Warfighter Support
Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of DOD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts Gao ID: GAO-10-95 October 29, 2009Prior to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) establishment in 2006, no single entity was responsible for coordinating the Department of Defense's (DOD) counter improvised explosive device (IED) efforts. JIEDDO was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD. This report, which is one in a series of congressionally mandated GAO reports related to JIEDDO's management and operations, assesses the extent to which 1) capability gaps were initially identified in DOD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, 2) JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, 3) JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, and 4) JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant documents and met with DOD and service officials.
With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq, DOD identified several counter-IED capability gaps that included shortcomings in the areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition processes. For example, prior to JIEDDO's establishment, many different DOD entities focused on counter-IED issues, but coordination among these various efforts was informal and ad hoc. DOD's efforts to focus on addressing these gaps culminated in the creation of JIEDDO, but its creation was done in the absence of DOD having formal guidance for establishing joint organizations. Further, DOD did not systematically evaluate all preexisting counter-IED resources to determine whether other entities were engaged in similar efforts. JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. First, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, limiting their visibility over counter-IED efforts across DOD. Although JIEDDO is currently developing a management system that will track initiatives as they move through JIEDDO's acquisition process, the system will only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives--not those being independently developed and procured by the services and other DOD components. Second, the services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process. With limited visibility, both JIEDDO and the services are at risk of duplicating efforts. JIEDDO faces difficulties with transitioning Joint IED defeat initiatives to the military services, in part because JIEDDO and the services have difficulty resolving the gap between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle. As a result, the services are mainly funding initiatives with funding for overseas contingency operations rather than their base budgets. Continuing to fund transferred initiatives with overseas contingency operations appropriations does not ensure funding availability for those initiatives in future years since these appropriations are not necessarily renewed from one year to the next. This transition is also hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during the development of joint-funded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced by two counter-IED jamming systems. As a result, JIEDDO may be investing in counter-IED solutions that do not fully meet existing service requirements. JIEDDO's lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund has affected its counter-IED training investment decisions. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. In March 2009, JIEDDO attempted to update its criteria for joint training initiatives by listing new requirements; however, these guidelines also could be broadly interpreted. Without specific criteria for counter-IED training initiatives, DOD may find that it lacks funding for future initiatives more directly related to the counter-IED mission.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-10-95, Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of DOD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2009:
Warfighter Support:
Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of DOD's Counter-
Improvised Explosive Device Efforts:
Warfighter Support:
GAO-10-95:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-10-95],
a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Prior to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization‘s
(JIEDDO) establishment in 2006, no single entity was responsible for
coordinating the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) counter improvised
explosive device (IED) efforts. JIEDDO was established to coordinate
and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and
development, throughout DOD. This report, which is one in a series of
congressionally mandated GAO reports related to JIEDDO‘s management and
operations, assesses the extent to which 1) capability gaps were
initially identified in DOD‘s effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps
and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, 2) JIEDDO has
maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, 3) JIEDDO has
coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military
services, and 4) JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED
training initiatives it will fund. To address these objectives, GAO
reviewed and analyzed relevant documents and met with DOD and service
officials.
What GAO Found:
With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq, DOD identified several
counter-IED capability gaps that included shortcomings in the areas of
counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in counter-
IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition
processes. For example, prior to JIEDDO‘s establishment, many different
DOD entities focused on counter-IED issues, but coordination among
these various efforts was informal and ad hoc. DOD‘s efforts to focus
on addressing these gaps culminated in the creation of JIEDDO, but its
creation was done in the absence of DOD having formal guidance for
establishing joint organizations. Further, DOD did not systematically
evaluate all preexisting counter-IED resources to determine whether
other entities were engaged in similar efforts.
JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over counter-IED
initiatives throughout DOD. First, JIEDDO and the services lack a
comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives,
limiting their visibility over counter-IED efforts across DOD. Although
JIEDDO is currently developing a management system that will track
initiatives as they move through JIEDDO‘s acquisition process, the
system will only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives”not those being
independently developed and procured by the services and other DOD
components. Second, the services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-
funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO‘s acquisition process. With
limited visibility, both JIEDDO and the services are at risk of
duplicating efforts.
JIEDDO faces difficulties with transitioning Joint IED defeat
initiatives to the military services, in part because JIEDDO and the
services have difficulty resolving the gap between JIEDDO‘s transition
timeline and DOD‘s base budget cycle. As a result, the services are
mainly funding initiatives with funding for overseas contingency
operations rather than their base budgets. Continuing to fund
transferred initiatives with overseas contingency operations
appropriations does not ensure funding availability for those
initiatives in future years since these appropriations are not
necessarily renewed from one year to the next. This transition is also
hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during the
development of joint-funded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced by
two counter-IED jamming systems. As a result, JIEDDO may be investing
in counter-IED solutions that do not fully meet existing service
requirements.
JIEDDO‘s lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training
initiatives it will fund has affected its counter-IED training
investment decisions. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training
initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. In
March 2009, JIEDDO attempted to update its criteria for joint training
initiatives by listing new requirements; however, these guidelines also
could be broadly interpreted. Without specific criteria for counter-IED
training initiatives, DOD may find that it lacks funding for future
initiatives more directly related to the counter-IED mission.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that JIEDDO (1) improve its visibility of all counter-
IED efforts, (2) work with the services to develop a complete
transition plan for initiatives, and (3) define criteria for funding
training initiatives. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations
and noted actions to be taken.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95] or key
components. For more information, contact William M. Solis, (202) 512-
8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD's Efforts to Address Counter-IED Capability Gaps Culminated in the
Creation of JIEDDO:
JIEDDO and the Services Lack Full Visibility Over Counter-IED
Initiatives throughout DOD:
JIEDDO Faces Difficulties with Transitioning Joint IED Defeat
Initiatives to the Military Services:
JIEDDO Lacks Clear Criteria for Defining What Counter-IED Training
Initiative It Will Fund:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation26:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figure:
Figure 1: Evolution of JIEDDO as IED Incidents Escalated in Iraq:
Abbreviations:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
CREW: Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device Electronic
Warfare:
CVRJ: Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device Electronic
Warfare Vehicle Receiver/Jammer:
DOD: Department of Defense:
IED: Improvised Explosive Device:
JCAAMP: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Capability Approval
and Acquisition Management Process:
JIEDDO: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 29, 2009:
Congressional Committees:
Improvised explosive devices (IED) continue to be the number one threat
to U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. During 2008, IEDs accounted for
almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. In 2009,
insurgents' use of IEDs against U.S. forces in Iraq began to decline
for the second straight year since 2003, while in Afghanistan the
number of monthly IED incidents increased to more than 800 in July
2009. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over $16
billion to the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to address the
IED threat. In addition, other Department of Defense (DOD) components,
including the military services, have devoted at least $1.49 billion to
the counter-IED effort. Along with the escalation in Afghanistan, the
IED threat is expanding throughout the globe with over 300 IED events
per month worldwide outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, according to
JIEDDO. There is widespread consensus that this threat will not go away
and that IEDs will continue to be a weapon of strategic influence in
future conflicts.
Prior to JIEDDO's establishment in 2006, no single entity was
responsible for coordinating DOD's counter-IED efforts. DOD established
JIEDDO and directed it to focus (lead, advocate, and coordinate) all
DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders' and their
respective joint task forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of
strategic influence. [Footnote 1] DOD's directive mandates that
JIEDDO's director serve as the DOD point of coordination for
initiatives across the full range of efforts necessary to defeat the
IED threat, integrate all counter-IED solutions throughout DOD, and
coordinate with other DOD components for ongoing midterm research and
development initiatives and long-term science and technology efforts.
In a series of reviews in response to direction in Senate Report 109-
292, we first reported in March 2007 on several issues related to
JIEDDO's management and operations, including JIEDDO's lack of a
strategic plan and the resulting effects on the development of its
financial and human capital management programs. We made several
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to improve the management
of JIEDDO operations, stressing the development of JIEDDO's detailed
strategic plan. Subsequently, we also reported on JIEDDO's financial
management processes and internal controls and JIEDDO's coordination of
intelligence support efforts. Due to concerns over JIEDDO's performance
and its ability to effectively coordinate DOD's response to IEDs,
Congress, in the Conference Report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2008
National Defense Authorization Act,[Footnote 2] mandated that we review
JIEDDO's efforts in this regard. In response, this review assesses the
coordination of DOD's counter-IED efforts, specifically focusing on the
extent to which (1) capability gaps were initially identified in DOD's
effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to the
development of JIEDDO, (2) JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all
counter-IED efforts, (3) JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of
JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, and (4) JIEDDO has
developed criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will
fund. In another ongoing engagement, we also are examining what
progress JIEDDO has made to improve its management of internal
processes.
To assess the extent to which capability gaps were initially identified
in DOD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led
to the development of JIEDDO, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the
Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other current
and former DOD officials involved in the establishment of JIEDDO. We
also examined documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E, which
established JIEDDO, and documentation and briefings relating to
JIEDDO's evolution. To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has maintained
visibility over all counter-IED efforts, coordinated the
transition[Footnote 3] of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military
services, and defined what constitutes a counter-IED training
initiative, we met with officials from organizations including the Army
Asymmetric Warfare Office, Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army
National Training Center, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Marine
Corps Training and Education Command, Training Counter-IED Operations
Integration Center, Joint Forces Command, JIEDDO Joint Center of
Excellence, U.S. Central Command, Technical Support Working Group,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and JIEDDO. We also examined
documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E[Footnote 4] and JIEDDO
Instruction 5000.01, [Footnote 5] which established JIEDDO's rapid
acquisition process, as well as other documents and briefings from
JIEDDO, the services, and other DOD entities.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through August 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides
additional details on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq, DOD identified several
counter-IED capability gaps and began focusing on addressing counter-
IED issues. These counter-IED gaps included shortcomings in the areas
of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in
counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited
acquisition processes. DOD's efforts to address these gaps culminated
in the creation of JIEDDO in 2006. Prior to JIEDDO's establishment,
many different DOD entities at the service and joint levels began
focusing on counter-IED issues, but communication and cooperation among
these various efforts was informal and ad hoc. In an attempt to
coordinate and focus counter-IED efforts, the Army established an IED
Task Force in 2003, but the Task Force lacked both the funding and
authority to undertake a large-scale, departmentwide effort. DOD
responded by elevating the Army IED Task Force to the joint level in
2004, placing it directly under the Deputy Secretary of Defense in
2005, and increasing the organization's budget from $20 million in 2004
to over $1.3 billion in 2005. In 2006, the Joint Task Force was turned
into a permanent joint entity and jointly manned activity of DOD--
JIEDDO--with an initial budget of over $3.7 billion and with the
intention to provide the institutional stability necessary to attract
and retain qualified personnel. These various actions that led to the
development of JIEDDO were done in the absence of DOD having formal
guidance for establishing joint organizations, and JIEDDO was developed
largely through informal communication among key individuals in various
services and agencies. Furthermore, DOD did not systematically evaluate
all preexisting counter-IED resources in order to determine whether
other DOD entities were engaged in similar efforts. In recognition of
the increasing number of joint activities and the lack of official
guidance for planning them, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called
for the development of a formal process for establishing joint
organizations.[Footnote 6] In response, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense is currently developing a Joint Task Assignment Process to
provide formal guidance for planning joint activities, which it expects
to implement in late 2009. Despite the creation of JIEDDO, many of the
organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort prior to JIEDDO
continued to develop, maintain, and expand their own IED defeat
capabilities.
JIEDDO and the services have limited visibility over counter-IED
initiatives throughout DOD. Although JIEDDO and various service
organizations compile some information on the wide range of IED defeat
initiatives existing throughout DOD, JIEDDO and the services lack a
comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives,
limiting their visibility over counter-IED efforts across DOD. JIEDDO
is required to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions to defeat
IEDs, and maintain the current status of program execution, operational
fielding, and performance of approved joint IED defeat initiatives.
However, JIEDDO does not maintain a comprehensive database of all IED
defeat initiatives across DOD. JIEDDO is currently focusing on
developing a management system that will track its initiatives as they
move through its own acquisition process. Though this system will help
JIEDDO manage its counter-IED initiatives, it will only track JIEDDO-
funded initiatives, not those being independently developed and
procured by the services and other DOD components. Without
incorporating service and other DOD components' counter-IED
initiatives, JIEDDO's efforts to develop a counter-IED initiative
database will not capture all initiatives throughout DOD. Additionally,
the services do not have a central source of information for their own
counter-IED efforts because there is currently no requirement that each
service develop its own comprehensive database of all of its counter-
IED initiatives. Accordingly, the services are limited in their ability
to provide JIEDDO with a timely and comprehensive summary of all of
their existing initiatives. Furthermore, although JIEDDO involves the
services in its process to select initiatives, the services lack full
visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's
acquisition process. In its process to select counter-IED initiatives,
JIEDDO has approved some counter-IED initiatives without vetting them
through the appropriate service counter-IED focal points, because the
process allows JIEDDO to make exceptions if they are deemed necessary
and appropriate. For example, at least three counter-IED training
initiatives sponsored by JIEDDO's counter-IED joint training center
were not vetted through the Army counter-IED focal point--the Army
Asymmetric Warfare Office's Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions
Branch--before being approved for JIEDDO funding. Service officials
have said that not incorporating their views on initiatives limits
their visibility of JIEDDO actions and could result in approved
initiatives that are inconsistent with service needs. JIEDDO officials
acknowledged that while it may be beneficial for some JIEDDO-funded
initiatives to bypass its acquisition process in cases where an urgent
requirement with limited time to field is identified, these cases do
limit service visibility over all JIEDDO-funded initiatives. We are
therefore recommending that the military services create their own
comprehensive IED defeat initiative databases and work with JIEDDO to
develop a DOD-wide database for all counter-IED initiatives. We are
also recommending that, in cases where initiatives bypass JIEDDO's
rapid acquisition process, JIEDDO develop a mechanism to notify the
appropriate service counter-IED focal points of each initiative prior
to its funding.
JIEDDO's initiative transitions to the services are hindered by funding
gaps between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle
as well as by instances when service requirements are not fully
considered during the development and integration of joint-funded
counter-IED initiatives. According to DOD's Directive, JIEDDO is
required to develop plans for transitioning joint IED defeat
initiatives into DOD programs of record, to be included in DOD's base
budget, for sustainment and further integration into existing service
programs.[Footnote 7] In a transition, one of the services is expected
to pick up sustainment costs for an initiative by placing it into a
base budget program as an enduring capability. In a transfer, one of
the services may sustain the initiative through funding for current
contingency operations. However, JIEDDO and the services still have
difficulty resolving the gap between JIEDDO's transition timeline and
DOD's base budget cycle, causing DOD to rely on service overseas
contingency operations funding to sustain jointly-funded counter-IED
initiatives following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline. According to
JIEDDO's latest transition brief for fiscal year 2010, the organization
recommended the transfer of 19 initiatives totaling $233 million to the
services for funding through overseas contingency operations
appropriations and the transition of only 3 into service base budget
programs totaling $4.5 million. Furthermore, JIEDDO's initiative
transitions are also hindered when service requirements are not fully
considered during the development of joint-funded counter-IED
initiatives, as evidenced during the acquisition of two counter-IED
radio jamming systems. In the first example, JIEDDO funded a man-
portable counter-IED jamming system to fill a U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) operational need, even though the Army and Marine Corps did
not have a formal requirement for the system. Nevertheless, DOD plans
to field the system to each of the services in response to the
operational need, which was revalidated in September 2009. It remains
unclear, however, which DOD organizations will be required to pay for
procurement and sustainment costs for the system, since DOD has yet to
identify the source of final procurement funding. In the second
example, Army officials stated that they were not involved to the
fullest extent possible in the evaluation and improvement process for a
JIEDDO-funded, vehicle-mounted jamming system, even though the Army was
DOD's primary user in terms of total number of systems fielded. The
system, called the Counter Remote Control IED Electronic Warfare
Vehicle Receiver/Jammer, ultimately required at least 20 proposals for
configuration changes to correct flaws found in its design after the
contract was awarded. Without ensuring that service requirements are
fully taken into account when evaluating and developing counter-IED
systems, this creates the potential for fielding equipment that is
inconsistent with service requirements. This could later delay the
transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the services following
JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline. To facilitate the transition of
JIEDDO-funded initiatives, we are recommending that JIEDDO coordinate
with the services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service
requirements are fully taken into account when making counter-IED
investment decisions. We are also recommending that the military
services work with JIEDDO to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the
transition of each JIEDDO-funded initiative, including expected costs,
identified funding sources, and a timeline with milestones for
inclusion into the DOD base budget cycle.
JIEDDO's lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training
initiatives it will fund has affected its counter-IED training
investment decisions. DOD's directive defines a counter-IED initiative
as a materiel or nonmateriel solution that addresses joint IED defeat
capability gaps, but does not specifically lay out funding criteria for
training initiatives. Though JIEDDO has published criteria for
determining what joint counter-IED urgent requirements to fund, it has
not developed similar criteria for the funding of joint training
initiatives not based on urgent requirements. As a result, JIEDDO has
funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than
defeating IEDs, such as role players and simulated villages to
replicate Iraqi conditions at various service combat training centers.
Without criteria specifying which counter-IED training initiatives it
will fund, JIEDDO may diminish its ability to fund future initiatives
more directly related to the counter-IED mission. DOD also could hinder
coordination in managing its resources, as decision makers at both the
joint and service levels operate under unclear selection guidelines for
which types of training initiatives should be funded and by whom. We
are therefore recommending that JIEDDO evaluate counter-IED training
initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate theater-based
joint counter-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate this new
guidance into an instruction.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with
three of our recommendations and partially agreed with two other
recommendations. However, DOD expressed concerns that our report
focused on counter-IED initiative challenges from a service perspective
rather than a combatant command urgency of need. While we recognize
JIEDDO's mission and contribution in supporting urgent warfighter
needs, as DOD's focal point for coordinating counter-IED efforts
throughout DOD, JIEDDO is tasked with the integration of all IED defeat
solutions, which includes the integration of service requirements
during the development of counter-IED initiatives. DOD also stated that
our report focused on a handful of initiatives or efforts that
encountered friction during either the development phase or the
coordination process to transfer, transition, or terminate the program.
While we recognize JIEDDO's progress to successfully transition some
initiatives to the services, the examples used in the report highlight
the challenges noted in our work and identify areas for improvement.
Furthermore, DOD generally agreed with our recommendations to address
these challenges. DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix II.
Background:
Although the IED was not a new threat when first encountered during
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to DOD officials, U.S.
forces were not initially concerned with the IED as a "weapon of
choice" until IED attacks began to increase in Iraq at the end of major
combat operations. Terrorist and insurgent groups facing overwhelming
conventional forces had previously used IEDs in a variety of scenarios,
including the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, the ship-borne
attack against the USS Cole in 1999, and the airborne attacks of
September 11th, 2001. In a 2006 report examining the requirements for
truck armor, we stated that the Army had previously identified the IED
as a threat to U.S. forces prior to the beginning of operations in
Iraq.[Footnote 8]
Following the end of major combat in 2003 in Iraq, insurgents began to
rapidly adjust their tactics due to the overwhelming firepower and
accuracy of U.S. and coalition military forces in conventional warfare.
As U.S. forces began to respond to this asymmetric threat, a new tactic
emerged as the preferred enemy form of fire, the IED. Beginning in June
2003, IED incidents targeting coalition forces began to escalate from
22 per month to over 600 per month in June 2004. In June 2006, these
incidents reached more than 2,000 per month. At one point in 2006,
coalition forces in Iraq were experiencing almost 100 IEDs per day. The
initial IED attacks in Iraq used nonconventional tactics, techniques,
and procedures with a magnitude U.S. forces had not seen before. This
threat involved an enemy that takes advantage of and adapts to the
environment and is not restricted by conventional rules of engagement.
For example, insurgents began using tactics such as buried or
camouflaged roadside bombs, vehicle-borne IEDs (car bombs), and suicide
bombers to attack coalition forces. Not only was the enemy flexible,
but these insurgents also had the ability to rapidly respond to
countermeasures.
Due to the magnitude and previously mentioned changes made by the enemy
in its tactics, techniques, and procedures, several counter-IED gaps
related to the IED threat were identified by DOD:
* technology gaps--shortage of jammers, robots, and other technology,
almost none of which were geared towards homemade roadside bombs,
* personnel gaps--lack of qualified personnel to analyze the threat and
collect and distribute information on intelligence, forensic evidence,
latest tactics, techniques, procedures, and other data,
* training gaps--training on latest tactics, techniques, and procedures
not available, equipment often supplied without training or
instructions, and jammers interfered with communications equipment,
* funding gaps--little to no dedicated funding for counter-IED efforts,
and:
* DOD acquisition process gaps--no process for rapidly developing and
fielding new equipment.
DOD's Efforts to Address Counter-IED Capability Gaps Culminated in the
Creation of JIEDDO:
DOD's efforts to address counter-IED gaps culminated in the creation of
JIEDDO. Initially, many different DOD entities began focusing on
counter-IED issues in an effort to address capability gaps. JIEDDO
emerged through a series of attempts to focus counter-IED efforts, but
its development did not follow a formal process. In recognition of the
lack of official guidance for planning joint activities, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is developing a formal process for
establishing future joint organizations. Despite steps taken to focus
DOD's counter-IED efforts, most of the organizations engaged in the IED
defeat effort prior to JIEDDO continue to develop, maintain, and in
many cases expand their own IED defeat capabilities.
Many Different DOD Entities Began Focusing on Counter-IED Issues in an
Effort to Address Capability Gaps:
As IED attacks in Iraq reached nearly 300 per month by October 2003 and
over 400 per month by May 2004, many different DOD entities at the
service and joint levels began focusing on addressing capability gaps
in the areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with
expertise in counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and
expedited acquisition processes. Many of these efforts were carried out
by the Army and Marine Corps, in addition to a number of joint and
interagency efforts.
Army officials stated that within the Army, individual units throughout
Iraq began to focus on counter-IED efforts as IED incidents increased
in Iraq. Army units developed their own counter-IED tactics,
techniques, and procedures as insurgent tactics evolved, and soldiers
began using an increasingly wide range of electronic jammers in varying
configurations to counter remote-detonated IEDs. According to Army
officials, the Army also employed Explosive Ordnance Disposal
technicians to disable and dispose of suspected IEDs. Army officials
stated that these personnel began relying on remote-controlled robots
as the number of IED incidents and the level of complexity of the
devices increased, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians were
initially among the few personnel with counterexplosives training in-
theater. To support these initial efforts, according to Army officials,
the Army relied on the Rapid Equipping Force to quickly acquire counter-
IED technology such as jammers and robots. This organization was
established in 2002 to identify and pursue off-the-shelf or near- term
materiel solutions that could be acquired and fielded quickly without
having to rely on the Army's normally lengthy acquisition processes,
Army officials stated. The Operational Needs Statement, a process that
enables commanders to request a materiel solution for an urgent need,
was another method of rapidly acquiring technology solutions.
Marine Corps officials stated that initial Marine Corps counter-IED
efforts were centered on the Marine Corps Combat Development Command,
which was responsible for managing materiel requests, known as
Universal Needs Statements, from deployed personnel. This organization
began to receive a larger number of counter-IED-related requests as the
IED threat escalated, according to Marine Corps officials, increasing
from 2 in 2002 to 8 in 2003, and 26 in 2004. Overall, 13 percent of all
requests during this 3-year period were counter-IED-related. According
to Marine Corps officials, in response, the organization established a
counter-IED cell in 2004 to focus exclusively on counter-IED-related
requests. The cell was later transferred to the Marine Corps
Warfighting Laboratory, and expanded to include personnel with more
specialized technical expertise. Marine Corps officials stated that the
Urgent Universal Needs Statement was developed during this period as a
means of providing commanders with an expedited process for requesting
critically needed capabilities, including counter-IED solutions.
Through this process, Marine Corps officials stated that they have been
able to develop and field equipment in a significantly shorter time
frame than the normal acquisition processes, sometimes within several
weeks.
At the joint and interagency level, a variety of organizations were
engaged in intelligence support and counter-IED technology acquisition.
Early joint efforts included the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell,
which was established by the Army in 2003 to perform physical,
biometric, and tactical exploitation of evidence from IED attack
scenes. Staffed by a combination of Army, law enforcement, and
intelligence personnel, the organization provided Army, Marines, and
Special Forces units with in-theater analyses of IED construction
techniques and enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures, and also
collected biometric data, such as fingerprints, in an effort to
identify specific bomb makers. While the organization often collected
evidence from IED attack scenes itself, it also collaborated with
Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and drew on data provided by these
teams in their analyses. Since 2004, the Naval Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Technology Division has served as the administrative sponsor
and primary source of technical and engineering support for the
organization. According to an Army official, the Technical Support
Working Group was involved in developing counter-IED technology
solutions as part of the Combating Terrorism Directorate of the Joint
Staff Operations Center, which in turn was responsible for counter-
terrorism force protection efforts, including counter-IED efforts. The
Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center was established in 2003 to
leverage law enforcement, the intelligence community, and military
capabilities to perform technical and forensic analyses on recovered
IED components in the United States and provide actionable intelligence
to field personnel. Army officials told us that, in contrast to the
Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell, it focused on higher-level
strategic issues rather than tactical ones, and included personnel from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and
Firearms, DOD, and the intelligence community.
Army and Marine Corps officials stated that communication and
cooperation among these various efforts lacked overall coordination,
with multiple entities independently engaged in attempts to address
various facets of the larger IED problem. Although the Army had direct
experience with IEDs due to its presence in Iraq, according to an Army
official, it had no single coordinator for even its own IED defeat
efforts. For example, Army officials stated that coordination of
counter-IED efforts between Army units occurred in-theater at the
working level as personnel facing similar enemy tactics exchanged
successful tactics, techniques, and procedures, but little
synchronization of Army-wide efforts was occurring. Army and Marine
Corps officials stated that some coordination between the Army and the
Marine Corps took place, for example, on the use of the different
electronic jamming systems used by each service, but communication was
carried out on an ad hoc basis and generally occurred only in Iraq as
commanders from both services attempted to overcome IED-related
threats. At the interagency level, counterterrorism force protection
efforts, including the Technical Support Working Group, were
coordinated by the Combating Terrorism Directorate of the Joint Staff
Operations Center. However, an Army official stated that this
organization was left with limited capabilities by 2003 as many of its
resources had been reallocated to the Department of Homeland Security
after the attacks of September 11, 2001.
JIEDDO Evolved through a Series of Attempts to Focus Counter-IED
Efforts:
As IED attacks increased following the invasion of Iraq, JIEDDO evolved
through a series of attempts to focus counter-IED efforts. Figure 1
illustrates JIEDDO's evolution as the IED threat increased from 2003 to
2007.
Figure 1: Evolution of JIEDDO as IED Incidents Escalated in Iraq:
[Refer to PDF for image: combination line and bar graph]
Horizontal Line:
IED Incidents between 2004-2007:
22;
64;
146;
193;
294;
503;
360;
407;
404;
481;
652;
746;
631;
629;
746;
774;
958;
1,136;
882;
1,175;
1,003;
1,001;
1,143;
1,249;
1,122;
1,277;
1,412;
1,413;
1,683;
1,373;
1,471;
1,246;
1,419;
1,685;
1,780;
2,070;
2,059;
2,216;
2,273;
2,392;
2,326;
2,262;
2,371.
Vertical Bar Graph:
Funding levels for JIEDDO and preceding organizations:
October 2003: Army IED Task Force formed: $20 million;
July 2004: Deputy Secretary of Defense creates Joint Integrated Process
Team for Defeating IEDs, transforms Army Task Force into the Joint IED
Defeat Task Force: $100 million;
June 2005: Directive 2000.19 elevates Joint IED Defeat Task Force to
report directly to Deputy Secretary: $1.3 billion;
February 2009: Directive 2000.19E transforms the Joint IED Defeat Task
Force into JIEDDO: $3.7 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
All of the actions, noted in the above timeline, were attempts to
coordinate counter-IED efforts and provide funding commensurate with
the increased scale of the effort. For example, in late 2003,
recognizing the need for closer coordination and greater focus on its
counter-IED efforts, the Army took the initial steps toward what would
later become a joint-level organization with the establishment of the
Army IED Task Force. According to an Army official, the IED Task Force
consisted of a coordinating cell in Washington and two field teams in
Iraq, and was largely focused on operational and training efforts in an
attempt to address both the lack of personnel in-theater with counter-
IED training and the need for better training on effective tactics,
techniques, and procedures. The field teams, including former Special
Forces personnel, developed effective tactics, techniques, and
procedures, which they then relayed to the Center for Army Lessons
Learned. An IED cell was established at the center to analyze these
practices and incorporate lessons learned in the training of outgoing
troops to Iraq, while an Army official stated that the coordinating
cell in Washington provided leadership and facilitated communication
between the field teams, field commanders, and the center. Army
officials also stated that the IED Task Force fielded a limited amount
of counter-IED-related technology in cooperation with the Rapid
Equipping Force, including more sophisticated jamming equipment,
vehicle armor, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal robots. However, an Army
official stated that with an initial budget of $20 million and no
formal authority to coordinate counter-IED efforts outside of the Army,
the IED Task Force lacked both the funding and authority to undertake a
large-scale, departmentwide effort.
In 2004, senior leaders began to believe that greater emphasis should
be placed on developing a technology solution rather than focusing on
training as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures, according to
Army officials. In June 2004, the commander of the CENTCOM wrote a
memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense requesting a Manhattan
Project-like effort to find a technical solution to the IED problem. In
response to the CENTCOM memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
created a Joint Integrated Process Team in July 2004. This team was
intended to identify, prioritize, and resource materiel and nonmateriel
solutions, and the Army IED Task Force was elevated to the joint level
and renamed the Joint IED Defeat Task Force, with a budget of $100
million.
In an attempt to enhance visibility over all DOD initiatives and to
further focus the counter-IED effort, in June 2005, DOD Directive
2000.19 elevated the Joint IED Defeat Task Force to report directly to
the Deputy Secretary, gave it a budget of over $1.3 billion, and
clarified its role as the focal point for all efforts in DOD to defeat
IEDs. The Joint Integrated Process Team was transformed into an
advisory group to the Joint IED Defeat Task Force's director, and a
retired four-star general was recruited to head the Task Force in an
effort to raise its profile among other senior DOD leaders, according
to a former senior DOD official. However, a DOD official stated that by
2006, the Joint IED Defeat Task Force had begun to encounter
difficulties attracting and retaining qualified personnel due to its
temporary status.
In late 2005, the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense began
working with the Joint Staff and the Director of Administration and
Management[Footnote 9] to give the task force more permanence and to
provide more manpower continuity. Several solutions were proposed by
the Director of Administration and Management, including placing the
task force within the Joint Forces Command, making it a Staff Element
within OSD, or creating a Jointly Manned Entity under OSD. Consequently
in February 2006, DOD Directive 2000.19E turned the joint task force
into a permanent joint entity and jointly manned activity of DOD--
JIEDDO--with a budget of nearly $3.7 billion, with the intention to
provide the institutional stability necessary to attract and retain
qualified personnel, according to a DOD official.
These various actions that led to the development of JIEDDO were done
in the absence of DOD having formal guidance for establishing joint
organizations. According to a former DOD official, JIEDDO developed
largely through informal communication among key individuals in various
services and agencies. For example, a former DOD official stated that
after the establishment of the Army IED Task Force, the Secretary of
the Navy became aware of its work and began meeting regularly with its
director, and these meetings eventually led to the idea of elevating
the IED Task Force to the joint level. Furthermore, DOD did not
systematically evaluate all preexisting counter-IED resources in order
to determine whether other entities were engaged in similar efforts
within DOD, according to DOD officials. Although the Technical Support
Working Group, for example, was already in existence at the time of the
establishment of the Army IED Task Force in 2003, an Army official
stated that Army officials were under pressure to find an immediate
solution and that creating a new working group or task force would be
the most efficient approach to overcoming the IED problem. In addition,
an Army official stated that existing organizations, such as the
Technical Support Working Group, were too focused on technology
solutions, but even after the CENTCOM's 2004 memorandum requesting a
technology solution, as noted above, a DOD official stated that the
possibility of using preexisting counter-IED resources rather than
creating a new organization was not considered when the decision to
establish JIEDDO was made. Furthermore, according to a DOD official,
the Director of Administration and Management was not tasked to
evaluate potential organizational solutions until after the decision to
establish a permanent organization had already been made.
OSD Is Developing a Formal Process for Establishing Future Joint
Organizations:
In recognition of the increasing number of joint activities and the
lack of official guidance for planning them, the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review called for the development of a formal process for
establishing joint organizations in the future. In response, the
Director of Administration and Management is currently developing a
Joint Task Assignment Process with the goal of ensuring that future
joint activities have the appropriate authorities, responsibilities,
resources, and performance expectations to carry out their missions.
This process will consist of four stages, during which preexisting
resources and capabilities will be fully evaluated, the optimal
organizational solution will be determined, and all stakeholders will
be identified and included in the process. OSD officials stated that
although the ultimate solution may range from a Memorandum of Agreement
between two existing organizations to a new defense agency, creation of
a new organization will be considered if no existing organizations are
determined to be capable of fulfilling the mission's goals. According
to OSD officials, the process will be implemented through a formal DOD
directive and instruction, and all new joint activities will be
required to go through the process before being established. Although
development of the process is still ongoing, DOD officials stated that
implementation will likely take place in late 2009.
Many Efforts to Address the IED Threat Have Continued after the
Creation of JIEDDO:
Despite these steps taken to focus DOD's counter-IED efforts, many of
the organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort prior to JIEDDO
continue to develop, maintain, and expand their own IED defeat
capabilities. For example, the Army continues to address the IED threat
through such organizations as the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office,
established in 2006, which coordinates Army responses to asymmetric
threats such as IEDs. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command provides
training support and doctrinal formation for counter-IED activities,
and the Research, Development & Engineering Command conducts counter-
IED technology assessments and studies for Army leadership.
Furthermore, an Army official stated that the Center for Army Lessons
Learned continues to maintain an IED cell to collect and analyze
counter-IED information. Similarly, the Marine Corps continues to
address the IED threat through the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,
whose Global War on Terror Operations Division is the focal point for
all Marine Corps IED countermeasures. DOD officials also stated that
the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the Training and Education
Command, and the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned have all
continued counter-IED efforts beyond the creation of JIEDDO. According
to DOD officials, at the joint level, CENTCOM maintains its own counter-
IED task force as part of the Interagency Action Group, while Joint
Forces Command continues to support counter-IED training and maintain
involvement with counter-IED doctrine development. At the interagency
level, the Technical Support Working Group continues its research and
development of counter-IED technologies.
JIEDDO and the Services Lack Full Visibility over Counter-IED
Initiatives throughout DOD:
JIEDDO has taken steps to improve visibility over its counter-IED
efforts by, for example, involving the services in the joint counter-
IED acquisition process and hosting DOD counter-IED conferences.
However, JIEDDO and the services have limited visibility over all
counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD in that there is no
comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives. In
addition, the services lack visibility over some JIEDDO-funded
initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process.
JIEDDO and the Services Have Taken Steps to Improve Visibility over
Their Counter-IED Efforts:
Since JIEDDO's establishment, JIEDDO and the services have taken steps
to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts. For example,
JIEDDO, the services, and several other DOD organizations compile some
information on the wide range of IED defeat initiatives existing
throughout DOD. JIEDDO also promotes visibility by giving
representatives from the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office's Adaptive
Networks, Threats and Solutions Division, and the Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab, the opportunity to assist in the evaluation of IED
defeat initiative proposals. Additionally, JIEDDO maintains a network
of liaison officers to facilitate counter-IED information sharing
throughout DOD. It also hosts a semiannual conference covering counter-
IED topics such as agency roles and responsibilities, key issues, and
current challenges. JIEDDO also hosts a technology outreach conference
with industry, academia, and other DOD components to discuss the latest
requirements and trends in the counter-IED effort. Lastly, the services
provide some visibility over their own counter-IED initiatives by
submitting information to JIEDDO for its quarterly reports to Congress.
No Comprehensive IED Defeat Initiative Database Exists throughout DOD:
JIEDDO and the services have limited visibility over all counter-IED
initiatives throughout DOD in that there is no comprehensive database
of all existing counter-IED initiatives. Tasked with leading,
advocating, and coordinating all DOD actions to defeat IEDs, JIEDDO is
also required by its directive to (1) integrate all IED defeat
solutions throughout DOD and (2) maintain the current status of program
execution, operational fielding, and performance of approved joint IED
defeat initiatives. Another document, JIEDDO's internal standard
operating procedure, requires it to maintain visibility and awareness
of all counter-IED initiatives. Despite these requirements, JIEDDO does
not maintain a comprehensive database of all IED defeat initiatives
existing throughout DOD, which has spent at least $1.49 billion in
fiscal years 2007 and 2008 on counter-IED activities outside of JIEDDO.
In a previous report, we recommended that JIEDDO develop a database to
capture all DOD counter-IED initiatives.[Footnote 10] In its response
to our report, JIEDDO acknowledged the need for such a database and
cited ongoing work in partnership with the Director, Defense Research
and Engineering, to develop one. JIEDDO is currently developing a
management system that will track its initiatives as they move through
JIEDDO's acquisition process. However, this system will only track
JIEDDO-funded initiatives--not those being independently developed and
procured by the services and other DOD components. Without
incorporating service and other DOD components' counter-IED
initiatives, JIEDDO's efforts to develop a counter-IED initiative
database will not capture all initiatives throughout DOD.
Though they are required by DOD directive[Footnote 11] to ensure that
JIEDDO maintains visibility over their IED defeat initiatives, the
services do not have a central source of information for their own
counter-IED efforts. DOD officials stated that there is currently no
requirement for each service to develop a comprehensive database of all
of its counter-IED initiatives. Without centralized counter-IED
initiative databases, the services are limited in their ability to
provide JIEDDO with a timely and comprehensive summary of all their
existing initiatives. For example, the U.S. Army Research and
Development and Engineering Command's Counter-IED Task Force and the
service counter-IED focal points--the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office's
Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions Division, and the Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab--maintain databases of counter-IED initiatives, but,
according to Army and Marine Corps officials, these databases are not
comprehensive of all efforts within their respective service.[Footnote
12] Additionally, of these three databases, only the U. S. Army
Research and Development and Engineering Command's database is
available for external use. Since the services are able to act
independently to develop and procure their own counter-IED solutions,
several service and joint officials told us that a centralized counter-
IED database would be of great benefit in coordinating and managing
DOD's counter-IED programs.
Two other DOD components maintain counter-IED initiative information
repositories, but they also are not comprehensive of all counter-IED
efforts within DOD. At the combatant command level, CENTCOM maintains a
Web-based information management system to track incoming requirements
from its area of responsibility, but the system does not capture nor
list all available counter-IED technologies. Additionally, DOD's
Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office's Technical Support
Working Group maintains an information management system that tracks
counter-IED technologies resulting from industry responses to broad
agency announcements. However, this system is neither searchable by
other agencies nor comprehensive of all initiatives being pursued
across DOD.
The Services Lack Visibility over Some JIEDDO-Funded Initiatives:
The services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives
that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process. In this process, JIEDDO
brings in representatives from the service counter-IED focal points to
participate on several boards to evaluate counter-IED initiatives, such
as the JIEDD Requirements, Resources, and Acquisition Board, and the
Joint IED Defeat Integrated Process Team. However, even with these
boards, JIEDDO has approved some counter-IED initiatives without
vetting them through the appropriate service counter-IED focal points
because the process allows JIEDDO to make exceptions if deemed
necessary and appropriate. [Footnote 13] Specifically, the process
allows the Director of JIEDDO's counter-IED training center to make
exceptions when training requirements and training support activities
need to be accelerated to meet predeployment training requirements. For
example, at least three counter-IED training initiatives sponsored by
JIEDDO's counter-IED joint training center were not vetted through the
Army counter-IED focal point before being approved for JIEDDO funding.
These initiatives included a $9.5 million upgrade to counter-IED
training areas, a $19.1 million search rehearsal site to replicate
conditions in Iraq, and a $1.5 million initiative to augment the number
of personnel trained on IED signal jamming at an Army training center.
In addition to not having visibility over these initiatives, Army
officials later rejected the transition or transfer from JIEDDO of each
of these initiatives for fiscal year 2011. In particular, Army
officials rejected the search rehearsal site and signal jamming
personnel augmentation initiatives because the Army had already been
pursuing similar efforts. JIEDDO officials acknowledged that while it
may be beneficial for some JIEDDO-funded initiatives to bypass its
acquisition process in cases where an urgent requirement with limited
time to field is identified, these cases do limit service visibility
over all JIEDDO-funded initiatives.
Army officials also cited examples where JIEDDO allowed certain science
and technology initiatives with high-technology readiness levels to
bypass the first stages of JIEDDO's process to select initiatives.
Officials from the Army's Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions
Division stated that this step limits the Army's visibility over
JIEDDO's funding decisions. They cited six initiatives that bypassed
JIEDDO's acquisition process, including one designed to predetonate
IEDs. While this method may shorten the time required for procurement,
it denies the service counter-IED representatives at JIEDDO's
initiative vetting boards the opportunity to review the initiatives.
JIEDDO also has bypassed its acquisition process by working directly
with individual service units and organizations to address specific
counter-IED capability gaps. For example, JIEDDO worked directly with
the Army's Training and Doctrine Command to establish the Joint
Training Counter-IED Operations and Integration Center without input
from the Army's Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Division. As
a result, the Army counter-IED focal point was initially unaware of the
initiative and expressed confusion about how the initiative would be
integrated into the Army's overall counter-IED effort. Additionally,
this training center was not based on a theater-based urgent need.
Furthermore, Army officials voiced concerns about the implications of
assigning a service responsibility for what is essentially a joint
training function. Additionally, officials with the Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab described the coordination and accountability
challenges involved when JIEDDO's counter-IED training center works
directly with a Marine unit to deliver counter-IED equipment, making it
difficult for the Marine counter-IED focal point to monitor counter-IED
activity and quantify the amount of funding it receives from JIEDDO.
Overall, service officials have said that not incorporating their views
on initiatives limits their visibility of JIEDDO actions and could
result in approved initiatives that are inconsistent with service
needs. This lack of visibility also creates the potential for
duplication of effort across the services and other DOD organizations.
JIEDDO Faces Difficulties with Transitioning Joint IED Defeat
Initiatives to the Military Services:
Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken steps to support the services' and
defense agencies' ability to program and fund counter-IED initiatives
approved for transition following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline.
According to DOD's Directive, JIEDDO is required to develop plans for
transitioning joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD base budget
programs for sustainment and further integration. However, JIEDDO's
initiative transitions to the services are hindered by funding gaps
between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle as
well as by instances when service requirements are not fully considered
during the development and integration of jointly-funded counter-IED
initiatives.
JIEDDO Has Taken Steps to Guide the Transition of Joint IED Defeat
Initiatives to the Military Services:
JIEDDO has taken steps to support the services' and defense agencies'
ability to program and fund counter-IED initiatives approved for
transition following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline. For example,
in November 2007, JIEDDO developed an instruction with detailed
guidance to formally document, clarify, and improve procedures for
transitioning JIEDDO-funded initiatives. JIEDDO has also taken steps to
keep the services informed of the status of upcoming initiative
transitions. For example, it holds a transition working group to
provide the services and other agencies with notification of upcoming
initiative transitions. JIEDDO also gives transition briefings to
several boards and councils throughout DOD to facilitate the transition
of joint-IED defeat initiatives. It gives a quarterly briefing to the
Joint Staff's Protection Functional Capabilities Board, a permanently
established body responsible for the organization, analysis, and
prioritization of joint warfighting capabilities within the protection
functional area. To ensure coordination of transition recommendations,
JIEDDO also provides annual briefings to the Joint Capabilities Board
and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. JIEDDO also annually
updates the Deputy Secretary of Defense's Senior Resource Steering
Group on the transition of initiatives valued greater than $25 million.
JIEDDO's Initiative Transitions Are Hindered by Funding Gaps within the
Services' Budgets:
JIEDDO and the services still have difficulty resolving the gap between
JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle, causing DOD
to rely on service overseas contingency operations funding to sustain
jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives. In our 2008 report, we
recommended that DOD develop a more effective process to ensure funds
designated for sustainment costs are included in its budget
cycle.[Footnote 14] However, DOD still lacks a comprehensive plan to
ensure that the services have the proper funding to sustain an
initiative following a transition.
According to DOD's Directive, JIEDDO is required to develop plans for
transitioning joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD base budget
programs for sustainment. As described in its instruction, JIEDDO plans
to fund initiatives for 2 fiscal years of sustainment. After that, the
initiative is supposed to be either disposed of or passed to one of the
services for its continued sustainment through a transition or
transfer. In a transition, one of the services is expected to pick up
sustainment costs for an initiative by placing it into a base budget
program as an enduring capability. In a transfer, one of the services
may sustain the initiative through funding for current contingency
operations. In comments on our prior report, JIEDDO stated that it
would work with DOD to develop a more effective process to ensure that
funds designated for sustainment costs are included in its base budget
cycle. However, since that report, service officials have stated that
JIEDDO's process has not yet been improved and that JIEDDO's transition
timeline may not allow the services enough time to request and receive
funding through DOD's base budgeting process. As a result, DOD
continues to transfer most initiatives to the services for funding as
permanent programs, with service overseas contingency operations
appropriations, rather than with service base budget funding. According
to JIEDDO's latest transition brief for fiscal year 2010, JIEDDO
recommended the transfer of 19 initiatives totaling $233 million to the
services for funding through overseas contingency operations
appropriations and the transition of only 3 initiatives totaling $4.5
million into service base budget programs.[Footnote 15] Continuing to
fund transferred initiatives with overseas contingency operations
appropriations does not ensure funding availability for those
initiatives in future years, since these appropriations are not
necessarily renewed from one year to the next.
In addition to the small number of transitions and transfers within
DOD, the services often decide to defer indefinitely their assumption
of funding responsibility for JIEDDO initiatives following JIEDDO's
intended 2-year transition or transfer point. According to the fiscal
year 2011 JIEDDO transition list, the Army and Navy deferred or
rejected the acceptance of 16 initiatives that JIEDDO had recommended
for transition or transfer, totaling at least $16 million.[Footnote 16]
Deferred or rejected initiatives are either sustained by JIEDDO
indefinitely, transitioned or transferred during a future year, or
terminated. When the services defer or reject the transition of
initiatives, JIEDDO remains responsible for them beyond the intended 2-
year transition or transfer point, a delay that could diminish its
ability to fund new initiatives.
Lastly, JIEDDO has delivered training aids to the Army without ensuring
that it had the appropriate funds to sustain the equipment. As a
result, Army officials have stated that they are unable to quickly
reallocate funding from current programs to pay for these sustainment
costs. For example, JIEDDO provided counter-IED training aids, such as
surrogates for mine-resistant vehicles to support training at the
Army's combat training centers, without first coordinating with the
Army's Combat Training Center Directorate to plan for their future
sustainment. Consequently, this directorate had not planned for the
$12.7 million requirement to sustain the vehicle surrogates and other
training equipment. As a result of unplanned sustainment costs such as
these, the services could face unexpected, long-term sustainment
requirements in the future.
JIEDDO's Initiative Transitions Are Hindered When Service Requirements
Are Not Fully Considered:
JIEDDO's initiative transitions are also hindered when service
requirements are not fully considered during the development and
integration of jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives. According to
DOD's Directive,[Footnote 17] JIEDDO is required to integrate joint-
funded counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. However, service
officials stated that transitioning JIEDDO-funded initiatives, such as
counter-IED radio jamming systems, is made more difficult when service
requirements are not fully considered throughout the systems'
evaluation process. In 2006, DOD established the Navy as single manager
and executive agent for ground-based jamming systems for DOD. Under
this arrangement, the Navy oversees several boards to review and
evaluate jamming system proposals, including a program board at the
general officer level and a technical acceptance board at the field
officer level. Though the services participate on each of these boards,
the counter-IED jamming program board approved, with JIEDDO funding,
two ground-based, counter-IED jamming systems that did not fully meet
the services' needs. In the first example, CENTCOM, in response to an
urgent operational needs statement originating from its area of
operations, published a requirement in 2006 for a portable IED jamming
system for use in theater. In 2007, JIEDDO funded and delivered to
theater a near-term solution to meet this capability gap. However, Army
officials stated that the fielded system was underutilized by troops in
Iraq, who thought the system was too heavy to carry, especially given
the weight of their body armor. Since then, the joint counter-IED radio
jamming program board has devised a plan to field a newer portable
jamming system called Counter Remote Control IED Electronic Warfare
(CREW) 3.1. According to JIEDDO, CREW 3.1 systems were developed by a
joint technical requirements board that aimed to balance specific
service requirements for portable systems. While CENTCOM maintains that
CREW 3.1 is a requirement in-theater, and revalidated the need in
September 2009, officials from the Army and Marines Corps have both
stated that they do not have a formal requirement for the system.
Nevertheless, DOD plans to field the equipment to each of the services
in response to CENTCOM's stated operational need. It remains unclear,
however, which DOD organizations will be required to pay for
procurement and sustainment costs for the CREW 3.1, since DOD has yet
to identify the source of final procurement funding. In a second
example, Army officials stated that they were not involved to the
fullest extent possible in the evaluation and improvement process for a
JIEDDO-funded, vehicle-mounted jamming system, even though the Army was
DOD's primary user in terms of total number of systems fielded. The
system, called the CREW Vehicle Receiver/Jammer (CVRJ), ultimately
required at least 20 proposals for configuration changes to correct
flaws found in its design after the contract was awarded. Two of the
changes involved modifying the jammer so it could function properly at
high temperatures. Another change was needed to prevent the jammer from
interfering with vehicle global positioning systems. Army officials
stated that had they had a more direct role on the Navy-led control
board that managed configuration changes to the CVRJ, the system may
have been more quickly integrated into the Army's operations. As this
transpired, the Army continued to use another jamming system, DUKE, as
its principal counter-IED electronic warfare system. Not ensuring that
service requirements are fully taken into account when evaluating and
developing counter-IED systems creates the potential for fielding
equipment that is inconsistent with service requirements. This could
also delay the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the services
following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline.
JIEDDO Lacks Clear Criteria for Defining What Counter-IED Training
Initiative It Will Fund:
JIEDDO devoted $454 million in fiscal year 2008 to support service
counter-IED training requirements through such activities as
constructing a network of realistic counter-IED training courses at 57
locations throughout the United States, Europe, and Korea. Although
JIEDDO has supported service counter-IED training, its lack of clear
criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund has
affected its counter-IED training investment decisions. According to
its directive, JIEDDO defines a counter-IED initiative as a materiel or
nonmateriel solution that addresses joint IED defeat capability gaps,
but the directive does not specifically lay out funding criteria for
training initiatives. Since our last report, JIEDDO has attempted to
clarify what types of counter-IED training it will fund in support of
in-theater, urgent counter-IED requirements. In its comments to our
previous report, JIEDDO stated that it will fund an urgent in-theater
counter-IED requirement if it "enables training support, including
training aids and exercises."[Footnote 18] JIEDDO also stated in its
comments that it will fund an urgent in-theater counter-IED requirement
only if it has a primary counter-IED application.[Footnote 19] Beyond
JIEDDO, CENTCOM officials have stated that they will process counter-
IED capabilities only if they are primarily related to countering IEDs.
Though JIEDDO has since published criteria for determining what joint,
counter-IED, urgent requirements to fund, it has not developed similar
criteria for the funding of joint training initiatives not based on
urgent requirements. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training
initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. For
example, since fiscal year 2007, JIEDDO has spent $70.7 million on role
players in an effort to simulate Iraqi social, political, and religious
groups at DOD's training centers. JIEDDO also spent $24.1 million on
simulated villages at DOD's training centers in an effort to make steel
shipping containers resemble Iraqi buildings. According to Army
officials, these role players and simulated villages funded by JIEDDO
to support counter-IED training are also used in training not related
to countering IEDs. Lastly, according to its 2008 annual report, JIEDDO
used counter-IED funding to purchase authentic Iraqi furniture and
other items to create a realistic environment for counter-IED search
rehearsals. In March 2009, JIEDDO attempted to clarify its criteria for
training initiatives not based on urgent requirements by requiring
counter-IED training initiatives to be (1) counter-IED related, (2)
joint in nature, (3) derived from an immediate need, and (4) unable to
be funded by a service. As with JIEDDO's urgent needs criteria for
training, these guidelines could also be broadly interpreted, as
demonstrated by the above examples. Without criteria specifying which
counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, JIEDDO may diminish its
ability to fund future initiatives that are more directly related to
the counter-IED mission. DOD also could hinder coordination in managing
its resources, as decision makers at both the joint and service level
operate under unclear selection guidelines for which types of training
initiatives should be funded and by whom.
Conclusions:
JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility and coordination of the
wide range of counter-IED measures throughout DOD, which presents
difficulties for DOD in efficiently using its resources to defeat IEDs.
While JIEDDO and the services have taken important steps to focus
counter-IED efforts, DOD remains challenged in its effort to harness
the full potential of its components towards an integrated effort to
defeat IEDs. In addition, difficulties remain in maintaining visibility
over all counter-IED activities throughout DOD, coordinating the
transition of JIEDDO initiatives, and clearly defining the types of
training initiatives it will fund. If these issues are not resolved,
DOD's various efforts to counter IEDs face the potential for
duplication of effort, unaddressed capability gaps, integration issues,
and inefficient use of resources in an already fiscally challenged
environment. As a result, DOD may not be assured that it has retained
the necessary capabilities to address the IED threat for the long term.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making five recommendations to address the issues raised in this
report:
* To improve JIEDDO's visibility over all counter-IED efforts, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services to
create their own comprehensive IED defeat initiative databases and work
with JIEDDO to develop a DOD-wide database for all counter-IED
initiatives.
* To further provide DOD visibility over all counter-IED efforts in
cases where initiatives bypass JIEDDO's rapid acquisition process, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to develop a
mechanism to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of
each initiative prior to its funding.
* To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services to
work with JIEDDO to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the
transition of each JIEDDO-funded initiative, including expected costs,
identified funding sources, and a timeline including milestones for
inclusion into the DOD base budget cycle.
* To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to coordinate
with the services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service
requirements are fully taken into account when making counter-IED
investment decisions.
* To better clarify what counter-IED training initiatives JIEDDO will
fund, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to
evaluate counter-IED training initiatives using the same criteria it
uses to evaluate theater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements,
and incorporate this direction into existing guidance.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with
three of our recommendations and partially agreed with two other
recommendations. However, DOD expressed concerns that our report
focuses on counter-IED initiative challenges from a service perspective
rather than a combatant command urgency of need. While we recognize
JIEDDO's mission and contribution in supporting urgent warfighter
needs, as DOD's focal point for coordinating counter-IED efforts
throughout the department, JIEDDO is tasked with the integration of all
IED defeat solutions throughout DOD, which includes the integration of
service requirements during the development of counter-IED initiatives.
DOD also stated that our report focused on a handful of initiatives or
efforts that encountered friction during either the development phase
or the coordination process to transfer, transition, or terminate the
program. While we recognize JIEDDO's progress to successfully
transition some initiatives to the services, the examples used in the
report highlight the challenges noted in our work and identify areas
for improvement. Furthermore, DOD generally agreed with our
recommendations to address these challenges.
In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO and the services to
develop a DOD-wide database for all counter-IED initiatives, DOD
concurred and noted that JIEDDO is supporting the Army Research
Development and Engineering Command's effort to establish a JIEDDO-
hosted network solution that establishes a common collaboration tool to
link these databases and provide comprehensive visibility across DOD
for all counter-IED efforts. However, this initiative does not describe
how the services will develop a comprehensive database for each of
their own counter-IED efforts. While we recognize that this ongoing
effort is a step in the right direction, until all of the services and
other DOD components gain full awareness of their own individual
counter-IED efforts and provide this input into a central database, any
effort to establish a DOD-wide database of all counter-IED initiatives
will be incomplete.
In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to develop a mechanism
to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of
initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process prior to its
funding, DOD concurred and stated that JIEDDO will take action to
notify stakeholders of all JIEDDO efforts or initiatives, whether or
not initiatives are required to go through the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management
Process (JCAAMP). JIEDDO will also inform stakeholders and elicit their
opinions on JIEDDO developmental efforts in order to decrease
duplication of efforts and allow services greater lead time to review
these efforts. DOD noted that this process will be incorporated in the
pending update of JCAAMP. We agree that if implemented, these actions
would satisfy our recommendation.
In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to develop a
comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each JIEDDO-funded
initiative, including expected costs, identified funding sources, and a
timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DOD base budget
cycle, DOD concurred and noted that the Navy and Marine Corps are
working on efforts to improve the transition of JIEDDO-funded
initiatives. DOD also stated that it has developed recommended changes
for DOD Directive 2000.19E that will address coordinating the
transition of counter-IED solutions. DOD noted that these changes will
be staffed to DOD and the services during the periodic update of DOD
Directive 2000.19E. We agree that if implemented, these actions would
satisfy our recommendation.
In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to coordinate with the
services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service
requirements are fully taken into account when making counter-IED
investment decisions, DOD partially concurred. DOD noted that JIEDDO
responds to in-theater requirements that have joint applications but
may not have service specific applications. DOD also stated that fully
vetted coordination with the services prior to funding an effort or
initiative could delay the fielding of material that would save lives.
DOD therefore suggested that this recommendation be incorporated with
our second recommendation to notify the services of all JIEDDO-funded
initiatives or the language to this recommendation be changed to
reflect DOD's position. While we recognize the need to respond rapidly
to support warfighter needs and that our previous recommendations will
help gain awareness of JIEDDO-funded initiatives as they are being
developed, we continue to support our recommendation and reiterate the
need for the integration of service requirements and full coordination
prior to funding an initiative to ensure that these efforts are fully
vetted throughout DOD before significant resources are committed.
In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to evaluate counter-IED
training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate in-
theater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate
this direction into existing guidance, DOD concurred with the intent
but not the language of this recommendation. DOD noted that the JCAAMP
provides the mechanism to identify, validate, and provide solutions for
combatant commanders and service training counter-IED capability gaps.
DOD also noted that it is currently developing a new DOD instruction on
counter-IED training guidance. According to DOD's comments, the
instruction directs DOD components to implement counter-IED, mission-
essential tasks across all levels of war into their training regiments
at the individual, collective, unit, and staff levels, and sustain
relevancy through interface with JIEDDO. While we recognize these
actions may be a positive step towards improving coordination of
training initiatives between JIEDDO and the services, neither the
JCAAMP nor the instruction cited in DOD's response to this report
contain the criteria by which JIEDDO will fund counter-IED training
initiatives. We, therefore, continue to support our recommendation and
reiterate the need for establishing criteria specifying which counter-
IED training initiatives JIEDDO will fund.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any questions about this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
William M. Solis Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which capability gaps were initially identified
in DOD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led
to the development of JIEDDO, we spoke with current and former senior
officials involved in the evolution of JIEDDO and examined existing
documentation. To assess initial DOD efforts to defeat IEDs and the
early evolution of JIEDDO, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army
Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other current and former DOD
officials involved in the establishment of JIEDDO. We also examined
documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E, which established
JIEDDO, and documentation and briefings relating to JIEDDO's evolution.
To assess DOD's efforts to implement a process for establishing new
joint organizations, we met with officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director of Administration and
Management, to examine documentation and conduct interviews on the
implementation of the Joint Task Assignment Process and its relevance
to JIEDDO.
To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all
counter-IED efforts, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army
Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the
Army's Research Development and Engineering Command, and CENTCOM to
discuss current efforts to gain visibility over all of DOD's counter-
IED efforts. We also examined documentation including DOD Directive
2000.19E and JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, which established JIEDDO's
rapid acquisition process, as well as analyzed JIEDDO, service, and
other DOD counter-IED databases.
To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of
JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, we met with
officials from JIEDDO, the Army's Combined Arms Center, the Army
Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and
the Navy's CREW Office. We also examined documentation including JIEDDO
Instruction 5000.01, JIEDDO's annual reports, and DOD Directive
5101.14, which designated the Secretary of the Navy as the Executive
Agent for CREW and authorized the Secretary of the Navy to designate a
Single Manager for CREW.
To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has developed criteria for the
counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, we met with officials
from organizations including JIEDDO, the JIEDDO Joint Center of
Excellence, and CENTCOM. We also examined documentation including DOD
Directive 2000.19E and other relevant documents and briefings, such as
published criteria for accepting counter-IED Joint Operational Urgent
Needs from JIEDDO, the services, and other DOD entities.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through August 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review:
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization:
* Operations and Training Division:
* Training Counter-IED Operational Integration Center:
* Joint Center of Excellence:
* J-5 (Interagency) Division:
* Technology and Requirements Integration Division:
* Congressional Affairs:
Department of Defense:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director of Program
Analysis and Evaluation:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director of
Administration and Management:
* U.S. Central Command:
* Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell:
* Office of the Inspector General:
Department of the Army:
* Army National Training Center:
* Army Center of Excellence:
* Army Asymmetric Warfare Office:
* Army Research Development and Engineering Command:
* Training and Doctrine Command:
Department of the Navy:
* Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory:
* Marine Corps Training and Education Command:
* CREW Program Office:
Joint Forces Command:
* Joint Warfighting Center:
Executive Office of the President:
* Office of Science and Technology Policy:
Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office:
* Technical Support Working Group:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Joint IED Deafeat Organization:
5000 Army Pentagon:
Washington DC 20310-5000:
October 20, 2009:
Mr. William Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-10-95, "Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve
Visibility and Coordination if DoD's Counter Improvised Explosive
Device Efforts," dated September 18, 2009 (GAO Code 351231).
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report. This report
fairly reflects some of the natural coordination tensions the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) encounters
providing Counter - Improvised Explosives Device (C-1ED) capabilities
to the warfighter given the unique nature of JIEDDO's rapid acquisition
process, However, the report does not adequately recognize the tension
between immediate combatant commander (COCOM) requirements and Service
programming objectives.
JIEDDO executes its mission in support of COCOM requirements by rapidly
responding to urgent warfighter needs. This primacy of effort requires
the flexibility necessary for JIEDDO to provide C-1ED capabilities and
both material and non-material solutions in a rapid manner based upon
requirement urgency and solution maturity. A "good enough" solution
delivered rapidly in a dynamic war environment is more valuable than an
ideal solution delivered later. Similarly, it is imperative for JIEDDO
to provide up-to-the-minute training solutions that reflect a
continually changing threat to ensure that our forces can train now as
they will fight when they arrive on the battlefield.
As written, the report focuses on C-IED initiative challenges from a
Service perspective rather than a COCOM urgency of need. This is
neither a balanced nor an accurate, assessment. The report does not
give appropriate weight to the fact that the single most relevant
factor in JIEDDO's decision making and coordination efforts is to
ensure these capabilities are available to a COCOM engaged in combat
during a decisive time of need. Undue delay leads to lost lives.
The report focuses on a handful of initiatives or efforts that
encountered friction during either the development phase or the
coordination process to transfer, transition, or terminate the program.
This does not appropriately reflect the true nature ofJ1EDDO's work.
Through FY11, 142 C-IED initiatives have or will successfully transfer,
transition, or terminate through the coordinated efforts of JIEDDO, the
Services, OSD staff elements, and the Joint Staff The samples cited
tend to be the exception rather than the rule.
In coordinating this response, all DoD stakeholders recognized the
fundamental requirement to meet COCOM urgent needs, while incrementally
improving JIEDDO processes to be more inclusive of Service requirements
and programming efforts while developing C-LED solutions, All the
Services concurred that the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
(JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP)
provides both visibility and coordination of C-LED efforts. JIEDDO is
finalizing the first update to JCAAIVIP that will address several of
the issues noted in this report. JIEDDO will complete this update by
the end of November 2009.
DoD Directive 2000.19e, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Weal
Organization, February 2006, is scheduled for its periodic update by
February 2010. DoD will begin review and coordination of this directive
in October 2009. The review process across DoD will provide the
opportunity for departmental review, coordination and determination of
any modifications of C-IED authorities. The proposed updates to DODD
2000.19e will result in process refinements that will help reduce the
inherent tensions between rapid acquisition and capability development,
and Dot) programming requirements all of which have been identified
since JIEDDO's inception.
The enclosed attachment contains a detailed response to each
recommendation. Comments on technical or factual corrections to the
report were provided in a separate document to the GAO audit team. The
point of contact for this response is Mr. William Rigby, JIEDDO
Internal Review, william.rigby@jieddo.dod.mil. 703-602-4807.
Signed by:
Thomas F. Metz:
LTG, U.S. Army:
Director:
Attachment:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report ” Dated September 18, 2009 GAO Code 351231 / GAO-10-95
"Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and
Coordination of DOD's Counter Improvised Explosive Device Efforts"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the military Services to create their own comprehensive
improvised explosive device (IED) defeat initiative databases and work
with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)
to develop a DoD-wide database for all counter-1ED initiatives.
DOD Response: Concur. Several C-IED databases have been established
across DOD. Notably U.S. Army Research Development and Engineering
Command (RDECOM), with cooperation from the Services and DARPA
established a database for counter - improvised explosive device (C-
IED) information called Technology Matrix. JIEDDO and Director of
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), with Service involvement,
issued a Counter - Improvised Explosive Device Science and Technology
(C-IED S&T) Strategy in February, 2009 to develop a common framework
for identifying and pursuing longer term, multi-year science that can
address fundamental challenges, capability gaps, and leap-ahead
efforts. JIEDDO is supporting RDECOM's effort to establish a JIEDDO
hosted network solution that establishes a common collaboration tool
that links these databases and provides comprehensive visibility across
DOD for all C-IED efforts.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) to develop a mechanism to notify the appropriate Service
counter-1ED focal points of each initiative prior to its funding.
DOD Response: Concur. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
(JIEDD) Capabilities Approval and Acquisition Management Process
(JCAAMP) already provides the mechanism to notify the appropriate
Service counter - improvised explosive device (C-1ED) focal points of
each initiative prior to its funding. JIEDDO recognized that in some
cases efforts or initiatives that bypassed the JCAAMP or were expedited
outside of JCAAMP were not provided to Service C-IED focal points.
JIEDDO revised the JCAAMP process to notify stakeholders of all J1EDDO
efforts or initiatives, whether or not JCAAMP processing is required.
JIEDDO will inform and elicit stakeholder opinions on JIEDDO
developmental efforts in order to decrease duplication of efforts and
allow Services greater lead time to review these efforts. This process
will be incorporated in the pending update of JCAAMP.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the military Services to work with the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to develop a
comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each JIEDDO-funded
initiative, including expected costs identified funding sources, and a
timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DoD base budget
cycle.
DOD Response: Concur. The majority of recommended counter - improvised
explosive device (C-IED) initiatives, 142 through FY I 1. have
successfully transferred, transitioned, or terminated through the
coordination efforts of JIEDDO, the Services, OSD staff elements, and
the Joint Staff, JIEDDO and the Services recognize that more
collaboration can be achieved to reduce friction in this process. The
Navy and USMC have undertaken internal efforts to improve their process
of how Joint funded transitions or transfers will be completed. The
Army uses various processes to determine the transition of each JIEDDO-
funded initiative and their associated costs, funding sources and
timelines. JIEDDO has developed recommended changes for DOD Directive
2000.19e that will address the coordination to transfer, transition, or
terminate C-1ED solutions. These changes will be appropriately staffed
to DoD and the Services during the periodic update of DOD Directive
2000.19e.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) to coordinate with the Services prior to funding an initiative
to ensure that Service requirements are fully taken into account when
making counter - improvised explosive device (C-1ED) investment
decisions.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. JIEDDO sources Combatant Command
theater requirements that have joint applications but may not have
Service specific application Fully vetted coordination with the
Services prior to Wilding an effort or Initiative could delay the
fielding of material that would save lives. The mechanisms described in
response to Recommendation 1 and 2 will ensure that JIEDDO and the
Services are fully aware of efforts and initiatives before funding
decisions are finalized. Per the response to Recommendation 2, JIEDDO
has unilaterally implemented revisions to the JCAAMP process to notify
stakeholders of all JEEDDO efforts or initiatives. DOD recommends that
Recommendation 4 be incorporated with Recommendation 2 or the language
to Recommendation 4 be changed to the following:
"The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Organization (JIEDDO) to
provide Services information on development endeavors and initiatives
through the MEDD Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process
(JCAAMP). This with use of the C-IED initiative database will ensure
that all CIED efforts are taken into account when making counter
improvised explosive device (C-1ED) investment decisions."
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) to evaluate counter- improvised explosive device (C-IED)
training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate
theater-based joint C-LED urgent requirements, and incorporate this
direction into existing guidance.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. DOD concurs with the intent but not the
language of this recommendation. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat (JIEDD) Capabilities Approval and Acquisition Management Process
(JCAAMP) provides the mechanism to identify, validate and provide
solutions for COCOM and Service training C-IED capability gaps.
A clear example of the process working effectively is development of
the Home Station Training Lanes (HSTL) initiatives; a coordinated
effort of JIEDDO and the Services to fix a training capability gap in
individual and small unit C-1ED training. A training gap was identified
in that warfighters were not receiving adequate C-IED training prior to
deployment. During the process to validate the capability gap it was
discovered that instead of participating in advanced unit training at
their major readiness exercises, they were catching up on individual
training requirements. In order to meet the COCOM's immediate
requirements, significant additional training resources were needed by
the Services that could not have been anticipated in the POM. With
JIEDDO, the Services identified the specific requirements; then the
initiatives went through JCAAMP and were fully funded. In validating
the requirements against emergent training shortfalls JIEDDO and the
Services developed the HSTL through three reviews within JCAAMP. These
initiatives are now completing the transfer process to the Services.
The HSTL initiatives support training lanes in 58 locations at a total
cost of $521M. JIEDDO, working in conjunction with the Services
improved the quality of improvised explosive device defeat (IEDD) Home
Station training by investing in three areas: 1. Development of IEDD
Lanes at all installations at which the Joint Forces train prior to
deployment; 2. Creation of a cadre of IEDD mobile trainers capable of
providing quality coaching, mentorship, and feedback for up to Brigade
sized units as they train on the IEDD Lanes; 3. Upgrading installation
Simulation Centers and instrumentation so they can accommodate the
training of Brigade and Battalion staffs on attacking the 1ED network
while their subordinate units execute the 1ED lanes.
In a complimentary effort to establish policy regarding C-IED training
guidance, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) is
currently staffing a Department of Defense Instruction, DoDI 1322.xx,
"Implementing DoD Training" that establishes policy, assigns
responsibilities, and provides implementing procedures for DoD
training. The instruction directs the DoD Components to:
"...shall implement {counter} improvised explosive device mission
essential tasks across all levels of war into their training regimens
at the individual, collective, unit and staff levels and shall sustain
relevancy through interface with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization."
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made
contributions to this report: Cary Russell, Assistant Director; Grace
Coleman; Kevin Craw; Will Horton; Ronald La Due Lake; James Lloyd;
Gregory Marchand; Lonnie McAllister; Jason Pogacnik; Michael
Shaughnessy; and Yong Song.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Department of Defense Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) para. 4 (Feb. 14, 2006).
(Hereinafter cited as DODD 2000.19E, (Feb. 14, 2006)). DODD 2000.19E
superseded DODD 2000.19 (June 27, 2005) and transformed the IED Defeat
entity from a joint task force, established under DODD 2000.19, into a
joint organization.
[2] H. Rep. No. 110-477 (2008)
[3] A service assumes sustainment costs for an initiative by placing it
into a program of record as an enduring capability in a transition.
[4] DOD Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) (Feb. 14, 2006).
[5] Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction
5000.01, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability
Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) (Nov. 9, 2007).
(Hereinafter cited as JIEDDOI 5000.01, (Nov. 9, 2007)).
[6] The Quadrennial Defense Review is a comprehensive examination of
the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization
plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the national
defense program. It is conducted every 4 years.
[7] For purposes of this report, we use the term "base budget program"
to refer to "programs of record" as described in DODD 2000.19E, para.
6.2.8, and JIEDDOI 5000.01.
[8] GAO, Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and
Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-160] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006).
[9] The Director of Administration and Management advises the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary of Defense on DOD-wide organizational and
management planning matters. Among other activities, the director
develops and maintains organizational charters for DOD activities.
[10] GAO, Defense Management: A Strategic Plan is Needed to Guide the
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's Efforts to
Effectively Accomplish Its Mission, GAO-07-377C (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
28, 2007)
[11] DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 14, 2006).
[12] The U.S. Army Research and Development and Engineering Command's
Counter-IED Task Force maintains an online counter-IED technology
interface that provides a search and organization tool of counter-IED
technologies, studies, signatures, and requirements. The Army
Asymmetric Warfare Office's Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions
Division maintains a list of all initiatives that have gone through
JIEDDO's acquisition process. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
maintains a list of all counter-IED solutions the Marine Corps uses in-
theater.
[13] JIEDDOI 5000.1 (Nov. 9, 2007).
[14] GAO, Defense Management: The Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization Provides Valuable Intelligence Support but Actions
Are Needed to Clarify Roles and Improve Coordination, GAO-09-172C
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2008)
[15] The three initiatives include a bomb-sniffing dog initiative for
both the Army and Air Force and a homemade explosives detection
initiative for the Navy. As of May 29, 2009, due to additional
transfers, JIEDDO estimated that the services would be responsible for
$410 million in transferred initiatives for fiscal year 2010.
[16] According to the Army's Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions
Division, nine of these initiatives were training initiatives or
medical initiatives later rejected by the Army for transition or
transfer in fiscal year 2011. The training initiatives were not
included in the $16 million figure cited above.
[17] DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 14, 2006).
[18] GAO, Defense Management: A Strategic Plan is Needed to Guide the
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's Efforts to
Effectively Accomplish Its Mission, GAO 07-377C (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
28, 2007)
[19] GAO 07-377C.
[End of section]
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