Defense Management
DOD Needs to Increase Attention on Fuel Demand Management at Forward-Deployed Locations Gao ID: GAO-09-300 February 20, 2009The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on petroleum-based fuel to sustain its forward-deployed locations--particularly those that are not connected to local power grids. While weapon platforms require large amounts of fuel, DOD reports that the single largest battlefield fuel consumer is generators, which provide power for base support activities such as cooling, heating, and lighting. Transporting fuel to forward-deployed locations presents an enormous logistics burden and risk, including exposing fuel truck convoys to attack. GAO was asked to address DOD's (1) efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations and (2) approach to managing fuel demand at these locations. This review focused on locations within Central Command's area of responsibility. GAO visited DOD locations in Kuwait and Djibouti to learn about fuel reduction efforts and challenges facing these locations.
DOD components have some efforts under way or planned to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations. Many of these efforts are in a research and development phase, and the extent to which they will be fielded and under what time frame is uncertain. Notable efforts include the application of foam insulation to tent structures, the development of more fuel-efficient generators and environmental control units, and research on alternative and renewable energy sources for potential use at forward-deployed locations. In addition, during visits to Kuwait and Djibouti, GAO met with officials about local camp efforts aimed at reducing fuel demand. DOD lacks an effective approach for implementing fuel reduction initiatives and maintaining sustained attention to fuel demand management at its forward-deployed locations. Moreover, DOD faces difficulty achieving its goals to reduce dependence on petroleum-based fuel and its logistics "footprint," as well as operating costs associated with high fuel usage, because managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations has not been a departmental priority and fuel reduction efforts have not been well coordinated or comprehensive. GAO found that DOD's current approach to managing fuel demand lacks (1) guidance directing locations to address fuel demand, (2) incentives and a viable funding mechanism to invest in fuel reduction projects, and (3) visibility and accountability for achieving fuel reduction. Although it may not be practical for DOD to decrease fuel usage at every forward-deployed location and base commanders must place their highest priority on meeting mission requirements, fuel demand is likely to remain high until the department gives systematic consideration to incorporating fuel demand in construction, maintenance, procurement, and other policy decisions for forward-deployed locations. The 2009 defense authorization act requires DOD to establish a director of operational energy and an energy strategy, providing the department with an opportunity to increase attention on improving fuel demand management.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-300, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Increase Attention on Fuel Demand Management at Forward-Deployed Locations
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Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
February 2009:
Defense Management:
DOD Needs to Increase Attention on Fuel Demand Management at Forward-
Deployed Locations:
Defense Energy Management:
GAO-09-300:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-300, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on petroleum-based fuel
to sustain its forward-deployed locations”particularly those that are
not connected to local power grids. While weapon platforms require
large amounts of fuel, DOD reports that the single largest battlefield
fuel consumer is generators, which provide power for base support
activities such as cooling, heating, and lighting. Transporting fuel to
forward-deployed locations presents an enormous logistics burden and
risk, including exposing fuel truck convoys to attack. GAO was asked to
address DOD‘s (1) efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed
locations and (2) approach to managing fuel demand at these locations.
This review focused on locations within Central Command‘s area of
responsibility. GAO visited DOD locations in Kuwait and Djibouti to
learn about fuel reduction efforts and challenges facing these
locations.
What GAO Found:
DOD components have some efforts under way or planned to reduce fuel
demand at forward-deployed locations. Many of these efforts are in a
research and development phase, and the extent to which they will be
fielded and under what time frame is uncertain. Notable efforts include
the application of foam insulation to tent structures (see fig.), the
development of more fuel-efficient generators and environmental control
units, and research on alternative and renewable energy sources for
potential use at forward-deployed locations. In addition, during visits
to Kuwait and Djibouti, GAO met with officials about local camp efforts
aimed at reducing fuel demand.
Figure: Tent before Application of Foam Insulation and Tent after
Application of Foam Insulation:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a combination of two photographs. One shows a tent
before application of foam insulation and the other shows a tent after
application of foam insulation.
Source: DOD Power Supply Task Force.
[End of figure]
DOD lacks an effective approach for implementing fuel reduction
initiatives and maintaining sustained attention to fuel demand
management at its forward-deployed locations. Moreover, DOD faces
difficulty achieving its goals to reduce dependence on petroleum-based
fuel and its logistics ’footprint,“ as well as operating costs
associated with high fuel usage, because managing fuel demand at
forward-deployed locations has not been a departmental priority and
fuel reduction efforts have not been well coordinated or comprehensive.
GAO found that DOD‘s current approach to managing fuel demand lacks (1)
guidance directing locations to address fuel demand, (2) incentives and
a viable funding mechanism to invest in fuel reduction projects, and
(3) visibility and accountability for achieving fuel reduction.
Although it may not be practical for DOD to decrease fuel usage at
every forward-deployed location and base commanders must place their
highest priority on meeting mission requirements, fuel demand is likely
to remain high until the department gives systematic consideration to
incorporating fuel demand in construction, maintenance, procurement,
and other policy decisions for forward-deployed locations. The 2009
defense authorization act requires DOD to establish a director of
operational energy and an energy strategy, providing the department
with an opportunity to increase attention on improving fuel demand
management.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD establish an effective approach to managing
fuel demand at forward-deployed locations by developing fuel demand
management requirements; designating the new director of operational
energy as the lead proponent of fuel demand management at forward-
deployed locations; addressing demand management shortcomings in DOD‘s
energy strategy; and establishing military department oversight of fuel
demand issues. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-300]. For more
information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 512-8365 or
solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Components Have Initiated Efforts to Reduce Fuel Demand at Forward-
Deployed Locations:
DOD Does Not Have an Effective Approach for Managing Fuel Demand at
Forward-Deployed Locations:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Fuel Demand at Selected DOD Forward-Deployed Locations
during June 2008:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Selected Initiatives of the DOD Power Surety Task Force
to Reduce Fuel Demand at Forward-Deployed Locations:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Responsibilities for Bulk Petroleum in Support of Military
Operations:
Table 2: Fuel Consumption Reported by Selected Forward-Deployed
Locations for June 2008:
Figures:
Figure 1: Fuel Storage and Delivery for Military Operations:
Figure 2: Tent before Application of Foam Insulation and Tent after
Application of Foam Insulation:
Figure 3: Improved Environmental Control Unit:
Figure 4: Renewable Energy Tent City at Tyndall Air Force Base,
Florida:
Figure 5: Deployable Renewable Energy Alternative Module Prototype:
Figure 6: Byproducts of Scrap Tire Recycling Process:
Figure 7: Proportion of Fuel Consumption Reported for Base Support
Activities and for Air and Ground Operations by Selected Forward-
Deployed Locations for June 2008:
Figure 8: Camp Lemonier:
Figure 9: Q-West Air Base:
Figure 10: Camp Arifjan:
Figure 11: Contingency Operating Base Adder:
Figure 12: Bagram Air Field:
Figure 13: Eskimo Spray Foam Insulation:
Figure 14: Transportable Hybrid Electric Power Stations (THEPS):
Figure 15: Net Zero Plus Joint Capability Technology Demonstration:
Figure 16: Monolithic Dome:
Figure 17: Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery (TGER):
Figure 18: Hybrid Electric Power Station:
Figure 19: Power Surety Feasibility Assessment:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 20, 2009:
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz:
Chairman:
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD) depends heavily on petroleum-based fuel
to sustain its forward-deployed locations around the world--
particularly those locations that are not connected to local power
grids and must rely on fuel-consuming generators for heating/cooling,
lighting, and other base support activities.[Footnote 1] Each day, over
2 million gallons of jet fuel alone are supplied to U.S. forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan.[Footnote 2] Transporting large quantities of fuel to
forward-deployed locations presents an enormous logistics burden and
risk. In 2006, a senior U.S. commander in Iraq submitted an urgent
request to DOD for renewable energy systems in order to reduce supply
line vulnerabilities associated with the military's dependence on fuel
for power generation at forward-deployed locations. Furthermore, global
oil supply routes are vulnerable because they flow through unstable
regions. High fuel demand, coupled with the recent volatility of fuel
prices, also have significant implications for DOD's operating costs.
With the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, which DOD officials have
referred to as "the longer war," the department may need to sustain
many of its forward-deployed locations supporting current operations
for longer than initially anticipated.
This report is the third in a series of studies requested by the
Subcommittee on Readiness of the House Committee on Armed Services
examining DOD's energy usage for military operations. Our March 2008
report found that while DOD and the military services have several
efforts under way to reduce energy used for military operations, the
department lacks key elements of an overarching organizational
framework to manage mobility energy matters across the
department.[Footnote 3] We also testified last March on the need for
DOD to establish an overarching organizational framework, including an
executive-level Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) official who
is accountable for mobility energy.[Footnote 4] This report addresses
DOD's (1) efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations
and (2) approach to managing fuel demand at these locations. We are
also providing information on DOD's fuel demand at selected forward-
deployed locations (see app. I). We focused our review on forward-
deployed locations within Central Command's area of
responsibility.[Footnote 5] Central Command has more than 400 forward-
deployed locations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as locations in
other countries.
To address our objectives, we analyzed DOD and military service
guidance, relevant legislation, and other documents and discussed fuel
demand issues with agency officials to gain their perspectives. Our
review focused on forward-deployed locations--DOD installations or base
camps situated outside of the United States that support current
operations--that relied primarily on fuel-based generators, as opposed
to local power grids.[Footnote 6] We asked officials to identify for us
key efforts planned or under way to reduce fuel demand. After
consultation with Central Command officials, we selected and visited
two forward-deployed locations--Camp Arifjan, an Army facility in
Kuwait and Camp Lemonier, a Navy facility in Djibouti--to gain a
firsthand understanding of fuel demand reduction efforts and challenges
facing these locations.[Footnote 7] We chose to visit these locations
because they relied heavily on fuel-based generators to carry out very
different missions--the former directly supported operations in Iraq
while the latter provided diplomatic, development, and counterterrorism
support within the Horn of Africa. In assessing DOD's approach to
managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations, we reviewed
documents and held discussions with agency officials on issues
including forward-deployed location construction and maintenance,
procurement, and funding procedures. For comparison purposes, we
reviewed DOD guidance related to energy reduction for the department's
permanent or U.S. facilities.
We conducted our review from March 2008 through February 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Details about our scope and
methodology are contained in appendix II.
Results in Brief:
DOD components have efforts under way or planned to reduce fuel demand
at forward-deployed locations. Many of these efforts are in a research
and development phase, and the extent to which they will be fielded and
under what time frame is uncertain. For example, one mission of the DOD
Power Surety Task Force, created in 2006, is to identify and
demonstrate emerging or commercial off-the-shelf technology that can
reduce DOD's fuel demand. Power Surety Task Force officials told us
that, based on results from a recent demonstration, the department
decided to pursue a large-scale effort to apply foam insulation to
temporary structures, such as military tents, in Iraq to reduce the
number of fuel-based generators needed to power these structures at
forward-deployed locations. Another DOD office is developing a new
generation of fuel-efficient generators and environmental control units
for use at forward-deployed locations. The military services are also
researching the use of alternative and renewable energy sources for
power generation. Moreover, during our visits to two forward-deployed
locations, we observed local efforts to reduce fuel demand. At Camp
Arifjan, Kuwait, for example, Army officials shared plans to
consolidate the loads on small individual generators by creating
groupings of larger generators, which could improve the overall
efficiency of generator usage and reduce the number of generators that
must operate during most times of the year. At Camp Lemonier, Djibouti,
foam insulation had been applied to the tent exterior of the camp's
gymnasium, which Navy officials told us reduced by 40 percent the
number of fuel-based generators needed to power the facility.
While these efforts show potential for achieving greater fuel
efficiency, DOD lacks an effective approach to managing fuel demand
that could enable the widespread implementation of fuel reduction
initiatives and sustained attention to fuel demand issues at its
forward-deployed locations. DOD has stated that it needs to reduce its
reliance on petroleum-based fuel and minimize the logistics "footprint"
of military forces. However, DOD faces difficulty in achieving these
goals because managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations has
not been a departmental priority and its fuel reduction efforts have
not been well coordinated or comprehensive. More specifically, we found
that DOD lacked guidance directing forward-deployed locations to
address fuel demand, incentives and a viable funding mechanism for
locations to invest in fuel reduction initiatives, and visibility and
accountability within the chain of command for achieving fuel
reduction.
* Lack of guidance: DOD generally lacks guidance that directs forward-
deployed locations to manage and reduce their fuel demand--at the
department level, combatant command level, and military service level.
DOD is driven to address energy issues--such as incorporating energy
efficiency into repair and construction projects, procuring energy-
efficient products when cost effective, and tracking and measuring its
progress and energy efficiency improvement--at its U.S. installations
largely by federal mandates and DOD guidance. However, agency officials
were unable to identify similar guidance for forward-deployed
locations, and they told us that reducing fuel use has been a low
priority compared with other mission requirements. Our analysis of
combatant command and military service guidance related to forward-
deployed location construction showed that the existing guidance is
largely silent with respect to fuel demand management and energy
efficiency. The Joint Staff has begun an effort to develop common
living standards (e.g., square footage for living space per person,
duration of showers) for military servicemembers at forward-deployed
locations that presents an opportunity to make decisions that take into
account fuel demand considerations, but Joint Staff officials told us
that fuel reduction has not been considered in this effort to date.
* Lack of incentives and viable funding mechanism: DOD encourages fuel
reduction projects at its permanent installations but has not
established incentives or a viable funding mechanism for investing in
such projects at its forward-deployed locations. Officials at Camp
Lemonier, for example, have identified several projects that would
reduce the camp's fuel demand but told us they saw little "return on
investment" for them to undertake such projects because they would not
receive the associated savings for use toward other camp improvements.
Moreover, many of DOD's forward-deployed locations rely heavily on
funding from supplemental appropriations related to the Global War on
Terrorism, and delays in receiving this funding can present challenges
in covering existing costs, making it difficult for commanders to fund
more expensive fuel reduction projects. Funding mechanisms exist to
promote energy reduction projects at permanent DOD installations,
including an energy conservation program and energy-performance saving
contracts with private sector firms. Without incentives and a viable
funding mechanism, commanding officials at DOD's forward-deployed
locations are unlikely to identify fuel reduction as a priority for
making a significant investment of resources.
* Lack of visibility and accountability: DOD's current organizational
framework does not provide the department visibility for fuel demand
issues at its forward-deployed locations. We found that information on
fuel demand management strategies and reduction efforts is not shared
among locations, military services, and across the department in a
consistent manner. Moreover, DOD guidance does not designate any DOD
office or official as being responsible for fuel demand management at
forward-deployed locations, and we could not identify anyone who is
specifically accountable for this function through our interviews with
various DOD and military service offices. The Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires DOD to
establish a Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs, an
operational energy strategy for DOD, and military department-level
energy officials.[Footnote 8] DOD has not yet established a director or
strategy for operational energy. In meeting the requirements, DOD has
an opportunity to improve visibility and accountability for fuel demand
management at forward-deployed locations.
Until DOD makes fuel demand management a higher priority and
establishes a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to managing
forward-deployed location fuel demand--with guidance, incentives, a
viable funding mechanism, visibility, and accountability--the
department cannot be assured that good fuel reduction practices are
identified, shared, prioritized, resourced, implemented, and
institutionalized across locations. Establishing such an approach could
enable the department to reduce the amount of fuel that must be
delivered to forward-deployed locations, decrease the department's
reliance on petroleum-based fuel and the logistics footprint, and save
on fuel costs.
We are making recommendations that DOD components develop requirements
and guidelines on fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations.
In addition, we are recommending that DOD designate the new,
congressionally-mandated director of operational energy as the
department's lead proponent of fuel demand management at forward-
deployed locations and that the director, in establishing a
departmentwide operational energy strategy, address the shortcomings
related to managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations that we
have identified in this report. Finally, we are recommending that the
military departments' senior energy officials be assigned, among their
other duties, responsibility for overseeing fuel demand management at
forward-deployed locations within their respective services. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with our
recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix IV.
Background:
DOD's Forward-Deployed Locations:
At any given time, the United States has a large portion of its
military personnel serving abroad in forward-deployed locations. The
forward presence of military forces at overseas locations is critical
to supporting U.S. strategic interests. Forward-deployed forces provide
the basic building blocks with which to project military power in
crises and strengthen U.S. military access. While the numbers of
personnel and locations vary with the frequency and types of military
operations and deployment demands, military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have led to the creation of several hundred new
locations.[Footnote 9] Operational control of U.S. military forces at
forward-deployed locations is assigned to the nation's six geographic,
unified overseas regional commands, which include Central Command. For
current operations, Central Command has identified the need for forward-
deployed locations within its area of responsibility to meet mission
requirements, and its military service components have been responsible
for establishing and maintaining the locations.
DOD is likely to continue its use of forward-deployed locations in
support of future U.S. defense strategy. In recent years, DOD has been
undergoing a transformation to develop a defense strategy and force
structure capable of meeting changing global threats. As part of its
transformation, DOD has been reexamining overseas basing requirements
to allow for greater U.S. military flexibility to combat conventional
and asymmetric threats worldwide. U.S. military presence overseas has
been converting from a posture established on familiar terrain to
counter a known threat to one that is intended to be capable of
projecting forces from strategic locations into relatively unknown
areas in an uncertain threat environment.
DOD Fuel Demand and Delivery for Current Operations:
In 2008, more than 68 million gallons of fuel, on average, were
supplied by DOD each month to support U.S. forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan. While DOD's weapon systems require large amounts of fuel-
-a B-52H, for example, burns approximately 3,500 gallons per flight
hour--the department reports that the single largest battlefield fuel
consumer is generators. Generators provide power for base support
activities such as air conditioning/heating, lighting, refrigeration,
and communications. A 2008 Defense Science Board Task Force report
noted that Army generators alone consume about 26 million gallons of
fuel annually during peacetime and 357 million gallons annually during
wartime.[Footnote 10] Fuel is delivered to forward-deployed locations
in Iraq via three main routes--from Kuwait in the south, Jordan in the
west, and Turkey in the north--and to forward-deployed locations in
Afghanistan via two main routes--from Central Asian states in the north
and from Pakistan in the east. According to the Defense Energy Support
Center, an organization within the Defense Logistics Agency that
manages contracts for the department's fuel acquisitions and
distribution, approximately 1.7 million gallons of jet fuel are
delivered into Iraq and approximately 300,000 gallons of jet fuel are
delivered into Afghanistan each day, in addition to other types of
fuel, such as diesel, motor gasoline, and aviation gasoline. At one
truck fill stand that we visited in Kuwait in June 2008, about 125
trucks, each holding 9,000 gallons of fuel, were loaded daily for
delivery to forward-deployed locations in Kuwait and Iraq.
High fuel requirements on the battlefield can place a significant
logistics burden on military forces, exposing supply convoys to risk.
For example, long truck convoys moving fuel to forward-deployed
locations have encountered enemy attacks, severe weather, traffic
accidents, and pilferage. Army officials have estimated that about 70
percent of the tonnage required to position its forces for battle
consists of fuel and water. Most fuel deliveries to forward-deployed
locations in Afghanistan are made by commercial contractors, and there
is no military-provided protection for the supply convoys other than
the protection contractors provide themselves. DOD officials reported
that in June 2008, for example, 44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel
were lost due to attacks or other events. While fuel delivery issues
have not been as severe in Iraq recently, the U.S. military provides
force protection to supply convoys in Iraq, increasing the logistics
burden. Fuel delivery to locations outside of Iraq and Afghanistan may
not be subject to battlefield conditions but is also logistically
complex. For example, Camp Lemonier receives its fuel through the
Djiboutian port. Fuel is loaded from the port into the storage tanks as
it arrives, and trucks also make daily runs to the port to bring fuel
to the camp.
Figure 1: Fuel Storage and Delivery for Military Operations:
[Refer PDF for image]
This figure is a combination of two photographs: fuel storage in Kuwait
and a fuel convoy.
Source: GAO (left) and Headquarters, Marine Corps (right).
[End of figure]
DOD Mobility Fuel Costs:
DOD reported that it consumed almost 4.8 billion gallons of mobility
fuel and spent $9.5 billion in fiscal year 2007, in addition to its
costs for fuel consumed at fixed U.S. installations. While fuel costs
represent less than 3 percent of DOD's total budget, they can have a
significant impact on the department's operating costs. DOD has
estimated that for every $10 increase in the price of a barrel of oil,
DOD's operating costs increase by approximately $1.3 billion. DOD
organizations pay a standard price for fuel that differs from the
market price. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) establishes for
DOD the price the department will use when constructing its budget for
upcoming fiscal years. DOD in turn uses OMB's price in establishing the
standard price to be used for a barrel of fuel for budgeting purposes
by DOD's customers, such as the military services. Because of the
volatility of world petroleum prices, the standard price for a barrel
of fuel included in the President's annual budget request for DOD may
be lower or higher than the actual price established by the world
market at any point in time after DOD's budget request is submitted to
the Congress. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget assumed a
standard fuel price of $115.50 per barrel. At the time of this report,
the price DOD charged its customers was $104.58, or $2.49 per gallon of
jet fuel (JP8). In the past, DOD's standard fuel price was typically
adjusted annually. However, with rising fuel costs in recent years, the
price has been adjusted more frequently. Effective July 1, 2008, for
example, DOD raised the standard fuel price per barrel from $127.68 to
$170.94; and effective December 1, 2008, DOD lowered the standard fuel
price per barrel from $170.94 to $104.58. Because the military services
prepare their annual budgets based on the approved fuel price in the
President's budget, market volatility resulting in out-of-cycle fuel
price increases can be difficult for the services to absorb. DOD has
received supplemental appropriations from the Congress in recent years
to cover budget shortages associated with rising fuel prices.
Moreover, the fully burdened cost of fuel--that is, the total ownership
cost of buying, moving, and protecting fuel in systems during combat--
can be much greater than the cost of fuel itself. A 2008 Defense
Science Board Task Force report noted that preliminary estimates by the
OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation office and the Institute of Defense
Analyses indicate that the fully burdened cost of a $2.50 gallon of
fuel could begin at about $15, assuming no force protection
requirements for supply convoys, and increases as the fuel moves
further onto the battlefield. Fuel delivered in-flight has been
estimated at about $42 gallon, though the report notes that these
figures are low. OSD has initiated a pilot program to determine the
fully burdened cost of fuel for three mobile defense systems.
Concerns about future fuel costs, price volatility, and fuel
availability have led the Air Force to undertake an effort to certify
its entire aircraft fleet to run on a synthetic blend of alternative
and jet fuels by early 2011. The Air Force has established a goal to
acquire 50 percent of the aviation fuels it uses within the United
States from domestic sources by 2016.
DOD Fuel Distribution Roles and Responsibilities:
Fuel distribution is a complex process involving several DOD offices.
Joint Publication 4-03 sets forth principles and establishes doctrine
for bulk petroleum and water in support of U.S. military operations.
The combatant commander has the predominant responsibility for fuel
within a theater, and this responsibility is discharged by its Joint
Petroleum Office. The Joint Petroleum Office is responsible for the
overall planning of petroleum for operations, and it may establish sub-
area petroleum offices as needed to support specific petroleum
requirements. The Director, Defense Logistics Agency, as the integrated
materiel manager for bulk petroleum, is responsible for meeting the
petroleum support requirements of the combatant commands and military
services. These functional responsibilities have been delegated to the
Director, Defense Energy Support Center, which is responsible for
procurement, transportation, ownership, accountability, budgeting,
quality assurance, and quality surveillance. It also plans and budgets
for the construction and repair of fuel storage and distribution
facilities, monitors the petroleum market, and negotiates international
agreements for energy commodities.
Each military service has responsibilities for providing petroleum
support. The Army normally provides management of petroleum support to
U.S. land-based forces of all DOD components. However, actual movement
of bulk petroleum may include the use of commercial vehicles and
associated infrastructure. The Air Force provides distribution of bulk
petroleum products by air within a theater where immediate support is
needed at remote locations. The Navy provides bulk petroleum products
for U.S. sea-and land-based forces. The Marine Corps maintains a
capability to provide bulk petroleum support to Marine Corps units.
Within Central Command's area of responsibility, military units
communicate their fuel requirements, which are based on historical
usage and planned rotations, to the sub-area petroleum offices. The sub-
area petroleum offices in turn provide these requirements to Central
Command's Joint Petroleum Office for validation. Once the requirements
are validated, the Defense Energy Support Center determines the most
appropriate means to support the requirements and provides for the
distribution of the fuel up to the "point of sale." The point of sale
is the point at which the customer takes possession of the fuel. The
Defense Energy Support Center owns and tracks the fuel up until this
point, at which time the fuel may be placed directly into a weapons
system or battlefield storage unit or handed off to the customer to
move to a forward-deployed location.
Congressional Requirements for Operational Energy:
Section 902 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009 requires that DOD establish a Director of Operational
Energy Plans and Programs, who shall be appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, to provide leadership and facilitate
communication and conduct oversight of operational energy plans and
programs within the department and military services.[Footnote 11]
Among other responsibilities the director shall establish and maintain
an operational energy strategy for the department; serve as the
principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary
of Defense on operational energy plans and programs; and consider
operational energy demands in defense planning, requirements, and
acquisition processes. In addition, the act requires that, within 90
days of the director's appointment, the secretaries of the military
departments each designate a senior official to be responsible for
operational energy plans and programs for his respective service. These
senior service officials shall be responsible for coordinating with the
director and implementing operational energy initiatives. The act
further requires DOD to consider fuel logistics support requirements in
the department's planning, requirements development, and acquisition
processes--including the consideration of the fully burdened cost of
fuel when analyzing fuel-consuming system alternatives.[Footnote 12]
The act also includes other energy requirements, including that DOD
conduct a study on the feasibility of using solar and wind energy to
provide electricity to deployed forces and the extent to which the use
of such alternative energy sources could reduce the risk of casualties
associated with convoys supplying fuel to forward-deployed
locations.[Footnote 13] The Secretary of Defense, acting through the
director, must also submit, on an annual basis, a report to the
congressional defense committees on operational energy management and
the implementation of the operational energy strategy.[Footnote 14]
DOD Components Have Initiated Efforts to Reduce Fuel Demand at Forward-
Deployed Locations:
DOD components have efforts under way or planned for reducing fuel
demand at forward-deployed locations. Many of these efforts are in a
research and development phase, and the extent to which they will be
fielded and under what time frame is uncertain. Notable efforts include
the application of foam insulation to tent structures, the development
of more fuel-efficient generators and environmental control units, and
research on alternative and renewable energy sources for potential use
at forward-deployed locations. In addition, during our visits to Kuwait
and Djibouti, we found local camp efforts aimed at reducing fuel
demand.
Power Surety Task Force Demonstrated Energy-Saving Benefits of Applying
Foam Insulation to Tents:
DOD is beginning to apply foam insulation on tents at some forward-
deployed locations to reduce energy demand for powering these
structures. In 2006, the DOD Power Surety Task Force was created in
response to a joint urgent operational needs statement from a senior
U.S. commander in Iraq calling for alternative energy sources to reduce
the amount of fuel transported to forward-deployed locations for power
generation. A mission of the task force is to identify and demonstrate
emerging or commercial off-the-shelf technology that can reduce DOD's
fuel demand. As one of several initiatives, the task force has
demonstrated the benefits of applying foam insulation on temporary
structures such as military tents. According to task force officials,
tests show that the application of foam insulation reduces dust, heat,
cold, noise, and air conditioning requirements, which in turn reduces
generator-powered fuel demand.[Footnote 15] For example, the officials
said that military tents insulated with foam at Fort Benning, Georgia,
used half the climate control units and required 75 to 90 percent less
power than non-insulated tents. (See fig. 2.)
Figure 2: Tent before Application of Foam Insulation and Tent after
Application of Foam Insulation:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a combination of two photographs. One shows a tent
before application of foam insulation and the other shows a tent after
application of foam insulation.
Source: DOD Power Supply Task Force.
[End of figure]
The Power Surety Task Force first demonstrated this technology at Fort
Benning in January 2007, and later at some forward-deployed locations
in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Djibouti. According to task force
officials, based on the results of a recent demonstration of this
technology, DOD decided to pursue a large-scale effort to apply foam
insulation to temporary structures, such as military tents, in Iraq to
reduce the number of generators needed to power those structures.
According to a Central Command official, the tent foaming initiative
could reduce energy consumption by approximately 50 percent,
potentially reducing the number of convoys needed to supply fuel to
locations in Iraq, although metrics had not yet been established to
systemically measure efficiency.[Footnote 16] However, the contract for
this initiative was terminated prior to completion, effective December
16, 2008. According to another Central Command official, the contract
was terminated early due to contractor performance as well as support
issues. At the time the contract was terminated, a DOD contractor noted
that foam insulation had been applied to about 900 temporary structures
(3.8 million square feet) at 10 forward-deployed locations in Iraq.
According to a senior Army official, DOD has also issued a $29 million
contract to apply foam insulation to tent structures in Afghanistan,
though he did not expect foaming to proceed until after the winter
weather in Afghanistan subsided.
In addition to foam insulation, the DOD Power Surety Task Force is
demonstrating other potential energy-saving technologies for use at
forward-deployed locations. The Power Surety Task Force initiated a 3-
year demonstration project--called the Net-Zero Plus Joint Capability
Technology Demonstration--at the National Training Center in Fort
Irwin, California, to demonstrate some of these technologies and
solicit feedback from visiting military personnel. (App. III provides
additional information on task force initiatives.)
Joint Program Office Is Developing More Fuel-Efficient Generators:
Another DOD effort to reduce fuel demand is the development of new fuel-
efficient generators and environmental control units. A DOD joint
program organization, the Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power office,
is responsible for providing a modernized standard family of mobile
electric power generators to the military services. According to the
office, many of DOD's generators have been in use for about three
decades, exceeding their expected life cycle of 15 years. The office is
developing a next generation of generators, called the Advanced Medium
Mobile Power Sources, which employ advanced technologies to achieve
greater fuel efficiency and other improvements over current military
generators. When fully fielded, the new generators are expected to
consume approximately 28 million gallons less fuel per year than the
tactical quiet generators currently in use by the Army.[Footnote 17]
According to a Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power official, DOD
plans to begin procuring these new generators in 2010 at a weighted
average cost of about $18,000 per generator. In addition, officials
said that the Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power office intends to
replace its current environmental control units with improved
environmental control units to provide cooling, heating, and
dehumidifying for servicemembers and material systems. The improved
units are expected to reduce energy consumption by up to 25 percent
over current units. (See fig. 3.) An official told us that one version
of the improved units is currently in low-rate initial production and a
contract for another version is expected to be awarded in February
2009.
Figure 3: Improved Environmental Control Unit:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a picture of an improved environmental control unit.
Source: DOD Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power.
[End of figure]
The Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power office also has initiatives
under way to improve the efficiency of power generation. For example,
the office has fielded a more fuel-efficient method of generating
power, called Central Power, at tactical operations centers (command
posts) for the Army's 4TH Infantry Division. Previously, power for
these operations centers was provided by many small generator sets that
had a large logistics footprint; required considerable fuel,
maintenance, and personnel to operate; and were subject to disruptions
in continuous power. The Central Power concept uses fewer, larger
generators to provide independent "islands" of power generation,
decreasing fuel consumption and the logistics footprint. According to
Project-Manager Mobile Electric Power officials, Central Power saved
the 4TH Infantry Division roughly $384,000 during its first year in
use. The officials said that they have plans to field Central Power to
all active Army components by the end of fiscal year 2009 but noted
that the Army had not yet updated its equipment requirements list for
units to include Central Power as a requirement.
Finally, the Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power office is pursuing a
$30 million, 6-year program to develop a future generation intelligent
management grid architecture, called Hybrid Intelligent Power (HI-
Power). HI-Power is intended to provide a flexible, grid-based
architecture that enables "plug-and-play" power generation using a
variety of power sources, including military and commercial generators,
vehicles, and renewable energy sources such as wind and solar.
According to the officials, HI-Power will automatically start and stop
generators to match demand and store energy for transient power
requirements. The intended benefits include reduced fuel consumption
(by 17 to 40 percent depending on the scenario), maintenance, personnel
requirements, and power interruptions. The officials are planning for
HI-Power to go into production during fiscal year 2013.
Military Services Are Researching Alternative and Renewable Energy
Technologies:
Several military services are exploring the use of alternative and
renewable energy technologies to generate power at forward-deployed
locations and reduce the demand for petroleum-based fuel. The Air
Force's Air Force Research Laboratory created the Renewable Energy Tent
City--a collection of various deployable shelters powered by solar and
fuel cell generators situated at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. (See
fig. 4.) The purpose of this research is to evaluate renewable energy
technologies for use at forward-deployed locations, according to an Air
Force Research Laboratory official. The official told us that the
laboratory is assessing, among other technologies, a solar-integrated
cover that it developed to generate power for small shelter systems
using a form of solar cell technology. The Air Force is also engaged in
other research and development projects involving the use of fuel cell,
biofuel, and other alternative and renewable energy technologies.
Figure 4: Renewable Energy Tent City at Tyndall Air Force Base,
Florida:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a picture of a renewable energy tent city at Tyndall Air
Force Base, Florida.
Source: Air Force Research Laboratory.
[End of figure]
The Marine Corps has several research initiatives under way to develop
alternative energy systems for forward-deployed locations. For example,
the Marine Corps Systems Command is working on the Deployable Renewable
Energy Alternative Module. This module is intended to be towed by a
vehicle and is designed to be used at forward-deployed locations to
temporarily power radios or computers until fuel can be resupplied to
the locations by employing solar, wind turbine, battery, and generator
technologies. (See fig. 5.) A Marine Corps Systems Command official
told us that three prototypes have been designed using variations of
these alternative technologies and that two have been tested. The
official noted, however, that the technologies used for the modules
have limitations. For example, vendors for this project developed solar
cells that either required large surface areas--equal to the size of a
tennis court--to recharge batteries or were too fragile for use in an
austere environment. Furthermore, according to the official, the
prototypes were not cost effective, since comparable diesel-powered
generators with a 30-day supply of fuel could be procured and
transported for considerably less. For these reasons, the modules are
not likely to be deployed in the field, but the official said that
lessons learned from this project could be used to inform the
development of future energy systems.
Figure 5: Deployable Renewable Energy Alternative Module Prototype:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a photograph of deployable renewable energy alternative
module prototype.
Source: Marine Corps Systems Command.
[End of figure]
The Army is also investigating ways of reducing fuel demand at forward-
deployed locations through various research initiatives. For example,
the Army Research Laboratory is working with universities and private
sector firms to develop a processor that converts tires into energy and
recyclable products that can be used at forward-deployed locations.
(See fig. 6.) The scrap tire recycling process produces diesel, gas,
carbon char, and steel--byproducts that can either be used to power
generators, boilers, and other items or recycled into products such as
asphalt and paint. Project partners estimated that 2.7 million gallons
of diesel fuel per year could be produced from a tire recycling
facility operating at a forward-deployed location in Iraq, thereby
reducing the number of trucks needed to deliver fuel. The fuel produced
from this process is currently being tested to determine if it meets
Army standards. In addition, the Army is providing support to the
Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power office for the development of the
Hi-Power program, and to the Power Surety Task Force for the
development of a refinery system designed to convert trash into energy.
Using a similar form of technology, the Army, working with the Defense
Energy Support Center, intends to demonstrate six waste-to-fuel (diesel
fuel) plants at six U.S. Army locations over the next year, according
to a senior Army official.
Figure 6: Byproducts of Scrap Tire Recycling Process:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a photograph of byproducts of scrap tire recycling
process.
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
[End of figure]
Specific Forward-Deployed Locations Have Efforts Under Way or Planned
to Reduce Fuel Demand:
During our visits to forward-deployed locations in Kuwait and Djibouti,
we found some local efforts by camp officials to reduce fuel demand. In
Kuwait, an official at Camp Arifjan shared plans to consolidate loads
on small generators by creating groupings--or networks--of multiple
generators, which could improve overall efficiency and reduce the
number of generators that operate at most times of the year. Camp
officials said that they would like to build a centralized power plant
for the location's communication complex by 2010. An Army official also
told us that foam insulation was being used to cool tent structures in
Kuwait, where outside temperatures can exceed 120 degrees Fahrenheit.
According to the official, insulated facilities require fewer
ventilation and air conditioning units to maintain cooler temperatures,
thereby providing 20 to 40 percent in energy savings and reducing the
wear and tear on the camp's generator fleet. As of June 2008, the Army
was in the process of insulating tents with foam at Camp Buehring,
Kuwait, and had plans to insulate tents at Camp Virginia, Kuwait. The
official also told us that other alternatives to increase cooling
efficiency, such as the use of special ceramic paints, were being
explored.
During our visit to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, Navy officials told us
that they allowed the Power Surety Task Force to apply foam insulation
on the tent exterior of the camp's gymnasium in August 2007. According
to camp officials, the temperature inside the air-conditioned tent
decreased from 95-100 degrees Fahrenheit to about 72 degrees after the
foam insulation was applied. The officials also said that they were
able to remove two of the five air conditioning units used to cool the
facility, resulting in an estimated fuel savings of 40 percent. The
officials were pleased with the reduced fuel demand and improved
quality of life that were produced as a result of the demonstration.
However, they noted that the disadvantages of the foam include more
material to dispose of when the tent is disassembled and difficulty in
moving or rearranging the tent after the foam was applied. In addition
to the foaming, Camp Lemonier officials had also posted signs aimed at
modifying the behavior of personnel to conserve energy. The signs
included tips on taking shorter showers, using less air conditioning,
and unplugging transformers when not in use. Camp officials had also
developed an energy savings plan to reduce electrical consumption.
DOD Does Not Have an Effective Approach for Managing Fuel Demand at
Forward-Deployed Locations:
Although DOD is undertaking a number of initiatives focused on reducing
fuel consumption, it lacks an effective approach for implementing fuel
reduction initiatives and maintaining sustained attention to fuel
demand management at its forward-deployed locations. DOD has stated
that it needs to reduce its dependence on petroleum-based fuel and the
logistics "footprint" of its military forces, as well as reduce
operating costs associated with high fuel usage. In 2008, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics reported
to Congress that fuel demand for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is
higher than any war in history and that protecting large fuel convoys
imposes a high burden on combat forces.[Footnote 18] The Under
Secretary's report noted that reducing fuel demand would move the
department toward a more efficient force structure by enabling more
combat forces to be supported by fewer logistics assets, reducing
operating costs, and mitigating the budget effects caused by fuel price
volatility. However, we found that DOD's current approach to managing
fuel demand at forward-deployed locations is not effective because it
lacks (1) guidance directing locations to address fuel demand, (2)
incentives and a viable funding mechanism to invest in fuel reduction
initiatives, and (3) visibility and accountability within the chain of
command for achieving fuel reduction. Until DOD addresses these
shortcomings and makes fuel demand management a higher priority, DOD
will face difficulty achieving its goals of reducing its reliance on
petroleum-based fuel, the associated logistics burden, and fuel costs.
DOD Generally Lacks Guidance That Requires Attention to Fuel Demand:
DOD generally lacks guidance that directs forward-deployed locations to
manage and reduce fuel demand and thus cannot ensure that base
commanders and their staffs will give sustained attention to this issue
among their many other mission requirements. In contrast, DOD is driven
to reduce energy consumption at its U.S. installations largely by
federal mandates and DOD guidance. For example, the Energy Policy Act
of 2005, Executive Order 13423, and the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007 set energy reduction goals for federal buildings
within the United States. Moreover, in November 2005, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued
an instruction that provided guidance, assigned responsibilities, and
prescribed procedures for energy management at its U.S.
installations.[Footnote 19] The instruction addresses topics such as
ensuring sufficient funds to meet energy goals, tracking and measuring
progress and energy efficiency improvement, reporting energy use and
accomplishments, and training facility managers on the energy efficient
operation of facilities. Among other responsibilities, it requires the
heads of DOD components to develop programs that result in facilities
that are designed, constructed, operated, and maintained to maximize
energy efficiency. However, DOD, Central Command, and military service
officials we met with could not identify similar DOD policies,
directives, or other documents that specifically require attention to
fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations, and we were told
that it is not a key consideration. In responding to a draft of this
report, DOD stated that the Army had issued an energy security
implementation strategy in January 2009 that provides overarching
guidance for reducing energy consumption at forward locations.[Footnote
20] Our analysis of the Army's new strategy found that it emphasizes
the need to reduce energy consumption, including at forward-deployed
locations, but it does not provide specific guidance that directs
forward-deployed locations to manage and reduce fuel demand. Instead,
the strategy tasks offices of primary responsibility to develop and
execute implementation plans that include activities to achieve the
Army's energy security goals.
Construction:
While some of DOD's combatant commands and military services have
developed construction standards for forward-deployed locations, our
analysis showed that this existing guidance is largely silent with
regard to fuel demand management and energy efficiency. Pertinent
guidance for Central Command, as well as Army guidance used by Central
Command and European Command, revealed only one reference to energy
efficiency--that is, semipermanent locations are to be designed and
constructed with finishes, materials, and systems selected for moderate
energy efficiency.[Footnote 21] According to the guidance,
semipermanent construction standards will be considered for operations
that are expected to last more than 2 years. Army construction guidance
that Southern Command uses for its forward-deployed locations does not
address fuel demand management or energy efficiency.[Footnote 22] A
Southern Command official told us that the command is in the process of
developing new guidance on construction standards similar to Central
Command's guidance. Pacific Command officials told us that they were
unaware of guidance on constructing and maintaining forward-deployed
locations within their area of responsibility.[Footnote 23]
Within Central Command, the temporary status of many forward-deployed
locations has limited the emphasis on energy efficiency. Army Corps of
Engineers officials said that the concern about maintaining a temporary
presence, particularly in Iraq, limits the type of materials and
equipment they are authorized to bring to forward-deployed locations
and presents a challenge for creating energy efficiencies. The
officials noted that, in practice, the Army--which has the most
expertise in establishing forward-deployed locations in austere
environments--does not typically use materials designed for operations
lasting longer than 6 months at locations supporting current
operations. Similarly, when we visited Camp Lemonier in June 2008, Navy
officials told us that their camp's "expeditionary" status hindered
their ability to make construction upgrades to the camp, though we
observed that Camp Lemonier had been under DOD's control for about 6
years at that time.
In addition, the expedited nature of setting up forward-deployed
locations limits emphasis on energy efficiency. For example, Army Corps
of Engineers officials said that the approach to establishing forward-
deployed locations in support of current military operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan has been to start out with an austere set-up and build
up the locations as needed. Because it is unknown how long a location
might be in existence, the Army's initial focus is on establishment,
not on sustainment. In general, after the combatant commander
determines a need for a forward-deployed location and the requirement
is relayed to the Army, the Army moves quickly to deploy with
prepackaged kits of equipment. According to the officials, energy
efficiency is not a consideration at this point, and in fact, because
the goal is to set up a location quickly, establishing a forward-
deployed location can be energy intensive.
Though the process may vary depending on military service and the
specific circumstances, including mission requirements, officials from
the other military services described a similar process for how they
establish forward-deployed locations. An Air Force official told us
that because its service guidance does not explicitly address energy
efficiency, it allows a certain amount of freedom and flexibility for
the engineers, who "implicitly" incorporate energy efficiency into
their planning.[Footnote 24] A Marine Corps headquarters official told
us that it is difficult to address fuel demand at forward-deployed
locations because, as an expeditionary force, the Marine Corps does not
expect to maintain a long-term presence at forward-deployed locations.
Our review of the Navy's guidance on advanced basing also revealed no
mention of fuel demand management.[Footnote 25] A Navy official
involved with equipment logistics told us that his service has not been
directed to examine energy efficiency while outfitting or procuring
products for forward-deployed locations and that the Navy often resides
at locations operated by other military services.
Maintenance:
Similarly, we found a lack of attention to fuel demand in guidance,
including an absence of fuel usage guidelines and metrics to evaluate
progress of reduction efforts, as forward-deployed locations are
sustained over time. The guidance officials identified for us generally
does not address fuel demand management in sustaining locations even
after they have been in existence for a certain period of time. For
example, while the Air Force has issued guidance on vehicle management,
which includes a goal to replace 30 percent or more of all applicable
light duty vehicles with more fuel-efficient, low-speed vehicles by
fiscal year 2010, Air Force officials did not provide us specific
guidance on overall fuel demand management at forward-deployed
locations.[Footnote 26] The general lack of military service guidance
on this issue makes it difficult to ensure the continuity of fuel
reduction efforts at individual locations. For example, during our
visit to Camp Arifjan, an official told us that the camp's public works
department was considering efficiency ratings, when possible, during
the installation of heating and cooling systems in new or upgraded
facilities in Kuwait, but he was unaware of DOD guidance requiring
forward-deployed locations to address fuel demand. Moreover, officials
we spoke with at Camp Lemonier said that they intended to implement a
Navy instruction on energy management at their location even though it
only applies to non-nuclear ships, aircraft, vehicles, and shore
installations.[Footnote 27] While we found that both camps we visited
were pursuing efforts to reduce fuel demand, the efforts were driven
largely by individual officers with short tours of duty (typically 12
months or less). Without guidance and metrics that require forward-
deployed locations to address fuel demand, DOD cannot ensure that fuel
reduction actions taken at specific locations will be continued over
time, as personnel and mission requirements change.
Procurement:
In addition to construction and maintenance, the procurement of
products for forward-deployed locations presents opportunities for DOD
to consider making purchases that take into account fuel demand or
energy efficiencies when practical. DOD's guidance for its U.S. or
permanent installations requires the selection of energy-efficient
products when they are life-cycle cost effective, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has
established the DOD Green Procurement Program that strives to meet the
requirements of federal green procurement preference programs. However,
we did not find a similar emphasis on procuring energy-efficient
products at DOD's forward-deployed locations. Moreover, while the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 requires federal agencies to procure Energy
Star products or Federal Energy Management Program-designated products,
except in cases when they are not life-cycle cost effective or
reasonably available to meet agency requirements, the law does not
apply to any energy-consuming product or system designed or procured
for combat or combat-related missions.[Footnote 28] Officials from each
of the military services indicated that there were unaware of efforts
to procure energy-efficient products for forward-deployed locations.
Instead, they told us that other factors, such as mission requirements,
availability from local economies, or cost played a larger role in
procurement decisions. Moreover, military services often gather
together available equipment for forward-deployed locations from
prepackaged sets, units, or the region, with little attention to energy
efficiency. For example, Army Corps of Engineers officials told us that
the Army often deploys with disparate generators that may be old and
energy inefficient. While DOD guidance requires components to obtain
approval to procure nonstandard generators, an official from DOD's
Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power office admitted that it is
difficult to enforce the requirement at forward-deployed
locations.[Footnote 29] He also noted that the military services' lists
of required equipment may not contain enough power generation and
distribution equipment to support current operations. Thus, we found
that the military services turn to a variety of sources to find enough
generators and other products to meet mission requirements, often
without regard to energy efficiency.
There are some difficulties with procuring energy-efficient products
for forward-deployed locations. From the Defense Logistics Agency's
perspective, for example, these include limited product availability,
logistics associated with transport to remote locations, and the
compatibility of products with locally available energy sources, if
used; or in the case of a solar-powered system, for instance,
availability of on-site technical expertise for installing such a
system. However, given DOD's high fuel demand for base support
activities at its forward-deployed locations, without guidance in place
to incorporate energy efficiency considerations into procurement
decisions when practical, DOD may be missing opportunities to make
significant reductions in demand without affecting operational
capabilities.
Joint Living Standards:
In a separate effort, the Joint Staff is in the process of developing
common living standards (referred to as "joint standards of life
support") for military servicemembers at forward-deployed locations,
which could provide another opportunity to make decisions that take
into account fuel demand considerations. Joint Staff officials said
that the effort is intended to create a consistent level of
habitability for servicemembers through the establishment of standard
square footage requirements for living space, duration of showers, and
so forth that would be applied at forward-deployed locations after 45
days of establishment. The officials described the effort as a long-
term initiative intended to inform acquisitions. Once initial standards
are approved by the department, a DOD memorandum would require the
acquisition of common items, such as military tents, based on the
standards.
At the time we completed our audit work, the Joint Staff had proposed
an initial set of six standards--pertaining to field billeting,
showers, laundry facilities, latrines, ice, and feeding--and had
requested that a Senior Warfighting Forum be convened within DOD to
review the initial standards.[Footnote 30] While officials told us that
the Joint Staff has not included fuel demand considerations to date, we
found that the types of standards the Joint Staff is developing have
implications for fuel demand. For example, the duration of showers
relates to how much fuel is required for hot water heaters. Moreover,
the officials said that there may be opportunities in the future to
develop standards for items such as military tents, generators, and
other equipment used at forward-deployed locations. Thus, the effort
provides an opportunity to integrate fuel demand considerations that
could lead to long-term, departmentwide energy efficiencies.
DOD Lacks Incentives and a Viable Funding Mechanism for Fuel Reduction
Projects:
DOD has not established incentives or a viable funding mechanism for
fuel reduction projects at its forward-deployed locations, which does
not encourage commanders to identify fuel demand management as a
priority.
DOD Has Not Established Fuel Reduction Incentives for Forward-Deployed
Locations:
DOD does not provide incentives to commanders to encourage fuel demand
reduction at forward-deployed locations. By contrast, DOD emphasizes
and encourages energy reduction efforts at its U.S. installations. A
November 2005 instruction issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics requires the heads of DOD
components to develop internal energy awareness programs to publicize
energy conservation goals, disseminate information on energy matters
and energy conservation techniques, emphasize energy conservation at
all command levels and relate energy conservation to operational
readiness, and promote energy efficiency awards and recognition through
the use of incentives.[Footnote 31] The instruction also requires
training and education for achieving and sustaining energy-efficient
operations at the installation level through venues such as technical
courses, seminars, conferences, software, videos, and certifications.
The Navy has also established an energy conservation program, which has
an award component, to encourage ships to reduce energy consumption.
Awards are given quarterly to ships that use less than the Navy's
established baseline amount of fuel, and fuel savings achieved during
the quarter are reallocated to ships for the purchase of items such as
paint, coveralls, and firefighting gear. We previously reported that
the ship energy conservation program receives $4 million in funding
annually, and Navy officials told us that they achieved $124.6 million
in cost avoidance in fiscal year 2006. They said that some other
benefits of the ship energy conservation program include more available
steaming hours, additional training for ships, improved ship
performance, reduced ship maintenance, and conservation of resources.
However, neither the Navy nor the other military services have
established similar incentive programs for their forward-deployed
locations. Instead, officials throughout the department consistently
said that the amount of fuel forward-deployed locations consumed was
related to mission requirements. We found that the lack of incentives
tends to discourage commanders from pursuing projects that could reduce
fuel demand. During our visit to Camp Lemonier, for example, we noted
that officials had identified several projects that could reduce the
camp's fuel usage, including a proposal to right-size air conditioning
units in living units by replacing the current 2-ton units (24,000
BTUs) with 1-ton units and applying foam insulation to the rooftops of
several buildings. However, camp officials questioned whether the
upfront costs of these projects made them worth undertaking because
there was no apparent "return on investment" for the camp, which would
not see the associated savings to invest in other camp projects.
Similarly, while officials at Camp Arifjan provided several examples of
projects that could increase fuel efficiency at Kuwait locations,
without incentives to pursue these projects, it is unclear whether they
would take priority over other initiatives.
While DOD is driven to reduce energy consumption at its U.S.
installations largely by federal mandates and DOD guidance, encouraging
fuel demand reduction at forward-deployed locations will likely require
a culture change for DOD. According to OSD and DOD Power Surety Task
Force officials, the department has viewed fuel as a commodity
necessary to meet its mission requirements because, historically, fuel
has been inexpensive and free flowing for the department. However, from
the perspective of the Power Surety Task Force, if commanders could
reallocate funds saved through fuel reduction to other initiatives, DOD
could be in a position to significantly reduce fuel demand at their
locations.
Given DOD's view of the Global War on Terrorism as a "longer war,"
forward-deployed locations such as Camp Lemonier, Camp Arifjan, and
others could remain in existence for the foreseeable future and future
conflicts will likely require the department to establish new
locations. DOD recognizes the risks associated with its heavy fuel
burden, but without incentives, commanding officials at DOD's forward-
deployed locations are unlikely to identify fuel reduction as a
priority in which to invest their resources.
DOD Has Not Established a Viable Funding Mechanism for Fuel Reduction
Projects:
DOD also has not developed a viable funding mechanism for fuel
reduction projects at its forward-deployed locations. This makes it
difficult for commanders to pursue projects that would reduce fuel
demand, even though such projects could lower costs and, in some cases,
risks associated with fuel delivery. A lack of a viable funding
mechanism is an obstacle for locations supporting current operations,
which are largely dependent on supplemental congressional
appropriations. Since September 2001, a large portion of funding for
military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism has come
through supplemental appropriations, which are requested by the
department and approved by Congress separately from DOD's annual
appropriation. At the time of our visit, Camp Lemonier relied
completely on supplemental appropriations for its base support
activities, and officials told us delays in receiving these funds
presented challenges in covering existing costs, making it particularly
difficult to pursue more expensive fuel demand reduction projects. Camp
Arifjan was also heavily reliant on supplemental appropriations
associated with the Global War on Terrorism. However, because about 40
percent of the camp was funded through a defense cooperative agreement
with Kuwait, it also depended on the host country for resources.
We have previously reported that past DOD emergency funding requests
have generally been used to support the initial or unexpected costs of
contingency operations.[Footnote 32] Once a limited and partial
projection of costs could be made, past administrations have generally
requested further funding in DOD's base budget requests. We have
encouraged DOD to include known or likely projected costs of ongoing
operations related to the Global War on Terrorism with DOD's base
budget requests. However, current administration policy is that the
costs of ongoing military operations in support of the Global War on
Terrorism, such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, should be requested as emergency funding. A senior Air Force
official noted that, from his perspective, forward-deployed locations
dependent on this type of emergency funding do not have to worry about
reducing energy costs as DOD's permanent installations do because the
commanders of forward-deployed locations know they will receive
supplemental appropriations to cover their costs.
Our discussions with Army and DOD Power Surety Task Force officials
about construction and maintenance of forward-deployed locations
revealed that, from their perspectives, other funding restrictions also
pose challenges in addressing fuel demands. DOD is appropriated funds
for certain activities such as operation and maintenance, military
construction, and other procurement. Operation and maintenance funds
are used for minor construction spending, and such projects are limited
to $750,000 or less. In using operation and maintenance funds, the
department and military services are also restricted by law from
purchasing any investment item that has a unit cost greater than
$250,000.[Footnote 33] The officials told us that, from their
perspective, this restriction can result in energy inefficiencies. For
example, the Army typically deploys with several smaller, less
expensive and energy-inefficient generators. The officials said that,
ideally, the Army would like to deploy with a larger, energy-efficient
generator that exceeds the funding limit but could produce savings over
the long term. The military services can seek approval for projects in
excess of the limit, but projects compete with other priorities. An
official with DOD's Power Surety Task Force told us that officials at
Camp Victory in Iraq recently requested funding to consolidate
generators, which would result in greater fuel efficiency, but were
denied due to other priorities.
The department manages an Energy Conservation Investment Program that
provides congressionally-appropriated military construction funds for
projects that save energy or reduce defense energy costs for its
existing installations but has no similar program specifically for
forward-deployed locations. Through the program, the military services
and defense agencies may submit projects for funding consideration
based on a 10-year or less savings payback. Funds accrued through
project savings may be used on projects that have experienced cost
growth, for the design of energy conservation investment program
projects, to supplement the funding of future or prior-year program
projects, or for additional program projects. In fiscal year 2007, the
Energy Conservation Investment Program provided over $54 million for 48
projects. Projects at all but five locations--Naval Support Activity
Souda Bay, Greece; Kadena Air Base, Japan; Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico;
Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and a Defense Commissary project in Guam--
were located within the United States.
DOD also uses energy savings performance contracts (ESPC) at several of
its U.S. installations. Under an ESPC, DOD enters into a long-term
contract (up to 25 years) with a private energy services company
whereby the company makes energy-efficiency improvements financed from
private funds. DOD then repays the company over a specified period of
time until the improvements have been completely paid off. We
previously reported that DOD had undertaken 153 ESPCs to finance about
$1.8 million in costs at about 100 military installations from fiscal
years 1999 through 2003.[Footnote 34] Moreover, the Army Corps of
Engineers reported that from 1998 to March 2008, its Huntsville Center
had awarded ESPC contracts that have resulted in $420 million in
contractor-financed infrastructure improvements on Army installations
and a total projected energy cost savings to the government of $100
million.
At the time of our review, the DOD Power Surety Task Force was
investigating the feasibility of establishing an energy dividend
reinvestment program to fund DOD energy projects across the department.
According to the officials, the program would be structured similarly
to an ESPC whereby an installation commander or program manager could
submit a project for funding consideration. If, after analysis and
review, funding was provided to pursue the project, the installation or
program would then repay the program using savings achieved by the
resulting energy efficiencies. While an initial briefing prepared for
DOD's Energy Security Task Force and other department stakeholders
noted all energy projects within DOD could be eligible under the
program, including those at forward-deployed locations, the officials
told us that this is unlikely because, like ESPCs, the program would
rely on long-term contracts. DOD's forward-deployed locations might not
be in existence for long periods of time, and therefore, the program
might not be able to recoup savings for projects funded at these
locations. Moreover, the officials expressed concern that if an
installation or program incurred higher energy costs than anticipated,
it might not achieve its projected savings and might not be in a
position to repay DOD.
DOD's Power Surety Task Force found that the source of funding for
large fuel demand reduction projects, such as foaming tents at forward-
deployed locations in Afghanistan, has been a challenge for the
department, noting that energy efficiency does not fit neatly into the
military services' budget processes. While the military services'
budget processes allow them to budget for operation and maintenance
costs, research and development efforts, and so forth, the processes
prevent DOD from making quick, upfront investments in energy-efficiency
projects. Conversely, the officials told us that DOD's budget process
in effect discourages commanders from generating savings by reducing
their future budgets--a limitation also cited by officials during our
visit to Camp Lemonier. In 2003, our work highlighted a similar funding
problem concerning corrosion mitigation projects.[Footnote 35] We found
that DOD and the military services gave corrosion mitigation projects,
whose benefits may not be apparent for many years, a lower priority
than other requirements that showed immediate results. In response to a
subsequent Senate Armed Services Committee report, DOD established a
specific, separate budget line for corrosion prevention activities to
help ensure that sustained and adequate funding is available for the
corrosion control projects that have the best potential to provide
maximum benefit across the department.[Footnote 36] This serves as one
example for the department in considering how best to fund fuel
reduction projects at forward-deployed locations. Without establishing
a viable funding mechanism for these projects, DOD is not well-
positioned to achieve fuel savings at its forward-deployed locations.
DOD Lacks Visibility and Accountability over Fuel Demand Reduction:
While DOD and the military services have efforts under way to reduce
fuel demand at forward-deployed locations, DOD's current organizational
framework does not provide the department visibility or accountability
over fuel demand issues at its forward-deployed locations. We found
that fuel reduction efforts are not consistently shared among
locations, military services, or across the department and that there
is no one office or official specifically responsible for fuel demand
management at forward-deployed locations.
Officials we spoke with from each of the military services told us that
fuel demand reduction practices at forward-deployed locations were not
consistently shared. For example, Army Corps of Engineers officials
said that no formal system is in place specifically designed to share
fuel demand reduction practices. Informal conversations occur, though
on an ad hoc basis. They acknowledged that forward-deployed locations
often pursue different initiatives; and the department, other military
services, or other Army forward-deployed locations are often unaware of
these different initiatives. Air Force officials also said that their
service does not have visibility over fuel demand reduction practices
that may occur at forward-deployed locations, noting that with joint
operations and Air Force forces embedded with the Army, fuel
consumption is not systemically recorded. Officials from the Navy and
Marine Corps were also unable to provide examples where fuel demand
reduction practices were shared across locations.
Moreover, while DOD guidance sets forth principles and establishes
doctrine for bulk petroleum and water in support of military
operations, it does not designate any DOD office or official as being
responsible for fuel demand management at forward-deployed
locations.[Footnote 37] As table 1 shows, several different offices
have responsibility for petroleum management, but none is specifically
accountable for fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations.
Table 1: Responsibilities for Bulk Petroleum in Support of Military
Operations:
Office: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics;
Responsibilities: Establish policies for management of bulk petroleum
stocks and facilities and provide guidance to other DOD agencies, the
Joint Staff, and the military services.
Office: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel
Readiness);
Responsibilities: Serve as the central administrator for energy
management and has integrated materiel management oversight
responsibility for fuel products.[A].
Office: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller);
Responsibilities: In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, establish financial policies
and guidance for management of bulk petroleum products.
Office: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Responsibilities: Primarily focuses on wartime support; coordinate with
DOD, the military services, and the combatant commands to resolve
petroleum issues.
Office: Joint Staff J-4;
Responsibilities: Act as primary agent of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff for all bulk petroleum matters.
Office: Commander, U.S. Transportation Command;
Responsibilities: Develop long-range plans for petroleum support of the
inter-theater mission and contingency operations worldwide.
Office: Combatant Commanders;
Responsibilities: Ensure fuel support is provided to combat forces to
accomplish those missions assigned by the President and the Secretary
of Defense.
Office: Director, Defense Logistics Agency;
Responsibilities: Meet the petroleum support requirements of the
combatant commands and the military services.
Office: Director, Defense Energy Support Center;
Responsibilities: Carry out functional responsibilities of the
Director, Defense Logistics Agency to include procurement, ownership,
quality surveillance, accountability, budgeting, and non-tactical
distribution of bulk petroleum stocks to the point-of-sale.
Office: Military Services;
Responsibilities: Provide petroleum support to its service and other
services; is responsible for further distribution and management of
fuel once it has been delivered to the service.
Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 4-03.
[A] We previously reported that although this office plays an active
role in maintaining DOD policy on energy supply issues and participates
in other department-level fuel-related activities, its primary focus
has not been on departmentwide fuel reduction efforts.
[End of table]
In addition, we could not identify anyone who is specifically
accountable for fuel demand management through our interviews with
various DOD and military service offices. While the DOD Power Surety
Task Force has been serving as a liaison on energy issues between the
combatant commands and military services, its temporary status and
resources limit its effectiveness. Moreover, because the Power Surety
Task Force staff is made up of contractors, OSD recognizes that the
Power Surety Task Force cannot represent the department. Defense Energy
Support Center officials told us that DOD needs to create an energy
office to oversee fuel demand reduction efforts and develop policy for
the department.
The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009 requires DOD to establish a Director of Operational Energy Plans
and Programs, an operational energy strategy for DOD, and military
department-level energy officials. The military departments have
established senior energy officials, but DOD has not yet established a
director or strategy for operational energy. In meeting these
requirements, DOD has an opportunity to improve visibility and
accountability by assigning responsibility and emphasize fuel demand
management at forward-deployed locations at both the department and
military service levels. An OSD official involved with the DOD Energy
Security Task Force noted that operational energy options should be a
high priority of the new director. Without establishing visibility and
accountability over fuel demand management at forward-deployed
locations, DOD is not well positioned to address the shortcomings we
have identified in this report--including the lack of fuel reduction
guidance, incentives, and a viable funding mechanism for initiatives to
decrease demand. Thus, DOD cannot be assured that good fuel reduction
practices are identified, shared, prioritized, resourced, implemented,
and institutionalized across locations in order to reduce the costs and
risks associated with high fuel demand.
Conclusions:
DOD faces high costs, operational vulnerabilities, and logistical
burdens in sustaining forward-deployed locations that depend heavily on
fuel-based generators. Moreover, current operations have resulted in
DOD maintaining some forward-deployed locations for longer than
initially anticipated and generally without regard to fuel demand.
While DOD's future operations may be unknown, the department's goals to
reduce its reliance on petroleum-based fuel and minimize its logistics
footprint--coupled with its reexamination of its overseas posture to
better respond to the changing threat environment--underscore the
importance of increasing attention on fuel demand management at
overseas locations where U.S. forces are stationed. Although base
commanders must place their highest priority on meeting mission
requirements and it may not be practical for DOD to decrease fuel usage
at every forward-deployed location, particularly at those that might
not be in existence for very long, fuel demand is likely to remain high
until the department gives systematic consideration to incorporating
fuel demand in construction, maintenance, procurement, and other policy
decisions for forward-deployed locations. In addition, the department
will not be in a position to effectively identify, share, prioritize,
resource, implement, or institutionalize good fuel reduction practices
across locations that may exist for longer periods of time. By placing
a higher priority on fuel reduction at forward-deployed locations and
developing a comprehensive and coordinated approach to managing fuel
demand, one that includes specific guidelines, incentives, a viable
funding mechanism, visibility, and accountability, DOD would be more
likely to achieve its goals of reducing its reliance on petroleum-based
fuel, the vulnerabilities and logistics burden associated with
transporting large amounts of fuel to forward-deployed locations, and
operational costs.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To establish an effective approach to managing fuel demand that would
facilitate the widespread implementation of fuel reduction initiatives
and sustained attention to fuel demand issues at its forward-deployed
locations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following five actions.
1. Direct the combatant commanders, in consultation with their military
service component commands, to establish requirements for managing fuel
demand at forward-deployed locations within their areas of
responsibility and provide specific guidelines as appropriate.
Officials may wish to consider identifying a triggering mechanism in
the guidance, such as a specific length of time after a location is
established, when fuel demand management should become a consideration
in forward-deployed location sustainability. In establishing
requirements, the combatant commanders should coordinate their efforts
with the new DOD Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs to
ensure departmentwide communication and consistency, where appropriate.
2. Direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop guidance that implements
combatant command requirements for managing fuel demand at forward-
deployed locations. The guidance should include specific guidelines
that address energy-efficiency considerations in base construction,
maintenance, procurement, and policies regarding fuel usage at a
location. In establishing guidance, the military services should
coordinate their efforts with the new DOD Director of Operational
Energy Plans and Programs to ensure departmentwide communication and
consistency, where appropriate.
3. Direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to require that fuel
demand considerations be incorporated into the Joint Staff's initiative
to develop joint standards of life support at DOD's forward-deployed
locations.
4. Designate the new, congressionally-mandated DOD Director of
Operational Energy Plans and Programs as the department's lead
proponent of fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations, and
through this designation, require that the director develop action
plans as part of the congressionally-mandated DOD energy strategy.
Specifically, the strategy should incorporate the department's action
plans for:
* facilitating departmentwide communication and consistency, when
appropriate, in the development or revision of combatant command and
military service guidance that establishes requirements and provides
guidelines for managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations;
* establishing incentives for commanders of forward-deployed locations
to promote fuel demand reduction at their locations, as well as
identifying a viable funding mechanism for the department and
commanders of forward-deployed locations to pursue fuel reduction
initiatives;
* establishing visibility over fuel demand management at forward-
deployed locations, including plans for sharing good fuel reduction
practices and solutions to identified challenges; and:
* establishing accountability for fuel demand management at appropriate
levels across the department.
5. Direct the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to assign
their senior energy officials, among their other duties, responsibility
for overseeing fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations
operated by their military department components. In carrying out this
responsibility, the officials should identify and promote sharing of
good fuel reduction practices and solutions to identified fuel demand
challenges at their component's forward-deployed locations and
communicate those practices and solutions to the DOD Director of
Operational Energy Plans and Programs for potential use across the
department.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally
concurred with all of our recommendations. Technical comments were
provided separately and incorporated as appropriate. The department's
written comments are reprinted in appendix IV.
In response to our recommendation that DOD direct the combatant
commanders to establish requirements for managing fuel demand at
forward-deployed locations in coordination with the new DOD Director of
Operational Energy Plans and Programs, DOD partially concurred, stating
that it believes the combatant commanders must be the decision
authorities for when reduction efforts should begin to be tracked and
what conservation measures are employed, in order to avoid distraction
from tactical operations. While we agree that the combatant commanders
should be responsible for establishing requirements for managing fuel
demand at their forward-deployed locations, it is important that this
effort be coordinated with the new DOD director of operational energy
as well as with the service component commands. Our report recommends
that DOD designate the new director of operational energy as the lead
proponent of fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations, and
through this designation, facilitate departmentwide communication and
consistency of requirements and guidelines for managing fuel demand, as
well as establish visibility and accountability for fuel demand
management. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations pertaining
to the new director's responsibilities. In order to effectively carry
out these responsibilities, attain visibility over fuel demand issues
across the department, and serve as the DOD official accountable for
such issues, the director of operational energy should be consulted by
the combatant commanders in establishing fuel demand management
requirements to ensure departmentwide communication and consistency
occurs where appropriate.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the secretaries of the
military services develop guidance that implements the combatant
command requirements for managing fuel demand and include specific
guidelines that address energy efficiency considerations. In its
response, the department stated that guidelines on policy will be
general in nature and allow combatant commands flexibility. While we
believe that forward-deployed locations within different regions could
require different guidelines, our audit work revealed that current
guidance for Central Command and Army guidance used in Central Command
and European Command contain only a general reference to energy
efficiency--that semipermanent locations are to be designed and
constructed with finishes, materials, and systems selected for moderate
energy efficiency--and that this guidance is not effective in
implementing fuel demand considerations at forward-deployed locations.
Our report concludes that fuel demand is likely to remain high until
DOD gives systematic consideration to incorporating fuel demand
management into construction, maintenance, procurement, and other
policy decisions for forward-deployed locations. Therefore, we continue
to believe that the military service guidelines on fuel demand
management should provide enough specificity to appropriately address
these issues so that DOD can achieve its goals of reducing its fuel
demand, logistics burden, and operational costs.
As noted, DOD generally concurred with our recommendations on the
responsibilities of the new director of operational energy. However,
regarding the need to establish a viable funding mechanism for fuel
reduction projects at forward-deployed locations, the department stated
that it is not convinced that financial incentives represent the best
fuel reduction strategy for forward-deployed locations. We recognize
that DOD has various options for providing incentives to commanders at
forward-deployed locations to reduce fuel demand but continue to
believe that, based on our audit work, the availability of funding for
such projects is a concern that needs to be addressed.
DOD concurred with our other recommendations that the Joint Staff
incorporate fuel demand considerations into its initiative to develop
joint standards for life support at DOD's forward-deployed locations
and that the military department senior operational energy officials be
assigned responsibility for oversight of fuel demand management at
forward-deployed locations operated by their military service component
commands.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send
copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Secretary
of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps. This report will also be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to the report
are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Fuel Demand at Selected DOD Forward-Deployed Locations
during June 2008:
This appendix illustrates the Department of Defense's (DOD) fuel demand
at selected forward-deployed locations for a 1-month period during
2008. We obtained and analyzed fuel receipts and consumption
information, by fuel type (jet fuel, diesel, and mobility gasoline),
for each day in June 2008 from five forward-deployed locations that
were in Central Command's area of responsibility and heavily reliant on
fuel-consuming generators for power. The locations, which were selected
in consultation with Central Command officials, were:
* Camp Lemonier, Djibouti,
* Qayyarah West (Q-West) Air Base, Iraq,
* Camp Arifjan, Kuwait,
* Contingency Operating Base (COB) Adder, Iraq, and:
* Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan:
The information presents a snapshot in time and cannot be generalized
to other time periods or forward-deployed locations. One limitation of
the data involves how locations classified fuel consumed for either
base support activities (defined as power, heating/cooling, facilities,
communications) or air and ground operations (the later defined as
vehicles). Although we provided the locations with examples of base
support activities and air and ground operations, these categories can
encompass a wide range of interrelated or overlapping activities.
Therefore, we deferred to the discretion of location officials in how
they classified their fuel use activities. Another limitation involves
how the data were collected. Data collection procedures and systems
varied by military service component and location; however, we found
that each location used a quality assurance process to ensure that the
data were accurate and complete. Therefore, we concluded that the data
were sufficiently reliable for descriptive purposes. For more
information on our scope and methodology, see appendix II.
Selected Forward-Deployed Locations Reported Consuming Large Amounts of
Fuel for Base Support Activities and Air and Ground Operations in June
2008:
The locations we reviewed reported consuming a total of approximately
11.67 million gallons during June 2008 for base support activities,
including power for heating/cooling units, machinery, and lighting; and
for air and ground operations, including aircraft, armored vehicles,
and other forms of transport. Table 2 and figure 7 summarize these fuel
consumption data.
Table 2: Fuel Consumption Reported by Selected Forward-Deployed
Locations for June 2008:
Location: Camp Lemonier;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 333,191;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 460,555;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 793,746.
Location: Q-West Air Base;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 731,449;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 278,769;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 1,010,218.
Location: Camp Arifjan;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 930,472;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 266,154;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 1,196,626.
Location: COB Adder;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 1,171,618;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 430,395;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 1,602,013.
Location: Bagram Air Field;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 916,911;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 6,155,225;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 7,072,136.
Total;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 4,083,641;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 7,591,098;
Gallons of fuel consumed: 11,674,739.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Bagram Air Field and Camp Lemonier reported fuel for aerospace
ground equipment (equipment used in servicing, handling, and
maintaining weapon systems) as fuel for air or ground operations, while
Q-West reported fuel for aerospace ground equipment as fuel for base
support activities. The other two locations, COB Adder and Camp
Arifjan, do not have flying missions.
[End of table]
Figure 7: Proportion of Fuel Consumption Reported for Base Support
Activities and for Air and Ground Operations by Selected Forward-
Deployed Locations for June 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Forward-deployed locations: Camp Lemonier;
Air and Ground Operations: 460,555;
Base Support Activities (Percent): 333,191.
Forward-deployed locations: Q-West Air Base;
Air and Ground Operations: 278,769;
Base Support Activities (Percent): 731,449.
Forward-deployed locations: Camp Arifjan;
Air and Ground Operations: 266,154;
Base Support Activities (Percent): 930,472.
Forward-deployed locations: COB Adder;
Air and Ground Operations: 430,395;
Base Support Activities (Percent): 1171,620.
Forward-deployed locations: Bagram Air Field;
Air and Ground Operations: 6,155,231;
Base Support Activities (Percent): 916,911.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Bagram Air Field and Camp Lemonier reported fuel for aerospace
ground equipment as fuel for air or ground operations, while Q-West
reported fuel for aerospace ground equipment as fuel for base support
activities.
[End of figure]
As shown in table 2, of the overall amount of fuel consumed by the five
locations during this 1-month period, more than 4 million gallons (35
percent) were consumed for base support activities. In comparison, the
same amount of fuel could be used to fill 71 Boeing 747 jet
airliners.[Footnote 38] Base support activities accounted for over 70
percent of total fuel consumption for three of the locations in our
review--Q-West Air Base, Camp Arifjan, and COB Adder. COB Adder
consumed the largest amount of fuel for base support activities in June
at 1.17 million gallons. Bagram Air Field reported that 13 percent of
its fuel consumption in this month was for base support activities--a
proportion that was lower than that of the other bases. However, the
6.16 million gallons that Bagram Air Field consumed for air and ground
operations in June was more than four times the amount of fuel consumed
for air and ground operations by the other four locations combined.
Fuel Demand Profiles of Individual Locations:
Figures 8 through 12 provide a brief description of the mission, power
structure, and June 2008 fuel demand for each of the five forward-
deployed locations. Each profile also includes a chart showing the
proportion of total fuel consumed for base support activities and air
and ground operations.
Figure 8: Camp Lemonier:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Mission overview and power structure:
Camp Lemonier provides counterterrorism, diplomatic, and development
support within the Horn of Africa. It was a former French Foreign
Legion base that dates back to World War II. The U.S. Marine Corps took
over the camp in 2003, and it was transferred to the U.S. Navy in 2006.
Formerly under Central Command, Camp Lemonier is now under Africa
Command and is home to Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. It houses about
2,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel, including DOD contractors.
The base relies on generators for its electrical power.
Proportion of total fuel consumption (in gallons) reported
for base support activities and air and ground operations
in June 2008:
Air and Ground Operations (percentage): 333,191: (42%);
Base Support Activities (percentage): 460,555: (58%).
Summary of fuel consumption for June 2008:
In June 2008, Camp Lemonier consumed nearly 800,000 gallons of fuel,
and base support activities accounted for nearly 42 percent of the
total consumption. According to camp officials, much of the power
generated by the prime power system provided cooling for living
quarters.a The balance of fuel consumption was primarily for air
operations, but fuel consumption for June 2008 also included ground
vehicles.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data (pie chart).
[A] According to a DOD Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power official,
prime power refers to mobile, but large, generators that operate off of
higher voltages than spot generators and provide large amounts of
continuous power.
[End of figure]
Figure 9: Q-West Air Base:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Mission overview and power structure:
Qayyarah West Air Base, also called Q-West, was built in the late 1970s
and was an important Iraqi airfield. The primary mission of the base
now is to provide logistics for Multi-National Division-North.a The
base relies on generators for its electrical power. Prime power
provides 40 percent of the power, and the remainder is provided by spot
generation.b Plans call for expanding the use of prime power.
Proportion of total fuel consumption (in gallons) reported for base
support activities and air and ground operations in June 2008:
Air and Ground Operations (percentage): 278,769: (28%);
Base Support Activities (percentage): 731,449: (72%).
Summary of fuel consumption for June 2008:
More than 70 percent of Q-West‘s fuel consumption was used for base
support activities. The officials stated that mine-resistant, ambush-
protected vehicles generally consumed the most fuel for ground
operations during the time period we reviewed, but that the type of
equipment consuming the most fuel could vary on a daily basis.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data (pie chart).
[A] Iraq is divided into major areas of responsibility referred to as
major subordinate commands. These include (1) Multinational Division-
Baghdad, (2) Multinational Division-North, (3) Multinational Force-
West, (4) Multinational Division-Central South, and (5) Multinational
Division-Southeast.
[B] Spot generation, or distributed power, generally refers to
generators that operate at lower voltages and produce less power than
prime power units.
[End of figure]
Figure 10: Camp Arifjan:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Mission overview and power structure:
Camp Arifjan, through contractors, provides logistics support for
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The location receives approximately
40 percent of its electrical power from a local utility provide with
the remainder supplied by generators.
Proportion of total fuel consumption (in gallons) reported for base
support activities and air and ground operations in June 2008:
Air and Ground Operations (percentage): 266,154: (22%);
Base Support Activities (percentage): 930,472: (78%).
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data (pie chart).
[End of figure]
Figure 11: Contingency Operating Base Adder:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Mission overview and power structure:
COB Adder, located southeast of Baghdad, was established during the
initial invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003. The location relies
entirely on spot generation for electrical power. According to a
location official, COB Adder‘s generators are old, past their life
cycle, and are in need of upgrade or repair. This has resulted in
repeated power outages to the location‘s tactical operation centers and
living areas.
Proportion of total fuel consumption (in gallons) reported for base
support activities and air and ground operations in June 2008:
Air and Ground Operations (percentage): 430,395: (27%);
Base Support Activities (percentage): 1,171,618: (73%).
Summary of fuel consumption for June 2008:
During June 2008, COB Adder consumed more than 1.6 million gallons of
fuel, 73 percent of which were for base support activities. The fuel
consumed for base support activities was used to provide heating and
cooling for structures, field new equipment to units, construct
concrete barriers, and support the majority of base operations. The
remainder of the fuel consumed at the location was used for ground
operations, which include vehicles.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data (pie chart).
[End of figure]
Figure 12: Bagram Air Field:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Mission overview and power structure:
Bagram Air Field, established in 2001, serves as a logistical hub and
air base supporting U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The 455th Air
Expeditionary Wing has approximately 3,400 personnel stationed at
Bagram. The location relies on generators for its electrical power.
Proportion of total fuel consumption (in gallons) reported for base
support activities and air and ground operations in June 2008:
Air and Ground Operations (percentage): 6,155,225: (87%);
Base Support Activities (percentage): 916,911: (13%).
Summary of fuel consumption for June 2008:
During June 2008, base support activities accounted for approximately
13 percent of Bagram Air Field‘s overall fuel consumption. Most of the
fuel consumed in June 2008 was jet fuel for air operations. The fuel
used for ground operations constituted 3 percent of the total fuel
consumed and was primarily used for vehicles. Officials told us that
the fuel consumed at Bagram Air Field during June 2008 exceeded the
amount of fuel received during the same month due to delays and losses
during delivery. During that month, officials said that 44 trucks and
220,000 gallons of fuel were lost due to attacks or other events.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data (pie chart).
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
We conducted our work at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD);
the Joint Staff; the headquarters and select components of the Army,
Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; the Defense Logistics Agency,
including the Defense Energy Support Center; and the Power Surety Task
Force.
To review DOD efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed
locations, we reviewed DOD component documents describing efforts and
met with DOD and military service officials to identify and discuss the
intent, scope, and status of these efforts. Our review focused on
forward-deployed locations--installations or base camps situated
outside of the United States that support current operations--that rely
primarily on fuel-based generators, as opposed to local power
grids.[Footnote 39] We supplemented our analysis with visits to Camp
Arifjan, Kuwait, and Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, where we observed efforts
made at the locations and discussed them with cognizant officials.
After consultation with Central Command officials, we selected and
visited these two forward-deployed locations to gain a firsthand
understanding of fuel demand issues at these locations. We chose to
visit these locations because servicemembers at each location relied
heavily on fuel-based generators, as opposed to local power grids, to
carry out very different missions--the former directly supported
operations in Iraq while the latter provided diplomatic, development,
and counterterrorism support within the Horn of Africa.[Footnote 40] We
also chose these locations because officials told us that the camps
were pursuing fuel demand reduction efforts; for example, Camp Lemonier
had applied foam insulation to a facility to reduce fuel demand. We
treated these two locations as illustrative case studies in our report
and information obtained from these locations is not generalizable to
other forward-deployed locations.
To review DOD's approach to managing fuel demand at forward-deployed
locations, we analyzed department documents and held discussions with
DOD and military service officials to gain their perspectives on issues
including forward-deployed location construction and maintenance;
procurement; funding procedures; and applicable DOD guidance and laws
related to energy reduction, procurement, and military construction. To
provide context for understanding the challenges associated with
managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations, we obtained
information on fuel distribution and delivery processes and challenges
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and for the two forward-deployed locations we
visited. For comparison purposes, we reviewed policies and programs
related to energy awareness and reduction for DOD's permanent or U.S.
facilities. In identifying opportunities for DOD to increase visibility
and accountability of fuel demand management at its forward-deployed
locations, we reviewed sections of the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 that require DOD to, among other
things, establish a Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs
and an operational energy strategy and that require the secretaries of
the military departments to designate senior officials for operational
energy.
To provide information on DOD's fuel demand at selected forward-
deployed locations (app. I), we asked Central Command officials to
identify and collect fuel receipts and consumption data from June 1
through 30, 2008, at several forward-deployed locations in Iraq and in
Afghanistan that rely heavily on generators, as opposed to commercial
power supplied by the host country. The data collected only represent a
snapshot in time of fuel demand at selected locations and cannot be
generalized to other time periods or other forward-deployed locations.
In total, Central Command collected fuel receipts and consumption data
for us on two locations in Iraq (Q-West and Contingency Operating Base
Adder) and one location in Afghanistan (Bagram Air Field). In addition,
we collected fuel receipts and consumption data for the same time
period at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, the two
locations from our case-study analysis. The missions of these locations
ranged from providing logistics support to U.S. forces to supporting
development and diplomacy within the region. Central Command officials
told us that different military services and locations have different
methods for collecting and reporting data. Therefore, to attempt to
collect as similar data as possible among the various locations, we
agreed that Central Command would develop a standard data collection
spreadsheet for the locations to record the following information by
day in June 2008:
* the quantity of fuel in gallons received by fuel type--JP8 jet fuel,
diesel, or mobility gasoline,
* the quantity of fuel in gallons consumed for base support (defined as
power, heating/cooling, facilities, or communications),
* the quantity of fuel in gallons consumed for air mobility,
* the quantity of fuel in gallons consumed for ground mobility
(vehicles),
* the largest consumer of base support fuel (for example, heating/
cooling) and:
* the largest consumer of ground mobility fuel by day (for example,
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle).
This spreadsheet was used to collect fuel receipt and consumption data
from all five of the locations we reviewed. We agreed with Central
Command officials to use this spreadsheet to increase the likelihood
that the locations would categorize fuel consumed for base support
activities and ground and air operations similarly; however, some of
the locations categorized fuel used for aerospace ground equipment
differently.[Footnote 41] In an attempt to reconcile these differences,
we subsequently requested that officials provide us separate data
pertaining to aerospace ground equipment, but officials stated that the
data were not collected in a way that could enable them to do so.
Therefore, in appendix I we have noted this difference in the data
illustrating fuel used by the locations for base support and ground and
air operations. To determine whether the data were reliable and valid,
we sent follow-up questionnaires to each of the locations reviewed,
asking how the locations recorded and maintained the data provided to
us and what quality assurance process they used to ensure that the data
were accurate and complete. Although data collection procedures and
systems varied by military service component and location, we found
that the data underwent a quality review. Therefore, we concluded that
the data were sufficiently reliable for descriptive purposes.
We conducted our review from March 2008 through February 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Selected Initiatives of the DOD Power Surety Task Force
to Reduce Fuel Demand at Forward-Deployed Locations:
This appendix provides an overview of selected initiatives of the DOD
Power Surety Task Force that are aimed at reducing fuel demand at
forward-deployed locations. It also provides information on the status
of each initiative at the time we conducted our review.
Figure 13: Eskimo Spray Foam Insulation:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a photograph of Eskimo spray foam insulation.
Description: Application of foam insulation on tent structures to
decrease fuel demand. According to Power Surety Task Force officials,
Eskimo has demonstrated a 40 to 75 percent reduction in power use for
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning and is expected to recoup
costs within 4 months of deployment.
Status: Has been tested in four countries. Currently being applied to
tents in Iraq. DOD plans to apply foam on tents in Afghanistan and
Kuwait.
Source: GAO (photograph).
[End of figure]
Figure 14: Transportable Hybrid Electric Power Stations (THEPS):
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a photograph of Transportable Hybrid Electric Power
stations.
Description: Mobile generators with solar panels, wind turbine, diesel
generator, and storage batteries. DOD Power Surety Task officials
expect THEPS to recoup costs within 14 months of deployment.
Status: Four prototypes have been assessed at the National Training
Center in Fort Irwin, California. Results have been shared with the HI-
Power program. Task force officials said that improvements
for THEPS have been identified, and that a few issues had been
addressed. However, they believe that THEPS is not ready for deployment
to Iraq.
Source: DOD Power Surety Task Force (photograph).
[End of figure]
Figure 15: Net Zero Plus Joint Capability Technology Demonstration:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is Net Zero plus joint capability technology demonstration.
Description: Intended to demonstrate energy saving strategies that can
be employed at forward-deployed locations. The emphasis will be on
replacing temporary living, office, and operational facilities with
enduring energy efficient structures and integrating renewable energy
technologies with improved energy generation to power those
structures.
Status: Intended to be demonstrated over 3 years in three phases,
beginning in fiscal year 2008.
Source: GAO (photograph).
[End of figure]
Figure 16: Monolithic Dome:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a photograph of a monolithic dome.
Description: Concrete, dome-shaped structure that is designed to be
energy efficient with energy supplied by a combination of solar panels
and windmills. According to a Power Surety Task Force official, the
dome is 75 percent more energy efficient than a comparable structure of
traditional design and technology.
Status: Three domes were built and tested at the National Training
Center.
Source: GAO (photograph).
[End of figure]
Figure 17: Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery (TGER):
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a photograph of Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery.
Description: An experimental device that converts trash (paper,
plastic, cardboard, and food slop) into energy for forward-deployed
locations, reducing the need for convoys to deliver fuel and haul away
trash. According to Power Surety Task Force officials, a production
model TGER is expected to recoup costs within 18-24 months of
deployment.
Status: Two units have been tested in Iraq.
Source: GAO (photograph).
[End of figure]
Figure 18: Hybrid Electric Power Station:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a Hybrid Electric Power Station.
Description: A hybrid generator system that uses wind and solar energy
to supplement diesel generators.
Status: Power Surety Task Force officials worked with the Army to test
this initiative in Kuwait in late 2008.
Source: GAO (photograph).
[End of figure]
Figure 19: Power Surety Feasibility Assessment:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a picture of power surety feasibility assessment.
Description: Power Surety Task Force has performed or is in the process
of performing energy surveys to better understand fuel burdens at
forward-deployed locations and to provide suggested actions on how to
save fuel.
Status: Ongoing.
Source: GAO (photograph).
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
The Joint Staff:
Washington, DC:
February 5, 2009:
Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis,
This is the DOD response to the GAO draft report, GAO-09-300, "Defense
Management: DoD Needs to Increase Attention on Fuel Demand Management
at Forward-Deployed Locations," dated 8 January 2009 (GAO Code 351172).
Enclosure A is the DOD response to the GAO's recommendations. Enclosure
B provides technical comments that the Department of Defense recommends
incorporating for clarification.
Our technical comments reference the recently completed Army Energy
Security Implementation Strategy. The Army completed this strategy
after the GAO completed its review. Consequently, the information was
not available until January 2009. Including these recommended changes
will make the final GAO report current as it will reflect the latest
Army guidance.
The Joint Staff point of contact is Lieutenant Colonel Richard Jones,
USAF; J-4/SD, 703-571-9809.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
W.E. Gaskin:
Major General, USMC:
Vice Director, Joint Staff:
Department Of Defense Comments On The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Combatant Commanders, in consultation with their Service
component commands, to establish requirements for managing fuel demand
at forward-deployed locations within their areas of responsibility and
provide specific guidance as appropriate. Officials may wish to
consider identifying a triggering mechanism in the guidance, such as a
specific length of time after a location is established, when fuel
demand management should become a consideration in forward-deployed
location sustainability. In establishing requirements, the Combatant
Commanders should coordinate their efforts with the new DoD Director of
Operational Energy Plans and Programs to ensure Department-wide
communication and consistency, where appropriate.
DOD Response: Partially concur. Agree that managing fuel demand should
become a consideration in forward-deployed location sustainability and
that the Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs will be part
of establishing the threshold. However, the department believes that
Combatant Commander must be the decision authority for when reduction
efforts start getting tracked and what conservation measures are
employed in order to avoid detraction from tactical operations.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop guidance that implements
Combatant Command requirements for managing fuel demand at forward-
deployed locations. The guidance should include specific guidelines
that address energy efficiency considerations in base construction,
maintenance, procurement, and policies regarding fuel usage at a
location. In establishing guidance, the Services should coordinate
their efforts with the new DoD Director of Operational Energy Plans and
Programs to ensure Department-wide communication and consistency, where
appropriate.
DOD Response: Concur. Agree that the Services and Combatant Commands
should develop guidelines that address energy efficiency considerations
in base construction, maintenance, and procurement policies. Policies
for fuel usage at each individual forward-deployed location will likely
vary based upon equipment types and operations being conducted.
Guidelines regarding policy will be general in nature and allow
combatant commands flexibility. Additionally, once the framework for
applying the Energy Efficiency Key Performance Parameter is
established, the procurement process will properly weigh energy
efficiency in the Battlespace.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to require that fuel demand
considerations be incorporated into the Joint Staffs initiative to
develop joint standards of life support at DoD's forward-deployed
locations.
DOD Response: Concur.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
designate the new, congressionally-mandated DoD Director of Operational
Energy Plans and Programs as the Department's lead proponent of fuel
demand management at forward-deployed locations. DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require the DoD Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs to
develop action plans as part of the congressionally-mandated DoD energy
strategy. Specifically, the strategy should incorporate the
Department's action plans for: facilitating Department-wide
communication and consistency, when appropriate, in the development or
revision of Combatant Command and Military Service guidance that
establish requirements and provide guidelines for managing fuel demand
at forward- deployed locations;
* establishing incentives for Commanders of forward-deployed locations
to promote fuel demand reduction at their locations, as well as
identifying a viable funding mechanism for the Department and
Commanders of forward-deployed locations to pursue fuel reduction
initiatives;
* establishing visibility over fuel demand management at forward-
deployed locations, including plans for sharing good fuel reduction
practices and solutions to identified challenges; and:
* establishing accountability for fuel demand management at appropriate
levels across the Department.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. With regard to providing, "...a viable
funding mechanism for....Commanders...to pursue fuel reduction
initiatives," the department is not convinced that financial incentives
represent the best fuel reduction strategy for forward deployed
locations. The department will seek to incorporate reduction incentives
while recognizing the primacy of mission accomplishment.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps to assign the new, congressionally-
mandated Service senior energy officials, among their other duties,
responsibility for overseeing fuel demand management at forward-
deployed locations operated by their Service components. In carrying
out this responsibility, the officials should identify and promote the
sharing of good fuel reduction practices and solutions to identified
fuel demand challenges at their Service component's forward-deployed
locations and communicate those practices and solutions to the DoD
Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs for potential use
across the Department.
DOD Response: Concur.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Thomas Gosling, Assistant
Director; Karyn Angulo; Alissa Czyz; Gilbert Kim; James Lawson; Marie
Mak; and Ryan Olden made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] DOD distinguishes between mobility energy--the energy required for
moving and sustaining forces and weapons platforms for military
operations--and facility energy--the energy consumed at fixed
installations. Mobility energy, also known as operational energy,
includes the energy used to sustain forward-deployed locations and
constitutes about 75 percent of DOD's total energy use.
[2] DOD uses jet fuel (such as JP8) for a wide range of fuel needs, not
just for aircraft. DOD also uses diesel fuel and other types of
petroleum-based fuel at its forward-deployed locations.
[3] GAO, Defense Management: Overarching Organizational Framework
Needed to Guide and Oversee Energy Reduction Efforts for Military
Operations, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-426]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2008).
[4] GAO, Defense Management: Overarching Organizational Framework Could
Improve DOD's Management of Energy Reduction Efforts for Military
Operations, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-523T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2008).
[5] Central Command, one of DOD's six geographic combatant commands,
has an area of responsibility that encompasses over 25 countries
including locations in the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia.
[6] We excluded Navy vessels from the scope of our review.
[7] At the time of our visit in June 2008, both camps were under
Central Command's area of responsibility. On October 1, 2008, DOD
transferred Camp Lemonier under its newly established Africa Command.
[8] The act defines operational energy as the energy required for
training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapon platforms
for military operations; it includes energy used by tactical power
systems, generators, and weapon platforms.
[9] According to Central Command, as of November 2008, there were more
than 300 forward-deployed locations in Iraq and more than 100 in
Afghanistan, in addition to locations in other countries.
[10] Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy, More
Fight--Less Fuel (February 2008). These figures were based on data and
estimates collected by the DOD Project Manager-Mobile Electric Power
office and the assumption that 50 percent of the total generator fleet
would be utilized in wartime. The figures can vary greatly depending on
the operational environment and other factors.
[11] Pub. L. No. 110-417, Sec. 902 (a) (2008).
[12] Pub. L. No. 110-417, Sec. 332 (2008).
[13] Pub. L. No. 110-417, Sec. 333 (2008).
[14] Pub. L. No. 110-417, Sec. 331 (2008).
[15] Army Corps of Engineers officials told us that there are some
concerns about a lack of ventilation associated with the foam-insulated
tents. In response, a task force official said that tests indicated
that internal air quality standards could be met with the addition of a
ventilation system that could be installed using commercially-available
products and conventional tools.
[16] According to a Central Command official, the 50 percent fuel
savings estimate was based on feedback from military servicemembers.
[17] The fuel savings estimate is based on tactical electric power
operational requirements and takes into account the Army Force
Generation model, which assumes that one-third of Army generators are
used at wartime rates and two-thirds are used at peacetime rates in any
given year.
[18] Department of Defense Report to Congress on Energy Efficiency in
Weapons Platforms, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (Feb. 2008).
[19] DOD Instruction 4170.11, Installation Energy Management, Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (Nov.
22, 2005).
[20] Army Senior Energy Council and Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Energy and Partnerships, Army Energy Security
Implementation Strategy, Department of the Army (Jan. 8, 2009).
[21] U.S. Central Command Regulation 451-1, Construction and Base Camp
Development in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), "The Sand
Book," Headquarters, United States Central Command (Dec. 17, 2007);
United States Army Central Pamphlet 415-1, Military Operations:
Contingency Base Camp Handbook, Headquarters, United States Army
Central (Apr. 25, 2008); and Army in Europe Pamphlet 420-100,
Facilities Engineering: Standards for Forward Operating Sites,
Headquarters United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, United States
Army Installation Management Command Europe Region (Apr. 21, 2008).
[22] United States Army South Regulation 415-1, Construction: Engineer
Exercises in Latin America and the Caribbean, Headquarters, U.S. Army
South (June 2001).
[23] Army Corps of Engineers officials told us that Pacific Command
consults portions of other combatant command guidance as needed.
[24] Air Force Headquarters AFMC/A5C, Agile Combat Support CONOPS (Nov.
15, 2007), and Air Force Handbook 10-222, Guide to Bare Base
Development, Department of the Air Force (Feb. 1, 2006).
[25] Department of the Navy Instruction 4040.39B, Navy Advanced Base
Functional Components (ABFC) Planning and Programming System, Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations (Aug. 23, 1996).
[26] Air Force Instruction 23-302, Material Management: Vehicle
Management, Secretary of the Air Force (Oct. 29, 2007).
[27] Department of the Navy Instruction 4100.5D, Energy Management,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Apr. 12, 1994).
[28] Pub. L. No. 109-58, Sec. 104 (2005) (42 U.S.C. § 8259b (a)(5)
(2008)).
[29] DOD Directive 4120.11, Standardization of Mobile Electric Power
(MEP) Generating Sources (Apr. 13, 2004).
[30] A Senior Warfighter Forum is a forum directed by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, a four-star panel consisting of the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff and a four-star officer
designated by each of the military services that makes recommendations
to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on requirements, programs, and
budgets. The Forum organizes, analyzes, prioritizes, and frames complex
warfighter resource and requirements issues for the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council's approval.
[31] DOD Instruction 4170.11.
[32] GAO, Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to Take Action to
Encourage Fiscal Discipline and Optimize the Use of Tools Intended to
Improve GWOT Cost Reporting, GAO-08-68 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6,
2007).
[33] 10 U.S.C. § 2245a (2008).
[34] GAO, Energy Savings: Performance Contracts Offer Benefits, but
Vigilance Is Needed to Protect Government Interests, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-340] (Washington D.C.: June 22,
2005).
[35] GAO, Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs
and Increase Readiness, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-
753] (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003).
[36] S. Rep. No. 108-260, at 319 (2004).
[37] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and
Water Doctrine (May 23, 2003).
[38] Calculated using specifications from the Boeing Company's web
site.
[39] We excluded Navy vessels from the scope of our review.
[40] At the time of our visit in June 2008, both camps were under
Central Command's area of responsibility. On October 1, 2008, DOD
established Africa Command and transferred Camp Lemonier under this
command.
[41] Aerospace ground equipment refers to equipment used in servicing,
handling, and maintaining weapon systems. Bagram Air Field and Camp
Lemonier reported fuel for aerospace ground equipment as fuel consumed
for air or ground operations, while Q-West reported fuel for aerospace
ground equipment as fuel consumed for base support activities. The
other two locations, COB Adder and Camp Arifjan, do not have flying
missions.
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