Warfighter Support
Challenges Confronting DOD's Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Efforts Gao ID: GAO-10-186T October 29, 2009Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the number-one threat to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, accounting for almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. Although insurgents' use of IEDs in Iraq has begun to decline, in Afghanistan the number of IED incidents has significantly increased. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was created to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD efforts to defeat IEDs. Its primary role is to provide funding to the military services and DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over $16 billion to JIEDDO. In addition, other DOD components, including the military services, have devoted at least $1.5 billion to the counter-IED effort--which does not include $22.7 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. This testimony is based on a report that GAO is issuing today as well as preliminary observations from ongoing work that GAO plans to report in early 2010. In the report being issued today, GAO is recommending that JIEDDO (1) improve its visibility of counter-IED efforts across DOD, (2) develop a complete plan to guide the transition of initiatives, and (3) define criteria for its training initiatives to help guide its funding decisions. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and noted actions to be taken.
Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve its management of counter-IED efforts. For instance, GAO's ongoing work has found that JIEDDO has been improving the management of its efforts to defeat IEDs, including developing and implementing a strategic plan that provides an overarching framework for departmentwide efforts to defeat IEDs, as well as a JIEDDO-specific strategic plan. Also, as noted in the report GAO is issuing today, JIEDDO and the services have taken steps to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts, and JIEDDO has taken several steps to support the ability of the services and defense agencies to program and fund counter-IED initiatives. However, several significant challenges remain that affect DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO. Some of these challenges are identified in GAO's report being released today along with recommendations to address them. For example, one challenge is a lack of full visibility by JIEDDO and the services over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. Although JIEDDO and various service organizations are developing and maintaining their own counter-IED initiative databases, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, which limits their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the department. In addition, JIEDDO faces difficulties coordinating the transition of funding responsibility for joint counter-IED initiatives to the services, due to gaps between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle. JIEDDO's initiative transitions also are hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during JIEDDO's acquisition process. JIEDDO also lacks clear criteria for defining what counter-IED training initiatives it will fund and, as a result, has funded training activities that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. Additionally, GAO's ongoing work has identified other oversight challenges. For example, JIEDDO lacks a means as well as reliable data to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts. GAO's work has identified several areas in which data on the effectiveness and progress of IED-defeat initiatives are unreliable or inconsistently collected. In some cases, data are not collected in-theater because the initiatives may not be designed with adequate data-collection procedures. Another challenge facing JIEDDO is its inconsistent application of its counter-IED initiative acquisition process, allowing initiatives to bypass some or all of the process's key review and approval steps. Further, JIEDDO lacks adequate internal controls to ensure DOD that it is achieving its objectives. For example, in July 2009, JIEDDO reported that its internal controls system had a combination of deficiencies that constituted a material weakness. Such a weakness could adversely affect JIEDDO's ability to meet its objectives. Finally, JIEDDO has not developed a process for identification and analysis of the risks it faces in achieving its objectives from both external and internal sources, and it has not assessed its performance over time or ensured that the findings of audits and other reviews have been promptly resolved. As GAO completes its ongoing work it expects to issue a report with recommendations to address these issues.
GAO-10-186T, Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD's Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Efforts
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-186T
entitled 'Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD's Ability to
Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices
Efforts' which was released on October 29, 2009.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, October, 29, 2009:
Warfighter Support:
Challenges Confronting DOD's Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its
Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Efforts:
Statement of William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-10-186T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-10-
186T], a testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the number-one threat to troops
in Iraq and Afghanistan, accounting for almost 40 percent of the
attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. Although insurgents‘ use of IEDs
in Iraq has begun to decline, in Afghanistan the number of IED
incidents has significantly increased. The Joint IED Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) was created to lead, advocate, and coordinate all
DOD efforts to defeat IEDs. Its primary role is to provide funding to
the military services and DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field
counter-IED solutions. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has
appropriated over $16 billion to JIEDDO. In addition, other DOD
components, including the military services, have devoted at least $1.5
billion to the counter-IED effort”which does not include $22.7 billion
for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles.
This testimony is based on a report that GAO is issuing today as well
as preliminary observations from ongoing work that GAO plans to report
in early 2010. In the report being issued today, GAO is recommending
that JIEDDO (1) improve its visibility of counter-IED efforts across
DOD, (2) develop a complete plan to guide the transition of
initiatives, and (3) define criteria for its training initiatives to
help guide its funding decisions. DOD generally concurred with GAO‘s
recommendations and noted actions to be taken.
What GAO Found:
Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve its
management of counter-IED efforts. For instance, GAO‘s ongoing work has
found that JIEDDO has been improving the management of its efforts to
defeat IEDs, including developing and implementing a strategic plan
that provides an overarching framework for departmentwide efforts to
defeat IEDs, as well as a JIEDDO-specific strategic plan. Also, as
noted in the report GAO is issuing today, JIEDDO and the services have
taken steps to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts, and
JIEDDO has taken several steps to support the ability of the services
and defense agencies to program and fund counter-IED initiatives.
However, several significant challenges remain that affect DOD‘s
ability to oversee JIEDDO. Some of these challenges are identified in
GAO‘s report being released today along with recommendations to address
them. For example, one challenge is a lack of full visibility by JIEDDO
and the services over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. Although
JIEDDO and various service organizations are developing and maintaining
their own counter-IED initiative databases, JIEDDO and the services
lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives,
which limits their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the
department. In addition, JIEDDO faces difficulties coordinating the
transition of funding responsibility for joint counter-IED initiatives
to the services, due to gaps between JIEDDO‘s transition timeline and
DOD‘s base budget cycle. JIEDDO‘s initiative transitions also are
hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during
JIEDDO‘s acquisition process. JIEDDO also lacks clear criteria for
defining what counter-IED training initiatives it will fund and, as a
result, has funded training activities that may have primary uses other
than defeating IEDs. Additionally, GAO‘s ongoing work has identified
other oversight challenges. For example, JIEDDO lacks a means as well
as reliable data to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts.
GAO‘s work has identified several areas in which data on the
effectiveness and progress of IED-defeat initiatives are unreliable or
inconsistently collected. In some cases, data are not collected in-
theater because the initiatives may not be designed with adequate data-
collection procedures. Another challenge facing JIEDDO is its
inconsistent application of its counter-IED initiative acquisition
process, allowing initiatives to bypass some or all of the process‘s
key review and approval steps. Further, JIEDDO lacks adequate internal
controls to ensure DOD that it is achieving its objectives. For
example, in July 2009, JIEDDO reported that its internal controls
system had a combination of deficiencies that constituted a material
weakness. Such a weakness could adversely affect JIEDDO‘s ability to
meet its objectives. Finally, JIEDDO has not developed a process for
identification and analysis of the risks it faces in achieving its
objectives from both external and internal sources, and it has not
assessed its performance over time or ensured that the findings of
audits and other reviews have been promptly resolved. As GAO completes
its ongoing work it expects to issue a report with recommendations to
address these issues.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T] or key
components. For more information, contact William Solis at (202) 512-
8365 or SolisW@GAO.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss Department of Defense (DOD)
management and oversight of its effort to defeat improvised explosive
devices (IEDs). Such devices continue to be the number-one threat to
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. During 2008, IEDs accounted for almost
40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. In 2009,
insurgents' use of IEDs against U.S. forces in Iraq declined for the
second straight year since 2003, while in Afghanistan the number of
monthly IED incidents reached more than 800 in July 2009. Due to the
magnitude of the IED threat, DOD created the Joint IED Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) in January 2006 in an effort to focus its counter-
IED efforts. JIEDDO is responsible for leading, advocating, and
coordinating all DOD efforts to defeat IEDs. A primary role for JIEDDO
is to provide funding to the military services and DOD agencies to
rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. Through fiscal year
2009, Congress has appropriated over $16 billion to JIEDDO to address
the IED threat. In addition, other DOD components, including the
military services, have devoted at least $1.5 billion to the counter-
IED effort, not including $22.7 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicles. Along with the escalation in Afghanistan, the IED
threat is increasingly expanding throughout the globe with over 300 IED
events per month worldwide outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, according
to JIEDDO. There is widespread consensus that this threat will not go
away and that the IED will continue to be a weapon of strategic
influence in future conflicts.
In response to congressional direction,[Footnote 1] GAO has issued a
series of reports on JIEDDO. This work has examined a broad spectrum of
JIEDDO's operations including its ability to lead, advocate, and
coordinate counter-IED efforts across DOD as well as establish itself
as an accountable organization that can effectively manage billions of
dollars in funding. As DOD looks to the future in deciding the
appropriate role, organizational placement, and degree of Office of
Secretary of Defense (OSD) oversight for JIEDDO, addressing these types
of issues will be critical. My testimony today will discuss our
observations in two main areas. First, I will describe the steps that
JIEDDO and DOD have taken to manage counter-IED efforts. Second, I will
highlight the challenges that affect DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO.
In preparing this testimony, we relied on the report we are issuing
today regarding actions needed to improve visibility and coordination
of DOD's counter-IED efforts.[Footnote 2] We met with officials from
several DOD organizations including JIEDDO, the Army Asymmetric Warfare
Office, the Army National Training Center, the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory, the Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center,
Joint Forces Command, the JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence, U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM), the Technical Support Working Group, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. We also examined documentation
including DOD Directive 2000.19E, which established JIEDDO, other
documentation and briefings relating to JIEDDO's evolution, and JIEDDO
Instruction 5000.01,[Footnote 3] which established JIEDDO's rapid
acquisition process, as well as other documents and briefings from
JIEDDO, the Services, and other DOD entities. This work was conducted
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In
addition, we are providing preliminary observations from our ongoing
work regarding JIEDDO's management of its internal processes, its
strategic planning, initiative development, and internal controls. For
this ongoing work, we conducted case studies of 56 of the 497 counter-
IED initiatives listed in JIEDDO's financial records as of March 30,
2009, covering the top 20 initiatives in each of the three categories
of operations. [Footnote 4] We compared historic documentation to
criteria specified in the JIEDDO directive and instructions. We
collected, reviewed, and analyzed JIEDDO and DOD counter-IED strategic
plans and guidance as well as documentation of JIEDDO actions for its
counter-IED initiatives. We met with officials in the office of the DOD
Comptroller, the OSD Office of the Director of Administration and
Management, and JIEDDO. In addition, to further evaluate JIEDDO's
initiative development we reviewed its oversight and internal control
processes. We are conducting this work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards, and we expect to issue a report
in early 2010.
Background:
With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq dating back to 2003, DOD
began identifying several counter-IED capability gaps including
shortcomings in the areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified
personnel with expertise in counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated
funding, and the lack of an expedited acquisition process for
developing new solutions to address emerging IED threats. Prior DOD
efforts to defeat IEDs included various process teams and task forces.
For example, DOD established the Joint IED Defeat Task Force in June
2005, which replaced three temporary organizations--the Army IED Task
Force; the Joint IED Task Force; and the Under Secretary of Defense,
Force Protection Working Group. To further focus DOD's efforts and
minimize duplication, DOD published a new directive in February
2006,[Footnote 5] which changed the name of the Joint IED Defeat Task
Force to JIEDDO. This directive established JIEDDO as a joint entity
and jointly manned organization within DOD, directly under the
authority, direction, and control of the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
rather than subjecting JIEDDO to more traditional review under an Under
Secretary of Defense within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
DOD's directive further states that JIEDDO shall focus all DOD actions
in support of the combatant commanders' and their respective Joint Task
Forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.
Specifically JIEDDO is directed to identify, assess, and fund
initiatives that provide specific counter-IED solutions, and is granted
the authority to approve joint IED defeat initiatives valued up to $25
million and make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for
initiatives valued over that amount. Beginning in fiscal year 2007,
Congress, has provided JIEDDO with its own separate appropriation,
averaging $4 billion a year. JIEDDO may then transfer funds to the
military service that is designated to sponsor a specific initiative.
After JIEDDO provides funding authority to a military service, the
designated service program manager, not JIEDDO, is responsible for
managing the initiatives for which JIEDDO has provided funds.
Since 2004, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123
has specified that federal agencies have a fundamental responsibility
to develop and maintain effective internal controls that ensure the
prevention or detection of significant weaknesses--that is, weaknesses
that could adversely affect the agency's ability to meet its
objectives.[Footnote 6] According to OMB, the importance of internal
controls is addressed in many statutes and executive documents. OMB
requires agencies and individual federal managers to take systematic
and proactive measures to develop and implement appropriate, cost-
effective internal controls for results-oriented management. In
addition, the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982
establishes the overall requirements with regard to internal
controls.[Footnote 7] Accordingly, an agency head must establish
controls that reasonably ensure that (1) obligations and costs are in
compliance with applicable law; (2) all assets are safeguarded against
waste, loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation; and (3) revenues
and expenditures applicable to agency operations are properly recorded
and accounted for to permit the preparation of accounts and reliable
financial and statistical reports and to maintain accountability over
the assets. Specific internal control standards underlying the internal
controls concept in the federal government are promulgated by GAO and
are referred to as the Green Book.[Footnote 8] The DOD Comptroller is
responsible for the implementation and oversight of DOD's internal
control program.
JIEDDO and DOD Have Taken Steps to Improve the Management of Counter-
IED Efforts:
Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve its
management and operation of counter-IED efforts in response to our past
work as well as to address congressional concerns. For example, in our
ongoing work, we have noted that JIEDDO has been improving its
strategic planning. In March 2007, observing that JIEDDO did not have a
formal written strategic plan, we recommended that it develop such a
plan based on the Government Performance and Results Act requirement
implemented by the OMB circular A-11 requirement that government
entities develop and implement a strategic plan for managing their
efforts. Further, in 2007, Congress initially appropriated only a
portion of JIEDDO's requested fiscal year 2008 funding, and a Senate
Appropriations Committee report directed JIEDDO to provide a
comprehensive and detailed strategic plan so that additional funding
could be considered. In response, JIEDDO, in November 2007, issued a
strategic plan that provided an overarching framework for
departmentwide counter-IED efforts. Additionally, JIEDDO continues to
invest considerable effort to develop and manage JIEDDO-specific plans
for countering IEDs. For example, during the second half of 2008, the
JIEDDO director undertook a detailed analysis of three issues. The
director looked at JIEDDO's mission as defined in DOD guidance, the
implicit and explicit functions associated with its mission, and the
organizational structure needed to support and accomplish its mission.
The effort resulted in JIEDDO publishing its JIEDDO Organization and
Functions Guide in December 2008, within which JIEDDO formally
established strategic planning as one of four mission areas.[Footnote
9] Actions taken in 2009 included developing and publishing a JIEDDO-
specific strategic plan for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, reviewing
JIEDDO's existing performance measures to determine whether additional
or alternative metrics might be needed, and engaging other government
agencies and services involved in addressing the IED threat at a JIEDDO
semiannual conference.[Footnote 10] As a result of these actions,
JIEDDO is steadily improving its understanding of counter-IED
challenges.
Additionally, as we note in our report being issued today, JIEDDO and
the services have taken some steps to improve visibility over their
counter-IED efforts. For example, JIEDDO, the services, and several
other DOD organizations compile some information on the wide range of
IED defeat initiatives existing throughout the department. JIEDDO also
promotes visibility by giving representatives from the Army's and
Marine Corps' counter-IED coordination offices the opportunity to
assist in the evaluation of IED defeat proposals. Additionally, JIEDDO
maintains a network of liaison officers to facilitate counter-IED
information sharing throughout the department. It also hosts a
semiannual conference covering counter-IED topics such as agency roles
and responsibilities, key issues, and current challenges. JIEDDO also
hosts a technology outreach conference with industry, academia, and
other DOD components to discuss the latest requirements and trends in
the counter-IED effort. Lastly, the services provide some visibility
over their own counter-IED initiatives by submitting information to
JIEDDO for the quarterly reports that it submits to Congress.
Several Challenges Affect DOD's Ability to Oversee the Management of
JIEDDO:
While JIEDDO has taken some steps toward improving its management of
counter-IED efforts, several significant challenges remain that affect
DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO. Some of these challenges are
identified in the report we are issuing today and include a lack of
full visibility by JIEDDO and the services over counter-IED initiatives
throughout DOD, difficulties coordinating the transition of funding
responsibility for joint IED defeat initiatives to the military
services once counter-IED solutions have been developed, and a lack of
clear criteria for defining what counter-IED training initiatives it
will fund. Additionally, our ongoing work has identified other
challenges including a lack of a means to gauge the effectiveness of
its counter-IED efforts, a lack of consistent application of its
counter-IED initiative acquisition process, and a lack of adequate
internal controls required to provide DOD assurance that it is
achieving its objectives. I will discuss each of these challenges in
more detail.
JIEDDO and the Services Lack Full Visibility over Counter-IED
Initiatives throughout DOD:
DOD's ability to manage JIEDDO is hindered by its lack of full
visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. Although JIEDDO
and various service organizations are developing and maintaining their
own counter-IED initiative databases, JIEDDO and the services lack a
comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, which
limits their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the department.
JIEDDO is required to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions to
defeat IEDs. Also, JIEDDO is required to maintain the current status of
program execution, operational fielding, and performance of approved
Joint IED Defeat initiatives. Despite the creation of JIEDDO, most of
the organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort in existence prior
to JIEDDO have continued to develop, maintain, and in many cases,
expand their own IED defeat capabilities. For example, the Army
continues to address the IED threat through such organizations as the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command, which provides training support
and doctrinal formation for counter-IED activities, and the Research,
Development & Engineering Command, which conducts counter-IED
technology assessments and studies for Army leadership. Furthermore, an
Army official stated that the Center for Army Lessons Learned continues
to maintain an IED cell to collect and analyze counter-IED information.
The Marine Corps' Training and Education Command and the Marine Corps
Center for Lessons Learned have also continued counter-IED efforts
beyond the creation of JIEDDO. At the interagency level, the Technical
Support Working Group continues its research and development of counter-
IED technologies.
Despite these ongoing efforts and JIEDDO's mission to coordinate all
DOD actions to defeat improvised explosive devices, JIEDDO does not
maintain a comprehensive database of all IED defeat initiatives across
the department. JIEDDO is currently focusing on developing a management
system that will track its initiatives as they move through its own
acquisition process. Although this system will help JIEDDO manage its
counter-IED initiatives, it will track only JIEDDO-funded initiatives,
not those being independently developed and procured by the services
and other DOD components. Without incorporating service and other DOD
components' counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO's efforts to develop a
counter-IED initiative database will not capture all efforts to defeat
IEDs throughout DOD.
In addition, the services do not have a central source of information
for their own counter-IED efforts because there is currently no
requirement that each service develop its own comprehensive database of
all of its counter-IED initiatives. Without centralized counter-IED
initiative databases, the services are limited in their ability to
provide JIEDDO with a timely and comprehensive summary of all their
existing initiatives. For example, the U.S. Army Research and
Development and Engineering Command's Counter-IED Task Force and the
service counter-IED focal points--the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office's
Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions Division; and the Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab--maintain databases of counter-IED initiatives.
However, according to Army and Marine Corps officials, these databases
are not comprehensive in covering all efforts within their respective
service.[Footnote 11] Additionally, of these three databases, only the
U.S. Army Research and Development and Engineering Command's database
is available for external use. Since the services are able to act
independently to develop and procure their own counter-IED solutions,
several service and Joint officials told us that a centralized counter-
IED database would be of great benefit in coordinating and managing the
department's counter-IED programs.
Furthermore, although JIEDDO involves the services in its process to
select initiatives, the services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-
funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process, called the
JIEDDO Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP).
In this process, JIEDDO brings in representatives from the service to
participate on several boards--such as a requirements, resources, and
acquisition board--to evaluate counter- IED initiatives, and various
integrated process teams. However, in its process to select counter-IED
initiatives, JIEDDO has approved some counter-IED initiatives without
vetting them through the appropriate service counter-IED focal points,
because the process allows JIEDDO to make exceptions if deemed
necessary and appropriate. For example, at least three counter-IED
training initiatives sponsored by JIEDDO's counter-IED joint training
center were not vetted through the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office's
Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Branch--the Army's focal
point for its counter-IED effort--before being approved for JIEDDO
funding. Service officials have said that not incorporating their views
on initiatives limits their visibility of JIEDDO actions and could
result in approved initiatives that are inconsistent with service
needs. JIEDDO officials acknowledged that while it may be beneficial
for some JIEDDO-funded initiatives to bypass its acquisition process in
cases where an urgent requirement with limited time to field is
identified, these cases do limit service visibility over all JIEDDO-
funded initiatives.
In response to these issues, we recommended in our report that is being
issued today that the military services create their own comprehensive
IED defeat initiative databases and work with JIEDDO to develop a DOD-
wide database for all counter-IED initiatives. In response to this
recommendation, DOD concurred and noted steps currently being taken to
develop a DOD-wide database of counter-IED initiatives. While we
recognize that this ongoing effort is a step in the right direction,
these steps did not address the need for the services to develop
databases of their initiatives as we also recommended. Until all of the
services and other DOD components gain full awareness of their own
individual counter-IED efforts and provide this input into a central
database, any effort to establish a DOD-wide database of all counter-
IED initiatives will be incomplete. We are also recommending that, in
cases where initiatives bypass JIEDDO's rapid acquisition process,
JIEDDO develop a mechanism to notify the appropriate service counter-
IED focal points of each initiative prior to its funding. In regard to
this recommendation, DOD also concurred and noted steps it plans to
take such as notifying stakeholders of all JIEDDO efforts or
initiatives, whether or not JCAAMP processing is required. We agree
that, if implemented, these actions would satisfy our recommendation.
JIEDDO Faces Difficulties Coordinating the Transition of Funding
Responsibility for Joint IED Defeat Initiatives to the Military
Services:
Although JIEDDO has recently taken several steps to improve its process
to transition IED defeat initiatives to the military services following
the development of new capabilities, JIEDDO still faces difficulties in
this area. JIEDDO's transitions of initiatives to the services are
hindered by funding gaps between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's
budget cycle as well as by instances when service requirements are not
fully considered during JIEDDO's acquisition process. JIEDDO obtains
funding for its acquisition and development programs through
congressional appropriations for overseas contingency operations.
JIEDDO typically remains responsible for funding counter-IED
initiatives until they have been developed, fielded, and tested as
proven capabilities. According to DOD's directive, JIEDDO is then
required to develop plans for transitioning proven joint IED defeat
initiatives into DOD base budget programs of record for sustainment and
further integration into existing service programs once those
initiatives have been developed. As described in its instruction,
JIEDDO plans to fund initiatives for 2 fiscal years of sustainment.
However, service officials have stated that JIEDDO's 2-year transition
timeline may not allow the services enough time to request and receive
funding through DOD's base budgeting process, causing DOD to rely on
service overseas contingency operations funding to sustain joint-funded
counter-IED initiatives following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline.
According to JIEDDO's latest transition brief for fiscal year 2010, the
organization recommended the transfer of 19 initiatives totaling $233
million to the services for funding through overseas contingency
operations appropriations and the transition of only 3 totaling $4.5
million into service base budget programs. The potential need for
increased transition funds will continue given the large number of
current initiatives funded by JIEDDO. For example, as of March 30,
2009, JIEDDO's initiative management system listed 497 ongoing
initiatives.[Footnote 12] In addition to the small number of
transitions and transfers that have occurred within DOD to date, the
services often decide to indefinitely defer assuming funding
responsibility for JIEDDO initiatives following JIEDDO's intended 2-
year transition or transfer point. According to JIEDDO's fiscal year
2011 transition list, the Army and Navy have deferred or rejected the
acceptance of 16 initiatives that JIEDDO had recommended for transition
or transfer, totaling at least $16 million.[Footnote 13] Deferred or
rejected initiatives are either sustained by JIEDDO indefinitely,
transitioned or transferred during a future year, or terminated. When
the services defer or reject the transition of initiatives, JIEDDO
remains responsible for them beyond the intended 2-year transition or
transfer point, a delay that could diminish its ability to fund new
initiatives and leads to uncertainty about when or if the services will
assume funding responsibility in the future.
Furthermore, JIEDDO's initiative transitions are hindered when service
requirements are not fully considered during the development and
integration of joint-funded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced by
two counter-IED radio jamming systems. In the first example, CENTCOM,
whose area of responsibility includes both Iraq and Afghanistan,
responded to an urgent operational need by publishing a requirement in
2006 for a man-portable IED jamming system for use in theater. In 2007,
JIEDDO funded and delivered to theater a near-term solution to meet
this capability gap. However, Army officials stated that the fielded
system was underutilized by troops in Iraq, who thought the system was
too heavy to carry, especially given the weight of their body armor.
Since then, the joint counter-IED radio jamming program board has
devised a plan to field a newer man-portable jamming system called CREW
3.1. According to JIEDDO, CREW 3.1 systems were developed by a joint
technical requirements board that aimed to balance specific service
requirements for man-portable systems. While CENTCOM maintains that
CREW 3.1 is a requirement in-theater, and revalidated the need in
September 2009, officials from the Army and Marine Corps have both
stated that they do not have a formal requirement for the system.
Nevertheless, DOD plans to field the equipment to each of the services
in response to CENTCOM's stated operational need. It remains unclear,
however, which DOD organizations will be required to pay for
procurement and sustainment costs for the CREW 3.1, since DOD has yet
to identify the source of funding to procure additional quantities.
In the second example, Army officials stated that they were not
involved to the fullest extent possible in the evaluation and
improvement process for a JIEDDO-funded vehicle-mounted jamming system,
even though the Army was DOD's primary user in terms of total number of
systems fielded. The system, called the CREW Vehicle Receiver/Jammer
(CVRJ), was initiated in response to an urgent warfighter need in
November 2006 for a high-powered system to jam radio frequencies used
to detonate IEDs. The development of this technology ultimately
required at least 20 proposals for configuration changes to correct
flaws found in its design after contract award. Two of the changes
involved modifying the jammer so it could function properly at high
temperatures. Another change was needed to prevent the jammer from
interfering with vehicle global positioning systems. Army officials
stated that had they had a more direct role on the Navy-led control
board that managed configuration changes to the CVRJ, the system may
have been more quickly integrated into the Army's operations. As this
transpired, the Army continued to use another jamming system, DUKE, as
its principal counter-IED electronic warfare system. Not ensuring that
service requirements are fully taken into account when evaluating
counter-IED initiatives creates the potential for fielding equipment
that is inconsistent with service requirements. This could later delay
the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the services following
JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline.
To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO funded initiatives, our report
issued today recommended that the military services work with JIEDDO to
develop a comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each JIEDDO-
funded initiative, including expected costs, identified funding
sources, and a timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DOD
base budget cycle. We also recommended that JIEDDO coordinate with the
services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service
requirements are fully taken into account when making counter-IED
investment decisions. In response to these recommendations, DOD
concurred with our recommendation to develop a comprehensive plan and
noted steps to be taken to address this issue. DOD partially concurred
with our recommendation that JIEDDO coordinate with the services prior
to funding an initiative, noting the department's concern over the need
for a rapid response to urgent warfighter needs. While we recognize the
need to respond quickly to support warfighter needs, we continue to
support our recommendation and reiterate the need for the integration
of service requirements and full coordination prior to funding an
initiative to ensure that these efforts are fully vetted throughout DOD
before significant resources are committed.
JIEDDO Lacks Clear Criteria for Defining What Counter-IED Training
Initiatives It Will Fund:
JIEDDO's lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training
initiatives it will fund affects its counter-IED training investment
decisions. JIEDDO devoted $454 million in fiscal year 2008 to support
service counter-IED training requirements through such activities as
constructing a network of realistic counter-IED training courses at 57
locations throughout the United States, Europe, and Korea. DOD's
directive defines a counter-IED initiative as a materiel or nonmateriel
solution that addresses Joint IED Defeat capability gaps. Since our
last report on this issue in March 2007, JIEDDO has attempted to
clarify what types of counter-IED training it will fund in support of
theater-urgent, counter-IED requirements. In its comments to our
previous report, JIEDDO stated that it would fund an urgent theater
counter-IED requirement if it "enables training support, including
training aids and exercises." JIEDDO also stated in its comments that
it would fund an urgent-theater, counter-IED requirement only if it has
a primary counter-IED application.[Footnote 14]
Although JIEDDO has published criteria for determining what joint
counter-IED urgent training requirements to fund and has supported
service counter-IED training, it has not developed similar criteria for
the funding of joint training initiatives not based on urgent
requirements. For example, since fiscal year 2007, JIEDDO has spent
$70.7 million on role players in an effort to simulate Iraqi social,
political, and religious groups at DOD's training centers. JIEDDO also
spent $24.1 million on simulated villages at DOD's training centers in
an effort to make steel shipping containers resemble Iraqi buildings.
According to Army officials, these role players and simulated villages
funded by JIEDDO to support counter-IED training are also utilized in
training not related to countering IEDs. As a result, JIEDDO has funded
training initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating
IEDs, such as role players and simulated villages to replicate Iraqi
conditions at various service combat training centers. Without criteria
specifying which counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, JIEDDO
may diminish its ability to fund future initiatives more directly
related to the counter-IED mission. DOD also could hinder coordination
in managing its resources, as decision makers at both the joint and
service level operate under unclear selection guidelines for which
types of training initiatives should be funded and by whom. We have
therefore recommended in the report being issued today that JIEDDO
evaluate counter-IED training initiatives using the same criteria it
uses to evaluate theater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements,
and incorporate this new guidance into an instruction. In commenting on
our recommendation, DOD partially concurred and expressed concerns
regarding our recommendation noting that JIEDDO's JCAAMP and the
development of new DOD-wide guidance would address the issues we note
in our report. In response, while we recognize the steps taken by DOD
to identify counter-IED training gaps and guide counter-IED training,
these actions do not establish criteria by which JIEDDO will fund
counter-IED training.
JIEDDO Lacks a Means to Gauge the Effectiveness of Its Counter-IED
Efforts:
JIEDDO has not yet developed a means for reliably measuring the
effectiveness of its efforts and investments in combating IEDs. The OMB
circular A-11 notes that performance goals and measures are important
components of a strategic plan and that it is essential to assess
actual performance based on these goals and measures.. JIEDDO officials
attribute difficulty in determining the effectiveness of its
initiatives to isolating their effect on key IED threat indicators from
the effect of other activities occurring in-theater at the same time,
such as a surge in troops, changes in equipment in use by coalition
forces, local observation of holidays, or changes in weather such as
intense dust storms, which may cause a decrease in the number of IED
incidents.
JIEDDO has pursued performance measures since its inception to gauge
whether its initiatives and internal operations and activities are
operating effectively and efficiently, and achieving desired results.
In December 2008 JIEDDO published a set of 78 specific performance
measures for its organization. The list included, for example, metrics
to evaluate JIEDDO's response time in satisfying urgent theater
requirements, the quality and relevance of counter-IED proposals JIEDDO
solicits and receives in response to its solicitations, and the ratio
of initiatives for which JIEDDO completes operational assessments.
However, JIEDDO has not yet established baselines for these measures or
specific goals and time frames for collecting, measuring, and analyzing
the relevant data.
Further, we have found several limitations with the data JIEDDO
collects and relies upon to evaluate its performance. Our ongoing work
has identified three areas in which the data JIEDDO uses to measure
effectiveness and progress is unreliable or is inconsistently
collected. First, data on effectiveness of initiatives based on
feedback from warfighters in-theater is not consistently collected
because JIEDDO does not routinely establish data-collection mechanisms
or processes to obtain useful, relevant information needed to
adequately assess the effectiveness of its initiatives. JIEDDO
officials also said that data collection from soldiers operating in-
theater is limited because the process of providing feedback may
detract from higher priorities for warfighters. In response to this
data shortfall, JIEDDO managers began an initiative in fiscal year 2009
to embed JIEDDO-funded teams within each brigade combat team to provide
JIEDDO with an in-theater ability to collect needed data for evaluating
initiatives. However, because this effort is just beginning, JIEDDO
officials stated that they have not yet been able to assess its
effectiveness. Second, data on the management of individual
initiatives, such as data recording activities that take place
throughout the development of an initiative, are not consistently
recorded and maintained at JIEDDO. Officials attribute the poor data
quality to the limited amount of time that JIEDDO staff are able to
spend on this activity. JIEDDO staff are aware that documentation of
management actions is needed to conduct counter-IED initiative
evaluations and told us that they plan to make improvements. However,
needed changes--such as routinely recording discussions, analysis,
determinations, and findings occurring in key meetings involving JIEDDO
and external parties and coding their activities in more detail to
allow differentiation and deeper analysis of activities and
initiatives--are yet to be developed and implemented. Third, JIEDDO
does not collect or fully analyze data on unexpected outcomes, such as
initiatives that may result in an increase in the occurrence or
lethality of IEDs. However, we believe that such data can provide
useful information that can be used to improve initiatives. For
example, in response to a general officer request in Iraq, the
Institute for Defense Analysis collected and analyzed IED incident data
before and after a certain initiative to determine its effect on the
rate of IED incidents. JIEDDO officials intended the initiative in
question to result in the reduction in IED attacks. However, the data
collected contradicted the intended result because the number of IED
incidents increased in areas where the initiative was implemented.
These data could provide lessons learned to fix the initiative or take
another approach. We expect to provide further information and
recommendations, if appropriate, on JIEDDO's efforts to gauge the
effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts--including issues involving
data collection and reliability--in the report we will be issuing in
early 2010.
JIEDDO Has Not Consistently Applied Its Counter-IED Initiative Review
and Approval Process:
Although JIEDDO has established JCAAMP as its process to review and
approve proposals for counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO excludes some
initiatives from that process. JCAAMP was established in response to
DOD's directive,[Footnote 15] which stated that all of JIEDDO's
initiatives are to go through a review and approval process. This
requirement is consistent with government internal control standards,
which identify properly segregating key duties and responsibilities--
including responsibility for authorizing and processing transactions--
as a fundamental control activity.[Footnote 16] In reviewing 56
initiatives for case studies, we found that JIEDDO excluded 26 of the
56 counter-IED initiatives from JCAAMP. For example, JIEDDO excluded
one initiative to enhance the counter-IED training experience by
funding role players who are to help create a realistic war
environment. However, another initiative with similar purpose and
objective was included in the JCAAMP process. As a result, when
initiatives are excluded from JCAAMP, internal and external
stakeholders do not have the opportunity to review, comment on, and
potentially change the course of the initiative in coordination with
competing or complementary efforts.
Additionally, although the remaining 30 of 56 initiatives we reviewed
went through JCAAMP, according to JIEDDO officials, we found that 22 of
those 30 initiatives did not comply with some of the steps required by
applicable DOD guidance. Applicable guidance includes JIEDDO's
directive, instruction, and standard operating procedures, which
together identify a set of various decision points and actions,
collectively intended to control JIEDDO's use of resources. For
example, we found that, for 16 initiatives among the 22, JIEDDO
released funding to the services without obtaining required funding
approval from either the Deputy Secretary of Defense--as is required
for initiatives over $25 million--or from the JIEDDO Director, for
initiatives up to $25 million.
The exclusion of initiatives from JCAAMP, coupled with noncompliance
with steps of the process required by applicable guidance, reduces
transparency and accountability of JIEDDO's actions within JIEDDO, as
well as to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the services, and other DOD
components. Without management oversight at important milestones in the
approval and acquisition process, some funds appropriated for JIEDDO
may be used to support efforts that do not clearly advance the goal of
countering IEDs.
According to JIEDDO officials, systematic compliance with its process
and documentation has been a weakness that JIEDDO has attempted to
correct, and it continues to pursue improvements in this regard. During
the course of our work, officials from different JIEDDO divisions--
including its accounting and budgeting, acquisition oversight, and
internal review divisions--said they saw significant improvement in
discipline and compliance with JIEDDO's process for managing counter-
IED initiatives beginning in the last quarter of fiscal year 2009. As
JIEDDO officials point out, the improvements they cite have occurred
relatively recently and have not had time to demonstrate their full
effect. Nonetheless, the findings in our ongoing review, and in prior
GAO reports, confirm that JIEDDO has not had a systematic process in
place to manage or document its activities and operations for the
majority of its operating life. In the report we plan to issue in early
2010, we will present a more detailed assessment of JIEDDO's review and
approval process and will make recommendations as appropriate.
JIEDDO Lacks Adequate Internal Controls Required to Provide DOD
Assurance That It Is Effectively Achieving Its Objectives:
While JIEDDO has affirmed the importance of addressing shortcomings in
its internal control system and is taking action to this end, it still
lacks adequate internal controls to ensure that it is achieving its
objectives. An adequate system of internal controls supports
performance-based management with the procedures, plans, and methods to
meet the agency's missions, goals, and objectives. Internal controls
serve as the first line of defense in safeguarding assets and
preventing and detecting errors and fraud, and they help program
managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of
public resources. However, in July 2009 JIEDDO reported to the OSD
Comptroller that a material weakness exists in JIEDDO's internal
control system and has existed since it was established in January
2006. OMB defines a material weakness as a deficiency or combination of
deficiencies that could adversely affect the organization's ability to
meet its objectives and that the agency head determines to be
significant enough to be reported outside the agency. For example, in
our ongoing work we have identified, and JIEDDO officials have
confirmed, that JIEDDO's internal controls system has not: (1) provided
for the identification and analysis of the risks JIEDDO faces in
achieving its objectives from both external and internal sources; and
(2) assessed its performance over time and ensured that the findings of
audits and other reviews have been promptly resolved. Consequently,
JIEDDO has not developed a set of control activities that ensure its
directives--and ultimately its objectives--are carried out effectively.
Without assurance from JIEDDO that it has identified and addressed its
control weaknesses, OSD does not monitor JIEDDO's progress and
effectiveness and therefore is unable to detect the extent to which
JIEDDO has weaknesses.
Given the longstanding weaknesses in JIEDDO's system of internal
controls, it is unable to assure the DOD Comptroller that the program
is achieving its objectives. The DOD Comptroller is responsible for the
development and oversight of DOD's internal control program. In
carrying out its responsibilities, DOD Comptroller officials told us
that they relied solely on JIEDDO to internally develop and implement
effective internal control systems that address key program performance
risks and monitor effectiveness and compliance, and to report
deficiencies or weaknesses in its internal control system through a
report called the annual assurance statement, which is provided each
year to the OSD Office of the Director of Administration and
Management.[Footnote 17] DOD uses additional techniques in its general
oversight of JIEDDO, such as the Deputy Secretary of Defense's review
and approval of certain high-dollar counter-IED initiatives. However,
JIEDDO's annual assurance statement is the key mechanism DOD relies
upon to comprehensively and uniformly summarize and monitor internal
control system status within its organizations--including JIEDDO--and,
more importantly, to report and elevate unresolved deficiencies to
higher levels within and outside of DOD for awareness and action.
However, DOD's limited oversight system for JIEDDO has not fully
addressed control weaknesses present at JIEDDO since its first year of
operation. Further, JIEDDO did not detail these control weaknesses in
either of its first two annual statements of assurance in 2007 and 2008
or in its third and most recent statement of assurance completed in
July 2009. The 2009 assurance statement established a 3-year timeline
with incremental milestones to develop and implement a complete
internal management control program by the end of fiscal year 2012. In
our report we plan to issue in early 2010, we will present a fuller
assessment of JIEDDO's management control processes, and will make
recommendations as appropriate.
Concluding Observations:
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while JIEDDO has taken important steps to
improve its management of DOD's counter-IED efforts, DOD continues to
face a number of challenges in its effort to gain full visibility over
all counter-IED activities, coordinate the transition of JIEDDO
initiatives, and clearly define the types of training initiatives it
will fund. Additionally, JIEDDO's approval process for counter-IED
initiatives poses significant challenges to its ability to provide full
transparency and accountability over its operations. All of these
challenges highlight the need for DOD to evaluate the effectiveness of
its current oversight of all counter-IED efforts across the department,
yet the consistent collection of reliable performance data is one of
JIEDDO's greatest challenges. With improved internal controls, JIEDDO
will be in a better position to ensure that it is in compliance with
applicable law and its resources are safeguarded against waste. If
these issues are not resolved, DOD's various efforts to counter IEDs,
including JIEDDO, face the potential for duplication of effort,
unaddressed capability gaps, integration issues, and inefficient use of
resources in an already fiscally challenged environment, and the
department will lack a basis for confidence that it has retained the
necessary capabilities to address the IED threat for the long term.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased
to answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For future questions about this statement, please contact me on (202)
512-8365 or SolisW@GAO.gov. Individuals making key contributions to
this statement include Cary Russell, Grace Coleman, Kevin Craw, Susan
Ditto, William Horton, Richard Powelson, Tristan To, Yong Song, and
John Strong.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] S. Rep. No. 109-292 (2006) (Senate Appropriations Committee report
on Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2007), and H.R. Rep. No.
110-477 (2007) (conference report accompanying the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008).
[2] GAO, Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and
Coordination of DOD's Counter Improvised Explosive Device Efforts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-10-95 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 29, 2009).
[3] Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction
5000.1, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability
Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) (Nov. 9, 2007).
Hereinafter cited as JIEDDOI 5000.1, (Nov. 9, 2007).
[4] JIEDDO manages its counter-IED efforts by placing its counter-IED
initiatives into one of three categories: initiatives to defeat IEDs,
initiatives to attack IED networks, and initiatives to train
warfighters how to recognize and deal with IEDs.
[5] DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 15, 2009).
[6] OMB Circular No. A-123, Management's Responsibility for Internal
Control, sec. I (2004).
[7] Codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3512 (2007).
[8] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[9] The four mission areas are: Strategic Planning, Rapid Acquisition,
Operations and Intelligence Fusion, and Enable Operations and Training
Support.
[10] Gauging counter-IED effort effectiveness was one of several
purposes for which JIEDDO convened its semiannual event to coordinate,
educate, and influence stakeholders in the counter-IED mission.
[11] The U.S. Army Research and Development and Engineering Command's
Counter-IED Task Force maintains an online counter-IED technology
interface that provides a search and organization tool of counter-IED
technologies, studies, signatures, and requirements. The Army
Asymmetric Warfare Office's Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions
Division maintains a listing of all initiatives that have gone through
JIEDDO's acquisition process. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
maintains a listing of all counter-IED solutions the Marine Corps uses
in-theater.
[12] Some of these initiatives may terminate and therefore not
transition or transfer to the service; however JIEDDO has not
determined the rate of transition/transfer.
[13] According to the Army's Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions
Division, 9 of these initiatives were training initiatives or medical
initiatives later rejected by the Army for transition or transfer in
fiscal year 2011. The 3 training initiatives were not included in the
$16 million figure cited above.
[14] GAO, Defense Management: A Strategic Plan is Needed to Guide the
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's Efforts to
Effectively Accomplish Its Mission, GAO-07-377C (Washington, D.C.:
March 2007).
[15] DOD Directive 2000.19E. (February 14, 2006).
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-
21.3.1]., Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
Nov.1, 1999.
[17] DOD Instruction 5010.40, Managers Internal Control Program
Procedures (Jan 4, 2006).
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
