally within the
department. While CCMRF is a joint mission, funding guidance leaves the
funding responsibilities for most requirements to the respective
military departments or defense agencies. For example, it is up to the
military departments to determine day-to-day funding requirements and
fund unit training. Moreover, DOD has not created an integrated, fully
dedicated, and consistent approach and funding strategy across the
department, instead dispersing responsibility for funding CCMRF among
the military services, NORTHCOM, and other entities. For example, while
NORTHCOM funds predominately joint mission training for the current
force, the day-to-day funding for CCMRF-assigned units and individual
mission training continue to comes from the services. However, the
services are also simultaneously scheduling and funding the training
required to meet the units' wartime mission requirements for which they
are responsible after the CCMRF mission ends. Table 5 shows funding
responsibilities for some CCMRF activities.
Table 5: CCMRF Mission Costs and Funding Sources:
CCMRF funding events: Day-to-day operational costs;
Northern Command: [Empty];
DOD components: [Check].
CCMRF funding events: Individual participation in educational events;
Northern Command: [Empty];
DOD components: [Check].
CCMRF funding events: Deployment Readiness Exercise;
Northern Command: [Empty];
DOD components: [Check].
CCMRF funding events: Command-Post Exercise Execution;
Northern Command: [Check];
DOD components: [Empty].
CCMRF funding events: Command-Post Exercise travel expenses;
Northern Command: [Empty];
DOD components: [Check].
CCMRF funding events: Base support installation or training area costs;
Northern Command: [Empty];
DOD components: [Check].
CCMRF funding events: Field Training Exercise Execution;
Northern Command: [Check];
DOD components: [Empty].
CCMRF funding events: Field Training Exercise Travel Duty expenses;
Northern Command: [Empty];
DOD components: [Check].
CCMRF funding events: Other exercise costs (reconstitution or
replenishment of expended supplies);
Northern Command: [Check];
DOD components: [Empty].
CCMRF funding events: Specialized and other CCMRF equipment;
Northern Command: [Empty];
DOD components: [Check].
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Starting in fiscal year 2010, NORTHCOM expects to fund training for two
CCMRFs, including mission rehearsal, mission readiness, command post,
and field training exercises. However, unit training not directed by
NORTHCOM is not funded centrally and must be funded by the military
services. This fragmentation in funding responsibilities is normal in
DOD, but the lack of a coordinated plan that allows visibility over all
CCMRF-related funding increases the risk that NORTHCOM would be unaware
of whether individual units have the necessary resources to effectively
conduct the pre-mission training they need. DOD's guidance does not
identify a single organization to provide oversight of total program
requirements and available resources. We have previously reported that
adequate oversight, including program direction and visibility of all
costs and individual program efforts, provides stronger assurance to
DOD that it is making the most effective use of departmentwide
resources to meet mission needs.[Footnote 32] Without this kind of
funding strategy and oversight, DOD cannot develop a complete
understanding of mission activities, priorities, and shortfalls or
identify resource redundancies and gaps.
Extent of Dedicated Funds for Some CCMRF Training Affects Mission:
In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority for the CCMRF mission
increased substantially within the department, and funding was provided
for specific aspects of the mission. For example, NORTHCOM's training
program includes more than $33 million to design, plan, and manage
exercises as well as funds for participant costs for CCMRFs for fiscal
year 2010. The Army Reserve planned funds of more than $37 million for
fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to support additional full-time personnel
and training days that have been authorized to support the CCMRF
mission. In addition, while the military services have not planned
funds for equipment specifically for the CCMRF mission, some
nonstandard equipment has been purchased with other remaining funds. In
other cases, purchase requests for certain equipment were denied by
administrative parent commands because, unit officials believed, the
equipment was considered noncritical by reviewing officials. Moreover,
units must fund their CCMRF training activities from their operations
and maintenance accounts, which were developed and approved months
before units knew they would be assigned to CCMRF. According to unit
officials, many units were not provided with additional funds for the
CCMRF mission. As a result, these units sometimes have funds allocated
from other sources to meet identified requirements for the CCMRF
mission. Also according to these officials, while the lack of planned
funds for CCMRF has been mitigated to some extent by the mission's high-
priority level, they have found it necessary to curtail or cancel some
desirable training because funding was unavailable. Army officials told
us that if funding shortfalls develop because units lack sufficient
funds to conduct both CCMRF and follow-on mission training, units can
request additional funds from the Army. However, unless units assess
their total funding requirement for CCMRF and their other designated
mission and receive funding based on both missions, CCMRF units may be
at risk of not having enough funding to conduct all of their CCMRF
training. This, in turn, puts units at risk of not being fully prepared
if they are needed to respond to an incident.
DOD lacks visibility across the department over the total funding
requirements for this mission because it has no funding strategy for
meeting CBRNE mission requirements. The services, in the absence of
funding dedicated to the CBRNE mission, have been using existing
operations and maintenance accounts to meet mission requirements.
Without an overarching approach to developing requirements and a
funding strategy for meeting these requirements, DOD's ability to carry
out this high-priority homeland security mission efficiently and
effectively is at risk.
Conclusions:
Our nation faces a continuing threat of the potential use of weapons of
mass destruction by terrorist organizations, and the federal government
recognizes the need for a comprehensive capability to mitigate the
consequences of such an attack. A domestic, catastrophic CBRNE-related
incident would require a unified, whole government, national response.
DOD plays a crucial role in support of civil authorities for CBRNE
consequence management and under certain circumstances might even be
designated as the lead federal agency for such an incident. To provide
timely and effective support when local and state capabilities are no
longer adequate, it is crucial that DOD be able to integrate its plans
with those of other federal agencies involved in disaster response.
Until all CBRNE plans that are being developed under the Integrated
Planning System are complete, it will be difficult for DOD to know
whether its considerable body of operational plans will adequately
address anticipated gaps in the capabilities needed to respond to
multiple, near-simultaneous, CBRNE incidents. DOD will also need to
overcome challenges related to sourcing its CBRNE Consequence
Management Response Forces, including issues regarding coordinating
with states about the availability and deployment status of National
Guard units, integrating Guard and Reserve units with active duty
forces, and ensuring that forces charged with dual missions are
properly trained to function effectively when called on for consequence
management response.
Because each of the CCMRFs are comprised of units that are
geographically dispersed, from both the Active and Reserve Components,
and from all of the military services, it must have opportunities to
train as a complete force before assuming the mission and to
demonstrate its capability to successfully conduct the mission,
including the ability to deploy rapidly. For the mission to succeed, it
is critical to ensure that each unit can meet its designated response
time. Because DOD has not developed complete and approved requirements
for the CCMRF mission and fully defined and monitored funding
responsibilities, it lacks full visibility across the department for
this mission. Without an overarching approach to develop full and
complete mission requirements, an approach and mechanisms in place to
fully support those requirements, and a centralized focal point to
ensure that all requirements have been identified and fully funded,
DOD's ability to carry out this high-priority homeland security mission
efficiently and effectively could be in jeopardy.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In the absence of completed plans under the Integrated Planning System
or other specific guidance on DOD's expected contribution to the
federal response to a domestic CBRNE-related incident, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs to work with DHS,
FEMA, and other interagency partners to agree on:
* interim goals, objectives, and planning assumptions for DOD's role in
responding to one or more simultaneously occurring CBRNE incidents in
the United States; and:
* the specific types and quantities of capabilities that DOD is
expected to contribute and the time frames in which those capabilities
are to be provided.
In order to ensure that DOD's plans are consistent with stated program
goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander
of NORTHCOM and the military services to:
* align plans for all parts of CCMRF, including specialized and general-
purpose units, with stated objectives for CCMRF, and include in their
planning efforts the extent to which existing CCMRF capabilities
contribute to identified response requirements and stated CCMRF mission
goals; and:
* work with the state governors through the states' Adjutants General
and the National Guard Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing
CCMRF and ensure that the agreements being established between DOD and
state governors include specific terms on National Guard force
availability and duty and response status.
In order to increase the assurance that CCMRF can effectively provide
CBRNE consequence management in support of civil authorities, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of
NORTHCOM--in coordination with the military services--to include in the
CCMRF training program requirements that:
* the entire CCMRF conduct a joint field training exercise as part of
its mission validation, and:
* the entire CCMRF conduct at least one no-notice deployment readiness
exercise annually.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of
NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and the Service
Secretaries to:
* determine the time needed by units to perform the necessary pre-
mission CCMRF training, and:
* examine sourcing options that would ensure that units had adequate
time to train prior to mission assumption once they had all required
personnel and equipment.
In order to provide a departmentwide understanding of requirements,
priorities, and resource shortfalls and to identify potential
redundancies and gaps in CCMRF resourcing, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Commander of NORTHCOM,
the Secretaries of the military services, the National Guard Bureau,
and the heads of participating defense agencies:
* determine the total requirements for CCMRF, including unique,
nonstandard equipment requirements for each type of unit that comprises
CCMRF, and develop a plan on how those requirements will be filled;
* develop an overall funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and
exercising CCMRF and designate a single focal point for coordinating
this strategy.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In comments on a draft of this report,[Footnote 33] DOD generally
agreed with the intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is
taking or plans to take to address these recommendations. DOD also
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report
where appropriate. DHS also reviewed a draft of this report and
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report
where appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that DOD work with DHS, FEMA, and
other interagency partners to agree on interim goals, objectives, and
planning assumptions for DOD's role in responding to CBRNE incidents in
the United States, DOD agreed and stated that in addition to its
routine planning activities, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs emphasizes
the need for the kind of planning we discuss in the report and our
recommendation. DOD stated that it recently convened an advisory panel
to evaluate and, as appropriate, make recommendations on modifying DOD
authorities, capabilities, plans and programs, and policies to assist
civil authorities in preventing or responding to CBRNE incidents. DOD
stressed that this panel is authorized to coordinate directly with any
department or agency the panel considers necessary to carry out its
duties. We believe the panel DOD described will be a suitable mechanism
for coordinating with DHS, FEMA, or any other relevant federal agency
in addressing the substance of our recommendation.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation that DOD work with DHS, FEMA,
and other interagency partners to agree on the specific types and
quantities of capabilities that DOD is expected to contribute and the
time frames in which those capabilities are to be provided. DOD
reiterated that the panel discussed above will assist in addressing the
recommendation. Additionally, DOD highlighted a number of ongoing
efforts within the department (such as the Quadrennial Defense Review),
and efforts being coordinated with DHS, FEMA, and other interagency
partners (such as the Task Force for Emergency Readiness) to more fully
understand the capabilities that may be required of DOD in the event of
a CBRNE incident. DOD stressed and we agree that realistic, detailed,
and coordinated planning at the federal, state, and local levels is
essential to resolving the uncertainty over just what specific CBRNE
consequence management capabilities DOD should be preparing to provide
in the event of an incident. We believe that if consistently pursued
and coordinated, the ongoing efforts DOD described should help address
this recommendation and greatly assist overall federal, state, and
local planning and preparedness for responding to CBRNE incidents.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that it align plans for all parts of
the CCMRFs, including the specialized and general purpose units, with
stated objectives for the CCMRF to include the extent to which existing
CCMRF capabilities contribute to identified response requirements and
stated CCMRF mission goals. DOD stated that it would continue to
evaluate changes to the CCMRF's roles, missions, and requirements and
make the necessary adjustments to the units' missions and goals.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that it work with the state
governors through the states' adjutants general and the National Guard
Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing the CCMRFs and ensure
that the agreements being established between DOD and state governors
include specific terms on National Guard force availability and duty
and response status. DOD stated that the Secretary of Defense has
directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a long-
term total force sourcing plan for the CCMRFs and to ensure that as
they are fielded, the CCMRFs remain appropriately sourced. DOD stated
that it continues to work with the Departments of the Army and Air
Force, and the National Guard Bureau along with states' adjutants
general, to address resourcing and readiness matters. We believe DOD's
approach to developing a long-term CCMRF sourcing plan will help build
stability into its preparedness efforts. We continue to believe that
negotiating and coordinating clear agreements between DOD and the
states on the availability and duty status of National Guard units
designated as part of CCMRF is critical to the overall DOD CCMRF
capability. If the specific availability and duty status of these units
is consistently pursued and coordinated, DOD's efforts vis-à-vis the
states should help in this regard.
In response to our recommendation that the Commander of NORTHCOM--in
coordination with the military services--include in the CCMRF training
program requirements that the entire CCMRF conduct a joint field
training exercise as part of its mission validation, DOD agreed but
cautioned that the availability of funds to conduct full force
exercises was a critical factor in fully addressing the recommendation.
We agree that field exercises for each of the CCMRFs requires
considerable logistical effort and associated costs. However,
establishing a requirement for the entire CCMRF to exercise would allow
DOD to evaluate the relative priority of the domestic CBRNE consequence
management mission against other requirements and would allow DOD to
evaluate potential risk if full funding is not available.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that NORTHCOM--in coordination with
the military services--include in the CCMRF training program
requirements that the entire CCMRF conduct at least one no-notice
deployment readiness exercise annually. DOD stated that NORTHCOM has a
field training exercise requirement in its proposed CCMRF training plan
and that the command is working with the services and U.S.
Transportation Command to determine the transportation requirements:
associated with a no-notice exercise for CCMRF. We agree that these
efforts should help NORTHCOM and DOD continue to develop the CCMRF
exercise plan. We continue to believe that given the rapid response
requirement of the mission, the geographic dispersion of CCMRF units
(Active, Reserve, or National Guard), and the fact that these units do
not work together routinely underscore the importance of no-notice
deployment readiness exercises.
In response to our recommendation that DOD determine the time needed by
units to perform the necessary pre-mission CCMRF training, DOD agreed
and stated that it is developing guidance that will direct force
providers to facilitate NORTHCOM access to allocated CCMRF units 180
days prior to mission assumption to synchronize CBRNE training and
exercises. We continue to believe that allocating CCMRF units to
NORTHCOM rather than assigning them curtails the commander of
NORTHCOM's ability to ensure adequate CCMRF training and monitor
readiness. However, we believe that if consistently implemented, the
guidance DOD describes will help DOD ensure that CCMRF units and their
parent commands can adequately plan for critical training.
In response to our recommendation that DOD examine sourcing options for
the CCMRF that would ensure that units had adequate time to train prior
to mission assumption once they had all required personnel and
equipment, DOD partially agreed. DOD stated that the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff has responsibility for sourcing the CCMRFs and
that the services and the National Guard Bureau support the Joint Staff
in this responsibility. DOD stated that it is preparing guidance that
will task components to allocate properly equipped, manned, and trained
forces to NORTHCOM to accomplish the CCMRF mission. We believe that if
consistently implemented such guidance will help DOD components and
commands better plan for and conduct the necessary CCMRF training.
However, we believe that DOD should continue to assess the sourcing and
timing of CCMRF unit assignments with respect to force rotations to
DOD's vital commitments overseas. Because the domestic CBRNE
consequence management mission is so different from DOD's warfighting
missions, it is all the more important to account for adequate time to
train for it.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD determine the
total requirements for the CCMRF, including unique, nonstandard
equipment requirements for each type of unit that comprises the CCMRF,
and develop a plan on how those requirements will be filled. DOD stated
that NORTHCOM and the services are working on a Joint Mission-Essential
Equipment List that defines CCMRF equipment requirements and that
NORTHCOM is working with the Army on procurement, storage, and
management of personal protective equipment for CCMRF units. We believe
that to the extent these efforts address standard and nonstandard
equipment needed by units designated for CCMRF, they should help DOD
provide more stable CCMRF equipment planning and reduce the uncertainty
of unit commanders about what equipment is needed but not clearly
identified in existing equipment lists. In addition, as we have
previously stated, we believe that DOD must identify all requirements
for CCMRF to provide decision makers with complete visibility over the
status of filling CCMRF requirements and to highlight potential risks.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD develop an
overall funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and exercising the
CCMRF and designate a single focal point for coordinating this
strategy. DOD stated that it has developed a CCMRF funding strategy and
that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs is the appropriate focal point for
coordinating the funding strategy for DOD assistance to civil
authorities in response to a CBRNE incident. DOD stated that the
assistant secretary will examine, in coordination with the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, secretaries of the military services, and
appropriate defense agency, what additional steps should be taken to
streamline coordination of the CCMRF funding strategy. DOD added that
as the employer of the CCMRF during an actual incident, NORTHCOM also
plays a significant role. While we do not believe DOD's existing
funding efforts constitute a complete CCMRF funding strategy,
particularly in light of all requirements not having been defined, we
agree that the steps DOD describes in further developing or refining
its funding strategy should help address the recommendation and better
assist DOD to plan for and oversee CCMRF preparedness.
DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,
Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site
[hyperlink, at http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contacts points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Miller:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Mac Thornberry:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has
planned for and structured its force to provide chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence
management assistance, we met with DOD officials and reviewed DOD's
plans to determine sourcing requirements for the CBRNE Consequence
Management Response Force (CCMRF). We reviewed the DOD, Northern
Command, Army North, Joint Task Force Civil Support, Army Forces
Command, and Army Reserve Command execution orders to determine the
requirements for the number of CCMRFs, planned response time frames,
force composition, sourcing, training, and readiness. We also reviewed
concept and operations plans for CBRNE. We discussed DOD's plans for
providing units to CCMRF with officials from the Joint Forces Command,
Army Forces Command, Northern Command, Army North, Joint Task Force
Civil Support, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the National Guard
Bureau. To determine DOD's approved incremental sourcing of the three
CCMRFs, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security
Affairs and the Joint Staff to assess the CCMRF sourcing requirements
in structuring the force. We discussed with officials from the U.S.
Army Reserve Command, Joint Forces Command, Army Forces Command, and
Army North the sourcing requirements for CCMRF technical support forces
(which perform in the contaminated or hot zone) and general support
force to determine how units are selected for CCMRF and to obtain
perspectives on sourcing challenges. We also reviewed documentation and
interviewed National Guard Bureau officials to determine its unit
sourcing plans for future CCMRFs.
To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for CBRNE consequence
management operations and integrated plans with other federal
government plans, we met with officials from the Department of Homeland
Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and the Joint Task
Force Civil Support. For example, we met with the Department of
Homeland Security officials to discuss the interagency process used to
support planning for responding to a domestic incident. Additionally,
we met with Northern Command, Army North, and Joint Task Force Civil
Support to discuss their plans for supporting federal CBRNE consequence
management efforts and to discuss how their plans are integrated with
those of federal agencies that DOD will support and reviewed plans,
playbooks, and briefing documents that described DOD's responsibilities
related to provided capabilities in support of others in response to a
CBRNE event. Further, we reviewed Joint Task Civil Support playbooks
relevant to each of the Department of Homeland Security's National
Planning Scenarios to determine the extent to which DOD has planned for
CBRNE consequence management operations. We reviewed relevant reports
and documents that govern the national response to disasters. We
discussed with Department of Homeland Security and Federal Emergency
Management Agency official their efforts to establish roles and
responsibilities in response to a CBRNE event. We also reviewed our
prior work on national preparedness to determine the status of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) efforts to complete and
integrate plans.[Footnote 34] We also reviewed the Department of
Homeland Security's National Response Framework, National Preparedness
Guidelines, and Target Capabilities List to assess DOD's and other
federal departments' roles and responsibilities in providing support to
civil authorities in response to a CBRNE event.
To determine how prepared the CCMRF is to perform the CBRNE consequence
management mission, we compared existing DOD readiness policies and
practices to the practices for preparing CCMRF units and plans for
assessing and reporting mission readiness. We discussed these issues
with officials from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Army Forces
Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the Joint Staff, U.S. Northern
Command, and U.S. Army North. Further, we discussed the assignment of
forces and readiness reporting with officials at the U.S. Joint Forces
Command to assess the CCMRF sourcing priority requirements and the
readiness reporting guidance for designated units assigned to the CCMRF
mission. We also discussed with these officials their plans for
training and assessing the readiness of units designated for CCMRF to
determine CCMRF training and readiness certification and validation
requirements. In determining the requirements, we reviewed pre-mission
training, exercise, and validation guidance that was used to assess
unit readiness. We also reviewed training requirements and spoke with
officials to determine individual and unit mission-essential tasks
identified for CCMRF. We also reviewed our prior work on U.S. Northern
Command planning efforts for homeland defense and civil support
[Footnote 35] to assess mission-essential tasks previously reported for
units assigned to the CCMRF mission. Additionally, we reviewed the
Defense Science Board's report, Unconventional Operational Concepts and
the Homeland[Footnote 36] to obtain their assessment of training and
readiness of military units for the domestic homeland security mission
and recommendations for providing realistic training and exercises.
Further, we reviewed our prior work on the Army's overall training
strategy to determine how it is supported by the Army Force Generation
Model[Footnote 37] and to determine the effect of overseas deployments
on the preparation for units designated for CCMRF.
We reviewed readiness briefings and mission readiness exercise lessons-
learned reports to determine pre-mission assumption validation
requirement challenges for task force units. To determine criteria for
training and readiness of designated units for the CCMRF mission, we
reviewed orders and plans that discussed individual, leader, and unit
training requirements and discussed those issues with Joint Staff,
Northern Command, Army North, Army Forces Command, and Army Reserve
Command officials. We also discussed with CCRMF unit officials the
guidance and resources that they were provided to prepare for the
mission to determine preparation challenges. These units were
judgmentally selected. While we cannot generalize the results of these
discussions to all units, they were selected to provide a cross section
of units from different services, from both the active and reserve
forces, and from units that will provide either specialized CBRNE
capabilities or general support capabilities.
To determine CCMRF fund planning and the linkage to mission
requirements, we met with officials from Northern Command, Army North,
Army Forces Command, and the Army Reserve Command to discuss mission
funding requirements and funding sources. We also reviewed guidance and
funding plans to determine efforts to develop CCMRF-unique requirements
and to identify the status of funding plans for meeting requirements.
We met with the National Guard Bureau to discuss their current
capabilities, identified shortfalls, and their approach to mitigate any
identifiable shortfalls. Further, we reviewed program-identified
funding shortfalls to determine the impact of planning, coordination,
and execution of homeland defense training and readiness exercises. We
discussed with unit officials the funding guidance that their units
were provided to meet the CCMRF mission and obtained their perspectives
on the extent to which additional specialized equipment beyond the
units' standard equipment would be needed to perform the CCMRF mission.
We also discussed funding requirements with officials from the
Department of the Army to determine long-term funding plans for units
designated for the CCMRF mission. We also met with U.S. Army Reserve
Command officials to determine equipment and training costs for general
support and commercial-off-the-shelf equipment costs for technical
support units for the CCMRF mission.
In addressing our objectives, we reviewed plans and related documents,
obtained information, and interviewed officials at the following
locations:
* United States Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado:
* Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia:
* The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.
* The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
* Joint Task Force Civil Support, Ft. Monroe, Virginia:
* U.S. Army North, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas:
* Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia:
* Army Reserve Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia:
* National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia:
* Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.
* Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C.
We conducted our review from February 2008 to October 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Agency comments were made on GAO-09-928. This report number was
subsequently changed to GAO-10-123.
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Homeland Defense And Americas Security Affairs:
2600 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2600:
September 18, 2009:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO 09-928, "Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and
Training Issues Challenge DoD's Response to Domestic Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Incidents."
dated August 20, 2009 (GAO Code 351150). DoD concurs with seven
recommendations, and partially concurs with three recommendations. Our
response to the recommendations is enclosed.
Our point of contact for this action is Thomas LaCrosse, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs (DASD (HD&ASA)), (703) 697-5822 or
tom.lacrosse@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul N. Stockton:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated August 20, 2009:
GAO-09-928 (GAO Code 351150):
"Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues
Challenge DoD's Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Incidents"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the DoD officials he deems appropriate to work with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), and other interagency partners to agree on interim
goals, objectives, and planning assumptions for DoD's role in
responding to one or more simultaneously occurring chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE)
incidents in the United States.
DOD Response: Concur. The National Preparedness Guidelines and Annex 1
to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) establish an
overarching framework and comprehensive risk-based approach to national
planning, including planning for domestic CBRNE incidents. Under these
mandates, DoD actively participates in the Integrated Planning System
(IPS) to develop interagency CBRNE terrorism prevention and response
plans. Planning improves effectiveness by clearly defining required
capabilities, shortening the time required to gain control of an
incident, and facilitating the rapid exchange of information about a
situation) In addition to its routine planning activities, the office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs has consistently emphasized the need for
detailed, operationally executable interagency planning in order to
conduct informed analyses of the capabilities required in response to a
catastrophic CBRNE incident, such as those outlined in the 15 National
Planning Scenarios ” 12 of which are CBRNE related.
DoD recently convened the advisory panel required by section 1082 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. This panel
will evaluate and, as appropriate, make recommendations on modifying
DoD authorities, capabilities, plans and programs, and policies to
assist civil authorities in preventing and responding to CBRNE
incidents. Additionally, the panel is authorized to secure directly
from DHS, the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and any other department or
agency of the Federal Government information that the panel considers
necessary for the panel to carry out its duties.
Of note, section 2313 of Title 50, U.S. Code, assigns responsibility
for coordinating DoD assistance to Federal, State, and local officials
in preventing and responding to CBRNE threats to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security
Affairs.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the DoD officials he deems appropriate to work with DHS, FEMA,
and other interagency partners to agree on the specific types and
quantities of capabilities that DoD is expected to contribute and the
timeframes in which those capabilities are to be provided.
DOD Response: Concur. See response to Recommendation 1. DoD has been
working with DHS, FEMA, and others through the IPS, implementation of
section 1815 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, the Task Force for Emergency Readiness (TFER), the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), and other efforts to determine the demand for DoD
capabilities to assist civil authorities in a CBRNE incident. In the
absence of a complete definition of Federal, State, and local
capabilities and their needs for DoD assistance, DoD planners have
prepared several assumptions about necessary capabilities and
capacities based on a wealth of experience and local partners. Until
DOD and its USG partners have greater visibility into national
capabilities, DoD's planning approach has been to ensure it has a
significant designated capacity to fulfill each of the required
capabilities and then draw on contingency sourcing from the Total Force
to meet the additional response requirements of a domestic incident,
while balancing the ongoing requirements of military preparedness to
execute DoD's primary mission worldwide. Efforts underway with IPS,
section 1815, TFER, and the QDR should eventually give DoD a much
better understanding of the "demand signal" from its Federal, State,
and local partners.
Realistic, detailed, and coordinated planning at the Federal, State,
and local levels is essential to resolving this uncertainty by
identifying needed resources, eliminating organizational,
jurisdictional, and operational seams and gaps, and ensuring a unity of
effort in future responses.
Of note, section 2313 of Title 50, U.S. Code, assigns responsibility
for coordinating DoD assistance to Federal, State, and local officials
in preventing and responding to CBRNE threats to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security
Affairs.
Attachment
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the military services to
align plans for all parts of the CBRNE Consequence Management Response
Forces (CCMRFs), including the specialized and general purpose units,
with stated objectives for the CCMRF, to include the extent to which
existing CCMRF capabilities contribute to identified response
requirements and stated CCMRF mission goals.
DOD Response: Concur. As part of DOD's continuing effort to optimize
its capabilities in regards to CBRNE Consequence Management, it will
continue to evaluate any changes to the CCMRFs' roles, missions, and
requirements and make the necessary adjustments to the units' missions
and goals.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct USNORTHCOM and the military services to work with the state
governors through the states' adjutants general and the National Guard
Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing the CCMRFs and ensure
that the agreements being established between DoD and state governors
include specific terms on National Guard force availability and duty
and response status.
DOD Response: Concur. The Secretary of Defense has already directed the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop the long-term Total Force
sourcing plan for the CCMRFs. In addition, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, via the Global Force Management Process, ensures that, when
fielded, the CCMRF continue to remain appropriately resourced.
In cases where National Guard units and personnel constitute elements
of the CCMRFs, DoD has worked, through Departments of the Army and the
Air Force and the National Guard Bureau, with the Adjutants General of
the States to address resourcing and readiness matters. This
cooperative approach will continue when the CCMRFs are fully
operationally capable to ensure appropriate sustainment.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander of USNORTHCOM ” in coordination with the military
services ” to include in the CCMRF training program requirements that
the entire CCMRF conducts a joint field training exercise as part of
its mission validation.
DOD Response: Concur, subject to the availability of funds. An FY2007
USNORTHCOM cost estimate for deploying a partial CCMRF for a field
training exercise exceeded $30 million. According to current DoD plans,
there will be three operational CCMRFs by October 1, 2010. Field
training exercises for each of the three CCMRFs would be expensive due
to the requirement to bring together forces from multiple locations in
the United States.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander of USNORTHCOM ” in coordination with the military
services ” to include in the CCMRF training program requirements that
the entire CCMRF conducts at least one no-notice deployment readiness
exercise annually.
DOD Response: Concur. USNORTHCOM has already included a requirement for
a field training exercise in its proposed CCMRF training plan. In
addition to a planned field training exercise, USNORTHCOM is working
closely with the Services and US Transportation Command to determine
the transportation requirements associated with a no-notice exercise
for CCMRF 10-1, their impact on ongoing operations and their cost,
which will further inform development of the CCMRF exercise plan.
Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander USNORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Service
secretaries to determine the time needed by units to perform the
necessary pre-mission CCMRF training.
DOD Response: Concur. Guidance is being finalized that will direct
force providers to facilitate USNORTHCOM access to allocated CCMRF
units and headquarters 180 days prior to mission assumption in order to
synchronize and coordinate participation in a CBNRE training exercise,
confirmation command post exercise, and confirmation field training
exercise. In accordance with DoD Directive 5105.77, National Guard
Bureau, the National Guard Bureau will also contribute to these
determinations
Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct USNORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Service secretaries to
examine sourcing options that would ensure that units had adequate time
to train prior to mission assumption once they had all required
personnel and equipment.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Secretary of Defense has assigned
the responsibility for sourcing the CCMRFs to the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff. USNORTHCOM, the Military Services, and NGB support the
Joint Staff in the execution of this responsibility. Guidance is being
finalized that will task components to allocate properly equipped,
manned, and trained forces to USNORTHCOM to accomplish the CCMRF
mission.
Recommendation 9: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with Secretaries of the military services, the National
Guard Bureau, and the heads of participating Defense Agencies determine
the total requirements for the CCMRF, including unique nonstandard
equipment requirements for each type of unit that comprises the CCMRF,
and develop a plan on how those requirements will be filled.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Secretary of Defense is advised by
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military
Services, USNORTHCOM, NGB, and Defense Agencies on capability
requirements. USNORTHCOM and the Military Departments are staffing a
Joint Mission Essential Equipment List that defines CCMRF equipment
requirements. USNORTHCOM is also working with the Department of the
Army on procurement, storage, and management of Personal Protective
Equipment sustainment stocks for the CCMRF units.
Recommendation 10: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with secretaries of the military services, the National
Guard Bureau, and the heads of participating Defense Agencies develop
an overall funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and exercising
the CCMRF and designate a single point for coordinating this strategy.
DOD Response: Partially concur, The Secretary of Defense is advised by
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military
Services, USNORTHCOM, NGB, and Defense Agencies on capability
requirements. DoD has developed an overall funding strategy for
fielding, sustaining, and employing the CCMRFs. In accordance with
Public Law 109-163 of the FY 06 National Defense Authorization Act, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs is responsible for the coordination of the DOD
assistance to Federal, State, and local officials in responding to
threats involving nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical weapons,
or high-yield explosives or related materials or technologies,
including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and
disposing of nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical weapons, and
high-yield explosives and related materials and technologies.
Consistent with the statutory role of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, OASD
(HD&ASA) will examine in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military Services and appropriate
Defense Agencies what additional steps are to be taken to further
streamline coordination of the CCMRF funding strategy. As the force
employer, USNORTHCOM also plays a significant role.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Joseph Kirschbaum, Assistant
Director; Rodell Anderson; Sandra Burrell; David Fox; Joanne Landesman;
Greg Marchand; Robert Poetta; and Jason Porter made key contributions
to this report.
Related GAO Products:
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program,
but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-849]. Washington, D.C.:
September 9, 2009.
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete
and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369]. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2009.
Emergency Management: Observations on DHS' Preparedness for
Catastrophic Disasters. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-868T]. Washington, D.C.: June 11,
2008.
National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and Procedures to
Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-768]. Washington, D.C.:
June 11, 2008.
Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern
Command's Coordination with States and the National Guards Bureau, but
Gaps Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-252].
Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to
Address force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251]. Washington, D.C.:
April 16, 2008.
Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Tested Various Capabilities
during 2006 Governmentwide Exercise. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-105]. Washington, D.C.: November 19,
2007.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Action to Address
Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1241T]. Washington,
D.C.: September 27, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1142T]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2007.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness Efforts Could
Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk
Mitigation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-696].
Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-395T]. Washington, D.C.:
March 9, 2007.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-903]. Washington, D.C.: September 6,
2006.
Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support
Teams' M9ission and Address Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-498]. Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-643]. Washington, D.C.: May 25,
2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-643]. Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-442T]. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with major Emergency Incidents. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-467T]. Washington, D.C.: February
23, 2006.
GAO'S Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-365R]. Washington, D.C.: February 1,
2006.
Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-652]. Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
Exercises Needs Further Attention. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-170]. Washington, D.C.: January 14,
2005.
Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental Cooperation
Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable Communications.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-740]. Washington, D.C.:
July 20, 2004.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for
Domestic Military Missions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-670]. Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2003.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-822]. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2001.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007).
[2] White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2002).
[3] GAO, Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil
Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-498] (Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2006).
[4] The 15 National Planning Scenarios have been grouped in 8 scenario
sets of similar characteristics. For example, the 4 National Planning
Scenarios related to chemical incidents have been grouped together.
Concept and operation plans are being developed for the 8 scenario
sets.
[5] DHS, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2008), and
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 14, 2007).
[6] United States Northern Command, established in 2002, has the dual
mission of homeland defense and support of civil authorities. NORTHCOM
leads efforts in its area of responsibility which includes the
continental United States and Alaska. The United States Pacific Command
leads DOD's civil support efforts in Hawaii and other U.S. Pacific
territories.
[7] This does not include U.S. Coast Guard forces, which are under DHS,
or the National Guard, which, unless federalized by the President,
would remain under the authority of the respective state and territory
governors.
[8] Under DOD's immediate response provision, local commanders are
authorized to take the necessary actions to respond to local civil
authorities without higher headquarter approval when a civil emergency
may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or
mitigate property damage.
[9] DHS, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2008). The
National Response Framework--previously known as the National Response
Plan--is the plan that guides how federal, state, local, and tribal
governments, along with nongovernmental and private sector entities,
will collectively respond to and recover from all hazards, including
catastrophic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina.
[10] Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a mutual aid agreement
among member states and is administered by the National Emergency
Management Association. States affected by disasters have increasingly
relied on the compact as a means to access resources from other states,
including emergency managers, National Guard assets, and first
responders. GAO, Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing
EMAC's Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve
National Disaster Response, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-854] (Washington, D.C.: June 29,
2007).
[11] The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the DOD agent responsible for
public works and engineering.
[12] U.S. Northern Command, Department of Defense Homeland Defense and
Civil Support Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0 (Oct. 2007), p. 43.
[13] California has two Civil Support Teams. New York and Florida are
each currently establishing a second team.
[14] One of the primary joint doctrine documents that lays out DOD
guidance for joint operation planning is Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 2006).
[15] The full National Response Framework is also not yet completed.
Partner guides, incident annexes for terrorism and cyber incidents, and
the incident annex supplement for catastrophic disasters remain
incomplete.
[16] White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1,
National Planning (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007).
[17] The 15 National Planning Scenarios have been grouped in 8 scenario
sets of similar characteristics. For example, the 4 National Planning
Scenarios related to chemical incidents have been grouped together.
Concept and operation plans are being developed for the 8 scenario
sets.
[18] GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to
Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 30, 2009).
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369].
[20] The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295,
(2006). Section 652 of the Post-Katrina Act requires that FEMA submit a
federal preparedness report to Congress in October 2007 and annually
thereafter. Section 652 also requires the submission of annual state
preparedness reports to FEMA, beginning January 2008, by recipients of
DHS preparedness assistance, including states, territories, or the
District of Columbia. 6 U.S.C. § 752(a), (c); see also 6 U.S.C. §§
101(15), 701(11) for the definition of a "state."
[21] GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to
Complete and Integrate, Planning, Exercise and Assessment Efforts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 30, 2009).
[22] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support (Washington, D.C.: June 2005), p. 3. DOD has since refined that
standard to "prepare for and mitigate the effects of multiple, near-
simultaneous CBRNE events." U.S. Northern Command, Department of
Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept,
Version 2.0 (Oct. 2007), p. 43.
[23] This assumes the CCMRF is tasked to deploy immediately after an
incident occurs.
[24] U.S. Northern Command, Homeland Defense and Civil Support
Capabilities Based Assessment (Colorado Springs, CO: Mar. 2009).
[25] Assigned forces are under the direct command of their unified
command, such as NORTHCOM. Allocated forces are transferred from their
assigned unified command to another command for employment for a
specific period of time.
[26] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but
Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other
Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008).
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251].
[28] U.S. Army North is the designated Joint Force Land Component
Commander for domestic civil support operations NORTHCOM would command.
[29] The standard CCMRF rotation for the first CCMRF, which is
predominately active units, is from October 1 to September 30.
[30] U.S. Northern Command, Homeland Defense and Civil Support
Capabilities Based Assessment (Colorado Springs, CO: Mar. 2009).
[31] U.S. Army North and Joint Task Force Civil Support are subordinate
commands of NORTHCOM.
[32] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Improve Program Management,
Policy, and Testing to Enhance Ability to Field Operationally Useful
Non-lethal Weapons, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-344]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009), p. 35.
[33] At the time of DOD's review, this report was numbered GAO-09-928.
Subsequently, the report number was changed to [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-123].
[34] GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to
Complete and Integrate, Planning, Exercise and Assessment Efforts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 30, 2009).
[35] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but
Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other
Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008).
[36] Defense Science Board, Unconventional Operational Concepts and the
Homeland, Report on the 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military
Operations in Support of U.S. Interests (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009).
[37] GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the
Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address
Implementation Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-936] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6,
2007).
[38] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework,
January 2008, page 28.
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