Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's Border Area with Afghanistan
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight Gao ID: GAO-09-263SP February 23, 2009Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing the terrorist safe haven along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, an important ally in the war on terror, with more than $12.3 billion for a variety of activities, in part to address these goals. About half of this amount has been to reimburse Pakistan for military-related support, including combat operations in and around the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Despite 6 years of U.S. and Pakistani government efforts, al Qaeda has regenerated its ability to attack the United States and continues to maintain a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. As the United States considers how it will go forward with efforts to assist Pakistan in securing, stabilizing, and developing its FATA and Western Frontier bordering Afghanistan, it is vital that efforts to develop a comprehensive plan using all elements of national power be completed and that continued oversight and accountability over funds used for these efforts are in place.
This report provides background information on Pakistan; the status of U.S. government efforts to develop a comprehensive plan; and information on the goals, funding, and current status of U.S. efforts to use various elements of national power (i.e., military, law enforcement, development and economic assistance, and diplomacy) to combat terrorism in Pakistan. The scope of this report does not include the plans, goals, operations, activities, and accomplishments of the intelligence community.
GAO-09-263SP, Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's Border Area with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
February 2009:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's Border Area With
Afghanistan:
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight:
GAO-09-263SP:
Contents:
Letter:
Enclosure I: Pakistan Facts and Figures:
Demographics and Development Indicators:
Economy:
The FATA and the Pakistan-Afghan Border:
U.S. Funding to Pakistan:
Enclosure II: The United States Needs to Develop a Comprehensive Plan:
Prior Recommendations and Agency Responses:
Efforts Underway to Improve Interagency Coordination:
Oversight Questions:
Enclosure III: Use of Military Element of National Power:
U.S. Military-Related Programs in Pakistan:
Training and Equipping of the Frontier Corps:
Enhancement of Pakistani Military's Helicopter Capability:
Border Coordination Centers:
The Security Development Plan May Face Funding Shortfall in Fiscal Year
2009:
Oversight Questions:
Enclosure IV: Use of Law Enforcement Element of National Power:
State's Border Security Program Focused on the FATA:
Border Security Program Accomplishments:
Border Security Program Faces Implementation and Monitoring Challenges:
Other U.S. Government Law Enforcement Training Efforts in Pakistan:
Oversight Questions:
Enclosure V: Use of Development and Economic Assistance Elements of
National Power:
U.S. Development and Economic Assistance Programs:
U.S. Efforts to Support Pakistan's Sustainable Development Plan for the
FATA:
U.S. Considering Establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in
Pakistan:
Oversight Questions:
Enclosure VI: Use of the Diplomatic Element of National Power:
U.S. Embassy Plans for Diplomacy:
Diplomacy Efforts for the FATA:
Oversight Questions:
Enclosure VII: Oversight and Accountability of CSF and Other Funds
Provided to Pakistan:
Previously Reported Deficiencies in Oversight and Accountability of
CSF:
Prior Recommendations Regarding Oversight of CSF:
Efforts Undertaken to Improve Oversight and Accountability of CSF:
Oversight Questions:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: U.S. Funding to Pakistan by Element of National Power, FY 2002-
2008:
Table 2: U.S. Military-Related Funding to Pakistan, FY 2002-2008:
Table 3: U.S. Law Enforcement-Related Funding to Pakistan, FY 2002-
2008:
Table 4: USAID Development and Economic Funding to Pakistan, FY 2002-
2008:
Table 5: ESF-Funded Emergency Economic Assistance to Pakistan, FY 2002-
2008:
Table 6: State Public Affairs Funding to Pakistan, FY 2002 to 2008:
Figures:
Figure 1: Pakistan and the FATA:
Figure 2: Village in the FATA:
Figure 3: Percentage of Funding Devoted to Military Activities:
Figure 4: Frontier Corps Checkpoint in the FATA:
Figure 5: MI-17 Troop Transport:
Figure 6: Percentage of Funding Devoted to Law Enforcement Activities:
Figure 7: Village Spanning Both Sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan
Border:
Figure 8: State/INL-Funded Road in the FATA Next to a Highway:
Figure 9: Percentage of Funding Devoted to Development and Economic
Assistance Activities:
Figure 10: Beneficiaries of a USAID Health Project:
Figure 11: Beneficiaries of a USAID/Pakistan Education Project:
Figure 12: Percentage of Funding Devoted to Diplomatic Activities:
Figure 13: Pakistani Exchange Students' Pre-Departure Orientation:
Figure 14: Lincoln Corner Children Gathering to Gain a Better
Understanding of American Culture:
Figure 15: Revised CSF Oversight Process:
Abbreviations:
ATA: Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
CSF: Coalition Support Funds:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
ESF: USAID's Economic Support Fund:
FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FCR: Frontier Crimes Regulations:
FY: fiscal year:
GDP: Gross Domestic Product:
IMF: International Monetary Fund:
INL: Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement:
NWFP: North West Frontier Province:
OPDAT: Department of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial
Development, Assistance and Training:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 23, 2009:
Congressional Requesters:
Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing the terrorist
safe haven along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan have been key
national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, an
important ally in the war on terror, with more than $12.3 billion for a
variety of activities, in part to address these goals. About half of
this amount has been to reimburse Pakistan for military-related
support, including combat operations in and around the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Despite 6 years of U.S. and Pakistani
government efforts, al Qaeda has regenerated its ability to attack the
United States and continues to maintain a safe haven in Pakistan's
FATA. As the United States considers how it will go forward with
efforts to assist Pakistan in securing, stabilizing, and developing its
FATA and Western Frontier bordering Afghanistan, it is vital that
efforts to develop a comprehensive plan using all elements of national
power be completed and that continued oversight and accountability over
funds used for these efforts are in place. As such, we have enclosed a
series of issue papers for your consideration.[Footnote 1] These papers
focus on U.S. efforts in Pakistan's FATA and the Western Frontier and
are largely based on GAO reports, briefings, and testimonies provided
to Congress in 2008.
In 2008, we issued three products and delivered two testimonies before
Congress on Pakistan covering various aspects of U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism in the FATA.[Footnote 2] In summary, we reported that:
* The United States had not met its national security goals to destroy
terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA;
* The United States lacked a comprehensive plan to meet these goals
that included all elements of national power--diplomatic, military,
intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement
support--called for by various national security strategies and
Congress, as well as key components we have previously reported as
being needed to improve the effectiveness of plans involving multiple
departments; and:
* Increased oversight and accountability was needed over Pakistan's
reimbursement claims for Coalition Support Funds (CSF).
Based on our work, we made recommendations to the National Security
Advisor and the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
relating to the development of a comprehensive plan to combat the
terrorist threat in the FATA, and to the Department of Defense
(Defense) on the improvement of oversight of CSF reimbursements to
Pakistan.
Responsiveness to our recommendation to develop a comprehensive plan
has varied. For example, officials from Defense and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) generally concurred with our April
2008 recommendations on the need to develop a comprehensive plan using
all elements of national power to combat the terrorist threat and close
the terrorist safe haven. The Department of State (State) asserted that
a comprehensive plan exists, while the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center stated
in their April 2008 comments, as well as in an August 2008 follow-up
letter, that plans to combat terrorism exist.[Footnote 3] We do not
assert that the United States lacks individual agency plans to destroy
the terrorist threat in the FATA; rather, we found that there was no
comprehensive plan that integrated the combined capabilities of
Defense, State, USAID, the intelligence community, and others, and
included key components we called for in our report to meet U.S.
national security goals in Pakistan. As of January 2009, neither the
National Security Council, the National Counterterrorism Center, nor
Defense, State, or USAID, has produced for our review a comprehensive
plan as recommended in our April 2008 report. Defense concurred with
the recommendations in our June 2008 CSF report on accountability over
CSF reimbursements. In response, Defense issued new guidance and
traveled to Pakistan to begin working with Pakistani and U.S. Defense
officials to implement this guidance.
The enclosures that follow provide background information on Pakistan;
the status of U.S. government efforts to develop a comprehensive plan;
and information on the goals, funding, and current status of U.S.
efforts to use various elements of national power (i.e., military, law
enforcement, development and economic assistance, and diplomacy) to
combat terrorism in Pakistan. The scope of this report does not include
the plans, goals, operations, activities, and accomplishments of the
intelligence community. Included in these enclosures are oversight
issues for Congress and the new administration to consider. The final
enclosure discusses oversight and accountability issues relating to
U.S. funds or assistance provided to Pakistan.
These enclosures incorporate updated information from agency program
documents through February 2009 as well as budget information through
fiscal year 2008. We discussed the updated status of our prior findings
and recommendations with Departments of Defense, State, Justice, and
USAID officials involved in efforts to meet national strategic goals in
the FATA and Western Frontier, as well as the status of the U.S. effort
to implement the various elements of national power. We conducted this
performance audit from August 2008 through February 2009, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
We requested comments from the National Security Council, the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, Defense, Justice, State, and
USAID. The National Security Council and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence did not provide comments. We received technical
comments from Defense, Justice, State, and USAID, which we incorporated
throughout the report where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to Members of Congress, cognizant
congressional committees, the President and Vice President of the
United States, and executive branch agencies. The report also is
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact Charles Michael Johnson at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
In addition to the contact named above, Steve Sebastian, Director;
Hynek Kalkus, Assistant Director; Roger Stoltz, Assistant Director;
Edward J. George; Claude Adrien; David W. Hancock; Cara Bauer; Janice
Friedeborn; Karen Deans; and Mark Dowling made key contributions to
this report. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations
and Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this report.
Signed by:
Gene L. Dodaro:
Acting Comptroller General of the United States:
Enclosures:
Congressional Requesters:
The Honorable Howard Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Gary Ackerman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Dan Burton:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Flake:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Harkin:
The Honorable Robert Menendez:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Mike Pence:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Pakistan Facts and Figures:
Located in southern Asia, bordering the Arabian Sea, between India on
the east, Iran and Afghanistan on the west, and China on the north,
Pakistan's area is about 300,600 square miles, which is slightly less
than twice the size of California (see figure 1). It is divided into
four provinces, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab, Sindh,
and Balochistan, as well as the FATA. The entire Pakistani/Afghan
border, known as the Durand Line, is 1,640 miles of difficult, widely
differentiated terrain, from the southern deserts of Balochistan to the
northern mountain peaks of the NWFP.
The FATA is a tribal belt administered by the Pakistani government
consisting of seven tribal agencies (Khyber, Kurram, North and South
Waziristan, Mohmand, Bajaur, and Orakzai). Its area is approximately
10,500 square miles, roughly the same size as the state of Maryland.
The FATA shares a 373-mile border with Afghanistan.
Figure 1: Pakistan and the FATA:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, depicting the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Durand line. The
FATA include the following:
South Waziristan Agency;
North Waziristan Agency;
Kurram Agency;
Orakzai Agency;
Khyber Agency;
Mohmand Agency;
Bajaur Agency.
The FATA borders the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan.
Also included in the map is an inset showing a map of Afghanistan and
Pakistan, with the their respective capitals indicated:
Kabul, Afghanistan;
Islamabad, Pakistan.
Note: The boundaries and names used on this map do not imply official
endorsement or acceptance by the U.S. Government.
Source: GAO; USAID and Map Resources (maps).
[End of figure]
Demographics and Development Indicators:
Pakistan's population is estimated at roughly 170 million. Pakistan's
largest ethnic groups include Punjabi (45 percent), Pashtun (15
percent), Sindhi (14 percent), Siraiki (8 percent), Mohajirs (8
percent), and Balochi (4 percent). Some ethnic groups predominantly
populate specific regions, such as the Pashtun along both sides of the
border with Afghanistan. Several languages are spoken in Pakistan, the
most common being Punjabi (48 percent). Urdu and English are the
official languages spoken in Pakistan. About 38 percent of the
population is under age 15, and Pakistanis have a life expectancy of
about 64 years. Islam is the predominant religion--75 percent of the
population are Sunni and 20 percent are Shi'a.
Economy:
Pakistan's principal natural resources are arable land, water, and
energy reserves. Agriculture accounts for about 21 percent of
Pakistan's gross domestic product (GDP) and employs about 42 percent of
the labor force. The most important crops are cotton, wheat, rice,
sugarcane, fruits, and vegetables, which together account for more than
75 percent of the value of total crop output. Pakistan exports rice,
fish, fruits, and vegetables and imports vegetable oil, wheat, and
cotton. Pakistan is a net food importer and the economic prominence of
agriculture has declined since independence, when its share of GDP was
around 53 percent. Pakistan's manufacturing sector accounts for about
25 percent of GDP. Cotton textile production and apparel manufacturing
are Pakistan's largest industries, accounting for about 70 percent of
total exports. Pakistan has extensive energy resources, including
natural gas, oil, coal, and hydroelectric power potential. According to
State officials, however, these energy resources are not fully
exploited. For instance, domestic gas and petroleum production totals
only about half the country's energy needs.
The World Bank considers Pakistan a low-income country and it is among
the largest recipients of World Bank financial assistance. In fiscal
year 2007, World Bank support to Pakistan totaled $985 million, making
it the seventh largest borrower in the world. Pakistan's economy also
contends with structural problems and corruption.[Footnote 4]
Pakistan's macroeconomic situation deteriorated significantly because
of large price increases in key commodities such as oil and food. In
November 2008, the IMF's Executive Board approved a $7.6 billion loan
for Pakistan to support its program to stabilize and rebuild the
economy while expanding its social safety net to protect the poor. The
loan is intended to enable the government to address economic concerns
such as bringing down both the inflation rate and the budget deficit,
while increasing expenditures on the poor through such measures as
targeted electricity subsidies.
The FATA and the Pakistan-Afghan Border:
The FATA, where al Qaeda and other militants have succeeded in
establishing safe havens, has an estimated population of 3.1 million,
and is characterized by harsh geography, poor education, and scarce
infrastructure. The FATA is the poorest, least developed part of
Pakistan. Literacy is only 17 percent, compared to the national average
of 56 percent, and among women it is 3 percent. Annual per capita
income is roughly $250--half the national average. About 60 percent of
households live beneath the poverty line. There is little employment in
the industrial sector. The FATA's forbidding terrain, as shown in
figure 2, further serves to isolate tribal communities from markets,
health and education services, and many outside influences.
Figure 2: Village in the FATA [Aerial Photograph]:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
The FATA is governed by an administrative system and a judicial system
different from the rest of Pakistan--the Frontier Crimes Regulations
(FCR) of 1901, codified under British rule. Because Pakistan retained
the colonial administrative and legal structures of the British, the
FATA populations are legally separate from and unequal to other
Pakistani citizens. Examples of differences under the FCR include the
following:
* FATA residents do not have access to national political parties, and
political parties are forbidden from extending their activities into
the FATA.
* The FATA is under the direct executive authority of the president of
Pakistan. Laws framed by the National Assembly of Pakistan do not apply
in the FATA unless so ordered by the president, who is empowered to
issue regulations for the tribal areas.
* FATA residents do not have the right to legal representation, to
present material evidence, or to cross-examine witnesses in Pakistan's
judicial system. Those convicted of crimes are denied the right of
appeal in Pakistan's courts.
* The president's representatives to the FATA, who are called political
agents, can punish an entire tribe for crimes committed on the tribe's
territory by issuing fines, making arrests, implementing property
seizures, and establishing blockades.
Some believe that the FCR is a culturally acceptable recognition of the
tribal structure of the FATA, where the population is ethnically
different from the majority of Pakistan's citizens, and precludes
forced assimilation and that removing the FCR without a replacement
mechanism that is accepted by the indigenous population has the
potential to create a vacuum that could result in negative
consequences. An announcement by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza
Gillani proposing the repeal of the FCR drew mixed reactions from
tribesmen and political leaders, some of whom called for amendments to
the FCR, rather than its repeal.
U.S. Funding to Pakistan:
Since fiscal year 2002, the United States has provided Pakistan with
approximately $12.3 billion in assistance and reimbursements. Table 1
provides a breakdown of U.S. funds for Pakistan from fiscal year 2002
to 2008, broken out by elements of national power--military, law
enforcement, diplomacy, development assistance, economic, and
intelligence--that the administration's national security strategies
and Congress have recognized are needed to address the terrorist threat
emanating from the FATA.[Footnote 5] Greater details for these elements
of national power are provided in the following enclosures.
Table 1: U.S. Funding to Pakistan by Element of National Power, FY 2002-
2008 (Dollars in thousands):
Element of national power[A]: Military;
FY 2002: $1,464,911;
FY 2003: $1,473,183;
FY 2004: $781,928;
FY 2005: $1,273,037;
FY 2006: $1,218,435;
FY 2007: $1,095,315;
FY 2008: $1,387,543;
Total: $8,694,352;
Percentage: 70.4%.
Element of national power[A]: Law enforcement;
FY 2002: $100,725;
FY 2003: $31,700;
FY 2004: $36,400;
FY 2005: $40,200;
FY 2006: $46,220;
FY 2007: $31,327;
FY 2008: $31,547;
Total: $318,119;
Percentage: 2.6%.
Element of national power[A]: Development & Economic;
FY 2002: $662,899;
FY 2003: $258,262;
FY 2004: $303,538;
FY 2005: $404,733;
FY 2006: $677,477;
FY 2007: $542,277;
FY 2008: $445,194;
Total: $3,294,380;
Percentage: 26.7%.
Element of national power[A]: Diplomacy[B];
FY 2002: $3,486;
FY 2003: $3,957;
FY 2004: $6,811;
FY 2005: $5,869;
FY 2006: $9,144;
FY 2007: $8,735;
FY 2008: $1,497[C];
Total: $39,499;
Percentage: 0.3%.
Total:
FY 2002: $2,232,021;
FY 2003: $1,767,102;
FY 2004: $1,128,677;
FY 2005: $1,723,839;
FY 2006: $1,951,276;
FY 2007: $1,677,654;
FY 2008: $1,865,781;
Total: $12,346,350;
Percentage: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of budget documents provided by State Director of
Foreign Assistance.
[A] These elements of national power are based on National Strategies
and other national security documentation. To classify the funding we
relied on State budget documents and consultations with State Director
of Foreign Assistance, and made judgments based on the nature of many
of the programs funded. We combined the Development and Economic
elements due to the similar nature of the programs funded. These
figures do not include normal operating costs, such as salaries of U.S.
government officials.
[B] To capture the diplomatic element of national power we combined
programmatic State Public Diplomacy from the State Operations account
with State Education and Cultural Exchange programs in Pakistan.
[C] State did not provide GAO with FY 2008 State Education and Cultural
Exchange funding.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Enclosure II: The United States Needs to Develop a Comprehensive Plan:
In our April 2008 report, we reported that the U.S. government had not
met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close
the safe haven in the FATA and had not developed a comprehensive plan
reflecting the integration of multiple U.S. government agencies'
efforts for meeting U.S. national security goals in Pakistan's FATA,
[Footnote 6] as called for by the National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism (2003), the independent 9/11 commission (2004), and as
mandated by congressional legislation (2007).[Footnote 7] We also
reported that the U.S. embassy in Pakistan has had no Washington-
supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorism and close the
terrorist safe haven in the FATA. We concluded that a comprehensive
plan to combat terrorism was needed. We noted that this plan should
include, among other things, the various elements of national power and
clear goals, objectives, priorities, and milestones in order to help
ensure the continuity of effort and allow Congress and the American
public to assess progress and ensure accountability of U.S. efforts in
Pakistan's FATA and Western Frontier.
Prior Recommendations and Agency Responses:
To address the lack of a comprehensive plan, we recommended that the
National Security Advisor and the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, in consultation with the Secretaries of
Defense and State, and the Administrator of USAID, the intelligence
community, and other executive departments as deemed appropriate,
implement the congressional mandate to develop a comprehensive plan. We
also recommended that the comprehensive plan include all elements of
national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development
assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--called for in the
Intelligence Reform Act, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, and components that we have previously reported
as being needed to improve the effectiveness of plans involving multi-
departmental efforts to combat terrorism. Specifically, we recommended
that the plan should:
* place someone directly in charge of this multi-department effort to
improve accountability;
* articulate a clear strategy to implement the national security goal
to destroy terrorists and close the safe haven in the FATA;
* clarify roles and responsibilities of each department;
* provide guidance on setting funding priorities and providing
resources;
* require a monitoring system; and:
* provide periodic reports to Congress on the progress and impediments.
In written responses to our report, Defense and USAID concurred with
the recommendation that a comprehensive plan should be developed; State
asserted that a comprehensive plan existed; the NSC provided no
comments; while the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and
the National Counterterrorism Center stated that plans to combat
terrorism exist. During a May 20, 2008, hearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the Deputy Secretary of State also
indicated plans exist for a variety of efforts underway to assist
Pakistan in combating terrorism, but he acknowledged that more can be
done to integrate plans to focus on the threat along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border. The Deputy Secretary of State also indicated that
efforts were underway to revisit the U.S. plans to focus on the key
components suggested in our April 2008 report. The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence noted in an August 2008 response to
our request for a status update on the development of a comprehensive
plan that it continues to disagree that the United States lacks plans
to combat terrorism in Pakistan's FATA. The Director also noted that
the United States has a multi-faceted strategy, with short-and long-
term elements to increase the capability of Pakistani security forces
to confront terrorist groups. We do not assert that the United States
lacks individual plans; rather, we did not find nor were we provided a
comprehensive plan that integrated the combined capabilities of
Defense, State, USAID, the intelligence community, and others, and
included key components we called for in our report to meet U.S.
national security goals in Pakistan. As of January 2009, neither the
National Security Council, the National Counterterrorism Center, nor
Defense, State, or USAID has produced for our review an integrated
comprehensive plan as recommended in our April 2008 report.
Efforts Underway to Improve Interagency Coordination:
Since the release of our report in April 2008, the U.S. embassy in
Islamabad has taken steps to coordinate the various efforts of Defense,
USAID, and State to implement their department-specific efforts focused
on combating terrorism in the FATA and Western Frontier. In addition,
the embassy, in conjunction with State headquarters, was working to
build support in Washington, D.C., for the need for a more
comprehensive approach to combating terrorism, including greater
integration of U.S. and Pakistani efforts in the FATA. State also
continued to collect information on Defense, USAID, and State
activities in the FATA, and added new objectives under the diplomatic
element of national power, including (1) increased cross-border
dialogue with Afghanistan, and (2) a public diplomacy objective
intended to undermine the ideological foundation of extremism and
bolster the image of the Pakistan government in the FATA.
State has staffed three new coordinator positions--one at State in
Washington, D.C., and one each for the U.S. embassies in Pakistan and
Afghanistan---intended to improve coordination among U.S. programs on
each side and across the Pakistan--Afghanistan frontier. Their goals
include (1) increasing interagency communications at the working level
and (2) integrating elements of U.S. strategy into a comprehensive
effort along the border. In addition, an Afghan-Pakistan Border Working
Group was convened in July 2008 and has met seven times as of December
18, 2008. It includes representatives from the National Security
Council; the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce;
USAID, and the U.S. Trade Representative.
Oversight Questions:
As the United States moves forward in its efforts to address the
terrorist threat and close the safe haven, the following oversight
issues should be addressed:
* What progress has been made in developing a comprehensive plan, as
called for by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 and the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007?
* What obstacles or impediments have prevented the completion of a
comprehensive plan?
* Are there sufficient resources devoted by the various agencies toward
completing the development of a comprehensive plan to address U.S.
national security goals in the FATA?
* How well are the various agencies coordinating their efforts in
developing a comprehensive plan and what interagency agreements, if
any, have been reached?
[End of section]
Enclosure III: Use of Military Element of National Power:
The United States has relied primarily on the use of the military
element of national power to address national security-related
priorities in Pakistan, providing about $8.7 billion in military-
related reimbursements and assistance since 2002. As figure 3 shows,
the military element of national power has accounted for about 70
percent of U.S. funds devoted to addressing the U.S. strategic goals in
Pakistan. This enclosure provides information on the U.S. military-
related funding and programs for Pakistan including status of the U.S.
Security Development Plan for FATA and the Western Frontier. It also
highlights several oversight issues for Congress and the new
administration to consider.
Figure 3: Percentage of Funding Devoted to Military Activities:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Percentage of Funding Devoted to Military Activities:
[Emphasis: Military: 70.4%;]
Development - Economic: 26.7%;
Law enforcement: 2.6%;
Diplomacy: 0.3%.
Source: GAO analysis of budget documents provided by State Director of
Foreign Assistance.
Note: Funding figures do not include normal operating costs, such as
salaries of U.S. government officials or funding for covert activities.
[End of figure]
Table 2 indicates the amount and sources of U.S. military-related
funding to Pakistan.
Table 2: U.S. Military-Related Funding to Pakistan, FY 2002-2008
(Dollars in thousands):
Funding source: State: Foreign Military Financing;
FY 2002: $75,000;
FY 2003: $224,500;
FY 2004: $74,560;
FY 2005: $298,800;
FY 2006: $297,000;
FY 2007: $297,000;
FY 2008: $297,570;
Total: $1,564,430.
Funding source: State: International Military Education and Training;
FY 2002: $894;
FY 2003: $990;
FY 2004: $1,384;
FY 2005: $1,885;
FY 2006: $2,037;
FY 2007: $1,992;
FY 2008: $2,325;
Total: $11,507.
Funding source: State: Peacekeeping Operations;
FY 2002: $220,000;
FY 2003: 0;
FY 2004: 0;
FY 2005: 0;
FY 2006: $850;
FY 2007: $700;
FY 2008: $750;
Total: $222,300.
Funding source: Defense: CSF Reimbursements;
FY 2002: $1,169,017;
FY 2003: $1,246,571;
FY 2004: $705,278;
FY 2005: $963,925;
FY 2006: $861,604;
FY 2007: $731,772;
FY 2008: $900,600;
Total: $6,578,767.
Funding source: Defense: Counterterrorism Fellowship Funding;
FY 2002: 0;
FY 2003: $1,122;
FY 2004: $706;
FY 2005: $727;
FY 2006: $744;
FY 2007: $998;
FY 2008: $816;
Total: $5,113.
Funding source: Defense: Counternarcotics Funding;
FY 2002: 0;
FY 2003: 0;
FY 2004: 0;
FY 2005: $7,700;
FY 2006: $28,700;
FY 2007: $49,100;
FY 2008: $54,700;
Total: $140,200.
Funding source: Defense: Section 1206 Funding;
FY 2002: 0;
FY 2003: 0;
FY 2004: 0;
FY 2005: 0;
FY 2006: $27,500;
FY 2007: $13,753;
FY 2008: $55,782;
Total: $97,035.
Funding source: Defense: Frontier Corps Train and Equip Authority;
FY 2002: 0;
FY 2003: 0;
FY 2004: 0;
FY 2005: 0;
FY 2006: 0;
FY 2007: 0;
FY 2008: $75,000;
Total: $75,000.
Funding source: Total;
FY 2002: $1,464,911;
FY 2003: $1,473,183;
FY 2004: $781,928;
FY 2005: $1,273,037;
FY 2006: $1,218,435;
FY 2007: $1,095,315;
FY 2008: $1,387,543;
Total: $8,694,352.
Source: GAO analysis of budget documents provided by the State Director
of Foreign Assistance.
Note: Funding figures in this table do not include normal operating
costs, such as salaries of U.S. government officials.
[End of table]
U.S. Military-Related Programs in Pakistan:
Coalition Support Funds Used to Reimburse Pakistan for Military
Operations: CSF payments have been used since fiscal year 2002 to
reimburse the Pakistani government for incremental costs (i.e., costs
above and beyond normal operating costs) incurred in direct support of
U.S. military operations associated with the war on terror.[Footnote 8]
CSF has reimbursed a broad range of Pakistani military operations,
including navy support for maritime patrols and interdiction
operations; air force support for combat air patrols, reconnaissance
and close air support missions, airlift support, and air traffic
control; army military operations in the FATA; and increased management
requirements at the Pakistan Joint Staff Headquarters. These activities
include Operation Al Mizan, a major deployment of the Pakistani army to
combat al Qaeda, Taliban, and other militants in the North West
Frontier Province and the FATA that began in 2001 and has continued in
various phases to date. The goal of this operation was to intercept
militants attempting to escape the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan by
fleeing into Pakistan. According to Defense, Pakistan has deployed over
100,000 army and paramilitary troops in support of this operation,
incurred more than 1,400 casualties, and killed hundreds of al Qaeda,
Taliban, and other terrorists. According to Defense, CSF is critical to
ensure Pakistan's continued support of U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism. Defense officials stated that without CSF or a similar
mechanism to reimburse Pakistan for its support, Pakistan could not
afford to deploy military forces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
Foreign Military Financing Program: Foreign Military Financing is the
second-largest source of military-related funding provided to Pakistan,
superseded only by CSF reimbursements. Foreign Military Financing has
been used to provide grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense
equipment to enable key allies to improve their defense capabilities
and to foster closer military relationships between the United States
and recipient nations. Pakistan has used Foreign Military Financing to
purchase military equipment, such as Cobra helicopters, Harris radios,
and upgrades to its F-16 fighter aircraft.
International Military Education and Training, Regional Defense
Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, and Peacekeeping Operations: Both
the International Military Education and Training and the Regional
Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program provide training to foreign
military and related civilian personnel. The International Military
Education and Training program specifically allows these personnel to
train at various U.S. military war colleges in the United States. The
Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program provides education
and training to the same foreign personnel, but concentrates on
counterterrorism activities intended to bolster the capacity of
friendly foreign nations to detect, monitor, and interdict or disrupt
the activities of terrorist networks. Additionally, Peacekeeping
Operations funding is currently used by State to engage the Pakistan
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense to develop plans to increase
Pakistan's capacity for conducting international peace support
operations.
Security Development Plan: Defense's Security Development Plan, which
seeks to enhance the counterinsurgency capacity of Pakistani security
forces in FATA and the Western Frontier, has three objectives: (1) to
secure Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, (2) to deny terrorists a
safe haven in the FATA, and (3) to create a security environment that
allows economic development and political reform to begin. The plan
encompasses Defense's initiatives in the FATA and the Western Frontier
to achieve these goals and is funded through several sources:
Counternarcotics, Section 1206, and Frontier Corps Train and Equip
Authority. According to Defense officials, Defense Counternarcotics
funding can be used to support counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan due
to the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border. Section 1206 funds are used to build the capacity
of foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or
support U.S. military operations. The Frontier Corps Train and Equip
Authority is an authority created in the fiscal year 2008 National
Defense Authorization Act that allows Defense to provide assistance to
enhance the ability of the Frontier Corps to conduct counterterrorism
operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The plan calls for
annual investments of around $200 million through 2012. The centerpiece
of the plan, according to Defense officials, is the expansion,
training, and equipping of the Pakistan Frontier Corps, a paramilitary
force that has previously experienced deficiencies in training and
equipment.[Footnote 9] The goal is to turn the Frontier Corps into a
local security force capable of supporting Pakistan's counterinsurgency
operations and providing sufficient security to allow for investments
in local governance and economic development to yield results.
Training and Equipping of the Frontier Corps:
The Security Development Plan seeks to assist the Pakistani government
in establishing 16 new Frontier Corps units of about 650 personnel each
capable of counterinsurgency operations. However, a deteriorating
security environment has delayed the completion of a training center in
the NWFP that was to be used to train Frontier Corps units. Defense
expects that the facility will not be operational until early 2009.
As the additional Frontier Corps units proceed through training,
Defense plans to supply each trainee with equipment needed to carry out
their counterinsurgency efforts, such as helmets and protective vests.
Defense is also currently supplying mobility equipment--pickup trucks,
water trucks, ambulances, motorcycles--to existing Frontier Corps units
already deployed to address existing mobility deficiencies. See figure
4 for an example of the mobility challenges posed by the mountainous
terrain in the FATA.
Figure 4: Frontier Corps Checkpoint in the FATA [Aerial Photograph]:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Enhancement of Pakistani Military's Helicopter Capability:
The Security Development Plan is also intended to support the
maintenance and re-servicing of Pakistani army helicopters used for
counter-insurgency operations in the FATA and Western Frontier,
including Bell 412s, Cobra gunships, and MI-17 troop transports. Bell
412s are utility helicopters used primarily for command and control
functions in the border region where there is rough terrain. These
helicopters are also used for administrative airlift and have been
equipped with door guns to use in the provision of security for
Pakistani army convoy movements. Cobra gunships are used in the FATA to
support ground forces with missiles, rockets, and guns. MI-17s are
heavy-lift helicopters used to move commando units in and out of combat
operations, including for medical evacuation (see figure 5). According
to Defense officials, these MI-17s are reaching their 1,500 flight hour
marks, at which point they must go through mandatory re-servicing.
Defense plans to enhance the operational readiness of all three
helicopter types by providing initial maintenance and developing long-
term sustainment programs. According to Defense officials, the MI-17s
are particularly important for the air mobility of the Special Services
Group Quick Reaction Squadron, a Pakistani army commando unit that
conducts targeted counterterrorism missions in the FATA and elsewhere.
Under the Security Development Plan the Special Services Group Quick
Reaction Squadron is being provided with night vision equipment as well
as air assault training and tactics.
Figure 5: MI-17 Troop Transport [Photograph]:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Source: Defense.
[End of figure]
Border Coordination Centers:
Finally, the Security Development Plan includes the establishment of
six Border Coordination Centers to integrate border security
operations. Their mission is to coordinate friendly forces and
coordinate the interdiction of terrorists and others. Each center is to
be staffed with officers from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and coalition
forces, and will possess communications and surveillance capabilities
intended to provide tactical intelligence to military forces on both
sides of the border. The first center in Torkham, Afghanistan, became
operational in October 2008. A second center is under construction in
Afghanistan. Defense plans for the third and fourth Border Coordination
Centers to be located on the Pakistan side of the border. The locations
for the centers, however, have not been finalized with the Pakistani
government.
The Security Development Plan May Face Funding Shortfall in Fiscal Year
2009:
Defense estimated that around $230 million would be required to fully
support the Security Development Plan initiatives in fiscal year 2009.
In fiscal year 2009, the plan received a total of $62.5 million ($37.5
million in counternarcotics funding and $25 million in Frontier Corps
Train and Equip Authority funding). As a result, Defense's Security
Development Plan faces a shortfall of approximately $167.5 million,
about 73 percent of its funding goal for fiscal year 2009. As of
December 2008, no existing security assistance funds have been re-
directed toward the Security Development Plan. Defense officials stated
that without dedicated long-term funding, implementation of the
Security Development Plan may be hampered, and the training and
equipping of the Frontier Corps could slow down by March 2009.
Oversight Questions:
* To what extent do the U.S.-funded Pakistani military efforts align
with the U.S. national security goals in Pakistan's FATA and Western
Frontier? What are future U.S. plans and strategies for this area?
* What have been the results of the U.S. investment of about $8.7
billion toward military efforts to address the terrorist threat and
close the safe haven in Pakistan?
* To what extent do the U.S.-funded Pakistani military efforts assist
in securing and stabilizing regions for development projects to be
undertaken in the FATA and Western Frontier? How is Defense measuring
the Pakistani military's adoption and success at implementing an
effective counterinsurgency doctrine to accomplish military goals and
to allow for economic development?
* What has the Security Development Plan accomplished to date and what
are future objectives?
* How is the Security Development program coordinated with other U.S.
efforts? For example, how has Defense's effort to train and equip the
Frontier Corps built on prior State efforts under the Border Security
Program to train and equip the Frontier Corps?
* Given the shortfall in funding noted by Defense officials to fully
implement the Security Development Plan in fiscal year 2009, how does
Defense envision funding the remainder of the Security Defense Plan?
What effect does the current funding situation have on planning and
implementation?
* What measures does the United States have in place to assess the
readiness and capability of Frontier Corps units that have been trained
and equipped under the U.S.-funded Security Development Plan?
* What is the level of oversight and accountability controls over
equipment provided to the Frontier Corps?
[End of section]
Enclosure IV: Use of Law Enforcement Element of National Power:
The United States has used the law enforcement element of national
power to address national security-related priorities in Pakistan,
providing about $318 million in law enforcement-related assistance
since 2002. As figure 6 shows, the law enforcement element of national
power has accounted for about 3 percent of U.S. funds devoted to
addressing the U.S. national security goals in Pakistan. This enclosure
provides information on U.S. government agency efforts to provide law
enforcement-related assistance to Pakistan, including the efforts of
the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury that relate to the
training and equipping of law enforcement entities, improving law
enforcement access, and combating terrorist financing. It also
highlights several oversight issues for Congress and new administration
to consider.
Figure 6: Percentage of Funding Devoted to Law Enforcement Activities:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Percentage of Funding Devoted to Law Enforcement Activities:
Military: 70.4%;
Development - Economic: 26.7%;
[Emphasis: Law Enforcement: 2.6%;]
Diplomacy: 0.3%.
Source: GAO analysis of budget documents provided by State Director of
Foreign Assistance.
Note: Funding figures do not include normal operating costs, such as
salaries of U.S. government officials or funding for covert activities.
[End of figure]
Table 3 indicates the amount of U.S. law enforcement-related assistance
to Pakistan. This funding is provided through the State Department's
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and Nonproliferation, Anti-
terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs accounts. According to State,
it also provides a small amount of operational support for law
enforcement agencies.
Table 3: U.S. Law Enforcement-Related Funding to Pakistan, FY 2002-
2008 (Dollars in thousands):
Funding source: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement;
FY 2002: $90,625;
FY 2003: $31,000;
FY 2004: $31,500;
FY 2005: $32,200;
FY 2006: $37,620;
FY 2007: $21,350;
FY 2008: $21,822;
Total: $266,117.
Funding source: Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs;
FY 2002: $10,100;
FY 2003: $700;
FY 2004: $4,900;
FY 2005: $8,000;
FY 2006: $8,600;
FY 2007: $9,977;
FY 2008: $9,725;
Total: $52,002.
Funding source: Total;
FY 2002: $100,725;
FY 2003: $31,700;
FY 2004: $36,400;
FY 2005: $40,200;
FY 2006: $46,220;
FY 2007: $31,327;
FY 2008: $31,547;
Total: $318,119.
Source: GAO analysis of budget documents provided by State Director of
Foreign Assistance.
Note: Funding figures in this table do not include normal operating
costs, such as salaries of U.S. government officials.
[End of table]
State's Border Security Program Focused on the FATA:
State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)
assists foreign nations in developing their law enforcement capacity.
INL has three general assistance efforts in Pakistan: (1) the Border
Security Program, (2) the counternarcotics program, and (3) law
enforcement reform, which includes training and capacity building
focused on the judicial system and rule of law programs.[Footnote 10]
INL funding from fiscal year 2002 through 2008 totaled about $266
million. The Border Security Program and the counternarcotics program
are intended to support and expand Pakistan's law enforcement capacity
to secure the Afghan border and frontier regions against terrorists,
narcotics traffickers, and other criminal elements. Figure 7 shows a
community that spans both sides of the border.
Figure 7: Village Spanning Both Sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan
Border [Photograph]:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Superimposed on the photograph is the border line separating
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Source: Pakistan Military Operations Directorate.
[End of figure]
The Border Security Program is State's primary law-enforcement effort
to build the capacity of the Pakistani government to identify and
arrest al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists and other criminals in
Pakistan's border region with Afghanistan. State launched the Border
Security Program shortly after the attacks of 9/11 to help the
government of Pakistan better secure its western border and coast
against exploitation by terrorists, drug traffickers, and other
criminals and support bilateral cooperation with the government of
Afghanistan. The Border Security Program's goals also include arresting
criminals operating in the border region through combined use of ground
forces and the Air Wing, expanding Pakistan's road and bridge network,
constructing forts, outposts, and pickets for border security forces,
and integrating modern law enforcement training techniques to enhance
border security. The Border Security Program is a key law enforcement
element of the U.S. embassy's strategy in the FATA, with efforts that
include:
* improving law enforcement access within the FATA through road and
outpost construction,
* providing training and equipment to law enforcement agencies
operating in the FATA, and:
* supplying technical and material support to law enforcement agencies
operating on the western border.
Under the program, the United States has provided funding and
assistance to Pakistan's Ministry of Interior; the Anti-Narcotics
Force; the Frontier Corps in the FATA, NWFP, and Balochistan; and
others.[Footnote 11] It has also provided funds for the maintenance,
support, and operating expenses of the Border Security Program-
established Ministry of Interior Air Wing based in Quetta, Balochistan.
The Air Wing, with three fixed-wing surveillance aircraft and nine Huey
II helicopters, was intended to permit monitoring and interception of
terrorists, drug traffickers, and other criminals operating in remote
areas.[Footnote 12]
Border Security Program Accomplishments:
According to State, the Border Security Program has made progress
toward many of its program goals. Program accomplishments cited by
State include Pakistan's detaining roughly 600 suspected al Qaida
and/or Taliban personnel, in part because of Border Security Program
assistance. In addition, State indicates that the program helped
Pakistan extend its authority into autonomous tribal border areas for
the first time and substantially increased drug seizures. Reported
progress on other efforts includes:
* construction of 137 of 176 planned outposts;
* construction of 113 of 370 planned kilometers of fully paved border
security roads, and 2 of 18 bridges;
* provision of 2,496 vehicles and motorcycles, 1,012 night vision
goggles and binoculars, 4,338 pieces of communications equipment, 1,824
bulletproof jackets, and 2,850 bulletproof helmets; and:
* completion of 500 kilometers of gravel roads intended to extend the
authority of the Pakistan government into previously inaccessible areas
in the FATA and open these areas up to the mainstream economy, as
illustrated in figure 8.
Figure 8: State/INL-Funded Road in the FATA Next to a Highway [Aerial
photograph]:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Border Security Program Faces Implementation and Monitoring Challenges:
Program managers in Washington and Pakistan have raised concerns about
the implementation and impact of this program. For example, since 2005
the pace of road and bridge construction, as well as monitoring
efforts, has slowed because Pakistan cannot guarantee the security of
the work crews or U.S. end-use monitors; the security situation has
caused the roads, bridges, and outpost construction efforts to be shut
down for months or even years, as in the Waziristans since 2005.
Additionally, U.S. trainers increasingly face security restrictions on
conducting training at locations in the NWFP according to State
officials. As a result, some training scheduled for the NWFP has been
either postponed or moved to secondary locations near Islamabad.
Monitoring of the Border Security Program has been hampered by the
deteriorating security situation in FATA and the NWFP, which has
restricted travel in the last 3 years. State officials told us that
this limits their ability to monitor road construction progress in two
of the seven FATA agencies, North and South Waziristan. According to
State, in 2007, all monitoring visits to the FATA were canceled for
security reasons. In some instances, Pakistani officials were asked to
bring the Border Security Program-supplied equipment to safer locations
for inspection by embassy staff.
Other U.S. Government Law Enforcement Training Efforts in Pakistan:
State also provides law enforcement training in Pakistan through its
Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. ATA's objectives are to provide
partner nations with counterterrorism training and equipment, improve
bilateral ties, and increase respect for human rights. ATA assistance
generally consists of (1) training courses on tactical and strategic
counterterrorism issues and (2) grants of counterterrorism equipment,
such as small arms, bomb detection equipment, vehicles, and computers.
ATA provides training primarily through contract employees and
interagency agreements with other U.S. law enforcement agencies.
According to our February 2008 report on ATA, Pakistan was the third
largest recipient of ATA funding in the world.[Footnote 13]
State has also funded law enforcement-related training activities
carried out by Department of Justice agencies. In August 2002, the
Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program (ICITAP) initiated an assistance program to increase
the capacity of the Pakistan law enforcement agencies to combat major
internal criminal activities and terrorist threats. ICITAP training has
primarily been targeted to address three specific needs: (1) building
training capacity by training institutional staff and assisting in
revision of core curricula, (2) improving investigative skills and
capability through training in crime scene processing and basic
criminal investigation, and (3) improving management and leadership
ability through training in modern police management practices. The
ICITAP program in Pakistan encompasses three major areas of
responsibility: (1) border security, (2) law enforcement reform, and
(3) the Automated Fingerprint Identification System. According to
Justice, the program has developed and presented more than 150 training
programs in both the border security and law enforcement reform areas.
In addition, Justice has one representative in Islamabad from the
Criminal Division's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development,
Assistance and Training (OPDAT). OPDAT's mission is to develop and
administer technical and developmental assistance designed to enhance
the capabilities of foreign justice sector institutions and their law
enforcement personnel to combat terrorism and other types of crime.
According to Justice, an OPDAT assessment led to the placement of a
Justice Resident Legal Advisor at the U.S. Embassy in 2006 to assist
Pakistan in legal reforms. Since than, the Advisor has worked to
improve Pakistan's anti-money laundering legislation, and monitored
terrorism prosecutions and the government's closure of Islamic
charities linked to terrorist organizations. According to Justice,
funding for OPDAT activities comes from State INL funds.
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) both have mandates to assist host nations, such as
Pakistan, combat threats emanating from criminal activities, including
those associated with illicit drugs and terrorist activities. DEA has
offices in Islamabad and Peshawar intended to target drug-related
threats to American citizens. Although it has not been given the
specific goal to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism, in
response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it has expanded its
intelligence capabilities and information sharing, and instituted a
formal procedure to query its in-country sources on terrorist-related
information, which is then shared with the FBI and other agencies
involved with efforts to fight terrorism. According to DEA officials,
DEA cannot access the FATA; however, DEA can query its in-country
sources on terrorist-related information when they leave the FATA. DEA
training has been focused on improving the counter-narcotics
capabilities of their Pakistani counterparts.
The FBI operates a Legal Attaché office in Islamabad, Pakistan. The
office is intended to (1) coordinate international investigations with
their foreign nation colleagues; (2) cover international leads for
domestic U.S. investigations; (3) link U.S. and international resources
in critical criminal and terrorist areas to protect Americans at home
and abroad; and (4) coordinate FBI training, including counterterrorism
classes, for police in their geographic regions. The FBI has also
provided terrorist financing and money laundering training to
Pakistan's law enforcement agencies. It also reported providing other
types of training, including post-blast crime scene instruction and
training related to the prevention, interdiction, and investigation of
terrorist acts.
The U.S. embassy also coordinates efforts by State, Justice, Treasury,
and Homeland Security to assist Pakistan identify and disrupt terrorist
financing. For terrorist financing, the embassy, working with
representatives from the FBI's Legal Attache office and the Department
of Homeland Security, provided the Pakistani government technical
assistance to develop an anti-money laundering law and helped create a
financial intelligence unit to implement the law and reduce sources of
terrorist financing. Treasury provided Pakistan assistance on its draft
money laundering legislation to ensure it meets minimum international
standards. Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs provides the bulk of the funding for interagency assistance
for counterterrorism financing programs in Pakistan, with additional
support provided by International Narcotics and Law Enforcement funds.
Oversight Questions:
* What performance indicators are in place to measure progress toward
the U.S. law enforcement goals in Pakistan's FATA and Western Frontier?
What progress has been made through the various law enforcement
efforts? What are the desired end states, and what are the expected
time frames for completion?
* Given that several U.S. agencies are involved in various law
enforcement activities in Pakistan, how well are law enforcement
efforts in Pakistan coordinated among the various U.S. agencies?
* How effectively is the experience and expertise of the Department of
Justice, its components, and others being used?
* To what extent are U.S. agencies working along the Afghanistan and
Pakistan border sharing information on potential terrorists, drug
traffickers, and other criminals?
* What are the anticipated costs of fully implementing the Border
Security Program? What accountability measures are built into the
Border Security Program to ensure U.S. funds are used as intended? How
has State determined whether the Government of Pakistan deployed Border
Security Program assets as intended?
[End of section]
Enclosure V: Use of Development and Economic Assistance Elements of
National Power:
The United States has used development and economic assistance to
address national security-related priorities in Pakistan, providing
about $3.3 billion in related activities since 2002. As figure 9 shows,
the development and economic assistance elements of national power have
accounted for about 27 percent of U.S. funds devoted to addressing the
U.S. strategic goals in Pakistan. The development and economic needs of
Pakistan are considerable. Pakistan is one of the world's poorest
countries and ranks near the bottom of several development indicator
categories, such as literacy; nutrition; and infant, child, and
maternal mortality (see enclosure I for additional information on
Pakistan's development indicators). As such, development and economic
assistance are two key elements of national power vital to U.S. efforts
to address terrorism and close the safe haven in Pakistan. This
enclosure provides information on U.S. development and economic policy
assistance to Pakistan, including development assistance for Pakistan's
underdeveloped areas, direct budget support to enhance Pakistan's
macroeconomic stability, and use of economic policy to assist Pakistan
to achieve economic prosperity. It also highlights several oversight
issues for Congress and the new administration to consider.
Figure 9: Percentage of Funding Devoted to Development and Economic
Assistance Activities:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Percentage of Funding Devoted to Development and Economic Assistance
Activities:
Military: 70.4%;
[Emphasis: Development - Economic: 26.7%;]
Law Enforcement: 2.6%;
Diplomacy: 0.3%.
Source: GAO analysis of budget documents provided by State Director of
Foreign Assistance.
Note: Funding figures do not include normal operating costs, such as
salaries of U.S. government officials or funding for covert activities.
[End of figure]
Table 4 indicates the amount and sources of U.S. development and
economic-related funding to Pakistan.
Table 4: USAID Development and Economic Funding to Pakistan, FY 2002-
2008 (Dollars in thousands):
Funding source: Child Survival and Health Programs Fund;
FY 2002: $14,000;
FY 2003: $15,600;
FY 2004: $25,600;
FY 2005: $21,000;
FY 2006: $28,100;
FY 2007: $22,385;
FY 2008: $29,816;
Total: $156,501.
Funding source: Development Assistance;
FY 2002: $10,000;
FY 2003: $34,500;
FY 2004: $49,400;
FY 2005: $29,000;
FY 2006: $37,500;
FY 2007: $95,327;
FY 2008: $29,757;
Total: $285,484.
Funding source: Economic Support Fund (ESF)[A];
FY 2002: $615,000;
FY 2003: $188,000;
FY 2004: $200,000;
FY 2005: $297,600;
FY 2006: $337,100;
FY 2007: v388,673;
FY 2008: $347,165;
Total: $2,373,538.
Funding source: Other[B];
FY 2002: $23,899;
FY 2003: $20,162;
FY 2004: $28,538;
FY 2005: $57,133;
FY 2006: $274,777;
FY 2007: $35,892;
FY 2008: $38,456;
Total: $478,857.
Funding source: Total;
FY 2002: $662,899;
FY 2003: $258,262;
FY 2004: $303,538;
FY 2005: $404,733;
FY 2006: $677,477;
FY 2007: $542,277;
FY 2008: $445,194;
Total: $3,294,380.
Source: GAO analysis of budget documents provided by State Director of
Foreign Assistance.
Note: Funding figures in this table do not include normal operating
costs, such as salaries of U.S. government officials.
[A] About two-thirds of ESF was provided directly to the Pakistani
government for debt relief, balance of payments, and direct budget
support.
[B] Other categories of funding include International Disaster and
Famine Assistance; Public Law 480, Title II (Emergency Food Aid);
Migration and Refugee Assistance; Human Rights and Democracy Funding;
Department of Agriculture's McGovern-Dole International Fund for
Education and Child Nutrition Program; Department of Agriculture's Food
for Progress; Overseas Humanitarian and Civic Aid; Foreign Assistance
Act section 506(a)(2) drawdown; and Emergency Response Fund.
[End of table]
USAID activities in Pakistan have been funded from Child Survival and
Health Assistance, Development Assistance, and ESF. These funds are
intended to help improve the lives of ordinary Pakistanis; lay the
groundwork for the country's sustained economic growth; and strengthen
social, political, and economic institutions. A stated goal of these
efforts in Pakistan is also to alleviate the conditions that breed
extremism while demonstrating that the United States' interest in
Pakistan extends beyond the war on terror to concern for the Pakistani
people as a whole. State is also supporting legislation for
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones intended to promote trade and economic
development. This legislation was not passed in the 110th Congress.
U.S. Development and Economic Assistance Programs:
USAID's development programs have been organized into strategic
objectives covering health, governance, education, and economic growth.
In 2005, following the 7.6 magnitude earthquake in the northwestern
part of Pakistan, USAID also began providing emergency relief and
earthquake reconstruction assistance funded from the accounts detailed
in table 4. In addition, the United States provides direct budget
support through ESF, as well as economic policy assistance to Pakistan,
including efforts to establish Reconstruction Opportunity Zones.
Health--USAID's Health Program has focused on improving maternal and
newborn health services, enhancing the accessibility and availability
of family planning products, preventing the spread of major infectious
diseases, and increasing access to safe drinking water (see figure 10).
For example, USAID's Pakistan Safe Drinking Water and Hygiene Promotion
Project supports the Pakistani government's effort to install more than
6,000 water filtration plants, with the aim of providing clean drinking
water.
Figure 10: Beneficiaries of a USAID Health Project:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph of a mother holding a child while being examined.
Source: USAID.
[End of figure]
Governance: USAID's Democracy and Governance Program was intended to
assist Pakistan's parliamentary institutions improve electoral
processes and advance the decentralization process. For example,
USAID's Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project has trained hundreds
of members of parliament on rules of procedure, the committee system,
law drafting, and budget review.
Education: USAID's Education Program has supported projects to reform
and revitalize Pakistan's education system, including educational
assistance to young children (see figure 11). Education received the
most development funding because the United States and Pakistan deemed
it critical to improving the quality of life for the citizenry. For
example, according to USAID, its Strengthening Teacher Education in
Pakistan initiative is intended to improve teacher education through
the development of national standards for teacher certification and
accreditation.
Figure 11: Beneficiaries of a USAID/Pakistan Education Project:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph of children at play in a school setting.
Source: USAID.
[End of figure]
Economic growth: USAID's Economic Growth Program has sought to increase
incomes and employment in Pakistan. The program focuses on expanding
access to credit, improving the competitiveness of Pakistani small-and
medium-sized enterprises through technical assistance, improving
agricultural practices, and catalyzing development in energy. For
example, according to USAID, its Developing Financial Services for
Communities without Credit Program worked with the Khushhali Bank to
disburse 356,361 micro-loans (average size approximately $200) in
various districts, totaling more than $63 million and including 2,531
loans in FATA worth $429,450.
Earthquake reconstruction: On October 8, 2005, a 7.6 magnitude
earthquake struck Pakistan, killing 74,000, injuring 70,000, and
rendering more than 2.8 million people homeless. Focusing on immediate
humanitarian needs, U.S. assistance provided emergency shelter, relief
supplies, and medical help. Emergency relief efforts were followed by a
USAID program to enable people to return home and rebuild their lives.
In October 2006, USAID commenced a 4-year, $200 million Earthquake
Reconstruction Program, through which it is constructing schools and
healthcare facilities, improving education and health services, and
enhancing economic well being by restoring livelihoods and expanding
employment and enterprise opportunities.
Economic Support Funds Used for Emergency Economic Assistance to
Pakistan: Although Economic Support Funds are used for a variety of
U.S. programs in Pakistan, nearly $1.6 billion of these funds have been
provided for direct budget support to the government of Pakistan via
Emergency Economic Assistance, as shown in table 5. According to USAID,
initially these funds provided balance of payments, budget support, and
debt relief to the government of Pakistan during a time of economic
hardship and political strain associated with Pakistan's participation
in the Global War on Terror. Beginning in fiscal year 2005, these funds
were direct grants for the government's health, education, clean
drinking water and earthquake reconstruction initiatives. Following the
announcement of a State of Emergency in Pakistan in November 2007, the
fiscal year 2008 ESF committed for direct budget support to Pakistan
was transferred into USAID-managed development programs. According to
USAID officials, the fiscal year 2009 ESF commitment that would have
gone to Emergency Economic Assistance will also be projectized.
Table 5: ESF-Funded Emergency Economic Assistance to Pakistan, FY 2002-
2008:
FY: 2002;
ESF level: $600 million;
Objective of Emergency Economic Assistance: Balance of payments and
direct budget support grant.
FY: 2003;
ESF level: $188 million;
Objective of Emergency Economic Assistance: Debt relief.
FY: 2004;
ESF level: $200 million;
Objective of Emergency Economic Assistance: Debt relief.
FY: 2005;
ESF level: $200 million;
Objective of Emergency Economic Assistance: Direct budget support grant
to help Pakistan meet macroeconomic stability objectives and increase
spending on human capital and private-sector development objectives.
FY: 2006;
ESF level: $200 million;
Objective of Emergency Economic Assistance: Direct budget support grant
to help Pakistan meet macroeconomic stability objectives and increase
spending on human capital, specifically in education, health, and clean
drinking water sectors.
FY: 2007;
ESF level: $200 million;
Objective of Emergency Economic Assistance: Direct budget support grant
to help Pakistan meet macroeconomic stability objectives and increase
spending on human capital, specifically in education, health, clean
drinking water, and earthquake reconstruction.
FY: 2008;
ESF level: $200 million;
Objective of Emergency Economic Assistance: This funding was
transferred into USAID development projects and was not used for
Emergency Economic Assistance.
Source: USAID.
[End of table]
Economic Policy Assistance: The embassy's objectives in economic policy
includes encouraging the Pakistani government to promote structural
reforms that further liberalize the economy and increase economic
opportunities in underserved areas, such as the FATA. In addition, they
include efforts to reduce the government's role in economic activity
through privatization of state-owned enterprises, improve the
efficiency of the financial sector, and increase the transparency of
fiscal and monetary policies. In addition, the embassy planned to help
Pakistan develop and strengthen its national export control system,
expand trade, and eliminate trade barriers.
U.S. Efforts to Support Pakistan's Sustainable Development Plan for the
FATA:
The use of development assistance in the FATA was not prominent in the
United States' efforts in Pakistan until March 2006, when the President
of Pakistan requested that the United States adopt a more comprehensive
approach to combating the terrorist threat in the FATA. Following these
discussions, Pakistan proposed a Sustainable Development Plan that
focuses on providing economic development and extending the influence
of the Pakistani government in the FATA. USAID provided technical
assistance to the Pakistani government's Sustainable Development Plan
and has based its development activities in the FATA on this plan. The
U.S. development activities include capacity building for the FATA
institutions needed to plan, manage, and monitor development projects;
efforts to build community and government relations; funding for health
and education services; and efforts to increase employment and economic
growth. The United States has pledged $750 million between 2007 and
2011 toward the Pakistani government's $2 billion, 9-year Sustainable
Development Plan.
As of December 2008, according to USAID, its efforts in support of
Pakistan's Sustainable Development Plan have led to numerous results,
including the following:
* The $43 million FATA Capacity Building Program has provided
administrative and management training for 340 staff from FATA
development agencies, procured $1.7 million worth of computer and
networking equipment, and started the development of a monitoring and
evaluation system.
* The $300 million Livelihoods Program has benefited over 10,000 youth
through short-term cash for work programs, enrolled over 800 youth in
vocational training and scholarship programs, and enrolled 350 youth in
literacy and life skills programs.
* The $15.4 million education programs have trained over 360 education
staff in areas such as school management, financial management,
training of trainers, and educational planning. In addition, 58
primary, middle, and high schools have been constructed and furnished
in the FATA.
* The $16.7 million health programs have conducted 1,824 Child Health
Days that provided more than 207,821 children and 19,000 mothers with
medical care and vaccinations. In addition, the programs provided
training for 1,321 health providers in newborn and child health care.
U.S. Considering Establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in
Pakistan:
During the 110th Congress, bills were introduced in both the House and
the Senate for Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan and
Pakistan; neither bill was the subject of committee or floor action.
[Footnote 14] The proposed legislation was intended to provide economic
incentives to address the widespread poverty and unemployment that,
according to State, provide fertile ground for violent extremism in
Afghanistan and the border region of Pakistan. By granting duty-free
treatment to a wide array of goods produced in areas designated by the
president as Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, the act was intended to
promote investment and employment while giving local populations a
stake in a more stable and prosperous future. The proposal included
duty-free treatment for certain non-textile, textile, and apparel
products for a period of 15 years. The Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
eligible areas would be the entire territory of Afghanistan and the
border region of Pakistan, which would include the FATA, the earthquake
affected areas of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, parts of Balochistan, and the
North West Frontier Province including Peshawar.
Oversight Questions:
* To what extent is development and economic assistance to be included
in future U.S. plans for addressing the terrorist threat and closing
the terrorist safe haven in Pakistan's FATA and Western Frontier?
* How has USAID coordinated its plans to carry out development projects
in Pakistan's FATA and Western Frontier with the Pakistani government
and what efforts are made to ensure that regions are secured before
development projects are undertaken?
* How much of the development and economic assistance funding has been
expended? How much of the development and economic assistance has
Pakistan used to support health and education initiatives? What are the
development and economic assistance priorities going forward and what
are the projected future funding requirements?
* What are the cost and benefits to the United States of implementing
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones?
* What performance indicators are in place to measure progress toward
the U.S. development and economic assistance goals in Pakistan and its
FATA and Western Frontier? What do the indicators show to date?
* How are USAID's activities in support of Pakistan's Sustainable
Development Plan coordinated with State, Defense, Pakistan government,
and other development activities to combat terrorism in the FATA?
* What challenges, if any, do USAID and others working on behalf of the
U.S. face in implementing development projects in FATA and Western
Frontier, and what are the United States' contingency plans for
mitigating these challenges?
[End of section]
Enclosure VI: Use of the Diplomatic Element of National Power:
The United States has used, to a limited extent, the diplomatic element
of national power to address national security-related priorities in
Pakistan, providing about $39 million in related activities since 2002.
As figure 12 shows, the diplomatic element of national power has
accounted for less than 1 percent of U.S. funds devoted to addressing
the U.S. strategic goals in Pakistan. This enclosure provides
information on U.S public diplomacy efforts in Pakistan and the FATA.
It also highlights several oversight issues for the Congress and new
administration to consider.
Figure 12: Percentage of Funding Devoted to Diplomatic Activities:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Percentage of Funding Devoted to Diplomatic Activities:
Military: 70.4%;
Development - Economic: 26.7%;
Law Enforcement: 2.6%;
[Emphasis: Diplomacy: 0.3%.]
Source: GAO analysis of budget documents provided by State Director of
Foreign Assistance.
Note: Funding figures do not include normal operating costs, such as
salaries of U.S. government officials or funding for covert activities.
[End of figure]
Table 6 indicates the amount of U.S. public diplomacy-related funding
to Pakistan.
Table 6: State Public Affairs Funding to Pakistan, FY 2002 to 2008
(Dollars in thousands):
Funding to Pakistan;
FY 2002: $3,486;
FY 2003: $3,957;
FY 2004: $6,811;
FY 2005: $5,869;
FY 2006: $9,144;
FY 2007: $8,735;
FY 2008: $1,497[A];
Total: $39,499.
Source: GAO analysis of budget documents provided by State Director of
Foreign Assistance.
Notes: Funding figures in this table do not include normal operating
costs, such as salaries of U.S. government officials. Data includes
State Public Diplomacy program funding and State Education and Cultural
Exchange programs in Pakistan, but does not include funding for the
Fulbright exchange program, which is funded by USAID and included in
our development and economic funding table.
[A] State did not provide FY 2008 Education and Cultural Exchange
funding.
[End of table]
In November 2008, we identified public diplomacy as one of the key
issues demanding urgent attention and continuing oversight by the new
Congress and administration to ensure our nation's security and well-
being.[Footnote 15] State leads public diplomacy efforts overseas, but
other agencies such as Defense and USAID also seek to influence foreign
public opinion through their public diplomacy and humanitarian relief
efforts.
U.S. Embassy Plans for Diplomacy:
According to the U.S. embassy in Pakistan, its public diplomacy efforts
span a broad range of embassy objectives, including efforts to promote
democracy and human rights, economic development, and regional security
in Pakistan. The embassy uses its exchange and visitor programs in an
effort to expose Pakistani opinion makers to the United States, as
illustrated in figure 13.
Figure 13: Pakistani Exchange Students' Pre-Departure Orientation
[Photograph]:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Source: Department of State.
[End of figure]
In addition, the embassy seeks to enhance its engagement with the
public through the Lincoln Corner program. The program provides
American books, Internet access, and other material, as well as space
to conduct programs for education, seminars, round tables, and language
training, with or without American involvement, as seen in figure 14.
It also utilizes a visiting speaker's program and enhanced public
speaking engagements for mission personnel to educate the Pakistani
public about U.S. policies and programs. State provided GAO numerous
examples of public diplomacy efforts in Pakistan, such as student
exchanges, press coverage, and training initiatives.
Figure 14: Lincoln Corner Children Gathering to Gain a Better
Understanding of American Culture [Photograph]:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Source: Department of State.
[End of figure]
Diplomacy Efforts for the FATA:
According to State, the embassy plans to use public diplomacy to
undermine the ideological underpinnings of extremism while bolstering
the image of the Pakistani national government. The U.S. embassy
included public diplomacy efforts toward its objective of preventing
terrorist acts and denying a safehaven for terrorists. The embassy has
used Pakistani government and local aid workers to implement and
publicize U.S. supported projects in an effort to extend the authority
of Pakistan's national government into the FATA, a key objective of the
Pakistani and U.S. effort in the FATA. In addition, the embassy planned
to deploy a variety of public diplomacy programs including speakers,
scholarships, exchanges, and Lincoln Corner programs to reinforce other
U.S. objectives in NWFP and Balochistan.
The U.S. government initiated a number of programs for the FATA for
fiscal year 2008:
* English Scholarship Program: The State Department awarded multiple
grants to higher education institutions in NWFP to conduct English
language training for students from the FATA and surrounding areas for
a period of 2 years.
* Youth Radio Drama Program: The State Department, through the Peshawar
Consulate, awarded a grant to a U.S. institution to develop a radio
drama program for broadcast in NWFP and FATA, the aim of which was to
train and support moderate local voices. Through this grant, a team of
trainers traveled to Peshawar to work with journalism and mass
communications students from two area universities. The trainers
provided training in script development and radio acting and helped the
students to produce serial dramas highlighting real-life problems
confronting residents in the FATA. This program was broadcast in Pashto
on local radio stations.
* Radio and Television Training Program: The State Department provided
a grant to a U.S. higher education institution to work with a higher
education institution in the NWFP on television and radio broadcast
training.
* International Visitor Leadership Programs: Two International Visitor
Leadership Programs specifically targeted the FATA region. One was a
program for tribal and community leaders from Pakistan's border region.
A second program, with an emphasis on Advancing Peace through Community
Problem Solving, targeted community leaders from both the Afghan and
Pakistan border areas.
* Small Grants Program for the FATA and NWFP: Through the Peshawar
Consulate, post provided small grants to support locally initiated
civic education programs.
* Sports Initiative: The State Department awarded a grant to a local
organization to encourage initiatives where sports can assist in
creating a platform for post-conflict, peace-building and development
by facilitating and equipping 150 youth sport teams with sports goods
and establishing a sports network. The initiative directly involves 150
teams of cricket, football, and volleyball, more than 20,000 indirect
beneficiaries (spectators), and provides recreational facilities for
youth teams.
* Social Awareness and Educational TV and Radio Programs: The State
Department awarded a grant to a higher education institution for the
development of a series of radio and TV programs in Pashto, Urdu, and
English designed to educate residents and promote tolerance through
moderate messaging.
* International Women of Courage Awards: The State Department conferred
an International Women of Courage Award on a community activist from
the FATA for her work to empower the voice and role of women in
traditional communities of the region.
State officials said that U.S. public diplomacy efforts in Pakistan
have been historically hampered by a lack of funding, staffing, and the
security environment. State officials characterized public diplomacy
funding to Pakistan as "woefully under-funded" to counter Pakistani
perceptions of U.S. policies in Pakistan. They also said that Pakistani
public diplomacy efforts were "very understaffed" given the number of
people in Pakistan (170 million), the number of media outlets, and the
grave national security concerns that Pakistan represented. State
officials said that there were eight officials with public diplomacy
responsibilities for Pakistan, and two of these have other
responsibilities. By contrast, they said, the U.S. mission in
Afghanistan has seven full-time Americans engaged in public diplomacy
efforts for a population of around 30 million people and a less complex
media environment than Pakistan. State officials said that the lack of
funding and staffing is one reason the United States has been unable to
counter the public perception that terrorist attacks in Pakistan are
caused by U.S. efforts to combat terrorism in the FATA. For example, a
June 2008 Pakistan-wide public opinion poll released by the New America
Foundation found negative views held by Pakistanis of the United States
and its policies in Pakistan. According to the poll, more than half (52
percent) blamed the United States when asked who was most responsible
for the violence that is occurring in Pakistan today, while 8 percent
blamed al Qaeda fighters.
State public diplomacy officials said that there has been a recent
increase in interest in expanding public diplomacy efforts in Pakistan.
In August 2008, State's Office of the Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs began to develop a list of potential
public diplomacy activities intended to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to
Pakistan as a key ally and counter the view that the United States is a
threat to Islam. State officials estimated the potential cost of these
proposed initiatives, still pending approval, at about $29 million.
Oversight Questions:
* How do State's diplomacy priorities align with the overall U.S.
strategy for combating terrorism emanating from Pakistan's border area?
* To what extent have diplomacy efforts been, or will they be,
integrated with other efforts, such as development assistance, to
combat terrorism in Pakistan's FATA and Western Frontier? What are the
projected scope, priorities, and future funding requirements for
diplomacy programs?
* What have been the results of U.S. diplomacy efforts in Pakistan?
What performance measures are, or will be, included to assess progress?
* How have the worsening security situation and limited funding and
resources devoted to U.S. diplomacy efforts impacted planning and
implementation of State's public diplomacy efforts?
* What steps have been taken, among the U.S. government agencies, to
coordinate public diplomacy and strategic communications activities in
Pakistan?
[End of section]
Enclosure VII: Oversight and Accountability of CSF and Other Funds
Provided to Pakistan:
As noted earlier, the U.S. government has provided Pakistan more than
$12.3 billion for military, law enforcement, development and economic
assistance, and diplomacy efforts to secure, stabilize, and develop
Pakistan, and particularly the FATA and Western Frontier. Where audits
have been completed covering about $5.7 billion in military and
development assistance, GAO and the Defense and USAID inspectors
general have raised accountability and oversight concerns, such as the
ability of the U.S. government to work with the Pakistani government to
validate the use of U.S. funds.[Footnote 16] Going forward, the U.S.
government's plans for training and equipping Pakistan security forces
in FATA and the Western Frontier call for annual investments of around
$200 million per year from fiscal year 2009 through 2012. Additionally,
the United States has committed $750 million for development efforts in
the FATA over 5 years (fiscal years 2007 through 2011), and legislation
currently under consideration, if passed, could provide billions more
in development assistance to Pakistan over a 5-year period.[Footnote
17] Given the oversight and accountability deficiencies that we and the
inspectors general have previously identified, as well as the number of
U.S. programs and activities that remain unaudited, continued
congressional oversight and agency monitoring efforts are needed to
help ensure U.S. funding is used as intended. This enclosure highlights
our previous findings relating to the need for increased oversight and
accountability of Pakistan's CSF reimbursement claims, prior
recommendations for enhancing oversight, and efforts undertaken by
Defense to improve the oversight and accountability of the CSF
reimbursement process.
Previously Reported Deficiencies in Oversight and Accountability of
CSF:
We previously reported in June 2008 that Defense did not consistently
apply its existing CSF oversight guidance. While Defense generally
conducted macro-level analytical reviews called for in its guidance,
such as determining whether the cost is less than that which would be
incurred by the United States for the same service, for a large number
of reimbursement claims, Defense did not obtain detailed documentation
to verify that claimed costs were valid, actually incurred, or
correctly calculated. For example, as of May 2008, Defense paid over $2
billion in Pakistani reimbursement claims for military activities
covering January 2004 through June 2007 without obtaining sufficient
information that would enable a third party to recalculate these costs.
We also found that Defense may have reimbursed costs that (1) were not
incremental, (2) were not based on actual activity, or (3) were
potentially duplicative. For example, Defense paid an average of more
than $19,000 per vehicle per month for Pakistani navy reimbursement
claims. These claims appeared to contain duplicative charges for a
fleet of fewer than 20 passenger vehicles. We also found that
additional oversight controls were needed. For example, Defense had no
guidance to verify currency conversion rates used by Pakistan, which if
performed would enhance Defense's ability to monitor for potential over-
billings. In addition, Defense's 2003 guidance did not specifically
task the Office of the Defense Representative (ODRP) in the U.S.
embassy with attempting to verify Pakistani military support and
expenses.
Prior Recommendations Regarding Oversight of CSF:
To improve oversight of CSF payments to Pakistan, our June 2008 report
made the following five recommendations to the Secretary of Defense:
* Consistently implement existing criteria to disallow or defer
Pakistani claims that do not include the documentation needed to verify
the claims.
* Define and formalize the roles and responsibilities of ODRP.
* Clarify guidance for Comptroller analysis of cost fluctuations.
* Develop and apply criteria to evaluate currency exchange rates to
ensure that the U.S. government is not overpaying for Pakistan
operations.
* Work with the government of Pakistan to develop procedures to allow
ODRP or other U.S. representatives to conduct greater oversight of CSF
use in Pakistan, including the potential use of onsite inspections.
Efforts Undertaken to Improve Oversight and Accountability of CSF:
Defense concurred with our recommendations and has taken steps to
address them. In June 2008, the Defense Comptroller issued formal
guidance that, among other things, clarified the roles and
responsibilities of Defense representatives at U.S. embassies. The
guidance also added a requirement for the Defense Comptroller to
analyze cost fluctuations that exceed 10 percent in each cost category
and note changes in operational tempo, force strength, or cost elements
that may have contributed to the change. The guidance also required
that reimbursement requests provide costs in local currency, convert
costs to the U.S. dollar equivalent, and indicate the effective date of
and the exchange rate used.
To help ensure consistent implementation of its guidance, in the case
of Pakistan, Defense staff from the Comptroller and U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) visited Islamabad to conduct discussions on the
administration and processing of CSF reimbursement claims with ODRP and
Pakistani military representatives. The U.S. delegation spent several
days in August 2008 discussing changes to the CSF claims approval
process with Pakistani military officials, including a joint
examination of the May 2008 claim.
As a result of these discussions, Defense agreed to: (1) provide
Pakistan a set of revised guidelines on CSF administrative procedures;
(2) provide Pakistan a revised format for the submission of Pakistan's
June 2008 claim and all future CSF claims; and (3) return to Pakistan
every 6 months beginning in February 2009 to discuss new CSF issues,
provide training on CSF administrative processing requirements and
revisit unresolved issues. Pakistani officials agreed to: (1) provide
additional documentation and cost methodology information for the May
2008 claim; (2) provide a monthly operational summary of Pakistani
army, air force, and navy actions in support of U.S. military
operations; (3) provide feedback on the proposed submission format
within 30 days of receipt; and (4) beginning with the May 2008 claim,
provide additional information or documentation for all disputed claims
within 90 days to substantiate claims deferred or disallowed by ODRP,
CENTCOM, or the Defense Comptroller. However, the Pakistani military
was reluctant to provide costs in rupees due to the long processing
time on previous CSF reimbursements. According to Defense officials,
the Pakistani officials worried that they would be significantly under-
compensated due to inflationary pressure on their national currency. In
addition, Defense would not agree to pay for certain Pakistani
requests, such as equipment depreciation or injury compensation for
Pakistani soldiers. As of December 2008, these remaining issues had not
been fully resolved. Figure 15 provides an illustration of the revised
CSF oversight process.
Figure 15: Revised CSF Oversight Process:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Legend:
CENTCOM = United States Central Command.
Defense = Department of Defense.
DSCA = Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
ODRP = Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan.
OMB = Office of Management and Budget.
OUSD/Comptroller = Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Comptroller.
Illustration of Revised CSF Oversight Process, as follows:
Pakistan:
Submits claim for reimbursement to ODRP at U.S.Embassy.
ODRP:
Assists host country in formulating claim for reimbursement and
endorses the country‘s claim through a memo that:
(1) Summarizes the expenses claimed by the country for support to U.S.
military operations.
(2) Verifies currency exchange rate used and date and source of
exchange rate.
(3) Describes the support provided by the country to U.S. military
operations.
(4) Certifies, to the best of the embassy's knowledge, information, and
belief, the country incurred the costs and provided the support.
(5) Verifies that expenses claimed for reimbursement are costs
reasonably expected to be incurred by the country for the type of
support provided.
(6) Recommends disallowing or deferring expenses with appropriate
explanation (e.g., not eligible for reimbursement, not reasonable
charges for type of support provided).
(7) Recommends use of comparative cost assessment in the absence of
invoices or other cost documentation.
(8) Confirms the country could not provide the support without
reimbursement of expenses;
(9) In the case of countries that receive recurring reimbursements,
verifies the country‘s explanation of fluctuations that exceed 10
percent in each cost category (e.g., increase in troop strength,
increase in operations, increase in food or fuel costs).
(10) Verifies, to the extent possible, that claimed costs are charged
to the appropriate category and are not double counted.
CENTCOM:
Prepares an operational validation that:
(1) Validates support provided by the country was essential to the
success of U.S. military operations.
(2) Describes operational support provided by the country and how
support met U.S. objectives.
(3) Verifies financial and non-financial indicators are reasonable for
the types of support provided.
(4) Certifies, to the best of the Combatant Command's knowledge,
information, and belief, that the costs are based on the U.S.
requirement and would not otherwise have been incurred by the country
requesting reimbursement.
(5) Describes, where possible, the types of costs incurred and method
for calculating the costs.
(6) Recommends use of comparative cost assessment in the absence of
invoices or other cost documentation.
OUSD/Comptroller:
(1) Compares total cost of country‘s support to the total potential
U.S. costs for similar support, including affirmation that the cost is
less than that which would be incurred by the United States for the
same service. If the cost comparison is not required or not
appropriate, the evaluation shall include a statement providing the
rationale. In cases where the country cannot provide the level of
quantifiable data generally considered reliable under U.S. standards,
the Department will rely on the Combatant Commander validation and the
comparative cost assessment to evaluate the claim for reasonableness
and credibility.
(2) Assesses whether cost categories reported are reasonable.
(3) Assesses whether selected subcategories are reasonable compared to
U.S. costs.
(4) Compares claim to previous reimbursements, including an assessment
of cost fluctuations that exceed 10 percent and possible changes in
operational tempo, force strength, or cost elements that may have
resulted in the fluctuation.
OMB:
Reviews Comptroller package.
Defense General Counsel:
Reviews Comptroller package.
State Department and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
Verify that the reimbursement is consistent with U.S. government‘s
national security policy and not adversely impact balance of power in
the region.
Secretary of Defense:
Provides Congress with 15-day notification of impending reimbursement.
Congress:
If no congressional action, transfer of funds to Pakistan is carried
out by DSCA.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense documentation and discussions with
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Comptroller.
[End of figure]
While we recognize Defense is taking various steps to strengthen
oversight of CSF claims, the extent to which Defense is consistently
implementing this new guidance cannot be determined until the more
recent Pakistan reimbursement claims are fully processed. Furthermore,
Defense's ability to improve oversight over the CSF program will depend
upon the cooperation of the Pakistani government.
Oversight Questions:
* Given that over $12 billion in U.S. assistance and reimbursements has
been provided Pakistan, what oversight and accountability controls are
now in place by the various U.S. agencies to oversee the use of U.S.
funds? To what extent have the various agencies adequately implemented
oversight and accountability controls?
* What are the challenges to ensuring funds are used towards U.S.
national security goals in Pakistan? What steps have U.S. agencies
taken, or do they plan to take, to address these challenges and to
ensure that funds are used as intended?
* To what extent have the various U.S. agencies devoted sufficient
resources for oversight of U.S. funds and efforts in Pakistan? How are
resource requirements determined and to what extent do they include
staff with appropriate skills (such as auditing, accounting, and
program evaluation)?
* Given limited ability to collect first-hand data on the use of U.S.
funds in Pakistan and the need, in some cases, to rely on the Pakistani
government for sufficient documentation to support reimbursement
claims, what has been the level of cooperation between U.S. agencies
and their counterparts in the Pakistani government to ensure oversight
and accountability over U.S. funds?
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed over
Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-806]. Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2008.
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist Threat in
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Require a Comprehensive
Plan and Continued Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-820T]. Washington, D.C.: May 20,
2008.
Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition
Support Funds Provided to Pakistan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-735R]. Washington, D.C.: May 6,
2008.
Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to
Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622]. Washington, D.C.: April 17,
2008.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-801SP]. Washington, D.C.: May 24,
2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits and Key
Oversight Issues. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-231T].
Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO plans to issue similar issue papers on Iraq (March 2009) and
Afghanistan (April 2009).
[2] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability
Needed over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-806] (Washington, D.C.:
June 24, 2008); Combating Terrorism: U.S. Oversight of Pakistan
Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-932T] (Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2008); Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist
Threat in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Require a
Comprehensive Plan and Continued Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-820T] (Washington, D.C.: May 20,
2008); Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S.
Coalition Support Funds Provided to Pakistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-735R] (Washington, D.C.: May 6,
2008); Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan
to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17,
2008).
[3] The National Security Council provided no comments.
[4] The Heritage Foundation's 2008 Index of Economic Freedom ranked
Pakistan's economy 93rd out of 157 countries. The index identified
restrictive trade policies, a heavy fiscal burden, weak property
ownership protections, and limited financial freedoms as issues.
Corruption is another serious problem; in 2007, Berlin-based
Transparency International placed Pakistan 138th out of 179 countries
in its annual ranking of world corruption levels.
[5] Intelligence funding is covert and was not included in this report.
[6] GAO, Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive
Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17,
2008).
[7] Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(P.L. 110-53, sec. 2042).
[8] CSF is used to reimburse 27 coalition allies, of which Pakistan is
the largest recipient.
[9] Beginning in 2007, responsibilities for training the Frontier Corps
in the FATA shifted from State to Defense as part of Defense's Security
Development Plan.
[10] The counternarcotics program focuses on eliminating poppy
cultivation, inhibiting further cultivation, interdicting smugglers,
building Pakistan government capacity, providing infrastructure for
alternative livelihood, and reducing domestic demand. The program
relies on law enforcement, air support, and judicial reform, which are
bolstered by complimentary INL programs: the Border Security Program
and the Law Enforcement Program. INL initiated law enforcement reform
in fiscal year 2003, working mainly through the Department of Justice
to focus on training and leadership/management development.
[11] The Border Security Program also provided funding to the Frontier
Constabulary; the Federal Investigation Agency; the coast guard; and
the Customs Department.
[12] State indicates that the Air Wing has the best operational rate of
any helicopter unit in Pakistan and is the country's only nighttime-
capable air unit. According to Defense, the operational rate was
supported by civilian contractors for some maintenance.
[13] See GAO, Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism
Program Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of
Outcomes, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-336]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008).
[14] Afghanistan-Pakistan Security and Prosperity Enhancement Act, H.R.
6387, 110th Congress, and Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones Act of 2008, S. 2776, 110th Congress.
[15] See GAO, 2009 Congressional and Presidential Transition,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/transition_2009/index.php].
[16] Department of Defense Inspector General, Financial Management:
Coalition Support Funds, D-2004-045 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 16, 2004).
This is a classified report. USAID, Audit of Selected Activities under
USAID/Pakistan's Basic Health Program, Audit Report No. 5-391-07-005-P
(May 23, 2007) and USAID, Audit of USAID/Pakistan's Education Sector
Reform Assistance Program, Audit Report No. 5-391-08-004-P (Mar. 28,
2008). The office of the Chief Financial Officer for USAID has since
issued a memorandum stating that final action is complete for all four
of the recommendations to the 2007 Health Programs audit (5-391-07-005-
P).
[17] Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008, S. 3263, 110th
Congress.
[End of section]
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