Personnel Security Clearances
An Outcome-Focused Strategy and Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process
Gao ID: GAO-10-117T October 1, 2009
This testimony discusses the key recommendations from the two reports we recently released, which include (1) the need for a fully developed strategic framework for the reform process that includes outcome-focused performance measures to show progress and (2) more transparency in annually reporting to Congress on the timeliness and quality of the clearance process. This testimony is based on our review of the Joint Reform Team's plans, as well as our work on DOD's security clearance process, which includes reviews of clearance-related files and interviews of senior officials at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOD, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and OPM. In addition, this statement is based on key practices and implementation steps for mergers and organizational transformations. We conducted our work on both reports between March 2008 and May 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Although the high-level leadership and governance structure of the current reform effort distinguish it from previous efforts, it is difficult to gauge progress of reform, or determine if corrective action is needed, because the council, through the Joint Reform Team, has not established a method for evaluating the progress of the reform efforts. Without a strategic framework that fully addresses the long-standing security clearance problems and incorporates key practices for transformation--including the ability to demonstrate progress leading to desired results--the Joint Reform Team is not in a position to demonstrate to decision makers the extent of progress that it is making toward achieving its desired outcomes, and the effort is at risk of losing momentum and not being fully implemented. In addition to limited visibility over timeliness of clearances, the executive branch's annual reports to Congress on the personnel security clearance process have provided decision makers with limited data on quality, and the executive branch has missed opportunities to make the clearance process transparent to Congress. For example, we independently estimated that 87 percent16 of about 3,500 investigative reports prepared by OPM that DOD adjudicators (employees who decide whether to grantclearance to an applicant based on the investigation and other information) used to make clearance decisions, for initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, were missing required documentation. Because neither OPM nor DOD measures the completeness of their investigative reports or adjudicative files, both agencies are limited in their ability to explain the extent to which or the reasons why some documents are incomplete. Incomplete documentation may lead to increases in the time needed to complete the clearance process and in the overall costs of the process and may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. We have stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process and emphasized that attention to quality could increase reciprocity--accepting another federal entity's clearances--and the executive branch, though not required to include information on quality in its annual reports, has latitude to report appropriate information. We are encouraged that, while the 2009 report did not provide any data on quality, unlike previous reports it did identify quality metrics that the executive branch proposes to collect.
GAO-10-117T, Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-117T
entitled 'Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy
and Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide
Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process' which was released on
October 1, 2009.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management, Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, October 1, 2009:
Personnel Security Clearances:
An Outcome-Focused Strategy and Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness
and Quality Would Provide Greater Visibility over the Clearance
Process:
Statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Director: Defense Capabilities and
Management:
GAO-10-117T:
[End of section]
Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Myrick, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here to discuss the key findings in
two reports that we recently released on the personnel security
clearance process.[Footnote 1] As you know, we conducted our review of
personnel security clearance reforms in response to a request from the
Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and
you, Madam Chairwoman. We conducted a separate review on the existing
personnel security clearance process within the Department of Defense
(DOD) under the authority of the Comptroller General.[Footnote 2] This
is the third in a series of hearings in which you have asked GAO to
testify; and this Subcommittee's oversight has helped focus attention
on the need for security clearance reform.[Footnote 3]
Personnel security clearances are used to verify that national security
information--which in some cases could cause exceptionally grave damage
to U.S. national defense or foreign relations if disclosed--is
entrusted only to individuals who have proven reliability and loyalty
to the nation. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
the nation's defense and intelligence needs grew, prompting increased
demand for personnel with security clearances. According to officials
from the Joint Reform Team,[Footnote 4] about 2.4 million people--
excluding some of those with clearances who work in areas of national
intelligence--currently hold clearances, and the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) conducted about 750,000 national security
investigations in fiscal year 2008. We have previously reported on
delays and backlogs in security clearance processing, lack of
reciprocity[Footnote 5] among agencies, and incomplete investigations.
As a result of these long-standing issues, we have designated the
Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security clearance program a
high-risk area since 2005.[Footnote 6]
In response to concerns about delays in processing clearances and other
issues, Congress, including the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, set goals and established requirements for improving the
clearance process in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (IRTPA).[Footnote 7] Those requirements include, among
other things, improving the timeliness of the clearance process,
achieving interagency reciprocity, establishing an integrated database
to track investigative and adjudicative information,[Footnote 8] and
evaluating available technology for investigations and adjudications.
IRTPA also requires the executive branch to provide a report to
Congress, by February 15 of each year, on the progress made during the
preceding year toward meeting IRTPA's requirements for security
clearances, including the length of time agencies take to complete
investigations and adjudications, a discussion of impediments to the
implementation of IRTPA's requirements, and any other information or
recommendations the executive branch considers appropriate.[Footnote 9]
While DOD and other executive branch agencies responsible for
investigating and adjudicating clearances for federal personnel,
military servicemembers, and government contractors have made
significant progress toward improving the timeliness of the clearance
process and evaluating the use of available technology in clearance
processing, problems related to the quality of clearance investigations
and adjudication determinations and in the use of information
technology persist.
The Joint Reform Team was established to coordinate efforts to achieve
IRTPA timeliness goals and improve the processes related to granting
security clearances and determining suitability for government
employment.[Footnote 10] In its April 2008 report, the Joint Reform
Team called for an executive branch governance structure to ensure
accountability and sustain reform momentum. In addition to the April
2008 report, the Joint Reform Team has provided two other key reports,
which collectively communicate the reform effort's plans for reforming
the security clearance process. First, in December 2008, the Joint
Reform Team issued a report on the progress of the reform efforts and
provided further details on the plans to implement reforms. Most
recently, in March 2009, the Joint Reform Team finalized an Enterprise
Information Technology Strategy to support the reformed security and
suitability process and its associated milestones described in the
April and December reports. Figure 1 highlights key events related to
security clearance reform.
Figure 1: Key Events Related to the Security Clearance Reform Efforts:
[Refer to PDF for image: timeline]
December 17, 2004:
Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act passed.
January 2005:
Government Accountability Office places Department of Defense‘s
clearance program on its high-risk list.
June 27, 2005:
Executive Order 13881 designates Office of Management and Budget the
single entity to ensure centralization, uniformity, and reciprocity of
security clearance policies.
November 2005:
Office of Management and Budget issues a plan for improving the
security clearance process.
June 25, 2007:
The Joint Reform Team is formed to develop a plan for clearance reform,
including research priorities and an information technology strategy,
to achieve IRTPA goals.
April 30, 2008:
The Joint Reform Team issues a report on reforming the security
clearance and suitability process.
June 30, 2008:
Executive Order 13467 establishes the Performance Accountability
Council to drive implementation of the reform effort and designated the
Office of Management and Budget's Deputy Director for Management as
Chair.
December 18, 2008:
The Joint Reform Team issues a report outlining reform progress and
further plans.
March 17, 2009:
The Joint Reform Team issues an Enterprise Information Technology
Strategy to support the reformed security and suitability process.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
My statement today will highlight the key recommendations from the two
reports we recently released, which include (1) the need for a fully
developed strategic framework for the reform process that includes
outcome-focused performance measures to show progress and (2) more
transparency in annually reporting to Congress on the timeliness and
quality of the clearance process. My statement is based on our review
of the Joint Reform Team's plans, as well as our work on DOD's security
clearance process, which includes reviews of clearance-related files
and interviews of senior officials at the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), DOD, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI), and OPM. In addition, this statement is based on key practices
and implementation steps for mergers and organizational
transformations.[Footnote 11]
We conducted our work on both reports between March 2008 and May 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Initial Reform Efforts Have Partially Aligned with Key Practices but
Lack a Fully Developed Strategic Framework with Outcome-Focused
Performance Measures to Show Progress:
Initial joint reform efforts have, in part, aligned with key practices
that we have identified for organizational transformations, such as
having committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but
reports issued by the Joint Reform Team do not provide a strategic
framework that contains other important elements of a successful
transformation, such as a mission statement and long-term goals with
related outcome-focused performance measures to show progress, and do
not identify obstacles to progress and possible remedies. In September
2002, GAO convened a forum to identify and discuss practices and
lessons learned from major private and public sector organizational
mergers, acquisitions, and transformations that can serve to guide
federal agencies as they transform their processes in response to
governance challenges. Consistent with some of these key practices, in
June 2008 Executive Order 13467 established the Suitability and
Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council, commonly known
as the Performance Accountability Council, as the head of the
governmentwide governance structure responsible for achieving reform
goals, driving implementation, and overseeing clearance reform efforts.
The Deputy Director for Management at OMB--who was confirmed in June
2009--serves as the chair of the council. The Executive Order also
designated Executive Agents for Suitability and Security.[Footnote 12]
The Joint Reform Team, while not formally part of the governance
structure established by Executive Order 13467, works under the council
to provide progress reports to the President, recommend research
priorities, and oversee the development and implementation of an
information technology strategy, among other things. Membership on this
council currently includes senior executive leaders from 11 federal
agencies. In addition to high-level leadership, the reform effort has
benefited from a dedicated implementation team--the Joint Reform Team--
to manage the transformation process from the beginning.[Footnote 13]
Although the high-level leadership and governance structure of the
current reform effort distinguish it from previous efforts, it is
difficult to gauge progress of reform, or determine if corrective
action is needed, because the council, through the Joint Reform Team,
has not established a method for evaluating the progress of the reform
efforts. Without a strategic framework that fully addresses the long-
standing security clearance problems and incorporates key practices for
transformation--including the ability to demonstrate progress leading
to desired results--the Joint Reform Team is not in a position to
demonstrate to decision makers the extent of progress that it is making
toward achieving its desired outcomes, and the effort is at risk of
losing momentum and not being fully implemented.
In addition to the key practices, the personnel security clearance
joint reform reports that we reviewed collectively also have begun to
address essential factors for reforming the security clearance process,
which represents positive steps. GAO's prior work and IRTPA identified
several factors key to reforming the clearance process. These include
(1) developing a sound requirements determination process, (2) engaging
in governmentwide reciprocity, (3) building quality into every step of
the process, (4) consolidating information technology, and (5)
identifying and reporting long-term funding requirements.[Footnote 14]
However, the Joint Reform Team's information technology strategy, which
is intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative, does not yet
define roles and responsibilities for implementing a new automated
capability. GAO's prior work has stressed the importance of defining
these roles and responsibilities when initiating cross-agency
initiatives.[Footnote 15] Also, the joint reform reports do not contain
any information on initiatives that will require funding, determine how
much they will cost, or identify potential funding sources. Without
long-term funding requirements, decision makers in both the executive
and legislative branches will lack important information for comparing
and prioritizing proposals for reforming the clearance processes. The
reform effort's success will be dependent upon the extent to which the
Joint Reform Team is able to fully address these key factors moving
forward.
Therefore, we recommended that the OMB Deputy Director of Management,
in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability Council,
ensure that the appropriate entities--such as the Performance
Accountability Council, its subcommittees, or the Joint Reform Team--
establish a strategic framework for the joint reform effort to include
(1) a mission statement and strategic goals; (2) outcome-focused
performance measures to continually evaluate the progress of the reform
effort toward meeting its goals and addressing long-standing problems
with the security clearance process; (3) a formal, comprehensive
communication strategy that includes consistency of message and
encourages two-way communication between the Performance Accountability
Council and key stakeholders; (4) a clear delineation of roles and
responsibilities for the implementation of the information technology
strategy among all agencies responsible for developing and implementing
components of the information technology strategy; and (5) long-term
funding requirements for security clearance reform, including estimates
of potential cost savings from the reformed process that are
subsequently provided to decision makers in Congress and the executive
branch.
In oral comments on our report, OMB stated that it partially concurred
with our recommendation to establish a strategic framework for the
joint reform effort. Further, in written agency comments provided to us
jointly by DOD and ODNI, they also partially concurred with our
recommendation. Additionally, DOD and ODNI commented on the specific
elements of the strategic framework that we included as part of our
recommendation. For example, in their comments, DOD and ODNI agreed
that the reform effort must contain outcome-focused performance
measures, but added that these metrics must evolve as the process
improvements and new capabilities are developed and implemented because
the effort is iterative and in phased development. We continue to
believe that outcome-focused performance measures are a critical tool
that can be used to guide the reform effort and allow overseers to
determine when the reform effort has accomplished its goals and
purpose. In addition, DOD and ODNI asserted that considerable work has
already been done on information technology for the reform effort, but
added that even clearer roles and responsibilities will be identified
moving forward. Regarding our finding that, at present, no single
database exists in accordance with IRTPA's requirement that OPM
establish an integrated database that tracks investigations and
adjudication information, DOD and ODNI stated that the reform effort
continues its iterative implementation of improvements to systems that
improve access to information that agencies need. They also
acknowledged that more work needs to be done to identify long-term
funding requirements.
Executive Branch Reporting Does Not Provide Congress Full Visibility
over Timeliness or Quality of Clearances:
While our work also found that DOD and OPM met timeliness requirements
for personnel security clearances in fiscal year 2008, the executive
branch's 2009 required report to Congress does not reflect the full
range of time it takes to make all initial clearance decisions.
Currently, 80 percent of initial clearance decisions are to be made
within 120 days, on average, and by December 2009 a plan is to be
implemented under which to the extent practical 90 percent of initial
clearance decisions are to be made within 60 days, on average. Under
both requirements, the executive branch can exclude the slowest
percentile, and then report on an average of the remaining clearances.
The most recent report stated that the average time to complete the
fastest 90 percent of initial clearances for military and DOD civilians
in fiscal year 2008 was 124 days, on average. However, without taking
averages or excluding the slowest clearances, we analyzed 100 percent
of initial clearances granted in 2008 and found that 39 percent still
took more than 120 days. By limiting its reporting on timeliness to the
average of the fastest 90 percent of the initial clearance decisions
made in fiscal year 2008, the executive branch did not provide
congressional decision makers with visibility over the full range of
time it takes to make all initial clearance decisions and the reasons
why delays continue to exist.
In addition to limited visibility over timeliness of clearances, the
executive branch's annual reports to Congress on the personnel security
clearance process have provided decision makers with limited data on
quality, and the executive branch has missed opportunities to make the
clearance process transparent to Congress. For example, we
independently estimated that 87 percent[Footnote 16] of about 3,500
investigative reports prepared by OPM that DOD adjudicators (employees
who decide whether to grant a clearance to an applicant based on the
investigation and other information) used to make clearance decisions,
for initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, were
missing required documentation. We found, however, that DOD has not
issued formal guidance clarifying if and under what circumstances
adjudicators can adjudicate incomplete investigative reports. For DOD
adjudicative files, we estimated that 22 percent[Footnote 17] were
missing required documentation of the rationale for granting clearances
to applicants with security concerns. Because neither OPM nor DOD
measures the completeness of their investigative reports or
adjudicative files, both agencies are limited in their ability to
explain the extent to which or the reasons why some documents are
incomplete. Incomplete documentation may lead to increases in the time
needed to complete the clearance process and in the overall costs of
the process and may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards
are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy
individuals. We have stated that timeliness alone does not provide a
complete picture of the clearance process and emphasized that attention
to quality could increase reciprocity--accepting another federal
entity's clearances--and the executive branch, though not required to
include information on quality in its annual reports, has latitude to
report appropriate information. We are encouraged that, while the 2009
report did not provide any data on quality, unlike previous reports it
did identify quality metrics that the executive branch proposes to
collect.
Because the executive branch has not fully addressed quality or the
full range of time to complete clearances in its reports, it has missed
opportunities to provide congressional decision makers with full
transparency over the clearance process. Therefore, in our recent
report, we recommended that the Deputy Director for Management at OMB,
as the Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, include (1)
comprehensive data on the timeliness of the personnel security
clearance process and (2) metrics on quality in future versions of the
IRTPA-required annual report to Congress. We also recommended that DOD
clarify its guidance to specify when adjudicators can use incomplete
investigative reports in adjudication decisions and that OPM and DOD
measure the completeness of their investigation and adjudication
documentation to improve the completeness of future documentation. In
commenting on a draft of our report, OMB concurred with both of our
recommendations to that agency, commenting that it recognized the need
for more reporting on timeliness and quality. OMB described some steps
that the Performance Accountability Council is taking to address our
recommendations, including developing measures to account, more
comprehensively, for the time it takes to complete the end-to-end
clearance process. In its written comments, DOD also concurred with
both of the recommendations directed to the department, and described
specific steps it expects to implement later this year to address the
recommendations. Finally, in its written comments, OPM did not indicate
whether it concurred with the one recommendation we made to that
agency. Instead, OPM highlighted improvements it has made in reducing
delays in the clearance investigations process since DOD transferred
this function to OPM in 2005.
Concluding Observations:
In my statement, I have highlighted recommendations from the two
reports we recently released that, if implemented, will help the
responsible agencies continue to guide the security clearance reform
effort and improve the clearance process. We are encouraged that the
Joint Reform Team's efforts during the past year have included several
actions to improve the process, and we recognize that OPM and DOD are
currently meeting IRTPA timeliness requirements, which represents
significant and noteworthy progress. At the request of your
Subcommittee, we will continue to monitor ongoing joint reform efforts
with a focus on reciprocity and information technology advances, as
well as efforts by the responsible agencies to implement our related
recommendations, and we will continue to assess the impact of those
efforts on the security clearance process governmentwide. Although the
high-level leadership and governance structure of the current reform
effort distinguish it from previous attempts at clearance reform, it is
important to note that, in June 2009 the administration confirmed a
vital leadership component necessary for sustaining the momentum
achieved to date. OMB's new Deputy Director for Management will play a
crucial role in deciding how to implement the recommendations contained
in the reports we recently released, as well as prior recommendations
on this issue, and in leading the reform effort in his role as chair of
the Performance Accountability Council.
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions that you or members of the
Subcommittee may have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Brenda S.
Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, at (202) 512-
3604, or farrellb@gao.gov. Key contributors to this statement include
David Moser (Assistant Director), Lori Atkinson, Joseph M. Capuano,
Sara Cradic, Susan Ditto, Cindy Gilbert, Shvetal Khanna, James P.
Klein, Greg Marchand, Shannin O'Neil, and Sarah Veale. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this testimony.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Delays
But Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain Reform
Efforts. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-684T].
Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed to
Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-488]. Washington, D.C.: May 19,
2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete
Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further
Improve the Clearance Process. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400]. Washington, D.C.: May 19,
2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January 22,
2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about Timeliness and
Quality. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-261R].
Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2008.
Personnel Security Clearance: Preliminary Observations on Joint Reform
Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility Process.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1050T]. Washington,
D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance
Process. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-776T].
Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD's
Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-551T]. Washington, D.C.: April 9,
2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform
Security Clearance Processes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-352T]. Washington, D.C.: February
27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More
Informed Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-350]. Washington, D.C.: February 13,
2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found For
Industry Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-842T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed To Improve
The Security Clearance Process. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1070]. Washington, D.C.: September
28, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record
Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security
Clearance Process. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-693R]. Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances
for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-748T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow
Clearances for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-747T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing
Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-233T]. Washington, D.C.: November 9,
2005.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is
Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-488] (Washington, D.C.:
May 19, 2009) and DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness
Reporting, Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are
Needed to Further Improve the Clearance Process. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400] (Washington, D.C.: May 19,
2009).
[2] This report discusses: (1) reporting on timeliness of processing
DOD clearances, (2) completeness of the documentation for making
initial top-secret clearance decisions for DOD personnel, and (3)
reporting of the quality of the clearance process.
[3] GAO testified before this Subcommittee in February and July 2008
(see [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-352T] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1050T]). In the past 2
years, GAO has also testified on concerns with the timeliness of the
security clearance process, among other things, before (1) the
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia of the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, (2) the Subcommittee on
Government Management, Organization, and Procurement, House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, and (3) the Subcommittee on
Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services.
[4] The Joint Reform Team--which currently consists of cognizant
entities within the Office of Management and Budget, Office of
Personnel Management, Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
and Department of Defense--was established in 2007 by the Director of
National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
through a Memorandum of Agreement to execute personnel security
clearance joint reform efforts.
[5] Reciprocity is an agency's acceptance of a background investigation
or clearance determination completed by another authorized
investigative or adjudicative agency.
[6] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-207] (Washington, D.C.: January
2005); High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.: January
2007); and High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January
2009).
[7] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 3001 (2004).
[8] The security clearance process currently consists of six phases:
requirements setting, application submission, investigation,
adjudication, appeal, and renewal.
[9] On January 22, 2009, Representative Anna Eshoo, Chairwoman of the
Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, introduced H.R. 639, the "Security
Clearance Oversight and Accountability Act." H.R. 639 would require
additional annual reports to Congress, including identifying how many
security clearances completed during the previous year took longer than
1 year to complete and the causes of significant delays in the
completion of those clearances, and another including metrics for
adjudication and investigation quality.
[10] Determinations of suitability for government employment in
positions in the competitive service and for career appointment in the
Senior Executive Service include consideration of aspects of an
individual's character or conduct that may have an impact on the
integrity or efficiency of their service. Exec. Order No. 13467,
Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment,
Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to
Classified National Security Information, at § 1.2(l) (June 30, 2008)
(citing 5 C.F.R. Part 731).
[11] GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation:
Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal
Agencies. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-293SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002) and Results- Oriented Cultures:
Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational
Transformations. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669]
(Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[12] The Director of OPM was designated as the Executive Agent for
Suitability, and the Director of National Intelligence was designated
Executive Agent for Security.
[13] According to the Joint Reform Team, over 70 personnel from DOD,
OPM, and ODNI currently support its initiatives (including
approximately 17 full-time staff).
[14] Establishing a sound requirement-determination process, building
quality into every step of the process, and providing Congress with
long-term funding requirements are identified in our previous work. See
GAO, Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform
Security Clearance Processes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-352T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27,
2008). Establishing governmentwide reciprocity and developing and
consolidating information technology are derived from § 3001(d) and (f)
of IRTPA.
[15] GAO, Information Technolgoy: Customs Automated Commercial
Environment Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements
Continues. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-267]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar 14, 2005).
[16] This estimate has a margin of error, based on a 95 percent
confidence interval, of +/-9 percent and is based on our review of a
random sample of 100 OPM-provided investigative reports for initial top
secret clearances granted in July 2008 by the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and
U.S. Air Force central adjudication facilities. In addition, we
reviewed the investigative reports for the presence or absence of
required documentation. Available information often did not allow a
determination of why the documentation was missing. For example,
required documentation could be missing because an investigator failed
to gather the information or to document that the information was
gathered. In either case, an investigative report would not provide an
adjudicator with all of the information required by the federal
investigative standards and OPM's internal guidance.
[17] This estimate has a margin of error, based on a 95 percent
confidence interval, of +/-10 percent and is based on our review of a
random sample of 100 DOD adjudicative files for initial top secret
clearances granted in July 2008 by the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, and
the U.S. Air Force central adjudication facilities. These adjudicative
files are associated with the 100 OPM-provided investigative reports we
reviewed and produced estimates from in the previous analysis about the
documentation completeness in investigative reports.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: