Afghanistan Security
U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation Gao ID: GAO-09-280 March 9, 2009The United States has invested more than $6.2 billion in the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The Department of Defense's (Defense) Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), with the Department of State (State), leads U.S. efforts to enhance MOI and ANP organizational structures, leadership abilities, and pay systems. This report assesses the status of U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan (1) restructure MOI and ANP, (2) retrain ANP units, (3) screen MOI and ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP pay systems. GAO reviewed Defense, State, and United Nations (UN) data and met with officials in the United States and Afghanistan.
U.S. agencies and Afghanistan have achieved their goals of restructuring and reducing a top-heavy and oversized MOI and ANP officer corps, modifying police wages, and planning a reorganization of MOI headquarters. These efforts are intended to help ensure that the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can manage a national police force. U.S. agencies and MOI cut the officer corps from about 17,800 to about 9,000, reduced the percentage of high-ranking officers, and increased pay for all ranks. MOI is scheduled to implement a U.S.-supported headquarters reorganization. CSTC-A has begun retraining ANP units through its Focused District Development (FDD) program, which is intended to address district-level corruption that impeded previous efforts to retrain individual police. FDD is achieving promising results, according to Defense status reports. In February 2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of FDD-retrained units as capable of conducting missions, 25 percent as capable of doing so with outside support, 31 percent as capable of partially doing so with outside support, and 25 percent as not capable. However, a lack of military personnel is constraining CSTC-A's plans to expand FDD and similar programs into the rest of Afghanistan by the end of 2010. Defense has identified a shortage of about 1,500 military personnel needed to expand FDD and similar police development programs. CSTC-A has previously obtained military personnel for ANP training by redirecting personnel from its Afghan army training program. However, the army program's demand for personnel is likely to increase as the Afghan army grows from 80,000 to 134,000 personnel. MOI and ANP officers were screened by Defense and State, but the full extent of the screening is unclear because State did not systematically compile records of its efforts. The screening effort was intended to improve the professionalism and integrity of the officer corps through testing by CSTC-A and background checks by State. At least 9,797 (55 percent) of the nearly 17,800 officers who took the tests passed, according to CSTC-A. State was unable to provide us with statistics concerning the results of background checks because it did not systematically compile its records. U.S.-supported pay system efforts are intended to validate MOI and ANP personnel rosters and ensure that wages are distributed reliably. Despite progress, these efforts face challenges that include limited ANP cooperation and a shortage of banks. U.S. contractors have validated almost 47,400 MOI and ANP personnel but have been unable to validate almost 29,400 personnel--who were paid in part by $230 million in U.S. contributions to a UN trust fund--because of a lack of cooperation from some ANP commanders. As of January 2009, 97 percent of all reported MOI and ANP personnel had enrolled in an electronic payroll system and 58 percent had enrolled to have their salaries deposited directly into their bank accounts. However, growth of the direct deposit system may be constrained because almost 40 percent of ANP personnel lack ready access to banks.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-280, Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation
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Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2009:
Afghanistan Security:
U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National
Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation:
GAO-09-280:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-280, a report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The United States has invested more than $6.2 billion in the Afghan
Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The
Department of Defense‘s (Defense) Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A), with the Department of State (State), leads U.S.
efforts to enhance MOI and ANP organizational structures, leadership
abilities, and pay systems.
This report assesses the status of U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan (1)
restructure MOI and ANP, (2) retrain ANP units, (3) screen MOI and ANP
personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP pay systems. GAO reviewed
Defense, State, and United Nations (UN) data and met with officials in
the United States and Afghanistan.
What GAO Found:
U.S. agencies and Afghanistan have achieved their goals of
restructuring and reducing a top-heavy and oversized MOI and ANP
officer corps, modifying police wages, and planning a reorganization of
MOI headquarters. These efforts are intended to help ensure that the
MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can manage a
national police force. U.S. agencies and MOI cut the officer corps from
about 17,800 to about 9,000, reduced the percentage of high-ranking
officers, and increased pay for all ranks. MOI is scheduled to
implement a U.S.-supported headquarters reorganization.
CSTC-A has begun retraining ANP units through its Focused District
Development (FDD) program, which is intended to address district-level
corruption that impeded previous efforts to retrain individual police.
FDD is achieving promising results, according to Defense status
reports. In February 2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of FDD-retrained
units as capable of conducting missions, 25 percent as capable of doing
so with outside support, 31 percent as capable of partially doing so
with outside support, and 25 percent as not capable. However, a lack of
military personnel is constraining CSTC-A‘s plans to expand FDD and
similar programs into the rest of Afghanistan by the end of 2010.
Defense has identified a shortage of about 1,500 military personnel
needed to expand FDD and similar police development programs. CSTC-A
has previously obtained military personnel for ANP training by
redirecting personnel from its Afghan army training program. However,
the army program‘s demand for personnel is likely to increase as the
Afghan army grows from 80,000 to 134,000 personnel.
MOI and ANP officers were screened by Defense and State, but the full
extent of the screening is unclear because State did not systematically
compile records of its efforts. The screening effort was intended to
improve the professionalism and integrity of the officer corps through
testing by CSTC-A and background checks by State. At least 9,797 (55
percent) of the nearly 17,800 officers who took the tests passed,
according to CSTC-A. State was unable to provide us with statistics
concerning the results of background checks because it did not
systematically compile its records.
U.S.-supported pay system efforts are intended to validate MOI and ANP
personnel rosters and ensure that wages are distributed reliably.
Despite progress, these efforts face challenges that include limited
ANP cooperation and a shortage of banks. U.S. contractors have
validated almost 47,400 MOI and ANP personnel but have been unable to
validate almost 29,400 personnel”who were paid in part by $230 million
in U.S. contributions to a UN trust fund”because of a lack of
cooperation from some ANP commanders. As of January 2009, 97 percent of
all reported MOI and ANP personnel had enrolled in an electronic
payroll system and 58 percent had enrolled to have their salaries
deposited directly into their bank accounts. However, growth of the
direct deposit system may be constrained because almost 40 percent of
ANP personnel lack ready access to banks.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense and State (1) provide
dedicated personnel to support creation of additional police mentor
teams to expand and complete the FDD program and (2) consider
provisioning U.S. contributions for police wages to reflect the extent
to which U.S. agencies have validated MOI and ANP personnel. Defense
concurred with the first recommendation and State noted it is prepared
to recruit additional personnel. State concurred with the second
recommendation but Defense asserted that it would unduly penalize MOI.
GAO maintains that the recommendation could encourage greater ANP
cooperation and help ensure that only legitimate personnel receive U.S.-
subsidized wages.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
GAO-09-280. For more information, contact Charles Michael Johnson Jr.
at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of figure]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
U.S. Agencies Have Helped Restructure the MOI and ANP Officer Corps and
Plan the Future Reorganization of MOI Headquarters:
Expansion of New Approach to Training Afghan Police Constrained by
Shortage of Military Personnel:
U.S. Agencies Screened MOI and ANP Officers but Did Not Systematically
Compile Records of Background Checks:
Efforts to Enhance MOI and ANP Pay Systems Face Challenges of Limited
Cooperation and Lack of a Nationwide Bank System:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National
Police:
Appendix III: Organizational Chart for the Ministry of Interior and
Afghan National Police:
Appendix IV: MOI and ANP Nonofficer Pay Rates before and after Pay
Reform:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Number of MOI and ANP Officers by Rank before and after Rank
Reform:
Table 2: MOI and ANP Officer Monthly Pay Rates before and after Pay
Reform :
Table 3: Test Passage and Failure of MOI and ANP Officers by Rank:
Figures:
Figure 1: The Afghan Ministry of Interior:
Figure 2: MOI and ANP Authorized Personnel Levels:
Figure 3: Attacks on Afghan Security Forces (2003-2008):
Figure 4: ANP Killed in Action from January 2007 to November 2008:
Figure 5: MOI and ANP Officer Corps Structure before and after Rank
Reform:
Figure 6: ANP Unit Members after Returning to Their District:
Figure 7: Model FDD Police Mentoring Team:
Figure 8: Initial FDD Districts in Relation to the Ring Road:
Figure 9: Validation Status of Applicants for Identification Cards,
November 2008:
Figure 10: Sample ANP Identification Cards at MOI‘s Headquarters in
Kabul:
Figure 11: Workstation Used to Process Identification Card at MOI
Headquarters:
Figure 12: Servers Used to Store Identification Data at MOI
Headquarters in Kabul:
Figure 13: LOTFA Electronic Payroll Training Class at MOI Headquarters
in Kabul:
Figure 14: Enrollment in Electronic Payroll System, as of January 2009:
Figure 15: Enrollment in Electronic Funds Transfer System, as of
January 2009:
Abbreviations:
ANP: Afghan National Police:
CENTCOM: Central Command:
CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
Defense: Department of Defense:
EUPOL: European Union Police Mission:
FDD: Focused District Development:
IDR: In District Reform:
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff:
LOTFA: Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan:
MOI: Afghan Ministry of Interior:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
SIU: Special Investigative Unit:
State: Department of State:
UN: United Nations:
UNAMAUN: Assistance Mission to Afghanistan:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
March 9, 2009:
The Honorable Howard Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Afghan National Police
(ANP) face a wide range of problems that include a history of
corruption, weak pay systems, and attacks by insurgents. Afghanistan is
a very poor and underdeveloped country that needs professional and
competent police to help defeat security threats to its homeland,
including widespread narcotics trafficking as well as a growing
insurgency. The MOI and ANP have a combined authorized personnel level
of 82,000. The United States has invested more than $6.2 billion since
2002 to help professionalize the MOI and ANP, including $230 million
for police wages contributed to the United Nations (UN) Law and Order
Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). U.S. efforts to help reform the MOI
and ANP are led by the Department of Defense's (Defense) Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in conjunction with
the Department of State (State).
This report assesses U.S. government efforts to help the government of
Afghanistan (1) restructure the MOI and ANP, (2) retrain selected ANP
units, (3) screen MOI and ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP
identification and pay systems.
To address these objectives, we reviewed a wide range of Defense and
State documents and briefings concerning U.S. efforts to reform the MOI
and ANP, including Defense's National Campaign Plan for Afghanistan,
CSTC-A's monthly assessments of the capabilities of ANP districts
participating in a focused development effort, and weekly situation
reports prepared by State-contracted police mentors. We also reviewed
documents concerning ANP reform efforts supported by LOTFA and by the
UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). To supplement our review
of these materials, we traveled to Afghanistan, where we discussed MOI
and ANP reform efforts with CSTC-A, State, Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), LOTFA, MOI, and ANP officials. We also visited
ANP training facilities and an ANP base in Afghanistan's Chapahar
district, where we met with State contractor personnel. In addition, we
spoke in the United States with officials from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense's Central
Command (CENTCOM), State, DEA, and UNAMA. See appendix I for a complete
description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to March 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Afghanistan is a very poor and underdeveloped country that has suffered
from instability and war for three decades. The United States and its
allies removed the ruling Taliban regime following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The new Afghan government
inherited a country with limited capacity to govern and a poorly
developed infrastructure. About 70 percent of the population is
illiterate. According to Transparency International, Afghanistan is the
world's fifth most corrupt country.[Footnote 1] Its police do not
respect human rights, according to the Fund for Peace. The MOI and ANP
have a history of corruption, and much of Afghanistan lacks a
functioning judicial sector.
The United States and other international partners agreed in 2006 to
establish a professional Afghan police service committed to the rule of
law, shortly after the United States assumed the lead in reforming the
MOI and ANP. U.S. goals for the MOI include ensuring that it is
competent and efficient, provides strong and effective leadership, and
has the organizational structures needed to reform, manage, and sustain
the police. U.S. goals for the ANP include ensuring that it is fully
constituted, professional, and functional; trained and equipped to
uphold the rule of law; and able to effectively meet Afghan security
needs, including controlling movement across Afghanistan's borders. In
2006, the United States, Afghanistan, and other international partners
outlined goals for the ANP in the Afghanistan Compact. The stated goals
of the compact include the establishment of, by the end of 2010, a
professional and functional ANP that can meet the security needs of the
country effectively and be increasingly fiscally sustainable. The
United States views an effective Afghan police force as critical to
extending rule of law in Afghanistan and improving Afghan security.
U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan reform the MOI and ANP are directed by
Defense through CSTC-A, which is also charged with training the Afghan
National Army. State provides policy guidance for CSTC-A's police
program and oversees civilian contractors to implement police training.
To date, the United States has provided about $6.2 billion to train and
equip the ANP.
Figure 1: The Afghan Ministry of Interior:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
To achieve U.S. goals, CSTC-A has set objectives for institutional,
organizational, and individual reform:
* Institutional reform is intended to ensure that MOI is run by a
professional and adequately trained staff that can manage and sustain a
national police force.
* Organizational reform is aimed at ensuring ANP units have sufficient
capacity to maintain domestic order and are responsive to the local
population's needs.
* Individual reform seeks to ensure that the MOI and ANP consist of
trained, competent, and credible individuals dedicated to public
service who are accountable and transparent in their actions.
The United States works with several international partners in
supporting reform, including the following organizations:
* The European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) is intended
to bring together European national efforts to support police reform in
Afghanistan.
* LOTFA was established by the United Nations Development Program in
May 2002 and provides funds for ANP salaries. As of November 2008,
LOTFA had received about $653.4 million from 20 international donors,
including the United States.
* UNAMA assists in leading international efforts to rebuild the
country.
The MOI and ANP have a total authorized force level of about 82,000.
The ANP consists of six components. As shown in figure 2, the largest
of these is the Afghan Uniformed Police, which serve as local police
and perform routine policing duties in Afghanistan's 365 police
districts. These districts are organized into five regional zones
(North, East, West, South, and Central) and a sixth zone for the
capital city of Kabul. According to State and Defense, the zone
commanders report to the Chief of the Afghan Uniformed Police, who
reports to the Deputy Minister of Interior for Security. (See
appendices II and III for further information on the structure of the
MOI and ANP.)
Figure 2: MOI and ANP Authorized Personnel Levels:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
MOI and ANP Authorized Personnel Levels:
Afghan Uniformed Police: 54.5% (44,801);
Afghan Border Police: 21.6% (17,676);
Ministry of Interior Headquarters: 7.3% (5,943);
Afghan Civil Order Police: 6.5% (5,365);
Criminal Investigative Division: 4.9% (4,009);
Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan: 4.6% (3,756);
Counter Terrorism Police: 0.5% (406).
Total authorized MOI and ANP force level: 81,956.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
[End of figure]
Afghan police and other security forces are facing increasing attacks
by insurgent forces. As shown in figure 3, attacks on Afghan security
forces (including the ANP and the Afghan National Army) increased
sixfold from October 2003 to October 2008, according to DOD. The number
of attacks rose nearly threefold in 1 year, from 97 attacks in October
2007 to 289 in October 2008.
Figure 3: Attacks on Afghan Security Forces (2003-2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Date: May 2003;
Number of attacks: 36.
Date: June 2003;
Number of attacks: 47.
Date: July 2003;
Number of attacks: 36.
Date: August 2003;
Number of attacks: 47.
Date: September 2003;
Number of attacks: 31.
Date: October 2003;
Number of attacks: 45.
Date: November 2003;
Number of attacks: 60.
Date: December 2003;
Number of attacks: 38.
Date: January 2004;
Number of attacks: 27.
Date: February 2004;
Number of attacks: 23.
Date: March 2004;
Number of attacks: 37.
Date: April 2004;
Number of attacks: 25.
Date: May 2004;
Number of attacks: 50.
Date: June 2004;
Number of attacks: 37.
Date: July 2004;
Number of attacks: 34.
Date: August 2004;
Number of attacks: 31.
Date: September 2004;
Number of attacks: 54.
Date: October 2004;
Number of attacks: 59.
Date: November 2004;
Number of attacks: 43.
Date: December 2004;
Number of attacks: 36.
Date: January 2005;
Number of attacks: 36.
Date: February 2005;
Number of attacks: 23.
Date: March 2005;
Number of attacks: 33.
Date: April 2005;
Number of attacks: 63.
Date: May 2005;
Number of attacks: 63.
Date: June 2005;
Number of attacks: 65.
Date: July 2005;
Number of attacks: 62.
Date: August 2005;
Number of attacks: 87.
Date: September 2005;
Number of attacks: 93.
Date: October 2005;
Number of attacks: 63.
Date: November 2005;
Number of attacks: 64.
Date: December 2005;
Number of attacks: 46.
Date: January 2006;
Number of attacks: 60.
Date: February 2006;
Number of attacks: 74.
Date: March 2006;
Number of attacks: 84.
Date: April 2006;
Number of attacks: 85.
Date: May 2006;
Number of attacks: 87.
Date: June 2006;
Number of attacks: 89.
Date: July 2006;
Number of attacks: 115.
Date: August 2006;
Number of attacks: 149.
Date: September 2006;
Number of attacks: 128.
Date: October 2006;
Number of attacks: 129.
Date: November 2006;
Number of attacks: 111.
Date: December 2006;
Number of attacks: 88.
Date: January 2007;
Number of attacks: 96.
Date: February 2007;
Number of attacks: 58.
Date: March 2007;
Number of attacks: 88.
Date: April 2007;
Number of attacks: 127.
Date: May 2007;
Number of attacks: 123.
Date: June 2007;
Number of attacks: 143.
Date: July 2007;
Number of attacks: 159.
Date: August 2007;
Number of attacks: 151.
Date: September 2007;
Number of attacks: 149.
Date: October 2007;
Number of attacks: 97.
Date: November 2007;
Number of attacks: 95.
Date: December 2007;
Number of attacks: 114.
Date: January 2008;
Number of attacks: 70.
Date: February 2008;
Number of attacks: 61.
Date: March 2008;
Number of attacks: 103.
Date: April 2008;
Number of attacks: 141.
Date: May 2008;
Number of attacks: 163.
Date: June 2008;
Number of attacks: 204.
Date: July 2008;
Number of attacks: 233.
Date: August 2008;
Number of attacks: 232.
Date: September 2008;
Number of attacks: 295.
Date: October 2008;
Number of attacks: 289.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
[End of figure]
The ANP has suffered significant casualties in recent years. According
to Defense, at least 3,400 police have been wounded or killed in action
since January 2007. In June 2008, a Defense official testified that ANP
combat losses during 2007 were roughly three times more than those of
the Afghan National Army. Defense data indicate that the ANP suffered
between 19 and 101 fatalities per month over a recent 23-month period
(see figure 4)--an average of 56 police killed in action per month.
Figure 4: ANP Killed in Action from January 2007 to November 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Date: January 2007;
ANP deaths: 28.
Date: February 2007;
ANP deaths: 22.
Date: March 2007;
ANP deaths: 46.
Date: April 2007;
ANP deaths: 21.
Date: May 2007;
ANP deaths: 82.
Date: June 2007;
ANP deaths: 101.
Date: July 2007;
ANP deaths: 89.
Date: August 2007;
ANP deaths: 41.
Date: September 2007;
ANP deaths: 81.
Date: October 2007;
ANP deaths: 57.
Date: November 2007;
ANP deaths: 51.
Date: December 2007;
ANP deaths: 69.
Date: January 2008;
ANP deaths: 59.
Date: February 2008;
ANP deaths: 19.
Date: March 2008;
ANP deaths: 24.
Date: April 2008;
ANP deaths: 88.
Date: May 2008;
ANP deaths: 43.
Date: June 2008;
ANP deaths: 42.
Date: July 2008;
ANP deaths: 80.
Date: August 2008;
ANP deaths: 51.
Date: September 2008;
ANP deaths: 71.
Date: October 2008;
ANP deaths: 50.
Date: November 2008;
ANP deaths: 75
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
[End of figure]
U.S. Agencies Have Helped Restructure the MOI and ANP Officer Corps and
Plan the Future Reorganization of MOI Headquarters:
U.S. agencies have helped Afghanistan restructure the MOI and ANP
officer corps, modify ANP pay rates, and plan a reorganization of MOI
headquarters. CSTC-A has also acted to better coordinate international
mentoring of MOI officials. These efforts were intended to help ensure
that the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can
successfully manage and sustain a national police force in Afghanistan.
The officer corps reform program reduced the oversized MOI-ANP officer
corps from about 17,800 to about 9,000 personnel, reformed the ANP's
top-heavy rank structure, and increased police pay. In a separate
effort, CSTC-A and MOI worked together to develop a plan for increasing
MOI's efficiency by restructuring the ministry and reducing its staff.
In addition, CSTC-A and other international partners have adopted a
plan to address problems affecting their efforts to build MOI staff
capacity through mentoring.
Goal of MOI-ANP Restructuring Programs Is to Promote Institutional and
Organizational Reform:
U.S.-supported efforts to restructure the MOI and ANP are intended to
promote institutional and organizational reform and to help ensure that
the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can
successfully manage and sustain a national police force in Afghanistan.
The programs have been aimed at addressing problems concerning the size
and pay structure of the MOI and ANP officer corps, MOI's organization
and capacity, and mentoring of MOI officials.
* According to U.S. officials, the MOI-ANP officer corps was top heavy.
It consisted of nearly 18,000 individuals, including more than 3,000
generals and colonels. ANP personnel were also paid less than Afghan
National Army personnel, creating recruitment and retention challenges
for the ANP.
* MOI headquarters suffers from numerous organizational deficiencies,
according to U.S. officials. The U.S. Embassy concluded in 2007 that
MOI suffered from corruption, limited control over provincial police
structures, and low institutional capacity at all levels. CSTC-A
reported in 2008 that MOI lacked a clear organizational structure,
basic management functions, and an overall strategy for policing. CSTC-
A also reported that MOI's departments did not have clearly defined
missions and did not communicate and coordinate with one another. State
has reported that MOI lacks a culture of accountability and
transparency. According to State police contactors, MOI's organization
has contributed to pervasive violations of its chain of command and to
a lack of accountability in ANP districts and provincial commands.
MOI's lack of clearly defined lines of authority and areas of
responsibility weakens its ability to combat fraud through effective
internal controls.[Footnote 2]
* To help address MOI's weak institutional capacity, the United States
and other international partners initiated efforts to mentor individual
MOI officials but did not coordinate these efforts. CSTC-A reported in
2008 that international partners provided more than one mentor to some
officials--despite a limited number of available mentors--while
providing none to others. For example, one MOI commander had four
mentors from two different countries at a time when four senior-level
MOI officials had none. CSTC-A also found that donors had not always
aligned mentor skills with the needs of MOI officials and had not
established a single communication chain to share information and
coordinate mentor activities.
MOI and ANP Officer Corps and Pay Restructured:
The United States and MOI have restructured and reduced the rank
structure of the MOI and ANP officer corps while increasing police pay
scales. The rank reform program cut the total number of officer
positions from about 17,800 to about 9,000 and reduced the number of
the highest ranking officers (generals and colonels) by nearly 85
percent. A board of MOI officials selected officers for retention with
help from CSTC-A and U.S. Embassy officials. The rank reform program
significantly altered the structure of the officer corps, as shown in
figure 5.
Figure 5: MOI and ANP Officer Corps Structure before and after Rank
Reform:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Rank: General;
Number before rank reform: 319;
Number after rank reform: 159.
Rank: Colonel;
Number before rank reform: 2,712;
Number after rank reform: 310.
Rank: Lt. Colonel;
Number before rank reform: 2,140;
Number after rank reform: 403.
Rank: Major;
Number before rank reform: 2,598;
Number after rank reform: 626.
Rank: Captain;
Number before rank reform: 3,779;
Number after rank reform: 1,507.
Rank: Lieutenant (first, second, and third);
Number before rank reform: 4,263;
Number after rank reform: 6,013.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
Note: CSTC-A was not able to identify the rank of 11 percent (1,985) of
the officers in the officer corps as it existed before rank reform.
This figure does not include these individuals.
[End of figure]
Table 1: Number of MOI and ANP Officers by Rank before and after Rank
Reform:
Rank[A]: General;
Number of officers before rank reform: 319;
Percentage of total officer corps before rank reform: 2;
Number of officers after rank reform: 159;
Percentage of total officer corps after rank reform: 2;
Net percentage change in officers: 0.
Rank[A]: Colonel;
Number of officers before rank reform: 2,712;
Percentage of total officer corps before rank reform: 17;
Number of officers after rank reform: 310;
Percentage of total officer corps after rank reform: 3;
Net percentage change in officers: -14.
Rank[A]: Lieutenant colonel;
Number of officers before rank reform: 2,140;
Percentage of total officer corps before rank reform: 14;
Number of officers after rank reform: 403;
Percentage of total officer corps after rank reform: 5;
Net percentage change in officers: -9.
Rank[A]: Major;
Number of officers before rank reform: 2,598;
Percentage of total officer corps before rank reform: 16;
Number of officers after rank reform: 626;
Percentage of total officer corps after rank reform: 7;
Net percentage change in officers: -9.
Rank[A]: Captain;
Number of officers before rank reform: 3,779;
Percentage of total officer corps before rank reform: 24;
Number of officers after rank reform: 1,507;
Percentage of total officer corps after rank reform: 17;
Net percentage change in officers: -7.
Rank[A]: Lieutenant (first, second, and third);
Number of officers before rank reform: 4,263;
Percentage of total officer corps before rank reform: 27;
Number of officers after rank reform: 6,013;
Percentage of total officer corps after rank reform: 67;
Net percentage change in officers: 40.
Rank[A]: Other[A];
Number of officers before rank reform: 1,985;
Percentage of total officer corps before rank reform: 11;
Number of officers after rank reform: N/A;
Percentage of total officer corps after rank reform: N/A;
Net percentage change in officers: N/A.
Rank[A]: Total;
Number of officers before rank reform: 17,796;
Percentage of total officer corps before rank reform: 100;
Number of officers after rank reform: 9,018;
Percentage of total officer corps after rank reform: 100.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
[A] CSTC-A informed us that it could not identify the rank of 11
percent (1,985) of the officers in its records of the officer corps as
it existed prior to rank reform.
[End of table]
The reduction in the MOI and ANP officer corps was accompanied by
substantial increases in ANP pay, as shown in table 2. The new pay
rates are on a par with those of the Afghan National Army.
Table 2: MOI and ANP Officer Monthly Pay Rates before and after Pay
Reform:
Officer rank: Lieutenant general;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $107;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $750;
Percentage increase in salary: 601.
Officer rank: Major general;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $103;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $650;
Percentage increase in salary: $531.
Officer rank: Brigadier general;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $95;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $550;
Percentage increase in salary: $479.
Officer rank: Colonel;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $92;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $400;
Percentage increase in salary: $335.
Officer rank: Lieutenant colonel;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $88;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $350;
Percentage increase in salary: $298.
Officer rank: Major;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $83;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $300;
Percentage increase in salary: $261.
Officer rank: Captain;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $78;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $250;
Percentage increase in salary: $259.
Officer rank: First lieutenant;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $69;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $200;
Percentage increase in salary: $233.
Officer rank: Second lieutenant;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $66;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $180;
Percentage increase in salary: $218.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
Note: Nonofficer pay was also impacted by pay reform. See appendix IV
for changes to nonofficer pay.
[End of table]
The MOI Has Approved U.S.-Supported Plan to Restructure MOI
Headquarters:
In 2008, CSTC-A, MOI, and international partner officials developed a
plan for restructuring MOI headquarters. Their goals in developing the
plan included increasing efficiency, streamlining organization,
improving coordination, creating conditions to mitigate corruption, and
reducing headquarters staff by 25 percent.
The plan's implementation was delayed by political resistance within
MOI, according to CSTC-A. MOI was originally to have begun implementing
the restructuring plan in September 2008. However, CSTC-A informed us
that some MOI departments were concerned that they would lose power and
personnel as a result of restructuring. The plan's implementation was
further delayed by the removal of the former Minister of Interior,
according to CSTC-A. The plan was approved in late December 2008 by the
new Minister of Interior and implementation is scheduled to begin in
March 2009. As approved, the restructuring plan provides for a 7
percent reduction in staff, rather than the 25 percent reduction goal
originally set by CSTC-A, MOI, and the international partners.
International Partners Have Approved Plan to Better Coordinate MOI
Mentoring:
CSTC-A and other international partners have agreed on a plan to better
coordinate U.S. and international efforts to mentor MOI officials. CSTC-
A and other international partners sought to define mentor roles and
required skill sets, outline the international partners best suited to
support mentoring requirements, establish a personnel management
process to facilitate mentor assignments, and identify information and
reporting requirements for mentors. The goal of their effort was to
reach an agreement to support an integrated mentor program within MOI's
headquarters. In the final plan, which was approved in January 2009,
CSTC-A and other international partners agreed to provide an
organizational framework to manage the mentoring program, agree on the
allocation of mentors according to rationally derived priorities, and
optimize the match between mentors' skill sets and position
requirements.
Expansion of New Approach to Training Afghan Police Constrained by
Shortage of Military Personnel:
CSTC-A has begun retraining ANP through its Focused District
Development (FDD) program, which is intended to build professional and
fully capable police units. FDD is achieving promising results in most
participating districts, according to Defense status reports. In
February 2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of units retrained through
the FDD program as capable of conducting primary operational missions,
25 percent as capable of conducting primary operational missions with
international support, 31 percent as capable of partially conducting
primary operational missions with international support, and 25 percent
as not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions[Footnote
3]. However, a shortage of military personnel is constraining CSTC-A's
plans to expand FDD and similar programs into the rest of Afghanistan
by the end of 2010. Defense has identified a shortage of about 1,500
military personnel to expand FDD and similar police development
programs. CSTC-A has previously obtained military personnel for the FDD
program and ANP training by redirecting such personnel from resources
intended for its Afghan National Army training program. However, the
Afghan army program's demand for military personnel is likely to grow
due to the recent decision by the United States, Afghanistan, and
international partners to increase the Afghan army from 80,000 to
134,000 individuals.
Goal and Structure of Focused District Development Program:
The goal of the FDD program is to enhance ANP organizational and
individual capability by training all uniformed police in a district as
a unit.[Footnote 4] According to State and Defense officials,
corruption and local loyalties hampered past efforts to train
individuals. Under the previous approach, the effects of individual
training were diluted when trainees returned to corrupt police stations
staffed by poorly trained personnel with little loyalty to the central
government. We reported in 2005 that some returning trainees had been
forced by their commanders to give their new equipment to more senior
police and to help extort money from truck drivers and travelers. In
2008, State reported that the effects of previous police training had
been diluted when newly trained police were reinserted to an unreformed
environment.
The FDD program differs from previous efforts to train ANP because it
focuses on retraining entire districts and not individuals. In
implementing the FDD program in a district, CSTC-A assesses the
district's organization, training, facilities, and judicial
infrastructure before removing the police unit from the district for 8
weeks of full-time training.[Footnote 5] During the training program,
the unit receives basic training for all untrained recruits, advanced
training for recruits with previous training, and management and
leadership training for officers.
Figure 6: ANP Unit Members after Returning to Their District:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
An embedded police mentor team accompanies the unit when it returns to
its home district. According to CSTC-A officials, a standard police
mentor team includes two civilian police mentors, four military support
personnel, and six military security personnel (see figure 7). While
State provides the civilian police mentors, CSTC-A is responsible for
providing the 10 military support and security personnel. According to
CSTC-A, the police mentor team provides the unit with continued on-the-
job training following its return to its home district and assesses the
unit's progress toward becoming capable of independently performing
basic law and order operations.
Figure 7: Model FDD Police Mentoring Team:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
6 Security team members:
Military:
1 x team chief;
1 x Operations;
1 x Personnel;
1 x Logistics.
Civilian police advisers:
1 x police chief;
1 x training officer;
1 x Linguist.
Sources: Defense (data); Copyright © Corel Corp. (clip art). All rights
reserved.
[End of figure]
Initial FDD Program Efforts Report Positive Results:
The FDD program has shown positive initial results, according to
Defense. In February 2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of the units
retrained through the FDD program as capable of conducting primary
operational missions, 25 percent as capable of conducting primary
operational missions with international support, 31 percent as capable
of partially conducting primary operational missions with international
support, and 25 percent as not yet capable of conducting primary
operational missions. In contrast, in April 2008 all of the districts
enrolled in FDD were only partially capable of independent action.
[Footnote 6]
Police mentor teams are required to send monthly capability assessment
forms to CSTC-A as part of CSTC-A's effort to monitor and assess the
FDD program. The assessments rank the units on a variety of
competencies, including personnel actions and pay reform, equipment
accountability, maintenance, formal training, crime-handling
procedures, and use of force. Mentor teams also address disciplinary
issues and observe units for signs of drug use. According to Defense,
in 2007, 29 FDD participants were identified as drug users, removed
from the program, and released from the police force.
Although Defense assesses the FDD program to be demonstrating promising
initial results, FDD districts have required more time to become fully
capable than CSTC-A had originally projected. CSTC-A had projected that
FDD units would reach full capability in 9 months. However, only 4 of
the first 7 units to undergo the FDD program reached full capability
within 10 months, according to CSTC-A. CSTC-A informed us the program
has been affected by growing security threats. Also, CSTC-A responded
to concerns of international partners in Afghanistan by initiating FDD
in districts that faced relatively greater security threats than
originally anticipated. These initial districts included several on or
near the ring road that links the major cities in Afghanistan, as shown
in figure 8.[Footnote 7]
Figure 8: Initial FDD Districts in Relation to the Ring Road:
[Refer to PDF for image: map]
Indicated on the map of Afghanistan are the following:
Regional Highway system;
Ring Road;
Initial FDD Districts, and;
Initial FDD Districts in Relation to the Ring Road:
Regional Command North;
Regional Command East;
Regional Command Central;
Regional Command South;
Regional Command West;
Regional Command Kabul.
Sources: GAO analysis of Defense data; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Existing Personnel Constraints Are Impeding Timely Expansion of FDD
Program:
CSTC-A currently lacks the military support and security personnel
resources to expand FDD into the rest of Afghanistan.[Footnote 8]
Senior CSTC-A personnel informed us that Defense has not provided CSTC-
A with dedicated personnel designated to serve as police mentors. As a
result, CSTC-A redirected to the police program personnel that would
have been used to mentor Afghan National Army units. CSTC-A staff
informed us that they redirected the personnel because the police
training program used prior to FDD was not succeeding at a time when
the Afghan army training program was making progress.
CSTC-A intends to retrain the uniformed police in all districts in
Afghanistan using FDD and other similar district-level reform programs.
[Footnote 9] To do so, CSTC-A estimates it would need a total of 399
police mentor teams--365 district teams and 34 provincial level teams.
CSTC-A informed us that its preference is to complete FDD using a 3-
year planning model that would have 250 police mentor teams fielded by
the end of December 2009 and the remaining 149 teams fielded in
districts by October 2010. This schedule, however, would not allow
Defense to complete FDD training and mentoring in time to meet the
Afghanistan Compact's goal of achieving a fully functional and
professional Afghan National Police by the end of 2010. Defense has
reported that it would need about 1,500 additional military personnel
to expand FDD and similar police development programs.
The FDD program faces the likely possibility of increasing competition
for these personnel from CSTC-A's program to fully train the Afghan
National Army. In the past, FDD and other ANP training programs have
relied on U.S. military personnel that had been intended for use for
Afghan army training programs. However, the demand for personnel for
use in Afghan army training programs is likely to increase because
Afghanistan, the United States, and other international partners have
agreed to increase the Afghan army from 80,000 to 134,000 personnel.
In November 2008, CSTC-A officials stated they may propose that Defense
use U.S. combat units, provincial reconstruction teams,[Footnote 10]
and international forces to help address the shortage of personnel. The
officials later informed us that six FDD police mentor teams had been
staffed using personnel provided by international forces. However,
according to Defense officials in headquarters, Defense has not altered
its guidance to CSTC-A for staffing the FDD program.
U.S. Agencies Screened MOI and ANP Officers but Did Not Systematically
Compile Records of Background Checks:
MOI and ANP officers were screened by Defense and State as part of a
rank reform program intended to promote institutional and
organizational reform, but State did not systematically compile records
of background checks conducted as part of the screening effort. The
screening effort included testing by CSTC-A of MOI and ANP personnel on
police practices. At least 55 percent of the almost 17,800 officers
tested passed, according to data provided by CSTC-A. The screening
effort also included background checks based on information from State
and UNAMA. However, U.S. officials were unable to provide us with
detailed information concerning the number of individuals whose
backgrounds had been checked and the results of those checks. ANP
recruits are endorsed by local elders and officials and, according to
CSTC-A, screened by MOI. Members of certain small elite units receive
additional screening by U.S. agencies or high-ranking MOI officials.
Screening Intended to Promote MOI and ANP Institutional and
Organizational Reform:
Efforts to screen MOI and ANP personnel are intended to promote
institutional and organizational reform. The goals of U.S.-supported
screening efforts are to help ensure that (1) MOI is run by a
professional and adequately trained staff that can manage and sustain a
national police force and (2) ANP units, under MOI control, have the
capacity to maintain domestic order while remaining responsive to the
needs of the local population. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul reported in
2007 that the effectiveness of the police had been seriously impeded by
"corrupt and/or incompetent" MOI and ANP leadership. The State and
Defense inspectors general reported in 2006 that then-current ANP
screening efforts were ineffective and that verifying the suitability
of police candidates in Afghanistan is difficult because of (1) the
strength of Afghan ethnic and tribal ties and (2) the lack of reliable
personnel and criminal records in Afghanistan.[Footnote 11]
MOI and ANP Officers Were Tested in Connection with Rank Reform:
According to CSTC-A, nearly 17,800 MOI and ANP officers took tests on
human rights and policing values that were required for consideration
in the reformed MOI and ANP officer corps.[Footnote 12] At least 9,797
(55 percent) of these officers passed. Higher-ranking officers below
the rank of general passed the tests at higher rates than lower-ranking
officers (see table 3).[Footnote 13]
Table 3: Test Passage and Failure of MOI and ANP Officers by Rank:
Rank: General;
Passed: Not available;
Failed: Not available;
Percentage passed: Not available.
Rank: Colonel;
Passed: 2,097;
Failed: 615;
Percentage passed: 77.
Rank: Lt. colonel;
Passed: 1,459;
Failed: 681;
Percentage passed: 68.
Rank: Major;
Passed: 1,624;
Failed: 974;
Percentage passed: 63.
Rank: Captain;
Passed: 1,997;
Failed: 1,711;
Percentage passed: 53.
Rank: First lieutenant;
Passed: 858;
Failed: 1,061;
Percentage passed: 46.
Rank: Second lieutenant;
Passed: 857;
Failed: 1,457;
Percentage passed: 37.
Rank: Third lieutenant;
Passed: 32;
Failed: 69;
Percentage passed: 32.
Rank: Other[A];
Passed: 873;
Failed: 1,112;
Percentage passed: 44.
Source: GAO analysis of CSTC-A data.
[A] CSTC-A informed us that it could not determine the ranks of 1,985
officers who were tested.
[End of table]
State Checked Backgrounds of MOI and ANP Officers but Did Not
Systematically Compile Records:
MOI and ANP officers were also subject to background checks as part of
the rank reform process. The background checks were based on
information from State and UNAMA. State officials informed us that the
Department of State screened officers for rank reform by using its
procedures for vetting foreign security personnel in connection with
U.S. law.[Footnote 14] In doing so, it made use of background checks
conducted at the State Department in Washington, D.C. State officials
in Washington said that the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan provided them
with lists of names and associated biographical information. The
officials then used the information to search both a governmentwide
database containing sensitive information and various nongovernment
databases. UNAMA officials informed us that background checks
concerning more than 18,000 names[Footnote 15] were based in part on
information collected locally by UNAMA. According to a UNAMA official,
UNAMA found no detailed information for "more than 10,000" names and
varying degrees of information about the remaining names.[Footnote 16]
State has not systematically compiled records of the background checks.
A U.S. Embassy official informed us that the embassy did not maintain a
database of the officers that had been checked. State officials in
Washington, D.C., informed us that they had retained copies of the
embassy's requests and their responses but had not systematically
compiled the information contained in them.
Because they had not systematically compiled their records of the
background checks, State officials could not provide us with the number
of officers whose backgrounds they had checked or with detailed
information concerning the results of the background checks. A U.S.
Embassy official provided us with a partial list of embassy screening
requests. The list indicates that the embassy had asked State to check
the backgrounds of 2,514 unidentified individuals in late 2007. State
officials in Washington, D.C., told us they may have screened as many
as 4,000 names during the rank reform program. One State official in
Washington, D.C., estimated he found derogatory information about fewer
than two dozen individuals. The officials in Washington, D.C., said
their screening efforts were hampered by the frequent lack of adequate
data about an individual's identity and date of birth. (Many Afghans
use a single name, according to U.S. officials, and birth records are
often lacking.)
The U.S. Embassy provided us with documents indicating that UNAMA found
negative information--including assertions of involvement in drug
trafficking, corruption, and assaults--on 939 (38 percent) of 2,464
officers it reviewed during late 2007. A UNAMA official informed us
that UNAMA had raised concerns about human rights abuses, ties to
insurgent groups, corruption, and involvement in drug trafficking in
"several hundred" cases. He stated MOI may have selected some officers
despite negative UNAMA information because of factional influence,
patronage, or possible corruption.
ANP Recruits Screened by Local Authorities and MOI, While Elite Units
Receive Additional Screening:
ANP enlisted recruits are endorsed in groups by village elders or local
government officials and vetted by local police chiefs. According to
CSTC-A, the recruits are also screened by MOI's medical, intelligence,
and criminal investigative departments, under MOI procedures
established in 2004 and in "full implementation" as of December 2008.
[Footnote 17]
Recruits in certain elite units receive additional screening, according
to U.S. officials. These units' authorized personnel levels constitute
about 7 percent of all authorized MOI and ANP personnel.
* The 56 members of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police's Special
Investigative Unit (SIU) are given periodic polygraph exams, tested for
drugs, and screened for human rights violations and drug-related
offenses, according to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
officials. DEA officials stated that in 2008 DEA repolygraphed 21 SIU
members and eliminated 7 based on the results. DEA noted this one-third
failure rate is greater than that of SIUs in other countries.
* The 185 members of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police's National
Interdiction Unit are initially tested for drug use and screened for
human rights violations and drug-related offenses, according to DEA
officials.[Footnote 18]
* The commanding general of the Afghan National Civil Order Police
informed us that he personally interviews all applicants for his force.
In our meeting with him in Kabul, the general stated he had dismissed
120 recruits MOI had sent to him due to allegations of drug use and
other abuses.[Footnote 19]
Efforts to Enhance MOI and ANP Pay Systems Face Challenges of Limited
Cooperation and Lack of a Nationwide Bank System:
U.S.-supported pay system efforts are intended to (1) validate the
status of reported MOI and ANP personnel rosters and (2) help ensure
that MOI and ANP wages are distributed reliably and fairly. Despite
some progress, these efforts face challenges that include limited ANP
cooperation and a shortage of commercial banks. Although U.S.
contractor personnel have validated the status of almost 47,400 current
MOI and ANP personnel, they have been unable to validate the status of
almost 29,400 additional personnel--paid in part by U.S. contributions
to LOTFA--because of a lack of cooperation from certain ANP commanders.
As of January 2009, about 97 percent of reported MOI and ANP personnel
had enrolled in a new U.S.-supported electronic payroll system, and 58
percent had enrolled in a new electronic funds transfer system to have
salaries deposited directly into their bank accounts. However, nearly
40 percent of personnel may have difficulties using this system because
they are not located within 15 miles of a commercial bank.
Goal of Pay System Projects Is to Promote Individual Reform:
U.S.-supported pay system reform efforts are intended to promote
individual reform. Unverified personnel lists and weak pay distribution
systems are closely linked to corruption in the ANP, according to U.S.
agencies. Corrupt pay practices jeopardize U.S. funds provided by State
and Defense to LOTFA in support of MOI and ANP wages. The United States
has contributed $230 million to LOTFA as of November 2008, which
constitutes more than one-third of the $653 million received by LOTFA.
The number of actual MOI and ANP personnel is unclear. While LOTFA data
indicate that 78,541 personnel were on MOI and ANP payrolls as of
January 12, 2009, CSTC-A informed us that MOI does not have an accurate
personnel manning roster or tracking system. The inspectors general of
State and Defense stated in 2006 that reports of the number of police
were inflated and that ANP salaries were being delivered to police
stations based on the number of police listed on the rolls. Further,
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul reported in 2007 that police chiefs had
inflated personnel rosters by creating "ghost policemen"--allowing
chiefs to obtain illegal payments. In 2008, we reported that a 2007
Defense census of ANP in several provinces could not confirm the
existence of about 20 percent of uniformed police and more than 10
percent of border police listed on MOI's payroll records.[Footnote 20]
Weak pay distribution systems have also fostered corruption. The U.S.
Embassy reported in 2007 that MOI's use of "trusted agents" to deliver
payrolls allowed district chiefs and other officials to take cuts from
patrolmen's pay. The embassy also noted that problems remain in
regularly and routinely providing pay to outlying districts and closing
off opportunities for corruption. In 2006, the State and Defense
inspectors general concluded that MOI's "completely broken" pay
disbursement system was one cause of the systematic corruption
associated with the police. They also found that senior police
officials routinely skimmed the salaries of junior police.[Footnote 21]
More examples of problems with ANP pay distribution processes can be
found in the weekly reports of U.S. civilian police mentors. During a 2-
month period in 2008, the mentors reported a variety of financial
irregularities and fraud, including the following:
* Police in several districts reported that they had not been paid.
* Some individuals continued to receive officers' wages after having
been demoted to noncommissioned officers.
* A district commander had lied about the number of ANP personnel in
his district to obtain additional funds. He then used some of these
funds to hire civilian friends to "help out" at the station.
* A finance officer reported concerns that district chiefs were forcing
their men to pay the chiefs part of their wages.
* An ANP acting provincial financial chief reported that several
district police chiefs had threatened to kill him if he continued to
work with the international community on pay matters.
* Another ANP provincial financial chief was removed for allegedly
conspiring to embezzle funds intended for the families of ANP personnel
who had been killed.
Effort to Validate Police Databases Challenged by Lack of Full ANP
Cooperation:
State and MOI have attempted to validate the status of more than
103,000 applicants for police identification cards by positively
identifying all police, building a computerized police database, and
issuing identification cards for use in paying police salaries. The
identification card program began in 2003. State contractor personnel
informed us that the validation process is being executed by joint
contractor-MOI validation teams that were created because ANP regional
zone commanders did not respond to requests to validate the status of
applicants in their zones. State informed us in November 2008 that
nearly 47,400 MOI and ANP personnel had received identification cards
after the validation teams confirmed these applicants had not retired,
been killed, or otherwise left the MOI or ANP (see figure 9). MOI and
State contractor validation teams also determined that another 26,700
applicants had retired, been killed, or had otherwise left the MOI or
ANP, including about 14,200 who had received identification cards
before they retired, were killed, or otherwise left the ANP. State
informed us that the validation process had been completed in two
regional zones in early October 2008.
Figure 9: Validation Status of Applicants for Identification Cards,
November 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Validation Status of Applicants for Identification Cards, November
2008:
Active with ID Card: 47,325;
Awaiting validation: 29,372;
Retired, killed, or otherwise left ANP or MOI: 26,701;
Total: 103,398.
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.
[End of figure]
However, according to State, these teams have been unable to validate
the extent to which another 29,372 applicants--about 37 percent of the
total reported MOI and ANP workforce of 78,541--are active and eligible
to receive identification cards. State informed us that three ANP zone
commanders are not cooperating with efforts to validate the status of
these applicants and that plans to complete the validation process have
been put on hold until MOI persuades the commanders to cooperate.
[Footnote 22]
According to CSTC-A and State contractor personnel, the identification
cards will eventually be used to identify MOI and ANP personnel for pay
purposes. We were informed by contractor personnel that each card has a
bar code with specific information concerning each individual's salary
group, name, and service number. The card also contains a fingerprint
and a digital photograph that can be scanned into a facial recognition
program (see figure 10).
Figure 10: Sample ANP Identification Cards at MOI's Headquarters in
Kabul:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Data collected from individuals are processed by MOI personnel and
stored in servers located at MOI headquarters (see figs. 11 and 12).
According to State contractor personnel, the cards use a variety of
optical features to discourage counterfeiters.
Figure 11: Workstation Used to Process Identification Card at MOI
Headquarters:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 12: Servers Used to Store Identification Data at MOI
Headquarters in Kabul:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Shortage of Banks Impedes Progress in Expanding Direct Deposit Pay
System:
According to Defense and State, the goal of the new electronic payroll
and funds transfer systems is to reduce corruption in pay distribution
by establishing fair and reliable pay processes. LOTFA and CSTC-A
officials stated the electronic payroll system is intended to replace
slow, paper-based processes with an automated system that creates a
monthly payroll for police and allows MOI to track individual payments.
LOTFA has sponsored training programs to familiarize MOI personnel with
the new payroll system (see figure 13). As shown in figure 14, LOTFA
data indicate that 97 percent (76,343) of 78,451 reported MOI and ANP
personnel were enrolled in the electronic payroll system as of January
2009.
Figure 13: LOTFA Electronic Payroll Training Class at MOI Headquarters
in Kabul:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 14: Enrollment in Electronic Payroll System, as of January 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Enrollment in Electronic Payroll System, as of January 2009:
Enrolled in electronic payroll system: 97%;
Not enrolled in electronic payroll system: 3%.
Source: GAO analysis of LOTFA data.
[End of figure]
The electronic funds transfer system is intended to help reduce MOI's
use of corruption-prone salary distribution methods by depositing wages
directly into the bank accounts of individual MOI and ANP personnel. As
of May 2008, LOTFA's stated goal was to enroll 80 percent of MOI and
ANP personnel by September 2008. However, as of January 2009, only 58
percent (about 45,200) of 78,451 reported MOI and ANP personnel were
enrolled in the system, according to LOTFA (see figure 15).
Figure 15: Enrollment in Electronic Funds Transfer System, as of
January 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Enrollment in Electronic Funds Transfer System, as of January 2009:
Enrolled in electronic funds transfer system: 58%;
Not enrolled in electronic funds transfer system: 42%.
Source: GAO analysis of LOTFA data.
[End of figure]
CSTC-A and LOTFA attributed the lack of greater enrollment in the
electronic funds transfer system to the absence of a nationwide Afghan
banking system. According to CSTC-A and LOTFA data, only about 61
percent (47,900) of reported MOI and ANP personnel live and work within
25 kilometers (about 15 miles) of a commercial bank. In November 2008,
CSTC-A informed us that the expansion of the electronic funds transfer
program was being limited primarily by the impact of security concerns
on efforts to open new banks, as well as by the slow installation of
automated teller machines, a lack of reliable power at remote
locations, and ANP officials who have not yet embraced the program.
CSTC-A officials are exploring the possibility of using cell-phone
companies in lieu of commercial banks to provide direct access to
wages.
Conclusions:
While Defense and State have worked with Afghanistan and other
international partners to initiate and support reform programs that
have the potential to help resolve some of the most significant
challenges facing the development of a fully professional MOI and ANP,
the agencies have not overcome persistent obstacles that will affect
the success of the programs. These obstacles include a lack of
dedicated personnel for use in creating new mentor teams to support
focused development of police districts. Without dedicated personnel
resources, the FDD program's ability to achieve its goals is in
jeopardy because it must compete with an expanding Afghan National Army
training program. In addition, the Departments of Defense and State
have not overcome the resistance of ANP regional commanders who are not
cooperating with efforts to validate almost 29,400 names registered to
receive ANP identification cards. The United States, Afghanistan, and
the international community need a validated database of ANP personnel
to help ensure that contributions to LOTFA to pay the wages of Afghan
police are not being used to pay nonexistent or inactive personnel.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
* To help ensure that the FDD program can achieve its goals, we
recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State undertake a
coordinated effort to provide dedicated personnel to support the
creation of additional police mentor teams needed to expand and
complete the FDD program.
* To help ensure that the United States does not fund the salaries of
unverified ANP personnel, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense
and State consider provisioning future U.S. contributions to LOFTA to
reflect the extent to which U.S. agencies have validated the status of
MOI and ANP personnel.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Departments of State, Defense, and Justice provided written
comments on a draft of this report (see apps. V, VI, and VII). In
addition, Defense provided technical suggestions, which we have
incorporated as appropriate.
Defense concurred with our recommendation that Defense and State
identify and provide dedicated personnel to support the creation of
additional police mentor teams needed to expand and complete the
Focused District Development program. Defense stated it is considering
possible solutions to the shortfall of police mentor teams. The agency
added that it plans to deploy about 17,000 additional forces to
Afghanistan and to use some of these forces on police mentoring
missions. State noted our recommendation and informed us that it is
prepared to recruit additional civilian police mentors for new police
mentor teams.
State concurred with our recommendation that State and Defense consider
provisioning future U.S. contributions to LOFTA to reflect the extent
to which U.S. agencies have validated the status of MOI and ANP
personnel. State added that U.S. contributions to LOTFA should reflect
the extent to which MOI and ANP personnel have been validated. Defense
did not concur with this recommendation. It asserted that the
recommendation would unduly penalize MOI by significantly reducing
police pay and that CSTC-A is working with MOI to identify and validate
all personnel on the payroll. We disagree with Defense's comment on our
recommendation. Given that the ANP identification card program has been
under way for more than 5 years, we believe it is not too soon for
Defense to work with State to consider whether to link future U.S.
contributions to LOTFA to the number of verified ANP personnel. Our
recommendation, if implemented, could help encourage uncooperative ANP
commanders to cooperate with U.S.-backed verification efforts and help
ensure that only legitimate ANP personnel receive wages subsidized by
the United States.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and to the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice. The
report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in
appendix VIII.
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
This report assesses U.S. government efforts to help the government of
Afghanistan (1) restructure the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the
Afghan National Police (ANP), (2) retrain selected ANP units, (3)
screen MOI and ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP
identification and pay systems.
To assess the status of U.S. efforts to restructure the MOI and ANP, we
reviewed the Department of Defense's (Defense) Afghan National Campaign
Plan, a draft joint mentor coordination plan prepared by Defense's
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the
European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan, and CSTC-A's MOI
Development Plan. We also reviewed briefings from CSTC-A on the MOI
restructuring program and the mentoring program. In addition, we
reviewed Department of State (State) documents, including situation
reports from State contractors in Afghanistan. We supplemented this
information by meeting with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and State's
bureaus of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and
South Central Asian Affairs. In Kabul, we met with CSTC-A officials
tasked with MOI reform, including officials who were mentoring MOI
personnel, as well as MOI officials. We also observed a weekly MOI
restructuring task team group that was attended by representatives of
CSTC-A and the international community.
To assess the status of U.S. efforts to retrain selected ANP units, we
reviewed numerous monthly capability assessments for the district
police units included in the Focused District Development (FDD)
program's first round. We also reviewed weekly situation reports
submitted over several months by State-contracted civilian police
mentors in Afghanistan. In addition, we reviewed numerous CSTC-A, OSD,
and State briefings that outlined the program's goals, objectives,
implementation plans, and overall status. In addition, we met with
agency officials to discuss the progress made and the challenges faced
by the FDD program. In Washington, D.C., we met with JCS, OSD, and
State officials. We also spoke with officials at the United States
Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. In Kabul, we met with
officials from CSTC-A tasked with implementing the FDD program, and
visited the CSTC-A Central Training Facility near Kabul and the
Jalalabad FDD regional training center. In the Chapahar district, we
visited an ANP operating base to see a police unit that had been
reinserted into its district after FDD training.
To assess the status of U.S. efforts to screen MOI and ANP personnel,
we reviewed documents and briefings obtained from State, the U.S.
embassy in Afghanistan, OSD, CSTC-A, and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). In addition, we met with U.S. and other officials
to discuss the screening processes for MOI and ANP personnel. In
Washington, D.C., we met with officials from Defense, State, and DEA.
We also spoke with CENTCOM officials located in Tampa, Florida. In
Kabul, we met with State officials at the U.S. Embassy. We also met
with DEA officials to discuss screening issues pertaining to the
Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan. In addition, we spoke with
officials at the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan.
To assess the status of U.S. efforts to enhance MOI and ANP
identification and pay systems, we reviewed data and documents from the
United Nations Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), CSTC-
A, and State-contracted mentors in Afghanistan. We also met with State
contractor, CSTC-A, LOTFA, and U.S. Embassy personnel in Kabul. To
determine the reliability of the data we collected concerning the
identification card and electronic pay systems programs, we compared
data collected from multiple sources to assess their consistency and
obtained written descriptions from LOTFA and State contractor personnel
concerning the processes they used to compile and check the data. We
concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
our review.
Any information on foreign law in this report is not a product of
original analysis but was instead derived from interviews and secondary
sources.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National
Police:
Component: Ministry of Interior;
Description: Responsible for the enforcement of the rule of law.
Component: Afghan Uniformed Police;
Description: Assigned to police districts and provincial and regional
commands; duties include patrols, crime prevention, traffic duties, and
general policing.
Component: Afghan Border Police;
Description: Provides broad law enforcement capability at international
borders and entry points.
Component: Afghan National Civil Order Police;
Description: Specialized police force trained and equipped to counter
civil unrest and lawlessness.
Component: Criminal Investigative Division;
Description: Leads investigations of national interest, those with
international links, and those concerned with organized and white-
collar crime.
Component: Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan;
Description: Law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics
production and distribution in Afghanistan.
Component: Counter Terrorism Police;
Description: Leads police and law enforcement efforts to defeat
terrorism and insurgency.
Source: U.S. Department of Defense.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Organizational Chart for the Ministry of Interior and
Afghan National Police:
[Refer to PDF for image: organizational chart]
Minister of Interior:
* Deputy Minister for Counter Narcotics;
- Operations Chief;
-- Special Counter Narcotics Units;
-- Regional and Provincial Counter Narcotics Chief;
* Deputy Minister for Security;
- Border Police Chief;
- Afghan National Civil Order Police Chief;
- Deputy Uniformed Police Chief;
-- Regional Commander South;
-- Regional Commander North;
-- Regional Commander East;
-- Regional Commander West;
-- Regional Commander Central;
-- Kabul Regional Commander;
- Anticrime Chief;
- Special Operations Chief;
- Plans and Operations Chief;
- Intelligence Chief;
- Public Guard.
Source: Department of Defense.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: MOI and ANP Nonofficer Pay Rates before and after Pay
Reform:
Rank: First sergeant;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $62;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $190;
Percentage increase in salary: 206.
Rank: Second sergeant;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $62;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $170;
Percentage increase in salary: 174.
Rank: Third sergeant;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $62;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $145;
Percentage increase in salary: 134.
Rank: First patrolman;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $70;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $110;
Percentage increase in salary: 57.
Rank: Second patrolman;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $70;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $100;
Percentage increase in salary: 43.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs:
2700 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2700:
February 25, 2009:
Mr. Charles Johnson Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Johnson:
The following are Department of Defense (DoD) comments to the GAO draft
report (GAO-09-280SU), "Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further
Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of
Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation," dated February 9, 2009 (GAO
Code 320570). DoD Comments refer to the two recommendations in the
draft report.
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense
and State undertake a coordinated effort to provide dedicated personnel
to create additional police mentor teams needed to expand and complete
the Focused District Development (FDD) program. (Page 31/GAO Draft
Report)
DOD Response: DoD concurs with the recommendation. DoD is considering
possible solutions to the shortfall of police mentor teams, and notes
that the Secretary of Defense recently approved deploying approximately
17,000 additional forces to Afghanistan, some of which will be used on
police mentoring missions.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense
and State consider provisioning future U.S. contributions to Law and
Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOFTA) to reflect the extent to which
U.S. agencies have validated the status of Afghan Ministry of Interior
(MOI) and Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel. (Page 31/GAO Draft
Report)
DOD Response: DoD non-concurs with this recommendation. Implementing it
would result in significantly reducing police pay, which would unduly
penalize the MOI at a time when it is taking steps to address
accountability challenges. Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) notes that it is working with the MOI to implement
programs to identify and validate all personnel on the payroll. The
Minister has dispatched teams to each province whose mission is to
verify personnel and equipment throughout the country. He is also
setting up a program of periodic re-validations to check compliance
with the new systems that the teams are implementing.
My point of contact is Ms. Cara Negrette, (703) 695-2859, or email:
cara.negrette@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Illegible, for:
David Sedney:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense East Asia:
Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense Asian and
Pacific Security Affairs:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Washington, D.C 20530:
February 23, 2009:
Mr. Charles M. Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20510-1501
Dear Mr. Johnson:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) draft report entitled Afghanistan Security: US. Programs
to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged
by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation, GAO-09-280SU
Given the GAO's finding of the lack of adequate personnel, the
Department of Justice (the Department) wishes to note the GAO report
reflects the absence of the Criminal Division's International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) from the Afghanistan
police training mission, as well as the overall criminal justice
system.
ICITAP works with foreign governments to develop professional and
transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights,
combat corruption. and reduce the threat of transnational crime and
terrorism. ICITAP programs are designed in partnership with the host
countries, and program implementation methods include: on-the-ground,
pre-program assessments; program planning, management, and review;
curriculum development; classroom training, seminars, and workshops;
internships; equipment donations; donor coordination; and on-the-job
training and mentoring provided by embedded, long-term advisors. ICITAP
is well-known as the premiere organization to provide a broad array of
police, corrections, border, anti-corruption, and forensic training
programs and has conducted its programs in over forty (40) countries,
always with a keen eye toward capacity building of the host nation's
law enforcement institutions. One of ICITAP's strengths lies with the
ability to reach deep into the Department agencies for subject matter
expertise, something no other law enforcement training program can do.
Some of ICITAP's success stories include:
* ICITAP was the first civilian law enforcement development and
training organization on the ground after the U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq, coordinating with coalition partners and deploying hundreds of
professional advisors to Iraq and training thousands of Iraqis; ICITAP
also developed a nationwide corrections system.
* ICITAP spearheaded the Police Assistance Program for the Indonesian
National Police after its separation from the Indonesian Armed Forces;
the program expanded over the years to focus on building Indonesia's
capability to combat trans-national crime throughout its sprawling
archipelago.
* Working with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
ICITAP led the building of a police academy in Kosovo to prepare and
train the new Kosovo Police Service (KPS).
* After the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, ICITAP supported United
Nations efforts to stand up a police force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
ICITAP's developmental work-particularly its technical assistance in
implementing modern information management systems-was critical to
combating terrorist and organized crime threats in the region.
ICITAP currently receives no direct appropriation for its valuable
work. Nevertheless, if asked, ICITAP stands ready, willing, and able to
assist in the wide-ranging needs of the Afghanistan Ministry of
Interior, its National Police, and the entire criminal justice
community.
Thank you again for the opportunity to review the draft report and to
submit our written comments for publication. If you have questions,
please contact Richard Theis, the Department's Audit Liaison on 202 514-
0469.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Lee J. Lofthus:
Assistant Attorney General for Administration:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
March 3, 2009:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Afghanistan
Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and
National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan
Cooperation," GAO Job Code 320570.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Melanie Brock, Program Manager, Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs at (202) 776-8829.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc:
GAO - Hynek Kalkus:
INL -- David T. Johnson:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Ministry of Interior
Reform and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and
Afghan Cooperation (GAO-09-280SU/Code 320570):
The Department welcomes this report and appreciates the GAO's views on
the status of Afghan National Police development and Ministry of
Interior reform, as well as its recommendations on how to improve USG
and international efforts to develop the Afghan National Police.
The Department notes GAO's recommendations that the Secretaries of
Defense and State identify and provide dedicated personnel to support
the creation of additional police mentor teams needed to expand and
complete the Focused District Development program. Pending completion
of the comprehensive strategy review, it is likely that the Focused
District Development will remain a priority effort. To that end, the
Department of State is prepared to recruit up to 286 additional
civilian police mentors in 2009 - paid for with Department of Defense
funding - to meet the civilian police requirement for additional police
mentor teams.
We concur with GAO's recommendation that the Secretaries of Defense and
State consider provisioning U.S. contributions to the Law and Order
Trust Fund for Afghanistan for police wages. Our contributions should
reflect the extent to which U.S. agencies have validated the status of
Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police personnel. While USG
contributions are made through the Defense Department, the Department
of State continues to support and strengthen validated identification
of Afghan National Police personnel. We are accomplishing this through
the issuance of ANP identification cards as part of the Focused
District Development process and the development of an in-processing
program - to be implemented this spring - to more accurately track
trainees following their graduation from Focused District Development.
Among other things, the new in-processing program will leverage the
existing ID card database to capture screening results such as medical
and biometrics data, fitness assessment, and financial information for
electronic payment of salaries.
We note with concern, however, that the report does not clearly and
consistently differentiate between the separate processes of Leahy
vetting and rank reform; rather, it appears to classify the two
processes together as "screening." [See comment 1] Leahy vetting of
individual police personnel was undertaken by the State Department's
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL). The DRL process
vetted senior MOI officers, starting with Generals, for human rights
concerns for the positions they had been selected for after testing,
whereas the rank reform process of testing all senior-level Ministry of
Interior officials - intended to determine appropriate rank levels of
senior officials - was led by the Defense Department's Combined
Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
The following is GAO's comment on Department of State's letter dated
March 3, 2009.
GAO Comment:
1. As noted in our report, we use the term "screening" to include both
the testing and background checks that were undertaken to accomplish
the goals of the rank reform effort.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant
Director), Pierre Toureille, Christopher Banks, Lucia DeMaio, Mattias
Fenton, Cindy Gilbert, Mark Dowling, Lynn Cothern, and Jena Sinkfield
made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranks
more than 150 countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as
determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys.
[2] See GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.:
November 1999).
[3] According to Defense, the role of the ANP encompasses a wide range
of policing, law enforcement, and security missions.
[4] As described in the background section of this report, enhancing
MOI and ANP organizational and individual capability are two of CSTC-
A's reform objectives.
[5] A force of Afghan National Civil Order Police maintains order in
the district during the unit's absence.
[6] We have not included the number of FDD units because Defense
controls this information as For Official Use Only. We plan to issue a
For Official Use Only annex to this report.
[7] For more information about the ring road, see GAO, Afghanistan
Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments
for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are
Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-689]
(Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2008).
[8] One similar district police reform program was the In District
Reform (IDR) program, which used the same basic training program as FDD
but relied on U.S. Marines to provide security in the district when
half of the local police force was removed for training. When the first
half of the force finished with the training, it was returned to active
duty and the other half of the police force went to training. Marines
became part of the IDR police mentor teams, along with contractor
personnel and other trainers.
[9] CSTC-A informed us in January 2009 that FDD-like district-level
police retraining programs could draw on personnel from international
forces or U.S. forces other than the U.S. Army. For example, U.S.
Marine Corps personnel are supporting efforts to reform several police
units in their districts.
[10] See GAO, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-86R] (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 1, 2008).
[11] Inspectors General, Departments of State and Defense, Interagency
Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness (Washington,
D.C., and Arlington, Va., November 2006).
[12] An ANP general informed us in May 2008 that senior officers were
administered written and oral tests while field officers were generally
tested orally.
[13] CSTC-A informed us it does not have data concerning the number of
generals who passed or failed the tests. The officer corps included 319
generals before rank reform and 159 generals after rank reform.
[14] A recent amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act states that "no
assistance shall be furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act or the
Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of another
country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit
has committed gross violations of human rights." Pub. L. 110-161, Div.
J, Title VI, sec. 651 codified at 22 U.S.C. 2378d. Prior to passage of
this amendment, similar language (known as the "Leahy Amendment") was
regularly incorporated into annual foreign operations appropriations
measures.
[15] A UNAMA official informed us that some of the names screened by
UNAMA may have been duplicates.
[16] UNAMA officials told us they no longer provide background
information because MOI officials had wrongly informed some officers
that they had been rejected because of UNAMA. UNAMA informed us that it
would require a formal request from the Afghan government to resume
such efforts.
[17] The State and Defense inspectors general reported in 2006 that MOI
procedures were not always used and had been bypassed by recruiters at
one U.S.-supported regional training center. See Inspectors General,
U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, Interagency
Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness (Washington,
D.C., and Arlington, Va., November 2006).
[18] DEA officials stated that the National Interdiction Unit's
authorized strength is 288.
[19] The Afghan National Civil Order Police is scheduled to reach its
full strength of 5,365 in March 2011.
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661].
[21] Inspectors General, U.S. Departments of State and Defense,
Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness.
[22] In commenting on a draft of this report in February 2009, Defense
stated that MOI had recently formed provincial inspection teams that
will attempt to verify personnel throughout the country. We were not
able to independently confirm whether these teams will validate the
status of identification card applicants.
[End of section]
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