Iraq and Afghanistan
Availability of Forces, Equipment, and Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans Gao ID: GAO-09-380T February 12, 2009The United States is in the process of developing its strategy for operations in Afghanistan, as well as for the drawdown and continued operations of forces in Iraq. As of December 2008, approximately 32,500 U.S. troops were deployed in Afghanistan. Moreover, DOD may add an additional 30,000 troops in Afghanistan. Since 2001, the war in Afghanistan changed from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency effort. As of December 2008, U.S. troops in Iraq numbered approximately 148,500. DOD also had about 162,400 contractors in Iraq as of mid-2008. Today's testimony addresses (1) key observations regarding the development of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) factors that should be considered as the United States refines its strategy for Iraq and plans to draw down forces; and (3) factors that should be considered as the United States develops a strategy for Afghanistan and plans for increasing forces. This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies on Iraq and Afghanistan.
Lessons learned from GAO's past work indicate that U.S. strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan should reflect a governmentwide approach and contain a number of key elements, including clear roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms among government agencies, as well as specific goals, performance measures, and time frames that take into account available resources. Given the heavy commitment of U.S. forces to ongoing operations over the past several years, the availability of forces, equipment, and infrastructure will need to be closely examined in developing plans to reposture military forces. Finally, in light of future demands on the federal budget, attention will be needed to ensure that U.S. plans are developed and executed in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Clearly, strong oversight by the Congress and senior decision makers will be needed to minimize past problems such as contract mismanagement and insufficient attention to overseeing contractors. In refining its strategy and plans for the drawdown of forces in Iraq, senior leaders will need to consider several operational factors. For example, DOD will need to develop plans to efficiently and effectively relocate thousands of personnel and billions of dollars worth of equipment out of Iraq; close hundreds of facilities; and determine the role of contractors. Furthermore, the capacity of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring countries may limit the speed at which equipment and materiel can be moved out of Iraq. With regard to Afghanistan, DOD will likely face an array of potential challenges related to people, equipment and infrastructure. For example, the availability and training of personnel will be critical considerations as the force is already significantly stressed from ongoing operations and current training capacity has been primarily focused on operations in Iraq. Additionally, the availability of equipment may be limited because the Army and Marine Corps have already deployed much of their equipment to Iraq and much of the prepositioned assets also have been withdrawn to support ongoing operations. Similarly, DOD will need to assess its requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities given its current allocation of these assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq. Further, the ability to transport personnel and equipment into Afghanistan will be challenged by the limited infrastructure and topography of Afghanistan. Moreover, the extent to which contractors will be used to support deployed U.S. forces must be considered as well as how oversight of these contractors will be ensured. Given all of these factors, sound planning based on a well-developed strategy is critical to ensure lessons learned over the years from Iraq are incorporated in Afghanistan and that competing resources are prioritized effectively between both operations.
GAO-09-380T, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans
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Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:30 a.m. EST:
Thursday, February 12, 2009:
Iraq And Afghanistan:
Availability of Forces, Equipment, and Infrastructure Should Be
Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans:
Statement of Janet St. Laurent, Managing Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-09-380T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-380T, a testimony before the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The United States is in the process of developing its strategy for
operations in Afghanistan, as well as for the drawdown and continued
operations of forces in Iraq. As of December 2008, approximately 32,500
U.S. troops were deployed in Afghanistan. Moreover, DOD may add an
additional 30,000 troops in Afghanistan. Since 2001, the war in
Afghanistan changed from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its
Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency effort. As of
December 2008, U.S. troops in Iraq numbered approximately 148,500. DOD
also had about 162,400 contractors in Iraq as of mid-2008.
Today‘s testimony addresses (1) key observations regarding the
development of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) factors that
should be considered as the United States refines its strategy for Iraq
and plans to draw down forces; and (3) factors that should be
considered as the United States develops a strategy for Afghanistan and
plans for increasing forces.
This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies on Iraq and
Afghanistan.
What GAO Found:
Lessons learned from GAO‘s past work indicate that U.S. strategy for
Iraq and Afghanistan should reflect a governmentwide approach and
contain a number of key elements, including clear roles,
responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms among government
agencies, as well as specific goals, performance measures, and time
frames that take into account available resources. Given the heavy
commitment of U.S. forces to ongoing operations over the past several
years, the availability of forces, equipment, and infrastructure will
need to be closely examined in developing plans to reposture military
forces. Finally, in light of future demands on the federal budget,
attention will be needed to ensure that U.S. plans are developed and
executed in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Clearly, strong
oversight by the Congress and senior decision makers will be needed to
minimize past problems such as contract mismanagement and insufficient
attention to overseeing contractors.
In refining its strategy and plans for the drawdown of forces in Iraq,
senior leaders will need to consider several operational factors. For
example, DOD will need to develop plans to efficiently and effectively
relocate thousands of personnel and billions of dollars worth of
equipment out of Iraq; close hundreds of facilities; and determine the
role of contractors. Furthermore, the capacity of facilities in Kuwait
and other neighboring countries may limit the speed at which equipment
and materiel can be moved out of Iraq.
With regard to Afghanistan, DOD will likely face an array of potential
challenges related to people, equipment and infrastructure. For
example, the availability and training of personnel will be critical
considerations as the force is already significantly stressed from
ongoing operations and current training capacity has been primarily
focused on operations in Iraq. Additionally, the availability of
equipment may be limited because the Army and Marine Corps have already
deployed much of their equipment to Iraq and much of the prepositioned
assets also have been withdrawn to support ongoing operations.
Similarly, DOD will need to assess its requirements for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities given its current
allocation of these assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq.
Further, the ability to transport personnel and equipment into
Afghanistan will be challenged by the limited infrastructure and
topography of Afghanistan. Moreover, the extent to which contractors
will be used to support deployed U.S. forces must be considered as well
as how oversight of these contractors will be ensured. Given all of
these factors, sound planning based on a well-developed strategy is
critical to ensure lessons learned over the years from Iraq are
incorporated in Afghanistan and that competing resources are
prioritized effectively between both operations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-380T]. For more
information, contact Janet St. Laurent, 202-512-4400,
stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Summary:
Establishing a Comprehensive U.S. Strategy Is an Essential First Step
in Planning for Future Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Operational Factors Should Be Considered in Developing Plans to Draw
Down U.S. Forces in Iraq:
Several Operational Concerns Need to Be Considered as DOD Refines Its
Strategy and Plans for Afghanistan:
Concluding Observations:
Contacts and Acknowledgements:
Related GAO Products:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss issues for
consideration as the United States develops its strategy and plans for
the future with regard to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As
conditions in Iraq have improved, the war in Afghanistan has now
entered its eighth year with a deteriorating security situation. As
such, the new administration is in the process of reviewing and
revising U.S. strategy. Also, the Department of Defense (DOD) has begun
planning for a reallocation of forces, which includes beginning to draw
down U.S forces in Iraq while increasing the U.S. military presence in
Afghanistan. According to DOD, these plans may include an increase of
up to 30,000 troops in Afghanistan. Since September 11, 2001, Congress
has provided about $808 billion to DOD for the Global War on Terrorism,
which includes operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003, and since that time the
United States has maintained a sizeable presence in Iraq, rotating
forces into and out of the country in support of ongoing operations.
After the U.S. military surge of five additional brigades peaked in
June 2007, those additional brigades began withdrawing in September
2007. In his April 2008 Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq,
the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), recommended that the
drawdown of brigade combat teams continue to pre-surge levels and that
an assessment then be performed to examine the conditions on the ground
and, over time, determine when he could make a recommendation for
further reductions. In the meantime, the November 2008 Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and the Republic of Iraq
that took effect January 1, 2009, specifies in detail and with specific
dates the requirements for future drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. As
of July 2008, there were approximately 162,400 DOD contractors and, as
of December 1, 2008, approximately 148,500 U.S. troops in Iraq.
Since 2001, the character of the war in Afghanistan has evolved from a
violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a
multifaceted counterinsurgency effort. In the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in order to end the ability of the
Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to
al Qaeda's use of Afghanistan territory as a base of operations for
terrorist activities.[Footnote 1] After the fall of the Taliban, the
character of the war shifted to a counterinsurgency effort. As of
December 1, 2008, approximately 32,500 U.S. troops were deployed in
Afghanistan-19,900 as part of OEF and 12,600 as part of the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF operates under
United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1833 and is comprised
of about 50,000 military personnel from 41 nations. ISAF forces
concentrate on stability and reconstruction operations, including
command of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). ISAF forces do not
have a mandate to perform any police training, but both OEF and ISAF
forces train and mentor the Afghan National Army. OEF is a smaller
multinational force that also pursues a more aggressive
counterterrorism role.
Afghanistan is a unique country with characteristics that will continue
to have distinct impacts on military operations there. For example, it
is slightly smaller than Texas but about a third larger than Iraq.
Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with limited
natural resources. Its population, estimated at over 31 million, is
ethnically and linguistically diverse, with many regions populated by
multiple ethnic groups speaking over 30 languages. The population is
largely rural and mostly uneducated. Afghanistan is one of the world's
poorest countries and ranks near the bottom of virtually every
development indicator category. Afghanistan has a poorly developed
infrastructure with few roads and little household access to
electricity and running water. According to the Central Intelligence
Agency World Factbook, Afghanistan has only 4 airports with runways
over approximately 3,000 meters. By way of comparison, Iraq has 19
airports with runways over approximately 3,000 meters. Additionally,
while Iraq has about 38,000 kilometers of paved roads, Afghanistan has
only about 12,000 kilometers of paved roads.
As you requested, my testimony will focus on the U. S. government's
efforts to develop a strategy for both Iraq and Afghanistan, and
factors DOD should consider as it develops and implements that
strategy. Specifically, I will address (1) key observations regarding
the development of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, (2) factors
that should be considered as the United States refines its strategy for
Iraq and plans to draw down forces, and (3) factors that should be
considered as the United States develops a strategy for Afghanistan and
plans for increasing forces.
My statement is based on our extensive body of work examining Iraq and
Afghanistan issues. A list of selected GAO reports and testimonies is
provided at the end of this testimony. This work was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
U.S. strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan should be comprehensive and
contain a number of key elements, including clear roles,
responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms among government agencies
and other sectors, as well as specific goals, objectives, performance
measures, and time frames for achieving the goals, taking into account
available resources. In refining its strategy and plans for the
drawdown of forces in Iraq and an increase of forces in Afghanistan,
there are several operational factors that DOD must consider to ensure
a successful approach. For example, with regard to an Iraq drawdown,
DOD's plans will need to consider the fact that some early planning
assumptions about the conditions and timing of redeployments may no
longer be applicable in light of the SOFA and evolving U.S. strategy.
For example, DOD's plans assume that redeployments would be based on
assessments of security and other conditions in Iraq. In addition, the
effectiveness and efficiency of DOD's redeployment efforts from Iraq
will depend on the extent to which it develops plans that address
challenges such as efficiently and effectively moving thousands of
personnel and billions of dollars worth of equipment out of Iraq. DOD's
ability to move equipment and materiel from Iraq may be constrained,
impacting its ability to quickly deploy these resources in Afghanistan
or elsewhere. Specifically, the availability of facilities in Kuwait
and other neighboring countries may limit the speed at which equipment
and materiel can be moved out of Iraq. With regard to a military build-
up in Afghanistan, some of the same challenges encountered during
operations in Iraq may also apply to that operation, but there will
likely be several new challenges as well. For example, the availability
and training of personnel will be critical considerations as the force
is already significantly stressed from ongoing operations and current
training capacity has been primarily focused on operations in Iraq.
Additionally, the availability of equipment may be limited because the
Army and Marine Corps have already deployed much of their equipment to
Iraq and much of their prepositioned assets also have been withdrawn to
support ongoing operations. Similarly, DOD will need to assess its
requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities to support increased force levels in Afghanistan, given
its current allocation of assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq.
Further, the ability to transport personnel and equipment into
Afghanistan will likely be constrained due to the limited
infrastructure and topography of Afghanistan. Moreover, the extent to
which contractors will be used to support deployed U.S. forces must be
considered as well as how oversight of these contractors will be
ensured. Given all of these factors, sound planning based on a well-
developed strategy is critical to ensure lessons learned over the years
from Iraq are incorporated in Afghanistan and that competing resources
are prioritized effectively between both operations.
Establishing a Comprehensive U.S. Strategy Is an Essential First Step
in Planning for Future Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan:
We have identified several key elements of an effective national
strategy that should be considered by the new administration in
developing national strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan to guide the
way forward.[Footnote 2]
* First, our work shows that new strategies for both countries should
reflect a comprehensive governmentwide approach and clearly delineate
U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms.
[Footnote 3] Not only should the strategy identify the specific U.S.
federal departments, agencies, or offices involved, but also the
responsibilities of the private and international sectors, and specific
processes for coordination and collaboration among the entities. In
particular, our work in Iraq has shown problems in these areas. For
example, in July 2006, we reported that the National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq (NSVI) did not clearly identify the roles and
responsibilities of specific federal agencies for achieving the
strategy's objectives, or how disputes among them will be resolved.
[Footnote 4] Later, in March 2008 we noted that U.S. efforts to build
the capacity of the Iraqi government have been hindered by multiple
U.S. agencies pursuing individual efforts without overarching
direction.[Footnote 5] We further noted that no single agency was in
charge of leading U.S. development efforts, and that the U.S. State
Department, DOD, and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) all led separate efforts with little or no coordination. As the
United States considers increasing its presence in Afghanistan, it will
be even more important that roles and responsibilities of the various
U.S. agencies are clearly identified and their programs and activities
are coordinated. For example, DOD's Commanders' Emergency Response
Program (CERP) and other funding have been used to a great extent for
building roads. At the same time, USAID has also invested funds in
constructing roads. In July 2008, we reported that coordination between
DOD and USAID on road projects was problematic because information was
not being shared among the agencies. As DOD expands its CERP program,
and other agencies expand their respective programs, it will be
important that their efforts be coordinated as part of an overall
development plan to identify priorities and maximize resources.
* Second, national strategies should include specific goals,
objectives, performance measures, and time frames for achieving the
goals. Regarding Iraq, one major issue that will need to be addressed
is to determine to what extent a drawdown of U. S. forces will be
determined based on the achievement of goals or conditions in light of
the specific time frames for withdrawal included in the November 2008
SOFA between Iraq and the United States that took effect in January
2009. Adopting a withdrawal timetable marks a major change from the
prior U.S. approach of withdrawing forces based on security, political,
economic, and diplomatic conditions in Iraq. The SOFA sets a two-phase
timetable--but no conditions--for withdrawing U.S. combat forces from
Iraq by the end of 2011. The President recently called for the
implementation of a responsible drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. A new
U.S. strategy and campaign plan for Iraq will need to clarify how a
responsible withdrawal of U.S. forces will be carried out consistent
with the SOFA timeframe. Furthermore, as the administration develops
strategies for both countries and plans to adjust force levels, it will
need to closely examine the availability of resources, given the heavy
commitment of U.S. forces to ongoing operations over the past several
years. The high pace of operations, particularly for ground forces
personnel, and heavy wear and tear on equipment have taken a toll on
the overall readiness of the U.S. military. These factors, coupled with
the likelihood of competing demands for certain capabilities to support
the drawdown of forces in one location and increase in forces in
another, such as strategic airlift, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets, and support forces, will need to be considered
in assessing the feasibility of various strategy options.
* Third, in light of future demands on the federal budget, attention
will be needed to ensure that U.S. efforts are executed in a manner
that maximizes the use of available resources and includes mechanisms
for oversight. From this perspective, it will be important that the
U.S. government make a concerted effort to avoid some of the problems
that occurred in Iraq which, in some cases, created numerous
opportunities for waste, fraud and mismanagement, particularly with
respect to the oversight and management of contractors. Another area
warranting attention is in DOD's approach to developing requirements
for equipment and other critical items to support operations in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, it will be important for DOD to
carefully screen and validate requirements and use cost-effective
approaches to acquiring items. Clearly, strong oversight on the part of
the Congress and senior decision makers within DOD will also be a
critical element to protecting the taxpayers' interest and resources.
Operational Factors Should Be Considered in Developing Plans to Draw
Down U.S. Forces in Iraq:
It is unclear how the timeline in the SOFA and growing operations in
Afghanistan will affect DOD plans for redeploying U.S. forces and
equipment from Iraq. As of September 2008, DOD's redeployment plans for
Iraq were based on three key assumptions that may no longer be
applicable in light of the SOFA and evolving U.S. strategy. These
assumptions were that:
* any redeployment will be based on MNF-I and Department of State
assessments of security and other conditions in Iraq;
* there will be sufficient lead time to refine redeployment plans once
an order with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued;
and:
* the redeployment of forces will be deliberate and gradual, predicated
on a 180-day process for units leaving Iraq and an estimated flow of no
more than 2.5 brigades' worth of equipment and materiel out of Iraq
primarily through Kuwait each month.
Based on discussions with DOD officials and an analysis of planning
efforts, we found that the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD's
redeployment efforts from Iraq will depend on the extent to which it
develops plans that address several issues such as the following
[Footnote 6]:
* Although the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has designated an
executive agent to coordinate the retrograde of materiel and equipment
from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified structure exists to
coordinate the teams and units engaged in efforts to manage and execute
the return of materiel and equipment. This results in confusion and a
lack of clarity on the ways those teams should be utilized. Joint
doctrine states that an unambiguous chain of command and clear
responsibilities and authorities are necessary for any such effort. We
have recommended, therefore, that DOD take steps to clarify a unified
or coordinated chain of command over logistical operations to support
this effort. While DOD has taken some actions to clarify certain
aspects of the command and control structure, we believe additional
steps are still needed to improve the efficiency of the retrograde
process.
* Closing or handing over U.S. installations in Iraq will be time-
consuming and costly. As of November 2008, there were 286 U.S.
installations in Iraq that will need to be closed or turned over to the
Iraqi forces during a U.S. redeployment, depending on its scope.
According to U.S. Army officials, experience has shown it takes 1 to 2
months to close the smallest platoon-or company-size installations,
which contain from 16 to 200 combat soldiers or marines. However, MNF-
I has never closed large, complex installations--such as Balad Air
Force Base, which contains about 24,000 inhabitants and has matured
over 5 years--making it difficult to accurately predict the time it
will take to close them. U.S. Army officials estimate it could take
longer than 18 months to close a base of that size.
* Maintaining accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S.
government property under the control of contractors may present
challenges to redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq. According to Defense
Contract Management Agency officials, there is at least $3.5 billion
worth of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq. From
late 2007 through July 2008, planning for the redeployment of U.S.
forces in Iraq did not include a theaterwide plan for contractors.
* The pace at which units can be redeployed and equipment and materiel
returned to the United States from Iraq will be governed by the
capacity of facilities in neighboring countries as well as restrictions
on the use of those facilities. According to DOD officials, Kuwait is
the main point of exit for all personnel, equipment, and materiel in
Iraq.[Footnote 7] At present there are three U.S. bases and five Kuwait
facilities that the United States is using to support operations in
Iraq, and the U.S.-Kuwait Defense Cooperation Agreement governs the use
of these facilities. According to DOD officials, any redeployment must
take into consideration the terms of this agreement, particularly given
that in their view, the government of Kuwait desires to limit the size
of the U.S. footprint in Kuwait.
* The availability in theater of military-owned and operated heavy
equipment transports and convoy security assets, combined with limits
on the primary supply route, could inhibit the flow of materiel out of
Iraq. According to DOD officials, two types of heavy equipment
transports support U.S. forces in the Iraqi theater of operations:
commercially contracted unarmored transports and armored military
transports with military crews. Any increase in the number of civilian
transports without a corresponding increase in the number of military
transports, they maintain, increases the risk of accidents. However,
DOD officials have reported shortages of military transports in
theater.[Footnote 8]
Several Operational Concerns Need to Be Considered as DOD Refines Its
Strategy and Plans for Afghanistan:
Based on our work examining current and past military operations, there
are several operational issues that must be considered as the United
States refines its strategy and plans for using military forces in
Afghanistan. We have identified several issues in the following five
key areas that warrant consideration by DOD planners as they develop
strategies and plans for these operations: availability of forces,
training of personnel, availability of equipment, transportation of
equipment and personnel, and management and oversight of contractors.
Availability of Forces:
Given the range of likely forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD may
continue to face near-term challenges in providing personnel for
operations in both locations. For the past several years, demands on
DOD's forces have been extremely high as the department has rotated
personnel in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan. As of December 1, 2008,
more than 180,000 service members were deployed in the two countries.
Demands have been particularly high within certain ranks and
occupational specialties. For example, officers and senior
noncommissioned officers are in high demand due to increased
requirements within deployed headquarters organizations, and
requirements for transition teams to train Iraqi and Afghan forces.
These teams do not exist in any of the services' force structures, and
the demand for these leaders creates challenges because the leaders are
generally pulled from units or commands, which are then left to perform
their missions while undermanned. The ongoing operations have
challenged DOD's ability to provide sufficient numbers of forces for
certain specialized capabilities including engineering, civil affairs,
transportation, and military police.
As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have continued, DOD has used a
number of different approaches to meet the ongoing requirements. For
example, it has adjusted the length and frequency of deployments and
reserve component mobilizations; moved personnel between units to
support deployments of units that were short of personnel; and used
Navy and Air Force personnel to fill some CENTCOM requirements that
would otherwise have exceeded the Army's capability to supply
personnel. While these approaches have helped DOD fill its ongoing
requirements, they have also created a number of challenges. For
example, many service members have experienced deployment and
mobilization rates in excess of DOD's stated goals. These goals
generally call for active component personnel to be deployed for 1 of
every 3 years and reserve component personnel involuntarily mobilized 1
of 6 years. In addition, the use of Navy and Air Force personnel has
presented challenges in meeting other service mission requirements.
Faced with these challenges, DOD developed a global force management
process that among other things was designed to prioritize
requirements, identify the most appropriate forces to meet combatant
command requirements, and provide predictability. The portion of the
global force management process that is being used to fill stable,
recurring world-wide requirements provides predictability and the time
necessary to consider a full range of options for meeting the combatant
commander requirements. However, a significant portion of emerging
requirements, including many of the Afghanistan requirements, are being
filled under a "request for forces" process that involves shorter time
lines. Within the shorter time lines, DOD may not have a full range of
options available to meet its requirements. For example, reserve
component forces may not be an option to meet some immediate
requirements because reserve forces train part-time and thus require
longer lead times to accomplish the same amount of training and
preparation when compared to full-time active component forces. If
emerging requirements for Afghanistan include many of the high demand
support skills that are resident in the reserve components, including
military police, engineers, and civil affairs units, DOD is likely to
continue to need to use its alternate approaches for filling
requirements--such as moving people between units, or using Navy and
Air Force personnel to fill traditional Army roles--rather than using
longer term options such as growing the force. These near-term
challenges could be exacerbated because many of these support forces
may also be needed to support the drawdown of forces in Iraq.
Adjustments in Training:
To meet mission requirements in CENTCOM, the services, particularly the
ground forces, have focused their unit training on counterinsurgency
tasks rather than full-spectrum operations. For example, since 2004,
all combat training rotations conducted at the Army's National Training
Center have been mission rehearsal exercises to prepare units for
deployments, primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan.
While DOD has invested heavily in training for particular mission sets
related to requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of that
effort has been directed at preparing for missions in Iraq, which has
had about five times as many U.S. forces as Afghanistan. As the number
of forces decreases in Iraq and increases in Afghanistan, it will take
time to adjust DOD's training capacity from one type of mission or
theater to another. For example, DOD has designed extensive training
areas to mimic Iraqi urban settings, has incorporated Arabic speakers
(the language spoken in much of Iraq) into training exercises, and
focused on weapons and tactics useful in densely populated areas, such
as training for escorting large armored convoys and using short-
barreled weapons in high-density population areas. In contrast,
training in Afghanistan has to take into consideration the more austere
operating environment, myriad mix of languages and cultures, and lack
of major infrastructure, such as paved roads. In addition, to support
ongoing operations, the Army has done an admirable job of enlisting
personnel returning from deployment to train next-deployers. While DOD
has some training infrastructure and combat-tested veterans to support
training for the Afghanistan mission, its training base is not
currently configured to support a large increase of forces deploying to
Afghanistan, and adjustments may need to be made to provide the
necessary capacity. Thus, it would be a risk to assume that units that
were preparing for deployments to Iraq could be easily rerouted for
deployments to Afghanistan with no changes in preparation, equipping,
or training.
Availability of Equipment:
Our previous work has shown that as of May 2008, DOD had the equivalent
of 47 brigades' worth of materiel and equipment in Iraq spread out over
some 311 installations of varying size.[Footnote 9] The majority of
this materiel and equipment, some 80 percent according to DOD
officials, is theater-provided equipment which includes approximately
582,000 pieces of equipment such as up-armored High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, Mine Resistant Armored Program (MRAP)
vehicles, and other wheeled and tracked vehicles. Although much of this
equipment has remained in Iraq as units rotate in and out, significant
amounts will be brought back to the United States if and when there is
a decrease in size of U.S. forces in Iraq. Upon returning from
operations, equipment is reset in preparation for future operations.
The services have also relied on prepositioned equipment stored at land
sites around the world as well as ships afloat. As we have previously
reported, the Army has withdrawn prepositioned equipment at various
stages throughout operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and removed
equipment from its prepositioned ships in December 2006 to accelerate
creation of two additional brigade combat teams.[Footnote 10] The Army
plans to reconstitute its prepositioned stocks by 2015; the Marine
Corps plans to reconstitute its prepositioned stocks by 2012.
The harsh operating environment and prolonged length of operations have
placed tremendous stress on deployed equipment. At the onset of
operations in Iraq in 2003, the Army and Marine Corps deployed with
equipment that in some cases was already more than 20 years old. The
services continue to operate equipment at a pace well in excess of
peacetime operations. In response to those challenges, the Army and
Marine Corps developed initiatives to retain large amounts of equipment
in theater and provide enhanced maintenance over and above the unit
level to sustain major equipment items such as High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles and other tracked and wheeled vehicles.
In-theater maintenance consists of field-level maintenance in Iraq and
some depot-level repair and upgrade capabilities at Camp Arifjan in
Kuwait. There are also limited maintenance facilities in Afghanistan.
The Army and Marine Corps have developed rotation plans that allow
equipment to be sent back to the United States for depot-level
maintenance cycles which essentially rebuilds equipment and extends its
service life.
Equipment availability may pose challenges depending on equipment
requirements for operations in Afghanistan. Army and Marine Corps
officials stated that they are in the process of determining equipment
requirements for Afghanistan; however, final equipment needs will be
based on several factors such as the type of operations, force
structure, and capabilities needed. For example, Army and Marine Corps
officials recently stated that operations in Afghanistan may require
lighter body armor and lighter MRAP vehicles. In addition, geographic
and environmental factors also play a role in determining equipment
requirements for Afghanistan. For example, heavy brigade combat teams,
which include tanks, may not be well suited for the Afghanistan
terrain. As a result, the Army is currently developing a lighter
version of the MRAP vehicle better suited for the difficult terrain of
Afghanistan. Also, given the fact that, since 2006, there have been
about 4,800 Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs requests
processed to date for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is likely
that the number of urgent needs requests will increase in the future as
DOD continues to build up its forces in Afghanistan.
In addition to ground equipment, DOD will need to assess its
requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities to support increased force levels in Afghanistan, given
its current allocation of assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq.
Although DOD has experienced a high level of mission success with ISR,
our work has shown that DOD continues to face challenges in maximizing
the use of these assets, including unmanned aerial systems.[Footnote
11] ISR assets have proven especially useful in counter-insurgency
operations and counter-terrorism, enabling the identification of
improvised explosive devices and the enemy forces who planted them. In
Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has employed military ISR collection assets
from each of the services, as well as national ISR collection assets.
As a result of operational successes, the demand for and use of ISR
assets continues to grow.
However, military commanders have also experienced numerous challenges
that should be considered as DOD considers its options for adjusting
force levels in Iraq to Afghanistan. During Operation Iraqi Freedom,
difficulties in airborne ISR assets' abilities to provide strategic,
operational, and tactical users with timely, accurate, and actionable
intelligence were reported. In addition, our previous work has shown
that DOD has faced challenges in optimizing the use of these assets,
including unmanned aerial systems. For example, DOD continues to
experience problems related to interoperability, availability of
communications bandwidths, and airspace integration. Some unmanned
aerial systems components cannot easily exchange and transmit data with
ground forces because they were not designed to interoperable
standards. In addition, stove-piped ISR allocation and tasking systems
do not allow consideration of the capabilities of all available ISR
assets in determining how best to meet the warfighters' needs.
Commanders at the theater level do not have information on how assets
controlled by tactical units are being employed, and tactical units do
not have information on how theater-level assets or assets controlled
by other tactical units are being used. Furthermore, DOD is still in
the process of developing metrics to measure the performance of these
assets. As we have recommended, improving visibility of all available
ISR capabilities and establishing performance metrics would help DOD
identify needs, make decisions about priorities, and optimize the use
of available assets.
The Report of the Joint Defense Science Board Intelligence Science
Board Task Force on Integrating Sensor-Collected Intelligence stated in
2008 that the number of images and signal intercepts being captured by
ISR assets is beyond the capacity of the current ISR infrastructure so
there are backlogs of data waiting for translators or image
interpreters. The Task Force made recommendations to improve
integration of data from different types of ISR assets and ensure that
information is visible and widely available to users. We are currently
assessing DOD's processes for analyzing, using, and disseminating
intelligence information and expect to report on these issues this
summer.
Factors Affecting Transportation:
Transportation issues should be a key factor in developing a strategy
for Afghanistan and continue to be a challenge for commanders. Changes
in regional staging base options, stresses on the limited military and
commercial air fleets, and underdeveloped infrastructure in landlocked
Afghanistan are only a few of the challenges that could exacerbate
already difficult transportation into and around the country.
As noted by military officials, operations in landlocked Afghanistan
depend on difficult and uncertain overland supply routes from
neighboring countries. This makes airlift very important, but
Afghanistan operations do not have the benefit of a nearby Kuwait-like
environment where staging and reception occur. Kuwait affords the
commanders in Iraq both air facilities and a seaport capable of
handling ships. To support air operations, commanders in Afghanistan
depend on access to bases such as Manas, Kyrgyzstan, which is still a
distance from Afghanistan. However, this access may not continue and
any strategy developed for operations in Afghanistan may have to
consider a regional approach. To this end, the Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command, has recently made efforts to secure other
options supporting movement into Afghanistan. Land routes, such as the
Khyber Pass, are also problematic. We have previously reported the lack
of a transloading operation for materiel shipped into Afghanistan,
similar to the one at the port of Kuwait for materiel going to Iraq, is
a limiting factor. Currently, items being shipped by sea to Afghanistan
enter through the port of Karachi, Pakistan, since Afghanistan is
landlocked. Officials told us that establishing a transloading
operation in Pakistan would be difficult.
U.S. strategy will have to consider the degree to which potentially
overlapping operations, the increase in U.S. forces in Afghanistan and
decrease of U.S. forces in Iraq, could stress U.S. strategic
transportation assets, both military and commercial. The U.S. military
primarily depends on commercial aircraft for strategic movement of
military personnel (93 percent of DOD personnel during a crisis) and,
to a lesser extent, for movement of equipment in a crisis or
contingency. Military-contracted commercial aircraft currently do not
enter either Iraq or Afghanistan, and military personnel and
contractors must transfer to U.S. military aircraft to reach their
final destinations. The Afghanistan situation differs from Iraq in that
military aircraft moving passengers into Afghanistan must travel
greater distances than those arriving in Iraq, and operations tempo and
aircraft utilization will reflect these increased demands. Also, U.S.
commercial aircraft do not deliver critical equipment into Afghanistan,
and essential systems, like MRAPs, arrive via contracted Russian
aircraft.
Limited existing facilities currently complicate arrival and onward
movement of forces and equipment and, as we increase force levels, may
have strategy implications for the near future. Ramp space and fuel
availability have been improved since operations began, but
infrastructure is limited and may influence the rate that forces can be
received and moved forward. For example, the way fuel is obtained and
distributed can potentially limit operations. In Afghanistan, Bagram is
the hub for fuel distribution, and distribution within the country is
difficult. In November 2008, the United States had over 100 forward
deployed locations in Afghanistan. Most fuel deliveries are made to
forward operating bases using commercial contractors, and we have found
through our work that fuel contractors strike often, delay delivery of
fuel, or arrive at destinations with fuel missing. Security issues
include attacks and threats on fuel convoys, and DOD officials have
told us that in June 2008, 44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were
lost in such events. It is unclear how the increased number of troops
will impact these issues.
Management and Oversight of Contractors:
In Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD relies heavily on contractors to not only
provide traditional logistical support--such as base operations support
(e.g. food and housing) and the maintenance of weapons systems--but
also intelligence analysis and interpreters who accompany military
patrols. DOD officials have stated that without a significant increase
in its civilian and military workforce, the department is likely to
continue to rely on contractors in support of future deployments.
Our body of work has identified several long-standing and systemic
problems that continue to hinder DOD's management and oversight of
contractors at deployed locations, which have led to negative financial
and operational impacts. Although we have made a number of
recommendations aimed at addressing these challenges, DOD has made
limited progress in implementing these recommendations. The key
problems we have identified include the following:
* Lack of adequate numbers of contract oversight personnel: Having the
right people with the right skills to oversee contractor performance is
crucial to ensuring the efficient and effective use of contractors.
However, most of the contract oversight personnel we have met with in
conducting work at deployed locations have told us DOD does not have
adequate personnel at those locations. We have found several cases in
Iraq where too few contract oversight personnel limited DOD's ability
to identify savings, monitor contractor performance, or resolve
contractor performance issues. While these personnel shortfalls are a
DOD-wide problem, the more demanding contracting environment at
deployed locations creates unique difficulties for contract oversight
personnel. Although the Army is taking steps to increase its
acquisition workforce, this will take several years, and in the
interim, the problems posed by personnel shortages in Iraq and
elsewhere are likely to become more significant in Afghanistan as we
increase the number of forces and the contractors who support them
there.
* Failure to systemically collect and distribute lessons learned: DOD
has made few efforts to leverage its institutional knowledge and
experiences using contractors to support deployed forces, despite years
of experience using contractors to support deployed forces in the
Balkans, Southwest Asia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. As a result, many of
the management and oversight problems we identified in earlier
operations have recurred in current operations. For example, we found
that a guidebook developed by U.S. Army, Europe on the use of a
logistical support contract in the Balkans was not made available to
military commanders in Iraq until 2006, limiting their ability to build
on efficiencies the Army had previously identified. We have also found
a failure to share best practices and lessons learned between units as
one redeploys and the other deploys to replace it. Given these
challenges, we have concerns that lessons learned from the experience
of using contractors to support forces deployed in Iraq may not be
shared with forces deploying to Afghanistan and many of the contractor-
related issues in Iraq may therefore recur in Afghanistan.
* Inadequate training of military commanders and contract oversight
personnel: We have issued multiple reports regarding the need for
better pre-deployment training of military commanders and contract
oversight personnel on the use of contractor support at deployed
locations. Limited or no pre-deployment training on the use of
contractor support can hinder the ability of military commanders to
adequately plan for the use of contractors and cause confusion. Several
commanders of combat units that deployed to Iraq told us that limited
or no pre-deployment training on services contractors would limit their
ability to integrate the need to provide on-base escorts for third
country and host country nationals, convoy security, and other force
protection support to contractors into their planning efforts. As a
result, the commanders were surprised by the substantial portion of
their personnel they had to allocate to fulfill these missions --
personnel they had expected to be available to perform other functions.
Lack of training also hinders the ability of contract oversight
personnel, such as contracting officer's representatives, to
effectively manage and oversee contractors, creating a variety of
problems including concerns about the quality of services being
provided and difficulties reviewing contractor performance. Although
DOD has taken steps to improve the contractor-related training of
military commanders and contract oversight personnel, it is likely that
training-related problems will continue to affect the management and
oversight of contractors in Afghanistan.
* Background screening of host nation and third country contractor
personnel: While contractor employees can provide significant benefits
to U.S. forces, they can also pose a security risk to U.S. troops,
particularly when U.S. forces are involved in a military operation
against an insurgency, as they are in Iraq. DOD and contractors,
however, have difficulty conducting background screenings of host
nation and third country national contractor employees because of a
lack of reliable information. Recognizing the limitations of data,
military officials responsible for security at installations in Iraq
and elsewhere told us that they take steps such as searching
contractors and escorting contractors on base to mitigate the risks
contractors, particularly non-U.S. contractors, pose. U.S. forces in
Afghanistan currently work with a number of host nation and third
country contractor employees. The number of these employees will likely
go up as the U.S. presence in Afghanistan increases, further
exacerbating challenges related to background screening.
In addition to these long-standing challenges, the unique aspects of
Afghanistan along with ongoing efforts regarding the drawdown of forces
in Iraq may present additional challenges regarding the use of
contractors to support forces deployed to Afghanistan.
* Different language needs: DOD relies on contractors to provide
linguist services in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the U.S. presence
increases in Afghanistan, so too will demand for contractor personnel
able to speak the languages in Afghanistan. The pool of Arabic
linguists will not be useful in supporting this requirement, and the
department may find it difficult to rapidly acquire sufficient numbers
of qualified individuals to support the mission in Afghanistan.
* Transportation and security concerns: Operation Iraqi Freedom
required the movement of large numbers of personnel and equipment over
long distances into a hostile environment involving harsh desert
conditions. The collective effort of military, civilian, and contractor
personnel in Iraq since then has been complicated by the country's lack
of a permissive security environment. Afghanistan presents its own
unique transportation and security concerns that will need to be
factored into how contractors will be able to support the increased
number of U.S. forces and, potentially, bases in Afghanistan.
* Drawdown will increase demands on contractors and contract oversight
personnel in Iraq: As noted above, the United States is planning for
the drawdown of its forces in Iraq. However, our previous work has
shown that there is not a one-for-one correlation between the number of
troops withdrawn from a contingency and the number of contractors
withdrawn. For example in 2003, we noted that when troop levels
decreased in the Balkans, contract support increased as additional
contractors were needed to continue the missions previously done by
service members.[Footnote 12] There may also be an increase in the
overall use of contractors to support the drawdown effort itself. For
example it is likely that DOD will need to increase its equipment reset
capabilities in theater by adding contractors. These increased
requirements will also increase the demands on contract oversight
personnel to manage and oversee these contractors. Contract oversight
personnel will also face increased requirements due to the need to
close out contracts supporting forces in Iraq. As a result, these
individuals may not be available to manage and oversee contractors in
Afghanistan.
Concluding Observations:
As I have stated today and as we have previously recommended, in
developing a comprehensive strategy for both Iraq and Afghanistan
several basic principles apply; that is, both strategies should include
clear and actionable near-and long-term goals and objectives, as well
as roles, responsibilities, resources to ensure success, and some means
to measure progress. In addition, as DOD considers the diverse but
related operational factors such as force availability, training,
equipment, transportation, contracting, and related infrastructure and
regional issues, these principles can be applied to both the drawdown
in Iraq and the buildup in Afghanistan. As the United States develops a
strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan, and related plans for adjusting
force levels, we believe that increased awareness of significant
challenges may improve their ability to successfully develop and
execute a strategy.
In addition, transparency of these strategies and operational factors
will also assist congressional decision makers with their oversight
responsibilities, especially as Congress considers programmatic issues
and funding requests.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have
at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgements:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Janet St.
Laurent, Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management or
stlaurentj@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include
Ann Borseth, Bruce Brown, Carole Coffey, Grace Coleman, Michael Ferren,
Jeremy Hawk, Larry Junek, Hynek Kalkus, Guy Lofaro, Gregory Marchand,
Judith McCloskey, Margaret Morgan, Marcus Oliver, Sharon L. Pickup,
James A. Reynolds, Donna Rogers, Cary Russell, Matthew Sakrekoff, David
Schmitt, Marc Schwartz, William. M. Solis, Maria Storts, Matthew
Tabbert, and Stephen Woods.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve
Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-175]. Washington, D.C.:
November 14, 2008.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for
Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-930]. Washington, D.C.:
September 10, 2008.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but
Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance
Program Are Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-689].
Washington D.C.: July 8, 2008.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington D.C.: June 23,
2008:
Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to
Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable
Afghan National Security Forces. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]. Washington D.C.: June 18,
2008.
Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the Training
and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-670]. Washington, D.C.; May 30, 2008.
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate
Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-568T]. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed to
Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-497T]. Washington, D.C.; February 14,
2008.
Defense Logistics: Army Has Not Fully Planned or Budgeted for the
Reconstitution of Its Afloat Prepositioned Stocks. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-257R]. Washington, D.C.; February 8,
2008.
Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That
Equipment Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While
Meeting Ongoing Operational Requirements. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-814]. Washington, D.C.: September
19, 2007.
Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army's
Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-936].
Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2007.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased
Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-836]. Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2007:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-801SP]. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007.
Defense Logistics: Improved Oversight and Increased Coordination Needed
to Ensure Viability of the Army's Prepositioning Strategy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-144]. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2007.
Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army's
Implementation of Its Equipment Reset Strategies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-439T]. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic
Equipment Requirements and Readiness. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-60]. Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP].
Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007.
Defense Transportation: Study Limitations Raise Questions about the
Adequacy and Completeness of the Mobility Capabilities Study and
Report. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-938]. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2006.
Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force
Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for
High-Demand Support Forces. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-962].
Washington, D.C.: September 5,
2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help
Achieve U.S. Goals. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788].
Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006:
Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset
Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-604T]. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Defense Logistics: Better Management and Oversight of Prepositioning
Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and Improve Future Programs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-427]. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Defense Logistics: DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution
Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-775]. Washington, D.C.: August
11, 2005.
Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of
Critical Items during Current and Future Operations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-275]. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2005.
Military Personnel: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Address Long-Term
Guard and Reserve Force Availability. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-285T]. Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2005.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force
Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1031]. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2004.
Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of
Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-305R]. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2003.
Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed
Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD's Plans. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-695]. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Congressional Research Service, War in Afghanistan: Strategy,
Military Operations, and Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
23, 2009).
[2] In July 2008, we recommended that DOD and State, in conjunction
with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated strategy for Iraq that
defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and addresses the
long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend, and
sustain itself. See GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, And Rebuilding Iraq:
Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1021T] (Washington, D.C.: July 23,
2008).
[3] This is one of GAO's six desirable characteristics of an effective
strategy: (1) purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) detailed discussion
of problems, risks, and threats; (3) the desired goal, objectives,
activities, and outcome-related performance measures; (4) description
of future costs and resources needed; (5) delineation of U.S.
government roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms; and
(6) a description of the strategy's integration among and with other
entities.
[4] See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy
Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2006).
[5] See GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address
Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-568T] (Washington, D.C.:
March 11, 2008).
[6] See GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD
Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-930] (Washington, D.C.: September
10, 2008).
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-930].
[8] According to DOD officials, although it is possible to self-deploy
vehicles from Iraq to Kuwait (i.e., drive them out under their own
power), the resulting wear and tear on a vehicle makes this an
unattractive alternative. Hence, when possible, vehicles are
transported out of Iraq on heavy equipment transports.
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-930].
[10] GAO, Defense Logistics: Army Has Not Fully Planned or Budgeted for
the Reconstitution of Its Afloat Prepositioned Stocks, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-257R] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8,
2008).
[11] See GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and
Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-836], (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2007).
[12] GAO, Military Operation: Contractors Provide Vital Services to
Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-695] (Washington, D.C.:
June 24, 2003).
[End of section]
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