Defense Acquisitions
Decisions Needed to Shape Army's Combat Systems for the Future Gao ID: GAO-09-288 March 12, 2009The Future Combat System (FCS) program is the centerpiece of the Army's effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. By law, GAO is to report annually on the FCS program. Also, law requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to hold a milestone review of the FCS program, now planned for 2009. This report addresses (1) what knowledge will likely be available in key areas for the review, and (2) the challenges that lie ahead following the review. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed key documents, performed analysis, attended demonstrations and design reviews, and interviewed DOD officials.
The Army will be challenged to demonstrate the knowledge needed to warrant an unqualified commitment to the FCS program at the 2009 milestone review. While the Army has made progress, knowledge deficiencies remain in key areas. Specifically, all critical technologies are not currently at a minimum acceptable level of maturity. Neither has it been demonstrated that emerging FCS system designs can meet specific requirements or mitigate associated technical risks. Actual demonstrations of FCS hardware and software--versus modeling and simulation results--have been limited, with only small scale warfighting concepts and limited prototypes demonstrated. Network performance is also largely unproven. These deficiencies do not necessarily represent problems that could have been avoided; rather, they reflect the actual immaturity of the program. Finally, there is an existing tension between program costs and available funds that seems only likely to worsen, as FCS costs are likely to increase at the same time as competition for funds intensifies between near- and far-term needs in DOD and between DOD and other federal agencies. DOD could have at least three programmatic directions to consider for shaping investments in future capabilities, each of which presents challenges. First, the current FCS acquisition strategy is unlikely to be executed within the current $159 billion cost estimate and calls for significant production commitments before designs are demonstrated. To date, FCS has spent about 60 percent of its development funds, even though the most expensive activities remain to be done before the production decision. In February 2010, Congress will be asked to begin advancing procurement funds for FCS core systems before most prototype deliveries, critical design review, and key system tests have taken place. By the 2013 production decision, Congress will have been asked for over $50 billion in funding for FCS. Second, the program to spin out early FCS capabilities to current forces operates on an aggressive schedule centered on a 2009 demonstration that will employ some surrogate systems and preliminary designs instead of fully developed items, with little time for evaluation of results. Third, the Army is currently considering an incremental FCS strategy--this is to develop and field capabilities in stages versus in one step. Such an approach is generally preferable, but would present decision makers with a third major change in FCS strategy to consider anew. While details are yet unavailable, it is important that each increment be justified by itself and not be dependent on future increments.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-288, Defense Acquisitions: Decisions Needed to Shape Army's Combat Systems for the Future
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2009:
Defense Acquisitions:
Decisions Needed to Shape Army's Combat Systems for the Future:
GAO-09-288:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-288, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Future Combat System (FCS) program is the centerpiece of the Army‘s
effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat
force. By law, GAO is to report annually on the FCS program. Also, law
requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to hold a milestone review of
the FCS program, now planned for 2009. This report addresses (1) what
knowledge will likely be available in key areas for the review, and (2)
the challenges that lie ahead following the review. To meet these
objectives, GAO reviewed key documents, performed analysis, attended
demonstrations and design reviews, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found:
The Army will be challenged to demonstrate the knowledge needed to
warrant an unqualified commitment to the FCS program at the 2009
milestone review. While the Army has made progress, knowledge
deficiencies remain in key areas. Specifically, all critical
technologies are not currently at a minimum acceptable level of
maturity. Neither has it been demonstrated that emerging FCS system
designs can meet specific requirements or mitigate associated technical
risks. Actual demonstrations of FCS hardware and software”versus
modeling and simulation results”have been limited, with only small
scale warfighting concepts and limited prototypes demonstrated. Network
performance is also largely unproven. These deficiencies do not
necessarily represent problems that could have been avoided; rather,
they reflect the actual immaturity of the program. Finally, there is an
existing tension between program costs and available funds that seems
only likely to worsen, as FCS costs are likely to increase at the same
time as competition for funds intensifies between near- and far-term
needs in DOD and between DOD and other federal agencies.
DOD could have at least three programmatic directions to consider for
shaping investments in future capabilities, each of which presents
challenges. First, the current FCS acquisition strategy is unlikely to
be executed within the current $159 billion cost estimate and calls for
significant production commitments before designs are demonstrated. To
date, FCS has spent about 60 percent of its development funds, even
though the most expensive activities remain to be done before the
production decision. In February 2010, Congress will be asked to begin
advancing procurement funds for FCS core systems before most prototype
deliveries, critical design review, and key system tests have taken
place. By the 2013 production decision, Congress will have been asked
for over $50 billion in funding for FCS. Second, the program to spin
out early FCS capabilities to current forces operates on an aggressive
schedule centered on a 2009 demonstration that will employ some
surrogate systems and preliminary designs instead of fully developed
items, with little time for evaluation of results. Third, the Army is
currently considering an incremental FCS strategy”this is to develop
and field capabilities in stages versus in one step. Such an approach
is generally preferable, but would present decision makers with a third
major change in FCS strategy to consider anew. While details are yet
unavailable, it is important that each increment be justified by itself
and not be dependent on future increments.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO suggests Congress consider not approving full funds for the program
until several conditions are met, such as preparation of a complete
budget for any program emerging from the milestone review. GAO also
recommends the Secretary of Defense, among other things, ensure: the
program that emerges conforms to current defense acquisition policy,
such as technology maturity; any spin out approach is based on fully
tested results; and any incremental strategy involves free-standing,
justifiable increments. DOD concurred with GAO‘s recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-288]. For more
information, contact Paul Francis at (202) 512-4841 or
francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Significant Knowledge Gaps Persist in Key Areas:
Oversight Challenges Will Continue Beyond the Milestone Decision:
Conclusions:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Legislative Requirements for 2009 FCS Go/No-Go Review:
Appendix IV: 2009 Defense Acquisition Board In-Process Review Criteria:
Appendix V: Other Related Legislation:
Appendix VI: Technology Readiness Levels:
Appendix VII: FCS Critical Technology Ratings and Projections for
Achieving TRL 6:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Actual and Projected Maturity of FCS Critical Technologies:
Table 2: Surrogate, Non-Production, and Not-Yet-Tested Systems:
Table 3: TRL Descriptions:
Figures:
Figure 1: FCS's Core Systems:
Figure 2: Differences between Best Practices Acquisition Approach and
FCS Approach:
Figure 3: Remaining FCS Research and Development Funding and Key
Events:
Figure 4: FCS Program Events and Congressional Budget Decisions:
Abbreviations:
ARV-A-L: Armed Robotic Vehicle - Assault (Light):
C2V: Command and Control Vehicle:
CDR: Critical Design Review:
Cl. I UAV: Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle:
Cl. IV UAV: Class IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle:
DAB: Defense Acquisition Board:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FCS: Future Combat System:
FRMV: FCS Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle:
GAO: Government Accountability Office:
ICV: Infantry Carrier Vehicle:
JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System:
KP: Knowledge Point:
LSI: Lead System Integrator:
LUT: Limited User Test:
MCS: Mounted Combat System:
MSC: Milestone C:
MULE-C: Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Countermine:
MULE-T: Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Transport:
MV-E: Medical Vehicle Evacuation:
MV-T: Medical Vehicle Treatment:
NLOS-C: Non-Line of Sight Cannon:
NLOS-LS: Non-Line of Sight Launch System:
NLOS-M: Non-Line of Sight Mortar:
PDR: Preliminary Design Review:
SUGV: Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle:
TRL: Technology Readiness Level:
T-UGS: Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor:
UAS: Unmanned Aerial Systems:
UGS: Unattended Ground Sensors:
UGV: Unmanned Ground Vehicles:
U-UGS: Urban Unattended Ground Sensor:
WIN-T: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 12, 2009:
Congressional Committees:
The Future Combat System (FCS) program--which comprises 14 integrated
weapon systems and an advanced information network needed for a brigade
combat team--is the centerpiece of the Army's efforts to transition to
a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force and according to
the Army, the greatest technology and integration challenge it has ever
undertaken. The Army seeks to develop and then integrate dozens of new
technologies in the FCS program and ultimately create a force in which
people, platforms, weapons and sensors are linked seamlessly together
in a system-of-systems.
The Army started the FCS program in May 2003 without having fully
defined the individual systems, their functions, or how they would
interact. The Army moved ahead without determining whether the concept
could be successfully developed with existing resources--without proven
technologies, a stable design, and available funding and time. The Army
currently projects the program will cost $159 billion, although the
Army has indicated that cost increases are likely. The program is also
using a unique partner-like arrangement with a lead system integrator
(LSI), the Boeing Company, to manage and produce the FCS. For these and
other reasons, the program is recognized as being high risk and in need
of special oversight. Accordingly, in 2006, Congress mandated that the
Department of Defense (DOD) hold a milestone review (also called go/no-
go review) following the FCS preliminary design review, which is now
tentatively scheduled for May 2009.[Footnote 1] Congress directed that
the review include an assessment of whether (1) the needs are valid and
can best be met with the FCS concept, (2) the FCS program can be
developed and produced within existing resources, and (3) the program
should continue as currently structured, be restructured, or be
terminated. Congress required the Secretary of Defense to review and
report on specific aspects of the program, including the maturity of
critical technologies, program risks, demonstrations of the FCS concept
and software, and a cost estimate and affordability assessment.
Given the cost, scope, and technical challenges, section 211 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires GAO to
report annually on the FCS program.[Footnote 2] The objectives of this
report are to determine (1) to what extent knowledge will likely be
available to DOD, the Army, and the Congress in the key areas of
technology, design, demonstrations, network performance, and cost and
affordability to support the 2009 milestone review and (2) the
challenges that a program (or programs) to furnish the Army with future
capabilities will face following the milestone review.
In conducting our work, we reviewed documents pertaining to the FCS
program, including the Operational Requirements Document, the
Acquisition Strategy Report, technology assessments, and modeling and
simulation results; attended meetings at which DOD and Army officials
reviewed program progress; and held discussions with key DOD and Army
officials on various aspects of the program. Officials from DOD and the
Army have provided us access to sufficient information to make informed
judgments on the matters in this report. In addition, we drew from our
body of past work on weapon system acquisition practices and conducted
our own analyses in key areas such as cost and technology. We conducted
this performance audit from March 2008 to March 2009 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. Appendix I further discusses our scope
and methodology.
Background:
The FCS concept is designed to be part of the Army's Future Force,
which is intended to transform the Army into a more rapidly deployable
and responsive force that differs substantially from the large division-
centric structure of the past. The Future Force is to be offensively
oriented and will employ revolutionary concepts of operations, enabled
by new technology. The Army envisions a new way of fighting that
depends on networking the force, which involves linking people,
platforms, weapons, and sensors seamlessly together in a system-of-
systems. If successful, the FCS system-of-systems concept would
integrate individual capabilities of weapons and platforms, thus
facilitating interoperability and open system designs. This concept
would represent a significant improvement over the traditional approach
of building superior individual weapons that must be retrofitted and
netted together after the fact.
The Army is reorganizing its current forces into modular brigade combat
teams, each of which is expected to be highly survivable and the most
lethal brigade-sized unit the Army has ever fielded. The Army expects
FCS-equipped brigade combat teams to provide significant warfighting
capabilities to DOD's overall joint military operations. The Army is
implementing its transformation plans at a time when current U.S.
ground forces continue to play a critical role in ongoing conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has instituted plans to spin out
selected FCS technologies and systems to current Army forces throughout
the program's system development and demonstration phase.
FCS is to be composed of advanced, networked air and ground-based
combat and maneuver sustainment systems, unmanned ground and air
vehicles, and unattended sensors and munitions. (See figure 1.) The
soldier is the centerpiece of the system-of-systems architecture and is
networked with 14 FCS core systems and numerous other enabling systems
referred to as complementary programs. FCS is expected to be networked
via a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture, including networked
communications, network operations, sensors, battle command systems,
training, and both manned and unmanned reconnaissance and surveillance
capabilities that will enable improved situational understanding and
operations at a level of synchronization heretofore unachievable. With
that, FCS brigade combat teams are expected to be able to execute a new
tactical paradigm based on the quality of firsts--the capability to see
first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively.
Fundamentally, the FCS concept is to replace mass with superior
information--allowing the soldier to see and hit the enemy first rather
that to rely on heavy armor to withstand a hit.
Figure 1: FCS's Core Systems:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Network:
Sensors;
Battle Command;
SOSCOE Transport:
Manned Ground Vehicles (MGV):
Mounted Combat System (MCS);
Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV);
Command and Control Vehicle (C2V);
Common Chassis:
- Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (RSV);
- Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C);
- Non-Line of Sight Mortar (NLOS-M);
- FCS Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV);
- Medical Vehicle Treatment (MV-T);
- Medical Vehicle Evacuation (MV-E).
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS):
Class I UAV;
Class IV UAV.
Unattended Ground Systems (UGS):
Tactical and Urban Unattended Ground Sensors:
- T-UGS;
- U-UGS.
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV):
Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Countermine (MULE-C);
Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Transport (MULE-T);
Armed Robotic Vehicle–Assault (Light) (ARV-A-L);
Small UGV (SUGV).
Source: U.S. Army.
[End of figure]
The Army is using a management approach for FCS that centers on an LSI
to provide significant management services to help the Army define and
develop FCS and reach across traditional Army mission areas. Because of
its partner-like relationship with the Army, the LSI's responsibilities
include requirements development, design, and selection of major system
and subsystem contractors. The team of Boeing and its subcontractor,
Science Applications International Corporation, is the LSI for the FCS
system development and demonstration phase of acquisition, which is
expected to extend until 2017. The FCS LSI is expected to act on behalf
of the Army to optimize the FCS capability, maximize competition,
ensure interoperability, and maintain commonality in order to reduce
life-cycle costs, and for overall integration of the information
network. Boeing also acts as an FCS supplier in that it is responsible
for developing two important software subsystems. Army officials have
stated they did not believe the Army had the resources or flexibility
to use its traditional acquisition process to field a program as
complex as FCS under the aggressive timeline established by the then-
Army Chief of Staff. The Army will maintain oversight and final
approval of the LSI's subcontracting and competition plans.
Legislative Requirements for FCS Milestone Review:
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
mandated that the Secretary of Defense carry out a Defense Acquisition
Board milestone review of FCS not later than 120 days after the system-
of-systems preliminary design review, which is now tentatively
scheduled for May 2009.[Footnote 3] The legislation is consistent with
our 2006 report on FCS wherein we recommended that the Secretary of
Defense establish a Defense Acquisition Board milestone review
following the Army's design review.[Footnote 4] Moreover, we
recommended that this should be a go/no-go review of the FCS program
based on its ability to meet knowledge markers consistent with DOD
acquisition policy and best practices and demonstrate the availability
of funds necessary to meet program costs. According to the law, DOD's
2009 milestone review of FCS should include an assessment for each of
the following:
(1) whether the warfighter's needs are valid and can be best met with
the concept of the program; (2) whether the concept of the program can
be developed and produced within existing resources; and (3) whether
the program should:
(a) continue as currently structured;
(b) continue in restructured form; or,
(c) be terminated.
Furthermore, the Congress stipulated that the Secretary make specific
determinations when making the assessment concerning the future course
of the FCS program. The original language contained six criteria the
Secretary was to use when answering the three assessment questions. In
our 2008 report on the FCS program, we recommended that the Secretary
establish objective and quantitative criteria that the FCS program will
have to meet in order to justify its continuation and gain approval for
the remainder of the acquisition strategy.[Footnote 5] Subsequently,
the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009 amended and expanded the existing requirements and added four new
criteria.[Footnote 6] These changes expand the scope of supporting
information the Congress mandated to be included with the DOD milestone
review report.
For example, the 2009 Act requires the Secretary, when making his
assessment of the program, to determine whether actual demonstrations,
rather than simulations, have shown that the software for the program
is on path to achieve threshold requirements on cost and schedule.
Appendix III contains the legislative requirements for the 2009
milestone review. For the purposes of our analysis, we aggregated the
congressional criteria into four key areas: technology maturity,
requirements/design, demonstrations (FCS concept and network), and
cost.
In 2008, we found that the progress made by FCS, in terms of knowledge
gained, was commensurate with a program in early development but was
well short of a program halfway through its development schedule and
its budget. In view of these findings, we recommended, in part, that
the Secretary of Defense establish criteria that the FCS must meet in
the 2009 milestone review in order to justify continuation along with
identifying viable alternatives to FCS.[Footnote 7]
In response to this recommendation, and to facilitate the Secretary's
assessment of the status of FCS and to decide the program's future, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics
issued an acquisition decision memorandum in August 2008 to the
Secretary of the Army outlining the information the Army must provide.
The Under Secretary established criteria for supporting information in
five program areas: program execution, unmanned systems, manned ground
vehicles, network, and test/experimentation/demonstration. The Under
Secretary has established specific criteria within each of the five
areas, as shown in Appendix IV. For example, in the area of program
execution, the Army must demonstrate that the FCS, Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS), and Warfighter Information Network Tactical (WIN-T)
programs' development, build, and test schedules are aligned and
executable. The Under Secretary's memorandum also instructed the Army
to mature its acquisition approach to deliver initial increments of FCS
capability to infantry brigade combat teams rather than the originally
planned heavy brigades. For the FCS core program, the Under Secretary
stated that the Army shall pursue an incremental or block approach to
acquiring FCS capability.
Along with the mandated 2009 milestone review of FCS, the Congress has
required the DOD and the Army to perform analyses and report separately
on two core systems of the FCS system-of-systems.[Footnote 8]
Specifically, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration is to report on an analysis of the FCS
communications network and software. This report, due not later than
September 30, 2009, will include assessments of issues such as network
vulnerability to enemy attack, electronic warfare, jamming, and adverse
weather. (See appendix V.)
Significant Knowledge Gaps Persist in Key Areas:
Compared with the criteria to be used for the milestone review, the FCS
program has significant knowledge gaps. Specifically, the program has
yet to show that critical technologies are mature, design issues have
been resolved, requirements and resources are matched, performance has
been demonstrated versus simulated, and costs are affordable. The Army
will be challenged to convincingly demonstrate the knowledge necessary
to warrant an unqualified commitment to FCS at the 2009 milestone
review. Four of the critical technologies have not yet achieved
minimally acceptable maturity levels despite being in development for
at least 6 years. The schedule to complete the remaining preliminary
design reviews is aggressive, and it seems clear from the results of
the initial system-level preliminary design reviews that numerous
performance trade-offs will be needed to close gaps between FCS
requirements and designs. Actual demonstrations (versus modeling and
simulation) of the FCS concept, including its critical survivability
aspects, have been limited to date; demonstrated network performance is
particularly limited with many key questions yet to be answered.
Finally, FCS costs appear likely to increase again at a time when
available funds may decline.
Major Risks Remain in the Maturation of FCS Technologies:
In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue,
DOD is required by congressional direction to make a determination of
whether each critical technology for the program is at least TRL 6. The
Army has struggled to attain this level of maturity, despite being a
lower standard than preferred by DOD policy and falling short of best
practices. At TRL 6, a representative model or prototype exists and is
tested in a relevant environment--a maturity level well beyond TRL 5
where the technology demonstrates functionality in a laboratory
environment but does not have the physical form or fit of the finished
product. Appendix VI contains a complete listing and description of
TRLs. Army technology officials stated the purpose of TRL 6
demonstrations is to build confidence the concept is technically
feasible, and TRL 6 actually means extensive testing remains before TRL
7 can be achieved. Maturing technologies to TRL 7 (prototype possessing
the form, fit, and function of the finished product that is
demonstrated in a realistic environment) prior to starting product
development is a best practice and a DOD policy preference.[Footnote 9]
Against these standards, all FCS technologies should have achieved TRL
7 as the program proceeded into the system development and
demonstration phase in May 2003. Even if the Army does demonstrate TRL
6 in 2009, extending technology development this late into the
acquisition process puts FCS at risk for experiencing problems that may
require large amounts of time and money to fix.
The Army anticipates that all the critical technologies will reach TRL
6 by the milestone review, but this projection deserves closer
examination and perspective. The Army may be unable to demonstrate
technology maturity as quickly as it plans. Based on Army assessments
from January 2009, three of the 44 FCS critical technologies were rated
TRL 7 and 37 were rated TRL 6. The remaining technologies are expected
to complete TRL 6 demonstrations prior to the system-of-systems
preliminary design review, but some of those scheduled demonstrations
are slipping. Appendix VII contains a list of all FCS critical
technologies with their 2007 and 2008 TRL ratings and Army projections
for attaining TRL 6.
Thirteen of the technologies that the Army rated at TRL 6 are awaiting
validation from technology review authorities--independent teams
convened by the FCS program manager and from the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering. These reviews could actually downgrade
maturity levels if demonstration results do not support the Army's TRL
designation. This occurred in 2007 with the mid-range munition's
terminal guidance[Footnote 10]. In 2008, independent reviewers
cautioned the Army about the maturity levels of three technologies: (1)
JTRS ground mobile radio, (2) Mobile Ad-hoc Networking Protocols, and
(3) Wideband Networking Waveforms. According to Army officials, the
Army had claimed these technologies had demonstrated TRL 6; however,
the independent reviewers suggested the Army consider providing
additional justification to strengthen the case for a TRL 6.
Consequently, it is not clear whether independent reviewers will concur
with the Army's assertion that these technologies have demonstrated TRL
6 maturity. Table 1 illustrates both the actual progress the Army has
made maturing FCS critical technologies and projected progress through
the production decision.
Table 1: Actual and Projected Maturity of FCS Critical Technologies:
TRLs 7: [Empty].
TRLs greater than or equal to 7;
Actual progress: Program start 2003: 0;
Actual progress: August 2006 [A]: 1;
Actual progress: July 2007 [A]: 2;
Actual progress: January 2009: 3;
Projected progress: 2009 Preliminary design review: 3;
Projected progress: 2011 Critical design review: 6;
Projected progress: 2013 Production decision: 44.
TRLs equals 6;
Actual progress: Program start 2003: 10;
Actual progress: August 2006 [A]: 34;
Actual progress: July 2007 [A]: 30;
Actual progress: January 2009: 37;
Projected progress: 2009 Preliminary design review: 40;
Projected progress: 2011 Critical design review: 38;
Projected progress: 2013 Production decision: 0.
TRLs less than or equal to 5;
Actual progress: Program start 2003: 42;
Actual progress: August 2006 [A]: 11;
Actual progress: July 2007 [A]: 12;
Actual progress: January 2009: 4;
Projected progress: 2009 Preliminary design review: 1;
Projected progress: 2011 Critical design review: 0;
Projected progress: 2013 Production decision: 0.
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[A] In these years, the Army removed technologies from its assessments.
[End of table]
As we have shown in the past, accepting lower technology levels in
development frequently increases program schedule and cost. In the case
of FCS, the downgrade in TRLs is particularly troublesome because TRL 6
represents a significant development step over TRL 5. Army engineers
maintain that anything beyond TRL 6 is a system integration matter and
not necessarily technology development. Leading commercial firms treat
adapting the technologies to the space, weight, and power demands of
their intended environment--in essence, TRL 7--as part of technology
development. Even if one accepts the lower standard of TRL 6 at program
start, the integration of these technologies into systems and
subsystems should have taken place in the first half of development,
which DOD refers to as "system integration." As a complex, networked
system-of-systems, FCS will have unprecedented integration issues. Yet,
FCS system integration will have to occur in the second half of
development, where it will compete for resources that are intended to
be for demonstration of the system.
As we have previously reported, advancing technologies to TRL 6 has
been especially challenging.[Footnote 11] The Army's history of
maturing FCS technologies does not inspire confidence that it will be
able to execute the optimistic and challenging integration plans
involved with advancing technologies to a TRL 7 before the production
decision in 2013.
Technologies critical to FCS survivability are illustrative of the
program's technology maturity issues. FCS survivability involves a
layered, network-centric approach that consists of detecting the enemy
first to avoid being fired upon; if fired upon, neutralizing the
incoming munition before it hits an FCS vehicle; and finally, having
sufficient armor to defeat those munitions that make it through the
preceding layers. Each of these layers depends on currently immature
technologies to provide the aggregate survivability needed for FCS
vehicles. Many of the technologies intended for survivability have
experienced developmental delays. As a key component of FCS
survivability, the short range active protection system is intended to
neutralize incoming munitions and help protect vehicles from threats
such as rocket-propelled grenades. Initially, Army requirements for the
system included the ability to defeat long-range anti-armor threats,
such as antitank missiles. However, Army officials have decided to
delay demonstration of this capability until 2011 or 2012. The Army
held a short-range active protection system demonstration in the latter
part of 2008 and declared that the system had reached TRL 6. The
results of these demonstrations are pending validation from technology
review authorities. It is important to note that the Army plans to
continue active protection system technology development and
demonstration for some time to ensure that it is an operationally
effective and safe capability. This is challenging because the active
protection system is to provide 360-degree protection for the
relatively lightly-armored FCS manned ground vehicles by using, among
other things, sensors, processors, rocket motors, and a counter-
munition warhead to counter multiple threats.
Lightweight hull and vehicle armor technology for FCS vehicles is also
problematic because it will not be sufficiently advanced to provide
military usefulness for several years. The Army is developing armor-
related critical technologies in a phased approach. The initial phase
of armor development only recently demonstrated TRL 6. The results of
these demonstrations are also pending validation from technology review
authorities. The Army intends for that initial version to satisfy
threshold (or minimally acceptable) survivability requirements and
plans to use it only in prototypes of manned ground vehicles. The
second phase of armor is expected to meet objective (or desired)
survivability requirements but is not scheduled to reach TRL 5 until
fiscal year 2011. Even then, Army engineers do not believe that armor
design will meet weight requirements. The third phase will be used for
low-rate production vehicles and is scheduled to demonstrate TRL 6 in
2012. This armor is expected to satisfy objective threat requirements
and be 25 percent lighter than the second armor iteration. The Army
plans to mature the fourth and final phase of armor to a TRL 6 in
fiscal year 2014. The Army also plans to make manufacturing technology
investments in the armor area in order to reduce its production costs.
Trade-offs Needed to Close Gaps between FCS Requirements and Designs:
For the 2009 milestone review, Congress has directed DOD, for each
system and network component of the program, to assess key design
knowledge and risks, based on system functional reviews, preliminary
design reviews, and technical readiness levels. Now tentatively
scheduled for May 2009, the system-of-systems preliminary design review
is a major technical review to assess whether the full suite of FCS
systems and information network are ready for detailed design and that
the FCS detailed performance requirements can be obtained within cost,
schedule, risk, and other system constraints.
The Army has continued to gain knowledge about FCS development, but
design knowledge expected to be available at the time of the 2009
milestone review may not provide confidence that FCS design risks are
at acceptable levels. Key design risks include the Army's ability to
accomplish all system-level design work in the time remaining before
the 2009 system-of-systems preliminary design review, demonstrate that
emerging system designs match detailed requirements, and mitigate
recognized technical risks to acceptable levels. This challenge has its
roots in the fact that the Army started FCS development in 2003 without
establishing firm requirements and preliminary designs to meet those
requirements; that is, demonstrating a match between customer needs and
available resources. Consequently, the Army is still seeking to
stabilize FCS designs at a time when the program is already past the
mid-point of development phase--the point when a program following best
practices and DOD policy would normally conduct a critical design
review demonstrating a stable, producible design capable of meeting
performance requirements. Having passed that mid-point, FCS is now far
out of alignment with current DOD policy, which requires a program to
show a match between requirements and resources at or shortly after
development start.
Over the past year, the Army has continued the process of setting and
refining requirements in order to establish system designs. At the
system-of-systems level, requirements are relatively stable. At the
individual system level, requirements continue to evolve. The Army
scheduled a series of 15 system-level preliminary design reviews, with
the first held in 2007 and the last expected to occur in March 2009, in
order to assess whether individual systems are ready to proceed into
detailed design. Although the Army plans to conduct all system design
reviews by the end of March 2009, the schedule to close out all the
reviews may take some time, and requirements and design trade-offs will
be necessary. Several examples are illustrative:
* The preliminary design review for the Multi-Function
Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle occurred in December 2007 and
noted critical design problems regarding vehicle weight reduction. The
Army did not close the weight issue until some 10 months later, in
October 2008.
* The Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle had its preliminary design review
in October 2008 and has now entered into detailed design. Operational
requirements call for the vehicle to operate for 6 hours between
battery changes within a temperature range of minus 25 degrees and 120
degrees. However, the vehicle does not meet those requirements at any
temperature. Even with optimum operating temperature, mission length is
no longer than 5.4 hours. Additionally, the vehicle cannot satisfy
operational requirements for storage at temperatures of 60 degrees
below zero because its motor lubricant decomposes and battery becomes
useless. Consequently, the Army now plans to remove the batteries and
provide for special storage.
* During the first part of the network preliminary design review held
in November 2008, the Army recognized that there are significant gaps
between the FCS requirements and the emerging network design. These
include the JTRS handheld radio; ground mobile radio; and airborne,
maritime, and fixed-station radios; the WIN-T increment 3; and the
Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveforms. The Army has
not yet been able to obtain validation of its TRL 6 rating for JTRS
ground mobile radio; the mobile, ad-hoc networking protocols; and
Wideband Networking Waveforms. According to Army officials, if
additional funding is provided and developments are fully successful,
they will not fully meet FCS requirements until about 2017 or 2018. The
Army conducted the second part of its network preliminary design review
in January 2009. The results were not available for inclusion in this
report.
For several months, the Army has been conducting a series of technical
reviews of various aspects of the FCS manned ground vehicle
requirements and designs. Those efforts culminated at the manned ground
vehicle preliminary design review in January 2009. The results of that
review were not available in time for inclusion in this report.
According to Army assessments, key risks remain within several areas:
software development and integration, network and transport, manned and
unmanned platforms, and average unit production cost. Many risks
involve the likelihood that requirements may be unachievable when or as
expected. The assessment of these risks will be a key determinant in
the overall feasibility of the FCS concept and the ability to execute
the FCS acquisition strategy going forward. FCS is also working to
address significant areas of high risk such as network performance and
scalability, immature network architecture, and synchronization of FCS
with the JTRS and WIN-T programs. JTRS and WIN-T are also having
difficulty with technology maturation and are at risk of being delayed
or delivering incomplete capabilities to FCS.
In a 2007 acquisition memorandum, DOD stated that its acquisition
policy was to adjust requirements and technical content to deliver as
much as possible of planned capability within budgeted cost. At the
same time, it directed the services to establish Configuration Steering
Boards in order to review all requirements changes and any significant
technical configuration changes that have the potential to result in
cost and schedule impacts. Despite this direction, the Army has not
established a steering board for FCS. DOD officials told us that such a
board would be useful for providing input to FCS requirements and
design trade-offs.
Army Has Not Yet Convincingly Demonstrated FCS Concept:
In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue,
Congress required DOD to make a determination on whether actual
demonstrations, rather than simulations, have shown that the concept of
the program will work. FCS brigade combat teams are expected to be able
to execute a new tactical paradigm based on what the Army refers to as
"the quality of firsts"--the capability to see first, understand first,
act first, and finish decisively. Because this paradigm depends on the
aggregate performance of interdependent FCS systems versus the
performance of any single system, it is essential that this concept be
proven through demonstrations. While modeling and simulation are
essential to assessing the performance of FCS, they must be anchored in
actual demonstrations.
DOD will be challenged to meet the congressional direction to
demonstrate (versus simulate) that the FCS warfighting concept will
work by the time of the 2009 milestone review. At this point in the
program, the FCS concept has been simulated but has not been
convincingly demonstrated in any sort of field event. This stems from
the fact that technologies have not finished development and prototype
systems with the essential network components are not ready to be built
yet. In preliminary field demonstrations, some people, sensors, and
platforms have been connected and information was transferred from one
to the other. Basic capabilities of the unmanned aerial and ground
vehicles, as well as some of the unattended sensors and munitions, have
been demonstrated. The manned ground vehicles have demonstrated some of
their mobility and lethality capabilities. There have been some
technology demonstrations of early versions of the lightweight armor
and an active protection system, but the feasibility of the FCS
survivability concept remains uncertain. Nothing approaching a
demonstration of the "quality of firsts" paradigm has yet been
attempted nor will it be before the 2009 milestone review.
The Defense Acquisition Board has established criteria for the 2009
Review including several in a category entitled "Test/Experimentation/
Demonstration." (See appendix IV.) However, none of the criteria
address the issue of demonstrating that the FCS concept will work.
Instead, the criteria call for the demonstration of some early FCS
prototypes and the completion of some events such as a 2008 joint
service experiment. The Defense Acquisition Board criteria also include
several that call for delivery of certain early prototypes and others
that call for demonstration of selected capabilities. Without
questioning the value of these individual criteria, it is not clear
what they will tell decision makers about the value or demonstration of
the FCS concept as a whole.
Demonstrations of FCS Network Performance Very Limited:
In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue,
Congress required DOD to make several determinations, including (1)
whether actual demonstrations, rather than simulations, have shown that
the software for the program is on a path to achieve threshold
requirements on cost and schedule; (2) whether the program's planned
major communications network demonstrations are sufficiently complex
and realistic to inform major decision points; (3) the extent to which
manned ground vehicle survivability is likely to be reduced in a
degraded communications network environment; (4) the level of network
degradation at which FCS manned ground vehicle survivability is
significantly reduced; and (5) the extent to which the FCS
communications network is capable of withstanding network attack,
jamming, or other interference.
In addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration is required to submit a report to Congress on
the FCS communications network and software. That report is to be
submitted by September 30, 2009 and is to include an assessment of the
communications network that will specifically address areas such as
vulnerability to network attack, electronic warfare, adverse weather,
and terrain; dependence on satellite communications support; and
operational availability and performance under degraded conditions. The
report is also to include assessments of the communications network's
test schedule and Army efforts to synchronize funding, schedule, and
technology maturity of critical networking programs with FCS. Appendix
V contains the comprehensive criteria from the legislation directing
this review.
These assessments of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the FCS
network will be important in determining if the FCS concept is
feasible. However, as we reported last year, the Army had an
understanding of network requirements and how to build the network, but
many challenges and work remained before the network would reach
maturity.[Footnote 12] Hence, network development and demonstration is
at a very early stage and therefore, the network assessments will most
likely be based on analysis and simulations rather than demonstrated
results. Even if software development proceeds on schedule and
technical risks of key network elements, such as JTRS and WIN-T are
successfully retired, the uncharted nature of the FCS network makes
predicting its eventual performance difficult. Army test officials are
assessing network scalability, which relates to increasing the number
of radios, or nodes, on the network, through limited testing. However,
the number of nodes used in testing to date has been limited, using
only 30 nodes, while a brigade combat team may require as many as 5,000
nodes. Considering that mobile, ad-hoc networks have limited
scalability, and performance decreases as more nodes are added, the
ultimate FCS network performance is difficult to predict.
To date, actual demonstrations of FCS software have been limited to the
early spin out tests and experiments, and it is not yet known whether
the information network is technically capable of delivering the
quality of service needed to make the FCS warfighting concept possible.
[Footnote 13] At the time of the FCS milestone review in 2009, the
extent of network demonstration is expected to be very limited. For
example, in 2008, the Army demonstrated, among other basic
capabilities, sensor control, terrain analysis, and unmanned platform
planning and operations. Other limited demonstrations are scheduled on
a regular basis. For example, in the 2008 joint service experiment,
several portions of the FCS network--including an early version of the
system-of-systems common operating environment, the unattended sensors,
and Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System--were evaluated in terms of their
basic operation and interoperability with other systems. The first
major demonstration of the FCS network is the limited user test
scheduled for fiscal year 2012, which will be at least a year after the
critical design review and only about a year before the start of low-
rate initial production for the core FCS program. This event comes
after the vehicle designs on manned ground platforms have been
established. One of the key objectives of that test will be to identify
the contributions and limitations of the network regarding the ability
of the FCS brigade combat team to conduct missions across the full
spectrum of operations. However, the fully automated battle command
system is not expected to be available until 2013 when the Army expects
100 percent of the network capabilities, including software, to be
available.
As a key part of the overall FCS communications network, it is
uncertain whether FCS software requirements can be achieved within cost
and schedule estimates. The first of 4 software builds has been
delivered and qualified, and build 2 is still in development, with a
planned delivery in 2010. As we have reported earlier, FCS software
estimates continue to grow, and the total estimate for the network and
platforms is projected to total over 100 million lines of computer
code, which is more than triple the size the program estimated in 2003.
Army officials have identified 16 risks in the software arena, or
specific areas where there is a risk of not achieving goals within cost
and schedule estimates, including system-of-systems common operating
environment, network management/quality of service, network security/
information assurance, distributed fusion management, and estimated
effective source lines of code. According to Army officials, software
development costs are capped at approximately $2.6 billion. As a
result, Army officials stated that they have had to defer some planned
FCS capabilities to later software builds. Yet, development experience
to date, coupled with the risks yet to be resolved, raise questions as
to whether the necessary software can be developed within cost and
schedule estimates. Alternatively, the Army may have to reduce or
eliminate FCS requirements.
FCS Costs Are Expected to Increase Again and Affordability Is Still in
Doubt:
In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue,
Congress required DOD to make a determination on (1) what the cost
estimate for the program is, including spin outs, and an assessment of
confidence levels for that estimate; and (2) what the affordability
assessment for the program is, given projected Army budgets, based on
that cost estimate.
For the 2009 milestone review, DOD and the Army are expected to provide
the updated program cost estimate and an affordability assessment for
the FCS program. The Army has indicated that the most recent cost
estimate for the program is no longer valid, but it has not yet
completed an official updated estimate. While full details are not yet
available, the Army is considering plans to request additional funds
for FCS beyond the current cost estimate of $159 billion. Those plans
would involve additional development costs of about $2 billion and
procurement costs of about $17 billion over the current cost estimate.
Where the Army has offset some cost increases in the past with
reductions in program content, we are not yet aware of any similar
actions to offset the expected cost increases. According to DOD
officials, DOD's Cost Analysis Improvement Group is expected to prepare
an updated independent cost estimate for the milestone review. Previous
estimates from the group have been significantly higher than the
Army's, particularly regarding the cost to develop software. DOD
officials also stated that DOD's Program Analysis and Evaluation group
may be tasked to provide input for an FCS affordability assessment.
These assessments are intended to cover all of the costs, including
those for the spin outs, which will be necessary to fully field the FCS
program. This would be the first complete cost estimate that will
include spin outs and other costs. The Army now projects that the costs
of its revised FCS spin out initiative will be about $21 billion beyond
the core FCS program costs of $159 billion. In addition to FCS-specific
costs, complementary program costs are separate from FCS and represent
significant additional commitments from the Army and other services.
Several of these complementary programs have funding issues of their
own. For example, the JTRS and the WIN-T programs are not yet fully
funded to develop the full capabilities currently required by the FCS
program.
Ultimately, FCS's affordability will hinge on two factors: the actual
cost of the program and the availability of funds. Heretofore, there
has not been a sound basis for preparing a firm cost estimate. The
preliminary design review process should provide a better foundation
for one. Yet, such an estimate would have the confidence of a program
in early development, with many risks and unprecedented challenges to
meet. As it stands, FCS commands the largest portion of the Army's
acquisition budget and, as currently planned, will continue to do so
for many years. The Army continues to indicate its willingness to
accept the high risks of the program and make trade-offs in both
requirements and other programs to accommodate its growing costs. Since
the program began, costs have increased from $92 billion to $159
billion, which only covers the cost to equip one-third of the Army's
active forces. Indicative of the tension between program costs and
available funds, the Army recently proposed deferring upgrades to
current systems such as the Abrams Tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle to
free up funds for FCS. This tension seems only likely to worsen, as
indications are that FCS costs are about to increase again at the same
time competition for funds--both between near-term and far-term needs
within DOD and between defense and other needs within the federal
government--is intensifying. The Army's position has been that it will
reduce FCS capabilities to stay within available development funds but
at some point, reductions in FCS capability--whether driven by money or
technical feasibility--will fall below an acceptable level. That level
appears as yet indefinable.
Oversight Challenges Will Continue Beyond the Milestone Decision:
The 2009 milestone review will not only require DOD to decide if FCS is
technically feasible and militarily worthwhile, it will provide the
opportunity to structure the emerging program so that it complies with
current acquisition policy and is knowledge-based--thus more conducive
to oversight. On several scores, the current FCS program falls short.
Its acquisition strategy is more schedule-driven than it is knowledge-
based and is unlikely to be executable, with a significant amount of
development and demonstration yet to be completed. The timing of
upcoming commitments to production funding puts decision makers in the
difficult position of making production commitments without knowing if
FCS will work as intended. For example, the Army plans for FCS core
production to directly follow the early NLOS-C production, which may be
premature based on design maturity and demonstrations expected to be
done up to that point. Likewise, the Army's schedule for providing
early FCS capabilities to current forces is hurried, as spin out
systems may not be fully demonstrated before the Army commits to their
production. Finally, the Army's potential adoption of an incremental
approach to FCS acquisition could represent another major restructure
of the program. While an incremental approach is generally preferable,
it would represent the fourth different strategy for the FCS program
that DOD and the Congress will be asked to evaluate and oversee.
FCS Acquisition Strategy Is Not Knowledge-Based and May Not Be
Executable Within Estimated Resources:
We have previously reported that to date, the FCS program has advanced
through acquisition milestones without having achieved the level of
knowledge preferred by best practices and DOD's own policies and a
commensurate level of information needed for oversight, given the scope
of the program and the risks it entails.[Footnote 14] The issuance of
DOD's 2008 acquisition instruction underscores the wide variance
between policy and the FCS acquisition strategy. Ideally, requirements
trades would already have been made and a high-confidence design
established. This would position the program to move toward maturity as
evidenced by such measures as successful completion of subsystem
critical design reviews, maturity of critical manufacturing processes,
planned corrective actions to hardware and software deficiencies, and
adequate developmental testing. At this point, however, FCS has yet to
establish a firm system-of-systems design and is several years from any
large-scale testing at the system-of-systems level. The milestone
review represents an opportunity to judge FCS on critical knowledge
markers and set it on a more reasonable course with opportunities for
effective and meaningful oversight from the Army, DOD, and the
Congress. Under its current acquisition strategy, the FCS is neither
knowledge-based nor does it lend itself to meaningful oversight. Figure
2 compares a knowledge-based approach to developing a weapon system
(consistent with DOD policy) with the approach taken for FCS. Best
practices for successful product development include three knowledge
points (KP). Knowledge Point 1 should occur at development start and is
attained when technologies and resources match requirements; KP 2
should occur at the mid-point between development and production and is
attained when the product design performs as expected; and KP 3 should
occur at production start and is attained when production can meet
cost, schedule, and quality targets. Ideally the preliminary design
review occurs at or near the start of development and the critical
design review occurs mid-way through development.
Figure 2: Differences between Best Practices Acquisition Approach and
FCS Approach:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Best practice approach (knowledge driven):
Technology development: 2000 to 2003;
Development start: 2003 (KP 1 and PDR);
System development and demonstration: 2003 through 2013 (KP 2 and CDR
in 2008);
Low-rate production start: 2013 (KP 3);
Production: 2013 through 2016 and beyond.
Knowledge acquired over time increases.
FCS approach (schedule driven):
Technology development: 2000 through 2013 (FCS KP 1, KP 2, and KP 3?);
System development and demonstration: 2003 through 2016 (PDR in 2009;
CDR in 2011);
Prototype delivery and test: 2010 through 2014;
Long-lead production: 2011 through 2013;
Production: 2013 through 2016 and beyond.
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 2 above, FCS technology development and system
development and demonstration phases will overlap by several years. The
Army has scheduled only 2 years between the critical design review in
2011 and the production decision in 2013. This leaves little time to
gain knowledge between the two events, and is particularly important
because the critical design review is the point at which a program
begins building fully-integrated, production-representative prototypes
whose testing will prove the design's maturity and form the basis for
the low-rate production decision. Instead, FCS will rely on less mature
prototypes and the decision to proceed into production will be made
without a mature design. As a result of the current acquisition
approach, the FCS program may not be executable given the amount of
development budget remaining and the development work that remains to
be done, as illustrated in figure 3 below.
Figure 3: Remaining FCS Research and Development Funding and Key
Events:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph with key events illustrated]
Fiscal year: 2003;
Percent of funds remaining: 99.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Percent of funds remaining: 94.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Percent of funds remaining: 83.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Percent of funds remaining: 73.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Percent of funds remaining: 61.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Percent of funds remaining: 49.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Percent of funds remaining: 39;
Key event: Preliminary Design Review.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Percent of funds remaining: 28.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Percent of funds remaining: 18;
Key event: Critical Design Review.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Percent of funds remaining: 12.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Percent of funds remaining: 7;
Key event: Low-Rate Initial Production.
Fiscal year: 2014;
Percent of funds remaining: 3.
Fiscal year: 2015;
Percent of funds remaining: 0;
Key event: Initial Operating Capability.
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
At the preliminary design review, the program expects to have all
critical technologies mature to TRL 6, system-level requirements
nearing completion, and a preliminary design available to reconcile
technologies with requirements. Using DOD policy as a reference, this
is about the point at which the FCS program should be ready to begin.
Should the program be approved to continue on its present course at the
2009 milestone review, the Army would have to complete development--in
essence, the entire system development phase--with 40 percent of its
financial and schedule resources remaining. This is not to judge either
the value of the work done to date or the rate of progress, but rather
to underscore where the program really is in terms of the development
process. Accordingly, ahead of FCS remains what is typically the most
expensive part of system development: completing the detailed system
and network designs and building prototypes and using them to
demonstrate that the system will work. In the case of FCS, there are
the added challenges of integrating multiple technologies and showing
that the system of systems as a whole will work, including the
unprecedented network.
The late completion of the system development activities that will
demonstrate whether FCS can deliver the promised capability is at odds
with the early requests for production funds. Additional maturation of
critical technologies, followed by the challenging prospect of
integrating FCS subsystems and systems, lies ahead. Design work is
ongoing and many designs remain to be matured and verified. A key
indicator of the Army's progress in this area will be the percentage of
design drawings that will be released to manufacturing at the critical
design review, currently scheduled for fiscal year 2011. The Army is
currently fabricating key FCS prototypes, many of which are scheduled
for delivery in the 2010 time frame. After they are delivered, much
additional engineering work will remain to be conducted as part of a
disciplined test, fix, and retest approach. For example, several
prototypes will be built based on preliminary versus final designs, and
will not have all key technologies integrated. In this sense, they will
not be representative of production items. Many of the results of these
demonstrations, and other key test and evaluation results, will not be
available until late in the program, creating difficulty in applying
knowledge gained from previous tests into subsequent tests. For
example, a key system-of-systems test scheduled before the low-rate
production decision is the limited user test 3 in 2012 to assess
brigade combat team network capabilities. This test will be the first
large-scale FCS test that will include a majority of the developmental
prototypes and a large operational unit and occurs only one year before
the low-rate initial production decision for the core FCS program. This
test is important because the Congress has required a broad network
demonstration to be conducted before starting low-rate production of
the core FCS program. This demonstration is also expected to occur in
fiscal year 2012 as part of the limited user test. Finally, the Army
will have to develop and mature production processes for a wide range
of FCS systems.
Our work has shown that development costs for programs with mature
technologies at the start of system development increased by a modest
average of 4.8 percent over the original estimate, whereas development
costs for programs with immature technologies increased by 34.9
percent.[Footnote 15] Our work has also shown that most development
cost growth occurs after the critical design review. Specifically, of
the 28.3 percent cost growth that weapon systems average in
development, 19.7 percent occurs after the critical design review. In
the case of FCS, the Army's strategy is schedule-driven and calls for
beginning low-rate production in 2013 and initial operational
capability in 2015, which leaves little time to overcome the remaining
technological and engineering challenges the program faces prior to
committing to production. Thus, it is likely that under the current
schedule, additional cost growth would be incurred as the Army works
through these remaining challenges.
According to DOD officials, the Systems and Software Engineering group,
within DOD's Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics organization, has
been tasked to conduct a systems engineering review of FCS that will
include an evaluation of risks associated with the FCS acquisition
strategy, test plans, software, and key complementary programs.
According to the Systems and Software Engineering group, the assessment
will also cover the FCS system engineering plan for reasonable exit
criteria associated with critical design review and production
readiness. The reporting objectives for this effort include, among
other things, clearly illustrating the risks and challenges of
proceeding to critical design review as planned. The Systems and
Software Engineering group's review is expected to provide input to
address three of the required congressional assessments--FCS
requirements/design, concept demonstration, and software demonstration--
and should provide critical information on the amount of FCS
development and demonstration work yet to be completed and its expected
cost and schedule.
Timing of Currently Planned Funding Commitments Puts Decision Makers in
Difficult Position:
Funding commitments for production begin before FCS capabilities are
demonstrated and even before the critical design review is held. This
puts decision makers in a difficult position, particularly when
considering that FCS is to deliver more than a better set of equipment--
it embodies a new concept of combat. Procurement funding for core FCS
production facilities will be requested for fiscal year 2011, the
budget for which will be presented to Congress in February 2010--
several months after the milestone review and before the stability of
the FCS design is assessed at the critical design review.[Footnote 16]
In fact, based on results of system-level preliminary design reviews
conducted to date, the Army could still be working to close action
items resulting from the system-of-systems preliminary design review
when it requests funding for FCS core production facilities. Further,
when Congress is asked to approve funding for low-rate initial
production of core FCS systems, the Army will not yet have proven that
the FCS network and the program concept will work. A key demonstration
of the FCS network, limited user test 3, is currently scheduled for
later in 2012, after the Congress will have received the fiscal year
2013 budget submission. This is illustrated further in figure 4 below.
Figure 4: FCS Program Events and Congressional Budget Decisions:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Article delivery and testing:
NLOS-C: 2010;
MGV: 2011;
Cl. IV UAV: 2012;
LUT 3: 2013.
FCS Program decision points:
PDR: 2009;
DAB: 2009;
CDR: 2011;
MSC: 2013.
Congressional budget decisions on production money:
FY 09 request -$154.6 million: 2008;
FY 10 request -$148 million: 2009;
FY 11 request -$677.8 million: 2010;
FY 12 request -$2.2 billion: 2011;
FY 13 request -$5.7 billion: 2012.
CDR = Critical Design Review;
DAB = Defense Acquisition Board Milestone Review;
LUT = Limited User Test;
NLOS-C = Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon;
MGV = Manned Ground Vehicle;
MSC = Milestone C;
PDR = Preliminary Design Review;
Cl. IV UAV = Class IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
Early NLOS-C Production May Portend Risks for FCS:
Since fiscal year 2003, the Army has been required by Congress to
develop and field the NLOS-C early in order to provide a self-propelled
indirect fire capability.[Footnote 17] The Department of Defense
Appropriations Act for 2008 required the Army to deliver eight NLOS-C
prototypes by the end of calendar year 2008 and to field early
production versions of the system by fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 18]
These systems are to be in addition to those needed for developmental
and operational testing. The Army determined that a set of 18, a full
battalion's worth, would be needed to meet the intent of the act's
language in terms of the early production units. Although the NLOS-C is
one of eight FCS manned ground vehicles, it is proceeding about 5 years
ahead of the other vehicles.
The Army began procuring long-lead production items for the NLOS-C
vehicle in 2008 to meet the requirement for the early production
versions. According to program officials, an urgent need to build Mine-
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles diverted subcontractor resources
away from the NLOS-C efforts. Officials further indicated that
technological challenges associated with a lack of completed production
facilities and specialized tooling also contributed to delays. The Army
accepted delivery of the first two NLOS-C prototypes in fiscal year
2008 and the remaining six vehicles in the following two years. A
Defense Acquisition Board decision to begin low-rate production for the
additional set of 18 NLOS-C vehicles was expected in December 2008.
Details of that decision were not available for inclusion in this
report. If approved, the Army expects delivery of six early production
units per year in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. None of these early
NLOS-C vehicles will meet FCS threshold requirements nor will they be
operationally deployable. Rather, they will be used as training assets
for the Army Evaluation Task Force.
In order to meet the early fielding dates, the Army will begin
production of the NLOS-C vehicles with immature technologies and
designs. Several key technologies, such as lightweight armor, the
active protection system, and the JTRS radios will not be fully mature
for several years. Much requirements definition work remains for all
the manned ground vehicles, including the NLOS-C. Software development
is in its early stages. Design work on the manned ground vehicles also
remains to be done, including work on the chassis and mission modules.
Significant challenges involving integrating the technologies,
software, and design will follow. To the extent that these aspects of
the manned ground vehicles depart from the early production cannons,
costly rework of the cannons may be necessary if they will ever be used
for other than training purposes.
The Army's efforts and financial investments made on the NLOS-C
vehicles could create additional pressure to proceed with FCS core
production, prior to achieving a solid basis of knowledge on which to
move forward. Production on the cannon is beginning 5 years in advance
of the production decision on the FCS core systems. By the time of that
decision, in fiscal 2013, the Army plans to have invested about $12
billion in FCS procurement funds and more than $50 billion for FCS
overall. In addition, the Army also plans to invest millions in
production facilities in which to build the vehicles. These activities
all contribute to starting up the manned ground vehicle industrial
base. If the FCS strategy goes according to plan, FCS core production
would directly follow NLOS-C production, with long lead items for the
FCS core program providing a transition. That may be premature based on
the expected design maturity and demonstrations expected to be done to
that point. DOD has attempted to make a distinction between NLOS-C and
the core FCS program, but the linkages continue to exist in the FCS
acquisition strategy. If decision makers were to consider delaying FCS
core production because it was not ready, a gap could develop when
early NLOS-C production ends. Sustaining the industrial base could then
become an argument against an otherwise justified delay.
FCS Spin Outs Will Not be Proven Prior to Production:
The Army initiated spin out development in 2004, when it embarked on an
effort to bring selected FCS capabilities to current force heavy
brigade combat teams while development of the core FCS program remained
under way. In 2006, the Army established the Army Evaluation Task Force
to use, evaluate, and train with the spin out capabilities, and the
Task Force began its testing under that brigade construct in early
2008. In mid-2008, the Army changed its focus from fielding spin out
equipment to heavy brigades and instead to field the equipment to
infantry brigade combat teams beginning in fiscal year 2011.[Footnote
19] Army officials stated that this change occurred because infantry
brigades are the optimal forces to fight in an urban environment, are
being used in combat more than other types of forces, and are the most
vulnerable forces. Accordingly, the Army now proposes to have 43
infantry brigade combat teams fully equipped with spin out equipment by
2025 at a total cost of $21 billion, with over $5 billion to be
provided in fiscal years 2010 to 2015. DOD officials have reviewed the
Army's revised FCS spin out plans, but they have not yet made a
decision to approve those plans.
The switch to infantry brigades led the Army to abandon its previous
plan for a series of three spin outs and instead pursue a two-phased
effort termed "early" and "threshold" with respective planned
production commitment dates of fiscal years 2010 and 2013. The early
spin out items are not expected to meet all FCS threshold requirements
nor will the threshold spin out items have the same network and battle
command capabilities as in the core FCS program. The early spin out
will include:
* Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,
* Urban and Tactical Unattended Ground Sensors,
* two types of Joint Tactical Radios,
* integrated computer system,
* early versions of the system-of-systems common operating environment
and battle command software,
* Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle,
* Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, and:
* Ground Soldier System.[Footnote 20]
The second phase of spin outs will include improved versions of the
above systems as well as add the Multifunction Utility/Logistics and
Equipment vehicle, Class IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Armed Robotic
Vehicle--Assault (Light), and Centralized Controller.[Footnote 21]
With the advent of the new structure, the Army moved its initial spin
out production decision from January 2009 to December 2009. However,
testing to date has not made a convincing case for this production
commitment for several reasons. First, the Army has conducted only one
test focused on the infantry brigade combat team structure. The two
initial spin out tests--a technical field test in early 2008 to verify
technical aspects of the capabilities and force development test and
evaluation in May 2008 to validate requirements and training associated
with those capabilities--occurred prior to the restructure and
therefore employed heavy brigade combat team constructs. While Army
officials have indicated that the force development test results have
applicability to the infantry brigades, the test's major objective in
terms of construct was to confirm the organizational structure and
equipment distribution for a spin out-equipped heavy brigade combat
team. The third test in July 2008, a preliminary limited user test to
assess maturity, interoperability, and contribution of spin out
systems, did utilize the infantry brigade structure. However, because
of the restructure, that test was a shortened 2-day version of an event
originally planned as a much longer effort focused on the heavy brigade
combat team.
Additionally, testing completed to date employed spin out systems that
are not in the form that will be fielded. In fact, four of the systems
planned for the early spin out have only been tested in surrogate or
non-production representative forms (not in a mature or final
configuration). The Ground Soldier System has not yet been included in
any testing. Table 2 shows the versions of the prototypes used in each
of the three tests to date.
Table 2: Surrogate, Non-Production, and Not-Yet-Tested Systems:
System: JTRS Ground Mobile Radio;
Technical field test: (February/March 2008): Non-production
representative;
Force development test: (May 2008): Non-production representative;
Preliminary limited user test: (July 2008): Non-production
representative.
System: JTRS Handheld Radio;
Technical field test: (February/March 2008): Surrogate;
Force development test: (May 2008): Surrogate;
Preliminary limited user test: (July 2008): Surrogate.
System: Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle;
Technical field test: (February/March 2008): Not tested;
Force development test: (May 2008): Not tested;
Preliminary limited user test: (July 2008): Non-production
representative.
System: Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle;
Technical field test: (February/March 2008): Not tested;
Force development test: (May 2008): Not tested;
Preliminary limited user test: (July 2008): Surrogate.
System: Ground Soldier System;
Technical field test: (February/March 2008): Not tested;
Force development test: (May 2008): Not tested;
Preliminary limited user test: (July 2008): Not tested.
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
Using surrogate and non-production representative systems is
problematic because it does not conclusively show how well the spin out
systems can address current force capability gaps in situational
awareness, force protection, and lethality. Moreover, they limit the
ability to translate spin out tactical operations from heavy brigade to
infantry combat teams and from spin outs to the core FCS. In fact,
DOD's current acquisition policy requires that systems meet approved
requirements and are demonstrated in their intended environments using
the selected production-representative articles before the engineering
and manufacturing development phase--which precedes the production
phase--can end. Army test officials and equipment users told us, and
test reports for the 2008 spin out tests confirm, that the surrogates
and non-production representative systems limited the ability to gauge
system performance, forced adjustments in testing, and made it
difficult to know whether beneficial lessons were learned in testing.
Officials from the Army's independent testing organization, the Army
Test and Evaluation Command, stated that prototype JTRS radios impact
the ability to evaluate overall system effectiveness regarding such
factors as range and reliability. They also noted that radio
performance can impact tactics used by the testing unit. Army officials
who actually participated in the testing expressed similar views, and
noted that the surrogates limited tactical operations. As a result,
they said, the Army is immature tactically in terms of what it knows
about spin out operations.
The three tests scheduled for 2009 will continue to include surrogate
and non-production representative systems. As in past tests, surrogates
will take the place of JTRS handheld radios in all three tests. As
noted by Army testers, this surrogate radio has limited basic
functionality and will impact the evaluation of performance for systems
used in conjunction with it, including the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch
System and unattended ground sensors. According to Army officials, they
will not have production representative versions of this radio to test
until initial operational test and evaluation in fiscal year 2011. In
addition, JTRS ground mobile radios used in 2009 testing are to consist
of a mix of non-production and production representative models, but
the composition will be heavily weighted toward the non-production
representative models. Of the 16 total radios planned for use in the
limited user test, only 4 are expected to be the production
representative version. Additionally, Army officials told us that if
these radios are delayed, they will not be able to properly operate and
evaluate the needed networking capabilities.
The schedule for completing 2009 testing is tight, and the issues
identified in the 2008 testing may not be resolved prior to the spin
out production decision. According to Army and DOD officials, the Army
Evaluation Task Force has proven extremely useful in identifying system
issues and suggesting design changes. While the Army is working to
improve spin out systems in accordance with the Task Force's testing
observations and recommendations, it does not plan to prove out all
final designs prior to the production decision. For example, the Army
is redesigning the Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor because 2008
testing showed that it had issues with range, battery life, and
hardware reliability. However, the Army does not expect to have the
final version of the redesigned sensor available until February 2010,
after the initial spin out production decision has been made. The Army
is also redesigning the Urban Unattended Ground Sensor in accordance
with testing feedback because that sensor had issues with battery life,
user set-up time, and display of data. A final version of that sensor
will not be available until February 2010. Additionally, the JTRS
ground mobile radio may not be able to achieve its schedule for a
production decision, which would impact the FCS spin out initiative.
The Army may be unable to thoroughly assess spin outs' military utility
for current forces because testing planned for 2009 is very compressed
and leaves little time for analysis before the production decision.
Under the revised spin out structure, the Army expects to conduct
technical field, force development, and limited user tests in a back-
to-back period from July through September 2009. This schedule allows
the Army only 12 weeks to conduct all the tests, assess tests results,
and incorporate lessons learned from one test to the next.
Additionally, the limited user test, the last test in the series before
the production decision and arguably the most important in terms of
demonstrating system interoperability and overall spin out military
utility, is planned to conclude at the end of September. That means the
Army only has 8 to12 weeks to assess those test results before DOD will
make the expected December 2009 production decision. By comparison, the
Army needed 8 months to produce its test report on the 2008 technical
field test. A DOD testing official told us that, because of the testing
schedule, the Army would be unable to analyze test results adequately
before making decisions. Army officials acknowledged that the schedule
is extremely compressed and noted that any delay in maturity or receipt
of hardware and/or software would impact the test schedule. They also
indicated that, because of the aggressive schedule, it might be
necessary to change the order of the tests and hold the force
development test after the limited user test.
Potential Incremental Acquisition Approach for FCS Would Represent
Another Major Restructuring:
Army officials informed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics that they are considering an incremental or
block acquisition approach to FCS. Citing the need to set a path to a
stable, executable baseline for FCS--one with appropriately scoped
requirements--FCS program officials believe that by adopting an
incremental or block approach, they may be better able to mitigate
risks in four major areas. These areas include: immaturity of
requirements for system survivability, network capability, and
information assurance; limited availability of performance trade space
to maintain program cost and schedule given current program risks
(schedule risks, weight/survivability, cost growth); program not funded
to Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimates and impact of
congressional budget cuts; and continuing challenges in aligning
schedules and expectations for multiple concurrent acquisitions (such
as JTRS and WIN-T).
Subsequent to the mid-2008 Defense Acquisition Board meeting, where the
Army presented its case for its consideration of an incremental or
block approach for FCS acquisition, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued a memorandum directing
the Army to, among other things, pursue this initiative. Moreover, the
memorandum stipulated that the incremental approach to acquire FCS must
be prioritized to meet the warfighter's most critical operational needs
and present a stable, executable program. The Army has been conducting
an analysis to define an incremental approach, which is expected to
address organizational structure, platforms, warfighter needs, and
unified battle command. This analysis will be coupled with DOD
assessments of FCS design maturity (including technology readiness
levels, network and platform readiness, and associated risks and costs)
and program maturity (including program execution feasibility, program
scope, resource availability, and program alternatives). The Army was
expected to present the analysis results and incremental FCS program
plan to the DOD in late 2008 or early 2009, but that had not occurred
at the time of this report. According to a DOD official, the adoption
of an incremental approach may affect both the FCS core program and the
spin out initiative. For the core FCS program, adoption of an
incremental approach may involve a phased development and demonstration
of individual FCS performance requirements and/or a phased fielding of
individual components of the FCS family of systems. For the spin out
initiative, the Army is considering if and when it should spin out FCS
capabilities to the Heavy and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.
Restructuring the FCS program around an incremental approach has the
potential to alleviate the risks inherent in the current strategy. It
also represents an opportunity to apply the policy and thus provide
decision makers more information before key program commitments, like
production funding, are made. Taking an incremental approach to new
acquisitions, versus attempting to acquire full capability in one step,
has been preferred by DOD policy and best practices since before FCS
began in 2003. The December 2008 policy adds several key features that
would benefit a restructured FCS program. These include:
* establishment of configuration steering boards that are tasked to
review all requirements changes and any significant technical
configuration changes that have the potential to result in cost and
schedule impacts to the program;
* a post-preliminary design review assessment to be conducted where the
results of the PDR and the program manager's assessment are considered
to determine whether remedial action is necessary to achieve the
program's objectives;
* a critical design review, which is an opportunity to assess design
maturity by measures such as completion of subsystem critical design
reviews, the percentage of software and hardware product specifications
and drawings completed, planned corrective actions to hardware and
software deficiencies; adequate developmental testing, the maturity of
critical manufacturing processes, and an estimate of system reliability
based on demonstrated reliability rates;
* a post-critical design review, which assesses the program manager's
report on the critical design review to determine whether the program
can meet its approved objectives or if adjustments should be made; and:
* before production, a demonstration that the system meets requirements
in its intended environment using a production-representative article,
manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated in a pilot
line environment, and industrial capabilities are reasonably available.
On the other hand, the newness of the incremental approach could
complicate oversight at this important juncture. For example, its
approval will lag behind the congressional schedule for authorizing and
appropriating fiscal year 2010 funds. Also, a new approach to FCS could
affect the scope of the milestone review. Evaluation of the new
approach will involve a number of factors, including whether:
* the incremental approach adequately addresses program risks and
unresolved questions on the feasibility of the FCS concept and its
information network;
* the initial increment of FCS capability is justifiable on its own,
without being dependent on future increments;
* each increment, including the first, will comply with current DOD
policy as it applies to a new program starting at the preliminary
design review stage; and:
* the Army's overall investment plan and resources for FCS increments,
spin outs, and its current forces is sound and affordable.
Should an incremental approach to FCS be pursued, one consideration
will be the future role of the Army's contracting relationship with the
LSI. We have previously reported the uniquely close relationship that
exists between the Army and the LSI.[Footnote 22] While this has
advantages, it also has disadvantages. In the past two years, the role
of the LSI, originally limited to development, has grown relative to
production. It is expected to be the prime contractor for production of
spin outs, the NLOS-C, and at least the low-rate production of the FCS
core systems. The specific role the LSI will play in production of spin
outs, NLOS-C, and FCS core production remains somewhat unclear.
Statements of work for the production contracts have not yet been
negotiated. According to the program officials, the LSI will contract
with the first tier subcontractors, which will in turn contract with
their own subcontractors. Thus, the production role of the LSI is
likely to be largely in oversight of the first tier subcontractors
versus fabricating systems or subsystems. The LSI is also responsible
for defining and maintaining a growth strategy for integrating new
technologies into the FCS brigade combat teams. Combined with a likely
role in sustainment, the LSI will remain involved in the FCS program
indefinitely.
Recently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics issued a directive to pursue alternate arrangements for
any future FCS contracts. The Under Secretary found that the fixed fee
was too high and the fee structure allows industry to receive most of
the incentive fee dollars prior to demonstrating integrated FCS system-
of-systems capability. The Under Secretary also directed that the Army
conduct a risk-based assessment to examine contracting alternatives for
FCS capability. This assessment is to evaluate opportunities for
procurement breakout of the individual platforms/systems that comprise
FCS and how the government's interests are served by contracting with
the LSI as compared to contracting directly with the manufacturers of
the items.
Conclusions:
The 2009 milestone review is the most important decision on the Future
Combat System since the program began in 2003. If the preliminary
design reviews are successfully completed and critical technologies
mature as planned in 2009, the FCS program will essentially be at a
stage that statute and DOD policy would consider as being ready to
start development. In this sense, the 2009 review will complete the
evaluative process that began with the original 2003 milestone
decision. Further, when considering that the current estimate for FCS
ranges from $159 billion to $200 billion when the potential increases
to core program costs and estimated costs of spin outs are included, 90
percent or more of the investment in the program lies ahead. Even if a
new, incremental approach to FCS is approved, a full milestone review
that carries the responsibility of a go/no-go decision is still in
order, along with the attendant reports and analyses that are required
inputs. In the meantime, establishing a configuration steering board,
as suggested in DOD policy, may help bridge the gaps between
requirements and system designs and help in the timely completion of
the FCS preliminary design reviews.
At this point, there are at least three programmatic directions, or
some combination thereof, that DOD could take at the milestone review
to shape investments in combat systems for the Army, each of which
presents challenges. First, the FCS program as currently structured has
significant risks and may not be executable within remaining resources.
Second, although an incremental approach may improve the Army's
prospects for fielding some capability, each increment must stand on
its own and not be dependent on future increments. Third, spin outs to
current forces currently rely on a rushed schedule that calls for
making production decisions before production-representative prototypes
have clearly demonstrated a useful military capability. The role of the
LSI in the FCS production phase will be a factor that will have to be
considered for any program that emerges from the milestone review.
There is no question that the Army needs to ensure its forces are well-
equipped. The Army has vigorously pursued FCS as the solution, a
concept and an approach that is unconventional, yet with many good
features. The difficulties and redirections experienced by the program
should be seen as revealing its immaturity, rather than as the basis
for criticism. However, at this point, enough time and money have been
expended that the program should be evaluated at the 2009 milestone
review based on what it has shown, not on what it could show. The Army
should not pursue FCS at any cost, nor should it settle for whatever
the FCS program produces under fixed resources. Rather, the program
direction taken after the milestone review must strike a balance
between near-term and long-term needs, realistic funding expectations,
and a sound plan for execution. Regarding execution, the review
represents an opportunity to ensure that the emerging investment
program be put on the soundest possible footing by applying the best
standards available, like those contained in DOD's 2008 acquisition
policy, and requiring clear demonstrations of the FCS concept and
network before any commitment to production of core FCS systems.
Any decision the Army makes to change the FCS program is likely to lag
behind the congressional schedule for authorizing and appropriating
fiscal year 2010 funds. Because of this, Congress needs to preserve its
options for ensuring it has adequate knowledge on which to base funding
decisions. Specifically, it does not seem reasonable to expect Congress
to provide full fiscal year 2010 funding for the program before the
milestone review is held nor production funding before system designs
are stable and validated in testing.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
The Congress should consider taking the following two actions:
* restricting the budget authority to be provided for FCS in fiscal
year 2010 until DOD fully complies with the statutory FCS milestone
review requirements and provides a complete budget justification
package for any program that emerges, and:
* not approving any production or long lead item funds for the core FCS
program until the critical design review is satisfactorily completed
and demonstrations using prototypes provide confidence that the FCS
system-of-systems operating with the communications network will be
able to meet its requirements.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense:
* ensure that the investment program that emerges from the 2009
milestone review be conformed with current DOD acquisition policy,
particularly regarding technology maturity, critical design reviews,
and demonstrating production-representative prototypes before making
production commitments;
* direct the Secretary of the Army to convene, following the
preliminary design reviews and in time to inform the 2009 FCS milestone
review, an FCS Configuration Steering Board to provide assistance in
formulating acceptable trade-offs to bridge the gaps between the FCS
requirements and the system designs;
* ensure that if an incremental approach is selected for FCS, the first
increments are justifiable on their own as worthwhile capabilities that
are not dependent on future increments for their value, particularly
regarding the order in which the information network and individual
manned ground vehicles will be developed;
* ensure that FCS systems to be spun out to current forces have been
successfully tested in production-representative form before they are
approved for initial production; and:
* reassess the appropriate role of the LSI in the FCS program,
particularly regarding its involvement in production.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD concurred with all our recommendations and provided comments on
two. Regarding our recommendation on testing spin out systems, DOD
commented that any production decision for FCS systems going to the
current force will be informed by an operational assessment or user
test of the systems. Although the Army plans to conduct such testing
prior to the spin out low-rate initial production decision in late
2009, that testing will employ surrogate and non-production
representative systems. We maintain that any systems planned for
production should be production-representative and thoroughly tested in
a realistic environment. DOD noted that such testing was more in line
with what is required for the full-rate production decision versus the
initial low-rate decision. The testing standards we apply reflect the
best practice and DOD policy of having production-representative
prototypes tested prior to a low-rate production decision. This
approach demonstrates the prototypes' performance and reliability as
well as manufacturing processes--in short, that the product is ready to
be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality goals. In fact,
current DOD policy states that development "shall end when the system
meets approved requirements and is demonstrated in its intended
environment, using the selected production-representative article;
manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated in a pilot
line environment; industrial capabilities are reasonably available; and
the system meets or exceeds exit criteria and [low-rate initial
production] entrance requirements."
Regarding our recommendation about reassessing the role of the LSI, DOD
stated that the FCS contractual arrangement is not an LSI contract as
defined by law. According to the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the FCS prime contractor "shall
be considered to be a lead systems integrator until 45 days after the
Secretary of the Army certifies in writing to the congressional defense
committees that such contractor is no longer serving as the lead
systems integrator."[Footnote 23] Army officials have stated that they
are unaware of the Army preparing any such certification for the
defense committees. Regardless of how the prime contractor is
characterized, it was originally envisioned by the Army as an LSI, and
its unusually close relationship with the Army on the FCS program still
warrants additional oversight.
Regarding our matters for congressional consideration, DOD expressed
concern over the impact to FCS acquisition execution with the fiscal
year 2010 budget authority limitations that we suggested Congress
consider. We believe a restriction is necessary as congressional
committees will be asked to provide funds for fiscal year 2010 before
the FCS milestone review, currently scheduled for July 30, 2009, is
held. The review will lead to a decision on whether the program should
continue as currently structured, continue in restructured form, or be
terminated. The scope and significance of those decisions create the
possibility that the Army's fiscal year 2010 budget plans for FCS could
differ significantly from the request that Congress will consider. A
restriction need not amount to a denial or reduction of funds, but
rather creates an opportunity for Congress to review any change in Army
plans before releasing funds for FCS for the entire fiscal year.
We received other technical comments from DOD, which have been
addressed in the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Army; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be made available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff has any
questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. The major contributors are listed in appendix
VIII.
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis:
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable John M. McHugh:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable C. W. (Bill) Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To develop information on to what extent knowledge will likely be
available to DOD and the Congress in the key areas of technology,
design, demonstrations, network performance, and cost and affordability
to support the 2009 milestone review, and the execution challenges that
a post-milestone review FCS program presents to DOD and the Congress,
we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Secretary of
Defense's Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Secretary of Defense's
Program Analysis and Evaluation; Director Defense Research and
Engineering; the Joint Staff; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks
and Information Integration); the Army's Training and Doctrine Command;
the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; the Future Force
Integration Directorate; the Army Evaluation Task Force, the Army Test
and Evaluation Command; the Director of the Combined Test Organization;
the Program Manager, Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); and
the Project Manager, Future Combat System Spin Out.
We reviewed relevant Army and DOD documents, including the Future
Combat System's Operational Requirements Document, the Acquisition
Strategy Report, the Selected Acquisition Report, critical technology
assessments and technology risk mitigation plans, and spin out test
results.
We attended system-level preliminary design reviews, board of directors
reviews, and system demonstrations. In our assessment of the FCS, we
used the knowledge-based acquisition practices drawn from our large
body of past work as well as DOD's acquisition policy and the
experiences of other programs.
We certify that officials from DOD and the Army have provided us access
to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the matters in
this report. We discussed the issues presented in this report with
officials from the Army and the Secretary of Defense and made several
changes as a result. We conducted this performance audit from March
2008 to March 2009 in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
March 3, 2009:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-09-288, "Defense Acquisitions: Decisions Needed to Shape
Army's Combat Systems for the Future," dated February 2, 2009 (GAO Code
120740).
The report recommends Congress (1) consider restricting the budget
authority for Future Combat Systems (FCS) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010
until the Department complies with statutory FCS review requirements
and (2) not approve production or long lead item funds for the core FCS
program until the critical design review is completed and
demonstrations using prototypes provide confidence that FCS will meet
its requirements. The Department is concerned with the impact to FCS
acquisition execution with the FY2010 FCS budget authority limitations
GAO is recommending to Congress. Also of note, GAO's recommended
testing requirements in support of the low-rate initial production
decision is more in line with the testing required for Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation, which occurs with low-rate production
assets and informs the full rate production decision.
The report recommends that the Secretary of Defense ensure the FCS
program conforms to current defense acquisition policy, direct the Army
to convene a Configuration Steering Board, ensure any increments of FCS
capability are justifiable on their own, ensure any systems going to
the current forces have been successfully tested, and reassess the
involvement of the FCS contractor in production.
The Department concurs with the GAO recommendations and our comments
are enclosed. It should be noted, the FCS contractual arrangement is
not an LSI contract as defined by law. Detailed technical comments were
provided separately.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated February 2, 2009:
GAO-09-288 (GAO Code 120740):
"Defense Acquisitions: Decisions Needed To Shape Army's Combat
Systems For The Future"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation I: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
ensure that the investment program that emerges from the 2009 milestone
review be conformed with current DoD acquisition policy, particularly
regarding technology maturity, critical design reviews, and
demonstrating production-representative prototypes before making
production commitments.
DOD Response: Concur.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to convene, following the preliminary
design reviews and in time to inform the 2009 Future Combat System
(FCS) milestone review, an FCS Configuration Steering Board to provide
assistance in formulating acceptable trade-offs to bridge the gaps
between the FCS requirements and the system designs.
DOD Response: Concur.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
ensure that if an incremental approach is selected for FCS, the first
increments are justifiable on their own as worthwhile capabilities that
are not dependent on future increments for their value, particularly
regarding the order in which the information network and individual
manned ground vehicles
will be developed.
DOD Response: Concur.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
ensure that FCS systems to be spun out to current forces have been
successfully tested in production-representative form before they are
approved for initial production.
DOD Response: Concur. Any Milestone C decisions on FCS systems going to
the current force will be informed by an operational assessment or user
test of the systems.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
reassess the appropriate role of the lead system integrator (LSI) in
the FCS program, particularly regarding its involvement in production.
DOD Response: Concur. In November 2008, the USD(AT&L) directed the
Secretary of the Army to examine contracting alternatives for
procurement of FCS capability. The FCS contractual arrangement is not
an LSI contract as defined by law.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Legislative Requirements for 2009 FCS Go/No-Go Review:
Section 214 of Public Law 109-364 mandated that the Secretary of
Defense perform a milestone (go/no-go) review of the Future Combat
Systems acquisition program. The following depicts that legislation in
its entirety as amended by section 211 of Public Law 110-417.
(a) Milestone Review Required - Not later than 120 days after the
preliminary design review of the Future Combat Systems program is
completed, the Secretary of Defense shall carry out a Defense
Acquisition Board milestone review of the Future Combat Systems
program. The milestone review shall include an assessment as to each of
the following:
(1) Whether the warfighter's needs are valid and can be best met with
the concept of the program. (2) Whether the concept of the program can
be developed and produced within existing resources. (3) Whether the
program should:
(A) continue as currently structured; (B) continue in restructured
form; or (C) be terminated.
(b) Determinations To Be Made In Assessing Whether Program Should
Continue - In making the assessment required by subsection (a)(3), the
Secretary shall make a determination with respect to each of the
following:
(1) Whether each critical technology for the program is at least
Technical Readiness Level 6. (2) For each system and network component
of the program, what the key design and technology risks are, based on
System Functional Reviews, Preliminary Design Reviews, and Technical
Readiness Levels. (3) Whether actual demonstrations, rather than
simulations, have shown that the concept of the program will work. (4)
Whether actual demonstrations, rather than simulations, have shown that
the software for the program is on a path to achieve threshold
requirements on cost and schedule. (5) Whether the program's planned
major communications network demonstrations are sufficiently complex
and realistic to inform major program decision points. (6) The extent
to which Future Combat Systems manned ground vehicle survivability is
likely to be reduced in a degraded Future Combat Systems communications
network environment. (7) The level of network degradation at which
Future Combat Systems manned ground vehicle crew survivability is
significantly reduced. (8) The extent to which the Future Combat
Systems communications network is capable of withstanding network
attack, jamming, or other interference. (9) What the cost estimate for
the program is, including all spin outs, and an assessment of the
confidence level for that estimate. (10) What the affordability
assessment for the program is, given projected Army budgets, based on
the cost estimate referred to in paragraph (9).
(c) Report - The Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the findings and conclusions of the milestone
review required by subsection (a). The report shall include, and
display, each of the assessments required by subsection (a) and each of
the determinations required by subsection (b).
(d) Restriction On Procurement Funds Effective Fiscal 2009:
(1) In General - For fiscal years beginning with 2009, the Secretary
may not obligate any funds for procurement for the Future Combat
Systems program. (2) Exceptions - Paragraph (1) does not apply with
respect to:
(A) the obligation of funds for costs attributable to an insertion of
new technology (to include spin out systems) into the current force, if
the insertion is approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; or (B) the obligation of funds
for the non-line-of-sight cannon system.
(3) Termination - The requirement of paragraph (1) terminates after the
report required by subsection (c) is submitted.
Appendix IV: 2009 Defense Acquisition Board In-Process Review Criteria:
Program Execution:[Footnote 24]
* Preliminary Design Reviews completed for System-of-Systems, Network,
Manned, Unmanned, and Sensors/Munitions Family-of-Systems:
* Platforms and Networks--Design, build, and test schedules are aligned
and executable:
* FCS/Joint Tactical Radio System/Warfighter Information Network-
Tactical Programs development, build, and test schedules are aligned
and executable:
* Technology Readiness Level 6 achieved for threshold critical
technologies:
Unmanned Systems:
* 36 Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Block 0 operational with 2ND
Brigade Combat Team, 25TH Infantry Division:
* 8 Class IV airframes (less payloads) built:
* Unmanned Ground Vehicles and Autonomous Navigation System engineering
technology demonstrators built:
* 22 Small Unmanned Ground Vehicles, Block 1 Delivered to Army
Evaluation Task Force:
Manned Ground Vehicles:
* Demonstrated Manned Ground Vehicle Common Chassis:
* Demonstrations of Non-Line of Sight-Mortar and Mounted Combat System
firing platforms:
* 5 Non-Line of Sight-Cannon early prototypes built:
Network:
* 12 Engineering Development Model ground mobile radios and 40
Engineering Development Model handheld, manpack small form fit radios
delivered to FCS and operational in an unclassified environment:
* Demonstration of integrated sensor data feeds using Level 1 Fusion in
an operational environment:
* Integrated Computer Systems with cross domain demonstrated:
* Software Build 1.0 Qualification Test complete:
* Centralized Controller Spiral 1 prototype:
* System-of-Systems Common Operation Environment Build 2 (Services or
Air and Ground Network) Functional Qualification Test Complete:
Test/Experimentation/Demonstration:
* Demonstration of 16 Urban-Unattended Ground Sensors, 10 Tactical-
Unattended Ground Sensors, 6 Non-Line of Sight-Launch System Container
Launch Units, 4 Small Unmanned Ground Vehicles Block 1 and 6 Class I
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Block 0 with the Army Evaluation Task Force in
an operational environment:
* Ongoing Non Line of Sight Launch-System guided test vehicle flights:
* Spin Out Pre-Limited user test completed:
* Experiment 2.1/Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 2008 and
Experiment 2.2 completed:
* Integrated Mission Testing 1 completed:
* Software Build 2 Early Engineering Release completed:
* System-of-System Simulation Framework maturation assessment
completed:
[End of section]
Appendix V: Other Related Legislation:
Section 212 of Public Law 110-417 requires the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Networks and Information Integration) to report by September
30, 2009 on its analysis of FCS communications network and software.
The specific issues to be addressed are listed below.
* An assessment of the vulnerability of the FCS communications network
and software to enemy network attack, in particular the effect of the
use of significant amounts of commercial software in FCS software.
* An assessment of the vulnerability of the FCS communications network
to electronic warfare, jamming, and other potential enemy interference.
* An assessment of the vulnerability of the FCS communications network
to adverse weather and complex terrain.
* An assessment of the FCS communication network's dependence on
satellite communications support, and an assessment of the network's
performance in the absence of assumed levels of satellite
communications support.
* An assessment of the performance of the FCS communications network
when operating in a degraded condition —and how such a degraded network
environment would affect the performance of FCS brigades and the
survivability of FCS Manned Ground Vehicles.
* An assessment, developed in coordination with the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation, of the adequacy of the FCS
communications network testing schedule.
* An assessment, developed in coordination with Defense, Operational
Test & Evaluation, of the synchronization of the funding, schedule, and
technology maturity of the WIN-T and JTRS programs in relation to the
FCS program, including any planned FCS spin outs.
Appendix VI: Technology Readiness Levels:
Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) are measures pioneered by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and adopted by DOD to
determine whether technologies were sufficiently mature to be
incorporated into a weapon system. Our prior work has found TRLs to be
a valuable decision-making tool because they can presage the likely
consequences of incorporating a technology at a given level of maturity
into a product development. The maturity level of a technology can
range from paper studies (TRL 1), to prototypes that can be tested in a
realistic environment (TRL 7), to an actual system that has proven
itself in mission operations (TRL 9). According to DOD acquisition
policy, a technology should have been demonstrated in a relevant
environment or, preferably, in an operational environment (TRL 7) to be
considered mature enough to use for product development. Best practices
of leading commercial firms and successful DOD programs have shown that
critical technologies should be mature to at least a TRL 7 before the
start of product development.
Table 3: TRL Descriptions:
Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported;
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties;
Hardware and software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application
formulated;
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption.
Examples are still limited to paper studies;
Hardware and software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical
function and/or characteristic proof of concept;
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative;
Hardware and software: Analytical studies and demonstration of non-
scale individual components (pieces of subsystem);
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard. Validation
in laboratory environment;
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity"
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad
hoc" hardware in a laboratory;
Hardware and software: Low-fidelity breadboard. Integration of non-
scale components to show pieces will work together. Not fully
functional or form or fit but representative of technically feasible
approach suitable for flight articles;
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation
in relevant environment;
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory
Integration of components;
Hardware and software: High-fidelity breadboard. Functionally
equivalent but not necessarily form and/or fit (size, weight,
materials, etc.). Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include
integration of several components with reasonably realistic support
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality;
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.
Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype
demonstration in a relevant environment;
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment;
Hardware and software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit,
and function. Probably includes the integration of many new components
and realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate
full functionality of the subsystem;
Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or limited/
restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. Integration
of technology is well defined.
Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an
operational environment;
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an
aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the prototype in
a test bed aircraft;
Hardware and software: Prototype. Should be form, fit, and function
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate
full functionality of subsystem;
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative
operational environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data.
Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight
qualified" through test and demonstration;
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if
it meets design specifications;
Hardware and software: Flight-qualified hardware;
Demonstration environment: Developmental test and evaluation in the
actual system application.
Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through
successful mission operations;
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the
system under operational mission conditions;
Hardware and software: Actual system in final form;
Demonstration environment: Operational test and evaluation in
operational mission conditions.
Source: GAO analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration
data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: FCS Critical Technology Ratings and Projections for
Achieving TRL 6:
FCS Critical Technologies:
Joint interoperability: Software programmable radio: JTRS Ground Mobile
Radio;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Joint interoperability: Software programmable radio: 2; JTRS Handheld,
manpack, small form fit;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Joint interoperability: Software programmable radio: 3; WIN-T;
2007 TRL rating: 5;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2008;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Joint interoperability: Interface and Information Exchange: 4; Army,
Joint, multinational interface;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Joint interoperability: Interface and Information Exchange: 5; SOSCOE
interoperability;
2007 TRL rating: 5;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2008;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: Security Systems and Algorithms: 6; Cross
Domain Guarding Solution;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: Security Systems and Algorithms: 7; Intrusion
detection--IP network;
2007 TRL rating: 5;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2008;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: Security Systems and Algorithms: 8; Intrusion
detection--waveform;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: 9; Mobile ad hoc networking protocols;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 5;
2008 TRL 6 projection: 2009.
Networked battle command: 10; Quality of service algorithms;
2007 TRL rating: 5;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2008;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: 11; Unmanned systems relay;
2007 TRL rating: N/R;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: N/R;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: Wideband waveforms; 12; Wideband waveform--
2007 TRL rating: JTRS;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 6;
2008 TRL rating: N/A;
2008 TRL 6 projection: 5;
2008 TRL 6 projection: 2009.
Networked battle command: Wideband waveforms; 13; Wideband waveform--
SRW;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2007 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL rating: N/A;
2008 TRL 6 projection: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: 14; Advanced man-machine interfaces;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: 15; Multi-Spectral sensors and seekers;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: 16; Decision aids/intelligent agents;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: Combat identification; 17; Air (rotary
wing/UAV)--to--ground;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: Combat identification; 18; Air (fixed wing)--
to--ground (interim/robust solutions);
2007 TRL rating: N/R;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: N/R;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: Combat identification; 19; Ground--to--ground
(mounted);
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: Combat identification; 20; Ground--to--air
(mounted);
2007 TRL rating: N/R;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: N/R;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: Combat identification; 21; Ground--to--
soldier;
2007 TRL rating: N/R;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: N/R;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: 22; Rapid battlespace deconfliction;
2007 TRL rating: 5;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2008;
2008 TRL rating: 5;
2008 TRL 6 projection: 2009.
Networked battle command: Sensor/data fusion and data compression
algorithms: 23; Distributed fusion management;
2007 TRL rating: 5;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2008;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: Sensor/data fusion and data compression
algorithms: 24; Level 1 fusion engine;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked battle command: Sensor/data fusion and data compression
algorithms: 25; Data compression algorithms;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 7;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked lethality: 26; Dynamic sensor--shooter pairing algorithms and
fire control;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked lethality: LOS/BLOS/NLOS precision munitions terminal
guidance: 27; Software programmable radio: PGMM precision munitions;
2007 TRL rating: N/R;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: N/R;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked lethality: LOS/BLOS/NLOS precision munitions terminal
guidance: 28; MRM precision munitions;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked lethality: LOS/BLOS/NLOS precision munitions terminal
guidance: 29; Excalibur precision munitions;
2007 TRL rating: 7;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 7;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked lethality: LOS/BLOS/NLOS precision munitions terminal
guidance: 30; NLOS-LS;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked lethality: Aided/automatic target recognition: 31; Aided
target recognition for RSTA;
2007 TRL rating: 5;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2008;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked lethality: Aided/automatic target recognition: 32; NLOS-LS
ATR for seekers;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked lethality: 33; Recoil management and lightweight components;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked lethality: 34; Distributed collaboration of manned/ unmanned
platforms;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Networked lethality: 35; Rapid battle damage assessment;
2007 TRL rating: N/R;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: N/R;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Transportability:
Sustainability/reliability: High-power density/fuel-efficient
propulsion: 36; High-power density engine;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Sustainability/reliability: High-power density/fuel-efficient
propulsion: 37; Fuel-efficient hybrid-electric engine;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Sustainability/reliability: 38; Embedded predictive logistics sensors
and algorithms;
2007 TRL rating: N/R;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: N/R;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Sustainability/reliability: 39; Water generation and purification;
2007 TRL rating: N/R;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: N/R;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Sustainability/reliability: 40; Lightweight heavy fuel engine;
2007 TRL rating: 5;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2008;
2008 TRL rating: 5;
2008 TRL 6 projection: 2009.
Training: 41; Computer generated forces;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Sustainability/reliability: 42; Tactical engagement simulation;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: Active protection system: 43; Active protection system;
2007 TRL rating: 5;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2008;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: Active protection system: 44; Threat warning sensor;
2007 TRL rating: 4;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2010;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: 45; Signature management;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: 46; Lightweight hull and vehicle armor;
2007 TRL rating: 5;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2008;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: 47; Health monitoring and casualty care interventions;
2007 TRL rating: 7;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 8;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: 48; Power distribution and control;
2007 TRL rating: N/R;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: N/R;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: Advanced countermine technology: 49; Mine detection;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: Advanced countermine technology: 50; Mine
neutralization;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: Advanced countermine technology: 51; Efficient resource
allocation;
2007 TRL rating: N/R;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: N/R;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: Advanced countermine technology: 52; Protection;
2007 TRL rating: 5;
2007 TRL 6 projection: 2008;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: Advanced countermine technology: 53; High-density
packaged power;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Survivability: Class 1 UAV propulsion technology: 54; Ducted fan;
2007 TRL rating: 6;
2007 TRL 6 projection: N/A;
2008 TRL rating: 6;
2008 TRL 6 projection: N/A.
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Contact:
Paul L. Francis, (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, major contributors to this
report were Assistant Director William R. Graveline, Marcus C.
Ferguson, William C. Allbritton, Noah B. Bleicher, Dr. Ronald N. Dains,
Tana M. Davis, John Krump, Carrie W. Rogers, and Robert S. Swierczek.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: 2009 Review of Future Combat Systems Is Critical
to Program's Direction. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-638T]. Washington, D.C.: April 10,
2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-467SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 31, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: 2009 Is a Critical Juncture for the Army's Future
Combat System. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-408].
Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Risks Underscore the
Importance of Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-672T]. Washington, D.C.: March 27,
2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat System.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-376]. Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Key for Future Combat
System's Success. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-564T].
Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case is Needed for Future
Combat System's Successful Outcome. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-367]. Washington, D.C.: March 14,
2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key for
Future Combat System's Success. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-478T]. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects
for Success. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-428T].
Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: The Army's Future Combat Systems' Features,
Risks, and Alternatives. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-635T]. Washington, D.C.: April 1,
2004.
Issues Facing the Army's Future Combat Systems Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-1010R]. Washington, D.C.: August 13,
2003.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-288]. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
2001.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 214 (2006).
[2] Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 211.
[3] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 214 (2006).
[4] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Is Needed for
Future Combat System's Successful Outcome, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-367] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14,
2006).
[5] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: 2009 Is a Critical Juncture for the
Army's Future Combat System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-408] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7,
2008).
[6] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 211 (2008).
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-408].
[8] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 212.
[9] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best
Practices, but More Controls Are Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-53] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10,
2003).
[10] The Army subsequently provided additional information to support
the independent review team's validation of TRL 6 for the mid-range
munition.
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-408].
[12] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Significant Challenges Ahead in
Developing and Demonstrating Future Combat System's Network and
Software, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-409]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2008).
[13] Quality of Service is the capability to transport information
across the network while satisfying communication performance
requirements such as low delay, low loss, or high throughput.
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-408].
[15] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-391]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
[16] The money requested for fiscal years 2009, 2010 and a portion of
the money for fiscal year 2011 is for NLOS-C production.
[17] Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-
248, § 8121 (2002), and similar provisions in subsequent defense
appropriations acts.
[18] Pub. L. No. 110-116, § 8088 (2007).
[19] Heavy brigades are equipped with armor, such as the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle. Light brigades are equipped with motorized infantry,
such as the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle.
[20] The Joint Tactical Radios and Ground Soldier System are
complementary programs and not directly part of the FCS program.
[21] The Centralized Controller will provide the dismounted soldier
with a hand-carried device capable of enabling remote network interface
with a number of FCS unmanned systems and remote control operation of
manned ground vehicle functions.
[22] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Role of Lead Systems Integrator on
Future Combat Systems Program Poses Oversight Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-380] (Washington, D.C.: June 6,
2007).
[23] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 112.
[24] Future Combat Systems (FCS) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)
for Secretary of the Army issued by The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Aug. 16, 2008.
[End of section]
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