Defense Acquisitions
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs Gao ID: GAO-09-326SP March 30, 2009This is GAO's seventh annual assessment of selected Department of Defense (DOD) weapon programs. The report examines how well DOD is planning and executing its weapon acquisition programs, an area that has been on GAO's high-risk list since 1990. This year's report is in response to the mandate in the joint explanatory statement to the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. The report includes (1) an analysis of the overall performance of DOD's 2008 portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs and a comparison to the portfolio performance at two other points in time--5 years ago and 1 year ago; (2) an analysis of current cost and schedule outcomes and knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 47 weapon programs--primarily in development--from the 2008 portfolio; (3) data on other factors that could impact program stability; and (4) an update on changes in DOD's acquisition policies. To conduct our assessment, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports for the programs in DOD's 2003, 2007, and 2008 portfolios. GAO also collected data from program offices on technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge, as well as on other factors that might affect program stability. GAO analyzed this data and compiled one- or two-page assessments of 67 weapon programs.
Since 2003, DOD's portfolio of major defense acquisition programs has grown from 77 to 96 programs; and its investment in those programs has grown from $1.2 trillion to $1.6 trillion (fiscal year 2009 dollars). The cumulative cost growth for DOD's programs is higher than it was 5 years ago, but at $296 billion, it is less than last year when adjusted for inflation. For 2008 programs, research and development costs are now 42 percent higher than originally estimated and the average delay in delivering initial capabilities has increased to 22 months. DOD's performance in some of these areas is driven by older programs, as newer programs, on average, have not shown the same degree of cost and schedule growth. For 47 programs GAO assessed in-depth, the amount of knowledge that programs attained by key decision points has increased in recent years; but most programs still proceed with far less technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge than best practices suggest and face a higher risk of cost increases and schedule delays. Early system engineering, stable requirements, and disciplined software management were also important as programs that exhibited these characteristics experienced less cost growth and shorter schedule delays on average. Program execution could be hindered by workforce challenges. A majority of the programs GAO assessed were unable to fill all authorized program office positions, resulting in increased workloads, a reliance on support contractors, and less personnel to conduct oversight. In December 2008, DOD revised its policy for major defense acquisition programs to place more emphasis on acquiring knowledge about requirements, technology, and design before programs start and maintaining discipline once they begin. The policy recommends holding early systems engineering reviews; includes a requirement for early prototyping; and establishes review boards to monitor requirements changes--all positive steps. Some programs we assessed have begun implementing these changes.
GAO-09-326SP, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
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GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-326SP, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
This is GAO‘s seventh annual assessment of selected Department of
Defense (DOD) weapon programs. The report examines how well DOD is
planning and executing its weapon acquisition programs, an area that
has been on GAO‘s high-risk list since 1990.
This year‘s report is in response to the mandate in the joint
explanatory statement to the Consolidated Security, Disaster
Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. The report
includes (1) an analysis of the overall performance of DOD‘s 2008
portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs and a comparison to
the portfolio performance at two other points in time”5 years ago and 1
year ago; (2) an analysis of current cost and schedule outcomes and
knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a
subset of 47 weapon programs”primarily in development”from the 2008
portfolio; (3) data on other factors that could impact program
stability; and (4) an update on changes in DOD‘s acquisition policies.
To conduct our assessment, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity
data from DOD‘s Selected Acquisition Reports for the programs in DOD‘s
2003, 2007, and 2008 portfolios. GAO also collected data from program
offices on technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge, as well as
on other factors that might affect program stability. GAO analyzed this
data and compiled one- or two-page assessments of 67 weapon programs.
What GAO Found:
Since 2003, DOD‘s portfolio of major defense acquisition programs has
grown from 77 to 96 programs; and its investment in those programs has
grown from $1.2 trillion to $1.6 trillion (fiscal year 2009 dollars).
The cumulative cost growth for DOD‘s programs is higher than it was 5
years ago, but at $296 billion, it is less than last year when adjusted
for inflation. For 2008 programs, research and development costs are
now 42 percent higher than originally estimated and the average delay
in delivering initial capabilities has increased to 22 months. DOD‘s
performance in some of these areas is driven by older programs, as
newer programs, on average, have not shown the same degree of cost and
schedule growth.
Table: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios
(Fiscal Year 2009 Dollars):
Portfolio status: Number of programs;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 77;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 95;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 96.
Portfolio status: Total planned commitments;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: $1.2 trillion;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: $1.6 trillion;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: $1.6 trillion.
Portfolio status: Commitments outstanding;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: $724 billion;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: $875 billion;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: $786 billion.
Portfolio status: Change to total research and development costs from
first estimate;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 37 percent;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 40 percent;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 42 percent.
Portfolio status: Change in total acquisition cost from first estimate;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 19 percent;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 26 percent;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 25 percent.
Portfolio status: Estimated total acquisition cost growth;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: $183 billion;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: $301 billion[A];
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: $296 billion.
Portfolio status: Share of programs with 25 percent or more increase in
program acquisition unit cost;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 41 percent;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 44 percent;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 42 percent.
Portfolio status: Average delay in delivering initial capabilities;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 18 months;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 21 months;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 22 months.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] Last year, GAO reported total acquisition cost growth for the
fiscal year 2007 portfolio was $295 billion in fiscal year 2008
dollars. This figure is now expressed in fiscal year 2009 dollars.
[End of table]
For 47 programs GAO assessed in-depth, the amount of knowledge that
programs attained by key decision points has increased in recent years;
but most programs still proceed with far less technology, design, and
manufacturing knowledge than best practices suggest and face a higher
risk of cost increases and schedule delays. Early system engineering,
stable requirements, and disciplined software management were also
important as programs that exhibited these characteristics experienced
less cost growth and shorter schedule delays on average. Program
execution could be hindered by workforce challenges. A majority of the
programs GAO assessed were unable to fill all authorized program office
positions, resulting in increased workloads, a reliance on support
contractors, and less personnel to conduct oversight.
In December 2008, DOD revised its policy for major defense acquisition
programs to place more emphasis on acquiring knowledge about
requirements, technology, and design before programs start and
maintaining discipline once they begin. The policy recommends holding
early systems engineering reviews; includes a requirement for early
prototyping; and establishes review boards to monitor requirements
changes”all positive steps. Some programs we assessed have begun
implementing these changes.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]. For more
information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or
sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Report to Congressional Committees:
March 2009:
Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs:
GAO-09-326SP:
Contents:
Foreword:
Letter:
DOD's 2008 Portfolio Shows Less Overall Cost Growth Than Last Year's
Portfolio, but Other Indicators Remain Mixed:
Programs Examined Have More Knowledge at Key Decision Points, but Still
Move forward Prematurely:
Other Factors Can Also Affect Program Stability, Execution, and
Outcomes:
DOD's Recent Policy Changes Put an Emphasis on Early Systems
Engineering and Knowledge-Based Acquisition Strategies:
How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed:
Assessments of Individual Programs:
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites:
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System:
AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guide Missile (AARGM):
B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP):
B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability:
BMDS Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD):
BMDS Airborne Laser (ABL):
BMDS Flexible Target Family:
BMDS Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
BMDS Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI):
BMDS Multiple Kill Vehicle:
BMDS Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):
BMDS Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System:
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program:
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP):
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):
CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR):
CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier:
DDG 1000 Destroyer:
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE):
EA-18G:
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
F-22A Modernization Program:
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T):
Future Combat System (FCS):
Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System:
Global Positioning Systems Block IIIA:
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM):
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS):
Joint Strike Fighter:
Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS
AMF):
Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR):
JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS):
Joint Tactical Radio System Network Enterprise Domain:
LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program:
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
Littoral Combat Ship - Mission Modules:
Longbow Apache Block III:
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform:
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle:
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):
MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System:
Mutifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical Radio
System (MIDS-JTRS):
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program:
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control:
Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT) Program:
P-8A Poseidon Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft:
PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit:
Extended Range/Multiple Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS):
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High:
Space-Based Space Surveillance Block 10:
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT):
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft:
VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program:
Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774):
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, Increment 2:
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3:
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS):
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH):
Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X):
Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM):
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV):
KC-X:
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios:
Table 2: Changes in Costs and Quantities for 10 of the Highest-Cost
Acquisition Programs:
Table 3: Changes in Program Cost and Schedule by Age of Program:
Table 4: Outcomes for Weapon Programs in 2009 Assessment:
Table 5: Program Office Composition for 61 DOD Programs:
Figures:
Figure 1:Schedule Delays for Major Weapon Systems as of December 2007:
Figure 2: Percentage of Technologies That Were Mature and Nearing
Maturity When Programs Entered System Development:
Figure 3: Average Percent of Total Expected Design Drawings That Are
Releasable at Critical Design Review:
Figure 4: Average RDT&E Cost Growth for Programs since First Estimates
by Timing of Key Systems Engineering Events:
Figure 5: Requirements Changes, Research and Development Cost Growth,
and Delays in Providing Initial Operational Capabilities:
Figure 6: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared
with Best Practices:
Abbreviations:
ACS: Aerial Common Sensor:
BAMS: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance:
BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System:
C-5 AMP: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program:
C-5 RERP: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengineering Program:
CAIG: Cost Analysis Improvement Group:
CDR: Critical Design Review:
CSAR-X: Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle:
DAMIRS: Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval System:
DIMHRS: Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EFV: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle:
FY: fiscal year:
GPS: Global Positioning Systems:
IOC: Initial Operational Capability:
JAGM: Joint Air-to-Ground Missile:
JLENS: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Dense Elevated Netted Sensor
System:
JLTV: Joint Light Tactical Vehicle:
JTRS AMF: Joint Tactical Radio Systems Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-
Station:
LRIP: low-rate initial production:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
MDAP: Major Defense Acquisition Program:
MIDS-JTRS: Multifunctional Information Distribution System - Joint
Tactical Radio System:
MUOS: Mobile User Objective System:
NA: not applicable:
OUSD (AT&L): Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics):
PAUC: Program Acquisition Unit Cost:
PDR: Preliminary Design Review:
RDT&E: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation:
SAR: Selected Acquisition Report:
SFR: System Functional Review:
SRR: System Requirements Review:
TBD: to be determined:
TRL: Technology Readiness Level:
WIN-T: Warfighter Information Network - Tactical:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
March 30, 2009:
Congressional Committees:
I am pleased to present GAO's seventh annual assessment of selected
weapon programs. This report provides a snapshot of how well the
Department of Defense (DOD) is planning and executing its major weapon
acquisition programs--an area that has been on GAO's high-risk list
since its inception in 1990. This report comes at an important time for
DOD. DOD--like the rest of the federal government--is in a transition
period as the new administration puts its management team in place and
sets its priorities. DOD also faces a number of near-term and long-term
fiscal pressures: extended operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have
taken a toll on readiness, and rebuilding will be complex and costly;
personnel costs for pay, benefits, and health care are rising; major
weapon system programs are experiencing significant cost growth, and
DOD is seeking to reshape and grow the force and modernize and
transform capabilities.
While DOD's wants and needs continue to grow, overall, federal budget
deficits are projected to increase significantly in the short term, and
longer-term fiscal imbalances remain. As one of the largest
discretionary items in the budget, DOD must improve its stewardship of
taxpayer funds and the return on investment it receives from its
expenditures on major weapon systems. Last year, we reported that the
cumulative cost growth on DOD's major defense acquisition programs was
$295 billion in fiscal year 2008 dollars ($301 billion in fiscal year
2009 dollars) and that the average delay in delivering promised
capabilities to the warfighter was 21 months.
Our review this year indicates that while the overall performance of
weapon system programs is still poor; there have been some modest
improvements in DOD's acquisition outcomes: total cost growth on this
year's portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs has decreased
marginally compared to the 2007 portfolio, and programs started in
recent years have more knowledge about technology and design at key
points in the acquisition process. However, the cumulative cost
overruns are still staggering--almost $296 billion in fiscal year 2009
dollars--and the problems are pervasive. Of DOD's 96 active major
defense acquisition programs, 64 programs have reported increases in
their projected cost since their initial cost estimate. While there are
different ways to measure the extent and nature of cost growth, there
is agreement between DOD and us on the sources of the problem: (1)
programs are started with poor foundations and inadequate knowledge for
developing realistic cost estimates; (2) programs move forward with
artificially low cost estimates, optimistic schedules and assumptions,
immature technologies and designs, and fluid requirements; (3) changing
or excessive requirements cause cost growth; and (4) an imbalance
between wants and needs contributes to budget and program instability.
These problems have roots in not only the acquisition process, but the
requirements and funding processes. A comprehensive approach will be
needed to improve acquisition outcomes. To improve the efficiency of
DOD's weapon system portfolio, it is essential for DOD to eliminate
underperforming or lower priority programs, by completing or canceling
them, and to initiate new programs, based on sound business cases and
knowledge-based acquisition approaches. There is a need also to be
mindful of the competing interests and other factors that have weakened
the processes DOD now has, so that change can take place not only in
the processes themselves, but also in the environment within which they
must operate.
The time for change is now. The Secretary of Defense has identified
acquisition as chief among the institutional challenges facing DOD and
stated that efforts are underway to address it. DOD is off to a good
start. In December 2008, DOD made major revisions to its acquisition
policies, which address many of the problems that can be traced back to
the acquisition system. The revisions, which are in line with our past
recommendations, aim to provide key department leaders with the
knowledge needed to make informed decisions before a program starts and
to maintain discipline once it begins. To improve outcomes on the
whole, though, DOD must ensure that these policy changes are
immediately and consistently put into practice and reflected in
decisions made on individual acquisitions. It must also fix
accountability in an individual or individuals for its implementation.
This will not be easy. Tough choices will need to be made about
specific weapon systems, and stakeholders--from the military services
to industry to the Congress--will have to play a constructive role in
this process. We will do our part to monitor the progress of DOD's
efforts in future assessments and continue to make recommendations that
address the broader challenges DOD faces with its requirements,
funding, and acquisition processes.
Signed by:
Gene L. Dodaro:
Acting Comptroller General of the United States:
[End of letter]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
March 30, 2009:
Congressional Committees:
This is GAO's seventh annual assessment of selected Department of
Defense (DOD) weapon programs and the first in response to the mandate
in the joint explanatory statement to the DOD Appropriation Act for
fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 1] This report provides a snapshot of how
well DOD is planning and executing its major weapon acquisition
programs--an area that has been on GAO's high-risk list since its
inception in 1990. Over the next 5 years, DOD expects to invest about
$329 billion (fiscal year 2009 dollars) on the development and
procurement of major defense acquisition programs.[Footnote 2] Given
the nation's short term and long term fiscal challenges, the pressures
on DOD to contain or reduce investments and to execute its existing
programs in a cost-effective manner will likely continue to increase.
Every dollar of cost growth on a DOD weapon system program represents a
lost opportunity to pay for another national priority.
This report includes (1) an analysis of the overall performance of
DOD's 2008 portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs and a
comparison to the performance of the portfolio at two other points in
time--5 years ago and 1 year ago;[Footnote 3] (2) an analysis of
current cost and schedule outcomes and knowledge attained by key
junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 47 weapon
programs--primarily in development--from the 2008 portfolio; (3) data
on other factors, such as cost estimating, requirements, software
management, and program office staffing that could affect program
stability; and (4) an update on DOD acquisition policies.
To conduct our analysis of DOD's portfolio of major defense acquisition
programs, we obtained cost, schedule, and quantity data from DOD's
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) and from the Defense Acquisition
Management Information Retrieval Purview system. We obtained
information on the 67 programs in our individual assessments on the
extent to which they follow knowledge-based practices for technology
maturity, design maturity, production maturity, and software
development from a data collection instrument provided to each program
office. The 20 programs that were not major defense acquisition
programs were excluded from our analysis of technology maturity, design
stability, and production maturity.[Footnote 4] Using a questionnaire,
we also collected information from program offices on other aspects of
program management including cost estimating, performance requirements
changes, systems engineering, and program office staffing. We conducted
this performance audit from August 2008 to March 2009 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our
audit objectives. Appendix I contains detailed information on our scope
and methodology.
DOD's 2008 Portfolio Shows Less Overall Cost Growth Than Last Year's
Portfolio, but Other Indicators Remain Mixed:
DOD's 2008 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs includes 96
programs--a net increase of 1 from a year ago and 19 since 2003.
[Footnote 5] The total investment in research, development, test and
evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement funds for this portfolio is still
about $1.6 trillion, while the funding needed to complete the programs
in it has decreased by about $89 billion from a year ago. The total
cost growth for DOD's portfolio of major defense acquisition programs
is higher than it was 5 years ago, but at $296 billion, it is actually
less than the 2007 portfolio's cost growth of $301 billion. To see how
the common elements of each portfolio were performing over time, we
identified and isolated 58 programs that have been part of the 2003 and
2008 portfolios and analyzed the estimated cost growth since 2003. For
these programs, the total funding needed from fiscal year 2004 through
their completion increased 27 percent, or $179 billion, between the
December 2002 portfolio and the December 2007 portfolio. Development
funding needs increased 46 percent, or $59 billion.
For DOD's 2008 programs, total research and development costs are now
42 percent higher than originally estimated, and the average delay in
delivering initial capabilities is now 22 months. In addition, 42
percent of the programs reported a 25 percent or more increase in
acquisition unit costs.[Footnote 6] DOD's performance in some of these
areas is driven by older, underperforming programs as newer programs,
on average, have not yet shown the same degree of cost and schedule
growth. In addition, while the total cost of the 2008 portfolio has
grown by $48 billion over initial estimates because of increased
purchases of certain weapon systems, this has been offset several times
over by quantity decreases in other systems. On the whole, cost growth
continues to have an adverse effect on the quantities programs are able
to deliver to the warfighter.
The programs that make up DOD's 2008 portfolio have changed slightly.
This is one of the reasons for the $5 billion decrease in total
acquisition cost growth over the last year. Three programs--the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle, E-2C Hawkeye, and Land Warrior--left the
portfolio, accounting for a net decrease of $15.6 billion in total
acquisition cost growth.[Footnote 7] The cost of the new and remaining
programs in the 2008 portfolio has increased by about $10.7 billion
since last year. Of the programs in the 2008 portfolio that reported
relevant cost data, 75 percent, or 69 programs, reported increases in
research and development costs since their first estimate, and 69
percent, or 64 programs, reported increases in total acquisition costs.
Quantities have been reduced by 25 percent or more for 15 of the
programs in the 2008 portfolio. Table 1 presents the results of our
analysis of DOD's major defense acquisition program portfolios for
2003, 2007, and 2008 with indicators for development cost, total
acquisition cost, unit cost, and schedule performance.
Table 1: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios:
Fiscal year 2009 dollars.
Portfolio status: Number of programs;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 77;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 95;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 96.
Portfolio status: Total planned commitments;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: $1.2 trillion;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: $1.6 trillion;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: $1.6 trillion.
Portfolio status: Commitments outstanding;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: $724 billion;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: $875 billion;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: $786 billion.
Portfolio status: Change to total research and development costs from
first estimate;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 37 percent;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 40 percent;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 42 percent.
Portfolio status: Change in total acquisition cost from first estimate;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 19 percent;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 26 percent;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 25 percent.
Portfolio status: Estimated total acquisition cost growth;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: $183 billion;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: $301 billion[A];
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: $296 billion.
Portfolio status: Share of programs with 25 percent or more increase in
program acquisition unit cost;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 41 percent;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 44 percent;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 42 percent.
Portfolio status: Average delay in delivering initial capabilities;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 18 months;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 21 months;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 22 months.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Data were obtained from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR)
(dated December 2002, 2006, and 2007). In a few cases data were
obtained directly from program offices. The number of programs reflects
the programs with SARs; however, in our analysis we have broken a few
SAR programs into smaller elements or programs. Not all programs had
comparable cost and schedule data and these programs were excluded from
the analysis where appropriate. Portfolio performance data do not
include costs of developing Missile Defense Agency elements or the
Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) program.
[A] The total acquisition cost growth for the 2007 portfolio was $295
billion in 2008 constant dollars.
[End of table]
The overall performance of this portfolio is one indicator of how well
DOD's acquisition system generates the return on investment it promises
to the warfighter, Congress, and the taxpayer. The surest way to
improve its performance is by reducing the number of underperforming
programs, by either completing or canceling them, and ensuring that new
programs are founded on sound business cases and follow a knowledge-
based approach, as embodied in DOD's recently revised acquisition
policy, as they enter the portfolio.[Footnote 8] This approach must
begin with strong systems engineering analysis that balances a weapon
system's requirements with available resources.
Our analysis of DOD's 2008 portfolio allows us to make several
observations about the portfolio's balance between its largest programs
and smaller ones, the relative performance of newer programs, and the
delivery of capabilities to the warfighter.
* Ten of DOD's largest acquisition programs, commanding about half the
overall acquisition dollars in the portfolio, have experienced
significant cost growth, and have seen quantities reduced by almost a
third. The total estimated development cost for these 10 programs has
grown 32 percent from initial estimates, from about $134 billion to
over $177 billion. Overall acquisition cost has grown by 13 percent
while quantities across all 10 programs have been reduced by 32
percent, from 6,645 to 4,503. Taken as a whole, total program
acquisition unit costs on these programs have also grown significantly.
The two largest programs--the Joint Strike Fighter and Future Combat
Systems--still represent significant cost risk moving forward and will
dominate the portfolio for years. Since these programs consume such a
large portion of the funding that DOD spends on research and
development and procurement, their performance also affects other major
weapon acquisitions, smaller acquisition programs, and DOD's ability to
fund and acquire other supplies and equipment.
Table 2 provides a summary of 10 of the largest major defense
acquisition programs. We do not include the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) and the DDG-51 in this list because comparable cost and
quantity data were not available for either program.
Table 2: Changes in Costs and Quantities for 10 of the Highest-Cost
Acquisition Programs (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Program: Joint Strike Fighter;
Total cost: First full estimate: $206,410;
Total cost: Current estimate: $244,772;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 2,456;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 2,866;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 38.
Program: Future Combat System;
Total cost: First full estimate: $89,776;
Total cost: Current estimate: $129,731;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 15;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 15;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 45.
Program: Virginia Class Submarine;
Total cost: First full estimate: $58,378;
Total cost: Current estimate: $81,556;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 30;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 30;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 40.
Program: F-22A Raptor;
Total cost: First full estimate: $88,134;
Total cost: Current estimate: $73,723;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 648;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 184;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 195.
Program: C-17 Globemaster III;
Total cost: First full estimate: $51,733;
Total cost: Current estimate: $73,571;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 210;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 190;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 57.
Program: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft;
Total cost: First full estimate: $38,726;
Total cost: Current estimate: $55,544;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 913;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 458;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 186.
Program: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet;
Total cost: First full estimate: $78,925;
Total cost: Current estimate: $51,787;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 1,000;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 493;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 33.
Program: Trident II Missile;
Total cost: First full estimate: $49,939;
Total cost: Current estimate: $49,614;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 845;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 561;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 50.
Program: CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier;
Total cost: First full estimate: $34,360;
Total cost: Current estimate: $29,914;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 3;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 3;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: -13.
Program: P-8A Poseidon Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft;
Total cost: First full estimate: $29,974;
Total cost: Current estimate: $29,622;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 115;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 113;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 1.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
* New programs in the portfolio are performing better than older
programs. For programs less than 5 years from inception, total costs
have not significantly changed since their first estimates. Older
programs experienced much higher levels of cost growth--for example,
average program acquisition unit cost increases on older programs
ranged from 38 percent to 127 percent. It is not yet certain that newer
programs will continue to perform well, as we have previously found
that most program cost growth does not materialize until later--after
the critical design review. However, newer programs may benefit from
recent changes in DOD's acquisition policies and practices. For
example, on programs in technology development, such as the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle and Joint Air-to-Ground Missile, DOD is demanding more
prototyping and risk reduction prior to initiating system development.
Table 3 provides various indicators of cost and schedule performance
stratified by age for the 80 programs in the 2008 DOD portfolio that
had complete cost, schedule, and quantity information.
Table 3: Changes in Program Cost and Schedule by Age of Program:
Age of program: 15 or more years since development start;
Overall change in RDT&E costs: (percent): 47;
Overall change in total costs: (percent): 19;
Average increase in acquisition unit costs: (percent): 127;
Average change in quantities: (percent): -39;
Average number of months late: 37;
Number of programs: 10.
Age of program: 10 to 14 years since development start;
Overall change in RDT&E costs: (percent): 73;
Overall change in total costs: (percent): 53;
Average increase in acquisition unit costs: (percent): 38;
Average change in quantities: (percent): 52;
Average number of months late: 26;
Number of programs: 17.
Age of program: 5 to 9 years since development start;
Overall change in RDT&E costs: (percent): 37;
Overall change in total costs: (percent): 31;
Average increase in acquisition unit costs: (percent): 55;
Average change in quantities: (percent): 9;
Average number of months late: 22;
Number of programs: 25.
Age of program: Less than 5 years since development start;
Overall change in RDT&E costs: (percent): 12;
Overall change in total costs: (percent): 11;
Average increase in acquisition unit costs: (percent): 1;
Average change in quantities: (percent): 1;
Average number of months late: 5;
Number of programs: 28.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
* Promised capabilities continue to be delivered later than planned. In
addition to delivering fewer quantities than expected, DOD continues to
experience delays in delivering new or modified weapon systems to the
warfighter as promised. Acquisition delays can lead to loss of program
credibility with stakeholders, increased acquisition costs, new systems
not being available to meet the needs of warfighters during combat
operations, and the continued use of less capable systems with
questionable reliability and high operating costs. The average delay in
delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter increased to 22
months for programs in DOD's 2008 portfolio, compared with 21 months
for programs in the 2007 portfolio (see table 1). Only 28 percent of
DOD's major defense acquisition programs currently estimate that they
will deliver on time or ahead of schedule, while just under one-half
report they will have a delay of 1 year or more in delivery of an
initial operational capability (see figure 1).[Footnote 9]
Figure 1: Schedule Delays for Major Weapon Systems as of December 2007:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Programs planning to achieve IOC on time (or less than 1 month late)(20
programs): 28%;
Programs planning to achieve IOC between 1 to 12 months late (17
programs): 24%;
Programs planning to achieve IOC between 13 to 24 months late (13
programs): 18%;
Programs planning to achieve IOC between 25 to 48 months late (12
programs): 17%;
Programs planning to achieve IOC more than 48 months late (10
programs): 14%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Initial operational capability (IOC) is generally achieved when
some units or organizations that are scheduled to receive a system have
received it and have the ability to employ and maintain it.
[End of figure]
Between the issuance of the December 2006 and December 2007 SARs, 20
major defense acquisition programs reported delays in achieving initial
operational capability, while 4 reported accelerating delivery of
initial operational capabilities--a margin of five to one. Of those 20
programs, 16 reported delays of 3 months or more in delivering initial
operational capabilities and 6 programs reported additional delays of 1
year or more.
Programs Examined Have More Knowledge at Key Decision Points, but Still
Move forward Prematurely:
Good acquisition outcomes require the use of a knowledge-based approach
to product development that demonstrates high levels of knowledge
before significant commitments are made. Achieving the right knowledge
at the right time enables leadership to make informed decisions about
when and how best to move into various acquisition phases. In essence,
knowledge supplants risk over time. This building of knowledge consists
of information that should be gathered at three critical points over
the course of a program:
* Knowledge point 1: Resources and requirements match. Achieving a high
level of technology maturity by the start of system development is an
important indicator of whether this match has been made.[Footnote 10]
This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended
environment. In addition, the developer has completed a preliminary
design of the product that shows the design is feasible.
* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when a
program determines that a product's design will meet customer
requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability targets. A
best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-level
critical design review, usually held midway through system development.
Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at this point
provides tangible evidence that the product's design is stable, and a
prototype demonstration shows that the design is capable of meeting
performance requirements.
* Knowledge point 3: Manufacturing processes are mature. This point is
achieved when it has been demonstrated that the developer can
manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A
best practice is to ensure that all critical manufacturing processes
are in statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable,
and capable of consistently producing parts within the product's
quality tolerances and standards--at the start of production.
A knowledge-based acquisition approach is a cumulative process in which
certain knowledge is acquired by key decision points before proceeding.
In other words, demonstrating technology maturity is a prerequisite for
moving forward into system development, during which the focus should
be on design and integration.
For 47 weapon programs in DOD's 2008 portfolio, we assessed the
knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process, as well
as cost and schedule performance. These programs are primarily in
development and, therefore, most relevant to current decisions about
which programs should receive substantial investments of research and
development funding now and large amounts of procurement funding in the
future. In recent years, there have been increases in the amount of
technology, design, and production knowledge that these programs have
attained by key points in the acquisition process. We also found that
some programs are conducting systems engineering reviews before
starting development, which can help ensure that requirements are
defined and feasible and that the proposed design can meet those
requirements within cost, schedule, and other system constraints.
However, while these are signs of progress, the number and percentage
of programs meeting our knowledge point criteria remains low and
virtually unchanged from last year; none of the 47 programs in our
assessment have attained or are on track to attain the requisite amount
of technology, design, and production knowledge by each of the key
junctures in the acquisition process.[Footnote 11] This lack of
knowledge makes initial cost estimates less predictable and increases
the risk of cost growth from those initial estimates.
Our analysis of 47 programs from DOD's 2008 portfolio allows us to make
the following observations about DOD's management of technology,
design, and manufacturing risks and its use of testing and early
systems engineering to reduce these risks. The total acquisition cost
growth for 43 of these programs with comparable initial and latest
estimates is 18 percent. Research and development costs were 38 percent
higher than initially estimated for 44 programs. The promised delivery
of capability has slipped, on average, by 25 months for 36 programs
reporting this data (see table 4).
Table 4: Outcomes for Weapon Programs in 2009 Assessment:
Performance indicators: Increase in RDT&E costs from first estimate
(percent);
Outcomes to date: 38;
Number of programs with available data: 44.
Performance indicators: Increase in total acquisition cost from first
estimate (percent);
Outcomes to date: 18;
Number of programs with available data: 43.
Performance indicators: Share of programs with more than 25 percent
growth in program acquisition unit cost (percent);
Outcomes to date: 38;
Number of programs with available data: 40.
Performance indicators: Share of programs with more than 25 percent
decrease in planned quantities (percent);
Outcomes to date: 20;
Number of programs with available data: 41.
Performance indicators: Average delay in delivering initial
capabilities (months);
Outcomes to date: 25;
Number of programs with available data: 36.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Not all programs in our assessment have entered system
development or had comparable first and latest estimates to measure
outcomes. These programs were excluded from this analysis. Details of
our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.
[End of table]
* Newer programs are beginning with higher levels of technology
maturity.[Footnote 12] In 2003, DOD revised its primary acquisition
policy to state that technologies should be demonstrated in a relevant
environment prior to starting an acquisition program.[Footnote 13] In
2006, this standard became a statutory requirement for all major
defense acquisition programs seeking to enter system
development.[Footnote 14] Since 2003, there has been a significant
increase in the percentage of technologies demonstrated in a relevant
environment by the start of system development (see figure 2). While
only one of the five programs that entered system development since
2006 had fully mature critical technologies--that is, demonstrated in a
realistic environment--the other four programs reported that all their
critical technologies had at least been demonstrated in a relevant
environment, in accordance with the DOD and statutory criteria.
Overall, only 4 of the 36 programs in our assessment that provided data
on technical maturity at development start did so with fully mature
critical technologies. On average, these 4 programs have experienced 30
percent less growth in research and development costs over their first
estimates than the programs that did not demonstrate technology
maturity by the start of system development.
Figure 2: Percentage of Technologies That Were Mature and Nearing
Maturity When Programs Entered System Development:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Year program entered system development: 2002 or 2003 (10);
Nearing maturity: 20% (22);
Mature: 9% (10).
Year program entered system development: 2004 or 2005 (12);
Nearing maturity: 23% (19);
Mature: 30% (24).
Year program entered system development: 2006, 2007, or 2008 (5);
Nearing maturity: 65% (15);
Mature: 35% (8).
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: The number of programs entering system development are in
parentheses under the years. The number of critical technologies for
those programs are in parentheses in the bars.
[End of figure]
* Programs are still concurrently developing technologies, finalizing
designs, and demonstrating manufacturing processes, which can lead to
cost and schedule inefficiencies and avoidable rework. Only 14 of 39
programs that provided data have or plan to have demonstrated all of
their technologies in a realistic environment prior to the system-level
critical design review, at which point the system's design should be
stable. Further, at the time a production decision is made, when DOD's
Technology Readiness Assessment handbook states that a system's
critical technologies should be demonstrated in a realistic
environment, 8 of 40 programs will have failed to demonstrate that all
of their critical technologies functioned at that level. In total, of
the 268 critical technologies identified during our assessment, 50
percent, or 134 technologies, were accepted by a program office into a
product's design based on no more than a laboratory demonstration of
basic performance, technical feasibility, and functionality, and not on
a representative model or prototype demonstration close to form and fit
(size, weight, materials) in a relevant or realistic environment. We
reported a similar percentage of immature technologies being accepted
in programs in our 2008 assessment.
* Programs that have held design reviews in recent years reported
higher levels of design knowledge. Knowing a product's design is stable
before system demonstration reduces the risk of costly design changes
occurring during the manufacturing of production representative
prototypes--when investments in acquisitions become more significant.
Of the 29 programs in our assessment that have held a system-level
critical design review, 7 reported having a stable design. Similar to
technology maturity, the level of design knowledge attained by the
critical design review has been increasing over time (see figure 3).
However, designs, on average, are still far from stable. For the 24
programs in our assessment that have held a critical design review
since 2003, the average percentage of total expected design drawings
releasable at this review has increased from 58 percent to 65 percent;
and 5 of the 16 programs that have held a critical design review since
2006 reported having stable designs. However, 4 of these programs still
have critical technologies that have not been demonstrated in a
realistic environment at the time of the critical design review, which
increases the risk of design changes and rework until the development
of those technologies is complete.
Figure 3: Average Percent of Total Expected Design Drawings That Are
Releasable at Critical Design Review:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
2003 or prior: 39.19% (4);
2004 or 2005: 57.93% (8);
2006, 2007, or 2008: 64.85% (16).
Stable design: 90%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Number of programs in parentheses.
[End of figure]
* More programs are identifying critical manufacturing processes.
Capturing critical manufacturing knowledge before entering production
helps ensure that a weapon system will work as intended and can be
manufactured efficiently to meet cost, schedule, and quality targets.
Identifying key product characteristics and the associated critical
manufacturing processes is a key initial step to ensuring production
elements are stable and in control. While only 4 of the 23 programs
that have already made a production decision identified key product
characteristics or associated critical manufacturing processes, 4 of
the 17 programs that are scheduled to make a production decision in the
next 3 years have already done so. At least 2 of those 4 programs--the
Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical Radio
System (MIDS-JTRS) and the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense
Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS)--have predicted that they will
have all of their critical manufacturing processes in statistical
control by the time a production decision is made.
* Programs are not testing fully integrated prototypes early enough. In
addition to demonstrating that the system can be built efficiently,
production and postproduction costs are minimized when a fully
integrated, capable prototype is demonstrated to show that the system
will work as intended and in a reliable manner. The benefits of this
testing are maximized when the tests are completed prior to a
production decision because making design changes after production
begins can be both costly and inefficient. Of the 33 programs that
reported that they were going to test a fully configured, integrated,
production-representative prototype, 17 programs planned to do so prior
to making a production decision.[Footnote 15] Of the 11 programs that
have already made a production decision, only 4 had tested such a
prototype prior to that decision. While another 2 programs tested a
production-representative prototype within 6 months of the production
decision, the remaining programs, on average, conducted or plan to
conduct this type of test almost 5 years after that decision. For
instance, the Presidential Helicopter program simultaneously started
system development and made a production decision in January 2005.
However, the program does not intend to test a fully configured,
integrated, production-representative prototype until July 2009.
* Early system engineering has proven helpful to programs that have
employed it. Early systems engineering, ideally beginning before a
program is initiated and a business case is set, is critical to
ensuring that a product's requirements are achievable and designable
given available resources. Before starting development, programs should
hold systems engineering events such as the system requirements review,
system functional review, and preliminary design review to ensure that
requirements are defined and feasible and that the proposed design can
meet those requirements within cost, schedule, and other system
constraints. A majority of the 41 programs in our assessment that
responded to our questionnaire conducted these reviews, but few
programs completed them before development start, making it unlikely
the programs will reap the full benefit of the information these
reviews provide. For example:
* Only 12 of the 31 programs that held a system requirements review did
so before development start. The remaining programs held the review, on
average, 27 months after development start.[Footnote 16]
* Only 8 of the 23 programs that held a system functional review did so
before development start. The remaining programs held the review, on
average, 31 months after development start.[Footnote 17]
* Only 4 of the 36 programs that held a preliminary design review did
so before development start; the remaining programs held the review, on
average, 31 months after development start.[Footnote 18]
As evidence of the benefits of early systems engineering, we found that
the programs in our assessment that conducted these systems engineering
events prior to development start experienced, on average, over 20
percent less research and development cost growth than programs that
conducted these reviews after development start (see figure 4). These
programs also often experienced a shorter delay in delivery of initial
operational capability. On average, the programs that conducted a
system requirements review or a system functional review prior to
development start experienced delays in the delivery of initial
operational capabilities that were, respectively, 8 and 9 months
shorter than programs that held these reviews after development start.
[Footnote 19]
Figure 4: Average RDT&E Cost Growth for Programs since First Estimates
by Timing of Key Systems Engineering Events:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple vertical bar graph]
SRR:
Programs that held the review before development start: 20.75%;
Programs that held the review after development start: 42.62%.
SFR:
Programs that held the review before development start: 26.57%;
Programs that held the review after development start: 47.99%.
PDR:
Programs that held the review before development start: 8.58%;
Programs that held the review after development start: 35.49%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
In December 2008, DOD, consistent with our past recommendations,
established in policy that a preliminary design review should be
conducted before development start, or as soon as possible after
program initiation, suggesting that it be done prior to establishing
initial cost, schedule, and performance estimates for its business
case. This is a positive development. If the new policy is implemented
consistently, completion of these reviews before development start
should become more common, which could reduce poor performance and
optimize acquisition outcomes on future programs.
Other Factors Can Also Affect Program Stability, Execution, and
Outcomes:
In addition to collecting and analyzing data on cost and schedule
performance and the attainment of knowledge at key junctures, we
collected and assessed data on other areas related to DOD's management
of its weapon programs, including cost estimating, performance
requirements, software management, and program office staffing.
[Footnote 20] For the programs in our assessment, we confirmed that
programs with requirements changes after system development start
experienced higher levels of cost growth and longer delays in
delivering initial operational capabilities to the warfighter. In
addition, a majority of the programs that provided data could face cost
and schedule problems because of substantial changes in the amount of
software lines of code required for the system to function. Further,
program execution could be hindered by workforce challenges. A majority
of the programs we assessed were unable to fill all authorized program
office positions, resulting in increased workloads, a reliance on
support contractors, and less personnel to conduct oversight.
Our analysis of data collected from programs in our assessment allows
us to make the following observations about cost estimating,
performance requirements, software management, and program office
staffing. We have previously identified poor cost estimating practices,
requirements changes, and increases in software lines of code as
sources of program instability that can contribute to cost growth and
schedule delays. Further, we have previously found shortages of
acquisition professionals in certain areas, such as cost estimating and
contracting; and program offices have expressed concerns about not
having adequate personnel to carry out program office roles.
* Most programs used initial cost estimates from sources that in the
past have been found to be less reliable. A reliable cost estimate
helps ensure a program's projected funding needs are adequate to
execute the program. The Office of the Secretary of Defense's Cost
Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) reviews these estimates and provides
new estimates based on the program's assumptions. Less than a quarter
of the 48 programs in our assessment that provided data used the CAIG
estimate as a basis for the program's baseline, while almost 70 percent
of the programs used the program office or service cost estimate. While
cost estimates from the CAIG can underestimate a program's costs by
billions of dollars, we have previously found that these independent
estimates generally underestimate costs by a smaller amount than
program office and service estimates.
* Programs that changed key system requirements after starting
development had added instability. Twenty-two of the 52 programs in our
assessment that provided data on requirements changes had at least one
change (addition, reduction, or deferment) in a key performance
parameter since development start. The average increase in research and
development costs over first estimates for these 22 programs was more
than three times greater than for those programs with no requirements
changes. The average delay in the delivery of initial operational
capabilities was also twice as long for programs with changes in key
performance parameters as for programs with no requirements changes
(see figure 5). Further, 6 programs with requirements changes
experienced a decrease in planned quantities of 25 percent or more
compared to only 2 programs without requirements changes.
Figure 5: Requirements Changes, Research and Development Cost Growth,
and Delays in Providing Initial Operational Capabilities:
[Refer to PDF for image: two vertical bar graphs]
Programs with requirements changes:
Percentage of change in RDT&E cost: 68.87;
Months: 31.24.
Programs without requirements changes:
Percentage of change in RDT&E cost: 21.18;
Months: 15.17.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
* Programs with software growth experienced greater cost growth and
longer schedule delays. Measuring changes in the expected amount of
software code that needs to be developed for the program is one of the
key metrics used by leading software developers to monitor software
development efforts. Fourteen of the 33 programs in our assessment that
provided data on software estimated that the number of lines of code
required for the system to function has grown or will grow by 25
percent or more since development start. Since development start, these
programs, on average, experienced a 40 percent growth in research and
development cost and an almost 38-month delay in fielding initial
operational capabilities, compared to 12 percent and 8 months for
programs with lower levels of software growth.
* Acquisition programs are not able to fill all the government
positions they have been authorized. The inability of programs to fully
staff their program offices may hinder program execution. While 46 of
the 59 programs that responded to questions on program office staffing
reported receiving authorization for all of the positions requested,
only 42 percent were able to fill all the positions authorized. As a
result, program offices reported degradation in oversight, delays in
certain management and contracting activities, increased workloads for
existing staff, and a reliance on support contractors to fill some
voids. This reliance on support contractors has increased since last
year's assessment. For the 61 programs in our current assessment that
responded, support contractors constituted approximately 41 percent of
the program office staff compared to 36 percent last year (see table
5). The greatest numbers of support contractors are in engineering and
technical positions; however, on a percentage basis, they are most
prevalent in administrative support roles.
Table 5: Program Office Composition for 61 DOD Programs (Percentage of
staff):
Military:
Program management: 40%;
Engineering and technical: 7%;
Contracting: 5%;
Other business functions: 4%;
Administrative support: 3%;
Other: 4%;
Total: 9%.
Civilian government:
Program management: 34%;
Engineering and technical: 40%;
Contracting: 78%;
Other business functions: 49%;
Administrative support: 32%;
Other: 33%;
Total: 41%.
Total government:
Program management: 74%;
Engineering and technical: 47%;
Contracting: 83%;
Other business functions: 53%;
Administrative support: 34%;
Other: 37%;
Total: 51%.
Support contractors:
Program management: 26%;
Engineering and technical: 40%;
Contracting: 17%;
Other business functions: 45%;
Administrative support: 64%;
Other: 62%;
Total: 41%.
Other nongovernment:
Program management: 1%;
Engineering and technical: 12%;
Contracting: Less than 1%;
Other business functions: 2%;
Administrative support: 2%;
Other: 1%;
Total: 8%.
Total nongovernment:
Program management: 26%;
Engineering and technical: 53%;
Contracting: 17%;
Other business functions: 47%;
Administrative support: 66%;
Other: 63%;
Total: 49%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding.
[A] Other nongovernment includes federally funded research and
development centers, universities, and affiliates.
[End of table]
DOD's Recent Policy Changes Put an Emphasis on Early Systems
Engineering and Knowledge-Based Acquisition Strategies:
In December 2008, DOD revised its policy governing major defense
acquisition programs in ways that aim to provide key department leaders
with the knowledge needed to make informed decisions before a program
starts and to maintain disciplined development once it begins. The
revised policy recommends the completion of key systems engineering
activities before development start, includes a requirement for early
prototyping, establishes review boards to identify and mitigate
technical risks and evaluate the effect of potential requirements
changes on ongoing programs, and incorporates program manager
agreements to establish achievable and measurable annual plans and
management accountability. These changes are consistent with the
knowledge-based approach to weapons development that we have
recommended in our work. If implemented, these changes can help
programs to replace risk with knowledge, thereby increasing the chances
of developing weapon systems within cost and schedule targets while
meeting user needs. Some of these changes are beginning to be
implemented on the programs in our assessment. These are encouraging
signs, but to improve outcomes on the whole, DOD must ensure that these
policy changes are consistently implemented and reflected in decisions
on individual programs.
New Policy Incorporates Knowledge-Based Acquisition Practices:
DOD's revisions to its acquisition policy and processes incorporate a
substantial number of the best practices we identified in our previous
work. The revised policy includes guidance to better ensure that
programs have demonstrated a certain level of technology maturity,
design stability, and production maturity before proceeding into the
next phase of the acquisition process. In the area of technology
maturity, the guidance put in place by this policy is reinforced by a
statutory requirement that decision makers certify that a program meets
specific criteria at Milestones A and B. This provides a meaningful
control for assuring that the guidance is followed. In a 2003 report,
we assessed DOD's 2003 acquisition policy against a best practices
model based on a knowledge-based approach and found that it contained
only some of these knowledge-based practices.[Footnote 21] In
particular, it lacked guidance for demonstrating design stability and
production maturity before moving into development and production. The
policy, as revised in December 2008, includes guidance for most of
those knowledge-based practices. For example, the revised policy notes
that the milestone decision authority shall conduct a formal program
assessment following the system level critical design review before the
program can proceed.[Footnote 22] However, even with this new policy in
place, DOD will need to address the inconsistent implementation that
has hindered its past efforts to reform its acquisition policies.
Implementation of Changes Is Key to Improved Outcomes:
The success of DOD's efforts to improve weapon acquisition outcomes
depends, in part, on the extent to which the letter and spirit of its
revised policies and recent statutory changes are implemented in
practice. While it is too early to comprehensively review the
implementation of DOD's revised acquisition policies and other
statutory changes, we observed that DOD has begun to implement some of
these changes on the programs we assessed. We noted that plans are in
place to utilize competitive prototyping; programs have received
certifications that specific criteria have been met before development
start; configuration steering boards have been held; and program
manager performance agreements have been put in place.
The revised technology development phase includes a competitive
prototyping requirement for systems or key system elements, which
should provide a stronger basis for analyzing and refining
requirements, ensuring more knowledgeable initial cost estimates, and
making an appropriate match between requirements and available
resources before programs begin. Improved technology with appropriately
matched requirements, funds, and schedule could make initial
development cost estimates and delivery times much more accurate and
predictable at program initiation. The Joint Air-to-Ground Missile and
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle programs have indicated that they plan to
use competitive prototyping during technology development to mature
technologies and reduce risks. However, DOD has also approved
acquisition strategies with only one prototype for the WIN-T and
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle based on a cost and benefit analysis of
using a competitive approach.
Certifications for entry into the technology development and system
development phases require the development of critical knowledge before
programs can proceed, for example, the successful demonstration of
technology. Requiring these demonstrations of knowledge has the
potential to increase program stability and predictability and reduce
acquisition cycle time. Further, eliminating programs with inadequate
technology and questionable affordability, funding, viability, and
sustainability early in the acquisition cycle could prevent DOD from
unnecessarily expending valuable resources. Five of the programs we
assessed--CSAR-X, KC-X, JTRS AMF, BAMS, and GPS IIIa--received
certifications to enter system development. Two programs, CSAR-X and KC-
X, awarded contracts after certification, but these awards were the
subject of bid protests and therefore the programs have not begun
development. According to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics officials, these programs will
likely require recertification prior to any future contract awards.
New configuration steering boards are implementing annual and event-
driven program reviews to ensure weapon system requirements do not
exceed resources, and, according to Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics officials, to
identify options to reduce cost, speed up delivery of capability, or
provide a reserve against emergent technical risks. Twenty-two of the
programs we assessed have held configuration steering boards to date. A
watchful eye on issues affecting cost and schedule could rectify delays
in the delivery of capabilities and prevent reductions in purchased
quantities. The MUOS program identified several descoping options at
its configuration steering board resulting in 10 contract modifications
that relaxed requirements to offset higher than expected costs.
Following the WIN-T configuration steering board, the program was
restructured into multiple increments.
Program manager performance agreements offer management accountability
and establish achievable and measurable annual plans. Thirty-nine
programs we assessed have program manager performance agreements in
place. However, there are currently no specific consequences for not
meeting the terms of the agreement or direct benefits for meeting the
terms of the agreement. DOD is using existing personnel policies to
evaluate program manager performance and provide rewards for good
performance, such as promotions and bonuses, or penalties for bad
performance, such as removal as program manager or lack of promotion.
How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed:
For our two-page assessments, we depict the extent of knowledge gained
by key points in a program using a stacked bar graph and provide a
narrative summary at the bottom of the first page of each assessment.
As illustrated in figure 6, the knowledge graph is based on three
knowledge points. The key indicators for the attainment of knowledge
are technology maturity (in orange), design stability (in green), and
production maturity (in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based on
the ideal attainment of the three types of knowledge at the three
knowledge points. The closer a program's attained knowledge is to the
best practice line; the more likely the weapon will be delivered within
estimated cost and schedule. A knowledge deficit at development start-
-indicated by a gap between the technology maturity attained and the
best practice line--means the program proceeded with immature
technologies and faces a greater likelihood of cost and schedule
increases as risks are discovered and resolved.
Figure 6: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared
with Best Practices:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
Development start:
Desired level of knowledge: Technological maturity.
DOD design review:
Desired level of knowledge: Design and technological maturity.
GAO review:
Desired level of knowledge: Design and technological maturity.
Production decision:
Desired level of knowledge: Production, design and technological
maturity.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
An interpretation of this notional example would be that system
development began with critical technologies that were partially
immature, thereby missing knowledge point 1 indicated by the orange
diamond. By the design review, technology knowledge had increased, but
all critical technologies were not yet mature, and only 33 percent of
the program's design drawings were releasable to the manufacturer.
Therefore, knowledge point 2, as indicated by the green diamond, was
not attained. At the time of GAO's review, this program had matured all
of its critical technologies and released approximately 75 percent of
its design drawings. When the program plans to make a production
decision, it expects to have released all of its design drawings and
have half of its critical manufacturing processes in statistical
control. The expected knowledge at this future point is captured in the
outlined region marked "projection." This program is not projected to
reach knowledge point 3, indicated by the blue diamond, by the time it
makes a production decision.
Assessments of Individual Programs:
This section contains assessments of individual weapon programs. Each
assessment presents data on the extent to which programs are following
a knowledge-based approach to system development and other program
information. In total, we present information on 67 weapon programs.
Forty-seven are major defense acquisition programs, most of which are
in development. We also collected information and provided profiles on
20 additional programs. These programs include:
* 8 MDA elements,
* 6 pre-major defense acquisition programs,
* 3 programs in the bid protest process at the time of our review or
canceled,
* 2 components of major defense acquisition programs, and:
* 1 acquisition category II program.
Our assessments of 60 programs are captured on 2-page assessments
discussing technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge obtained and
other program issues. The other 7 programs are described in a 1-page
format that describes their current status.
[End of section]
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites.
Source: Lockheed Martin.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing
Milstar system with higher-capacity, survivable, jam-resistant,
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and tactical
warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission control
segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications are
acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international
partnership program that includes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and mission control segments.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: 4/99;
Development start: 9/01;
Design review: 4/04;
Production decision: 6/04;
GAO review: 1/09;
First launch: 4thQ,2010;
Initial capability: 6/13.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,495.9 million;
* Procurement: $2,313.4 million;
Total funding: $3,809.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 1:
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/2001: $4,748.5;
Latest, 9/1008: $7,205.4;
Percent change: 51.7.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/2001: $1,404.4;
Latest, 9/1008: $3,098.4;
Percent change: 120.6.
Total program cost;
As of 10/2001: $6,152.9;
Latest, 9/1008: $10,303.7;
Percent change: 67.5.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/2001: $1,230.583;
Latest, 9/1008: $2,575.932;
Percent change: 109.3.
Total quantities;
As of 10/2001: 5;
Latest, 9/1008: 4;
Percent change: -20.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/2001: 111;
Latest, 9/1008: 170;
Percent change: 53.2.
[End of table]
The AEHF technologies are mature and the design appears stable. We
could not assess production maturity because the program does not
collect statistical process control data. In September 2008, the Air
Force reported a critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach due to cost
growth brought on by technical issues, schedule delays, and increased
costs for the procurement of a fourth AEHF satellite. For the second
straight year, technical problems with satellite components resulted in
a delay of the first launch. This latest delay is almost 2 years.
Further, the program office estimates that the fourth AEHF satellite
could cost more than twice the third satellite because some components
that are no longer manufactured will have to be replaced and production
will have to be restarted after a 4-year gap.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
AEHF Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, all 14 AEHF critical technologies are
mature, having been demonstrated in a relevant environment. All
hardware has been integrated into the first satellite for system-level
environmental testing.
Design Maturity:
The AEHF‘s design appears stable with all of its expected design
drawings released. However, in the last year, the program has
discovered design problems with some components during testing. During
system-level environmental testing of the first satellite, the program
office identified six components with workmanship or design problems.
Five of these components will need to be removed from the spacecraft
for repair, and one will need a software fix. Once all components are
repaired and reinstalled, the spacecraft will undergo environmental
testing a second time to assure all components are working properly.
Continued problems with integration and testing have led to additional
schedule delays. The launch of the first satellite has slipped almost
two years”from November 2008 to as late as September 2010. The launch
of the second satellite was delayed from August 2009 to around June
2011, and the third satellite is now planned for launch in 2012. Due to
these delays, initial operational capability has slipped 3 years”from
2010 to 2013.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the program office does
not collect statistical process control data. However, prior to and
during system-level environmental testing of the first satellite, the
program identified workmanship problems at the component level, which
have contributed to the program‘s schedule delays.
Other Program Issues:
In September 2008, the Air Force reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost
increase over the critical cost growth threshold. Program office
officials stated the increased cost associated with the schedule delays,
along with the much higher cost of the fourth satellite, increased
average procurement unit cost about 130 percent above that of the
previous acquisition program baseline.
The original AEHF program included the purchase of five satellites. In
December 2002, satellites 4 and 5 were deleted from the program with
the intention of using the first TSAT satellite to achieve full
operational capability. However, because of concerns about TSAT
development and a possible gap in capability, the conference report
accompanying the fiscal year 2008 Defense Appropriations Act
recommended funding for the advanced procurement of the fourth AEHF
satellite and asked the Air Force to fully fund it in the fiscal year
2009 budget. The program office projects that the fourth satellite
could cost more than twice the third satellite. Some electronics
components on AEHF are no longer manufactured and integrating and
testing new components will require additional time and money. Further,
there will be a 4-year break in production, which the program office
states will greatly add to the cost of the fourth satellite. The fourth
satellite launch is planned for 2016.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred
with the information provided in this report.
[End of section]
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile
Warning System:
Source: BAE Systems.
[End of figure]
The Army and Special Operations Command ATIRCM/CMWS is a component of
the Suite of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures planned to defend U.S.
aircraft from advanced infrared-guided missiles. The system will be
employed on Army and Special Operations aircraft. ATIRCM/CMWS includes
an active infrared jammer, missile warning system, and countermeasure
dispenser capable of loading and employing expendables, such as flares
and chaff.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program/development start: 6/95;
Design review: 2/97;
Low-rate decision: 11/03;
GAO review: 1/09;
Full-rate decision: 6/10;
Last procurement: 2017.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: BAE Systems North America;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $120.8 million;
* Procurement: $1,966.4 million;
Total funding: $2,087.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 186:
Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in
millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 03/1996: $646.8;
Latest, 12/2007: $810.5;
Percent change: 25.3
Procurement cost;
As of 03/1996: $2,649.3;
Latest, 12/2007: $4,001.2;
Percent change: 51.0.
Total program cost;
As of 03/1996: $3,296.1;
Latest, 12/2007: $4,811.7;
Percent change: 46.0.
Program unit cost;
As of 03/1996: $1.065;
Latest, 12/2007: $1.341;
Percent change: 25.8
Total quantities;
As of 03/1996: 3,094;
Latest, 12/2007: 3,589;
Percent change: 16.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 03/1996: Classified;
Latest, 12/2007: Classified;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The ATIRCM portion of the program is in low-rate production and the
CMWS portion is in full-rate production. The technologies for CMWS are
mature and the design is stable. Currently, the program's production
processes are at various levels of control. The CMWS portion of the
program entered limited production in February 2002 to meet urgent
deployment requirements. However, full-rate production of the ATIRCM
component was delayed because of reliability issues. Key technologies
were demonstrated late in development, and only a small number of
design drawings were completed by design review. Although the infrared
jam head's reliability improved during recent testing, the Army plans
to replace the current jam head turret with a smaller turret if a
mature one is available.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
ATIRCM/CMWS Program:
Technology Maturity:
All five critical technologies are now considered mature. Four of the
critical technologies did not mature until after the design review in
February 1997. The infrared jam head continued to have reliability
issues after it matured. However, a reliability test was concluded in
June 2008 and found the jam head had a significant improvement in
reliability.
Design Maturity:
The basic design of the system is complete, with all of the drawings
released to manufacturing. However, the program office expects the
number of drawings to change because the infrared jam laser and the
infrared lamp will be replaced with a multi-band laser. Additionally,
the CMWS electronic control unit is undergoing a product improvement,
and the turret for the jam head is being replaced with a smaller and
lighter weight turret. The number of drawings or potential changes will
not be known until the changes are completed.
Production Maturity:
According to program officials, the program has 17 key manufacturing
processes in various phases of control. Also, the ATIRCM/CMWS
acquisition strategy is currently being revised to upgrade and
incorporate the technology improvements to the ATIRCM/CMWS. The
critical manufacturing processes have not been completely assessed for
the CMWS electronic control unit improvement, multiband laser, and the
directed laser countermeasure jam head. Program officials further
stated that as the design is finalized, the manufacturing processes
will be assessed. Initial estimates are that 5 to 10 additional
critical manufacturing processes will be identified at that time.
The Army entered limited CMWS production in February 2002 to meet an
urgent need. Subsequently, full-rate production of the ATIRCM component
was delayed because of reliability issues. The program implemented
reliability fixes to six ATIRCM production representative subsystems
for use in initial operational test and evaluation. The full-rate
production decision for the complete system was delayed and is
scheduled for June 2010.
Other Program Issues:
The Army uses the airframe as the acquisition quantity unit of measure
even though it is not buying an ATIRCM/CMWS system for each aircraft.
When the program began, plans called for putting an ATIRCM/CMWS on each
aircraft. Due to funding constraints, the Army reduced the number of
systems to be procured and will rotate the systems to aircraft as
needed. The Army is buying kits for each aircraft, which include the
modification hardware, wiring harness, and cables necessary to install
and interface the ATIRCM/CMWS to each platform. Previously, the
approved program was for 1,710 ATIRCMs; however, in May 2007, the Army
reduced the number of ATIRCMs to 1,076 after a comprehensive
requirements review. The current approved program is for 1,076 ATIRCMs,
1,710 CMWSs, and 3,571 kits to use for aircraft integration. The Army
approved an ATIRCM Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) for the CH-47D/F
helicopters in September 2008. The QRC is for 70 aircraft currently
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The QRC is being funded with
supplemental appropriations and its cost is not included in the current
cost estimate.
Program Office Comments:
Program officials stated that all aircraft designated for Iraq and
Afghanistan have been equipped with CMWS. In addition, the program
office is in the process of equipping all aircraft with a fifth sensor
and has received a requirement to equip OH-58D helicopters with CMWS.
The Army is continuing ongoing efforts to improve CMWS performance to
improve detection while reducing false alarm rates. Further, the
program office has embarked on a QRC effort to equip all CH-47
helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan with ATIRCM. Finally, the program
office plans to incorporate a small, light-weight low-cost turret into
ATIRCM to provide a fleet-wide infrared countermeasure capability. The
program office also provided technical comments on a draft of this
assessment, which we incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guide Missile (AARGM):
[Refer to PDF for image: Illustration]
Drawing of the AARGM.
Source: AGM-88E AARGM Program Office (PMA).
[End of figure]
The Navy's AARGM is an air-to-ground missile for carrier-based aircraft
designed to destroy enemy radio frequency-enabled surface-to-air
defenses. The AARGM is an upgrade to the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-
Radiation Missile (HARM). It will utilize the existing HARM propulsion
and warhead sections, a modified control section, and a new guidance
section with a Global Positioning System and improved targeting
capabilities. The program is following a phased approach for
development. We assessed Phase I and made observations on Phases II and
III.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: ATK Missile Systems Company:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $13.2 million:
Procurement: $949.2 million:
Total funding: $962.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,842:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 07/2003: $615.4;
Latest 12/2007: $653.2;
Percent change: 6.2.
Procurement cost;
As of 07/2003: $930.6;
Latest 12/2007: $992.0;
Percent change: 6.6.
Total program cost;
As of 07/2003: $1,546.0;
Latest 12/2007: $1,645.3;
Percent change: 6.4.
Program unit cost;
As of 07/2003: $.864;
Latest 12/2007: $.861;
Percent change: -0.3.
Total quantities;
As of 07/2003: 1,790;
Latest 12/2007: 1,911;
Percent change: 6.8.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 07/2003: 85;
Latest 12/2007: 87;
Percent change: 2.4.
[End of table]
The AARGM program received approval to enter into production after
conducting a successful production readiness review and operational
assessment. The AARGM's production processes are not currently
considered mature because the contractor will not start collecting
statistical process control data until low-rate production begins.
Instead, the contractor demonstrated that the overall AARGM round was
mature enough to enter production using manufacturing readiness levels.
The AARGM's critical technologies are mature and its design is stable.
The AARGM's critical technologies were nearing maturity at development
start because the major subsystems on the program were designed,
developed, and flight tested as part of an advanced technology
demonstration program. The program will face a funding shortfall if
developmental testing is not completed by March 2009 as planned.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
AGM-88E AARGM Program:
Technology Maturity:
Both of the AARGM's critical technologies--the millimeter wave software
and radome--are currently mature and completing developmental testing.
The two technologies were nearing maturity at the start of development
because the program designed, developed, and flight tested them under
two prior advanced technology demonstration programs. This is a good
practice for maturing technologies prior to their inclusion in
acquisition programs.
In addition to the two critical technologies identified in the
program's most recent technology readiness assessment, the program
office assessed three other technologies--a GPS-aided inertial
navigation system (INS), weapons impact assessment (WIA) transmitter,
and integrated broadcast service (IBS) receiver--in its production
requirements document. The program stated that the GPS-aided INS and
WIA transmitter were mature at production start and that the IBS
receiver was nearing maturity. However, program officials stated that
the IBS receiver, which can receive targeting information from sources
other than the aircraft prior to launch, does not pose a risk for the
current program because it is planned for inclusion in a later phase
and does not affect the AARGM's ability to meet its key performance
parameters.
Design Maturity:
The design of the AARGM is currently stable and all of the drawings
were released to manufacturing by the start of production. The AARGM's
design has been stable since its March 2006 design review and the
number of drawings has grown only marginally. In addition, software
development is nearing completion. Of the 91 planned software blocks,
86 had been completed at the start of production, and 95 percent of the
total lines of code had been released. The AARGM program has also
demonstrated in an operational assessment that the design can perform
as expected. In addition, most of the AARGM elements included in the
prototype used in this operational assessment were production
representative.
Production Maturity:
The AARGM's production processes are not currently considered mature
because, according to the program office, the contractor will not start
collecting statistical process control data until low-rate production
begins. However, the program has identified the number of critical
manufacturing processes, and the contractor plans to demonstrate that
90 percent are mature using statistical process control data during low-
rate initial production. According to program officials, the contractor
conducted its own assessment to support the program's production
decision and demonstrated that the overall AARGM round was mature
enough to enter production using manufacturing readiness levels. The
contractor identified several management risks and challenges
associated with the cost of several components and subsystems and the
millimeter wave technology.
Other Program Issues:
The AARGM program could face funding shortfalls if the contractor
cannot complete developmental testing by March 2009. According to a
program official, the program will need to seek additional funding if
developmental testing is not completed by this date. The program
received approximately $20.3 million less than was requested for fiscal
year 2009. According to the program office, the reduction in funding
could have caused a break in initial production. To prevent this, the
AARGM program will have three lots during initial production instead of
two, and will delay the award of the full-rate production contract from
fiscal year 2010 to 2011.
Program Office Comments:
The program office states that the contractor has submitted an
acceptable plan for completing developmental testing by the spring of
2009, which mitigates the magnitude of system development and
demonstration funding shortfalls, and the program office is addressing
funding requirements. The program recently received approval to enter
into low-rate initial production. Program officials further noted that
the program office has established a production plan that maintains
initial operational capability and assures transition from low-rate
initial production to full-rate production without a production break.
The initial production contract is on track for award by the end of the
first quarter of fiscal year 2009.
[End of section]
B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP).
Source: Raytheon.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system
to resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage. Program
officials told us that to comply with federal requirements, the
frequency must be changed to a band where DOD has been designated as
the primary user. The modified radar system, with both conventional and
nuclear operational modes, is being designed to support the B-2 stealth
bomber and its combination of stealth, range, payload, and near-
precision weapons delivery capabilities.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: 10/02;
Development start: 8/04;
Design review: 5/05;
Low-rate decision: 12/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Full-rate decision: 10/09;
Initial capability: 4/10;
Last procurement: 2010.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $99.1 million:
Procurement: $372.7 million:
Total funding: $471.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 13:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2004: $729.0;
Latest 08/2008: $707.9;
Percent change: -2.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2004: $570.2;
Latest 08/2008: $529.5;
Percent change: -7.1.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2004: $1,299.2;
Latest 08/2008: $1,237.4;
Percent change: -4.8.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2004: $61.869;
Latest 08/2008: $61.868;
Percent change: -0.0.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2004: 21;
Latest 08/2008: 20;
Percent change: -4.8.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
63;
68;
Percent change: 7.9.
The total quantity of 20 operational units includes 13 to be bought
with procurement funds and 7 with research and development funds. Costs
reflect the program of record but are expected to change.
[End of table]
The four B-2 RMP critical technologies are currently considered mature
and the program has released 100 percent of its design drawings.
However, in early 2007, the program experienced technical problems with
the radar antenna. Due to an aggressive development schedule, important
systems engineering and integration tasks were not completed, and
subsequent antenna performance deficiencies forced a delay in the
development program, including flight-testing, in January 2007.
Consequently, the Air Force reprogrammed fiscal year 2007 procurement
funds to other priorities, and the fiscal year 2008 Defense
Appropriation Act conference report suggested a reduction in the RMP's
procurement funding. The Air Force plan is to enter low-rate production
before the planned completion of some events such as development flight-
testing, follow-on operational testing, and an assessment of radar
reliability.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
B-2 RMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
All four of the B-2 RMP's critical technologies are currently mature.
However, in early 2007, the program experienced technical problems
including numerous system failures and misrepresentations of radar-
displayed weather. These difficulties contributed to a halt in the
flight-test program and a delay in the start of production. The program
reviewed the technical problems and systems engineering process,
determined the root causes of the problems, and resumed flight-testing
in June 2007.
Design Maturity:
Eighty-five percent of the expected drawings were released to
manufacturing at the program design readiness review in May 2005. Since
then, all drawings have been released.
Production Maturity:
The program does not collect statistical process control data to assess
production maturity because of the small number of production units.
However, it has taken steps to understand and demonstrate production
maturity. Six development radar units have been produced using
production processes, tooling, and labor.
Other Program Issues:
In late January 2007, the development program, including flight-
testing, was delayed, and the Air Force began replanning the program
because of radar antenna performance problems. The Air Force
reprogrammed fiscal year 2007 funds for the first four production radar
units and the fiscal year 2008 Defense Appropriation Act conference
report suggested a reduction in the RMP's procurement funding. Program
officials acknowledged that pursuing an aggressive schedule to meet the
mandated change in radar frequency caused significant program execution
problems. A highly concurrent development and production program was
put in place, and important systems engineering, integration and
testing tasks were not completed. Because the program did not complete
these tasks, it had difficulty understanding the causes of the radar
antenna's technical problems when they were encountered during flight-
testing. The Air Force eventually identified the root causes of the
radar antenna technical problems and flight-testing resumed in June
2007. In fiscal year 2008, the program received limited funding for
advance procurement items for six radar ship sets in preparation for
entering low-rate production. Production contract costs are currently
being determined but could potentially be about 14 percent over the
current program baseline.
The Air Force entered low-rate initial production in December 2008.
While operational testing of the radar's conventional capability was
completed in December 2008, the results of follow-on operational
testing of the radar's nuclear capability will not be available until
December 2009. Some limited issues with the radar's performance still
exist. An operational assessment issued in August 2008 revealed the
radar is having some minor difficulty with weather characterization,
which is planned to be addressed with a software fix. Development
flight-testing has also shown that the overall radar's reliability
falls short of stated requirements, even though the majority of the
reliability issues are with legacy, not modernization, aspects of the
radar. Operational testing officials indicate that reliability
improvements must occur to demonstrate system maturity. A full
reliability assessment is planned for completion in 2010, after the
planned full-rate production decision.
Program Office Comments:
The program office agrees with the accuracy of this report, based on
the reported results of the operational assessment. However, the data
supporting the operational assessment are based on only 67 hours of
flight-testing that occurred through mid-January 2008. Since that time,
more than 200 hours of additional flight-testing has been accomplished
to rectify and verify identified system performance issues and there
have been multiple software and firmware updates. While additional
software development and performance verification remains, testing to
date, including completion of all hardware qualification testing,
supports the Air Force assertion of high confidence that the hardware
design is stable and ready for production. Current flight-test data and
analysis also support the Air Force assessment that this hardware will
meet or exceed reliability requirements. Final reliability will be
assessed at the end of development using all available operational
data.
[End of section]
B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM
Capability.
Source: B-2 Systems Group 1999, USAF photo.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's B-2 EHF SATCOM is a satellite communication system
designed to upgrade the B-2's avionics infrastructure, replace the
ultra high frequency system, and ensure secure, survivable
communication capability while maintaining its low-observable
signature. The program has three increments: Increment 1 includes
upgraded flight management computer processors; Increment 2 adds
antennas and radomes; and Increment 3 allows connectivity to the Global
Information Grid. We assessed Increment 1 and made observations on
Increments 2 and 3.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: 3/02;
Development start: 2/07;
Design review: 10/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Low-rate decision: 7/11;
Full-rate decision: 10/11;
Initial capability: 3/14;
Last procurement: 2016.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $372.4 million:
Procurement: $119.7 million:
Total funding: $492.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 16:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2007: $566.3;
Latest 08/2008: $575.7;
Percent change: 1.7.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2007: $119.3;
Latest 08/2008: $119.7;
Percent change: 0.3.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2007: $685.6;
Latest 08/2008: $695.4;
Percent change: 1.4.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2007: $32.649;
Latest 08/2008: $34.770;
Percent change: 6.5.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2007: 21;
Latest 08/2008: 20;
Percent change: -4.8.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2007: 85;
Latest 08/2008: 85;
Percent change: 0.0.
Cost and schedule data above is for Increment 1 only.
[End of table]
All Increment 1 critical technologies are nearing maturity and the
design appears stable. However, since the critical technologies will
not be fully mature until after the design review, additional design
changes could be necessary. During the past year, the EHF program
revised the software plan to better align requirements with system
design. A program official acknowledged the potential for cost overruns
from this effort, but anticipated being able to cover overruns with
current funding. While software development is meeting the new
schedule, the program is still at risk for schedule delays because the
most difficult software work remains to be done. Increments 2 and 3 are
not yet in development, but there are already areas of concern. For
instance, critical technologies for Increment 2 are very immature, will
add significant weight, and may affect the aircraft's low observable
nature.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
B-2 EHF SATCOM Inc 1 Program:
Technology Maturity:
The B-2 EHF SATCOM program, Increment 1, entered system development in
February 2007 with all five of its critical technologies approaching
maturity. However, the program office does not expect the technologies
to be demonstrated in a realistic environment, and therefore fully
mature, until after the design review in October 2008. The program
office is projecting that the technologies will be flight qualified by
the production decision in 2011.
Design Maturity:
The design for Increment 1 of the B-2 EHF SATCOM program appears
stable. The program completed its design review in October 2008, with
90 percent of its drawings released. All drawings are expected to be
released by December 2008; however, since the critical technologies are
not yet fully mature, additional design changes could be necessary.
During the past year, officials revised the software plan in an attempt
to better align requirements with the system design. The revision was
needed because, according to one program official, phasing of the work
was not done well initially and requirements for all software blocks
were not defined up front. As a result of these changes, requirements
for all software components must be defined before coding begins.
Although program officials said software development is currently
meeting the new schedule, two future software blocks (blocks 7 and 8,
out of 10 planned) will be the most challenging and pose a potential
schedule risk for the program. Also, a program official said the
software plan could result in additional costs, but that there should
be sufficient funds in the program to cover overruns.
Other Program Issues:
In October 2008, the B-2 program office said the estimated program cost
for all increments was more than $2.3 billion. While Increments 2 and 3
are not yet in development, the program office has already identified
areas of concern. The program office expects Increment 2 to be the most
extensive modification to the B-2 platform since it left production.
The two most critical technologies for Increment 2, the radomes and
antennas, are very immature. These components and their associated
hardware will add significant weight to the platform. Moreover, since
their integration requires holes to be cut in the aircraft skin, the
low observable properties of the aircraft could be affected. Increment
2 is scheduled to enter development in February 2011. Additionally,
Increment 3 requirements are not yet defined or funded, and its four
critical technologies are immature.
In March 2008, the B-2 EHF SATCOM program initiated a $38.1 million
advanced development effort for Increment 2 to better define system
requirements and address potential risks. As part of that effort, the
program conducted loads analyses for the antenna hardware. Based on the
results, the program decided to make structural modifications to B-2
aircraft to ease installation by providing a uniform mounting system.
Likewise, working prototypes of the antenna positioning system and the
radome, which houses the antenna, have been developed and are being
tested. The program also plans to cut holes in a static test article in
late 2009 to identify potential radome installation issues before
cutting into an actual B-2 aircraft.
Last year, we noted that the B-2 EHF SATCOM program was dependent on
the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) program,
which was experiencing significant delays. According to program
officials, the B-2 EHF SATCOM program will attempt to mitigate schedule
risk by performing software and hardware integration activities with
the FAB-T program; however, FAB-T terminals are still required as
Government Furnished Property.
Agency Comments:
The program office concurred with this assessment and provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
BMDS Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: BMDS Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD).
Source: Aegis BMD Program Office.
[End of figure]
MDA's Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system being
developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to defend against
ballistic missiles of all ranges. Key components include the shipboard
SPY-1 radar, Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) missiles, and command and
control systems. It will also be used as a forward-deployed sensor for
surveillance and tracking of ballistic missiles. The SM-3 missile has
multiple versions in development or production: Blocks IA, IB, and IIA.
We assessed the SM-3 Block IA.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: 10/95;
Transition to MDA: 1/02;
Missile contract awarded: 8/03;
Design review: 10/04;
Production start-SM-3-Block 1A: 6/09;
GAO review: 1/09.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin (WS), Raytheon (SM-3):
Program office: Dahlgren, VA:
Funding FY09-FY13:
R&D: $5,093.2 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $5,093.2 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 07/2007: $11,457.7;
Latest 02/2008: $11,291.5;
Percent change: -1.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 07/2007: NA;
Latest 02/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 07/2007: $11,457.7;
Latest 02/2008: $11,291.5;
Percent change: -1.4.
Program unit cost;
As of 07/2007: NA;
Latest 02/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 07/2007: NA;
Latest 02/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 07/2007: NA;
Latest 02/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include costs from the program's inception through fiscal year
2013. Latest totals do not include sustainment funds for fielded
assets.
[End of table]
Program officials assess all four Block IA critical technologies as
fully mature; however, the Solid Divert and Attitude Control System
(SDACS) and the zero pulse mode of the missile's third stage rocket
motor should not be considered fully mature since neither has been
demonstrated in a realistic environment. The program reported that the
missile's design is stable with 100 percent of drawings released to
manufacturing. We could not assess the production maturity of Block IA
missiles because, according to program officials, the contractor's
processes are not mature enough to collect statistical control data.
Instead, the program uses other means to gauge production readiness,
such as tracking rework hours and cost of defects per unit.The program
will buy 23 more Block IA missiles than planned because it extended the
development of Block IB by 1 year.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Aegis BMD Program:
Aegis BMD Element - Block 2004:
Aegis program officials consider all four critical technologies for the
SM-3 Block IA missile to be mature. However, we assessed two
technologies--pulse two of the Solid Divert and Attitude Control System
(SDACS) and the zero pulse mode of the Third Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM)-
-as nearing maturity. The other two technologies--the kinetic warhead
seeker and the SDACS pulse one--are fully mature and have been
successfully demonstrated during operational testing. Although pulse
two is identical in technology and functionality as pulse one, pulse
two has not been flight tested and cannot be considered fully mature.
Program officials state that both pulse modes have been successfully
tested in four consecutive ground tests, but that it is difficult for
the SDACS to use both pulse modes in a flight test because the first
pulse has provided sufficient divert capability to make the intercept.
Similarly, the zero pulse mode of the TSRM that increases the missile's
capability against shorter-range threats has not been flight tested.
According to the program, range safety limitations continue to preclude
Aegis testing of the zero pulse mode. Officials from the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation state that operational testing for
these two critical technologies is still an outstanding recommendation
that the program has yet to address.
Design Maturity:
Program officials reported that the design for the SM-3 Block IA
missiles being produced is stable, with 100 percent of its drawings
released to manufacturing. Program officials do not anticipate
additional design changes. However, Aegis officials told us the TSRM
had experienced a malfunction, which required the nozzles to be
redesigned. The program has no plans to retrofit the SM-3 Block I
missiles that have already been manufactured because their service life
expires in 2009.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the production maturity of the SM-3 Block IA
missiles because, according to program officials, the contractor's
production processes are not yet mature enough to collect statistical
control data. The Aegis BMD program continues to use other means to
assess progress in production and manufacturing, such as tracking
rework hours, cost of defects per unit, and other defect and test data.
Other Program Issues:
Aegis encountered problems in development, testing, and transition to
production of the SM-3 Block IA missile. As a result, MDA officials
extended the development of the follow-on Block IB missile by 1 year,
delaying its procurement by 1 year as well. The 1 year development
extension caused a future missile buy to change from an SM-3 Block IB
configuration to Block IA. MDA will buy 23 more Block IA missiles than
originally planned. MDA plans to buy 82 SM-3 Block IA missiles by
fiscal year 2011. Finally, the program had a goal to deliver 20 Block
IAs by the end of fiscal year 2008, which was met ahead of schedule.
The Block IB is planned to provide more capability than the Block IA.
The Aegis program is developing new technologies for Block IB that
would provide a two-color seeker capability for better target
discrimination and an adjustable divert and attitude control system.
Block IIA critical design review, under a cooperative agreement with
the government of Japan, has been delayed more than 1 year. Block IIA
design collaboration on the TSRM has taken longer than Aegis officials
expected because U.S. and Japanese engineers followed different
approaches during the design phase. The Block IIA missile is intended
to be faster and have an advanced discrimination seeker. The first
operational test of the Block IIA is planned for July 2014.
Program Office Comments:
Technical comments provided by the program office were incorporated as
appropriate. In addition, program officials acknowledged that the zero-
pulse mode of the TSRM is yet untested, but consider overall system
performance as more than satisfactory. Because of test range safety
constraints, officials stated that it is unclear when that testing will
occur.
[End of section]
BMDS Airborne Laser (ABL):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: BMDS Airborne Laser (ABL).
Source: Airborne Laser Program Office.
[End of figure]
MDA's ABL element is being developed to destroy enemy missiles during
the boost phase of their flight. Carried aboard a modified Boeing 747
aircraft, ABL employs a battle management subsystem to plan and execute
engagements, a high-energy chemical laser to rupture the fuel tanks of
enemy missiles, and a beam control/fire control subsystem to focus the
high-energy chemical laser beam. We assessed the system's prototype
design that is expected to lead to a lethality demonstration in 2009.
Timeline: Concept to system development to production:
Program start: 11/96;
Transition to MDA: 10/01;
GAO review: 1/09;
Lethality demonstration: 4thQ/09.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Kirtland AFB, NM:
Funding FY09-FY13:
R&D: $3,040.3 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $3,040.3 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2007: $8,289.9;
Latest 07/2008: $8,213.7;
Percent change:-0.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2007: NA;
Latest 07/2008: NA;
Percent change:NA.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2007: $8,289.9;
Latest 07/2008: $8,213.7;
Percent change:-0.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2007: NA;
Latest 07/2008: NA;
Percent change:NA.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2007: NA;
Latest 07/2008: NA;
Percent change:NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2007: NA;
Latest 07/2008: NA;
Percent change:NA.
Columns include costs from the program's inception through fiscal year
2013.
[End of table]
None of ABL's seven critical technologies are fully mature. Program
officials plan to demonstrate the prototype's critical technologies
during a flight test planned for the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2009. Even if the prototype's technologies are demonstrated, the
program must make the business case that the system is affordable and
operationally feasible--a task that has not yet been accomplished. The
program has released 100 percent of the prototype's design drawings;
however, additional drawings or design changes may be needed to address
any problems encountered during testing. Transitioning to an
operational aircraft could also require additional design work. During
fiscal year 2008, the program encountered technical problems with the
system's beam control/fire control which contributed to unanticipated
increases in the contractor's cost and schedule budgets for the year.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
ABL Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of ABL's seven critical technologies are fully mature. Program
officials assessed one of ABL's seven critical technologies--managing
the high-power beam--as fully mature, but the technology has not been
demonstrated in a realistic environment. The remaining six
technologies--the six-module laser, missile tracking, atmospheric
compensation, transmissive optics, optical coatings, and jitter
control--were assessed as nearly mature. The program plans to
demonstrate all of its critical technologies during flight testing
leading up to a lethality demonstration of the system prototype, which
is scheduled for 2009. During the demonstration, the ABL will attempt
to shoot down a ballistic missile.
Although program officials assessed jitter control as nearly mature,
they continue to consider this technology as a high risk to the
program. Jitter is a phenomenon pertaining to the technology of
controlling and stabilizing the high-energy laser beam so that
vibration unique to the aircraft does not degrade the laser's aimpoint.
It is critical to imparting sufficient energy on the target to rupture
its fuel tank. Jitter mitigation is important to the success of the ABL
because if it is not controlled, the ABL may not be able to succeed in
demonstrating lethality. Program officials assert that jitter
performance measured during testing was determined to be sufficient to
support a successful lethal demonstration. Officials also noted that
they are pursuing jitter mitigations to provide additional margin for
the lethality demonstration in 2009. However, it should be noted that
jitter will have to be substantially reduced for the operational
system.
Design Maturity:
We did not assess ABL's design stability because its initial capability
will not be fully developed until the second aircraft is well underway.
While the program has released 100 percent of its engineering drawings
for the prototype, it is unclear whether the design of the prototype
aircraft can be relied upon as a good indicator of design stability for
the operational aircraft. More drawings may be needed if the design is
enhanced or if problems encountered during flight testing force design
changes.
Other Program Issues:
During fiscal year 2008, the program's prime contractor continued to
experience negative cost and schedule trends. The program incurred
unanticipated costs and required additional time to rectify technical
issues with the ABL's beam control/fire control hardware, including
approximately a one-month delay to integration and test activities to
replace and refurbish key components of the beam control/fire control
subsystem. However, the contractor believes it can recover the schedule
in time to conduct the lethality demonstration as planned in 2009.
The 2009 lethality demonstration is a key knowledge point for MDA. Upon
completion of the demonstration, the agency will decide the future of
the program. If the demonstration is successful, the agency will
analyze whether to invest in a second aircraft--the aircraft in which
an initial capability will reside. However, even with the successful
completion of the lethality demonstration, MDA will need to determine
whether an operationally effective and suitable ABL system can be
developed with available technologies, funding, time, and management
capacity. For example, the ABL will require unique support in addition
to the standard support required for the aircraft. To remain deployed
for extended periods of time, ABL will need a facility in the theater
of operations that can store and mix chemicals for the high-energy
laser. ABL will also require a ground support cadre and transportation
of chemicals to a forward location. These support requirements and the
costs associated with them have yet to be fully determined by MDA.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate. Program officials also stated that they have made
tremendous progress, and a series of tests will build confidence
leading up to the lethal demonstration. They stated that those tests
will also prove risk mitigation efforts, like jitter control, have been
successful. They acknowledged that significant work remains but assert
that analysis indicates the program will provide an effective
operational capability. They also stated that after successful
demonstration they will transition to a production representative
program. They further noted that they are using current program data to
develop a plan that is affordable, operationally effective, and
supportable.
[End of section]
BMDS Flexible Target Family (FTF):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Flexible Target Family (FTF).
Source: Lockheed Martin.
[End of figure]
MDA's Flexible Target Family is a new family of short, medium, and long-
range targets designed with common components for ground, air, and sea
launch capabilities. These targets were being developed to eventually
replace target system designs currently used to test elements of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). MDA recently stopped working
on all FTF variants except the 72-inch LV-2 ground-launched target. We
assessed this missile.
Timeline: Technology/system development:
Program start/design review: 3/06;
GAO review: 1/09;
First flight/initial capability: 3rdQ/09.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding FY09-FY13:
R&D: $1,322.4 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $1,322.4 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 03/2006: NA;
Latest 09/2008: $1,418.1;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of 03/2006: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 03/2006: NA;
Latest 09/2008: $1,418.1;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of 03/2006: NA;
Latest 09/2008: $59.088;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 03/2006: NA;
Latest 09/2008: 24;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 03/2006: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include costs from fiscal years 2008 to 2013.
[End of table]
Four of the LV-2 target's six critical technologies are nearing
maturity; two are immature. The LV-2's design appears stable, but
ongoing technology maturation efforts could lead to design changes.
Program office officials expect all critical technologies to be mature
before MDA uses the first LV-2 in a planned third quarter, fiscal year
2009, flight test; however, two of these technologies will not be
flight tested before that time. While most of the missile's components
have been flown in legacy systems, many have been modified for the LV-
2 and have not been flown together. Using a BMDS element flight test as
"first flight" for a target missile poses significant risk for MDA. The
qualification process for the LV-2 was more difficult and costly than
expected. Development and production costs for the first four targets
have grown 34 percent and development is still not complete.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
FTF Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of the LV-2's six critical technologies are mature, even though
the missile is currently in production. Four of the technologies are
nearing maturity and two are still immature. The LV-2 target began
development in March 2006 with almost all of its technologies still
being demonstrated in a lab or through analytical studies--a low level
of maturity. The program office estimates that all six critical
technologies will be mature before they are needed for BMDS flight
tests in fiscal year 2009. However, the components will not be flight
tested in a relevant environment prior to these tests, posing
significant risk for MDA's flight test program.
Two of the LV-2's critical technologies--the reentry vehicle separation
system and countermeasure integration--are components of a payload
deployment module that have been designed and built specifically for
the LV-2 and have not been flight tested. The other four technologies-
-the re-entry vehicle shroud, avionics suite, avionics software, and
the C4 booster--are components that have been previously flown on
legacy systems, but their form, fit, and function have been modified
for the LV-2 design. The reentry vehicle shroud is the least mature and
may need to be redesigned before it can be used in the third LV-2
flight test, planned for fourth quarter fiscal year 2009. As a risk
mitigation step, the program office is developing a backup technology,
but it is very immature and the program would need additional funding
to complete the development effort.
Design Stability:
The design of the LV-2 target appears stable, although the target lacks
the technology maturity and flight test history to show this design can
operate as intended. While the program office has now released 92
percent of engineering drawings to manufacturing, ongoing efforts to
test critical technologies in a realistic environment--in-flight--may
lead to additional modifications to the target's design. The program
office estimates that 91 percent of engineering drawings were complete
when they started producing the first LV-2 target missile in September
2007, however the total expected number of drawings has since grown. In
addition, 83 percent of the design drawings have required changes after
they were released.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the program office does
not have statistical process control data on the LV-2 target's critical
manufacturing processes. The LV-2 is the first target in the Flexible
Target Family to be produced. At this time, the program relies on its
contractor's quality system to verify product integrity and to identify
production trends. The program has initially contracted to buy four
vehicles, but future plans call for four to six vehicles per year.
Other Program Issues:
Development of the LV-2 target has been more difficult and more costly
than expected. Some of the missile's components failed to complete the
qualification process and are being redesigned. These development
problems have delayed the first launch of the LV-2 target from fourth
quarter, fiscal year 2008 to third quarter, fiscal year 2009. The
development and production costs of the first four targets have grown
34 percent, from $245 million to at least $328 million, and development
is still not complete. In addition, integration and launch options were
subsequently added to the contract, bringing the cost up to $405
million.
Program Office Comments:
Program officials stated that GAO's knowledge build graph depicts a
very limited level of product knowledge for a program near completion
of the first four flight units. Officials stated that the first FTF 72-
inch target flight in third quarter, fiscal year 2009, will lift the
rating on four of six critical technologies to mature (avionics suite,
avionics software, C4 booster, and reentry vehicle separation system).
The remaining critical technologies (reentry vehicle shroud and payload
deployment module) will be proven on following flight tests.
GAO Response:
The knowledge build graph accurately shows the current and historical
state of the program. Technologies are not mature until they are proven
in flight and MDA has not yet launched the 72-inch LV-2 target. MDA
made the decision to begin developing and producing the target when
critical technologies were still immature. Our assessment and the graph
depict the challenges and increased risk associated with this decision.
[End of section]
BMDS Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: BMDS Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD).
Source: Department of Defense.
[End of figure]
MDA's GMD is being fielded to defend against limited long-range
ballistic missile attacks during the midcourse phase of flight. The new
block structure develops blocks of capability concurrently, and GMD
supports multiple blocks in the Ballistic Missile Defense System. It
consists of an interceptor and a fire control system that formulates
battle plans and directs components and is integrated with BMDS radars.
We assessed the maturity of all technologies, but design and production
maturity only for the interceptor's current configuration.
Timeline: Technology/system development:
Program start/design review: 2/96;
Directive to field initial capability: 12/02;
Integrated design review: 3/03;
Initial capability: 10/04;
First end-to-end test: 9/06;
Critical design review: 10/07;
GAO review: 1/09.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Company:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding FY09-FY13:
R&D: $5,485.8 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $6,311.5 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 03/2001: NA;
Latest 08/2008: $35,533.1;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of 03/2001: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 03/2001: NA;
Latest 08/2008: $35,533.1;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of 03/2001: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 03/2001: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 03/2001: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include costs from the program's inception through fiscal year
2013. Totals include program office designated military construction
funding but not sustainment costs.
[End of table]
All technologies critical to the fielded GMD configuration are mature,
but two technologies in the upgraded interceptor are experiencing
problems in development. All drawings for the current interceptor have
been released to manufacturing; however, the number of drawings may
increase in response to an expansion of planned refurbishment
activities and issues discovered during flight testing. MDA is
producing hardware for operational use, but does not intend to make a
formal production decision. In fact, MDA has bought interceptors before
the critical technologies planned for that configuration had been
demonstrated in a realistic environment. Since 2005, GMD has only
conducted three intercept flight tests, which limits the capability to
assess the system's overall performance.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
GMD Program:
Technology Maturity:
All nine technologies in the fielded configuration are mature, but two
technologies being developed for the interceptor's exoatmospheric kill
vehicle--an upgraded infrared seeker and onboard discrimination--are
still not yet fully mature. Although the GMD program expected to
integrate these technologies and field the enhanced interceptor in
fiscal year 2008, the program was not able to do so because of problems
during development of certain components. According to program
officials, the program delivered the first two upgraded EKV units in
the first quarter of fiscal year 2009 for emplacement; however, the
upgraded EKV's capability will not be assessed through flight tests
until at least fourth quarter fiscal year 2009.
Design Maturity:
The design of the fielded interceptor appears stable with 100 percent
of its drawings released to manufacturing. However, according to
program officials, planned refurbishment of the emplaced interceptors
revealed some unexpected issues. Efforts to address these issues are in
the early stages, and the number of drawings may increase as a result.
Additionally, the design of the enhanced interceptor may not be
complete because two technologies are still being developed and have
not had their capability verified through flight testing.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the maturity of the production processes for GMD
interceptors. While the program is buying interceptors for operational
use, officials do not plan to make an official production decision or
collect statistical control data because the planned quantities are
small.
Other Program Issues:
GMD's flight test program continues to experience delays, which impedes
realistic evaluation of GMD's capability. For example, two flight tests
with intercepts were planned for fiscal year 2008; however, the program
was unable to conduct either intercept attempt. The first, FTG-04, had
already gone through six configuration alterations before it was
subsequently canceled and restructured into a sensor integration test
utilizing only a simulated interceptor. The second flight test, FTG-05,
was altered to support the objectives of the canceled FTG-04 test;
however, it was delayed until December 2008, when it resulted in a
successful intercept. Not all objectives were achieved, however,
because the target did not deploy its countermeasures, reducing the
complexity of the test.
The program has begun a scheduled refurbishment effort for emplaced
interceptors to deal with less reliable parts that were incorporated
into the booster and kill vehicle. According to program officials, this
effort uncovered unexpected issues in some emplaced interceptors. To
address this problem, MDA is undertaking, in some cases, what the
program calls an extensive level of refurbishment. However, it is not
yet clear how the expanded refurbishment will affect the program's cost
and schedule.
We estimate that at contract completion, the GMD prime contractor,
Boeing, could experience a cost overrun over $1.0 billion on the $17.3
billion contract. However MDA officials believe that ongoing baseline
adjustments have affected current variances to a degree that they are
not accurate predictors of future costs. Additionally, the Defense
Contract Management Agency reports that replanning has produced
artificial positive schedule variances in fiscal year 2008.
Program Office Comments:
GMD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
BMDS Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: BMDS Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI).
Source: Northrop Grumman Space and Mission System.
[End of figure]
MDA's KEI element is a missile defense system designed to destroy
medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles during
boost and midcourse phases of flight. The program was restructured in
April 2007 and is now only developing the booster components of the
system. MDA deferred work on its kill vehicle, fire control, and
launcher. The program plans to utilize multiple kill vehicles as a
future payload. Although MDA is considering land-and sea-based options,
we assessed the baseline land-based, mobile launch booster.
Timeline: Technology/system development:
Program start: 10/02;
Prime contractor selection: 12/03;
Element system requirements review: 0/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Booster flight test: 3rdQ/FY09;
Preliminary design review: 9/10;
Design review: 12/11;
Initial capability: TBD.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding FY09-FY13:
R&D: $2,753.3 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $2,753.3 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/2007: $4,118.9;
Latest 09/2008: $4,212.0;
Percent change: 2.3.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 10/2007: $4,118.9;
Latest 09/2008: $4,212.0;
Percent change: 2.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include costs from the program's inception through fiscal year
2013.
[End of table]
As a result of an April 2007 program restructure, KEI is only
responsible for developing four technologies related to the
interceptor's booster. These four technologies are immature, even
though the program has been in development since 2003. The KEI program
office also reported that none of its design drawings are releasable
and that the design is not projected to be stable by its 2011 design
review. The program is working towards its next key knowledge point, a
booster flight test (FTK-01) planned for third quarter, fiscal year
2009, intended to confirm boost phase capability. FTK-01 has slipped
nearly a year due to qualification and static fire testing issues.
These delays have compressed the program's schedule leading up to and
beyond the test. Program officials have stated that the test could slip
to as late as fourth quarter fiscal year 2009.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
KEI Program:
Technology Maturity:
In April 2007, MDA issued a stop work order on the KEI development
contract and restructured the program to focus on booster development,
including four critical technologies--the attitude control system
(ACS), booster motors, third-stage rocket motor, and trapped ball
thrust vector control. These, and the identified backup technologies,
remain at relatively low levels of maturity. At development start, all
of the critical technologies were still being demonstrated in a lab or
through analytical studies--a low level of maturity. Program officials
plan to do a prototype demonstration of form, fit, and function in a
relevant environment for the booster motors and trapped ball thrust
vector control by the 2011 design review. However, at this time,
program officials have stopped development of the third-stage rocket
motor and the ACS until after the FTK-01 and have no plans to mature
these technologies by that point. Work on the kill vehicle, fire
control, and launcher components has been deferred.
Of the 21 critical technologies reported last year, KEI transferred
responsibility for 16 technologies back to the Multiple Kill Vehicle
(MKV) program and one technology to the Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS) Program. While the KEI program intends to utilize the
multiple kill vehicles as a future payload as well as the STSS
program's algorithms that enable the kill vehicle to discriminate
between the exhaust plume and the missile body itself, it is not
responsible for their development. Program officials will decide
whether or not to pursue development of the deferred technologies after
the FTK-01 test has been completed.
Design Stability:
The design of the KEI program is not projected to be stable by its
critical design review in 2011. According to the program office, none
of the design drawings are currently releasable and none will be
releasable at the critical design review. At the program restructure in
April 2007, the estimated number of design drawings decreased from
7,500 to 1,500. The updated count includes the estimated number of
drawings for the KEI's canisterized booster program. It excludes the
kill vehicle, fire control, and launcher components.
Other Program Issues:
The KEI program's next key knowledge point is FTK-01, which is intended
to confirm the boost phase capability as an alternative to the Airborne
Laser and the high acceleration booster as a capability for midcourse
defense. This flight test has been delayed by approximately 1 year due
to technical issues discovered during ground testing. Component
failures during acceptance testing, as well as during the second-stage
static fire test in 2007, delayed the program and the flight test by at
least 9 months from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008 until mid-
2009. Program officials told us that hardware issues discovered during
qualification testing will likely delay the flight test further to the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009.
The KEI program is experiencing both short-term and long-term schedule
compression due to recent delays in ground and flight testing. In the
short-term, the program has compressed the time to analyze test results
for the four static fire tests leading up to FTK-01 in the third
quarter, fiscal year 2009. While program officials told us it generally
takes 60-90 days to produce a test report, the average time between
static fires in fiscal year 2009 is about a month, making it difficult
to recognize or fix issues encountered on the current static test
before the next test is conducted. In the long-term, the program has
delayed FTK-01 by nearly a year, but has adjusted the date of the
critical design review planned for 2011 by only a quarter.
Consequently, there will be less time to conduct the activities planned
between these two key events and stablilize the design after the
booster has been tested.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the KEI program office
stated that work is currently being conducted only on the first-and
second-stage rocket motors and the thrust vector control system. After
FTK-01, the ACS and third-stage rocket motor work will begin. Program
officials stated they have added several risk reduction activities to
increase confidence in flight vehicle performance and have resequenced
tasks to relieve some of the short term schedule compression. Program
officials believe that the timing asymmetry for the FTK-01 and design
review is not a reason for concern as most supporting activities are
accomplished in parallel.
[End of section]
BMDS Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: BMDS Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV).
Source: Lockheed Martin.
[End of figure]
MDA's MKV is being designed as a modular payload for midcourse defense
system interceptors including the Ground-based and Kinetic Energy
Interceptors. The original payload concept is to engage midcourse
threat clusters by deploying multiple kill vehicles from a larger
carrier vehicle. In September 2007, the program awarded a second
contract to develop an alternative concept for multiple kill
capability. Our assessment focuses on the original contractor's
concept, which has an expected initial capability around 2017.
Timeline: Technology/system development:
Program start: 2/06;
GAO review: 1/09;
System requirements review: 6/09;
Design review: 6/12;
Initial capability: 2017.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin, Raytheon:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding FY09-FY13:
R&D: $2,849.1 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $2,849.1 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/2007: $3,216.1;
Latest 11/2008: $3,269.1;
Percent change: 1.6.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 11/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 10/2007: $3,216.1;
Latest 11/2008: $3,269.1;
Percent change: 1.6.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 11/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 11/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 11/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include costs from the program's inception through fiscal year
2013.
[End of table]
According to the program office, the MKV program transitioned to an
acquisition program and began system development in 2006 without
setting top-level requirements for the payload. The program plans to
set these requirements in 2009. Until this occurs, it is uncertain
whether the technologies under development by the program will satisfy
the final requirements. We assessed none of the 16 critical
technologies as mature, although the program office assessed 13 of the
16 critical technologies as nearly mature. Although we reported the
carrier vehicle's divert and attitude control system as nearly mature
last year, the program changed the technology and subsequently lowered
its maturity level. The program has completed the first of three phases
to mature the engagement algorithms critical to the system's ability to
engage targets with multiple kill vehicles.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MKV Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of the MKV element's 16 technologies are mature. The carrier
vehicle's critical technologies include the divert and attitude control
system (DACS), cooler, inertial measurement units (IMU), focal plane
array (FPA), optics, power, processor, and carrier vehicle-ground
datalink. The technologies critical to the kill vehicle include the
DACS, seeker FPA, cooler, optics, IMUs, power, processors, and carrier
vehicle-to-kill vehicle datalink. Last year we reported that the
carrier vehicle DACS was nearing maturity; however, the program made a
determination to change the technology and lower the TRL level
accordingly since this new design has not been tested in the form, fit,
and function for the MKV element. According to the program, all sixteen
critical technologies are nearly mature with the exception of the
carrier vehicle's DACS, optics, and focal plane array. We continue to
disagree with this assessment since none of the technologies have been
repackaged and successfully tested in the correct form and fit. It is
unclear when the program's critical technologies will be demonstrated
in the correct form, fit, and function for the payload to achieve full
maturity.
The program office has not set top-level requirements for the MKV
payload and does not plan to do so until 2009. Program officials told
us that the way forward was based on understanding objectives for the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and the capabilities available,
synthesizing those capabilities into the BMDS based on their benefit
then, lastly, setting requirements at the BMDS level down to the
payload level. However, until the requirements are approved, it is
uncertain whether the technologies under development by the program
will satisfy those final requirements.
In May 2008, the program office completed a modeling and simulation
exercise as the first of three phases in its efforts to demonstrate its
engagement management algorithms. This capability is critical to the
system's ability to engage targets with multiple kill vehicles. The
program plans to demonstrate their functionality in an integrated
hardware and software test planned for 2011. According to program
officials, without this capability, the program would instead pursue
unitary kill vehicles--much like the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
System's Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle.
Other Program Issues:
Since September 2007, Raytheon has performed work on an alternative MKV
concept as a subcontractor on the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
program. In October 2008, MDA awarded an indefinite delivery/indefinite
quantity contract to Raytheon worth $441.9 million through 2011 to
continue work on the alternative concept. Lockheed Martin, the original
MKV contractor, will continue to work in parallel with Raytheon.
Although the program has two prime contractors for the MKV element,
program officials told us the contractors would not be in competition
and that there are currently no plans to downselect to one contractor.
In 2008, MDA renamed the MKV program office as the BMDS Kill Vehicles
program office and placed management of the MKV element and all other
unitary kill vehicles under its direction. Although programs finance
the development of their individual kill vehicles, the BMDS Kill
Vehicles program office is responsible for their management to foster
an integrated and modular approach to producing kill vehicles.
Program Office Comments:
The program office states that MDA has demonstrated all 16 technologies
successfully and identified a rigorous set of knowledge points in order
to mature the design. MDA plans to accomplish this through both
realistic component development and testing--ground and flight testing.
Officials state that requirements follow demonstrated capabilities that
exploit design margin and that efficiencies gained through commonality
among the kill vehicles enable the agency to make focused investments
with the contractor and vendor base.
GAO Response:
We maintain that although some testing of the critical technologies has
been accomplished, until the technologies are repackaged into the
correct form, fit, and function for the MKV and tested in a realistic
environment, they cannot be considered mature. Additionally, we believe
that until requirements are approved, uncertainties remain as to
whether technologies under development will satisfy those final
requirements.
[End of section]
BMDS Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: BMDS Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS).
Source: Photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman Space Technology.
[End of figure]
MDA's STSS element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks designed to track enemy missiles throughout their flight. The
initial increment is composed of two demonstration satellites started
under the Space Based Infrared System Low program. MDA plans to launch
these satellites in 2009 to assess how well they work within the
context of the missile defense system. If successful, MDA also plans to
develop a yet-to-be-defined operational constellation of STSS
satellites. We assessed the two demonstration satellites.
Timeline: Technology/system development:
SBIRS-low program start: 1995;
Transition to MDA: 10/00;
STSS program start: 2002;
GAO review: 1/09;
Demonstrator satellite launch: 6/09.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding FY09-FY13:
R&D: $2,524.0 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $2,524.0 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 09/2007: $6,723.0;
Latest 08/2008: $6,380.6;
Percent change: -5.1.
Procurement cost;
As of 09/2007: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 09/2007: $6,723.0;
Latest 08/2008: $6,380.6;
Percent change: -5.1.
Program unit cost;
As of 09/2007: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 09/2007: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 09/2007: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include costs from the program's inception through fiscal year
2013, including the potential operational constellation to be defined.
[End of table]
Both STSS demonstration satellites have been built. All five critical
technologies are mature, and the design appears stable. In the last
year, the scheduled launch of the satellites has been delayed again
from April 2008 to June 2009, and further schedule slips are possible.
At one point, MDA set a November 2008 launch date. However, the program
lost its position on the launch schedule due to issues with the launch
manifest. After the slip was identified, hardware issues arose, which
further necessitated the slip. According to program officials, the
program office has also experienced staffing and budget shortfalls that
have had an adverse effect on the program. All of these factors--
technical issues, launch site availability, staffing, and funding--are
risks that the program will have to address to meet its planned June
2009 launch date.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
STSS Program:
Technology & Design Stability:
All five critical technologies reached maturity when thermal vacuum
testing on the first satellite's payload was completed in February
2006. The program's design is stable, with all drawings released to
manufacturing. Both STSS demonstration satellites have been built.
Other Program Issues:
In the past year, the launch of the demonstration satellites was
delayed from April 2008 to June 2009 because of hardware problems on
the second space vehicle. For example, a flight communications box
overheated during testing. The program office thoroughly tested the
usability of the unit, and the unit was successfully tested, does not
have to be replaced, and is acceptable for flight. In addition, there
were failures in both the main spacecraft computer and the
reprogrammable memory of one of the two payload computers. The program
office initially recommended the removal of the entire computer from
the spacecraft to fix the problem. After extensive research and
testing, the program manager determined that the event with the
spacecraft computer is currently an unverifiable failure with low
probability of occurrence and low mission impact. According to the
program manager, the spacecraft computer will not be removed, which
will eliminate the need to repeat integration testing.
According to program officials, the program office has experienced
staffing shortages and budget cuts that have had an adverse effect on
the program. According to the program office, five of the program's top
system experts were recently reassigned. In addition, the Air Force
removed eight junior officers from the program as part of a recent
force-shaping initiative, thereby creating a knowledge and experience
gap. As a result, current program office personnel are taking on
increased workloads to accomplish critical tasks in preparation for the
launch of the satellites. The program manager stated that he has had to
rely much more on contractor support for systems engineering than in
the past. According to MDA, however, the Air Force has committed to
fully staffing the program office and has begun appropriate fiscal year
2009 personnel requisitions to support that commitment.
The program manager is also making changes to the STSS program to
account for receiving less funding than was requested in the
President's fiscal year 2009 budget. The program intends to stretch out
the planned software upgrades for the ground segment and demonstration
satellites--with the final updgrades delayed by almost 2 years. Since
only one of the four software drops is now projected to be available by
the time the satellites are on-orbit, functioning, and ready to
transmit data after the 6-month checkout period, data from the
satellites may not be fully utilized by external users. The program
office is considering plans to reduce the amount of on-orbit testing by
going to a "day-shift only" operation rather than the around-the-clock
schedule currently planned. If this plan is implemented, the amount of
testing that can be accomplished will be reduced and it will take
longer to analyze test data and make data available.
The program did make progress in the past year. In August 2008, the
demonstration satellites successfully completed acoustics environmental
testing, during which both space vehicles are stacked in their launch
configuration and subjected to the acoustic environment they will
experience during launch. Final factory testing of the second space
vehicle is also underway.
Program Office Comments:
MDA stated that the assessment was an accurate depiction of the program
at this point in time. MDA also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
BMDS Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: BMDS Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).
Source: THAAD Project Office/MDA, Release.
[End of figure]
MDA's THAAD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks to provide a ground-based missile defense system able to defend
against short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD will
include missiles, a launcher, an X-band radar, and a fire control and
communications system. We assessed the design for the initial fire unit
that MDA plans to deliver to the Army in fiscal year 2010 for limited
operational use.
Timeline: Technology/system development:
Program start: 1/92;
Transition to MDA: 10/01;
First successful intercept: 7/06;
Contract award for fire units: 12/06;
Missile unit activation: 5/08;
Early capability delivery: 9/08;
GAO review: 1/09.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding FY09-FY13:
R&D: $2,635.2 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $2,635.2 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 09/2007: NA;
Latest 07/2008: $15,123.7;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of 09/2007: NA;
Latest 07/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 09/2007: NA;
Latest 07/2008: $15,123.7;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of 09/2007: NA;
Latest 07/2008: NA;
Percent change: 0.0.
Total quantities;
As of 09/2007: NA;
Latest 07/2008: NA;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 09/2007: NA;
Latest 07/2008: NA;
Percent change: 0.0.
Columns include costs from the program's inception through fiscal year
2013. Totals do not include sustainment funds.
[End of table]
THAAD's technologies are mature and its design appears stable, with 99
percent of its design drawings released; however, since the program is
still in development and conducting flight tests, additional design
work may be necessary. MDA has purchased two operational fire units,
however it will not assess production maturity until a formal
production decision is made. In fiscal year 2008, the program
successfully conducted two of three scheduled tests. The first test
demonstrated an intercept outside of the atmosphere. The second test
was a successful intercept of a separating target inside the
atmosphere. According to program officials, the third test was
designated a "no test" because of a target failure. During fiscal year
2008, the program continued to mature THAAD's design, and it expects to
deliver the first THAAD battery to the Army in fiscal year 2010.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
THAAD Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials assessed all of THAAD's critical technologies as
mature. All of these technologies are included in four major
components: the fire control and communications component, the
interceptor, the launcher, and the radar.
Design Maturity:
Approximately 99 percent of THAAD's 14,606 drawings have been released
indicating that THAAD's design is generally stable. The number of
drawings has increased since 2003 because previously excluded drawings
were added for radar and missile components. Additional drawings or
design work could still be required based on the results of remaining
ground and flight testing.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess THAAD's production maturity because the program has
not collected data on its key production processes. MDA does not plan
to assess production maturity until a formal production decision is
made. In December 2006, MDA ordered two fire units that will be
operational systems and ultimately fielded. The first THAAD battery
will be provided to the Army in fiscal year 2010, with the second
expected to become available during fiscal year 2011. Prior to a formal
production decision, the program office plans to assess production
maturity using risk assessments and verification reviews to ensure that
the contractor's processes are repeatable and of high quality.
Other Program Issues:
In fiscal year 2008, the THAAD program successfully conducted two of
three scheduled flight tests. The first two tests resulted in
successful target intercepts inside and outside of the atmosphere while
demonstrating the radar, launcher, and fire control and communications
capabilities. The third test, designated by MDA as a key risk reduction
test, resulted in a "no test" because the target failed. This flight
test was also intended to be the first developmental/operational test
of the THAAD system that included the launch of multiple THAAD
interceptors and a separating target. THAAD expects to conduct a
replacement test during the second quarter of fiscal year 2009.
The THAAD program has experienced funding shortfalls that have delayed
the delivery of a limited operational capability to the Army. The
funding shortfalls have been driven in part by cost overruns and target
availability problems that have caused the flight test program to be
restructured. Target availability issues have cost the THAAD program
approximately $175 million in the past 2 fiscal years. As a result of
these funding pressures, the THAAD program has deferred the fire unit 1
and 2 interceptor deliveries (50 interceptors) by 6 months.
Hardware issues and technical problems are still causing the program's
prime contractor to experience negative cost variances. The variance
can primarily be attributed to the missile, launcher, and radar. As of
September 2008, the THAAD program was overrunning its fiscal year 2008
budget by $34.0 million.
Program Office Comments:
THAAD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System.
Source: PMA-262.
[End of figure]
The Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System
(BAMS UAS) is to provide a persistent maritime intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Along with the P-8A
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft and the future EP-X electronic
surveillance aircraft, BAMS UAS will be part of a maritime patrol and
reconnaissance force family of systems integral to the Navy's
recapitalization of its airborne ISR.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Development start: 4/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Design review: 1/11;
Low-rate decision: 5/13;
Initial capability: 12/15;
Last procurement: TBD.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,060.8 million:
Procurement: $707.7 million:
Total funding: $2,887.7 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/2008: NA;
Latest 09/2008: $2,268.7;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/2008: NA;
Latest 09/2008: $707.7;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 04/2008: NA;
Latest 09/2008: $3,095.6;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/2008: NA;
Latest 09/2008: $44.222;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 04/2008: NA;
Latest 09/2008: 70;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/2008: NA;
Latest 09/2008: 92;
Percent change: NA.
Column labeled "latest" includes known costs through fiscal year 2013.
Total quantities extend beyond fiscal year 2013.
[End of table]
The BAMS UAS program began system development in August 2008 with all
technologies approaching maturity. The program received approval from
DOD to begin system development in April 2008, but the source selection
was subject to a bid protest that delayed development start to August
2008. Program officials explained that the program has no critical
technologies according to a technology readiness assessment conducted
in 2007. However, six watch-list technologies have been identified that
could affect system development. The BAMS UAS initial operational
capability has been delayed from August 2014 to December 2015.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
BAMS UAS Program:
Technology Maturity:
In 2008, DOD and the Navy concluded that all BAMS UAS technologies were
approaching maturity and have been demonstrated in a relevant
environment. This assessment also concluded that the program had no
critical technologies. Though not considered critical technologies, the
program office has identified six subsystems, such as the due-regard
radar that could cause cost, schedule, or performance issues during
development. Other subsystems include the multi-spectral targeting
system, multi-function active sensor rotary joint, automatic dependent
surveillance-broadcast, on-board image formatting, compression, and
reduction, and smart image bandwidth management. Program officials
indicated that they are monitoring the development risks for these
subsystems. The decision to allow the program to begin system
development also included a requirement for an additional independent
technology readiness assessment. It is to be conducted and submitted
for DOD review once the preliminary design review has been completed.
Other Program Issues:
BAMS UAS is intended to serve as an adjunct to the P-8A Multi-mission
Maritime Aircraft. The Navy intends to position BAMS UAS mission crews
with maritime patrol and reconnaissance forces personnel to allow
operators to closely coordinate missions and utilize a common support
infrastructure. According to program officials, BAMS UAS plans to
achieve full operational capability in time to avoid a capability gap
due to the retirement of the P-3C Orion aircraft.
Program officials explained that BAMS UAS air vehicle is about 78
percent common by weight to the Air Force Global Hawk and leverages
sensor components or entire systems from other DOD platforms. In
addition, the BAMS UAS program is leveraging lessons learned from that
program and has established a Memorandum of Agreement with the Global
Hawk program office.
The BAMS UAS requirements and schedule align with the Australian AIR
7000 program. According to program officials, a system development and
demonstration (SDD) Memorandum of Understanding will be negotiated if
the Australian government decides to form a BAMS UAS cooperative
program. Australian unique objectives were included in the BAMS UAS SDD
contract as separately priced options. Prior project arrangements
focused on modeling and simulation development and engineering risk
reduction activities.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the BAMS UAS program
office provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program.
Source: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit and avionics for
three combat configurations of the C-130 fleet, which provides
increased reliability, maintainability, and sustainability. The program
is intended to ensure C-130 global access and deployability by
satisfying navigation and safety requirements, installing upgrades to
the cockpit systems, and replacing many systems no longer supportable
due to diminishing manufacturing resources.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Development start: 7/01;
Design review: 8/05;
GAO review: 1/09;
Low-rate decision: TBD;
Full-rate decision: 1/12;
Last procurement: 2017.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $362.3 million:
Procurement: $3,465.0 million:
Total funding: $3,827.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 216:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 07/2001: $749.0;
Latest 08/2008: $1,919.0;
Percent change: 156.2.
Procurement cost;
As of 07/2001: $3,242.3;
Latest 08/2008: $3,493.5;
Percent change: 7.7.
Total program cost;
As of 07/2001: $3,991.3;
Latest 08/2008: $5,412.4;
Percent change: 35.6.
Program unit cost;
As of 07/2001: $7.690;
Latest 08/2008: $24.491;
Percent change: 218.5.
Total quantities;
As of 07/2001: 519;
Latest 08/2008: 221;
Percent change: -57.4.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 07/2001: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Latest cost data do not fully account for changes following the
critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach. As of December 2008, the C-130
AMP program had not completed an updated cost estimate.
[End of table]
The C-130 AMP's technologies are mature and its design is stable. The
program does not collect process control data to demonstrate production
maturity. In 2008, the program finalized a restructuring that resulted
from a critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach. However, completion of
its production decision has been delayed until January 2009 primarily
because of software testing issues and a failure to complete required
documentation. The program has been authorized to procure two AMP kits
prior to the production decision to preserve its test schedule. Still,
cost and schedule risks remain. Flight testing of a production
representative aircraft began in August 2008, but the airdrop
capability has yet to undergo a full operational assessment. The Air
Force has proposed a second phase to the AMP, which would provide
avionics upgrades to C-130s not included in the current program.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
C-130 AMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
The three C-130 AMP critical technologies--global air traffic
management, defensive systems, and combat delivery navigator removal--
are mature. As part of the program restructuring that resulted from a
critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost increase breach, the number of critical
technologies for the program was cut in half from six to three. The
removed technologies were intended for Special Mission C-130 aircraft
configurations, which were eliminated from the program during the
restructure.
Design Maturity:
The design of the C-130 AMP combat delivery configuration is stable,
with all of the expected drawings releasable to manufacturing. The
program believes it has addressed past integration issues that stemmed
from underestimating the complexity of the engineering efforts needed
to modify the different C-130 aircraft configurations. The program has
more recently encountered software delays with its production software
package. These software problems have contributed to a series of delays
to the program's production decision, which is now expected to be
completed in January 2009.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the program does not
collect statistical process control data on its critical manufacturing
processes. However, according to program officials, the Air Force and
the contractor will use detailed, proven work instructions to control
the installation quality and will conduct inspections to ensure
installations are performed as planned. In addition, factory metrics
associated with quality and productivity are collected.
The C-130 AMP's low-rate initial production decision will not be
finalized until January 2009 primarily due to software testing issues
and problems completing required documentation. In order to prevent
this delay from affecting the program's initial operational test and
evaluation schedule, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics authorized the program to buy two AMP kits in
advance of its production decision. The program began flight testing of
a production representative aircraft in August 2008. Nevertheless,
other issues could affect the test schedule or pose cost and schedule
risks for the program in production. According to an operational
assessment completed by the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation
Center, late aircraft availability poses a risk to maintaining the
current test schedule. In addition, the program's airdrop capability
has not undergone a full operational assessment. Specifically, final
hardware and software installation, which provides situational
awareness functionality, was not completed before the Air Force's
operational assessment.
Other Program Issues:
The Air Force has proposed including a second phase to the AMP in its
fiscal year 2010 budget request. The second phase would provide the
avionics modernization to C-130 aircraft that are not part of the 221
aircraft included in the current program baseline. The cost of this
effort is estimated to be $870 million over 5 years.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force concurred with this assessment and provided technical
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP).
Source: Edwards AFB.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5
to improve mission capability rate and transport capabilities and to
reduce ownership costs. The AMP incorporates Global Air Traffic
Management, navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment,
and an all-weather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the
engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We
assessed the C-5 AMP here and the C-5 RERP separately.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Development start: 1/99;
Design review: 5/01;
Production decision: 2/03;
Initial capability: 2/07;
GAO review: 1/09;
Last procurement: 2013.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1.8 million:
Procurement: $415.5 million:
Total funding: $417.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 42:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/1998: $387.5;
Latest 12/2007: $468.4;
Percent change: 20.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/1998: $677.8;
Latest 12/2007: $1,001.5;
Percent change: 47.7.
Total program cost;
As of 11/1998: $1,065.4;
Latest 12/2007: $1,469.8;
Percent change: 38.0.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/1998: $8.455;
Latest 12/2007: $13.124;
Percent change: 55.2.
Total quantities;
As of 11/1998: 126;
Latest 12/2007: 112;
Percent change: -11.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/1998: 83;
Latest 12/2007: 97;
Percent change: 16.9.
[End of table]
The C-5 AMP technologies and design are used in other aircraft and
considered mature. We did not assess production maturity as the
components are commercial off-the-shelf items. Operational testing
identified 250 deficiencies and assessed the AMP as partially mission
capable. Some of the deficiencies have since been resolved and others
are being addressed in future AMP software builds and the C-5 RERP. The
AMP was fielded with waivers to 14 specification requirements. The C-5
RERP will address 4 of these requirements. Other deficiencies and
waivers may be addressed in a new modernization program slated for
fiscal year 2010. The AMP is addressing some diminishing manufacturing
source problems with the navigation system and backup integrated
processor. The Air Force is currently conducting a mobility
capabilities requirement study which may or may not affect future C-5
AMP requirements.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
C-5 AMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies because the
program uses commercial technologies that are considered mature.
Design Maturity:
The program reports that the contractor has now released all of the
drawings for the AMP.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the production maturity because most components are
readily available as commercial off-the-shelf items. This equipment is
being used on other military and commercial aircraft. To ensure
production maturity, the contractor annually surveys its suppliers to
assess future availability of AMP modification kits and works with the
program office and end user to ensure that installations can be
completed according to the installation schedule.
The program is addressing diminishing manufacturing source issues
related to the navigation system and the backup integrated processor.
The program will be installing an upgraded and certified navigation
system, due to a diminishing manufacturing source issue, for C-5s
receiving the modification starting in 2010.
Other Program Issues:
According to the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the AMP
is partially mission capable, however, not operationally suitable.
About 250 deficiencies, including software issues related to autopilot
disconnects, were found during testing, and 14 specification
requirements that affect operational requirements have been waived.
A total of 37 deficiencies will be corrected in C-5 RERP and an
additional 6 deficiencies will be fixed if the RERP Operational Flight
Plan 3.4 software build is fielded. In addition, 73 more deficiency
reports have been corrected or are being corrected as part of a
sustainment contract software build that will be released in March
2009. C-5 RERP has addressed 4 of the 14 previously waived
specification requirements, such as the Auto Take Off and Go Around
functionality and memory improvement for the Flight Management System
database. Other deficiencies and waivers may be addressed in a
modernization block upgrade program beginning in 2010. DOD has
currently funded $65 million for the initial upgrades; additional
funding will be requested in 2012 and beyond to provide additional
capabilities.
Fewer C-5s may need the AMP modification if the Air Force decides to
retire some of its C-5 aircraft. This decision is not likely to be made
until after the results of the current mobility capabilities
requirement study are released in May 2009. As of November 2008, the
Air Force has modified 45 aircraft, 1 C-5A, 2 C-5Cs, and 42 C-5Bs with
over 43,300 operational flight hours.
Program Office Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5
RERP).
Source: Edwards AFB.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. The
RERP is designed to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and
availability of the C-5 by replacing the propulsion system and
modifying the mechanical, hydraulic, avionics, fuel, and landing gear
systems as well as other structural modifications. Together with the C-
5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), these upgrades are intended to
improve the mission capability rates and reduce total ownership costs.
We assessed the C-5 RERP here and the C-5 AMP separately.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 2/00;
Development start: 11/01;
Design review: 4/04;
Low-rate decision: 4/07;
GAO review: 1/09;
Full-rate decision B-model: 12/10;
Last procurement: 2014.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $240.7 million:
Procurement: $5,295.6 million:
Total funding: $5,544.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 48:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/2001; $1,692.7;
Latest 06/2008: $1,757.3;
Percent change: 3.8.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/2001; $8,836.3;
Latest 06/2008: $5,524.2;
Percent change: -37.5.
Total program cost;
As of 11/2001; $10,532.7;
Latest 06/2008: $7,289.5;
Percent change: -30.8.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/2001; $83.593;
Latest 06/2008: $140.182;
Percent change: 67.7.
Total quantities;
As of 11/2001; 126;
Latest 06/2008: 52;
Percent change: -58.7.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/2001; 100;
Latest 06/2008: 139;
Percent change: 39.0.
[End of table]
The C-5 RERP technologies are mature and the basic design is stable. We
did not access production maturity because the Air Force is buying
commercially available items. However, in 2007, the program notified
Congress that program unit costs increased over 50 percent because of
rising production costs, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost increase
over the critical cost growth threshold. Subsequently, DOD examined 14
options to meet its strategic airlift requirements and chose the option
that would upgrade 52 aircraft, less than half originally intended.
Prior to the breach, DOD planned to apply AMP and RERP to its entire
fleet of C-5 aircraft. The results of an ongoing mobility capabilities
requirements study, to be released in May 2009, may or may not affect
the number of C-5 aircraft receiving the RERP modification.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
C-5 RERP Program:
Technology Maturity:
The C-5 RERP's technologies are mature based on an independent
technology readiness assessment conducted in October 2001.
Design Maturity:
The basic design of the C-5 RERP is now complete with over 90 percent
of the drawings released.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air
Force is buying commercially available items. According to program
officials, the program office and prime contractor have expended
considerable effort in preparing the RERP for production. For example,
a production readiness review was conducted, three test aircraft were
produced in the system development and demonstration phase, and the
lessons learned from AMP are being applied to production plans.
Developmental flight testing was completed in August 2008 and
developmental test and evaluation will end in December 2008.
Operational testing is expected to begin in August 2009. However, the
Air Force does not plan to provide a low-rate initial production
aircraft for operational testing, as recommended by the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation because one will not be available until
September 2010. The program expects a 30-month delay between the first
flight of the last system development and demonstration aircraft in
February 2007 and the start of the installation modification of the
first production aircraft in August 2009. The primary causes of the
development delay were increased costs related to development efforts
that caused the expansion of system development and demonstration, that
is, the need to expand the test period and development issues, for
example. The primary driver of the Lot 1 production award was the
upward production cost pressures. In September 2007, Congress was
notified of a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost increase over the critical cost
growth threshold. The breach was attributable to increased development
delays; budget adjustments; and production cost increases associated
with engines, pylons, and reliability enhancements items, and Lockheed
Martin labor cost increases. Proceeding with RERP modifications before
mature production processes have been demonstrated increases the risk
that the RERP may not meet the warfighter's performance and time
requirements as design changes, revised production processes, and
rework may be necessary.
Other Program Issues:
Following the Nunn-McCurdy notification to Congress in 2007, DOD
considered 14 options to meet its strategic airlift requirements
covering a range of scenarios for the RERP program in three broad
categories: modifying all C-5 aircraft, partially modifying the C-5
fleet, and canceling the C-5 RERP program. Based on this analysis, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
concluded that the cost to upgrade all C-5 aircraft was unaffordable
and selected the option to limit RERP modifications to 52 aircraft--
including 49 production aircraft (47 C-5Bs and 2 C-5Cs) and 3 system
development and demonstration aircraft (2 C-5Bs and 1 C-5A). While the
Air Force is expected to spend $3.4 billion less under the restructured
program, ultimately, less than one-half of the aircraft will be
modernized at a much higher unit cost. DOD had planned to provide AMP
and RERP modifications to its entire fleet of C-5 aircraft.
DOD is currently studying its mobility capabilities requirements for
the future. Study results are expected to be released in May 2009.
Results of that study may or may not affect the number of C-5s that
require the RERP modification.
Program Office Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR).
Source: © 2008 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.
[End of figure]
The Marine Corps' CH-53K helicopter will perform marine expeditionary
heavy-lift assault transport of armored vehicles, equipment, and
personnel to support distributed operations deep inland from a sea-
based center of operations. The CH-53K program is expected to replace
the current CH-53E helicopter with a new-build design to improve range
and payload, survivability and force protection, reliability and
maintainability, coordination with other assets, and total cost of
ownership.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 11/03;
Development start: 12/05;
GAO review: 1/09;
Design review: 8/09;
Low-rate decision: 3/13;
Initial capability: 9/15;
Full-rate decision: 12/15;
Last procurement: 2021.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,053.9 million:
Procurement: $11,864.6 million:
Total funding: $14,918.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 152:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2005: $4,228.8;
Latest 12/2007: $4,173.4;
Percent change: -1.3.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2005: $11,762.3;
Latest 12/2007: $11,864.6;
Percent change: 0.9.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2005: $15,991.1;
Latest 12/2007: $16,038.1;
Percent change: 0.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2005: $102.507;
Latest 12/2007: $102.808;
Percent change: 0.3.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2005: 156;
Latest 12/2007: 156;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2005: 119;
Latest 12/2007: 117;
Percent change: -1.7.
[End of table]
Both of the CH-53K's current critical technologies, the main rotor
blade and the main gearbox, are immature and are expected to be fully
mature following the low-rate initial production decision in 2013. The
program replaced a third technology, the viscoelastic lag damper, with
a modified version of an existing technology. During preparations for
the preliminary design review, it was discovered that maturing system
engineering tasks would potentially require additional cost and time.
As a result, the program eliminated noncritical requirements to contain
costs and delayed the preliminary and critical design reviews and low-
rate initial production decision. Due to attrition in the fleet of CH-
53Es, the Marine Corps has recognized the need for fielding the CH-53Ks
as soon as possible. To do so, the program plans to commence low-rate
initial production concurrent with operational testing.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
CH-53K Program:
Technology Maturity:
The two current critical technologies for the CH-53K program--the main
rotor blade and the main gearbox--are immature. While the technologies
are maturing on schedule, the program office does not expect them to be
fully mature until completion of initial operational test and
evaluation, following the CH-53K's low-rate initial production decision
in 2013. The main rotor blade will be the same diameter (79 feet) and
11 percent wider than the CH-53E design. A smaller-scale (1/7th) model
of the main rotor blade has demonstrated improved performance in wind
tunnel tests to meet new vertical lift requirements. The actual-sized
rotor blade has not been tested because appropriately sized wind
tunnels do not exist. According to program officials, full scale
prototypes of main gearbox components have been tested and have met or
exceeded performance requirements.
The CH-53K program office removed one critical technology from the
program by replacing the viscoelastic lag damper with a modified linear
hydraulic damper. The modified damper will provide double the
reliability of the damper on the CH-53E, but will provide only half the
expected reliability of the viscoelastic lag damper.
Design Maturity:
We could not assess design stability because the CH-53K program office
does not collect traditional information on design drawings to manage
stability. Instead, the program office assesses design stability at
systems engineering and technical reviews, by reviewing and approving
the relevant design baseline at the time. During preparations for the
preliminary design review, the program conducted a full review of all
tasks and discovered that maturing system engineering tasks would
potentially require additional cost and time. As a result, the program
eliminated noncritical requirements to contain costs and delayed, in
sequence, the preliminary design review, the critical design review,
and the low-rate initial production decision. The critical design
review and design readiness review have both been delayed by 5 months,
and the start of low rate initial production has been delayed by 4
months. Given these schedule challenges, the program office is placing
a greater emphasis on mitigating schedule risk and increasing the
efficiency of testing to put the program back on schedule.
Other Program Issues:
With the current gap between required and operational CH-53Es expected
to almost double in the next 5 years, the need for the deployment of
the CH-53K as a replacement has increased. According to program
officials, all available decommissioned CH-53E helicopters have been
reclaimed while the program continues to review the condition of other
nonflying assets for potential spare parts. Program officials stated
that to address the operational challenges that have led to this
attrition, the requirements of the CH-53K are greater than the CH-53E's
thresholds for operating environment, range, and load capacity.
Currently deployed CH-53E aircraft are flying at three times the
planned utilization rate. This operational pace is expected to result
in higher airframe and component repair costs, including short-term
fatigue repairs necessary to minimize CH-53E inventory reductions until
CH-53K deliveries reach meaningful levels. The program intends to
manufacture up to 29 of the 156 total helicopters (19 percent) during
low-rate initial production at the same time that it is conducting
initial operational testing. While concurrent testing and production
may help to field the systems sooner, it could also result in greater
retrofit costs if unexpected design changes are required.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier.
Source: CVN-21 Program Office 050708-D-8455H-001 Washington, D.C. (July
8, 2005) U.S. Navy graphic (released).
[End of figure]
The Navy's CVN 21 program is developing a new class of nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers that will replace USS Enterprise and the Nimitz-
class. The new carriers are expected to include advanced technologies
in propulsion, weapons handling, aircraft launch and recovery, and
survivability designed to improve operational efficiency and enable
higher sortie rates while reducing required manpower. The Navy awarded
a contract for construction of the lead ship, CVN 78, in September 2008
and expects delivery of the ship by September 2015.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 6/00;
Development start: 4/04;
Production decision: 7/07;
Construction contract award - first ship: 9/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
First ship delivery: 9/15;
Initial capability: 9/16.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Newport News:
Program office: Washington, DC Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,303.4 million:
Procurement: $19,590.1 million:
Total funding: $20,893.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 2:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/2004: $4,639.4;
Latest 12/2007: $4,205.0;
Percent change: -9.4.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/2004: $29,720.9;
Latest 12/2007: $25,709.0;
Percent change: -13.5.
Total program cost;
As of 04/2004: $34,360.3;
Latest 12/2007: $29,913.9;
Percent change: -12.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/2004: $11,453.450;
Latest 12/2007: $9,971.308;
Percent change: -12.9.
Total quantities;
As of 04/2004: 3;
Latest 12/2007: 3;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/2004: 137;
Latest 12/2007: 149;
Percent change: 8.8.
Program costs decreased due to changes in the estimated costs for the
second and third ships.
[End of table]
Five of 14 current critical technologies are fully mature, including
the nuclear propulsion and electric plant. Five technologies are
approaching maturity, while four others remain immature. Of these
technologies, the development and design of the electromagnetic
aircraft launch system (EMALS), the advanced arresting gear, and the
dual band radar (composed of the volume search and multifunction
radars) present the greatest risk to the ship's cost and schedule.
Technology development challenges have already caused delays in testing
and the delivery of key subsystems to the shipyard. As of July 2008, 87
percent of the design was complete and construction of a number of
units located low on the ship is already complete. According to the
Navy, these units account for 6-7 percent of the ship's total
production hours.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
CVN 21 Program:
Technology Maturity:
Nine of the CVN 21 program's 14 critical technologies are not yet fully
mature. Of these technologies, EMALS, the advanced arresting gear, and
the dual band radar present the greatest risk to the ship's cost and
schedule. Problems during EMALS development have already resulted in
cost growth and schedule delays. In order to meet CVN 78's delivery
date, the Navy adopted a strategy that will test, produce, and
ultimately install EMALS with a high degree of concurrency. In
September 2008, the contractor completed the first round of high-cycle
testing, gaining confidence in the performance of the generator--a
source of past problems. Contractor-led integrated land-based system
testing will not be complete until the end of fiscal year 2011--2-years
later than estimated in December 2007. Assuming no further delays,
EMALS will not demonstrate full performance of a shipboard ready system
until at least 7 months after installation on CVN 78 has begun. The
advanced arresting gear has completed early verification tests that
proved the system's concept. Integrated land-based testing with both
simulated and live aircraft has slipped by one year since last year's
assessment and is now scheduled for 2010. The Navy recently postponed
delivery of the arresting gear to the shipyard. Consequently, the
shipbuilder will not install the gear prior to laying the flight deck-
-a less optimal and more costly approach to building the ship. The dual
band radar--which includes the volume search and multifunction radars-
-is being developed as part of the DDG 1000 program. While the
multifunction radar has been tested at sea, considerable testing
remains for the volume search radar. Land-based tests of the volume
search radar prototype will not be completed until May 2009--2 years
later than planned. Upcoming land-based tests will be conducted at a
lower voltage than needed to meet requirements--and without the radome
(the radar's composite shield). Full power output will not be tested on
a complete system until 2012. Tests of carrier-specific functionality
will not conclude until shortly before shipyard delivery in 2013
leaving little time to resolve problems before ship installation.
Design Maturity:
As of July 2008, 87 percent of the design was complete. However, we did
not assess design stability because the Navy does not use the
percentage of drawings completed as an indicator of design maturity.
Instead, it measures design progress by the number of zones completed
in the product model. The program has faced challenges in maintaining
its design schedule due to delays in the receipt of technical
information on EMALS and the advanced arresting gear; however, the Navy
believes this issue has been largely resolved. The shipbuilder
anticipates changes to CVN 78's design based on the results of EMALS
testing.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess production maturity because the shipbuilder does not
use statistical process controls. Instead, it uses other processes to
ensure that ship construction meets CVN 78 performance, service life,
and producibility requirements. The Navy awarded a contract for CVN 78
construction in September 2008 and construction of a number of units
located low in the ship is already complete. According to the Navy, one-
third of the ship's units are in production, but these units only
account for 6-7 percent of the ship's production hours.
Other Program Issues:
A February 2008 program assessment recommended a number of changes to
the EMALS program to improve performance. The Navy re-planned the test
program and changed the management approach. The CVN 21 program office
is now responsible for overseeing EMALS production and ship
integration, rather than the Naval Air Systems Command. In addition,
EMALS will no longer be provided as government-purchased equipment.
Instead, the shipbuilder will purchase EMALS, giving it a more direct
role in managing the integration on CVN 78. The cost impact of this
change has not been finalized.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
DDG 1000 Destroyer:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: DDG 1000 Destroyer.
Source: PEO Ships (PMS 500).
[End of figure]
The Navy's DDG 1000 destroyer (formerly known as DD(X)) is a
multimission surface ship designed to provide advanced land attack
capability in support of forces ashore and contribute to U.S. military
dominance in littoral operations. The program awarded contracts for
detail design in August 2006 and negotiated contract modifications for
construction of two lead ships in February 2008. The program will
continue to mature its technologies and design as it approaches
construction start, currently planned for February 2009.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 1/98;
Development start: 3/04;
Design review: 9/05;
Production decision - first ship: 11/05;
GAO review: 1/09;
Construction start - first ship: 2/09;
Construction start - second ship: 11/09;
Initial capability: 9/15.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: BAE Systems, Bath Iron Works, Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding, Raytheon:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,942.7 million:
Procurement: $11,896.4 million:
Total funding: $13,839.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 5:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 01/1998: $2,196.9;
Latest 08/2008: $9,526.9;
Percent change: 333.7.
Procurement cost;
As of 01/1998: $31,412.4;
Latest 08/2008: $18,084.4;
Percent change: -42.4.
Total program cost;
As of 01/1998: $33,609.3;
Latest 08/2008: $27,611.3;
Percent change: -17.8.
Program unit cost;
As of 01/1998: $1,050.292;
Latest 08/2008: $3,944.473;
Percent change: 275.6.
Total quantities;
As of 01/1998: 32;
Latest 08/2008: 7;
Percent change: -78.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 01/1998: 128;
Latest 08/2008: 212;
Percent change: 65.6.
Quantities based on the approved program estimate. Current Navy
estimates plan a total quantity of three ships.
[End of table]
Four of 12 DDG 1000 critical technologies are fully mature, having been
demonstrated in a sea environment. Six other technologies are
approaching maturity, but 5 of them will not demonstrate full maturity
until after installation on the ship. Two technologies remain at a
lower level of maturity--the volume search radar (one of two radars
that constitute the dual band radar system) and total ship computing
environment. Land-based tests of the volume search radar prototype
originally planned for before ship construction will not be completed
until June 2009--over 2 years later. Software development for the total
ship computing environment has proved challenging; the Navy certified
the most recent software release before it met about half of its
requirements. The Navy plans on completing 89 percent of product
modeling of the ship's design prior to the start of construction.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
DDG 1000 Program:
Technology Maturity:
Four of DDG 1000's 12 critical technologies are fully mature. Six
others are approaching maturity. Practical limitations prevent the Navy
from fully demonstrating all critical technologies prior to
installation. The Navy does expect to demonstrate the maturity of the
integrated deckhouse prior to the start of ship construction. The Navy
conducted the deckhouse production readiness review in October 2008;
with completion of a large-scale deckhouse test unit in November 2008.
Testing of other technologies continues through ship construction
start. The integrated power system will not be tested with the control
system until 2011--nearly 3 years later than planned. The Navy will buy
a power system intended for the third ship and use it in land-based
tests. As a result, the power system will not be demonstrated until a
year after production and installation on the two lead ships.
The volume search radar remains at a lower level of maturity. Land-
based tests of the volume search radar prototype will not be completed
until June 2009--over 2 years later than planned. Upcoming land-based
tests will be conducted at a lower voltage than needed to meet
requirements--and without the radome. The Navy will not demonstrate a
fully capable radar at its required power output until testing of the
first production unit in 2011. Partly due to delays, the volume search
radar will not be installed during deckhouse construction as initially
planned. Instead, installation will occur in April 2013--after the Navy
has taken custody of the ship.
The Navy initially planned to develop and demonstrate all software
functionality of the total ship computing environment (phased over six
releases and one spiral) over 1 year before ship light-off. As a result
of changes in the software development schedule, the Navy eliminated
this margin. Until recently, the Navy was able to keep pace with its
development schedule. However, the contractor delivered release 4
without incorporating all software system requirements and deferred
work to release 5, primarily due to issues with the command and control
component. Problems discovered in this release, coupled with the
deferred work, may be a sign of larger issues that could disrupt the
development of later releases and prevent the timely delivery of
software to meet the ship's schedule.
Design Stability:
The Navy aims to complete 89 percent of product modeling for the ship's
94 design zones prior to the start of construction. At the program's
production readiness reviews in October 2008, the shipbuilders had
completed less than 35 percent of the product model and faced
challenges maintaining its design schedule. The Navy has now delayed
the start of ship construction by 4 months to February 2009 in order to
mature the ship's design. According to the Navy, as of January 2009, 88
percent of the zones are complete.
Other Program Issues:
The Navy recently decided to reduce its quantities from seven ships to
a total of three. Rather than DDG 1000, the Navy now wants to restart
the procurement of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. According to the
Navy, this is primarily because of a change in its assessment of likely
future threats and in the requirements for destroyers needed to meet
those threats. While eliminating follow-on ships will reduce program
procurement costs by at least $10.4 billion, the costs of the three
ships will likely increase. Further, the Navy still intends to spend
$1.6 billion to complete research and development of DDG 1000's
critical systems.
Program Office Comments:
The Navy stated that the program successfully completed production
readiness reviews in October 2008 and that almost 90 percent of the
final Navy zone design reviews have been completed, emphasizing that no
zone will start construction until the design for that zone is done.
According to the Navy, DDG 1000 has a design that is much more
complete, developed to a greater level of detail, and has undergone a
more rigorous review than any previous ship class. Due to the long
timeline required to design, develop, and deliver a Navy ship, the Navy
stated that some concurrency is unavoidable to prevent obsolescence and
preclude the additional cost that would be associated with stretching
the timeline to allow all technologies to reach readiness levels
meeting GAO best practice recommendations prior to construction. The
Navy concluded that DDG-1000 has achieved the proper balance of
developmental risk, schedule impact, and cost.
[End of section]
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE).
Source: Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft Programs (PEO(T)).
[End of figure]
The Navy's E-2D AHE is an all-weather, twin-engine, carrier-based
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. It
is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The key objectives of
the E-2D AHE are to improve battle space target detection and
situational awareness, especially in the littorals; support Theater Air
and Missile Defense; and provide improved operational availability for
the radar system.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program/Development start: 6/03;
Design review: 10/05;
GAO review: 1/09;
Low-rate decision: 3/09;
Initial capability: 4/11;
Full-rate decision: 12/12.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corp.
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $854.3 million:
Procurement: $11,634.7 million:
Total funding: $12,489.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 70:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 06/2003: $3,709.8;
Latest 09/2008: $3,924.0;
Percent change: 5.8.
Procurement cost;
As of 06/2003: $10,538.5;
Latest 09/2008: $11,686.6;
Percent change: 10.9.
Total program cost;
As of 06/2003: $14,248.3;
Latest 09/2008: $15,610.6;
Percent change: 9.6.
Program unit cost;
As of 06/2003: $189.977;
Latest 09/2008: $208.141;
Percent change: 9.6.
Total quantities;
As of 06/2003: 75;
Latest 09/2008: 75;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 06/2003: 95;
Latest 09/2008: 94;
Percent change: -1.0.
[End of table]
All four of the E-2D AHE's critical technologies are mature. Ninety-
nine percent of total estimated design drawings were releasable and the
E-2D AHE design is stable. While the program has experienced growth in
total expected design drawings since its critical design review in
October 2005, the rate of growth has slowed considerably since our last
assessment. In 2008, the program completed a production readiness
review and an operational assessment in preparation for a low-rate
initial production decision scheduled for March 2009. The program
currently faces a 4 to 6 month delay in its flight testing schedule.
The program is planning to take a series of steps to minimize the
effect on the program. Program officials estimate there will be also be
a 12 to 24 month delay in initial operating capability and a 20 percent
increase in unit cost due to recent budget cuts.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
E-2D AHE Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, all four of the E-2D AHE's critical
technologies are mature. Three of these technologies--the rotodome
antenna, power amplifier module UHF transistor, and multi-channel
rotary coupler--demonstrated their maturity in the last year. The
program office's technology maturity assertion is based on flight
testing since August 2007. The program is currently in the process of
completing a formal technology readiness assessment in preparation for
a low-rate initial production decision scheduled for March 2009.
Design Maturity:
Ninety-nine percent of total estimated design drawings were releasable
and the E-2D AHE design is stable. While the program has experienced
growth in total expected design drawings since its critical design
review in October 2005, the rate of growth has slowed considerably. In
the last year, the increase was approximately 8 percent compared to the
39 percent increase from 2006 to 2007. The program office expects there
will be negligible additional drawing growth and all design drawings
will be released by the low-rate initial production decision.
Production Maturity:
The program office did not identify any critical manufacturing
processes associated with the E-2D AHE, nor does the program require
the contractor's major assembly site to use statistical process
controls to ensure its critical processes are producing high-quality
and reliable products. Instead, the program office indicated that it
uses a variety of tools to assess production maturity including
production readiness reviews, earned value management data, production
schedules, and tool design and fabrication metrics and schedules. The
program successfully completed a production readiness review in August
2008.
Other Program Issues:
In early flight testing, the program experienced problems with the high
power circulators, hydraulic lines, antenna power amplifier modules,
and inclement weather, which has resulted in a 4 to 6 month delay in
the program's flight testing schedule. As a result, the program has
completed fewer test points than planned. The program is taking a
series of steps to address flight testing delays, such as improving
aircraft maintenance, conducting more tests per flight, and utilizing
both test aircraft for mission systems testing. However, given the
extent of the delays, completing flight testing according to its
original schedule may not be feasible.
According to program officials, the program will experience additional
delays due to budget cuts that will decrease the number of aircraft
available for testing and training purposes. The budget cuts are
expected to decrease the number of aircraft to be purchased in each of
the first two low-rate initial production lots from three to two.
According to program officials, it is likely that the budget cuts will
impede the program's ability to meet its planned initial operational
capability date due to the reduced number of aircraft available to
perform pilot and maintenance training operations to prepare for
initial deployment. Program officials estimate this reduction in two
aircraft will cause a 12 to 24 month delay in initial operating
capability and a 20 percent increase in the aircraft's unit cost.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
EA-18G:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: EA-18G.
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
The Navy's EA-18G Growler will replace the carrier-based EA-6B and
provide electronic warfare capability beginning in 2009. The EA-18G is
designed to support friendly air, ground, and sea operations by
suppressing enemy radar and communications. The aircraft is a
combination of the new, more capable Improved Capability (ICAP) III
electronic suite, the F/A-18F airframe, and other EA-18G unique
capabilities. The program began operational testing in September 2008
and is scheduled to replace all carrier based Navy EA-6Bs by 2013.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 8/02;
Development start: 12/03;
Design review: 4/05;
Low-rate decision: 4/07;
GAO review: 1/09;
Full-rate decision: 4/09;
Initial capability: 9/09;
Last procurement: 2012.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $240.4 million:
Procurement: $4,039.4 million:
Total funding: $4,279.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 54:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2003: $1,846.5;
Latest 10/2008: $1,918.0;
Percent change: 3.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2003: $6,822.6;
Latest 10/2008: $6,865.3;
Percent change: 0.6.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2003: $8,669.1;
Latest 10/2008: $9,847.0;
Percent change: 13.6.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2003: $96.323;
Latest 10/2008: $111.898;
Percent change: 16.2.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2003: 90;
Latest 10/2008: 88;
Percent change: -2.2.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2003: 70;
Latest 10/2008: 69;
Percent change: -1.4.
[End of table]
The EA-18G began development in December 2003 without demonstrating
that its five critical technologies were fully mature. A 2007
independent assessment reduced the number to two and judged both
mature. While the design appeared stable at the time of the 2005 design
review, the number of drawings has since increased. Acceptance reports
for five aircraft delivered since 2007 identified several defects that
are common to the production line. Additionally, an April 2008
operational assessment identified tactical display clutter, crew
workload, and mission planning as high risk areas. A subsequent
technical evaluation reports them as moderate to low risk. The Navy
plans to buy one-third of the total production before completing
operational testing, which adds retrofit risk. An updated agreement
with the Air Force on airborne electronic attack support could affect
the program.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Growler Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to a 2007 independent technology readiness assessment, the EA-
18G program's two current critical technologies--the ALQ-218 receiver
system and inertial measurement unit software--are mature. When the
program began development in 2003, none of its then five critical
technologies were fully mature.
Operational and technical assessments of the EA-18G identified issues
related to critical technologies that affected its ability to meet
reliability requirements and could degrade mission effectives. An April
2008 operational assessment lists tactical situation display clutter,
crew workload, and mission planning as high-risk areas that affected
all EA-18G critical operational issues. A September 2008 technical
evaluation, used to support the operational readiness decision, reports
them as presenting a moderate to low risk to operational testing. This
evaluation also highlights deficiencies that will require the operator
to make excessive adjustments in order to accomplish the primary or
alternate mission. In addition, the report identified deficiencies that
could present a severe hazard to the weapon system or personnel. For
example, inadequate threat warning indications and limitations to the
aircraft's flight envelope when it is carrying the ALQ-99 tactical
jamming system pods with extended low-band radome could degrade mission
effectiveness. The program has provided a redesigned low-band radome to
the operational test community. Fixes for some of the other open
deficiencies have not yet been identified.
Design Maturity:
While the design of the EA-18G appeared stable at its 2005 critical
design review, the total number of drawings released has increased by
87 percent. This change is due, in part, to the exclusion of drawings
related to electrical, armament, and equipment installation
modifications for flight test aircraft at the design review. According
to the program officials, the additional drawings went through proper
configuration controls and had no effect on cost and schedule. The
program has redesigned the low-band radomes because legacy radomes
could not handle the increased EA-18G flight envelope. The redesigned
radome has been provided to the operational test community for use
during testing.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the contractor does not
collect statistical process control data. The EA-18G is a derivative of
the F/A-18E/F aircraft and, according to the program office, the
contractor determined that the current tooling provides sufficient mold
line tolerance control. Five aircraft have been delivered since 2007.
Acceptance reports have identified defects that are not unique to the
EA-18G but rather are common with the F/A-18E and F aircraft as well.
For most of the defects, root cause investigations by the contractor
are underway. The Navy still plans to buy one-third of the total
production quantity prior to completing operational testing. The
potential for redesign and retrofit risk remains until all capabilities
are demonstrated during operational testing. The program office noted
that this buy is in accordance with the approved acquisition strategy.
Other Program Issues:
Continuation of a memorandum of agreement between the Navy and the Air
Force on airborne electronic attack support could affect the number of
EA-18G the Navy needs. According to program officials, the Navy's
requirements are being met with the current buy of EA-18Gs. If there
were a need for additional EA-18Gs, a decision to buy more should be
made by April 2009 to optimize pricing and schedule. However, if
additional aircraft were purchased, there would be significant
personnel-related risk due to the lead time needed to train pilots and
maintainers.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery
Projectile.
Source: PM Excalibur.
[End of figure]
The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based,
fire-and-forget, 155 mm cannon artillery precision munitions intended
to provide improved range and accuracy. The Excalibur's near-vertical
angle of fall is expected to reduce collateral damage around the
intended target, making it more effective in urban environments than
current projectiles. The Future Combat System's Non-Line-of-Sight
Cannon requires the Excalibur to meet its required range. Only the
unitary variant is currently being developed.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program/Development start: 5/97;
Design review/Low-rate decision: 5/05;
GAO review: 1/09;
Full-rate decision: 1/10;
Initial capability: 2/10;
Last procurement: 2020.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $125.0 million:
Procurement: $1,216.3 million:
Total funding: $1,341.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 28,728:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 02/2003: $739.3;
Latest 08/2008: $934.4;
Percent change: 26.4.
Procurement cost;
As of 02/2003: $3,873.8;
Latest 08/2008: $1,429.5;
Percent change: -63.1.
Total program cost;
As of 02/2003: $4,613.1;
Latest 08/2008: $2,363.8;
Percent change: -48.8.
Program unit cost;
As of 02/2003: $.060;
Latest 08/2008: $.078;
Percent change: 29.3.
Total quantities;
As of 02/2003: 76,677;
Latest 08/2008: 30,388;
Percent change: -60.3.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 02/2003: 136;
Latest 08/2008: 153;
Percent change: 12.5.
[End of table]
According to program officials, Excalibur's critical technologies were
mature and its design was stable by May 2005. Since development began
in 1997, the program has encountered a number of significant changes,
including four major restructures, reduced production quantities, and
increased unit costs. Only the unitary variant is currently being
developed. This variant will be developed in three incremental blocks,
which will incorporate increased capabilities over time. The Excalibur
program has begun early production on Increment Ia to support an urgent
early fielding requirement in Iraq for more accurate artillery that
will reduce collateral damage. In September 2008, the program awarded
two contracts for the development of Increment Ib projectiles.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Excalibur Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, all three of the unitary variant's
critical technologies reached full technology maturity in May 2005 at
the time of the Excalibur's design review. These technologies were the
airframe, guidance system, and warhead.
Design Maturity:
Excalibur's design for Block Ia-1 appears to be stable. In May 2005,
Excalibur held its design review and concurrently entered production to
support an urgent fielding requirement in Iraq. At the time of the
design review, 750 of 790 design drawings were released. By August
2006, the number of drawings had increased by almost 20 percent to 943,
all of which have been released.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess Excalibur's production maturity. According to the
program office, the program is taking steps to utilize statistical
process control at the subsystem and component levels, but, at this
point, the production processes remain largely noncontinuous and are
still not conducive to using statistical process control at the system
level. The program's early focus will be on areas with stable
processes, consistent suppliers, and high inspection costs.
Other Program Issues:
The Excalibur acquisition plan currently focuses on developing its
unitary version in three incremental blocks--Ia-1, Ia-2, and Ib. In
Block Ia-1, which has been made available for early fielding, the
projectile would meet its requirements for lethality and accuracy in a
nonjammed environment. In Block Ia-2, the projectile would be improved
to meet its requirements for accuracy in a jammed environment, with
extended range and increased reliability, and would be fielded with the
Army's Future Combat System's Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C). In
Block Ib, the projectile would be improved to further increase
reliability, lower unit costs, and would be available for fielding in
fiscal year 2012. The other two Excalibur variants--smart and
discriminating--are expected to enter system development in fiscal year
2010, although both variants are unfunded.
Excalibur was fielded in Iraq with its first use in combat in 2007.
Block Ia-1 Excalibur rounds have been delivered to Army, Marine Corps,
and Canadian troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The project reported
that 90 percent of the rounds expended in combat operations fired as
expected, exceeding the requirement for Increment Ia.
Block Ia-2 is currently in development. According to program officials,
no production deliveries have been made yet and qualification tests are
continuing. The program is experiencing technical problems working in a
jammed environment. Because of these technical problems, the program
has delayed initial operational test and evaluation, full-rate
production, and initial operating capability by seven months. In
addition, the Excalibur program continues to address compatibility
issues with the Increment Ia round and the muzzle brake of the NLOS-C.
According to program officials, an engineering study indicated that
changes were needed in the NLOS-C to be compatible with Excalibur, but
that modifying the base of the Excalibur round would help as well. The
official added that the program is performing backwards compatibility
testing on howitzers that plan to fire Excalibur rounds and
compatibility testing on the NLOS-C. If this modification does not
resolve the compatibility issue with NLOS-C, then NLOS-C will have to
wait for the availability of Block Ib projectiles in 2012. The
Excalibur program awarded fixed price incentive fee contracts to
Alliant Techsystems and Raytheon for a planned 18-month design
maturation and demonstration phase for the Block Ib round in September
2008.
Program Office Comments:
The project office concurred with a draft of this assessment.
[End of section]
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photographs: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV).
Source: EFV Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Marine Corps' EFV is designed to transport troops from ships
offshore to inland destinations at higher speeds and from longer
distances than the Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A--the system it is
designed to replace. The EFV will have two variants--a troop carrier
for 17 combat equipped Marines and 3 crew members and a command vehicle
to manage combat operations. DOD restructured the program in June 2007
and awarded a follow-on development contract in July 2008 that focuses
on redesigning key subsystems to improve reliability.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 3/95;
Development start: 12/00;
Design review: 12/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Low-rate decision: 12/11;
Full-rate decision/Initial capability: 8/15.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics:
Program office: Woodbridge, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,043.6 million:
Procurement: $9,778.4 million:
Total funding: $10,889.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 573:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2000: $1,593.5;
Latest 09/2008: $3,611.2;
Percent change: 126.6.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2000: $7,156.1;
Latest 09/2008: $9,978.1;
Percent change: 39.4.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2000: $8,841.5;
Latest 09/2008: $13,682.5;
Percent change: 54.8.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2000: $8.626;
Latest 09/2008: $23.073;
Percent change: 167.5.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2000: 1,025;
Latest 09/2008: 593;
Percent change: -42.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2000: 138;
Latest 09/2008: 245;
Percent change: 77.5.
[End of table]
The EFV's critical technologies are mature and its design is stable. In
December 2008, the program completed its critical design review with 94
percent of the system's design models releasable. The number of
critical manufacturing processes will be established now that the
design has been stabilized. However, production representative tooling
and procedures will be used to manufacture new prototype vehicles, and
program officials plan to begin collecting statistical process control
data during their fabrication. The program also intends to collect and
use statistical process controls during low-rate initial production and
full-rate production.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
EFV Program:
Technology Maturity:
All four of the EFV system's critical technologies are mature and have
been demonstrated in a full-up system prototype under the initial
development contract.
Design Maturity:
The EFV's design is currently stable. The government reassessed the
vehicle's design and held a critical design review in December 2008.
According to program documents, 94 percent of the system's design
models were releasable at that time and the contractor expected to
complete the remaining models in January 2009. Prior to the critical
design review, the government authorized the contractor to begin hull
fabrication on the prototype vehicles being produced as a part of the
extended systems development phase. According to program officials,
this does not present a risk to the system because the hull design did
not contribute to earlier reliability problems and therefore did not
change. At the time of the critical design review, hull fabrication on
the seven prototype vehicles ranged between 78 percent complete and 7
percent complete.
The EFV program has revised its approach for meeting the reliability
threshold of 43.5 hours of operation before maintenance is required.
The program's failure to meet this requirement in its 2006 operational
assessment was the key factor behind its restructuring. According to
program officials, the individual components and subsystems of the
prototypes used in the 2006 operational assessment were designed to
meet the reliability requirement, but now the program plans to design
them to exceed it. The program hopes this will help ensure that the
integrated EFV system meets the required reliability threshold.
Production Maturity:
The EFV program plans to demonstrate its production processes during
prototype fabrication and assess their maturity in low-rate and full-
rate production. According to the program office, the prototypes will
be built using production representative tooling and procedures and
data will be collected on the critical manufacturing processes.
However, due to the small number of prototypes being built, the program
will not have those processes in statistical control. Program officials
indicated that while the design-for-reliability process may change
parts and materials, the majority of the manufacturing processes will
remain unchanged. The number of critical manufacturing processes will
be established now that the design has been stabilized. The program
intends to collect data on key manufacturing processes and use
statistical process controls during low-rate initial production and
full-rate production. The contractor also requires suppliers that
provide parts associated with key system characteristics to have their
manufacturing processes in control.
Other Program Issues:
In February 2007, the Navy reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of
the critical threshold. Reliability issues, optimistic cost estimating
assumptions, and quantity reductions all contributed to cost increases.
The program was restructured in June 2007. System development was
extended and the Marine Corps modified the EFV development contract to
redesign the subsystems that contributed to the reliability problems.
In July 2008, the Marine Corps chose to award a follow-on development
contract to build a second set of prototypes to try to resolve the
reliability issues. As a result of the restructure and extension of
system development, low-rate production will not begin until 2011 and
full-rate production will not begin until 2015.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Marine Corps stated
that the design approved at critical design review should achieve an
average reliability of 61 hours before maintenance or repair is
required, based on models validated by Army reliability experts. The
Marine Corps expected that 100 percent of the system design would be
releasable in early January 2009.
[End of section]
F-22A Modernization Program:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: F-22A Modernization Program.
Source: U.S. Air Force, [hyperlink,
http://www.af.mil/photos/index.asp?galleryID=40&page=].
[End of figure]
The Air Force's F-22A, originally planned to be an air superiority
fighter, will have an expanded air-to-ground attack capability. It was
designed with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics and
supercruise to make it less detectable and capable of higher speeds.
The Air Force established the F-22A modernization and improvement
program in 2003 to add enhanced air-to-ground, information warfare,
reconnaissance, and other capabilities and to improve the reliability
and maintainability of the aircraft.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Development start: 3/03;
Design review: 12/06;
GAO review: 1/09;
Development complete: FY 2013;
Initial capability: FY 2015.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,199.5 million:
Procurement: $1,231.6 million:
Total funding: $3,431.2 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 03/2003: $3,101.2;
Latest 08/2008: $4,265.1;
Percent change: 37.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 03/2003: $537.4;
Latest 08/2008: $1,655.7;
Percent change: 208.1.
Total program cost;
As of 03/2003: $3,638.6;
Latest 08/2008: $5,920.8;
Percent change: 62.7.
Program unit cost;
As of 03/2003: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 03/2003: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 03/2003: 109;
Latest 08/2008: 145;
Percent change: 33.0.
[End of table]
The Air Force planned to field enhanced F-22A capabilities in three
increments to be completed in 2010. However, due to funding decreases,
schedule slips, and changes in requirements and work content, the last
increment will not complete development until 2013. Two of the three
critical technologies are still nearing maturity and others have been
deferred to future modernization efforts. The Air Force now plans to
integrate additional capabilities beyond the three increments in a
separate major defense acquisition program. Procurement of F-22As is
due to end with the delivery of the final aircraft in 2011. However,
Congress appropriated $523 million in the fiscal year 2009 Defense
Appropriation Act for advance procurement for 20 F-22As. The Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 limited the obligation of these
funds to $140 million pending a certification by the President.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
F-22A Program:
Technology Maturity:
One of the F-22A modernization program's three critical technologies-
processing memory-is mature. The two remaining technologies-stores
management system and cryptography-are approaching maturity, and have
been tested in a relevant environment. The maturity of these
technologies has not changed in the past year. According to program
officials, the current F-22 production and modernization plans do not
commit to incorporating new technology into developmental increments
until the underlying technologies have been tested in a relevant
environment and do not commit to fielding these technologies until they
have been proven in developmental and operational testing. The number
and mix of technologies identified by program officials have changed
since the modernization effort began, reflecting changes in program
direction, priorities, and work content. Some of these have been
deferred to future modernization efforts, which the Air Force plans to
undertake in a separate major defense acquisition program.
Design Maturity:
The design of the first increment of the F-22A modernization program
appears stable, almost 2 years after its critical design review. The
program office reported that all expected engineering drawings have
been released. According to program officials, they did not plan to
release drawings at the design review because most of the design
consisted of software changes or modifications of existing hardware.
Even though the design of the first increment appears stable,
additional design work may be necessary, and the program still needs to
demonstrate two of its critical technologies in operational
environments. In addition, the program is just beginning developmental
and operational testing for a number of capabilities. According to the
program office, two developmental test aircraft and six operational
test aircraft are being modified in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to prove
out technologies before fielding or production incorporation.
Other Program Issues:
According to the F-22 program office, implementation of the
modernization program's three increments has been delayed by 3 years
because of numerous budget decreases and program restructurings. Since
fiscal year 2002, the F-22A's modernization budget has been decreased
by over $450 million. Nearly $200 million of the reductions can be
attributed to program restructuring by the Air Force and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. In fiscal year 2008, the conference report
accompanying the Defense Appropriation Act recommended $611 million in
research and development funds for the F-22A modernization program,
about $132 million less than requested by the Air Force. The 2009
Defense Appropriation Act appropriated an additional $523 million for
advance procurement for 20 additional aircraft. However, the 2009
Defense Authorization Act limited the obligation of the advance
procurement funds to $140 million pending a certification by the
President that the procurement of F-22A fighter aircraft is in the
national interest of the United States or that the termination of the
production line for F-22A fighter aircraft is in the national interest
of the United States.
The current F-22A multiyear procurement contract for 60 aircraft will
end the program's planned procurement when the final aircraft is
delivered in 2011. Program officials reported that some contractors are
already beginning to cease their F-22-related efforts and would need to
be replaced if additional aircraft are purchased. According to the
program officials, a decision on additional F-22 purchases needs to be
made by in early 2009 to avoid losing additional contractors. Further,
program officials stated, it is unclear how new aircraft would affect
future modernization efforts. The additional aircraft could be
configured the same as previous production models (Increment 2), or
they could possibly be produced as the newest increment available
(Increment 3.1).
Program Office Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T).
Source: Boeing.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's FAB-T will provide a family of satellite communications
terminals for airborne and ground-based users. FAB-T will address
current and future communications capabilities and technologies,
replacing many program-unique terminals. FAB-T is being developed
incrementally; the first increment will provide voice and data military
satellite communications for nuclear and conventional forces as well as
airborne and ground command posts, including the B-2, B-52, RC-135, E-
6, and E-4 aircraft. We assessed the first increment.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program/Development start: 9/02;
Design review: 1/09;
GAO review: 1/09;
Low-rate decision: 2/10;
Full-rate decision: 12/12;
Initial capability: 6/13.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Company:
Program office: Hanscom AFB, MA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $441.6 million:
Procurement: $1,948.5 million:
Total funding: $2,390.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 197:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2006: $1,484.6;
Latest 08/2008: $1,498.4;
Percent change: 0.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2006: $1,595.0;
Latest 08/2008: $1,954.7;
Percent change: 22.6.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2006: $3,079.6;
Latest 08/2008: $3,453.0;
Percent change: 12.1.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2006: $14.257;
Latest 08/2008: $15.554;
Percent change: 9.1.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2006: 216;
Latest 08/2008: 222;
Percent change: 2.8.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2006: 129;
Latest 08/2008: 129;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
The FAB-T program's seven critical technologies are approaching
maturity and its design appears stable. The program office expects to
demonstrate that all the critical technologies are mature and that the
design is stable by the January 2009 design completion review. In the
past year, the program incorporated two major design changes that
increased the cost of the development effort. Program officials do not
expect additional major design changes. In August 2008, the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
delayed the start of initial operational test and evaluation and full-
rate production by 1 year in order to ensure a required cryptographic
module is included in testing. The FAB-T program office continues to
monitor two areas--certification by the National Security Agency and
software development--that could cause cost increases and schedule
delays.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
FAB-T Program:
Technology Maturity:
All seven of FAB-T's critical technologies are approaching maturity,
and program officials expect they will be fully mature by January 2009.
Since FAB-T was not a major defense acquisition program when it entered
system development in 2002, its critical technologies were not assessed
at development start.
Design Maturity:
The design of the FAB-T program appears stable, based on the number of
drawings that are releasable to manufacturing. As of September 2008, 85
percent of the total expected drawings were releasable and the program
office expected that almost all drawings will be releasable by January
2009. Two major engineering change proposals--one related to platform
and Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite interface changes and
another for modifications related to a new strategic network
requirement--required design changes and increased the number of design
drawings by 39 percent from the prior year. Program officials also
noted that testing at the line replaceable unit level identified some
places where redesign was necessary to meet requirements, however the
program's June 2008 preliminary design review did not reveal any
significant design issues. Program officials also noted that they have
discovered multiple items in the integration process that required
software changes, but they suggested these were normal for an
integration of this complexity. Program officials do not expect any
additional major design changes prior to the design completion review
planned for January 2009.
The FAB-T program office continues to monitor two remaining risk areas-
-certification of FAB-T's cryptographic element by the National
Security Agency (NSA) and the large amount of new software code being
developed. NSA is currently performing an evaluation of the
cryptographic element for low-data rate engineering models; however,
NSA will not complete certifications for FAB-T until fiscal year 2011.
Program officials said that while there is a potential risk of not
obtaining NSA certification, they conduct regular meetings with the
contractor and NSA and no major risks have surfaced to date. As a
software-defined radio, 71 percent of the total lines of software code
are expected to be newly developed. Since last year, the total lines of
code expected in the final system have increased by over 7 percent, and
software development costs have increased by approximately 6 percent.
These increased costs are primarily a result of the two engineering
change proposals the program has incorporated. Program officials said
they expect only nominal increases to the total lines of code in the
future.
Other Program Issues:
According to program officials, in August 2008, the Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics delayed the start of
initial operational testing and evaluation and full-rate production by
1 year to ensure a required cryptographic module is included in
testing. As a result of this delay, low-rate initial production will be
extended by 1 year. Program officials stated that this delay will have
no effect on users and will not require a break in production. In
addition, even though the scheduled launch of the Advanced Extremely
High Frequency satellite has been delayed by 2 years, FAB-T program
officials said this would have no adverse effect on FAB-T's development
schedule for the first increment.
In the past year, the contract value for system development increased
by over 12 percent or $120 million. Program officials primarily
attributed this to FAB-T's two major design changes. Most of these
increases were planned and budgeted for in 2006. Although FAB-T has
experienced problems in the past with contractor performance, program
officials told us that a new contractor team structure has successfully
resolved many of these issues.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Future Combat System (FCS):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Future Combat System (FCS).
Source: U.S. Army.
[End of figure]
The Army's FCS program consists of an integrated family of advanced,
networked combat and sustainment systems; unmanned ground and air
vehicles; and unattended sensors and munitions intended to equip the
Army's new transformational modular combat brigades. Within a system-
of-systems architecture, FCS features 14 major systems and other
enabling systems along with an overarching network for information
superiority and survivability. We assessed the FCS program as a whole.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 5/00;
Development start: 5/03;
GAO review: 1/09;
Milestone review: 8/09;
Design review: 4/11;
Low-rate decision: 4/13;
Initial capability: 6/15;
Full-rate decision: 2/17;
Last Procurement: TBD.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Hazelwood, MO:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $13,506.6 million:
Procurement: $100,080.2 million:
Total funding: $114,321.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 15:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2003: $20,886.2;
Latest 12/2007: $28,835.2;
Percent change: 38.1.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2003: $68,197.6;
Latest 12/2007: $100,160.9;
Percent change: 46.9.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2003: $89,776.1;
Latest 12/2007: $129,730.6;
Percent change: 44.5.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2003: $5,985.076;
Latest 12/2007: $8,648.704;
Percent change: 44.5.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2003: 15;
Latest 12/2007: 15;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2003: 91;
Latest 12/2007: 147;
Percent change: 61.5.
[End of table]
According to Army officials, all 44 FCS critical technologies are
expected to approach maturity this year and be demonstrated in a
relevant environment by the time DOD conducts a milestone review of the
program later in 2009. All FCS critical technologies may not be fully
mature until the production decision. The Army has released a number of
design drawings of systems that are candidates for early fielding, but
there is a significant chance that designs for other systems will
change. The Army began spending procurement money on FCS this year to
build early prototypes of the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon and to procure
long-lead items for systems scheduled for early fielding. Last year,
DOD instructed the Army to develop an incremental development approach
for FCS. Details of the approach were not available, so the
implications for design and production are unknown.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
FCS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Of the FCS program's 44 critical technologies, 3 are fully mature and
27 are nearing maturity. Army officials expect to demonstrate the
remaining 14 technologies in relevant environments through various
tests by early 2009, in time for DOD to conduct a milestone review of
the FCS program later in 2009. In the fiscal year 2007 DOD
authorization act, Congress required DOD to conduct this review to
determine whether and how the program will continue. All FCS critical
technologies may not be fully mature until the production decision in
2013.
Since 2003, the Army has not advanced the maturity of 11 critical
technologies. Two others, which are central to the Army's plans to
replace armor with superior information, are now rated less mature than
when the FCS program began. The Army is developing both technologies,
Warfighter Information Network--Tactical and Joint Tactical Radio
System, outside the FCS program. Army officials have not yet resolved
requirements issues between FCS and these systems. Consequently, the
Army will use engineering development versions of the Joint Tactical
Radio System for testing to inform near-term production decisions.
Design Maturity:
The Army has tentatively scheduled a system-of-systems preliminary
design review for FCS in May 2009 and a critical design review in April
2011. At the critical design review, the Army expects to have completed
90 percent of FCS design drawings. FCS contractors have released some
design drawings for a small number of systems that are candidates for
early fielding as spinouts, including unattended sensors, the Non-Line-
of-Sight Launch System, and various communications equipment.
Contractors have also released some design drawings for an early
production version of the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C). These
vehicles are being built to satisfy a congressional mandate for their
early fielding.
The Army is still refining many detailed FCS requirements, creating a
potential for additional design changes. FCS must interoperate with at
least 50 complementary systems to meet performance objectives. However,
many of these systems are in development, and in some cases FCS
requirements were not adequately defined for these systems. If those
complementary systems are not able to accommodate additional FCS
requirements, then FCS may need to change its design or sacrifice
capabilities.
Production Maturity:
Production of core FCS equipment is not scheduled to begin until 2013.
However, the Army plans to make significant production commitments for
the NLOS-C and a number of spinout systems before that date. Contract
awards are scheduled for the early version of NLOS-C in January 2009
and a production decision on the first increment of spinout items is
expected in late 2009.
Other Program Issues:
After almost 6 years of development, the Army has spent more than half
its planned development funds for FCS but will have only reached
preliminary design and will only be approaching the best practice
standard for the start of system development. At the same time, the
Army plans to make significant investments in the production of FCS
spinout, core, and NLOS-C systems before the critical design review.
During the congressionally-required milestone review to be conducted
later in 2009, DOD is expected to consider such factors as it
determines whether and how to proceed with FCS development. DOD has
already instructed the Army to prepare an alternative acquisition
strategy that would involve an incremental development approach, but
the details of that approach were not available in time for this
report.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Army stated that FCS has
taken an approach that focuses on risk mitigation and a flexible
architecture, which enables adaption to changes in technology and
priorities over time. FCS's flexible architecture has enabled a
refocusing of the spinouts from heavy brigades to infantry brigades
enabling soldiers to benefit from FCS technology as soon as possible.
Because of the significant amount of new technology development and the
emphasis on laying a good, flexible architecture foundation,
development effort/costs may not follow typical expenditure rates as
other projects, and a larger percentage will be needed in the early
stages of the program.
[End of section]
Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System.
Source: Northrop Grumman Corp.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high-altitude, long-endurance
unmanned aircraft with integrated sensors and ground stations providing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. After a
successful technology demonstration, the system entered development and
limited production in March 2001. The acquisition program has been
restructured several times. The current plan acquires 7 aircraft
similar to the original demonstrators (the RQ-4A) and 47 of a larger
and more capable model (the RQ-4B).
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Demonstration program start: 2/94;
Development start/low-rate decision: 3/01;
GAO review: 1/09;
Full-rate decision: 12/09;
Last Procurement: 2013.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corporation:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,290.3 million:
Procurement: $3,421.6 million:
Total funding: $4,712.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 25:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 03/2001: $1,006.1;
Latest 09/2008: $3,657.5;
Percent change: 263.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 03/2001: $4,171.4;
Latest 09/2008: $5,929.7;
Percent change: 42.2.
Total program cost;
As of 03/2001: $5,208.1;
Latest 09/2008: $9,699.4;
Percent change: 86.2.
Program unit cost;
As of 03/2001: $82.668;
Latest 09/2008: $179.618;
Percent change: 117.3.
Total quantities;
As of 03/2001: 63;
Latest 09/2008: 54;
Percent change: -14.3.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 03/2001: 55;
Latest 09/2008: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
RQ-4A production is complete and RQ-4B aircraft are currently in
production. Key technologies are mature but integration and testing is
not complete. The basic airframe design is stable and the program
office reports that the airframe production processes are mature.
Development and operational testing to verify the design and ensure
performance meets warfighter requirements has been delayed nearly 3
years due to hardware and software problems. Problems found during
testing could increase costs and affect future production. Extended
development times, engineering changes, production cost increases, and
a reduction in quantity have contributed to a more than doubling of
unit costs since the start of development in March 2001.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Global Hawk Program:
Technology Maturity:
Critical technologies on the RQ-4B are mature, including the two key
capabilities required for the larger aircraft--the advanced signals
intelligence payload and multiple platform-radar technology insertion
program. However, significant integration and testing to ensure
technologies perform as intended is planned over the next year and a
half. The first flight of a RQ-4B equipped with the signals
intelligence payload occurred in September 2008 and development and
operational testing is expected to continue through October 2009.
Development of the advanced radar has experienced delays. It has flown
on a surrogate platform similar to the Global Hawk. Development testing
on the advanced radar RQ-4B is planned to start in May 2009 with
operational testing starting by November 2010.
Design Maturity:
The RQ-4B basic airframe design is now stable with all its engineering
drawings released. During the first year of production, however,
frequent and substantive engineering changes increased development and
airframe costs and delayed delivery and testing schedules. Differences
between the two aircraft models were much more extensive and complex
than anticipated.
Production Maturity:
The program office reports that the manufacturing processes for the
airframe are fully mature and in statistical control. Production of the
smaller RQ-4A (block 10) aircraft completed in August 2006 with
delivery of the seventh unit. The RQ-4B aircraft is being produced in
three configurations. Block 20 aircraft are equipped with an enhanced
imagery intelligence payload, block 30 aircraft have both imagery and
signals intelligence payloads, and block 40 aircraft will have the
advanced radar surveillance capability only. All six block 20 aircraft
have been produced. Production continues on block 30 and block 40
aircraft, and 29 total aircraft have been procured through fiscal year
2008. The first block 30 aircraft was delivered to the Air Force in
November 2007 and delivery of the first block 40 aircraft is projected
in July 2010.
Other Program Issues:
The Global Hawk system continues to provide intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance in support of military operations in the Middle East
with over 20,000 combat hours as of late 2008. The technology
demonstrator version first deployed in November 2001 with the RQ-4A
aircraft following in January 2006. The Global Hawk airframe was also
recently selected as the winner in the Navy's competition for the Broad
Area Maritime Surveillance program.
We have previously reported significant cost, schedule, and performance
problems for the Global Hawk program. The program has been rebaselined
three times. Extended development times, engineering changes,
production cost increases, and a reduction in quantity have contributed
to a more than doubling of unit costs since the start of development in
March 2001. Delays in the schedules for integrating, testing, and
fielding new capabilities could drive additional cost growth and
increase the risk that warfighter requirements may not be met.
Operational tests to verify that the basic RQ-4B design works as
intended are now planned to be completed in October 2009--a delay
approaching 3 years. By that time the Air Force expects to have
purchased more than three-fifths of the total program quantities. Any
problems discovered in testing could require changes in design and
manufacturing, and could result in higher costs and further delays in
deliveries to the warfighter.
Program Office Comments:
The Air Force stated that the Global Hawk program made significant
strides in program execution while reducing program risk. RQ-4A
aircraft have amassed over 20,000 combat flight hours demonstrating its
operational utility. The larger and more capable RQ-4B aircraft with
its enhanced integrated sensor completed development testing and an
Operational Assessment (OA). The advanced signals sensor completed
testing and an OA on a surrogate aircraft, and was integrated into and
completed initial testing on the RQ-4B. The advanced radar continued
development testing on a surrogate aircraft as the program prepares for
integrated sensor/RQ-4B testing in 2009. Major challenges in 2009
include: preparing for and executing Block 20/30 IOT&E, software
production, Block 40/MP-RTIP integration and initial testing, and
deploying and sustaining operational aircraft.
[End of section]
Global Positioning Systems Block IIIA:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Global Positioning Systems Block IIIA.
Source: GPS Wing.
[End of figure]
GPS is an Air Force-led joint program with the Army, Navy, Department
of Transportation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, United
Kingdom, and Australia. GPS III is the next generation of satellites.
They are expected to provide enhanced capabilities, including a new
signal for civilian users, anti-jam capabilities, and compatibility
with the European Galileo satellite navigation system signal. GPS III
will provide capabilities in three increments: GPS IIIA, IIIB, and
IIIC. We assessed GPS IIIA, the first of these increments.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program/Development start: 5/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Design review: 8/10;
Production decision: 1/11;
First satellite available for launch: 5/14.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,825.8 million:
Procurement: $1,784.1 million:
Total funding: $3,610.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 6:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2008: $2,438.0;
Latest 06/2008: $2,438.0;
Percent change: 0.0.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2008: $1,368.8;
Latest 06/2008: $1,368.8;
Percent change: 0.0.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2008: $3,806.9;
Latest 06/2008: $3,806.9;
Percent change: 0.0.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2008: $475.862;
Latest 06/2008: $475.862;
Percent change: 0.0.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2008: 8;
Latest 06/2008: 8;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2008: NA;
Latest 06/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
We could not calculate acquisition cycle times for GPS IIIA because
initial operational capability will not occur until GPS IIIC satellites
are fielded.
[End of table]
In May 2008, the GPS IIIA program began system development and awarded
a contract for the development and production of eight satellites.
According to the program office, the five critical technologies for the
GPS IIIA are mature. The program is pursuing an incremental acquisition
approach aimed at reducing cost and schedule risk by delivering
capabilities to the warfighter over a period of time. The satellites
are to be built using primarily heritage and commercial hardware.
Because this program is in the early stages, design stability or
production maturity could not be assessed. The program plans to conduct
its critical design review in 2010. In addition, the new GPS IIIA
contractor, which is different than the contractor for Block IIF, is
still assembling the workforce needed to implement the program.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
GPS IIIA Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, the five GPS IIIA critical
technologies--space-qualified atomic frequency standards, 28 percent
efficient solar cell, radiation hardened data processor, radiation
hardened field programmable gate array, and transponders--are mature.
Design Maturity:
Since the GPS IIIA program is in the early stages of development, we
did not assess design stability. Unlike the GPS Block IIF program, we
will be able to assess the design stability of the GPS IIIA as it
approaches its critical design review. According to the program office,
under the GPS IIIA contract, the contractor will be required to provide
design drawings to the program office for review, unlike under the
contract for the current GPS Block IIF program.
Other Program Issues:
Prior to the start of system development, a program office assessment
determined that attempting to deliver all desired GPS III capabilities
in a single block would be risky and potentially cost-prohibitive. It
could also jeopardize the availability of the GPS signal to users. As a
result, the program developed an acquisition strategy that would
deliver capabilities in increments. Each GPS III increment is to
develop satellites of increasing capabilities. The program plans to
acquire 8 GPS IIIA satellites, which will transmit a new signal for
civilian users and increase military signal power to provide anti-jam
capabilities; 8 GPS IIIB satellites, which will provide the ability to
support near real-time command and control and a high-power military
code signal; and 16 GPS IIIC satellites, which will provide the
regional high-power military code signal that will be demonstrated in
GPS IIIB. The program plans to launch the first GPS IIIA satellite in
2014--72 months after contract award.
The GPS III program separated the acquisition of the ground segment
from the space segment. However, it is also using an incremental
development approach for the ground segment to help ensure that the
capabilities to control and operate the satellites are available when
needed.
Despite the planned launches of 14 GPS satellites before 2013, the
program office continues to be concerned about a possible gap in GPS
capabilities because of the the age and health of the GPS satellites
currently on orbit. According to the program office, the 6-month delay
in the start of the GPS IIIA program added to the risk of a capability
gap. In addition, the new GPS IIIA contractor will have to assemble a
workforce to implement the program from the ground up since it is not
the incumbent currently building the Block IIF satellites.
Program Office Comments:
In responding to a draft of this assessment, the program office
provided technical comments, which we included as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM).
Source: 676th Armament Systems Squadron/JASSM Program Office, approved
under 96 ABW/PA #08-07-08-364.
[End of figure]
JASSM is a long-range Air Force air-to-ground precision missile that is
able to strike targets from a variety of aircraft, including the B-1, B-
2, B-52, and F-16. The Air Force plans for the JASSM Extended Range
(ER) variant to add greater range capability to the baseline missile.
According to the program office, the baseline JASSM and the ER variant
share approximately 70 percent commonality in components. We assessed
both variants.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 6/96;
Development start: 11/98;
Low-rate decision: 12/01;
Initial capability: 9/03;
Full-rate decision: 7/04;
GAO review: 1/09;
ER low-rate decision: 2010;
Last procurement: 2020.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Ft. Walton Beach, FL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $12.8 million:
Procurement: $3,624.7 million:
Total funding: $3,637.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 3,843:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/1998: $985.1;
Latest 12/2007: $1,304.4;
Percent change: 32.4.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/1998: $1,228.2;
Latest 12/2007: $4,407.6;
Percent change: 258.9.
Total program cost;
As of 11/1998: $2,236.8;
Latest 12/2007: $5,712.0;
Percent change: 155.4.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/1998: $.906;
Latest 12/2007: $1.141;
Percent change: 25.9.
Total quantities;
As of 11/1998: 2,469;
Latest 12/2007: 5,006;
Percent change: 102.8.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/1998: 75;
Latest 12/2007: 87;
Percent change: 16.0.
[End of table]
The baseline JASSM entered production in 2001. JASSM-ER development
work is continuing and a production decision is scheduled for fiscal
year 2010. Both the JASSM baseline and the JASSM-ER have the same three
critical technologies, and the program office indicates that all three
are mature. However, the JASSM program has a history of cost growth and
poor missile reliability which contributed to a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost
breach of the critical cost growth threshold. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics certified a
restructured JASSM program in May 2008. The restructured program
consists of two separable increments, the JASSM baseline increment and
the JASSM-ER increment. Each increment has separate milestone decision
reviews and budget lines.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JASSM Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JASSM program identified the same three critical technologies for
both the baseline and ER variants--composite materials, global
positioning system anti-spoofing receiver module, and stealth/
signature reduction--and indicated all three are mature.
Design Maturity:
The JASSM program will not achieve design stability until it can
demonstrate that the missile can perform reliably. According to the
program, all of the design drawings have been released, however the
program office did not provide data on the number of drawings because
the government is not acquiring drawings as a contract deliverable.
According to the Program Office, the contractor has total system
performance responsibility and guarantees the missile performance.
Following the 2007 Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical cost
growth threshold, the JASSM program office conducted a series of ground
and flight tests. Fourteen out of 16 flight tests were successful. The
successful ground and flight test results contributed to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
certification of a restructured JASSM program. The JASSM program has
implemented plans to address reliability problems and missile
procurements beyond Lot 7 are contingent upon continued demonstrations
of improved reliability. September 2008 flight tests for both the
baseline JASSM and the JASSM-ER were successful. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has directed the Air
Force to conduct a Defense Acquisition Board meeting prior to the
anticipated Lot 8 contract award to review the missile and its progress
on the reliability growth curve.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the program does not
collect statistical process control data. The program office stated
that the contractor collects limited statistical process control data
from its vendors, but it does not formally report the data to the Air
Force under JASSM's contract terms. The program office stated it
reviews production data during monthly program management reviews.
The Air Force has noted that previous independent reviews found
reliability issues primarily driven by supplier quality control
problems. However, program officials believe that none of the
manufacturing processes that affect critical system characteristics are
currently a problem. Additionally, the manufacturer now tracks
suppliers' performance in the delivery and performance of various
components and subassemblies of the JASSM.
Other Program Issues:
The Air Force has 1053 missiles on contract (Lots 1-7) including 111
baseline missiles that were put on contract in June 2008 for $107
million; 779 have been delivered to date. Integrated testing is ongoing
for the ER variant and low-rate initial production is scheduled to
begin in 2010. The program office has scheduled 16 initial operational
test and evaluation events to be conducted prior to the start of ER
variant deliveries in 2011.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
the government has assumed an increased role in configuration
management oversight. In addition, increased manpower will be provided
to review and improve subcontractor production and quality assurance
practices. The Air Force is concerned about the manufacture of the
current fuze and program resources have been devoted to increasing
production processes and quality. Overall missile reliability will be
demonstrated through lot-based flight tests, with 50+ flights scheduled
for the next 2 years. The JASSM-ER program has successfully completed
four flight tests and will continue its Integrated Test period in 2009
to support an Operational Assessment and a 2010 low-rate initial
production milestone decision. Technical comments were also provided
and incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted
Sensor System (JLENS).
Source: JLENS Product Office.
[End of figure]
The Army's JLENS is designed to provide over-the-horizon detection and
tracking of land attack cruise missiles and other targets. The Army is
developing JLENS in two spirals. Spiral 1 is complete and served as a
test bed to demonstrate initial concept. Spiral 2 consists of two
aerostats with advanced sensors for surveillance and tracking as well
as mobile mooring stations, communication payloads, and processing
stations. JLENS provides surveillance and engagement support to other
systems, such as PAC-3 and MEADS. We assessed Spiral 2.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Development start: 8/05;
Design review: 12/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Low-rate decision: 3/11;
Full-rate decision: 6/13;
Initial capability: 9/13;
Last procurement: 2020.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,139.3 million:
Procurement: $4,660.6 million:
Total funding: $5,874.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 14:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2005: $1,936.8;
Latest 12/2007: $1,965.6;
Percent change: 1.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2005: $4,431.6;
Latest 12/2007: $4,660.6;
Percent change: 5.2.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2005: $6,437.8;
Latest 12/2007: $6,700.3;
Percent change: 4.1.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2005: $402.361;
Latest 12/2007: $418.771;
Percent change: 4.1.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2005: 16;
Latest 12/2007: 16;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2005: 97;
Latest 12/2007: 97;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
The program began development in August 2005 with one of its five
critical technologies mature. The program has reduced the number of
technologies from five to four. Two are mature, while two are
approaching maturity. All technologies are expected to be mature in
late 2010. Although the program released 88 percent of its engineering
drawings in December 2008 at critical design review, risks for redesign
remain until technologies demonstrate full maturity. The
synchronization of JLENS development with the Army's effort to
integrate the program with its Air and Integrated Missile Defense
(IAMD) program also poses a risk to the program's schedule.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JLENS Program:
Technology Maturity:
JLENS entered system development in August 2005 with only one of its
five critical technologies mature. Since that time, the program has
combined two of their critical technologies, the communications payload
and the processing group, into one critical technology called the
communications processing group. The communications processing group,
which includes radios and fiber optic equipment and also serves as the
JLENS operations center, has reached full maturity, along with the
platform, which includes the aerostat, mobile mooring station, power
and fiber optic data transfer tethers, and ground support equipment.
Both sensors, the fire control radar and the surveillance radar, have
not yet reached maturity. The program expects to demonstrate these
technologies by late 2010.
According to program officials, JLENS development predominately
requires integration of existing technologies, and therefore all have
been demonstrated as mature. However, components of the JLENS platform
and the two sensors will require demonstration in the JLENS operational
environment.
While many of the JLENS sensor technologies have legacy components, key
hardware that proves functionality, such as the surveillance radar's
element measurement system that provides data for signal processing,
have yet to be demonstrated in the size and weight needed for
integration on the aerostat. Tests to characterize and integrate the
fire control radar and surveillance radar components are currently
being conducted in the program's system integration laboratory.
Furthermore, sensor software items related to signal processing,
timing, and control, as well as element measurement, are not yet
mature.
Design Maturity:
The critical design review was completed in December 2008. At that
time, the program office released 88 percent of the estimated 6,304
engineering drawings, and expects to release the remainder of its
drawings in 2009. The program has held a number of prime item critical
design reviews during the year in preparation for the critical design
review. However, until the maturity of the JLENS prime items have been
demonstrated, the potential for design changes remains.
The JLENS program continues to define, develop, and design the mobile
mooring station used to anchor the aerostat during operations. The
mobile station is based on a fixed mooring station design; however, the
program has yet to demonstrate its mobility. The design parameters of
the vehicle that will transport the mobile asset have not yet been
identified. A new "survivability" operational requirement by the Army
is expected to add armor to the vehicles that will transport the mobile
mooring station. According to program officials, if the survivability
requirement is levied on JLENS, the combined weight of the mooring
station and the up-armored vehicle will exceed the maximum allowed for
roads in the United States and in a operational theater, requiring a
redesign prior to incorporation of the up-armor.
Other Program Issues:
The cost and schedule of the JLENS program could be affected by its
synchronization with the Army's IAMD program. The IAMD program is
tasked with developing a standard set of interfaces between systems
such as JLENS and other sensors, weapons, and the battle management,
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
components to provide a common air picture. As part of the IAMD
strategy, the Army plans to extend the system development and
demonstration phase of the JLENS program by approximately twelve months
and delay low rate initial production until fiscal year 2012. According
to program officials, the schedule extension and associated cost growth
would cause the JLENS program to breach its cost and schedule
baselines:
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JLENS program office
provided technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Strike Fighter:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Joint Strike Fighter.
Source: Lockheed Martin: BF-1 (STOVL Variant).
[End of figure]
The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy
strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S.
allies, with maximum commonality to minimize costs. The carrier-
suitable variant will complement the Navy's F/A-18 E/F. The
conventional takeoff and landing variant will primarily be an air-to-
ground replacement for the Air Force's F-16 and the A-10 aircraft, and
will complement the F-22A. The short takeoff and vertical landing
variant will replace the Marine Corps' F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 11/96;
Development start: 10/01;
Design review: 6/07;
Low-rate decision: 6/07;
GAO review: 1/09;
Initial capability USMC: 3/12;
Initial capability USAF: 3/13;
Initial capability USN: 3/15;
Last procurement: 2034.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Arlington, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $10,223.2 million:
Procurement: $193,881.1 million:
Total funding: $204,465.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 2,429:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/2001: $37,645.7;
Latest 09/2008: $46,840.8;
Percent change: 24.4.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/2001: $167,016.3;
Latest 09/2008: $197,437.3;
Percent change: 18.2.
Total program cost;
As of 10/2001: $206,410.3;
Latest 09/2008: $244,772.1;
Percent change: 18.6.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/2001: $72.020;
Latest 09/2008: $99.663;
Percent change: 38.4.
Total quantities;
As of 10/2001: 2,866;
Latest 09/2008: 2,456;
Percent change: -14.3.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/2001: 175;
Latest 09/2008: 125;
Percent change: -28.6.
[End of table]
Five of the eight JSF critical technologies are mature and three are
approaching maturity. Though none of the variants demonstrated design
stability at their design review, more than 90 percent of the
engineering drawings for each variant have now been released. The
program collects data to manage manufacturing maturity, but production
inefficiencies and a lack of flight testing could result in costly
future changes to design and manufacturing processes. While the program
began testing its first production representative prototype in June
2008, a fully integrated, capable aircraft will not begin flight
testing for 4 years. Despite these concerns, the program plans to
accelerate production. Program costs have increased and the schedule
has slipped since last year. A recent independent cost estimate
projects even greater cost increases and schedule delays through fiscal
year 2015.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JSF Program:
Technology Maturity:
Five of the JSF's eight critical technologies are mature. The remaining
three--mission systems integration, prognostics and health management,
the radar--are approaching maturity.
Design Maturity:
The program reported that it had released over 90 percent of planned
engineering drawings for each of the three variants indicating that the
designs are generally stable. While the designs appear stable, the late
release of design drawings led to manufacturing inefficiencies from
which the program is still recovering.
Production Maturity:
The JSF program's production processes are not mature. While the
program collects information on the maturity of manufacturing
processes, a good practice, only about 12 percent of its critical
manufacturing processes are in statistical control. Projected labor
hours have increased about 40 percent since 2007. The late release of
drawings and subsequent supplier problems have led to late part
deliveries, delaying the program schedule and forcing inefficient
manufacturing processes. Program officials do not expect these
inefficiencies to be fully corrected until 2010, during its third low
rate production lot.
The JSF designs are still not fully proven and tested. Flight testing,
begun in late 2006, was only about two percent completed as of November
2008. The program began testing its first production representative
prototype--a short takeoff vertical landing variant flown in
conventional mode--in June 2008. A fully integrated, capable aircraft
is not expected to enter flight testing until 2012, increasing risks
that problems found may require design and production changes and
retrofits of completed aircraft.
Other Program Issues:
The program continues to experience significant cost increases and
schedule delays. A recent independent cost estimate identified
additional funding requirements for system development of as much as
$7.44 billion through fiscal year 2016. This would increase the total
development costs 14 percent from $44.3 billion to $51.81 billion. The
estimating team also projected a three year extension in system
development. Separately, the program office has projected that
development costs will increase by approximately $2.43 billion to
address cost overruns on the airframe and engine contracts and to pay
for a one-year schedule extension. The independent cost estimate was
higher than the program office estimate because it also included (1)
the alternate engine effort, (2) higher contractor engineering staff
levels, (3) additional software growth, (4) an expanded flight test
program, and (5) more labor hours to manufacture aircraft. Program
officials argue that costs will be lower than the independent estimate
because, among other things, they believe the program has made
substantial progress in software development and has invested heavily
in advanced simulation labs intended to reduce risk.
Despite the program's continued manufacturing problems and the infancy
of the flight test program, DOD officials want to accelerate production
by 169 aircraft between fiscal years 2010 and 2015. This may require up
to $33.5 billion in additional procurement funding in those years. We
believe this more aggressive production approach is optimistic and
risky.
Program Office Comments:
The program noted that JSF's technical, software, production processes,
and testing maturity are tracking to plan and substantially exceeding
standards set in past programs. The manufacturing fit and quality of
the jets are unprecedented and production processes are improving with
each jet. The program's second prototype test aircraft flew on the
schedule established two-years prior. Software development is 65
percent complete (twelve million lines) in accordance with the spiral
development plan/schedule and with record-setting code-writing
efficiencies. The software demonstrates stability across multiple
mission system subsystems. Systems integration testing continues on
schedule through the use of flight tests, a flying lab, and over
150,000 hours of ground labs testing. A fully integrated mission
systems jet is scheduled to fly in 2009. The latest DOD independent
cost estimate increased little from the one of four years ago. The
second production lot contract was signed for a price below the cost
model prediction. The program's plan for incremental blocks of
capability balances cost, schedule and risk.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS
AMF):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-
Station (JTRS AMF).
Source: JTRS AMF”Airborne/Maritime Fixed Station ’Notional“.
[End of figure]
DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a
central acquisition authority that cuts across the military services.
Program and product offices develop hardware and software for users
with similar requirements. The AMF program will develop radios and
associated equipment for integration into nearly 160 different types of
aircraft, ships, and fixed stations.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Pre-SDD competitive contract award: 9/04;
Development start: 3/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Design review: 7/09;
Production decision: 11/11.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Corp.
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,375.3 million:
Procurement: $6,026.0 million:
Total funding: $7,401.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 11,052:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of: NA;
Latest 01/2009: $1,887.9;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of: NA;
Latest 01/2009: $6,025.7;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of: NA;
Latest 01/2009: $7,913.6;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of: NA;
Latest 01/2009: $.712;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of: NA;
Latest 01/2009: 11,107;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of: NA;
Latest 01/2009: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
JTRS AMF began system development in March 2008 with all five critical
technologies approaching full maturity. An independent technology
readiness assessment conducted prior to the start of system development
found that all five critical technologies had been demonstrated in a
relevant environment and were approaching full maturity. The Under
Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology concurred with those
findings, but expressed concern about the maturity of four technologies
being developed by the JTRS Network Enterprise Domain program, on which
JTRS AMF is dependent. The Under Secretary's office recommended that
independent technical assessments of those technologies be conducted.
The JTRS Network Enterprise Domain will implement the recommendation in
future technical evaluations. The next major review of the program will
be its critical design review, planned for July 2009.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JTRS AMF Program:
Technology Maturity:
JTRS AMF obtained milestone B certification and began system
development in March 2008 with all five critical technologies
approaching full maturity. During 2006 and 2007, an independent
technology readiness assessment was completed by the Army to support a
decision on whether or not the program was ready to begin system
development. The technology readiness assessment found that all
critical technologies had been demonstrated in a relevant environment.
An independent review team representing the Under Secretary of Defense
for Science and Technology reviewed the technology readiness assessment
and concurred with those findings.
However, the Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology also
expressed concern about four technologies being developed by the JTRS
Network Enterprise Domain program, on which JTRS AMF is dependent.
These technologies include waveforms and network management services.
To address this concern, the Under Secretary recommended that the JTRS
Joint Program Executive Office conduct an independent technical
assessment of the Network Enterprise Domain's waveforms, networking,
and network management approaches. In addition, the Under Secretary
recommended that a technology readiness assessment be conducted on the
networking and Mobile User Objective System waveforms and network
management software to show that they are mature before being inserted
into the JTRS AMF program. According to program officials, these
recommendations will be implemented by the JTRS Network Enterprise
Domain program in future technical evaluations.
Prior to the start of system development, the JTRS AMF program took
steps to develop key product knowledge. In 2004, the program awarded
competitive system design contracts to two industry teams led by Boeing
and Lockheed Martin to help mitigate technical risks and address key
integration challenges. DOD has incorporated a similar approach in its
acquisition policies.
Other Program Issues:
The JTRS AMF radio set must meet the network and computer security
requirements as specified by the National Security Agency (NSA) JTRS
Unified INFOSEC Criteria (UIC) and obtain NSA certification. While this
is a high-risk area that may have negative effect on program costs and
schedule if not completed, program officials expressed confidence that
the program's risk mitigation strategy and plan sufficiently reduce
this risk to an acceptable level for obtaining NSA approval of a
certifiable security architecture. Current AMF program critical design
review is planned for July 2009.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on our draft, the program office generally concurred with
our findings and offered technical comments for our consideration. We
incorporated the technical comments where appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR).
Source: JPEO JTRS.
[End of figure]
DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with select radios and also increase communications and
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across
the services, while product offices are developing radio hardware and
software for users with similar requirements. The JTRS Ground Mobile
Radio office, within the JTRS Ground Domain program office, is
developing radios for ground vehicles.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 9/97;
Development start: 6/02;
Design review: 12/07;
New acquisition program baseline: 1/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Production decision: 10/10;
Initial capability: 2/12.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: The Boeing Company:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $335.5 million:
Procurement: $15,200.6 million:
Total funding: $15,536.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 86,512:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 06/2002: $985.0;
Latest 12/2007: $1,399.8;
Percent change: 42.1.
Procurement cost;
As of 06/2002: $15,841.6;
Latest 12/2007: $15,200.6;
Percent change: -4.0.
Total program cost;
As of 06/2002: $16,826.6;
Latest 12/2007: $16,600.3;
Percent change: -1.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 06/2002: $.155;
Latest 12/2007: $.192;
Percent change: 23.4.
Total quantities;
As of 06/2002: 108,388;
Latest 12/2007: 86,652;
Percent change: -20.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 06/2002: 55;
Latest 12/2007: 114;
Percent change: 107.3.
[End of table]
Twelve of JTRS GMR's 20 critical technologies are now mature, 7 are
nearing maturity, and 1 is still immature. According to the program
office, the design is stable and the first two engineering development
models were delivered in September 2008. However, until the remaining
critical technologies are demonstrated in a realistic environment, the
potential for design changes remains. The cost and content of the
program continues to change. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, has directed the program to
replace its January 2008 acquisition program baseline with a revised
baseline supported by a new cost estimate. In addition, two waveforms
previously cut from the program have been reinstated. Program officials
report that GMR is on track to complete the Security Verification Test
in fiscal year 2010 to receive the system security certification.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JTRS GMR Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JTRS GMR program started system development in 2002 with none of
its 20 critical technologies mature. Currently, 19 critical
technologies are either mature or approaching maturity. The remaining
immature critical technology--bridging/retransmission software--is
currently in development and, according to the program office, will be
implemented and demonstrated in upcoming Integrated Builds.
Design Maturity:
The design of the JTRS GMR currently appears stable. The program held
its critical design review in December 2007 and reported that all of
the expected design drawings were releasable at that time. However, the
potential for design changes remains. All the program's critical
technologies have not been demonstrated in a realistic environment and
the content of the program has changed. In September 2008, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
directed the program to reinstate two waveforms that were previously
cut from the program.
Production Maturity:
The program has reported that approximately 77 percent of its critical
manufacturing processes were expected to be in statistical control when
the program makes its low-rate production decision in 2010. However,
program office staff recently reported that the program office was
working with the contractor to obtain an updated estimate of processes
that will be in statistical control at the time of the low-rate
production decision. By not having all processes in statistical
control, there is a greater risk that the radio will not be produced
within cost, schedule, and quality targets.
The JTRS GMR program is already producing pre-engineering and
engineering-development models for use in testing. The Army's Future
Combat Systems program has procured 121 GMR pre-engineering development
model sets, which were installed on Bradley, Abrams and High Mobility
Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle platforms, and has ordered 153 GMR
engineering development model sets. According to the JTRS GMR program
office, the first two engineering development models were delivered in
September 2008.
Other Program Issues:
The JTRS program was restructured in 2006, and in January 2008 the GMR
Acquisition Program Baseline was revised reflecting this restructure.
The program office has been measuring performance against this January
2008 baseline. In August 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics completed an in-depth review of
the overall JTRS enterprise and each JTRS program. As a result, the
Under Secretary directed the program to update the GMR cost estimate to
support another updated Acquisition Program Baseline. DOD's Cost
Analysis Improvement Group was tasked with developing an independent
cost estimate for the GMR program. In addition, the program is to
develop a backup plan to address potential schedule slips. The Under
Secretary also directed the program to address potential performance
issues: specifically it is to reinstate two waveforms and to
collaborate with other DOD departments to address the need for lab and
field tests of at least 30 nodes for the Wideband Networking Waveform.
The cost of the JTRS GMR program continues to grow. According to the
program office, the primary drivers of recent increases in program's
estimated cost were (1) the implementation of design changes to respond
to the National Security Agency's assessment of vulnerability; (2)
higher Soldier Radio Waveform development and porting costs than
estimated in the contractor's 2006 proposal; and (3) contractor
performance in hardware and software development. Although research and
development costs have continued to increase, the program office stated
that procurement cost estimates have decreased slightly since it
developed its January 2008 acquisition program baseline. According to
program office officials, the decrease was based on revised estimates
and data on the actual costs of engineering development models.
However, current estimated program acquisition unit costs are still
almost 20 percent higher than originally estimated for the 2002
Milestone B Acquisition Program Baseline.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office provided technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate.
[End of section]
JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS).
Source: General Dynamics C4 Systems.
[End of figure]
The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and
networking capabilities. The JTRS HMS product office, within the JTRS
Ground Domain program office, is developing handheld, manpack, and
small form fit radios. The program includes two concurrent phases of
development. Phase I includes select small form fit radios, while Phase
II includes small form fit radios with enhanced security as well and
handheld and manpack variants. We assessed both phases.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program/Development start: 4/04;
Design review Phase I: 4/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Design review Phase II: 4/09;
Low-rate decision Phase I: 11/09;
Low-rate decision Phase II: 11/11.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $71.7 million:
Procurement: $2,189.3 million:
Total funding: $2,261.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 95,551:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2004: $526.1;
Latest 12/2007: $833.5;
Percent change: 58.4.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2004: $9,168.5;
Latest 12/2007: $2,189.3;
Percent change: -76.1.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2004: $9,694.5;
Latest 12/2007: $3,022.7;
Percent change: -68.8.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2004: $.029;
Latest 12/2007: $.031;
Percent change: 7.1.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2004: 329,574;
Latest 12/2007: 95,961;
Percent change: -70.9.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2004: 85;
Latest 12/2007: 93;
Percent change: 9.4.
[End of table]
The critical technologies for JTRS HMS have changed as a result of the
program's 2006 restructuring. Currently, Phase I includes two critical
technologies, both of which are approaching maturity. Critical
technologies for Phase II have yet to be defined. Developing multiple
layers of communication security and obtaining National Security Agency
certification continues to be a challenge, along with designing the two-
channel handheld to meet size, weight, power, and thermal requirements.
The key networking waveform has been tested in a field experiment, but
program officials report that it will take additional efforts to
transition the waveform to an operational platform. The program has
completed critical design review for Phase I, and is scheduled to
complete critical design review for Phase II in 2009. The program has
delivered 230 prototype radios for testing and evaluation.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JTRS HMS Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JTRS HMS program started system development in 2004 with only one
of its six critical technologies mature. In 2006, the program was
restructured to include two concurrent phases of development. Phase I,
which intends to maximize the use of commercial off the shelf
components and products, includes two critical technologies--logical
partitioning and software power management. The program has not
completed an independent technology assessment, but program officials
note that both technologies are approaching maturity.
Critical technologies for Phase II, which includes the handheld and
manpack variants, will be defined in a technology readiness assessment
scheduled to begin in 2010. The development of the Phase II two-channel
handheld continues to pose a significant risk for the program. The risk
stems from trying to meet size, weight, power, and thermal requirements
with current technologies. DOD and program leadership are currently
assessing the viability of this radio as well as alternatives as part
of the Ground Domain Fielding Strategy. The program has added a
nonembedded and embedded variant of its Small Form Fit-C radio,
referred to as the Rifleman Radio, to Phase I. This radio will support
protected communications within fire teams and squads.
Design Maturity:
Phase II design, which includes the handheld and manpack variants, is
not stable. The program has completed critical design review for Phase
I, and is scheduled to complete critical design review for Phase II in
2009. The program has released about 90 percent of the Phase I drawings
and about 37 percent of Phase II drawings to the manufacturer. It is
important to note that drawings for the two-channel handheld are not
included in the Phase II drawing count. The reason for this exclusion
is that the two-channel handheld effort has been put on hold for fiscal
year 2009.
Production Maturity:
The program has identified 24 critical manufacturing processes, but the
program only collects statistical process control data for 3 of them.
According to program officials, the program is implementing key
processes to mitigate production risks, which include participation in
contractor risk review boards, emphasizing cost and earned value
management, and overall rigor of the system engineering process. The
program also noted that there are no unique processes associated with
the HMS program. However, by not having all the key processes in
control, there is a greater risk that the radio will not be produced
within cost, schedule, or quality targets. The program has delivered
230 prototype radios for testing and evaluation, which includes 84
small form fit prototypes for various FCS platforms.
Other Program Issues:
While JTRS was originally intended to replace virtually all legacy
radios, this is no longer a practical or affordable investment strategy
for DOD and the services. JTRS is still critical to networking the
force, but the strategy of a wholesale replacement of radios is being
reconsidered. The unit cost for the HMS program will vary significantly
by form factor, from an estimated $1,800 for the Rifleman Radio to
about $55,000 for the manpack radio. Given these high costs, DOD and
the services have scaled back the number of JTRS radios they plan to
buy. The total planned quantity of JTRS HMS radios was recently reduced
from an original baseline of about 330,00---established in May 2004---
to about 96,000, a 71 percent decrease.
Agency Comments:
Program officials noted that they are in the process of updating their
Acquisition Program Baseline and Selected Acquisition Report to show an
increase in quantities of 120,000 radios. This increase is attributed
to requirements identified for the Small Form Fit Factor-C radio also
known as the Rifleman Radio. In addition, the program provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System Network Enterprise Domain:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Joint Tactical Radio System Network Enterprise Domain.
Source: JTRS Network Enterprise Domain.
[End of figure]
DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a
central acquisition authority. The Network Enterprise Domain (NED) is
responsible for the development of products or software applications
that will operate on the JTRS radios. We assessed the Wideband
Networking Waveform (WNW) and Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW), which
provide key advanced networking capability.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 6/02;
GAO review: 1/09;
WNW: 6/09;
SRW: 12/09;
MUOS: 8/10;
ENM: 10/12.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Various:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $787.8 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $787.8 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 06/2002: $947.4;
Latest 08/2008: $2,031.7;
Percent change: 114.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 06/2002: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 06/2002: $947.4;
Latest 08/2008: $2,031.7;
Percent change: 114.4.
Program unit cost;
As of 06/2002: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 06/2002: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 06/2002: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The NED program develops legacy and networking waveforms and Network
Enterprise Services for the JTRS radios. The one critical technology
element for both WNW and SRW--the Mobile Ad Hoc Networking--is
approaching maturity and is expected to be fully mature by August 2010.
The program office reported progress in developing and testing the WNW
and SRW waveforms. The next critical milestone for both is formal
qualification tests. These tests are scheduled for June 2009 and
December 2009 for WNW and SRW, respectively. NED is a software
development effort and does not have design drawings. The NED program
requirement is for delivery of a complete set of software requirements,
design, and test documentation as well as the code. Officials assess
waveform design stability and maturity using software development
metrics and reported low requirements and design volatility for both
waveforms.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
JTRS NED Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JTRS NED program's one critical technology element for both WNW and
SRW--the Mobile Ad Hoc Networking--is approaching maturity and is
expected to be fully mature by August 2010. JTRS NED is a software
development effort, and the major milestones are the formal
qualification tests (FQT). The first FQT for SRW was successfully
performed for the Unattended Ground Sensor/Non-Line of Sight-Launch
System ending in September 2008, and NED will be conducting other FQTs
for other domains in 2009. Similarly, WNW was successfully demonstrated
during a field experiment ending in October 2008 that included a multi-
subnet test by Future Combat Systems personnel. The final version of
WNW is expected to complete FQT in June 2009.
The SRW effort has experienced cost growth and schedule inefficiencies
because the contractor underestimated the complexity of the work and
could not close their software deficiency reports. However, the program
office reports that both SRW and WNW software developments have, for
the most part, added the necessary functionality and are currently in
the Software Integration Testing phase of the software development
lifecycle.
Design Maturity:
We could not assess design stability, because the JTRS NED is a
software development effort and does not have design drawings. Instead,
program officials indicated that waveform design stability and maturity
are evaluated using metrics such as waveform requirements and design
volatility, software lines of code counts, and software defect reports.
The NED program office reported that since December 2007, the waveforms
show less than 5 percent requirements volatility and less than 1
percent design volatility.
Other Program Issues:
In a September 2008 acquisition decision memorandum, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed
the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office to work with other DoD offices
to assess resources and identify the funding needed for a 30-node or
larger test of the WNW and Ground Mobile Radio in fiscal year 2009.
That test is currently scheduled for May 2009. WNW and SRW are key
enabling technologies for Future Combat Systems.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office provided technical comments which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program.
Source: LHA-6 Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Navy's LHA 6 will replace the aging LHA 1 Tarawa-class amphibious
assault ships. The LHA 6 is a modified variant of the LHD 8 amphibious
assault ship which is currently under construction. The LHA 6 features
enhanced aviation capabilities and is designed to support all Marine
aviation assets in the Expeditionary Strike Group, including the V-22
Osprey and the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter. Fabrication of the LHA 6
modules began in February 2008 and ship delivery is anticipated for
February 2013.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 7/01;
Development start: 5/05;
Design review: 10/05;
Production decision: 1/06;
Construction start: 12/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Ship delivery: 2/13;
Initial capability: 2/14.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Ship Systems:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $28.4 million:
Procurement: $154.8 million:
Total funding: $183.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 0:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 01/2006: $213.4;
Latest 08/2008: $217.0;
Percent change: 1.7.
Procurement cost;
As of 01/2006: $2,858.1;
Latest 08/2008: $3,069.6;
Percent change: 7.4.
Total program cost;
As of 01/2006: $3,071.5;
Latest 08/2008: $3,286.6;
Percent change: 7.0.
Program unit cost;
As of 01/2006: $3,071.497;
Latest 08/2008: $3,286.591;
Percent change: 7.0.
Total quantities;
As of 01/2006: 1;
Latest 08/2008: 1;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 01/2006: 146;
Latest 08/2008: 151;
Percent change: 3.4.
[End of table]
Cost data do not yet reflect the change in ship delivery date.
DOD and the Navy assert that there are no critical technologies
associated with the LHA 6 program because all critical systems and
equipment utilize technologies that have been developed for existing
Navy programs. The program did identify six key subsystems needed to
achieve full LHA 6 capabilities. Development of the machinery control
system, which the program office considers its biggest remaining
technology risk, will begin in 2009. Approximately 50 percent of the
ship's detail design drawings are currently releasable. Fabrication
began on modules of the ship in February 2008, though the official
start of construction was delayed to December. Ship delivery is
expected to be delayed from August 2012 to February 2013 due to
productivity and workforce management issues at the shipyard. Officials
indicated that any cost growth associated with this delay has not yet
been determined.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
LHA 6 Program:
Technology Maturity:
In 2005, DOD and the Navy concluded that all LHA 6 components and
technologies were fully mature. Although not considered critical
technologies, the program did identify six key subsystems needed to
achieve full LHA 6 capabilities. Five of these are mature and installed
on numerous Navy ships and do not require modification for installation
on the LHA 6. The sixth, the Joint Precision Approach and Landing
System (JPALS), a Global Positioning System (GPS)-based aircraft
landing system, is not mature. However, JPALS, which will be used to
support all-weather landings of next-generation fleet aircraft, is not
needed to achieve LHA 6's operational requirements and the ship's
construction is not dependent on JPALS availability.
Previously, the program office has identified the machinery control
system as a subsystem that may pose some risk. Development of this
system is scheduled to begin by March 2009. The LHA 6 machinery control
system will be based largely on the LHD 8 system, using 99 percent of
its software code. While the LHA 6 system will be less complex and have
fewer signals than the LHD 8 system, the development of the machinery
control system on the LHD 8 was delayed and program officials have
identified it as that ship's biggest technology risk.
Design Stability:
About 50 percent of the ship's detailed design drawings are complete.
Approximately 45 percent of the LHA 6 design is expected to be based on
the LHD 8. Changes from the LHD 8 to the LHA 6 include the expansion of
the aviation hangar and removal of the well deck to accommodate more
aircraft and create additional aviation fuel capacity. In October 2005,
the Navy conducted a design review of the LHA 6 and determined its
preliminary design was stable. However, program officials indicated
that despite the similarities between the LHD 8 and the LHA 6,
modifications of the LHD 8 design for LHA 6 have caused the shipbuilder
to redraw rather than reuse more drawings than expected. This has
increased engineering hours and led to a subsequent delay in completing
design activities.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess production maturity because the shipbuilder does not
use statistical process controls.
Ship delivery for the LHA 6 is expected to be delayed from August 2012
to February 2013. The program's planned April 2008 review to determine
the shipyard's readiness to begin ship construction was postponed until
September due to workload management and productivity concerns at the
yard. Despite these concerns, the shipbuilder began construction on 25
of the ship's 191 units by August 2008--though not at the planned rate.
According to program officials, unit level readiness reviews have been
completed for all modules on which construction has begun and
construction is not proceeding out of sequence. The shipbuilder plans
to ramp up construction in December 2008; however, it is facing a short
supply of workers with critical craftsmanship skills and continues to
struggle with worker attendance and attrition.
Other Program Issues:
The LHA 6 has experienced $14.3 million in cost growth in the last year
due to a transfer of work between shipyards. In the fall of 2007, the
Navy authorized the shipbuilder to move some construction to Newport
News, Virginia, from the Gulf Coast yard, where a majority of the ship
will be constructed. As work transitioned between the yards, labor and
process inefficiencies resulted in cost growth.
Program Office Comments:
The Navy did not agree with GAO's assessment of design and production
knowledge. The Navy stated that the LHA 6 has a stable design that
meets requirements with sufficient detail design complete for its
production phase. In addition, the Navy noted the shipyard has
previously demonstrated mature production processes that are stable and
repeatable on LHA 6 and does not need to develop any new or modified
production techniques to construct LHA 6.
GAO Response:
For the purpose of this assessment, design stability is reached when 90
percent of the system's detailed design drawings are released. At the
time of this assessment, the LHA 6 had not yet reached this critical
level, and, in addition, the program did not complete design activities
as scheduled due to the addition of unplanned work. Further, as
indicated above, the shipbuilder continues to struggle with
productivity and capacity to construct the ship on schedule.
[End of section]
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
Source: Alion Science.
[End of figure]
The Navy's LCS is designed to perform mine countermeasures, anti-
submarine warfare, and surface warfare missions. It consists of the
ship itself--the seaframe--and the mission package it deploys. The Navy
plans to construct the first seven LCS seaframes in two unique designs.
The first seaframe (LCS 1) was delivered in September 2008, and the
Navy expects the second seaframe (LCS 2) to be delivered by September
2009. We assessed the first two seaframes (known as Flight 0). See
pages 107-108 for an assessment of LCS mission packages.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 9/02;
Development start: 6/04;
Production decision - first design: 12/04;
First Ship delivery: 9/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Second Ship delivery: 3rd-4thQ/FY09;
Initial capability: 6/11.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $354.6 million:
Procurement: $946.7 million:
Total funding: $1,301.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 2:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2004: $856.7;
Latest 07/2008: $2,147.9;
Percent change: 150.7.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2004: $455.5;
Latest 07/2008: $1,774.0;
Percent change: 289.5.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2004: $1,312.1;
Latest 07/2008: $3,921.9;
Percent change: 198.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2004: $328.035;
Latest 07/2008: $560.275;
Percent change: 70.8.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2004: 4;
Latest 07/2008: 7;
Percent change: 75.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2004: 41;
Latest 07/2008: 85;
Percent change: 107.3.
Baseline estimates above are for seaframe-related costs only. Research
and development funding includes detail design and construction of two
ships.
[End of table]
Fifteen of 19 critical technologies for the two seaframe designs are
fully mature, and 2 technologies are approaching maturity. The overhead
launch and retrieval system in the LCS 1 design and the aluminum
structure in the LCS 2 design are immature. The Navy also identified
watercraft launch and recovery as a major risk affecting both designs.
Final integration of mission package vehicles will not begin until 2010
with the LCS 1 seaframe. Acceptance trials for LCS 1 uncovered several
deficiencies. Most notably, the Navy found that LCS 1 may not meet
stability requirements in the event of critical damage. In response,
the Navy is taking steps to reduce the weight and increase the buoyancy
of the design. The Navy plans to award contracts for the next two
seaframes absent validated earned value management systems--needed to
ensure reliable cost and schedule data--in both LCS shipyards.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
LCS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Fifteen of 19 critical technologies for the two seaframe designs are
fully mature, and 2 technologies are approaching maturity. The overhead
launch and retrieval system in the LCS 1 design and the aluminum
structure in the LCS 2 design are immature. The Navy identified the
watercraft launch and recovery concept as a major risk to both seaframe
designs. This capability is essential to complete the LCS anti-
submarine warfare and mine countermeasures missions. According to the
Navy, industry watercraft launch and recovery designs are unproven. To
mitigate risk, the Navy is conducting launch and recovery modeling and
simulation, model basin testing, and experimentation and is encouraging
the seaframe industry teams to adopt similar approaches. Final
integration of mission package vehicles with each seaframe will not
occur until post-delivery test and trials--planned first for LCS 1 in
2010 using the mine countermeasures mission package. Any problems
detected could require redesign and costly rework, which could delay
the introduction of LCS to the fleet.
Design and Production Maturity:
The Navy assesses LCS design stability by monitoring changes to
requirements documents, execution of engineering change proposals, and
the completion of contract deliverables related to drawings, ship
specifications, and independent certification of the design.
Construction is monitored using earned value management and through
evaluation of manufacturing hours spent on rework, deficiencies
detected and corrected, and the number of test procedures performed.
The Navy adopted a concurrent design-build strategy for the first two
LCS seaframes, which has proven unsuccessful. Contributing challenges
included the implementation of new design guidelines, delays in major
equipment deliveries, and an unwavering focus on achieving schedule and
performance goals. These events drove low levels of outfitting, out-of-
sequence work, and rework--all of which increased construction costs.
Also, incomplete designs during construction led to weight increases
for both seaframes. According to the Navy, this weight growth
contributed to a higher than desired center of gravity on LCS 1 that
degraded the stability of the seaframe. In fact, an inclining
experiment performed during acceptance trials showed LCS 1 may not meet
Navy stability requirements for the damaged ship condition. The Navy is
taking steps to remove weight and implement stability improvements for
LCS 1, while also incorporating design changes for future seaframes.
Other Program Issues:
As part of LCS 1 acceptance trials, the Navy's Board of Inspection and
Survey (INSURV) identified 21 critical "starred" deficiencies and
recommended the Chief of Naval Operations authorize delivery of LCS 1
after correction or waiver of these deficiencies. According to Navy
officials, only 9 of these deficiencies were corrected prior to
delivery. Navy officials report that transiting the ship away from
Marinette, Wisconsin, prior to the winter freeze was a higher priority
than timely correction of starred deficiencies. The Navy intends to
correct remaining deficiencies during planned post-delivery maintenance
availabilities. The Navy plans to hold an INSURV review of LCS 2 upon
completion of construction and builder's trials for that seaframe.
Navy officials report that the earned value management systems in each
of the LCS shipyards do not meet Defense Contract Management Agency
requirements for validation. Thus, the cost and schedule data reported
by the prime contractors cannot be considered fully reliable by the
Navy when evaluating contractor cost proposals or negotiating for
construction of follow-on ships.
Program Office Comments:
The Navy stated the LCS program is delivering vital capabilities to the
fleet and will be a critical component of the Navy. It noted that LCS 1
was delivered September 18, 2008--6 years and 1 day after the LCS
program was established. In fiscal year 2009, the program will deliver
a second ship of a completely different design. According to the Navy,
while the initial cost and schedule objectives were overaggressive--and
necessitated a concurrent design and construction plan--they provided
the tension and urgency for these achievements, and lessons learned
will be applied to future shipbuilding programs. In August 2008, INSURV
evaluated LCS 1 and found it to be "capable, well-built, and inspection-
ready." The Navy stated it is leveraging lessons learned from LCS 1 and
LCS 2 to ensure future ship awards provide the right mix of:
capability and affordability.
[End of section]
Littoral Combat Ship - Mission Modules:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Littoral Combat Ship - Mission Modules.
Source: © Northrop Grumman Corporation.
[End of figure]
The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will perform mine
countermeasures, surface warfare and antisubmarine warfare missions
using modular mission packages. Packages include weapons and sensors
that operate from MH-60 helicopters or unmanned underwater, aerial, or
surface vehicles. Initial packages are partially capable. They include
engineering development models and some, but not all, systems planned.
Mission capability improves with each package delivered until it
reaches a baseline capability of production representative systems.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
LCS Program start: 5/04;
First MCM delivery: 9/07;
First SUW delivery: 7/08;
First ASW delivery: 9/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Milestone B- LCS: 6/10;
Initial capability MCM: 2011;
Initial capability ASW: 2011;
Initial capability SUW: 2013.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $274.2 million:
Procurement: $2,869.4 million:
Total funding: $3,143.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 58:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2007: $475.0;
Latest 11/2008: $780.3;
Percent change: 64.3.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2007: $3,147.8;
Latest 11/2008: $2,986.7;
Percent change: -5.1.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2007: $3,622.8;
Latest 11/2008: $3,767.0;
Percent change: 4.0.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2007: $56.607;
Latest 11/2008: $58.860;
Percent change: 4.0.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2007: 64;
Latest 11/2008: 64;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2007: NA;
Latest 11/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Above comparison of costs reported in 2007 and 2008 does not include
mission package common equipment, or the helicopter or vertical takeoff
and landing unmanned aerial vehicle.
[End of table]
Operation of the Mine Countermeasures (MCM), Surface Warfare (SUW), and
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) packages requires a total of 25 critical
technologies, including 13 sensors, 5 weapons, and 7 vehicles.
Technology development has proceeded more slowly than expected.
Individual mission systems in each package have experienced problems
requiring design changes and resulting in schedule delay. For example,
integration of MCM systems with the MH-60S helicopter has proved
challenging due to problems with the cable that tows the various
systems. Overall, the Navy will reach baseline capability for each
package between 1 and 2 years later than previously planned. The Navy
plans to procure 64 mission packages for use on 55 LCS seaframes.
Procurement has slowed to keep pace with seaframe acquisition.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
LCS Modules Program:
Technology Maturity:
Operation of the MCM, SUW, and ASW packages on the LCS requires a total
of 25 critical technologies, including 13 sensors, 5 weapons, and 7
vehicles. Of these technologies, 17 are currently mature and 8 are
nearing maturity.
The first of 24 MCM packages was delivered in September 2007 and
included 7 of 10 planned mission systems. Four systems are not yet
mature; two of these are struggling to reach full maturity. Officials
note the Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep is being
redesigned to address corrosion issues and the Rapid Airborne Mine
Clearance System requires design changes to perform in all
environmental conditions. An airborne mine countermeasures system was
decertified and its tow cable is being redesigned following the results
of testing with the helicopter. The Navy also decertified the Remote
Minehunting System during testing in 2007 due to reliability issues,
and, according to officials, results of a recent operational assessment
are pending. The Navy now plans to deliver the third and fourth mission
packages in fiscal year 2011 and has delayed delivery of the baseline
package until fiscal year 2012.
The first of 24 SUW packages was delivered in July 2008 and included 1
of 2 planned mission systems. The SUW package includes the fully mature
30mm gun and a variant of the Army's Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) system
(missile and launcher), which is nearing maturity. The first package
consisted of two gun engineering development models, without the NLOS
launcher or missiles. The NLOS design for LCS has not yet been
validated. Integration of the gun with LCS is not complete. A design
review for the gun module is scheduled for October 2009. Delivery of a
baseline package has been delayed to fiscal year 2013.
The first of 16 ASW packages was delivered in September 2008 and
included 4 of 10 planned mission systems. Three systems remain immature
including the Unmanned Surface Vehicle's Dipping Sonar, the Remotely
Towed Array and the Remotely Towed Array Source. Failure to develop
these technologies as expected could increase reliance on the MH-60R
helicopter. The Navy has delayed delivery of a second ASW package until
fiscal year 2011, and delayed baseline capability from fiscal year 2011
to 2013.
Other Program Issues:
The development cost of the LCS packages has increased by more than
$300 million, or 64 percent since last year. Procurement costs have
decreased for MCM, in part because the delivery of the more expensive
baseline capability has been delayed. Reductions in fiscal year 2008
and 2009 budget requests have slowed mission package procurement to
account for continuing delays in seaframe acquisition. The explanatory
statement accompanying DOD Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2009
Congress asked the Navy to develop a plan for fielding the MCM
capability independent of LCS. The program office indicates all
packages are currently scheduled to undergo operational assessments
with both LCS seaframe designs, beginning in June 2010. According to
program officials, in September 2008, the Navy conducted a shore based
integration exercise using simulated seaframe mission bays. Officials
note this activity accelerated MCM mission package integration with
both seaframes and reinforced previous crew training.
Program Office Comments:
Program officials noted that changes to the program between the 2008
and 2009 president's budgets resulted in an apparent increased
development cost. Costs for the SUW package bought in fiscal year 2009
were realigned from procurement to development to support technical and
operational evaluations. In addition, data provided to GAO for last
year's assessment did not include costs of common equipment that was
subsequently distributed among the MCM and ASW packages. The program
office acknowledges technical maturity challenges for some mission
systems and is working closely with mission system program offices to
resolve any issues. The program office is leading a coordinated test
approach to prove mission package capabilities and suitability for
fleet delivery. The program office also provided technical comments
that were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Longbow Apache Block III:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Longbow Apache Block III.
Source: Army ATTC Office, Fort Rucker; Apache PMO.
[End of figure]
The Army is inserting Block III enhancements into the AH-64D Longbow
Apache helicopter to ensure compatibility with the Future Combat
Systems and to provide the capability to simultaneously conduct
missions across the warfare spectrum. Apache Block III (AB3) upgrades
are expected to amplify performance, improve situational awareness,
enhance lethality, increase survivability, provide interoperability,
and prevent fratricide. Upgraded AH-64D Longbow Apache helicopters are
scheduled to enter service starting in 2011.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Development start: 7/06;
System design review: 1/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Production design review: 4/09;
Low-rate decision: 4/10;
Full-rate decision: 4/12;
Initial capability: 1/13.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $619.0 million:
Procurement: $6,616.7 million:
Total funding: $7,235.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 634:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2006: $1,116.0;
Latest 10/2008: $1,103.2;
Percent change: -1.2.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2006: $5,878.9;
Latest 10/2008: $6,616.7;
Percent change: 12.5.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2006: $6,995.0;
Latest 10/2008: $7,719.9;
Percent change: 10.4.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2006: $11.620;
Latest 10/2008: $12.081;
Percent change: 4.0.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2006: 602;
Latest 10/2008: 639;
Percent change: 6.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2006: 79;
Latest 10/2008: 78;
Percent change: -1.3.
[End of table]
The AB3 program entered system development in July 2006 with one
critical technology--an improved drive system--which is approaching
full maturity. The AB3 program will hold a series of design reviews
corresponding with the technical insertion phases of the program.
According to the program office, over 85 percent of the design drawings
were released when the program completed the first of these reviews in
January 2008. A subsequent production design review is scheduled for
April 2009. The AB3 program successfully completed the first flight of
the developmental aircraft in July 2008 as scheduled. This flight
initiated the development flight test program which will culminate with
a limited operational test in 2009. A decision was made this year to
incorporate a new fuselage at the start of full-rate production
increasing program costs by 10 percent and increasing unit costs by 4
percent.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
AB3 Program:
Technology Maturity:
The AB3 program entered system development in July 2006 with one
critical technology, an improved drive system, which is approaching
full maturity. This is the first time this technology will be used in a
helicopter transmission and it is expected to improve the available
power and reliability over the existing transmission. The Army has
plans for flight testing the improved drive system in fiscal year 2009.
The AB3 upgrade and modernization effort involves a time-phased series
of technical insertions. There are three phases. First, each Apache
aircraft will go to the factory for Block III modifications,which
completes most of the required hardware changes. The remaining two
phases of modifications consist of software improvements that can be
installed in the field, which eliminates the need to return the
aircraft to the factory, reduces the time an aircraft is away from the
unit, and increases training time for the soldier in the field.
Design Maturity:
The AB3 program has demonstrated design stability for the technology
insertion phase covered during its initial design review. The AB3
program has planned for critical design reviews before the start of
each technical insertion phase, and the success of each review
determines the ability to move forward. There are four critical design
reviews for the AB3 upgrades and modernization. According to the
program office, criteria within the AB3 contract require completion of
85-90 percent of the estimated design drawings for each phase before
AB3 can advance to the design review. The first critical design review
held in January 2008, which served as the system level review, met this
criterion. The second critical design review is scheduled for April
2009. Program officials estimate that 85-90 percent of the total design
drawings will be released during this review, which will serve as the
basis for the production decision scheduled for April 2010. The last
two design reviews, which involve software insertions, should not
significantly affect the total number of design drawings and are slated
for fiscal years 2012 and 2014.
Other Program Issues:
DOD decided to incorporate a new fuselage at the start of full rate
production due to a dramatic increase in the number of flight hours on
the existing Apache fleet. The costs associated with this new fuselage
led the program to move 6 of the planned 59 low-rate initial production
aircraft to later production lots. The fuselage change resulted in a 4
percent increase in unit cost and a 10 percent increase in total
program cost. Program officials believe that the cost increases will be
offset by operation and sustainment savings and reductions in
remanufacture times.
The weight of the AB3 aircraft is considered a moderate cost risk. The
current design is within its acceptable weight growth margin and
program efforts have resulted in a decrease of approximately 20 pounds
in the overall aircraft empty specification weight. AB3 program
officials continuously monitor weight and attempt to minimize weight
increases to the aircraft through contracted weight incentives,
technical performance measures, and weight savings initiative programs.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing
Platform.
Source: MPF(F) Program Office, notional concept.
[End of figure]
The Navy's Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) is one of six classes of ships
for the planned Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)--MFP(F)--
squadron that supports seabasing. The MLP would facilitate at-sea
vehicle and cargo transfer, support the employment of combat ready
forces from over the horizon, and serve as a staging area for supplies
that support activities on shore. The Navy plans to procure a total of
three MLP ships. The MLP--a new ship design for the Navy--is currently
in the technology development phase.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 6/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Development start: 6/09;
Lead ship award: 9/10;
Production readiness review: 9/12;
Lead ship delivery: 9/15.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $35.3 million:
Procurement: $3,042.2 million:
Total funding: $3,077.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 3:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of: NA;
Latest 08/2008: $83.3;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of: NA;
Latest 08/2008: $3,042.2;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of: NA;
Latest 08/2008: $3,125.5;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of: NA;
Latest 08/2008: $1,041.830;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of: NA;
Latest 08/2008: 3;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of: NA;
Latest 08/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The MLP program plans to have its five critical technologies mature by
design review. Of these technologies the skin-to-skin mooring and craft
interface are currently mature, the crane is nearing maturity, and the
remaining two technologies are immature. The program has developed a
risk reduction strategy--including component and subscale model testing
as well as full-scale at-sea demonstrations--to demonstrate the
maturity of the vehicle transfer system and dynamic positioning system
in at least a relevant environment by fiscal year 2010 when a milestone
review will be held to authorize the beginning of detailed design and
production. In addition, the program office plans to have its
shipbuilding contractors develop system designs and virtual prototypes
for ship construction as well as hull models for testing and analysis.
This will assist in reducing risk for design and production.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MPF(F)/MLP Program:
Technology Maturity:
The MLP program has identified five technologies as critical to the
functionality of the ship and plans to demonstrate their maturity in at
least a relevant environment before the milestone review to authorize
detailed design and production in 2010. The program office, as well as
the Office of Naval Research and DOD, have stated that the technologies
necessary for MLP do not represent high-risk development items as they
can be supported by the existing industrial base and have been used in
commercial and military operations. However, as the Navy has not
previously integrated the technologies into a single ship design, or
operated them in the expected environment, development and testing of
certain technologies is still required.
Of the five technologies identified, the most mature are the skin-to-
skin mooring and craft interface technologies, which allow connections
between other surface ships for loading and unloading cargo. These
technologies have been tested at sea through the use of surrogate
platforms. According to the program office, the pendulation control
system crane, which allows the transfer of 20-foot shipping containers
in varying weather conditions, is nearing maturity having been
demonstrated in a relevant environment in 2008. The Office of Naval
Research, in cooperation with the program office, is also developing a
second crane capable of transferring cargo in rougher weather
conditions, but the technology remains immature and is scheduled to
complete subscale testing in 2009. The vehicle transfer system and
dynamic positioning system, the final two technologies for the MLP, are
currently immature. The vehicle transfer system is a large ramp that
allows equipment and personnel to be transferred from heavy lift ships
to the MLP at sea before being loaded into landing craft for transfer
to shore. The primary challenge for this technology is transferring
cargo in different weather conditions while both ships are in motion.
The program conducted subscale testing and land-based full-scale tests
on the vehicle transfer system through 2008, and will conduct a full-
scale at-sea test in 2010. The program office will utilize modeling and
simulation as well as subscale tests to mature the dynamic positioning
system, which aligns the MLP with other ships using position sensors
and the propulsion system.
The program office plans to have shipbuilding contractors develop
system designs and virtual prototypes for ship construction as well as
hull models for testing and analysis. This will assist in reducing risk
for design and production as well as meeting the intent of the DOD's
prototyping policy as established in September 2007.
Other Program Issues:
According to the program manager, the Navy has changed the acquisition
approach for MPF(F) from a single acquisition squadron approach to an
incremental family of ships approach with separate acquisition programs
and milestone reviews. The first increment of the MPF(F) program
includes the acquisition of three MLP ships and three T-AKE class cargo
ships.
Program Office Comments:
The program office does not agree with GAO presentation of program data
in the knowledge graph. The MLP program will reach technology maturity
by the design review currently planned for June 2010 when all critical
technologies are expected to be demonstrated in a relevant environment
or better. DOD mandates this level of maturity as exit criteria for
Milestone B. The MLP program will also achieve design maturity by the
design review currently planned in June 2010, when the system design
will be almost 100 percent complete and stable. Production maturity
will be achieved at the production readiness review, currently planned
for September 2012. At the production readiness review, the program
will be able to demonstrate, based on the success criteria established
at Milestone B, that all production resources are in place for the MLP
shipbuilder to successfully commence ship construction.
GAO Response:
The knowledge graph is consistent with how we assess all programs, that
is, the extent that technology has been demonstrated in a realistic
environment. As the program office has not provided design or
production information, and a design review or production decision has
not yet occurred, progress towards achieving maturity on those areas is
not reflected in the graphic.
[End of section]
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Series of photographs: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle.
Source: Joint MRAP Vehicle Program Office.
[End of figure]
The MRAP is a joint program led by the Navy and Marine Corps to procure
armored vehicles to protect personnel from mine blasts and fragmentary
and direct-fire weapons. DOD is acquiring three categories of vehicles:
Category I for urban combat and ambulance missions; Category II for
convoy escort, troop transport, explosive ordinance disposal, and
ambulance missions; and Category III for clearing mines and improvised
explosive devices. The Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Special
Operations Command are acquiring vehicles.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Production decision: 1/07;
Contract awards: 2/07;
GAO review: 1/09.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Various:
Program office: Quantico, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2007: $232.5;
Latest 08/2008: $408.6;
Percent change: 75.8.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2007: $21,252.9;
Latest 08/2008: $26,265.5;
Percent change: 23.6.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2007: $22,453.2;
Latest 08/2008: $27,642.1;
Percent change: 23.1.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2007: $1.460;
Latest 08/2008: $1.745;
Percent change: 19.5.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2007: 15,374;
Latest 08/2008: 15,838;
Percent change: 3.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2007: 6;
Latest 08/2008: 6;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
The MRAP vehicle program is DOD's highest-priority acquisition program.
To meet an urgent, joint-service operational need, DOD is buying MRAP
vehicles as non-developmental items from multiple sources. For the most
part, all vendors are achieving planned production rates. DOD is still
grappling with a number of unknowns that could significantly increase
the total ownership cost. The program is concurrently producing the
baseline MRAP, developing and producing various upgrades, and
potentially seeking to produce a lighter, more agile version of the
vehicle. Since the MRAP is well into production and the program office
has not identified any outstanding technology, design, or production
issues, we have characterized each of these areas as mature.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MRAP Vehicle Program:
Production Maturity:
DOD is buying MRAP vehicles as non-developmental items and the
production processes appear mature. While we did not assess their
maturity using statistical process control data, we did assess the
ability of vendors to manufacture the required number of vehicles in
the time frames needed to achieve accelerated production and fielding
requirements. For the most part, all vendors have achieved planned
production rates and earlier concerns about obtaining sufficient
quantities of ballistic steel and tires appear to have been resolved.
Planned monthly production quantities will taper down as vendors near
the end of their contracted deliveries. The key challenge will be
ensuring availability of repair parts for vehicles in theater. DOD
appears to be balancing the demand for parts required for production
and demands from the field. The replacement rate for certain vehicle
components, such as tires, is still unknown at this time.
Other Program Issues:
In order to rapidly field the vehicles, DOD substantially compressed
both developmental and operational test and evaluation. The test
strategy helped to quickly identify the vehicles that protected crews,
but resulted in the fielding of vehicles with significant operational
issues. Automotive mobility and handling shortcomings identified during
testing have also been observed in the field. DOD continues to address
shortcomings through a combination of engineering changes and upgrades
introduced into the production line and modifications in the field.
Specific details on shortcomings cannot be addressed in this report
because they are classified.
Most of the logistical support for the MRAP is being provided by
contractor personnel, with more than 1,400 government civilians and
contractors supporting operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. The
program office is currently developing a plan to begin transitioning to
military personnel provided support in early fiscal year 2011.
According to program officials, readiness levels have consistently
exceeded the 90 percent benchmark across all theaters of operation. As
of December 2008, the readiness rate for Iraq was 93 percent, the rate
for Afghanistan was 87 percent, and the overall MRAP fleet readiness
was 92 percent. Program officials attributed this disparity to the
austere environment, rough terrain, and repair parts distribution
challenges in Afghanistan. As of October 2008, according to program
officials, the time to return a vehicle to fully mission capable once
repairs begin is 8.57 hours for Iraq and 7.42 hours for Afghanistan.
This is much better than the required time of 15 days or less.
DOD has yet to make decisions on the MRAP's role in its tactical
wheeled vehicle strategy, including how many of the fleet will remain
on active service and how many will be stored or turned over to
coalition forces. These decisions will ultimately impact the total cost
of ownership. Other DOD decisions will also affect the future of the
MRAP vehicle program. DOD plans to acquire and the Joint Program Office
recently issued a request for proposal for a lighter vehicle with MRAP-
level protection and off-road mobility. DOD is seeking mature items for
production and will expect offerors to present for preliminary
inspection two production representative vehicles between mid-to late-
February 2009. Purchase of the vehicles for further testing will be
contingent on their assessed potential to meet certain performance and
safety requirements.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Marine Corps provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS).
Source: Lockheed Martin, © 2008 Lockheed Martin.
[End of figure]
The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to
provide a worldwide, multi-service population of mobile and fixed-site
terminal users with an increase in narrowband communications capacity
and improved availability for small terminals. It is to replace the
Ultra High Frequency Follow-On (UFO) satellite system currently in
operation and provide interoperability with legacy terminals. MUOS
consists of a network of satellites and an integrated ground network.
We assessed both the space and ground segments.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 9/02;
Development start: 9/04;
Design review: 3/07;
Production decision: 2/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
On-orbit capability: 2/11;
Full capability: 3/14.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,373.3 million:
Procurement: $2,393.0 million:
Total funding: $3,776.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 4:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 09/2004: $3,523.0;
Latest 08/2008: $3,751.3;
Percent change: 6.5.
Procurement cost;
As of 09/2004: $2,931.3;
Latest 08/2008: $2,594.9;
Percent change: -11.5.
Total program cost;
As of 09/2004: $6,491.6;
Latest 08/2008: $6,411.3;
Percent change: -1.2.
Program unit cost;
As of 09/2004: $1,081.932;
Latest 08/2008: $1,068.547;
Percent change: -1.2.
Total quantities;
As of 09/2004: 6;
Latest 08/2008: 6;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 09/2004: 91;
Latest 08/2008: 102;
Percent change: 12.1.
[End of table]
All of the MUOS program's critical technologies are mature and the
design is currently stable. We could not assess production maturity
because the program does not collect statistical process control data.
The delivery of MUOS capabilities has become time-critical due to the
operational failures of two UFO satellites, creating a risk of a gap in
communications capabilities prior to the launch of the first MUOS
satellite. Additionally, the program office estimates a delay in the
MUOS launch due to difficulties with the development of the space
segment, such as flight unit qualification and test anomalies. These
development challenges could also cause costs to grow above the current
program baseline. Further, MUOS planned capabilities could be
significantly underutilized because of development problems with the
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MUOS Program:
Technology Maturity and Design Stability:
According to the program office, all critical technologies are mature
and the design is currently stable. The number of critical technologies
has varied over time, but all eight current critical technologies have
been demonstrated in a realistic environment. Additionally, the
satellite design is stable, as all expected design drawings have been
released. According to the program office, satellite weight--a design-
related risk item we reported on in our last assessment--has stabilized
at approximately 8,380 pounds with 86 percent of actual and qualified
hardware developed. As of December 2008, there was over 350 pounds
margin between the weight of the satellite and the capacity of the
launch vehicle.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the program does not
collect statistical process control data. However, it is collecting and
tracking data on manufacturing process defects to assess the maturity
of MUOS production. According to the program office, these data for the
components of the first satellite indicate high production maturity.
Other Program Issues:
The importance of the first MUOS launch has increased due to the
unexpected failures of two UFO satellites, one in June 2005 and another
in September 2006. As a result, UHF communication capabilities are
predicted to fall below the required availability level in December
2009, 15 months before the first MUOS satellite is to become
operational. The MUOS program office has begun mitigation efforts to
address this capability gap, including activating dual digital receiver
unit operations on a UFO satellite and leasing services from a
commercial vendor. The MUOS program office is also examining the
feasibility of expanded digital receiver unit and dual digital receiver
unit operations on the legacy payloads of the MUOS satellites.
In early 2009, the MUOS program began implementing an over-target
baseline to account for program schedule delays and contractor cost
increases. As a result of satellite development issues, the MUOS
program office estimates an 11-month delay--from March 2010 to February
2011--in the delivery of on-orbit capability from the first satellite.
According to the program office, this delay does not negatively affect
the full capability date for MUOS in 2014. Further, contractor costs
for space segment development have significantly increased, due to the
additional labor required to address issues related to satellite design
complexity, satellite weight, and satellite component test anomalies
and associated rework. According to the program office, as of October
2008, space segment costs were about $278 million, or about 48 percent,
over the contractor's initial estimate. Likewise, the integrated ground
segment costs, which include the MUOS waveform, while essentially on
schedule, was $60.3 million, or about 9 percent, over the contractor's
initial estimate mainly due to software tasks requiring more effort
than planned and rework.
Due to development delays in the JTRS program, the advanced
communication capabilities of the MUOS satellites may initially be
significantly underutilized. The lack of synchronization means that
early utilization of MUOS capability will largely be limited to the
legacy communications waveform. According to the MUOS program office,
maintaining the MUOS schedule is critical to support legacy users.
However, underutilization of the new waveform represents an inefficient
use of on-orbit resources given the limited life and estimated $1.1
billion program unit cost of the MUOS satellites.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System.
Taken in performance of official duties as a photographer/journalist.
(U.S. Air Force Photo/Master Sgt. Robert W. Valenca).
Source: [hyperlink,
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/071110-F-1789V-991.jpg].
[End of figure]
The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper (formerly Predator B) is a multirole,
medium-to high-altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system
capable of flying at higher speeds and higher altitudes than its
predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator A. The Reaper is designed to provide a
ground attack capability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and
assess small ground mobile or fixed targets. Each system consists of
four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite communications
suite.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 1/02;
Development start: 2/04;
Low-rate decision: 2/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Initial capability: 8/09;
Full-rate decision: 3/10;
Last procurement: 2015.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $199.9 million:
Procurement: $1,336.7 million:
Total funding: $1,637.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 68:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2004: $195.4;
Latest 10/2008: $385.5;
Percent change: 97.3.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2004: $508.7;
Latest 10/2008: $2,405.7;
Percent change: 373.0.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2004: $704.0;
Latest 10/2008: $2,892.4;
Percent change: 310.8.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2004: $21.330;
Latest 10/2008: $24.512;
Percent change: 14.9.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2004: 63;
Latest 10/2008: 118;
Percent change: 87.3.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2004: 70;
Latest 10/2008: 66;
Percent change: -5.7.
Latest cost and quantity data are through fiscal year 2015; earlier
data go through fiscal year 2009. The Air Force could not provide
comparable data. Program unit cost as of August 2004 is based on 33
aircraft.
[End of table]
All four of the Reaper's original critical technologies are mature.
However, in 2008, the program office identified 14 technology
improvements, half of which are not yet mature. Because of early
fielding demands, the program did not conduct a system-level critical
design review. Nevertheless, the program office estimates that over 95
percent of the design drawings have been completed. The Air Force has
contracted for 37 aircraft--31 percent of the planned total. Initial
operational testing was completed in August 2008. Test results
indicated that the Reaper was partially mission capable. The Reaper was
effective in the killer role, but issues associated with the radar and
network precluded the test team from evaluating the other two key
performance parameters, the hunter and the net-ready capability.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MQ-9 (Reaper) Program:
Technology Maturity:
All four of the Reaper's critical technologies, the synthetic aperture
radar, the multispectral targeting system, the air vehicle, and the
stores management subsystem, are now mature. In its 2008 technology
development strategy, the MQ-9 program office identified 14 additional
technology improvements, half of which are not yet mature. These
technologies (ranging from TRL 5-8) are expected to enhance the
capability of existing on-board subsystems and ground control stations
and will be phased into the increment-one aircraft when mature. The
second increment will require other new technologies.
Design Maturity:
The program office currently reports that over 95 percent of the
drawings for the increment-one aircraft are complete. The design review
for this increment was initially planned for September 2005. However,
because the user required an early operational capability, the Air
Force did not conduct a traditional system critical design review.
Instead, it conducted a series of smaller incremental reviews of the
early operational aircraft configurations. The next design review--for
the weapons--is planned for February 2009. Program officials
acknowledge that additional drawings will be needed for subsequent
aircraft increments.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess production maturity because the MQ-9 program does not
use statistical process controls. The program uses other quality
control measures such as scrap, rework, and repair to track product
quality. Although the contractor has had trouble meeting its aircraft
delivery dates in the past, its most recent deliveries have been
earlier than planned. To date, the Air Force has contracted for 37
aircraft, 31 percent of the current planned total. The Air Force
completed a manufacturing readiness assessment and determined that the
production line is capable of manufacturing two aircraft per month.
After its planned facilities expansion is complete, the contractor
projects that it should be able to produce up to five aircraft per
month.
Other Program Issues:
Since its inception, the Reaper program has followed a nontraditional
acquisition path highlighted by changing requirements. Within the past
2 years, total program quantities have increased from 63 to 118
aircraft, due in part to large increases in the wartime supplemental
budget. Quantities may grow significantly higher because the Air Force
plans to curtail production of the MQ-1 Predator aircraft and buy only
MQ-9 Reapers. The system's performance requirements have also changed.
Shortly after the February 2004 development decision, the user required
an early operational capability that included the Hellfire missile and
a digital electronic engine control. Subsequent aircraft will have
upgrades to the radar, weapons, and software developments. The Reaper
completed initial operational testing and was assessed as partially
mission capable. It was effective in the killer role, a key performance
parameter (KPP), but problems associated with radar and the network
prevented testers from evaluating the other KPPs, hunter and net-ready
capability. Follow-on testing has not yet been scheduled.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
it was forced into a nontraditional acquisition path to rapidly meet
the demands of the Global War on Terrorism. While this path has
introduced inefficiencies, the Air Force stated that it has delivered
effective combat capability well ahead of what would have been
achievable using a traditional acquisition path. It also noted that the
majority of the aircraft production to date has been the result of
congressional plus-ups and direction. Program officials maintain there
is manageable and accepted risk with production taking place before
critical design review and operational testing within this
nontraditional acquisition. An Integrated System Exercise 1
operationally assessed MQ-9 Reaper for a successful deployment. An
Integrated System Exercise 2 further assessed MQ-9 in preparation of
the initial operational test and evaluation.
GAO Response:
Our reviews of DOD weapon systems confirm that producing a system
before the completion of operational testing adds significant cost risk
to the program. Operational testers recently determined that the Reaper
was only partially mission capable due to effectiveness and suitability
shortfalls. Changes needed to resolve these shortfalls could affect
program cost and schedule.
[End of section]
Mutifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical Radio
System (MIDS-JTRS):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Mutifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint
Tactical Radio System (MIDS-JTRS).
Source: MIDS Program Office.
[End of figure]
DOD's MIDS-JTRS program is intended to transform the existing MIDS Low
Volume Terminal--a jam-resistant, secure voice and data information
distribution system--into a 4-channel, programmable JTRS-compliant
radio that will be used in aircraft, ships, and ground stations across
the military services. We assessed the development of the MIDS-JTRS
core terminal and made observations on the status of the planned JTRS
platform capability package, which includes an airborne networking
waveform being developed by the JTRS Network Enterprise Domain.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start/Development start - core terminal: 12/04;
Design review - core terminal: 5/06;
GAO review: 1/09;
Low-rate decision - core terminal: 4/09;
Initial capability - core terminal: 2/10.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Data Link Solutions, ViaSat:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $35.9 million:
Procurement: $92.5 million:
Total funding: $128.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 280:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2004: $301.0;
Latest 08/2008: $458.5;
Percent change: 52.3.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2004: $0.0;
Latest 08/2008: $134.9;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2004: $301.0;
Latest 08/2008: $593.2;
Percent change: 97.1.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2004: $9.406;
Latest 08/2008: $1.541;
Percent change: -83.6.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2004: 32;
Latest 08/2008: 385;
Percent change: 1103.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2004: 50;
Latest 08/2008: 62;
Percent change: 24.0.
[End of table]
All four of the MIDS-JTRS core terminal critical technologies are
approaching maturity; the design appears stable; and the production
processes are mature. Core terminal development models integrated into
F/A-18 aircraft are now undergoing testing in an operational
environment. Test results will be used to support the low-rate initial
production decision. The production decision has been delayed by at
least 1 year since our last assessment because of the effects of
changes in the MIDS-JTRS security design. In September 2007, the JTRS
Board of Directors suspended the design, development, fabrication, and
testing of the JTRS platform capability package pending a determination
of whether there were enough potential users among the military
services to support this effort. This suspension is still in effect.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MIDS JTRS Program:
Technology Maturity:
The core terminal's four critical technologies--(1) Link-16 waveform
software, (2) Link-16 architectural design, (3) operating environment,
and (4) programmable crypto module--are approaching maturity. However,
unanticipated complexity in integrating these subsystems has caused
program schedule delays. According to program officials, integration
concerns are being addressed, and the critical technologies are
expected to demonstrate maturity just prior to the projected low-rate
initial production decision. The program office began demonstrating the
terminal's capabilities in an operational environment during the first
quarter of fiscal year 2008, which thus far has not disclosed any
significant technical issues. Program officials stated that test
results will be used to support the core terminal program's low-rate
initial production decision, which has been delayed until April 2009.
Design Maturity:
According to program officials, the core terminal's design is stable,
as the program has released 100 percent of its design drawings to the
manufacturer. However, until the maturity of the core terminal's
critical technologies has been demonstrated in an operational
environment, the potential for design changes remains.
The core terminal will be the first JTRS radio to undergo National
Security Agency certification and it has faced challenges in meeting
security requirements. Though it received National Security Agency
design concurrence and over-the-air approval in an F/A-18 aircraft,
understanding and implementing information security criteria caused
changes in security design. The effects of the design changes were not
adequately scoped into the integration schedule, which has contributed
to a 1-year delay in the program's production decision. Security
verification testing is ongoing, and is proceeding well, according to a
program official. First article qualification testing has begun and is
expected to be completed in early 2009. Air worthiness terminals are on
loan to the government to support developmental and operational testing
until purchased terminals are delivered.
Production Maturity:
The MIDS-JTRS program has demonstrated that its two critical
manufacturing processes are mature. Program officials stated that
production maturity is high because the core terminal is a form, fit,
and function replacement for the MIDS Low Volume Terminal and the
manufacturing processes are the same as those previously employed.
Other Program Issues:
The unanticipated complexity in meeting National Security Agency
security requirements has resulted in development cost increases for
MIDS-JTRS. A cost cap agreement with incentives was negotiated between
the government and MIDS contractors to reduce the government's cost
risk to complete the core terminal program. The acquisition program
baseline is in the process of being updated in preparation for the low-
rate initial production decision. This baseline will reflect revised
schedule and cost parameters.
MIDS JTRS airborne networking waveform development has still not been
authorized. In September 2007, the JTRS Board of Directors suspended
the design, development, fabrication, and testing of the JTRS platform
capability package, pending a determination from Joint Staff and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration
on the requirements for the future advanced airborne tactical data
link. This package will allow the MIDS-JTRS radio to operate a wideband
networking waveform specifically designed for low latency airborne
missions. Furthermore, the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office was
advised by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and
Technology to conduct an independent technical assessment of waveforms,
networking, and network management approaches. These studies are not
completed, and the suspension of effort on the platform capability
package is still in effect.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the MIDS-JTRS program
office provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program.
Source: Northrop Grumman.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-
RTIP) is designing a modular, scalable, two-dimensional active
electronically scanned array radar for integration into the Global Hawk
unmanned aerial vehicle platform. The radar will provide an improved
ground moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar imaging.
The MP-RTIP program funds research, development, and test and
evaluation activities only; the Global Hawk program will fund
production of the radars.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program/Development start: 10/03;
Design review: 9/06;
Radar testing on Proteus: 9/06;
GAO review: 1/09;
Start Global Hawk Integration: 5/09.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman ISWR:
Program office: Hanscom AFB, MA Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $41.8 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $41.8 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2003: $1,735.1;
Latest 12/2007: $1,334.5;
Percent change: -23.1.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest 12/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2003: $1,735.1;
Latest 12/2007: $1,334.5;
Percent change: -23.1.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest 12/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest 12/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2003: NA;
Latest 12/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
All eight of MP-RTIP's critical technologies for the Global Hawk radar
are mature, and the design is stable. In 2006, a Global Hawk MP-RTIP
development unit was installed on a surrogate testbed aircraft
(Proteus) and flight testing began in September 2006. Proteus flight
testing is planned to be complete in February of 2009. According to the
program office, Proteus testing completion has been delayed from the
planned date of September 2007 because issues with the calibration of
the radar antenna have caused significant software maturity delays. In
May 2009, the MP-RTIP program plans to deliver one MP-RTIP development
unit to the Global Hawk program to support developmental testing on
that air vehicle. The MP-RTIP program office will support the Global
Hawk program through the completion of initial operational testing,
which is planned to start no later than November 2010.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
MP-RTIP Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the MP-RTIP program, all eight of MP-RTIP's critical
technologies for the Global Hawk radar are fully mature. In addition,
the Global Hawk program office conducted a technology readiness
assessment in 2008 and also found that all MP-RTIP critical
technologies were fully mature.
Design Maturity:
The program completed 100 percent of its planned drawings as of
September 2008 and the design is stable.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess MP-RTIP's production maturity because the program
only consists of research, development, and test and evaluation
activities; the Global Hawk program is responsible for radar
production. The MP-RTIP program office, along with the contractor,
Northrup Grumman, conducted two production readiness reviews to
determine how well the radar was progressing toward the five production
readiness criteria categories: product design and test, manufacturing
operations, subcontract and material, product support and management,
and management. According to program officials, all deficiencies were
remedied and all action items have been closed.
Other Program Issues:
Originally, the MP-RTIP program also included the development of the
Wide Area Surveillance radar for integration into a wide-body aircraft,
specifically the E-10A aircraft. However, the fiscal year 2008
President's budget eliminated funding for the Wide Area Surveillance
radar, and the E-10A technology development program was terminated by
the Air Force in February 2007. The Senate Committee on Armed Services
noted that the MP-RTIP radar should be on platforms larger than the
Global Hawk in its report on the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 2008. In that same report, the committee recommended an
increase in funding so that the MP-RTIP could be retrofitted into the E-
8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), which
was the original platform designated for the radar. In fiscal year
2008, the Joint STARS Program received $85.4 million in Global War on
Terror funding for the radar technology insertion program. The National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009 authorized $20 million
for the MP-RTIP sensor for the Joint STARS platform. The Air Force is
also considering whether additional platforms could utilize the radar.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred
with our findings. The program office also provided technical comments,
which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS).
Source: Courtesy of Northrop Grumman.
[End of figure]
NPOESS is a tri-agency--National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration--
satellite program to monitor the weather and environment through the
year 2026. Current NOAA and DOD satellites will be merged into a single
national system. NOAA and DOD each provide 50 percent of the funding
for NPOESS. The program consists of four segments: space; command,
control, and communications; interface data processing; and the launch
segment. We assessed the space segment.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 3/97;
Development start/production decision: 8/03;
GAO review: 1/09;
First satellite launch: 1/13;
Initial capability: 4/13.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology:
Program office: Silver Spring, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,202.4 million:
Procurement: $2,879.8 million:
Total funding: $6,082.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 2:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2002: $5,130.2;
Latest 12/2008: $8,032.9;
Percent change: 56.6.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2002: $1,324.4;
Latest 12/2008: $2,879.8;
Percent change: 117.5.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2002: $6,454.5;
Latest 12/2008: $10,912.6;
Percent change: 69.1.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2002: $1,075.758;
Latest 12/2008: $2,728.147;
Percent change: 153.6.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2002: 6;
Latest 12/2008: 4;
Percent change: -33.3.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2002: 172;
Latest 12/2008: 193;
Percent change: 12.2.
[End of table]
In August 2002, the program began development and production before
achieving technology maturity, design stability, or production
maturity. In July 2007, the NPOESS program was restructured in response
to a Nunn-McCurdy program acquisition unit cost breach of the critical
cost growth threshold. As part of the restructure, 7 of the original 14
critical technologies were removed from the program. Of the remaining
technologies, all but one is mature, and the remaining technology is
expected to be mature by the design review in April 2009. While the
restructure's goal was to lower future cost and schedule risks, it
increased the risk of a satellite coverage gap and significantly
reduced data collection capabilities. Also, continuing development
problems have caused further cost and schedule problems.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
NPOESS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Only one of the NPOESS's 14 critical technologies was mature when the
program began development and committed to production in August 2002.
When the program was restructured as a result of cost growth in 2007, 7
of those technologies were removed from the program. Of the remaining
technologies, 6 are mature, and the program projects that all will be
mature by design review in April 2009.
The launch of an NPOESS demonstration satellite continues to experience
delays due to development problems with a critical sensor. The launch,
which was initially planned for May 2006, will not occur until at least
June 2010. When in orbit, the satellite is now expected to demonstrate
the performance of three sensors deemed critical--because they are to
provide data for key weather products--and two noncritical sensors in
an operational environment.
Design Maturity:
The NPOESS program began production before achieving design stability
or production maturity. As of November 2008, the program had 77 percent
of an estimated 6,578 total drawings released and expects 87 percent of
those drawings to be released by its planned April 2009 design review.
While the NPOESS program will be approaching design stability at this
review, the percentage of drawings it plans to be releasable by that
point has decreased in the last year.
Production Maturity:
The program office does not collect statistical process control data
due to the small number of satellites to be built. However, program
officials stated that the contractors track and use various metrics for
subcomponent production, such as rework percentages, defect
containment, and schedule and cost performance. The program does not
have goals for production metrics.
Contract Management:
In July 2007, the NPOESS program was restructured in response to a Nunn-
McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical cost growth threshold. The
program was originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion for six
satellites from 1995 through 2018. The restructured program called for
acquiring fewer satellites and included an overall increase in program
costs, delays in satellite launches, and deletions or replacements of
satellite sensors. Specifically, the current estimated life cycle cost
of the program is about $13.5 billion for four satellites through 2026-
-about $1 billion more than estimated last year. The increased cost
reflects revisions to outdated operations and support cost estimates.
As we have previously reported, the delayed launches of fewer
satellites will result in reduced satellite data collection and require
dependence on a European satellite for coverage during midmorning
hours. There is also an increased risk of a coverage gap for the
existing constellation of satellites should there be premature
satellite failures or unsuccessful launches of legacy satellites.
Finally, the restructured program deleted 4 of 13 instruments and
reduced the functionality of four sensors. While the program has added
one sensor back to the first satellite, the NPOESS system will have
significantly less capability for providing global climate and space
environment measures than originally planned. According to the program
office, this reduced capability will not meet all the system's key
performance parameters (KPP) or critical user requirements, which did
not change as a result of the restructure.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the NPOESS Integrated
Program Office noted that while the reduced capability of the first
satellite will not meet all KPPs, the second satellite will meet all
KPPs. Additionally, the NPOESS Integrated Program Office provided
technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control.
Source: GPS Wing.
[End of figure]
GPS is an Air Force-led joint program with the Army, Navy, Department
of Transportation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, United
Kingdom, and Australia. This space-based radio-positioning system
nominally consists of a 24-satellite constellation providing navigation
and timing data to military and civilian users worldwide. In 2000,
Congress began funding the modernization of Block IIR (called Block IIR-
M) and Block IIF satellites. GPS also includes a control system and
receiver units. We focused our review on Block IIF.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 1/99;
Development start: 2/00;
Production decision: 7/20;
GAO review: 1/09;
First satellite launch: 10/09.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing for IIF, Boeing for OCS, Lockheed Martin for
IIR and IIR-M:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $245.2 million:
Procurement: $425.2 million:
Total funding: $670.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 0:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 02/2002: $2,126.4;
Latest 12/2007: $2,621.6;
Percent change: 23.3.
Procurement cost;
As of 02/2002: $3,878.1;
Latest 12/2007: $4,517.3;
Percent change: 16.5.
Total program cost;
As of 02/2002: $6,004.5;
Latest 12/2007: $7,138.9;
Percent change: 18.9.
Program unit cost;
As of 02/2002: $181.956;
Latest 12/2007: $216.329;
Percent change: 18.9.
Total quantities;
As of 02/2002: 33;
Latest 12/2007: 33;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 02/2002: NA;
Latest 12/2007: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
Total quantities include 13 IIR, 8 IIR-M, and 12 IIF satellites.
The GPS program continues to experience delays in the launch of the
first Block IIF satellite and increases in program costs. The program
office estimates that the launch will be delayed almost 3 years from
its original date to October 2009, due to development and production
problems. Specifically, technical issues with various satellite
components, such as transmitters, were discovered during testing
earlier this year. As a result, the program has temporarily delayed
further testing to allow time for the contractor to identify the causes
of the problems and take corrective actions. While the GPS Block IIF
program began development with its one critical technology mature, we
have not been able to assess design stability or production maturity
because the contractor is not required to provide data on design
drawings or statistical process control under its contract.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
NAVSTAR GPS-Space & Control Program:
Technology Maturity:
The Block IIF critical technology-space--qualified atomic frequency
standards--is mature.
Design Maturity:
We could not assess design stability because according to the Program
Office, the Block IIF contract does not require that design drawings be
delivered to the program. Program Officials stated they assess design
maturity through reviews of contractor testing, technical interchange
meetings, periodic program reviews, and participation in the contractor
development process.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because according to the
Program Office, the Block IIF contract does not require the contractor
to collect statistical process control data. Program Officials stated
they assess production maturity through the same activities they
conduct to assess design stability.
Other Program Issues:
As a result of development and production problems, the program office
now estimates the launch of the first Block IIF satellite will be
delayed to October 2009--almost 3 years later than its original launch
date. In the last year, the Block IIF program began its first phase of
thermal vacuum testing--one of the most critical space vehicle
environmental tests. It is used to determine flight-worthiness and
deficiencies by subjecting the satellite to space-like operating
conditions. However, technical problems discovered during thermal
vacuum testing resulted in additional schedule delays and cost
increases on the program. For example, a navigation signal transmitter
failed during testing. According to program officials, testing was
suspended in August 2008 to allow time for the contractor to identify
the causes of the problem and take corrective actions, including
replacing another similar transmitter. The Block IIF program is also
experiencing other technical problems. For example, the satellite's
reaction wheels, used for pointing accuracy, had to be redesigned
adding $10 million to the program's cost. The program also had
difficulty maintaining the proper propellant fuel-line temperature, and
power failures delayed final integration testing.
The development schedule for the ground control segment for the Block
IIF satellites also presents a risk for the program. In September 2007,
the Air Force approved the transition from the legacy ground control
system to the Architectural Evolution Plan (AEP), the new ground
control segment that will eventually control the Block IIF satellites.
The delivery of the first AEP segment allowed for the transfer of
operations of current GPS satellites from the existing ground control
system. In March 2008, AEP was upgraded to add the capability to
control Block IIF satellites. However, according to the program office,
the development schedule for the final AEP upgrade, which will ensure
the integrity of the GPS signal, may not allow enough time for
sufficient operational testing before the scheduled launch of the first
Block IIF satellite.
Program Office Comments:
In responding to a draft of this assessment, the program office
provided technical comments, which we included as appropriate.
[End of section]
Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT) Program:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT) Program.
Source: © 2008 Raytheon Company.
[End of figure]
The Navy's NMT is the next-generation maritime military satellite
communications terminal. Together with the Air Force's Advanced
Extremely High Frequency satellite system, NMT is designed to enhance
protected and survivable satellite communications to naval forces. NMT
multiband capabilities will also enable communications over existing
military satellite communication systems, such as Milstar, Wideband
Global SATCOM, and the Defense Satellite Communications System.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Development start: 10/03;
Design review: 5/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Low-rate decision: 4/10;
Initial capability: 9/12;
Full capability: 3/17.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $246.2 million:
Procurement: $1,294.1 million:
Total funding: $1,540.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 276:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2006: $673.4;
Latest 10/2008: $648.8;
Percent change: -3.7.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2006: $1,568.3;
Latest 10/2008: $1,294.5;
Percent change: -17.5.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2006: $2,241.7;
Latest 10/2008: $1,943.3;
Percent change: -13.3.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2006: $6.732;
Latest 10/2008: $6.392;
Percent change: -5.0.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2006: 333;
Latest 10/2008: 304;
Percent change: -8.7.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2006: 107;
Latest 10/2008: 107;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
The NMT program's two critical technologies are nearing maturity and
the program office expects them to reach full maturity before the
production decision in April 2010. The NMT's design is stabilizing.
About 70 percent of the design drawings were released at the critical
design review. The Navy expects to release more than 90 percent of the
drawings by December 2008. The Navy has also identified critical
manufacturing processes--a first step in assessing production maturity-
-and began to produce engineering development models in May 2008.
According to program officials, the NMT's full operational capability
will be delayed 2 years to 2017 due to changes in the NMT's procurement
and installation schedule that were made to align the program with the
naval operations resources and objectives.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
NMT Program:
Technology Maturity:
The NMT program's two critical technologies--a multi-band antenna feed
and monolithic microwave integrated circuit power amplifiers for Q-band
and Ka-band communication frequencies--are nearing maturity, according
to a June 2008 Office of Naval Research technology readiness
assessment. The program office expects these technologies to be fully
mature before the production decision in 2010. According to the program
office, the backup technologies are older versions of the same
technologies, but the challenge will be to repackage them in a more
efficient form for use in the terminals if they are needed.
Design Maturity:
The NMT's design is stabilizing. Program officials reported that at its
May 2008 design review about 70 percent of NMT drawings were releasable
to manufacturing. While approximately 300 drawings remain to be
released, the program office expects that more than 90 percent of the
total expected drawings will be released by December 2008. The program
has also released all of the technical data packages necessary to build
the program's engineering development models. The program office does
not expect significant additional drawings at production, however
further design work could be necessary as the program tests its
engineering development models. The NMT program held an earlier design
review in May 2005 for NMT prototypes from two contractors, which were
competing to build the engineering development models. DOD has stated
that having competing contractors produce prototypes to demonstrate key
systems elements is a good practice for lowering a program's technical
risk, among other benefits.
The NMT program's software lines of code have significantly increased
since development start to accommodate Software Communications
Architecture requirements. Currently, software integration testing is
approximately 60 percent complete and almost 70 percent of the defects
detected have been resolved.
Production Maturity:
The Navy has identified three critical manufacturing processes--a first
step in assessing production maturity--for the NMT program. Since
production has yet to begin, statistical process control data are not
yet available for NMT. The three critical manufacturing processes were
identified during the program's June 2008 technology readiness
assessment and are related to the Q-band and Ka-band monolithic
microwave integrated circuits and the Q/Ka radome. Work on engineering
development models began at the conclusion of critical design review in
May 2008.
Other Program Issues:
The NMT program may encounter challenges in developing and fielding the
system. The full capability of the NMT program depends upon the
successful launches of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
satellites, which are experiencing delays. Specifically, the AEHF
program is anticipating that the first satellite launch and initial
capability will slip by 2 years to 2010 and 2013, respectively.
According to NMT program officials, delays with AEHF will directly
affect the ability of the NMT program to test the new higher data rate
communications capability that AEHF will provide. However, these
officials stated that they continue to work closely with the AEHF
program office to identify other opportunities for testing this
capability and the systems infrastructure. Despite the AEHF delays, the
NMT program stated that the terminal can provide value to the fleet
upon fielding by accessing existing satellite communication systems
such as Milstar, Wideband Global SATCOM, and the Defense Satellite
Communications System. The NMT program is also anticipating a 2-year
slip in its full operational capability. NMT program officials stated
that this delay is necessary to align the program with the naval
operations resources and objectives and is due to changes in NMT's
procurement and installation schedule.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
NMT program is being executed well to provide deployed naval commanders
with assured access to secure, protected command and control and
communication capabilities to support the exchange of warfighter
critical information. It will support the Navy's Net-Centric FORCEnet
architecture and act as an enabler for transforming operational
capability available to the warfighter. The Navy also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
P-8A Poseidon Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: P-8A Poseidon Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft.
Source: © 2008 Boeing.
[End of figure]
The Navy's Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A), a Boeing 737
commercial derivative, is the replacement for the P-3C. Its primary
roles are persistent antisubmarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The P-8A shares an
integrated maritime patrol mission with the Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance Unmanned Aerial System and the EPX (formerly the Aerial
Common Sensor). These systems are intended to operate independently or
in tandem to support the Navy's maritime warfighting capability.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 3/00;
Development start: 5/04;
Design review: 6/07;
GAO review: 1/09;
Low-rate decision: 5/10;
Full-rate decision: 4/13;
Initial capability: 7/13;
Last procurement: 2019.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: The Boeing Company:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,324.8 million:
Procurement: $22,489.2 million:
Total funding: $25,933.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 108:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2004: $7,274.1;
Latest 08/2008: $6,990.6;
Percent change: -3.9.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2004: $22,566.9;
Latest 08/2008: $22,489.2;
Percent change: -0.3.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2004: $29,974.0;
Latest 08/2008: $29,621.9;
Percent change: -1.2.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2004: $260.643;
Latest 08/2008: $262.141;
Percent change: 0.6.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2004: 115;
Latest 08/2008: 113;
Percent change: -1.7.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2004: 160;
Latest 08/2008: 160;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
The P-8A program entered development with none of its critical
technologies mature. Since then, the program has made several revisions
to its critical technologies. One of the two current critical
technologies is mature; the other, the Hydro-Carbon Sensor, is expected
to reach maturity by September 2009. In October 2008, almost all of the
expected design drawings had been released. However, the design may not
be stable until the program completes technology development and
developmental testing. The program has initiated fabrication of test
aircraft, with the first scheduled to be delivered in August 2009. A 2-
month strike by Boeing machinists in 2008 may result in schedule delays
and increased costs. The P-8A has already experienced a $1.4 billion
contract cost increase, and is currently managing weight growth to
ensure that the aircraft will meet its key performance requirements.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
P-8A Program:
Technology Maturity:
The program has revised its critical technologies since entering
development in May 2004. First, it replaced two technologies with less
capable but more mature backups which will still meet P-8A
requirements. Next, it recategorized the integrated rotary sonobuoy
launcher as a developmental risk. Developmental testing for this
technology has been completed, but additional qualification testing may
be needed after the production decision. As a result, it may not be
fully mature prior to production and could lead to delays should design
changes be necessary. The Magnetic Anomaly Detector Control Surface
Compensation Algorithms, added as a critical technology last year, have
been removed from the design, along with the Magnetic Anomaly Detector
antenna. According to program officials, the existing system will meet
the required performance specifications. In addition, the ESM Digital
Receiver, being leveraged from the EA-18G program, is considered
mature. Finally, the Hydro-Carbon Sensor, designed to detect fuel
vapors, was added as a critical technology during a September 2008
technology readiness assessment. While the sensor is mature in ground-
based applications, it has not been previously used in an aircraft.
Design Maturity:
According to P-8A officials, the program has released 96 percent of the
total expected design drawings to the manufacturer. However, the
potential for design changes remains while the program demonstrates the
maturity of critical technologies, completes testing of key subsystems,
and manages weight growth. Weight growth previously affected the
aircraft's ability to meet key performance requirements for range and
endurance. However, a program-initiated effort reduced the estimated
aircraft weight by 3,500 pounds. Current weight growth projections for
the remainder of the program project a 1,500 pound favorable margin at
completion.
Production Maturity:
Since last year, the program has begun fabrication of test aircraft and
the first is to be delivered in August 2009. Original plans called for
seven test aircraft, but the seventh aircraft has been cut from the
program, in part to cover increases in contract costs. In addition, the
first test aircraft will not be fully configured as originally planned.
The second and third test aircraft will support combined developmental
and operational testing and will be fully mission capable; however,
they are not production representative prototypes. Only the final three
test aircraft will be fully configured, fully mission capable,
integrated, production representative prototypes. They will be built in
phase II of the program's system design and demonstration and will be
used to complete operational testing. Phase II will not begin until
after the low-rate initial production decision in May 2010.
Other Program Issues:
A 2-month strike at Boeing in 2008 may result in additional costs and
delays in test aircraft deliveries. Program officials stated they plan
to make trade-offs within the program to pay for strike-associated
costs. Although the NAVAIR cost analysis division recommends that the
program should have 10 percent of the budget for work remaining in
management reserve, as of August 2008, the program office only had
about 5 percent in management reserve. Development contract costs have
already risen from $3.9 billion to $5.3 billion as a result of delays
in design drawing release and additional costs to mitigate software
development risks. Despite the cost increases and an expected 7-month
delay in test aircraft delivery, the program still plans to meet the
cost and schedule targets in its program baseline.
Program Office Comments:
The program continues to manage the critical technologies. The program
has continually assessed the technologies comprising the P-8A in order
to identify new candidate critical technologies that require additional
management attention. The maturation of the P-8A technologies is on
schedule to support the System Development and Demonstration phase. The
airplane remains approximately 60-65 percent common with the commercial
737-800 baseline. Although contract costs have grown since the original
proposal, they still remain below the Milestone B cost estimates. The
program continues to meet or exceed the cost, schedule, and performance
parameters defined in the P-8A Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement.
[End of section]
PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit.
Source: US MEADS National Product Office.
[End of figure]
The Army's Patriot/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined
Aggregate Program transitions the Patriot missile system to MEADS.
MEADS is intended provide, low-to medium-altitude air and missile
defense to counter, defeat, or destroy tactical ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, or other air-breathing threats. MEADS is being
developed by the United States, Germany, and Italy. We assessed the
MEADS fire unit, including launchers, radars, battle management
component, and launcher reloaders. We did not assess the Patriot
missile.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start/Development start: 8/04;
GAO review: 1/09;
Design review: 2/10;
Initial production decision: 11/12;
Initial capability: 9/17.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: MEADS International:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,789.8 million:
Procurement: $13,044.0 million:
Total funding: $16,833.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 48:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2004: $5,126.6;
Latest 12/2007: $4,840.6;
Percent change: -5.6.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2004: $13,575.2;
Latest 12/2007: $13,044.0;
Percent change: -3.9.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2004: $18,701.8;
Latest 12/2007: $17,884.6;
Percent change: -4.4.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2004: $389.620;
Latest 12/2007: $372.596;
Percent change: -4.4.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2004: 48;
Latest 12/2007: 48;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2004: 157;
Latest 12/2007: 157;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
Program essentials: MEADS officials will rebaseline the program's cost
and schedule in 2009 to reflect changes in the program related to the
Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense program.
The MEADS fire unit's four current critical technologies have not
advanced in maturity since development started in 2004 and will not be
fully mature until the production decision in 2012. In 2008, the MEADS
program withdrew three technologies from its previous list of six
critical technologies, reduced the technology readiness level of one
critical technology, and added one new technology. The program has not
reported any design knowledge, but it did hold a preliminary design
review in 2008. MEADS officials will need to rebaseline the program's
cost and schedule in 2009 because the development of its common battle
management component is being transferred to the Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (IAMD) project office. The program has also experienced
delays due to developmental issues surrounding MEADS radars.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit Program:
Technology Maturity:
The MEADS fire unit's four current critical technologies--launcher
electronics, low noise exciter, Battle Management Command, Control,
Communications, Computers and Intelligence (BMC4I) software
requirements, and fire control transmit/receive module--have not
advanced in maturity since development started in 2004. In 2008, the
MEADS program did not report three of its original six technologies--
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile integration, cooling system, and
slip ring--as critical. However, the program still employs these
technologies and their nearing maturity status has not changed during
the last year. The program added the BMC4I software requirements as a
critical technology which, along with the low noise exciter, is nearing
maturity. The technology readiness level of the launcher electronics
was reduced from mature to nearing maturity due to design changes made
by the contractor. The fire control radar transmit/receive module is
still reported as being immature. The program office estimates that all
four current technologies will be nearing maturity at its February 2010
design review and be fully mature by the start of production in 2012.
There are no backup technologies for any of the MEADS critical
technologies.
Design Stability:
We could not assess MEADS design stability because the number of
releasable drawings and total drawings expected was not available.
According to the program, the total number of drawings is still not
known because the program just completed its preliminary design review
in 2008. Program officials indicated that the design is currently being
assessed through the integrated product team process, working groups,
and design reviews. The MEADS fire unit's critical design review has
been delayed from October 2009 to February 2010 due to developmental
issues with anti-jamming capability and radar weight.
Other Program Issues:
Elements of the Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program will need to
be rebaselined if the Army's IAMD project office receives approval to
start development on the BMC4I program in 2009 as planned. In
accordance with a 2006 Army initiative, that project office is leading
the development effort of a battle management component that will
provide a common battle management system for MEADS and other Army air
and missile defense systems. As a result, the development of the MEADS
common battle management component is being transferred to the IAMD
project office.
Additionally, a DOD official verified that the National Armaments
Directors of the MEADS partner nations have directed the NATO MEADS
Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) to develop plans to restructure the MEADS
development program. NAMEADSMA is working with the program's prime
contractor, MEADS International, on a contract modification to execute
this restructure with a target date for signature of March 6, 2009.
Program Office Comments:
The Army concurred with the overall top-level assessment of the MEADS
program and stated that the critical technologies assessed continue to
be areas of intense program management focus. It noted that risk
mitigation plans have been developed and the recently-completed
preliminary design review resulted in better understanding of the
design maturity. Additionally, the Army noted that international
program partners and management are considering a number of measures,
such as more time before critical design review and increased
integration time overall, to increase the program's probability of
success. The Army stated that, at the system-level critical design
review in 2010, it expected the design work in the critical
technologies to be mature enough to support fabrication of the
prototypes necessary to demonstrate the system's capabilities.
[End of section]
Extended Range/Multiple Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Extended Range/Multiple Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System
(UAS).
Source: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.
[End of figure]
The Army expects its Extended Range / Multiple Purpose Unmanned
Aircraft System, Sky Warrior, to fill a capability gap for an unmanned
aircraft system at the division level. The system will include 12
aircraft, ground control stations, ground and air data terminals,
automatic takeoff and landing systems, and ground support equipment.
The Army plans for Sky Warrior to operate alone or with other platforms
such as the Longbow Apache helicopter and perform missions including
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition and attack.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Development start: 4/05;
Design review: 11/06;
GAO review: 1/09;
Low-rate decision: 11/09;
Full-rate decision: 4/12;
Initial capability: 4/13.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $236.7 million:
Procurement: $1,463.1 million:
Total funding: $1,854.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 7:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/2005: $333.1;
Latest 08/2008: $568.5;
Percent change: 70.7.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/2005: $647.5;
Latest 08/2008: $1,614.2;
Percent change: 149.3.
Total program cost;
As of 04/2005: $980.5;
Latest 08/2008: $2,339.2;
Percent change: 138.6.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/2005: $196.108;
Latest 08/2008: $194.937;
Percent change: -0.6.
Total quantities;
As of 04/2005: 5;
Latest 08/2008: 12;
Percent change: 140.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/2005: 50;
Latest 08/2008: 96;
Percent change: 92.0.
[End of table]
Cost and quantities shown are from program inception through fiscal
year 2015. Cost and schedule are subject to change due to a planned
March 2009 acquisition rebaseline.
According to the program office, the four Sky Warrior critical
technologies are mature, and the design is stable. The office stated
that two technologies nearing maturity last year, the airborne Ethernet
and tactical control data link, have been demonstrated in a realistic
environment. The total number of drawings increased to some 39 percent
more than projected at the 2006 design review; however, all drawings
now have been released to manufacturing. The program's low-rate
production decision has been delayed by over a year to realign the
program to address nearer-term priorities. The Sky Warrior contractor
uses statistical process controls to monitor production processes but
not in a format that would allow us to assess production maturity. The
program is expected to combine with the Air Force's Predator program
and have a new acquisition baseline in March 2009.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Sky Warrior Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, the four Sky Warrior critical
technologies now are mature. Two technologies, the heavy fuel engine
and automatic takeoff and landing system, were mature last year. The
office indicates that two technologies nearing maturity last year, the
airborne Ethernet and tactical control data link, now have been
demonstrated in a realistic environment. These technologies were at low
levels of maturity in a laboratory environment when the program began
development in 2005. The program office indicated that the increased
maturity of the critical technologies reflects the results of testing
and operational use. The technologies have been demonstrated on the
Block 1 aircraft, which is intended to be the final version of the Sky
Warrior.
Design Maturity:
The Sky Warrior's design appears stable. Due to requirements changes,
redesign, and technology improvements, the total number of drawings is
some 39 percent more than the program office projected at the 2006
design review. However, all drawings have now been released to
manufacturing.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess Sky Warrior's production maturity. According to the
program office, the contractor uses statistical process controls to
monitor production processes, but these data are not in a format that
would allow us to assess production maturity. The contractor employs
global technology standards per the International Standards
Organization as its method for monitoring, controlling, and improving
processes. The program office employs measurements related to design
stability, infrastructure tooling, test equipment, facilities, and
materials and personnel training to assess production maturity. The
program's low-rate production decision was delayed from July 2008 to
late 2009 as part of a Secretary of Defense-directed effort to surge
certain assets for fielding.
Other Program Issues:
The Sky Warrior program office anticipates a new acquisition baseline
by the end of March 2009. According to the Army, the program was
realigned to respond to a Secretary of Defense directive to field the
capability as soon as possible. At this direction, the Army will field
two "Quick Reaction Capability" systems. The first of those systems is
to be fielded in 2009. This reprioritization had an effect on the rest
of the Sky Warrior program. System development and demonstration has
been extended by about 2 years, and the award of the low-rate initial
production contract has been delayed by over 1 year.
Additionally, in September 2007, DOD issued a memorandum directing that
the Predator and Sky Warrior programs be combined into a single
acquisition program in order to achieve common development,
procurement, sustainment, and training activities and migrate to a
single contract. In May 2008, DOD reinforced this direction and stated
that progress towards these objectives was not fast enough, and that
there was significantly more work to be done to complete the effort.
DOD directed the programs to present a progress update on their efforts
in January 2009.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
Additionally, the Army noted that it believes use or nonuse of
statistical process control does not preclude production maturity
assessment. It also stated that it will conduct a production readiness
review in fiscal year 2009 to support the Sky Warrior production
decision, and that this review will provide a reflection of production
maturity. Furthermore, the Army indicated that the Ethernet as a
technology had been mature for several decades but was designated a
critical technology early in the program because it had not been
demonstrated in an unmanned aircraft. The Army also stated that the
direction to combine the Sky Warrior and Predator programs into a
single acquisition program and contract will result in a common
airframe and ground control station. According to program officials,
there will be no joint program office, and each service will maintain a
separate program office.
[End of section]
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High.
Source: © 2007 Lockheed Martin Corporation.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's SBIRS High satellite system is intended to meet
requirements for missile warning, missile defense, technical
intelligence, and battlespace awareness missions. A planned replacement
for the Defense Support Program, SBIRS High is a constellation of four
satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), two sensors on host
satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and fixed and mobile
ground stations. In 2007, two replenishment HEO sensors were authorized
for procurement. We assessed the space segment.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 2/95;
Development start: 10/96;
Design review/production decision: 8/01;
First sensor delivery: 8/04;
Second sensor delivery: 9/05;
GAO review: 1/09;
First satellite delivery: 11/09;
Second satellite delivery: 11/10.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,822.6 million:
Procurement: $2,160.2 million:
Total funding: $4,030.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 2:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/1996: $4,220.4;
Latest 12/2007: $9,371.9;
Percent change: 122.1.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/1996: $0.0;
Latest 12/2007: $2,595.4;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 10/1996: $4,427.4;
Latest 12/2007: $12,209.6;
Percent change: 175.8.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/1996: $885.484;
Latest 12/2007: $3,052.406;
Percent change: 244.7.
Total quantities;
As of 10/1996: 5;
Latest 12/2007: 4;
Percent change: -20.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/1996: TBD;
Latest 12/2007: TBD;
Percent change: TBD.
[End of table]
The 1996 data show no procurement cost as the Air Force planned to use
research and development funds to buy all five satellites. We could not
calculate cycle time because the program stopped reporting an initial
operational capability date in 2006.
Two of the SBIRS High program's three critical technologies are mature-
-a lower level of maturity than last year. The program's design is
considered stable because about 97 percent of the total expected
drawings are releasable. However, the program has experienced design-
related problems, especially with the flight software, and more could
still emerge. We could not assess production maturity. After delays of
18 and 21 months, two HEO sensors have been delivered. According to
program officials, the first sensor's on-orbit performance is exceeding
expectations. Program costs have increased due to software development
problems on the first GEO satellite. The Air Force estimates that the
first GEO satellite launch will be delayed an additional 15 months from
September 2008 to December 2009. However, this estimate is optimistic
and additional schedule delays and cost increases are likely.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
SBIRS High Program:
Technology Maturity:
Two of three critical technologies are mature--a lower level of
maturity than last year. The program previously reported that all three
critical technologies were mature, but it recently split on-board
processing into two components, payload and spacecraft. While the on-
board processing technology for the payload is mature, the spacecraft
component has not been fully developed and tested.
Design Maturity:
Design is considered stable since about 97 percent of expected design
drawings are releasable. However, the program has experienced design-
related problems and more could emerge. For example, the flight
software that controls the health and status of the space vehicle was
found to be inadequate when it unexpectedly failed during testing in
2007. In April 2008, independent experts approved a new software
design. DOD estimates the design changes will delay the first satellite
launch at least 15 months to December 2009 and increase costs by about
$414 million. Further cost increases and schedule delays are likely. In
September 2008, we reported that the flight software development
schedule is ambitious, due in part to concurrent systems engineering
and software development, a productivity assumption that has not yet
been demonstrated on this program, the significant amount of work
remaining, and inadequate schedule margin. According to the Air Force,
about 60 percent of testing is complete on the first GEO satellite with
development, integration, and test activities continuing. As these
activities are completed, further design problems may be discovered.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the contractor does not
collect statistical process control data. The program tracks and
assesses production maturity by reviewing monthly test data and
updates.
Other Program Issues:
The SBIRS High program remains at risk for cost and schedule growth.
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) assessments indicate that the
contractor's cost and schedule performance are high risks. DCMA is
currently projecting a $103 million cost overrun at contract
completion, and that amount is growing. Further contractor cost
increases and schedule delays are expected due in part to unanticipated
rework, the software redesign, and delays in integration and test
activities.
The explanatory statement accompanying the DOD appropriations act for
fiscal year 2009 recommended that DOD begin procurement of a fourth and
fifth GEO satellite in the fiscal year 2010 budget request. The program
intends to award a follow-on production contract in June 2009 that
would bundle production of the third and fourth GEO satellites and two
additional HEO sensors. If a fifth GEO satellite is funded, the program
plans to award a contract to its current lead contractor using other
than full and open competition. The explanatory statement also
recommended not providing funding for the SBIRS High follow-on
development effort--called Third Generation Infrared Surveillance, or
3GIRS--and instead an additional $75 million was appropriated to the
Operationally Responsive Space budget for infrared sensor payload
development and demonstration. The 3GIRS effort has continued to pursue
risk reduction and technology maturation for new infrared sensors,
including plans to test a prototype sensor in space on a commercial
host satellite in 2010.
Program Office Comments:
The program office stated that the first HEO sensor is operational, and
on-orbit testing to date of the second HEO sensor has been successful.
Additionally, development of the first two GEO satellites has made
significant progress. For example, flight software development is
nearly complete with delivery scheduled for March 2009. At that time,
the program intends to re-assess the program schedule. Furthermore, it
stated that ground software development activities are on track.
Activities this year will focus on testing the first GEO satellite in a
space-relevant environment. The program office also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Space-Based Space Surveillance Block 10:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Space-Based Space Surveillance Block 10.
Source: Boeing.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block 10
satellite is intended to provide a follow-on capability to the
Midcourse Space Experiment / Space Based Visible sensor satellite,
which ended its mission in July 2008. SBSS will consist of a single
satellite and associated command, control, communications, and ground
processing equipment. The SBSS satellite is expected to operate 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, to collect positional and characterization
data on earth-orbiting objects of potential interest to national
security.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 2/02;
Development start: 9/03;
Design review: 11/06;
GAO review: 1/09;
Available for launch: 6/09.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Ball Aerospace, Boeing, Northrop Grumman Mission
Systems:
Program office: Los Angeles AFB, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $248 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $248 million:
Procurement quantity: 0:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 01/2008: $842.3;
Latest 09/2008: $857.6;
Percent change: 1.8.
Procurement cost;
As of 01/2008: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 01/2008: $842.3;
Latest 09/2008: $857.6;
Percent change: 1.8.
Program unit cost;
As of 01/2008: $842.340;
Latest 09/2008: $857.618;
Percent change: 1.8.
Total quantities;
As of 01/2008: 1;
Latest 09/2008: 1;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 01/2008: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The SBSS program initiated development with none of its five critical
technologies mature, although all of the technologies have now been
tested in a relevant environment. The SBSS design appears stable and
100 percent of the design drawings have been released to manufacturing.
Production maturity could not be assessed because the contractor does
not collect statistical process control data. In 2005, the program
experienced cost growth with payload electronics, sensor assembly,
integration and test, and launch locks. In 2006, the program was
restructured. New cost and schedule goals were established and a new
strategy was designed to reduce assembly, integration and test risk,
and relax payload requirements. The SBSS satellite is expected to
complete thermal vacuum testing in February 2009 and launch in April
2009, nearly 2 years later than originally planned.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
SBSS Block 10 Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, all five critical technologies are
mature and have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. The SBSS
program began development in late 2003 with none of its five critical
technologies mature. The satellite is scheduled to complete thermal
vacuum testing in February 2009.
Design Maturity:
The SBSS design appears stable. Program officials reported that 100
percent of the space vehicle design drawings have been released to
manufacturing. The number of drawings has remained stable since the
program's 2006 critical design review. At that point about 74 percent
of the total drawings were releasable.
Production Maturity:
Production maturity could not be assessed because the program office
does not collect statistical process control data. Assembly of the
integrated space vehicle, comprising the bus and payload, is complete
and in the final stages of integration and test. According to program
officials, with the satellite in thermal vacuum testing, no needed
rework has been identified. The most recent Defense Contract Management
Agency data indicate that the program will incur a cost overrun at
program completion of about $37 million.
Other Program Issues:
The SBSS program was restructured in 2006 after an independent review
team found that the program's original cost and schedule baseline was
not executable; the assembly, integration, and test plan was risky; and
the requirements were overstated. The program's largest cost driver was
in payload development; specifically, problems with the sensor and
electronics. The restructure provided for increased funding and
schedule margin; streamlined the assembly, integration, and test plan;
and relaxed requirements.
Satellite and launch vehicle compatibility tests have yet to be
completed even though this will be the first launch for the Minotaur IV
launch vehicle. Although satellite and launch vehicle compatibility has
been verified through testing, there are some interface requirements
still being resolved between the Minotaur launch vehicle and SBSS
satellite. According to the Minotaur IV user's guide, integration
events should occur about 6 months before a planned launch. According
to program officials, the satellite is scheduled for launch in April
2009. However, the current baseline shows that the SBSS satellite will
be available for launch in June 2009.
Program officials have not made a decision to purchase additional Block
10 satellites or enhanced SBSS satellites. Parts obsolescence could be
an issue in this decision. However, according to program officials,
these parts could be transitioned as spares to support a second build
of a Block 10 satellite, if the decision is made to do so.
Program Office Comments:
In January 2008, the program office estimate for the total system cost
was $826 million (in then-year dollars). As of September 2008, this
estimate remains the same. Unit cost for SBSS Block 10 includes
development of the satellite and ground system, acquisition of and
integration with the launch vehicle, program office technical support
and oversight, and operations and sustainment of the system through
completion of initial operational test and evaluation.
[End of section]
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT).
Source: TSAT Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's TSAT system will provide high-data-rate military
satellite communications services to DOD users worldwide, including
mobile tactical warfighting elements. The system will provide
survivable, jam-resistant, global, secure, and general-purpose radio
frequency cross-links with other air and space systems. The TSAT system
will consist of a constellation of four satellites, plus a spare, a
network management architecture, and a ground control system. We
assessed the satellites and the ground system.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
GAO review: 1/09;
Development start: 5/10;
Design review: 5/14;
Production decision: 11/14;
First satellite launch: 8/29.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: SE&I: Booz Allen Hamilton, TMOS: Lockheed Martin
Integrated Systems Solutions:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2010: NA;
Latest 08/2008: $7,541.0;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2010: NA;
Latest 08/2008: $198.9;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2010: NA;
Latest 08/2008: $7,801.9;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2010: NA;
Latest 08/2008: $1,560.380;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2010: NA;
Latest 08/2008: 5;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2010: NA;
Latest 08/2008: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include costs and quantities budgeted for fiscal years 2007 to
2013.
[End of table]
According to the program office, all seven critical technologies are
mature. In July 2008, an independent technology readiness assessment
revalidated the maturity of the critical technologies. Design stability
and production maturity could not be assessed because the development
phase has not yet begun. A Defense Space Acquisition Board is scheduled
to convene in late 2009 to determine if the overall TSAT program is
ready to enter the development phase. The first planned satellite
launch is now scheduled for no later than 2019--almost 4 years later
than previously reported.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
TSAT Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the Air Force, the independent technology readiness
assessment determined that all TSAT critical technology elements are at
a technology readiness level of at least a six, which is the
appropriate level of maturity for the program to move into the next
phase. The extended Risk Reduction and System Definition contracts will
continue to develop the program while ensuring a stable industrial base
for the award of the development and production phase contract.
Other Program Issues:
Information on cost, design stability, production maturity, or
satellite software development metrics will not be available until the
TSAT program formally enters the development phase and awards the space
segment contract. The Air Force expects to award the space segment
contract in 2010. By that time, the program should also have an
approved program baseline that includes cost estimates for the first
block of satellites and key milestone dates. These events have been
delayed since early 2008 to allow time for the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) to assess the results of its study of the military
satellite communications investment strategy with the intent of
balancing affordability across the military satellite communications
portfolio. According to the program office, OSD concluded that the Air
Force should continue with the process to award the space segment
contract for TSAT. However, the board review did not occur as
scheduled, and in late 2008, DOD decided to restructure the program. A
new board review date has been scheduled for late 2009.
The TSAT program office now estimates the first satellite launch date
to be 2019--almost 4 years later than previously reported. The delay
was supported by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which had
concerns about TSAT's development progress and synchronization with
other programs.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
since our last assessment, an OSD-led affordability study resulted in a
DOD decision to restructure the TSAT program. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JRCOM 2008-08) directed the program office to
restructure the TSAT program to satisfy a new capacity key performance
parameter and provide a phased approach for capacity growth. According
to the Air Force, the Key Decision Point B (KDP-B) Defense Space
Acquisition Board will be rescheduled for the first quarter of fiscal
year 2010 (October-December 2009) to support the fiscal year 2010
contract award.
[End of section]
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft.
Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
[End of figure]
The V-22 is a tilt-rotor aircraft developed for Marine Corps, Air
Force, and Navy use. The MV-22 will replace Marine Corps CH-46E
helicopters. The MV-22 Block B variant addresses reliability and
maintenance concerns of earlier variants. It has been deployed in Iraq
since September 2007, and a shipboard deployment is set for 2009. The
Air Force Special Operations Forces CV-22 variant was deployed to
Africa in 2008. Our assessment focuses on the MV-22 Block B but applies
to the CV-22 as they have common design and manufacturing processes.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program start: 12/82;
Development start: 4/86;
Full-rate decision: 9/05;
Initial capability: 6/07;
Operational deployment: 9/07;
GAO review: 1/09;
Last procurement: 2018.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Bell-Boeing JPO:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $415.3 million:
Procurement: $24,863.4 million:
Total funding: $25,419.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 318:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/1986: $4,095.4;
Latest 12/2007: $12,664.5;
Percent change: 209.2.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/1986: $34,401.7;
Latest 12/2007: $42,603.5;
Percent change: 23.8.
Total program cost;
As of 04/1986: $38,725.7;
Latest 12/2007: $55,544.0;
Percent change: 43.4.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/1986: $42.416;
Latest 12/2007: $121.275;
Percent change: 185.9.
Total quantities;
As of 04/1986: 913;
Latest 12/2007: 458;
Percent change: -49.8.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/1986: 117;
Latest 12/2007: 294;
Percent change: 151.3.
[End of table]
The V-22 has been deployed in Iraq for over a year. While the V-22's
mission capability and full-mission capability rates were short of its
goals, the Marine Corps considers the deployment a success, and the
aircraft's speed and range were demonstrated in transporting troops and
internal cargo. The V-22 was rarely tasked with external cargo lift
operations. The deployment also highlighted reliability and service-
life issues with certain components and the engines. In addition, the
program is adding technologies to improve the system's utility. In
March 2008, the Marine Corps signed a 5-year contract for 167 aircraft;
however, the demand for spare parts for deployed aircraft and the
acceleration of CV-22 production could both pose challenges for ramping
up MV-22 production.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
V-22 Program:
Technology Maturity and Design Stability:
The V-22 is being procured in blocks. The program office considers the
MV-22 critical technologies to be mature and its design stable.
However, MV-22 Block B aircraft, the full-rate production configuration
deployed to Iraq, have experienced reliability problems. These aircraft
fell short of their mission capability goal (the ability to accomplish
any one mission), due in part to component reliability problems with
parts such as gearboxes and generators. The aircraft fell well short of
its full-mission capability goal (the ability to accomplish all
missions), primarily due to a complex and unreliable de-icing system.
During the Iraq deployment, the V-22's less than 400 hour engine
service life fell short of the 500-600 hours estimated by program
management. The program office noted that the contract does not require
a specific service life to be met. Also, pending modifications to the
program's engine support contract with Rolls Royce could result in
increased support costs in the future.
Planned upgrades to the aircraft could affect the aircraft's ability to
meet its requirements. A limited-coverage, ramp-mounted defensive
weapon was installed on aircraft deployed to Iraq. The program plans to
incorporate a mission-configurable, belly-mounted defensive weapon
system that will provide fuller coverage. For missions requiring the
new weapon, however, the interior space needed to integrate the system
will reduce the V-22's troop carrying capability below its key
performance parameter of 24 troops, as well as reduce its internal
cargo capacity. The program also plans to integrate an all-weather
radar into the V-22. This radar and an effective de-icing system are
essential for self-deploying the V-22 without a radar-capable escort
and deploying the V-22 to areas such as Afghanistan, where icing
conditions are more likely to be encountered. However, expected weight
increases from these and other upgrades, as well as general weight
increases for heavier individual body armor and equipment may affect
the V-22's ability to maintain key performance parameters, such as
speed, range, and troop carrying capacity.
While the program office reports a stable design, changes can be
expected in order to to integrate planned upgrades. Issues with the
aircraft's internal cargo handling capability were identified during
Iraq operations and led to significant delays. Program officials state
that revised techniques and procedures reduced these delays. External
cargo carriage missions were rarely assigned to V-22s in Iraq, as
mission tasking during this period required minimal external lift
support. In addition, most external loads cannot be carried at speeds
that leverage the high-speed capability of the V-22. The program is
adding forward firing countermeasures to enhance the aircraft's
survivability; modifying the engine air particle separator to prevent
engine fires and enhance system reliability; and improving the
environmental control system.
The Navy and Marine Corps conducted training for the V-22's shipboard
deployment and identified challenges related to this operating
environment. Design changes are already being made to some of the ships
on which the V-22 will deploy to help ensure effective operations on
the flight deck and in the hangar deck during maintenance. The changes
will also provide increased space for V-22 spare parts.
Production Maturity:
In March 2008, the V-22 program signed a $10.4 billion multiyear
production contract with Bell Boeing for the production of 167 aircraft
through 2012, even though aircraft continue to be conditionally
accepted with deviations and waivers relating to components such as
brakes, landing gear, hydraulic hoses, de-icing systems, and radar
altimeters. The demand for spare parts for deployed aircraft and the
acceleration of CV-22 production could both pose challenges for ramping
up V-22 production from 11 in 2005 to 36 in 2009. For example, lessons
learned from the initial Iraq deployment stated that the lead time for
and lack of availability of MV-22 repair parts led to high
cannibalization rates.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the V-22 program office
provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program.
Source: AgustaWestland.
[End of figure]
The Navy's VH-71 will be a dual-piloted, multi-engine helicopter
employed by Marine Helicopter Squadron One to provide safe, reliable,
and timely transportation for the President and Vice President of the
United States, heads of state, and others. When the President is
aboard, it will serve as the Commander in Chief's primary command and
control platform. The VH-71 will replace the VH-3D and VH-60N, and is
planned to be developed in two increments. We assessed Increment I and
made observations on Increment II.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Development start/production decision - Inc. I: 1/05;
GAO review: 1/09;
Initial capability - Inc. I: 9/10;
Production decision - Inc. II: 9/13;
Initial capability - Inc. II: 9/17.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Systems Integration:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 02/2006: $3,890.3;
Latest 12/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of 02/2006: $2,450.2;
Latest 12/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 02/2006: $6,523.9;
Latest 12/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of 02/2006: $283.647;
Latest 12/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 02/2006: 23;
Latest 12/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 02/2006: 57;
Latest 12/2007: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Current cost estimates are unknown until the the program completes its
restructuring process.
[End of table]
The VH-71 program began system development and committed to production
without achieving design stability or demonstrating production maturity
due to a high-risk schedule driven by White House needs. The program
now faces a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach due to continued cost
increases. The program is near full technology maturity and design
stability for Increment I. However, concurrency in design, production,
and testing continues to put Increment I at risk for further cost
growth and schedule delays. The program office presently expects
initial operating capability for Increment I in 2010 or later.
Increment II is being restructured, and the VH-71 program office
recently requested a proposal from Lockheed Martin to modify its
existing contract to reflect the restructured program. Costs for the
restructured program could grow to over $11 billion.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
VH-71 Program:
Technology Maturity and Design Maturity:
Increment I of the VH-71 program is nearing technology maturity and
design stability. A January 2004 Technology Readiness Assessment
concluded that there are no critical technologies on the program. One
of the two critical technologies originally identified by the program-
-the Communication and Subsystem Processing Embedded Resource
Communication Controller--has been tested in a laboratory setting, but
not demonstrated in a realistic environment. As of May 2008, about 90
percent of expected Increment I engineering drawings were released.
For Increment II, no critical technologies have been identified.
Program officials estimate roughly 50 percent of the Increment I and II
designs will be common. The most significant differences will be a new
engine, transmission, and main rotor blade. The Increment II blade will
be larger than Increment I, and will employ a new design, which has
been implemented on another aircraft but must be scaled up by 30
percent.
Production Maturity:
Increment I production is underway, but concurrent design, production,
and testing continues to drive program risk. Although VH-71 officials
have identified metrics to evaluate production, they said that they
have not been able to set specific targets for these measures because
of continued design iterations. Program officials reported some quality
concerns with the initial aircraft, including foreign object debris,
but DCMA officials noted that these issues are of concern only because
of the rigorous standards of a presidential aircraft, and would not
otherwise be seen as problems. The program office is flight testing two
Increment I aircraft. Delivery of the first missionized test article is
expected in April 2009, which will allow testing of the aircraft's
integrated systems.
Other Program Issues:
The VH-71 program began with a compressed schedule dictated by White
House needs stemming from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
According to the program manager, this aggressive acquisition strategy
included a source selection process that was shorter than desired and
contributed to confusion regarding specifications between the program
office and the contractor and concurrent design, testing, and
production that resulted in increased program risk, an unsustainable
schedule, and inaccurate cost estimates. As a result of continued cost
growth, program officials expect to initiate the certification process
for a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach in January 2009.
Increment II is being restructured and the VH-71 program office
recently requested a proposal from Lockheed Martin to modify its
existing contract to reflect the restructured program. The program
faces significant challenges due to funding instability. Fiscal year
2008 budget reductions slowed program progress, and a stop work order
has been in place for Increment II since December 2007. In addition,
the joint statement accompanying the 2009 Defense Appropriation Act
recommended $212 million less funding than requested for Increment II.
According to program officials, this will prevent any Increment II work
during fiscal year 2009 and result in a further 18-month delay in
Increment II initial operating capability beyond the fiscal year 2017
date anticipated in the proposed restructured schedule. Officials also
said the shortfall would cause about $640 million in cost growth above
the $11.2 billion estimated total program cost.
Increment I aircraft will have a short service life of 1,500 hours
compared to the 10,000-hour service life of Increment II aircraft. The
program manager estimated that remedies to extend use of Increment I
aircraft would take about 4 years to implement, making this approach of
limited use to address delays in Increment II availability. According
to program officials, the short service life is in part because
Increment I lacks some redundant fail-safe design elements. Program
officials have requested funding for a fatigue test article, but they
stated that it would take 2 years to assess fatigue problems and
another 2 years to develop remedies.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
program is executing an accelerated schedule driven by an urgent need
to replace existing aging assets. Concurrency in development, design,
and production was necessary to meet the accelerated schedule, but
Increment II will follow a more typical acquisition approach. The Navy
reported that significant production maturity has been demonstrated for
Increment I, including the first flights of two pilot production
aircraft.
[End of section]
Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774).
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
The Navy's Virginia-class attack submarine is designed to combat enemy
submarines and surface ships, fire cruise missiles, and provide
improved surveillance and special operation support to enhance littoral
warfare. The Navy is gradually introducing three new technologies to
improve performance and lower construction costs. The Navy is also
working towards a goal of reducing construction costs by approximately
$400 million per ship by fiscal year 2012. We assessed the status of
the three new technologies and the cost reduction effort.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Development start - SSN 774: 6/95;
Development start - AESR: 12/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Full-rate production decision - SSN 774 Block III: 7/09;
Production decision - AESR: 4/11;
Development start - CAVES WAA: 4/11;
Development start - flexible payload: 6/12;
Production decision - flexible payload: 2/14;
Production decision - CAVES WAA: 10/14.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Electric Boat Corporation:
Program office: Washington, DC Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,026.4 million:
Procurement: $46,119.0 million:
Total funding: $47,145.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 20:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 06/1995: $4,349.8;
Latest 12/2007: $6,233.8;
Percent change: 43.3.
Procurement cost;
As of 06/1995: $54,027.8;
Latest 12/2007: $75,322.4;
Percent change: 39.4.
Total program cost;
As of 06/1995: $58,377.5;
Latest 12/2007: $81,556.2;
Percent change: 39.7.
Program unit cost;
As of 06/1995: $1,945.918;
Latest 12/2007: $2,718.540;
Percent change: 39.7.
Total quantities;
As of 06/1995: 30;
Latest 12/2007: 30;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 06/1995: 134;
Latest 12/2007: 151;
Percent change: 12.7.
[End of table]
The Navy is gradually introducing three new technologies--advanced
electromagnetic signature reduction, a flexible payload sail, and a
conformal acoustic velocity sensor wide aperture array--on new or
existing submarines as they mature. The Navy has also focused on
reducing the cost per submarine from $2.4 billion to $2.0 billion (in
2005 dollars, or $2.2 in 2009 dollars), and seems to be on track to
achieve this goal. The Navy has invested $600 million in this cost
reduction effort and, according to Navy officials, reduced costs by
more than $172 million per ship through design changes and construction
time reductions. Many of the design changes will be implemented
beginning with the first ship of Block III currently scheduled for
fiscal 2009. Navy officials stated plans to order two submarines a year
in 2011 to further reduce costs.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
Virginia Class Submarine Program:
Technology Maturity:
There are three new technologies that the Navy plans to incorporate on
current and future Virginia Class submarines once they mature. Advanced
electromagnetic signature reduction is a software package comprised of
two systems that use improved algorithms to continuously monitor and
recalibrate the submarine's signature. The basic algorithms required to
support this technology have been proven on other submarines, and Navy
officials stated they are now developing software and conducting
laboratory tests in support of algorithm development. Navy officials
stated they expect the technology to be installed during new
construction starting with SSN 781 and back-fit during modernization
for earlier ships.
The flexible payload sail (formerly the advanced sail)--a redesign of
the structure that sits atop the main body of the submarine--will allow
the sail to house additional systems and payloads. According to Navy
officials, the flexible payload sail design replaced the advanced sail
due to concerns about weight, hydrodynamic performance, and access to
the weapons trunk. The design of the flexible payload is under review
for inclusion on later submarines.
The conformal acoustic velocity sensor wide aperture array is intended
to be a more cost-effective sensor array that replaces transducers with
accelerometers, while providing the same capability. According to the
Navy, the new array is expected to save $11 million to $12 million per
submarine, and consists of panels that will be integrated with one of
two types of sensors designed to detect vibrations and acoustic
signatures of targets--ceramic accelerometers, a mature but more costly
technology, or fiber-optic accelerometers, a less expensive but
immature technology. According to program officials, testing of panels
incorporating both types of sensors was completed in December 2008, and
a decision on which accelerometer will be selected is expected by the
end of fiscal year 2009, and at-sea testing is expected in 2010.
Other Program Issues:
Navy officials stated that they are currently conducting an operational
evaluation of the Virginia class, and in July 2009 hope to conduct a
milestone review to assess the health of the program. One of the
program's near-term focuses is to reduce the cost of each submarine by
$400 million (in 2005 dollars) by 2012. Thus far, the Navy has realized
cost reductions of $84.2 million through design changes. For example,
the bow of the submarine has been redesigned to replace the spherical
sonar array with a hull conforming sonar array, which program officials
say is easier and cheaper to build. Program officials also stated that
the twelve vertical launch tubes will be replaced with two large
payload tubes, similar to those on guided missile submarines, to
simplify construction. The Navy realized an additional $87.9 million in
cost reductions by decreasing construction time from 95 to 66 months.
Program officials attributed the decrease to the shipyards gaining
familiarity with building the ship, and the integration of more
efficient building processes, such as coating the submarine hulls at a
more efficient stage in the process. This change alone allows the
shipyard to save up to 6 months in construction. Program officials told
us the Block III contract, signed in December 2008, includes the design
change and schedule reduction savings described above, an expected $200
million in savings due to escalating production and beginning multi-
year procurement, and a further $28 million in reductions gained
through contract negotiations.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, Increment 2:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, Increment 2.
Source: Office of the Project Manager WIN-T.
[End of figure]
WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels of
command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global
Information Grid. WIN-T was restructured following a Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost breach of the critical threshold, and will be fielded in four
increments. The second increment will provide the Army with an initial
networking on-the-move capability.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program/Development start: 6/07;
Design review: 2/08;
GAO review: 1/09;
Low-rate decision: 6/09;
Full-rate decision: 3/11;
Initial capability: 2/12.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $111.1 million:
Procurement: $3,351.1 million:
Total funding: $3,462.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,837:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/2007: $230.4;
Latest 09/2008: $230.4;
Percent change: 0.0.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/2007: $3,351.1;
Latest 09/2008: $3,351.1;
Percent change: 0.0.
Total program cost;
As of 10/2007: $3,581.5;
Latest 09/2008: $3,581.5;
Percent change: 0.0.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/2007: $1.892;
Latest 09/2008: $1.892;
Percent change: 0.0.
Total quantities;
As of 10/2007: 1,893;
Latest 09/2008: 1,893;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/2007: 50;
Latest 09/2008: 56;
Percent change: 12.0.
[End of table]
Fourteen of the WIN-T Increment 2's 15 critical technologies are mature
or approaching maturity. The Office of the Secretary of Defense's
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) has raised
concerns about the maturity of the remaining critical technology, which
enables network quality of service. When the WIN-T Increment 2 began
development in June 2007, 7 critical technologies were mature or
approaching maturity; however the other 8 could not be assessed because
the Army did not provide sufficient evidence on their maturity to
DDR&E. Similarly, even though the WIN-T Increment 2 program held a
critical design review in February 2008, we could not assess design
stability because the program office does not track the number of
releasable drawings. According to the program office, this metric is
not meaningful because WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
WIN-T Inc 2 Program:
Technology Maturity:
Three of WIN-T Increment 2's 15 critical technologies are mature, while
11 others are approaching maturity. The maturity of the remaining
technology is unclear. In March 2008, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) approved
WIN-T Increment 2's technology readiness assessment, and confirmed that
14 of its 15 critical technologies are either mature or approaching
maturity. However, DDR&E raised concerns with the maturity of the 15th
critical technology, which enables network quality of service by
controlling the admission of data onto the network based on the
priority of the data and local network conditions. DDR&E has requested
that the Army provide additional evidence demonstrating the maturity of
this critical technology. In October 2008, the Army provided DDR&E with
additional evidence based on laboratory demonstrations carried out by
the WIN-T contractor. Moreover, the Army conducted additional WIN-T
Increment 2 field testing in November and December 2008. While DDR&E
believes that this additional evidence and the results from field
testing will be sufficient to establish the maturity of this critical
technology, officials do not expect to confirm a maturity rating until
the results of field testing have been fully analyzed, and until the
Army has completed a technology readiness assessment for WIN-T
Increment 3 and submitted it to DDR&E for review; the Army plans to
complete this technology readiness assessment by March 2009. Program
officials estimate that all 15 critical technologies will be mature by
the start of production in June 2009.
The original WIN-T program entered system development in August 2003
with only 3 of its 12 critical technologies approaching maturity, and
none were fully mature. Insufficient technical readiness was cited as
one of the key factors leading to the March 2007 Nunn-McCurdy unit cost
breach of the original WIN-T program. Following that cost breach, the
WIN-T program was restructured to be fielded incrementally using more
mature technologies. However, the maturity of WIN-T Increment 2's 15
critical technologies could not be assessed when development began in
June 2007 because insufficient evidence had been provided to DDR&E to
support technology maturity ratings for 8 of the critical technologies.
The other 7 technologies were mature or approaching maturity.
Design Maturity:
According to program officials, WIN-T Increment 2 completed a
successful critical design review in February 2008; however, we could
not assess the design stability of the WIN-T Increment 2 because the
program office does not track the number of releasable drawings.
According to the program office, this metric is not meaningful because
WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort. Instead it measures performance
through a series of component, subsystem, configuration item, and
network level test events designed to demonstrate performance at
increasing levels of system integration.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army noted that the
WIN-T Increment 2 program office had completed its developmental test
in November 2008. This test was a technical test designed to verify and
validate the systems engineering process and prove that the system
design is on track to satisfy the required technical capabilities. The
test was conducted at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona and included the Increment
2 equipment needed to support an Army brigade combat team and key
elements of an Army division. The test also included a representative
suite of WIN-T Increment 1 equipment to demonstrate interoperability
across the increments. The Army noted that while data from the test is
still being analyzed, it believes that preliminary analysis has
provided the WIN-T program office with confidence that the Increment 2
design is stable and meets the required performance capability.
Moreover, the Army believes that results from this test will
demonstrate that all Increment 2 critical technologies are mature. The
program office is currently preparing for a limited user test to be
conducted in March 2009 to demonstrate that WIN-T Increment 2 will meet
its operational requirements.
[End of section]
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, Increment 3.
Source: Office of the Project Manager WIN-T.
[End of figure]
WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels of
command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global
Information Grid. WIN-T was restructured following a Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost breach of the critical threshold, and will be fielded in four
increments. The third increment will provide the Army a full networking
on-the-move capability and fully support the Army's Future Combat
Systems.
Timeline: Concept/system development/production:
Program/Development start: 7/03;
GAO review: 1/09;
Design review: 11/09;
Low-rate decision: 3/12;
Full-rate decision: 9/15;
Initial capability: 2/16.
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost;
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities;
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/2007: NA;
Latest 09/2008: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Costs and quantities for Increment 3 are not available from the Army
due to the absence of an approved acquisition program baseline.
[End of table]
The Army concluded that 11 out of the WIN-T Increment 3's 19 critical
technologies were mature or approaching maturity at its second
preliminary design review in September 2008. Since the WIN-T program
was restructured in June 2007, the maturity of the other 8 technologies
has not been assessed. However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
has questioned whether 12 of the 19 technologies are approaching
maturity since September 2006. The Army must complete a technology
readiness assessment of WIN-T Increment 3 and get DDR&E concurrence
that all critical technologies are approaching maturity before an
acquisition program baseline for the program can be approved. Army
officials expect to have an approved baseline by June 2009 at which
point a cost estimate for the program will also be available.
Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and
production, design and technical maturity.
[End of figure]
WIN-T Inc 3 Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the Army, three of the WIN-T Increment 3's 19 critical
technologies are mature and 8 are approaching maturity. Since the WIN-
T program was restructured in June 2007, the remaining 8 technologies
have not been assessed and the program was unable to provide evidence
of their current level of maturity. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) has
questioned whether twelve technologies are approaching maturity since
September 2006, including four of the eight technologies that the Army
assessed as approaching maturity. The program has developed technology
maturation plans, which included conducting a key 30-node test in
November 2008. The results of this test are intended to demonstrate the
maturity level of most WIN-T critical technologies. Army officials also
noted that they plan to complete a technology readiness assessment of
WIN-T Increment 3 by March 2009. DDR&E will review this assessment.
DDR&E must assess the technologies of WIN-T Increment 3 as approaching
maturity before an acquisition program baseline can be approved and as
fully mature prior to the start of the increment's production.
The original WIN-T program entered system development in July 2003 with
only 3 of its 12 critical technologies approaching full maturity, and
none were fully mature. Insufficient technical readiness was cited as
one of the key factors leading to the June 2007 Nunn-McCurdy unit cost
breach of the original WIN-T program. Following that cost breach, the
WIN-T program was restructured to be fielded incrementally using more
mature technologies.
Design Maturity:
We could not assess the design stability of the WIN-T Increment 3
because the program office does not track the number of releasable
drawings. According to the program office, this metric is not
meaningful because WIN-T is primarily an information system integration
effort, not a manufacturing effort. Instead, the program office
measures performance through a series of component, subsystem,
configuration-item and network-level tests designed to demonstrate
increasing levels of system integration. The program plans to conduct
its critical design review by summer 2009. Historically, evolving FCS
hardware requirements and the immaturity of FCS technologies have
affected the requirements for and stability of hardware design for
Increment 3 transceivers and antennas mounted in or on FCS vehicles. In
October 2008, the Army approved size, weight, power, and cooling
requirements for integrating FCS and WIN-T. The full cost to the WIN-T
program of meeting these requirements will not be known until DOD
approves an Increment 3 acquisition program baseline--expected by June
2009. Future FCS requirements or design changes could further affect
WIN-T Increment 3.
Other Program Issues:
In the defense authorization act for fiscal year 2009, Congress
restricted Increment 3's research, development, test, and evaluation
funding. No more than 50 percent of this funding can be obligated or
expended until DOD notifies Congress of the completion of the
following: an acquisition program baseline approved by the Under
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; an
independent cost estimate by the DOD Cost Analysis Improvement Group;
and a technology readiness assessment by DDR&E.
Program Office Comments:
Technical comments provided by the program office were incorporated as
appropriate. In addition, on the basis of Army preliminary analysis of
the 30-node test, the program office is confident that Increment 3
technologies are mature and scalable to meet the full network on-the-
move capability for the Army. Additionally, program officials consider
Increment 3 to be on track to address FCS network requirements.
[End of section]
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Aerial Common Sensor (ACS).
Source: Graphic artist rendering of generic ISR Platform. No photo
image available.
[End of figure]
The Army's ACS is an airborne intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance (ISR) and target acquisition system intended to provide
timely intelligence data on threat forces to the land component
commander. It is expected to replace the Army's Guardrail and Airborne
Reconnaissance Low systems. The Army is currently assessing
requirements for the program and plans to use an incremental approach
to deliver an initial set of signals intelligence and imagery
intelligence capabilities, followed by greater capabilities in later
increments.
Current Status:
The Army began ACS systems development in July 2004, and was joined by
the Navy in an effort to replace the capabilities of the Army's
Guardrail and Airborne Reconnaissance Low systems and the Navy's EP-3.
The Army terminated the development contract in January 2006, after the
contractor reported that the weight of the mission equipment needed to
meet both services' requirements exceeded the structural limits of the
aircraft. In January 2008, the Army and Navy received approval from the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council to split ACS into two separate
programs because the Navy required a longer-range aircraft with a
larger crew than the Army.
ACS program officials told us that the Army's technology development
strategy for ACS has been structured in accordance with newly signed
DOD acquisition guidance to include evaluation of competing prototypes
and a preliminary design review before the start of system development.
The Army plans to issue a request for proposal for technology
development in January 2009 and award two technology development
contracts in July 2009. The program tentatively plans to award the ACS
engineering and manufacturing development contract in fiscal year 2011,
after obtaining the approval of the ACS program's Milestone Decision
Authority.
Program officials expect the 18-to 24-month technology development
effort to mitigate risks related to the maturity of critical
technologies and airframe integration and add technical rigor to the
program. Previously, the ACS technology development program allowed the
use of technologies that were nearing maturity and had been
demonstrated in relevant environments; however, the new effort will
require the demonstration of mature technologies. In addition, the Army
is planning to focus technology development on ACS's system-level
design. Program officials report that they have also evaluated
technical information on similar ISR systems used by other countries
and improved the contents of the systems engineering plan.
Funding, Fiscal Years 2009-2013 (FY09 dollars): TBD.
Next Major Program Event: Technology development contract awards, July
2009.
Program Office Comments: Technical comments provided by the program
office were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH).
Source: ARH Prototype #1 Flight Testing at Bell Helicopter, © 2006 Bell
Helicopter, A Textron Company.
[End of figure]
Until the program was recently terminated, the Army's ARH was expected
to provide reconnaissance and security capability for air and ground
maneuver teams. The ARH was to combine a modified off-the-shelf
airframe with a nondevelopmental item mission-equipment package and
would have replaced the Kiowa Warrior helicopter fleet and portions of
the Army National Guard's Apache assets. A streamlined acquisition
strategy was proposed for the ARH program in order to support current
military operations.
Current Status:
In October 2008, DOD ended the current ARH program when the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
decided not to certify it for continuation after a critical Nunn-
McCurdy unit cost breach. The Army subsequently terminated its prime
contract for convenience. In the Army's July 2008 Nunn-McCurdy
notification to Congress, it noted at least 25 percent cost growth
attributed to an increase in actual labor hours and material costs to
complete the development phase and an increase in contractor labor
rates higher than previous projections. According to an OSD memorandum
on the decision not to continue the program, OSD believed that the
fundamental cost and schedule basis underlying the ARH contract was no
longer valid. OSD teams also found that there is at least one
alternative that will provide equal or better capability at less cost
and that the current ARH management structure is inadequate.
The decision to end the current ARH contract will further delay the
delivery of a replacement for Kiowa Warrior and National Guard Apache
assets, but it will allow for near-term funds to be spent on Kiowa
Warrior upgrades in lieu of an operationally viable alternative. During
the Nunn-McCurdy process, OSD validated the need for a manned
helicopter that is armed, small, and maneuverable. Based on recent
feedback from operational theaters, OSD stated that the replacement for
the Kiowa Warrior would operate in concert with current Apache and
extended-range, multi-purpose unmanned aerial systems and would
together be used for attack, reconnaissance, intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition missions.
Funding Fiscal Years 2009-2013 (FY09 dollars): TBD.
Next Major Program Event: NA.
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment,
the Army provided technical comments which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X).
Source: 669 AESS/TH CSAR-X Program Office. Note: Photo is of the HH-60
Pavehawk, the aircraft the CSAR-X will replace.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X)
is planned to provide a vertical take-off and landing aircraft that is
quickly deployable and capable of main base and austere location
operations for worldwide combat search and rescue and personnel
recovery missions. The CSAR-X will be developed in two blocks and will
replace the aging HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter fleet. We assessed Block
0, which is the first block to be developed.
Current Status:
CSAR-X is being managed as an incremental development program. Block 0
and Block 10 will be managed as separate programs with their own
requirements, program baselines, and milestone reviews.
The initiation of CSAR-X Block 0 development has been delayed several
times, in part due to two bid protests filed at GAO. The Air Force
awarded the Block 0 development contract to Boeing in November 2006,
but a bid protest by competing contractors filed with GAO required the
Air Force to suspend the beginning of product development activities.
In February 2007, GAO sustained the protest. In response, the Air Force
amended its request for proposals. However, the competitors filed
another bid protest in response to the Air Force's amended request.
This second protest was also sustained by GAO in August 2007. As a
result, the Air Force has again amended the request for proposals in
response to the protest. Further, the Air Force released another
amendment in December 2008 to incorporate more changes and
clarifications.
Program officials do not expect to award a Block 0 development contract
before spring 2009. The delay to Block 0 development will likely affect
the entire CSAR-X acquisition schedule including the development of
Block 10, which is currently scheduled to start in 2010. Although the
Air Force would like to have the first unit of CSAR-X helicopters in
the field by 2013, program officials acknowledge that initial
operational capability could occur as late as 2015, because of the
delays in beginning product development.
Funding, Fiscal Years 2009-2013 (FY09 dollars): RDT&E $1,764.3 million
Procurement $2,162.0 million:
Next Major Program Event: Contract award projected for 2009.
Program Office Comments: The program office concurred with this
assessment and provided technical comments, which were incorporated
where appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Photograph: Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM).
Source: JAMS Project Office.
[End of figure]
JAGM is an Army-led joint program between the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps. The missile will be air-launched from helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft and is designed to target tanks; light armored vehicles;
missile launchers; command, control, and communications vehicles;
bunkers; and buildings. It is expected to provide line-of-sight and
beyond line-of sight capabilities and be employed in a fire-and-forget
mode or a precision attack mode. The missile will replace Hellfire,
Maverick, and air-launched TOW missiles.
Current Status:
JAGM was approved to start a 27-month technology development phase in
September 2008, and the program is implementing DOD's 2007 policy on
competitive prototyping. The Army awarded fixed-price incentive
contracts to Lockheed Martin and Raytheon for the technology
development effort, which will culminate with flight tests of competing
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon prototypes. At that time, the Army will
down-select to one of the contractors prior to proceeding into system
development.
The JAGM program has identified three critical technologies-a multimode
seeker for increased countermeasure resistance, boost-sustain
propulsion for increased standoff range, and a multipurpose warhead for
increased lethality. Program officials noted that many of the
components of these technologies are currently in production on other
missile systems, but they have not been fully integrated into a single
missile. Program officials expect these technologies to be nearing
maturity by the start of system development. In addition, the program
has identified backup technologies that are almost all mature. However,
if these backup technologies are used, they may require additional time
and funding to fully integrate them.
The Army will continue to extend Hellfire missiles to meet the needs of
the warfighter, while Navy will rely on both Maverick and Hellfire
missiles until JAGM becomes available.
Funding, Fiscal Years 2009-2013: $1,107.9 million:
Next Major Program Event: System development start, December 2010.
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment,
the Army concurred with the information provided and provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
Source: Joint Combat Support Systems (JCSS) Project Office.
[End of figure]
The Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command's Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle concept is a family of vehicles that is intended
to supplement and potentially replace the High-Mobility Multi-Purpose
Wheeled Vehicle. The JLTV plans to provide defensive measures covering
troops while in transport, increase payload, improve the logistics
footprint, and reduce soldier workload associated with system operation
and field maintenance activities. JLTV also expects to reduce life
cycle costs through commonality at the subassembly and component level.
Current Status:
JLTV was approved to start a 27-month technology development phase in
December 2007. Earlier that year, the program attempted to start system
development, but it was directed by the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to first get approval to enter
technology development-an earlier phase of the acquisition cycle. One
of the goals of the technology development phase is to demonstrate
critical technologies in a relevant environment before proceeding into
system development. It is also intended to shorten the length of and
reduce the risk associated with system development.
The JLTV program is implementing DOD's 2007 policy on competitive
prototyping. The Army plans for 4 of the 10 configurations of JLTV to
be prototyped and tested in the technology development phase. In
October 2008, the Army awarded three technology development contracts.
BAE Systems Land & Armaments, Ground Systems Division was awarded a
$73.9 million cost share contract, in which DOD will pay $58.5 million
and the contractor will contribute $15.4 million. General Tactical
Vehicles, a joint venture between General Dynamics Land Systems and AM
General, was awarded a $117 million cost share contract in which both
DOD and the contractor will contribute $58.5 million. Lockheed Martin
Systems Integration was awarded a $48.9 million cost plus fixed-fee
contract. In November 2008, bid protests of the JLTV technology
development contract awards were filed with GAO. The Army is in receipt
of the protests and has said it will respond in accordance with GAO
timelines. GAO will issue its decisions not later than 100 days from
the date the protest was filed.
Funding Fiscal Years 2009-2013: $510.3 million (Army--$204.6 million;
USMC--$305.7 million):
Next Major Program Event: System Development Start.
Program Office Comments: The Army and Marine Corps provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
KC-X:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: KC-X.
Source: SAF/PAO.
[End of figure]
The Air Force KC-X program is the first of three phases in the
recapitalization of the current KC-135 aerial refueling tanker fleet.
It is planned to provide sustained aerial refueling capability to
facilitate global attack, air-bridge, deployment, sustainment, homeland
defense, theater support, specialized national defense missions, as
well as airlift capabilities for passenger and palletized cargo
deployment. The current KC-X acquisition strategy calls for the
procurement of 179 commercial aircraft to be modified for military use
at an expected cost of about $35 billion:
Current Status:
The KC-135 recapitalization is the Air Force's highest acquisition
priority and is expected to involve the procurement of about 600
aircraft over 40 years at a cost that could exceed $100 billion. On
February 29, 2008, the Air Force selected a consortium consisting of
Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company
(EADS)-the parent company of Airbus over Boeing to build the KC-X
tankers. In March 2008, Boeing filed a bid protest with GAO. On June
18, 2008, GAO sustained Boeing's protest and, consistent with that
decision, recommended that the Air Force reopen discussions with the
offerors, obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals,
and make a new source selection decision. In July 2008, the Secretary
of Defense stated that there would be a new solicitation requesting
revised proposals from industry, and the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics would replace the Air Force as
the source selection authority. DOD expected to award the new contract
by December 31, 2008. However, on September 10, 2008, the Secretary
announced his decision to terminate the second competition noting there
was not enough time for DOD to complete a competition that would be
viewed as fair and competitive in such a highly-charged environment by
January 2009, when the next administration would take office. He stated
that rather than handing the next administration an incomplete and
possibly contested process, the next team should review the military
requirements objectively and craft a new acquisition strategy. Further,
he added that DOD plans to continue funding the program in the fiscal
year 2010 through 2015 budget. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force
stated that a new KC-X competition could take the new administration
between 8 months and 4 years to complete.
Funding, Fiscal Years 2009-2013 (FY09 dollars): $239.8 million in no-
year Tanker Replacement Transfer Funds were rescinded by the Department
of Defense Appropriations Act, 2009. However, the accompanying joint
explanatory statement tables suggested $23 million in fiscal year 2009
research, development, test and evaluation funds be provided to the
program.
Next Major Program Event: Develop new acquisition strategy beginning
January 2009.
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment,
DOD concurred with the information provided in the report.
[End of section]
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Illustration: Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II.
Source: SDB II Program Office.
[End of figure]
The Air Force's Small Diameter Bomb Increment II will provide the
capability to attack mobile targets from standoff range in adverse
weather. The program builds on a previous increment that provided
capability against fixed targets. SDB II will add capability for
multiple kills per pass, multiple ordnance carriage, near-precision
munitions, and reduced munitions footprint. SDB II will be installed on
the Air Force F-15E and the Navy and Marine Corps Joint Strike Fighter,
and is designed to work with other aircraft, such as the F-22A.
Current Status:
In May 2006, the SDB II program was approved to start a 42-month
technology development phase. One of the goals of the technology
development phase is to demonstrate critical technologies in a relevant
environment before proceeding into system development. It is also
intended to shorten the length of and reduce the risk associated with
system development. According to the program office, all five of the
SDB II's critical technologies are expected to be approaching maturity
by the start of system development in December 2009. The program office
reports that two of the SDB II's five critical technologies are
currently mature because they are in use on legacy Air Force and Navy
systems. Of the three other technologies, the multimode seeker will be
the most challenging to demonstrate due to the complexity of the
algorithms it requires and size requirements.
For the technology development phase, the Air Force awarded separate
risk-reduction contracts to Boeing and Raytheon. The contractors are
developing system performance specifications as part of this effort.
The contractors will compete for the system development contract, which
the program plans to award in December 2009. According to program
officials, during system development the contractor will be accountable
for system performance, which includes designing the weapon system and
planning the developmental test program to verify the system
performance.
Funding Fiscal Years 2009-2013 (Fiscal Year 2009 Dollars): $473.547
million:
Next Major Program Event: System development start, December 2009.
Program Office Comments: The program office was provided a copy of this
draft but did not provide comments.
[End of section]
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The
comments are reprinted in appendix II. We also received technical
comments from DOD, which have been addressed in the report, as
appropriate.
Over the past year, we have worked closely with DOD on metrics to
measure the performance of DOD's major defense acquisition programs.
These discussions have been productive and we have added several new
metrics to our portfolio analysis as a result. With regard to the
composition of the major defense acquisition program portfolio, DOD
believes a better way to measure performance is to track programs that
are common to all of the portfolios we examined (2003, 2007, 2008),
instead of using portfolios that vary in size and composition. This
type of analysis is included in our report. We identified and isolated
58 programs that were part of the 2003 and 2008 major defense
acquisition program portfolios and analyzed the estimated cost growth
since 2003. The result was consistent with our primary analysis. For
these programs, the total funding needed from fiscal year 2004 through
their completion increased 27 percent or $179 billion between December
2002 and December 2007. Development funding needs increased 46 percent
or $59 billion. In addition, we continue to believe that annual
snapshots of the performance of the entire major defense acquisition
portfolio are an important indicator of how well DOD's acquisition
system generates the return on investment it promises to the
warfighter, Congress, and taxpayer. In its comments, DOD mentioned that
programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter and Future Combat System will
be in the portfolio until 2034 and 2030, respectively, and the $78
billion in cost growth they have experienced will remain in the
portfolio as well. Since this $78 billion in cost growth will have to
be funded from DOD's investment accounts over that time, including it
in our measures of portfolio performance helps to illustrate the
lingering opportunity costs of the cost growth from those systems.
DOD also commented that a significant portion of cost growth in the
portfolio is attributable to increases in procurement quantities and
stated that this does not reflect poor acquisition management. We note
that no single number or measurement captures all of the dimensions of
cost growth; rather, it is important to look at several measurements to
gain insight into the true factors at play. Thus, while it is true that
a measurement like total cost growth for a portfolio of weapons does
not adjust for increases in quantities that may be unrelated to
acquisition management, it is also true that the same measurement does
not isolate offsets to cost growth stemming from quantity reductions,
which may, in fact, be symptomatic of acquisition problems. Our
analysis shows that quantity reductions far outweigh the added cost of
quantity increases. Specifically, while the total cost of the 2008
program portfolio has grown by $48 billion over initial estimates
because of quantity increases, quantity decreases amount to $369
billion--a much larger offset against the cumulative cost growth we
report.
Lastly, DOD commented that cost growth is the result of many factors,
including those unrelated to the acquisition process and the management
of programs. While we do not discuss these factors in this report, we
could not agree more. For several years, GAO's work has highlighted a
number of strategic-level causes that contribute to cost, schedule, and
performance problems in DOD's weapon system programs. Specifically,
DOD's processes for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources,
and developing and procuring weapon systems, which together define the
department's overall weapon system investment strategy, have serious
difficulty balancing the competing needs of the services with those of
the joint warfighter. The result is a consistent commitment to more
programs than resources can support. This imbalance promotes an
unhealthy competition for funds. In addition, DOD's funding process
does not produce an accurate picture of the department's future
resource needs for individual programs---in large part because it
allows programs to go forward with unreliable cost estimates and
lengthy development cycles. As a result, DOD does not have a sound
basis for allocating resources and ensuring program stability.
Invariably, DOD and Congress end up continually shifting funds to and
from programs---undermining well-performing programs to pay for poorly
performing ones. A comprehensive approach that addresses problems in
the acquisition process, the requirements process, and funding
processes will be needed to improve acquisition outcomes.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Air
Force, and Navy, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions on this report, please contact me at (202)
512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United State Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable John M. McHugh:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
This report contains analysis of the performance of the Department of
Defense (DOD) Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) portfolio for
fiscal year 2008 based on data we obtained from the Selected
Acquisition Reports (SAR) and other information in the Defense
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval Purview system referred to
as DAMIR.[Footnote 23] We retrieved data that showed annual funding
requirements for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
and procurement for 96 major defense acquisition programs with SARs
dated December 2007. We converted cost information to fiscal year 2009
dollars using conversion factors from the DOD Comptroller's National
Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 2009 (Table 5-9) and analyzed
the data to determine cost growth in RDT&E, procurement, and total
acquisition from the first full estimate to the current estimate. We
extracted data on quantities and compared current quantities to those
initially planned to determine differences in raw quantities and in the
Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC). We calculated the number of
programs that had experienced a 25 percent cost increase from initial
estimates. We also obtained schedule information and calculated cycle
time from development start to initial operational capability. Using
the SAR data from DAMIR and other GAO reports, we constructed similar
analyses for the programs submitting SARs in December 2002 and December
2006 to compare to the data from December 2007. We identified 10 of the
most costly programs from the December 2007 SARs and calculated changes
in RDT&E and total costs and quantities between the first full estimate
and the December 2007 SAR. We excluded DDG 51 and Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) from this analysis, because these programs did
not have first estimates or quantity information associated with the
SARs. To highlight cost growth in a common set of programs between 2003
and 2008, we determined the common programs and calculated differences
in the funding streams for each year. In order to show schedule delays,
their magnitude, and the percentage of programs in each category, we
calculated cycle time from initial estimates compared to December 2007
data. Through discussions with DOD officials responsible for the
database and confirming selected data with program offices, we
determined that the SAR data and the information retrieved from DAMIR
were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
Data for the total planned investment of major defense acquisition
programs was obtained from funding stream data included in the SARs and
in DAMIR. We aggregated the data for all programs in three selected
portfolios (fiscal years 2003, 2007, and 2008) using fiscal year 2009
dollars. We refer to programs with SARs dated December 2002 as the
fiscal year 2003 portfolio; programs with SARs dated December 2006 as
the fiscal year 2007 portfolio; and programs with SARs dated December
2007 as the 2008 portfolio. However, the data do not include the full
costs of acquiring Missile Defense Agency (MDA) programs, and these
programs were not included in our assessment of each portfolio's
performance. Further, we divided some SAR programs into smaller
elements, because they report performance data separately. We compared
cost and schedule data from the first full estimate, generally
development start, with the current estimate. For a few programs that
did not have a development or full estimate, we compared the current
estimate to the planning estimate to measure changes in development
costs and schedule delays, but excluded these programs from our
analysis of total acquisition costs and PAUC. When comparable cost and
schedule data were not available for programs, we excluded them from
the analysis. We did not adjust the cost data to reflect changes in
quantities that may have occurred over the life of the programs.
Analysis of Selected DOD Programs Using Knowledge-Based Criteria:
This section contains assessments of individual weapon programs, and
each assessment presents data on the extent to which programs are
following a knowledge-based approach to system development. We obtained
and analyzed data on knowledge attainment for 47 programs. These
programs are all MDAPs--generally between development start and
production. We also collected information and provided profiles on 20
additional programs. These programs include:
* 8 MDA elements,
* 6 pre-major defense acquisition programs,
* 3 programs in the bid protest process at the time of our review or
canceled,
* 1 acquisition category II program, and:
* 2 components of MDAPs.
A table listing the systems is found in appendix IV. We selected the
programs because of their status as major defense acquisition programs,
because of their development cost, or because they are early in
development but have high potential of becoming major defense
acquisition programs.
To assess the performance and outcomes of the 47 weapon system
programs, we collected information contained in the SARs or from
program office responses to a questionnaire. To assess the overall
outcomes for the 47 programs to date, we identified programs with cost,
schedule, and quantity data at the first full estimate, generally
Milestone B, and a latest estimate, either a SAR or a program office
estimate. Of the programs in our assessment, 44 had relevant data on
RDT&E costs; 40 had PAUC data, and 36 had data on schedules for
delivering initial quantities. The remaining programs, not included in
this analysis, did not have comparable data. We summed the first full
estimate and the latest estimate of RDT&E costs for the programs and
calculated the percentage change between the two estimates. The unit
cost growth assessment reflects the share of the 40 programs that
experienced PAUC growth greater than 25 percent. The schedule
assessment is the average of the change in months between the first and
latest estimates for the planned or actual delivery of initial
operational capability.
To assess knowledge attainment of programs at critical decision points,
we identified programs that proceeded through each juncture (system
development start, DOD design review, and production start) and
collected data about their knowledge levels at each point. The data
were collected from program offices, as of January 2009, using a
questionnaire (additional information on product knowledge is found in
the product knowledge assessment section of this appendix). Programs in
our assessment were in various stages of the acquisition cycle and not
all of the programs provided knowledge information for each point.
Programs were not included in our assessments if relevant decision or
knowledge point data were not available. For each decision point, we
summarize knowledge attainment as the number of programs with data that
achieved that knowledge point. The technology maturity for programs at
various decision points includes 36 programs at development start, 39
programs at design review, and 40 programs at production, some of which
are projected values. We compared the knowledge attainment of programs
that entered development from 2006 to 2008 with those that did so from
2004 to 2005, and those that did so from 2002 to 2003, to determine if,
over time, programs were reaching this critical juncture with an
increasing amount of knowledge. We also assessed the accumulation of
knowledge through the decision points. For development start, we
assessed the percentage of programs with mature technologies. For
design review, we assessed the number of programs that had stable
designs and mature technologies. For production, we assessed the
percentage of programs that had production processes in statistical
control, a stable design at the critical design review, and mature
technologies at development start.
The maturity levels of the 268 critical technologies at development
start were collected from program officials as described in further
detail in the product knowledge assessment section of this appendix. We
only included programs, with their corresponding technologies, that
have entered system development. To compare differences in RDT&E cost
growth between programs with mature technologies, we examined 36
programs with relevant first and current cost estimates that have
passed through development start. We calculated the total RDT&E cost
growth for all programs with mature technologies and compared it to
total RDT&E cost growth for all programs with technologies that were
not fully mature.
To determine the cost growth of systems that conducted technical
reviews at appropriate times during the development cycle, we
calculated the amount of RDT&E cost growth for systems that held the
technical reviews at the appropriate times and compared it to the
amount of cost growth for systems that did not hold the technical
reviews at the appropriate times. To determine whether there had been
an improvement over time in the percent of expected design drawings
that were releasable at the time of critical design review, the
indicator of stable design, we calculated the average percent of design
drawings releasable for the 28 programs with relevant data. We
collected data from 33 programs on the date the program conducted or
plans to conduct key development tests of a fully configured,
integrated, production representative prototype, and compared that data
to the program's production decision date. To determine software
growth, we collected data on software size from 30 programs and
compared the current size to the program's estimate at development
start. Using this information, we compared the average percent change
in RDT&E cost and delay in delivery of an initial operational
capability between programs that had more than a 25 percent increase in
lines of codes and those that had less than a 25 percent increase.
We submitted an additional data collection instrument to the 67
programs assessed in this report and obtained programmatic data from 63
of the programs. We did not validate the data provided by the program
offices, but reviewed it and performed various checks. Where we
discovered discrepancies, we clarified the data accordingly. Fifty-two
of the 63 programs that responded provided data on whether the program
had experienced requirements changes after development start. Our
analysis includes a comparison of RDT&E cost growth for those programs
that experienced requirements changes and those that did not. We did
not evaluate the complexity of the requirements changes. We also
obtained data from programs on the use of cost estimates from the Cost
Analysis Improvement Group or the service and program office staffing.
We obtained the revised DOD 5000.02 Acquisition Instruction from the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics) and compared the revisions to the May 2003 revision. We
analyzed the instruction to compare the extent to which the 2008
policies for conducting acquisition are knowledge-based. We based our
analysis on criteria from our previous work identifying best practices
for acquisition development.
Finally, we relied on GAO's body of work examining DOD acquisition
issues over the years. In recent years, we have issued reports that
have identified systemic problems with major weapon systems
acquisitions and we have made recommendations to DOD on ways to improve
how it acquires major weapon systems. These reports cover contracting,
program management, acquisition policy, cost estimating, budgeting, and
requirements development. We have also issued many detailed reports
evaluating specific weapon systems, such as aircraft programs, ships,
communication systems, satellites, missile defense systems, and future
combat systems. Finally, we used information from numerous GAO products
that examine how commercial best practices can improve outcomes for DOD
programs. During the past 10 years, we have gathered information based
on discussions with more than 25 major commercial companies. Our work
has shown that valuable lessons can be learned from the commercial
sector and can be applied to the development of weapon systems.
System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment:
Over the past several years, DOD has revised policies governing weapon
system acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major
acquisition events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more
consistent across the 67 program assessments, we standardized the
terminology for key program events. For most individual programs in our
assessment, "development start" refers to the initiation of an
acquisition program as well as the start of system development. This
coincides with DOD's Milestone B. A few programs in our assessment
(mostly programs that began before 2001) have a separate "program
start" date, which begins a pre-system development phase for program
definition and risk reduction activities. This "program start" date
generally coincides with DOD's old terminology for Milestone I,
followed by a "development start" date, either DOD's old Milestone II
or new Milestone B depending on when the program began system
development. The "production decision" generally refers to the decision
to enter the production and deployment phase, typically with low-rate
initial production. The "initial capability" refers to the initial
operational capability--sometimes also called first unit equipped or
required asset availability. For shipbuilding programs, the schedule of
key program events in relation to milestones varies for each program.
Our assessments of shipbuilding programs report key program events as
determined by each program's individual strategy. For MDA programs that
do not follow the standard DOD acquisition model but instead develop
systems in incremental capability-based blocks, we identify the key
technology development efforts that lead to an initial capability for
the block assessed.
The information presented on the "funding needed to complete" from
fiscal year 2009 through completion, unless otherwise noted, draws on
information from SARs or on data from the program office. In some
instances, the data were not yet available, and we annotate this by the
term "to be determined" (TBD), or "not applicable" (NA). The quantities
listed refer only to procurement quantities. Satellite programs, in
particular, produce a large percentage of their total operational units
as development quantities, which are not included in the quantity
figure.
Out of the 67 programs in our assessment, 60 programs are captured in a
two-page format discussing technology, design, and manufacturing
knowledge obtained and other program issues. The remaining 7 programs
are described in a one-page format that describes their current status.
To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we
reviewed DOD's SARs or obtained data directly from the program offices.
In general, we compared the latest available SAR information with a
baseline for each program. For programs that have started product
development--those that are beyond Milestone II or B--we compared the
latest available SAR to the development estimate from the first SAR
issued after the program was approved to enter development. For systems
that have not yet started system development, we provided funding
through the future years defense program. For systems not included in
the SARs, we attempted to obtain comparable baseline and current data
from the individual program offices. For MDA systems, for which a
baseline was not available, we compared the latest available cost
information to the amount reported last year.
All cost information is presented in fiscal year 2009 dollars using
Office of the Secretary of Defense approved deflators to eliminate the
effects of inflation. We have depicted only the program's main elements
of acquisition cost--research and development and procurement. However,
the total program costs also include military construction and
acquisition operation and maintenance costs. Because of rounding and
these additional costs, in some situations, total cost may not match
the exact sum of the research and development and procurement costs.
The program unit costs are calculated by dividing the total program
cost by the total quantities planned. These costs are often referred to
as program acquisition unit costs. For some programs we refer to a
"Nunn-McCurdy" cost breach to describe an increase in unit costs.
[Footnote 24] In some instances, the data were not applicable, and we
annotate this by using the term "NA." In other instances, the current
absence of data on procurement funding and quantities precludes
calculation of a meaningful program acquisition unit cost, and we
annotate this by using the term "TBD." The quantities listed refer to
total quantities, including both procurement and development
quantities.
The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, defined as
the number of months between program start and the achievement of
initial operational capability or an equivalent fielding date. In some
instances, the data were not yet available, and we annotate this by
using the term "TBD," or noting that the information is classified.
The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate, or overall,
picture of a program's history. These assessments represent the sum of
the federal government's actions on a program, not just those of the
program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of detailed
analyses of changes which attempt to link specific changes with
triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such
detailed distinctions.
Product Knowledge Data on Individual Two-Page Assessments:
To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key
points in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to
each program office. The results are graphically depicted in each two-
page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program documentation such
as the operational requirements document, the acquisition program
baseline, test reports, and major program reviews.
To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a
tool, referred to as Technology Readiness Levels (TRL), for our
analysis. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally
developed TRLs, and the Army and Air Force science and technology
research organizations use them to determine when technologies are
ready to be handed off from science and technology managers to product
developers. TRLs are measured on a scale from 1 to 9, beginning with
paper studies of a technology's feasibility and culminating with a
technology fully integrated into a completed product. (See appendix III
for TRL definitions.) Our best practices work has shown that a
technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a technology in a
realistic environment--is the level of technology maturity that
constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program. In
our assessment, the technologies that have reached TRL 7, a prototype
demonstrated in a realistic environment, are referred to as mature or
fully mature. Those technologies that have reached TRL 6, a prototype
demonstrated in a relevant environment, are referred to as approaching
or nearing maturity and are assessed as attaining 50 percent of the
desired level of knowledge. Satellite technologies that have achieved
TRL 6 are assessed as fully mature due to the difficulty of
demonstrating maturity in an operational environment--space.
In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of
maturity. We sought to clarify the TRLs in those cases where
information existed that raised concerns. If we were to conduct a
detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies assessed,
the readiness levels demonstrated, or both. It was not always possible
to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system at key
decision points after the passage of many years. In a few cases, we
discussed information we received from program offices concerning
technology readiness with officials from the Office of the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering.
To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of our
current assessment. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the
percentage of engineering drawings provided by the program office. We
clarified the percentage of drawings completed in those cases where
information that raised concerns existed. Completed drawings were
defined as the number of drawings released or deemed releasable to
manufacturing that can be considered the "build to" drawings.
To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those
processes. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the information
provided by the program office. We clarified the number of critical
manufacturing processes and percentage of statistical process control
where information existed that raised concerns. We used a standard
called the Process Capability Index, a process performance measurement
that quantifies how closely a process is running to its specification
limits. The index can be translated into an expected product defect
rate, and we have found it to be a best practice. We sought other data,
such as scrap and rework trends in those cases where quantifiable
statistical control data were unavailable. Although the knowledge
points provide excellent indicators of potential risks by themselves,
they do not cover all elements of risk that a program encounters during
development, such as funding instability. Our detailed reviews on
individual systems normally provide a more comprehensive assessment of
risk elements.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to March 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3010 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3010:
March 17, 2009:
The Honorable Gene L. Dodaro:
Acting Comptroller General of the United States:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Dodaro:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report GAO-09-326SP, "Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected
Weapon Programs," dated February 18, 2009 (GAO Code 120750).
First, the Department is encouraged that the draft report cites the
progress that we have made over the past several years in reducing cost
growth. We have instituted several major changes that are beginning to
show results. As noted in the draft report, the updated acquisition
documents which I signed in December 2008, and several policy memos I
issued in 2007 and 2008, are aimed at starting programs out right,
using competitive prototyping, using configuration steering boards, and
strengthening performance agreements with program managers. The draft
report shows a slight decrease in the cumulative cost growth over the
past year, noting early systems engineering reviews and increasing
technology readiness levels for new programs. I strongly believe as
these initiatives are implemented across the major defense acquisition
programs (MDAPs), they will be key to restraining cost growth. I have
also developed a plan to improve and grow the acquisition workforce,
which I believe will have very positive effects on program cost,
schedule and performance.
Secondly, I thank you and your staff for working with the Department to
improve the information flow between our organizations and to develop
more meaningful metrics in this area. I am still concerned that DoD's
performance in several areas is, as you note, "driven by older,
underperforming programs as newer programs, on average, have not yet
shown the same degree of cost and schedule growth" and that the
"portfolios" are not the same size or composition. For example, the
number of programs in the portfolios increases from the 2003 portfolio
to the 2007 and 2008 portfolios - from 77 in 2003 to 95 in 2007 and 96
in 2008. Using the 59 programs that are common across the three time
periods - 2003, 2007 and 2008 - we find a total cost growth from the
original baselines of $243.8B, over 40% of which occurred before 2003.
We should continue to work together to remove from our metrics cost
growth that occurred in the late 1980s and through the 1990s, as we
have made many improvements in our acquisition process since that time.
Our staffs worked together to develop some metrics that did not include
such "long-ago" growth. These new metrics were not included in the 2009
draft report, but I hope that they will be included in future reports.
These metrics will, I believe, allow for a more accurate assessment of
current portfolio performance and policies. Looking forward, I am
mindful that cost growth cited in this report will not vanish in the
short run, and it will take years for the new initiatives to work their
way into the majority of the programs in the portfolio. For example,
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and Future Combat system (FCS) programs
are planned to be in the portfolio until 2034 and 2030, respectively.
They will keep $78B of cost growth in the portfolio even if they have
no cost growth for the next 25 years.
Thirdly, my personal analysis shows that a significant portion of the
cost growth is attributable to increases in procurement quantities over
the original program baseline. Purchasing greater quantities, and the
associated cost of these items, is not acquisition program cost growth
and does not reflect poor acquisition management.
Additionally, our analysis shows that the procurement plans for several
programs were delayed and procurement rates slowed as a result of DoD
budget decisions which are completely beyond the control of DoD program
managers. Procuring weapon systems at rates lower than planned ensures
significantly higher cost. Again, these choices made in DoD and
Congressional budget processes do not constitute procurement cost
growth as a result of poor program planning, execution, or management.
It is very important to recognize that these large, sensational numbers
are a result of many factors, some of which are unrelated to the DoD
acquisition process and management of programs. Make no mistake, there
is clearly a need for greater discipline in program planning and
execution, but the GAO analysis overstates the problem directly
attributable to acquisition. I believe we have made improvements. We
have much more work to do to ensure we deliver the maximum value for
the taxpayer and robust capability for the warfighter. However, the
future analysis needs to recognize all of the reasons for cost growth
and avoid attributing program performance solely to the DoD acquisition
process.
The Department has worked diligently over the past year to improve
acquisition policies, reporting and cost estimation methodologies, and
this work is reflected in the 2009 draft report. The draft report
acknowledges that cost growth is decreasing, that early systems
engineering reviews yield demonstrable program successes, and because
all MDAPs under development must now have technology readiness levels
(TRLs) greater than or equal to six, TRLs are increasing. The
Highlights page from the draft report states a total cost growth in FY
2008 of $296B, which is an improvement over the FY 2007 total cost
growth of $301B.
We must continue to improve the acquisition process to more effectively
and efficiently deliver products to our customers, and we need to
continue to develop better metrics. The Department looks forward to
working with the GAO in both important endeavors.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. Technical comments are being developed and will be provided
separately to your staff. My point of contact for this effort is Dr.
Nancy L. Spruill, 703-614-5737.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
John J. Young, Jr.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels:
Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported;
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties;
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application
formulated;
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption.
Examples are still limited to paper studies;
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical
function and/or characteristic proof of concept;
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative;
Hardware/software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale
individual components (pieces of subsystem);
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard validation
in laboratory environment;
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity"
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad
hoc" hardware in a laboratory;
Hardware/software: Low-fidelity breadboard; Integration of nonscale
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach
suitable for flight articles;
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation
in relevant environment;
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory
integration of components;
Hardware/software: High-fidelity breadboard; Functionally equivalent
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc).
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of
several components with reasonably realistic support
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality;
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.
Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype
demonstration in a relevant environment;
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated realistic environment;
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be very close to form, fit and
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full
functionality of the subsystem;
Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or limited/
restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. Integration
of technology is well defined.
Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in a
realistic environment;
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in an
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a
test bed aircraft;
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate
full functionality of subsystem;
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative
realistic environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator aircraft;
Technology is well substantiated with test data.
Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight
qualified" through test and demonstration;
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if
it meets design specifications;
Hardware/software: Flight-qualified hardware;
Demonstration environment: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in
the actual system application.
Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through
successful mission operations;
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the
system under operational mission conditions;
Hardware/software: Actual system in final form;
Demonstration environment: Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in
operational mission conditions.
Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space
Administration data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or s [Hyperlink, sullivanm@gao.gov]
ullivanm@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
Principal contributors to this report were Ronald E. Schwenn, Assistant
Director; Helena Brink, Carol T. Mebane, Sean C. Seales, and Jessica R.
Wintfeld. Other key contributors included David B. Best, Ridge C.
Bowman, Thomas J. Denomme, Bruce D. Fairbairn, Arthur Gallegos, William
R. Graveline, Michael J. Hesse, Richard Y. Horiuchi, Arthur L. James,
Jr., Meredith A. Kimmett, John E. Oppenheim, Kenneth E. Patton, Charles
W. Perdue, Guisseli Reyes-Turnell, Rae Ann H. Sapp, Robert S.
Swierczek, Bruce H. Thomas, Alyssa B. Weir, and Karen S. Zuckerstein.
The following were responsible for individual programs:
System: Advanced Extreme High Frequency Satellites (AEHF);
Primary staff: Bradley L. Terry.
System: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning
System (ATIRCM/CMWS);
Primary staff: Danny G. Owens.
System: Aerial Common Sensor (ACS);
Primary staff: Sean C. Seales/Dayna L. Foster.
System: AGM-88E AARGM;
Primary staff: Kathryn M. Edelman/Gary C. Guggolz.
System: Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH);
Primary staff: Michael J. Hesse/Wendy P. Smythe.
System: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP);
Primary staff: Don M. Springman/Sean C. Seales.
System: B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency SatCom Capability
(B-2 EHF SATCOM);
Primary staff: Andrew H. Redd/Elizabeth DeVan.
System: BMDS: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD);
Primary staff: Thomas A. Mahalek/Ivy G. Hubler.
System: BMDS: Airborne Laser (ABL);
Primary staff: LaTonya D. Miller/Isabella P. Johnson.
System: BMDS: Flexible Target Family (FTF);
Primary staff: Ivy P. Hubler/Letisha T. Watson.
System: BMDS: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD);
Primary staff: Steven B. Stern/Isabella P. Johnson.
System: BMDS: Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI);
Primary staff: Letisha T. Watson/Meredith A. Kimmett.
System: BMDS: Multiple Kill Vehicle;
Primary staff: Meredith A. Kimmett.
System: BMDS: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS);
Primary staff: Sigrid L. McGinty.
System: BMDS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD);
Primary staff: Steven B. Stern.
System: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS);
Primary staff: W. William Russell IV/Caitlin Tobin.
System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP);
Primary staff: Sean D. Merrill/Erin L. Stockdale.
System: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP);
Primary staff: Marvin E. Bonner/Cheryl K. Andrew.
System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengineering Program (C-5
RERP);
Primary staff: Cheryl K. Andrew/Marvin E. Bonner.
System: CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR);
Primary staff: Kevin J. Heinz/Laurier R. Fish.
System: Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X);
Primary staff: Julie C. Hadley/Travis J. Masters.
System: CVN-21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier;
Primary staff: Diana L. Moldafsky/Richard G. Winsor.
System: DDG 1000 Destroyer;
Primary staff: Diana L. Moldafsky/Molly W. Traci.
System: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE);
Primary staff: Jeffrey L. Hartnett/Jessica R. Wintfeld.
System: EA-18G;
Primary staff: Bonita P. Oden/Jonathan R. Stehle.
System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV);
Primary staff: Dayna L. Foster/Jessica R. Wintfeld.
System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile;
Primary staff: Richard A. Cederholm/Beverly A. Breen.
System: Extended Range/Multiple Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System
(Warrior);
Primary staff: Tana M. Davis.
System: F-22A Modernization;
Primary staff: Robert K. Miller/Marvin E. Bonner.
System: Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T);
Primary staff: Alexandra K. Dew/Nicholas Alexander.
System: Future Combat Systems (FCS);
Primary staff: Marcus C. Ferguson/Carrie W. Rogers.
System: Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System;
Primary staff: Charlie Shivers/J. Andrew Walker.
System: Global Positioning Systems Block IIIA;
Primary staff: Josie H. Sigl.
System: Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM);
Primary staff: Jessica M. Berkholtz/Danny G. Owens.
System: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM);
Primary staff: William C. Allbritton/John M. Ortiz.
System: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System (JLENS);
Primary staff: John M. Ortiz/Angela D. Thomas.
System: Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV);
Primary staff: Carrie W. Rogers/Dayna L. Foster.
System: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF);
Primary staff: Ridge C. Bowman/Georgeann M. Higgins.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station
(JTRS AMF);
Primary staff: Paul G. Williams/Guisseli Reyes-Turnell.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR);
Primary staff: Ann Marie Udale/Paul G. Williams.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit
(JTRS HMS);
Primary staff: Guisseli Reyes-Turnell/Ann Marie Udale.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System Network Enterprise Domain (JTRS
NED);
Primary staff: James S. Kim/James P. Tallon.
System: KC-135 Replacement (KC-X);
Primary staff: Mary Jo Lewnard/Wendell K. Hudson.
System: LHA-6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program;
Primary staff: Jessica R. Wintfeld/Gwyneth B. Woolwine.
System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS);
Primary staff: Kelly Bradley/Christopher R. Durbin.
System: Littoral Combat Ship: Mission Modules;
Primary staff: Gwyneth B. Woolwine/Brian Egger.
System: Longbow Apache Block III (AB3);
Primary staff: Helena Brink/Wendy P. Smythe.
System: Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform
(MPF(F)/MLP);
Primary staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Angie Nichols Friedman/Carolynn A.
Cavanaugh.
System: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP);
Primary staff: Dayna L. Foster/Erin L. Stockdale.
System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS);
Primary staff: Richard Y. Horiuchi.
System: MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System;
Primary staff: Rae Ann H. Sapp/Charlie Shivers.
System: Multi-Functional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical
Radio System (MIDS-JTRS);
Primary staff: Raffaele Roffo/Paul G. Williams/Leigh Ann Nally.
System: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP);
Primary staff: Leigh Ann Nally/Anne McDonough Hughes.
System: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite
System (NPOESS);
Primary staff: Suzanne Sterling.
System: NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) Space and Control;
Primary staff: Josie H. Sigl.
System: Navy Multiband Terminals (NMT);
Primary staff: Lisa P. Gardner.
System: P-8A Poseidon Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A MMA);
Primary staff: Heather L. Miller/Sarah R. Jones.
System: Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit;
Primary staff: Ronald N. Dains/Tana M. Davis.
System: Small Diameter Bomb, Increment II (SDB II);
Primary staff: John M. Ortiz/William C. Allbritton.
System: Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS);
Primary staff: Claire A. Cyrnak.
System: Space Based Surveillance System (SBSS);
Primary staff: Maricela Cherveny.
System: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT);
Primary staff: Arturo Holguin, Jr.
System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft;
Primary staff: Jerry W. Clark/Kathryn E. Bolduc.
System: VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program;
Primary staff: Ian N. Jefferies/Teague A. Lyons.
System: Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774);
Primary staff: C. James Madar/J. Kristopher Keener.
System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, Increment 2;
Primary staff: James P. Tallon/Thomas A. Mahalek.
System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, Increment 3;
Primary staff: Thomas A. Mahalek/James P. Tallon.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January,
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Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination Process Has Not
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060]. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve
Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619]. Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Better Weapon Program Outcomes Require
Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes in the Acquisition
Environment. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-782T].
Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Results of Annual Assessment of DOD Weapon
Programs. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-674T].
Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-467SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 31, 2008.
Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed to
Improve DOD's Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-294]. Washington, D.C.:
February 1, 2008.
Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and Managing
Program Costs. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1134SP].
Washington, D.C.: July 2007.
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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-406SP]. Washington,
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Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon
System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-388]. Washington, D.C.:
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Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology
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15, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to
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Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. [hyperlink,
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Practices. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-469T].
Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,
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2001.
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better
Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,
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31, 2000.
Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon
System Decisions. [hyperlink,
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April 26, 2000.
Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Programs
Implement Best Practices. [hyperlink,
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16, 1999.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve
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30, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program
Outcomes. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116].
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123].
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1998.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires
Changes in DOD's Environment. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-56]. Washington, D.C.:
February 24, 1998.
Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer
Improvements for DOD. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-96-162]. Washington, D.C.: August
26, 1996.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See Explanatory Statement, 154 Cong. Rec. H 9427, 9526 (daily ed.
Sept. 24, 2008) and the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Division C, Department of Defense
Appropriation Act Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, § 4.
[2] All dollar amounts used in this report are in fiscal year 2009
constant dollars unless otherwise noted.
[3] Major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) are those identified by
DOD that require eventual total research, development, test and
evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures of more than $365 million or
procurement expenditures of more than $2.19 billion in fiscal year 2000
constant dollars.
[4] These programs include: eight Missile Defense Agency elements, six
pre-major defense acquisition programs, three programs that are
addressing issues raised in bid protests or have been canceled, two
components of major defense acquisition programs, and one acquisition
category II program. An acquisition category II program is defined as a
program that does not meet the criteria for an acquisition category I
program and is estimated to require eventual total RDT&E expenditures
of more than $140 million or procurement expenditures of more than $660
million in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.
[5] In 2008, four programs left the portfolio, a Chemical
Demilitarization program, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, E-2C
Hawkeye, and Land Warrior; four programs entered the portfolio, the
Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle, B-2 EHF Increment I,
Space-Based Space Surveillance Block 10, and Large Aircraft Infrared
Countermeasures; and one existing program, the Warfighter Information
Network-Tactical was restructured and began reporting cost and schedule
data separately for Increments 1 and 2.
[6] The program acquisition unit cost is the total cost for development
and procurement of, and system-specific military construction for, the
acquisition program divided by the number of fully-configured end items
to be produced.
[7] DOD combined two previously separate programs, the Chemical
Demilitarization Program-Chemical Materials Agency (Newport) and the
Chemical Demilitarization Program-Chemical Materials Agency, leaving a
single program, the Chemical Demilitarization Program--Chemical
Material Agency.
[8] Part of DOD's acquisition policy is DOD Directive 5000.01, The
Defense Acquisition System, which describes the management principles
for DOD's acquisition programs, and DOD Instruction 5000.02, The
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, which outlines a framework
for managing acquisition programs. Collectively, these are referred to
as the 5000 series.
[9] We assessed delivery time frames using the program's planned dates
for achieving initial operational capability or other equivalent dates.
Delays of less than 1 month are considered on-time for the purposes of
this analysis.
[10] The start of system development, as used here, indicates the point
at which significant financial commitment is made to design, integrate,
and demonstrate that the product will meet the user's requirements and
can be manufactured on time, with high quality, and at a cost that
provides an acceptable return on investment. Under the revised 5000
series, this phase is now called engineering and manufacturing
development. Engineering and manufacturing development follows the
materiel solution analysis and technology development.
[11] Not all programs provided information for every knowledge point or
had reached all of the knowledge points--development start, design
review, or production start.
[12] Demonstration in a relevant environment is Technology Readiness
Level (TRL) 6. See appendix III for a detailed description of TRLs.
[13] In December 2008, DOD revised its acquisition policy for major
defense acquisition programs. We did not assess programs' compliance
with these revisions.
[14] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, § 801, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2366b.
[15] This analysis is based on responses received from the
questionnaire submitted to the 67 programs we individually assessed.
[16] The purpose of a system requirements review (SRR) is to ensure
that the system under review can proceed into system development and
that all system and performance requirements are consistent with cost,
schedule, risk, and other system constraints.
[17] The purpose of a system functional review (SFR) is to ensure that
the system can proceed into preliminary design and that all system and
functional performance requirements are defined and are consistent with
cost, schedule, risk, and other system constraints.
[18] The purpose of a preliminary design review (PDR) is to ensure that
the system under review can proceed into detailed design, and can meet
the stated performance requirements within cost, schedule, risk, and
other system constraints.
[19] This analysis is based on responses received from the
questionnaire submitted to the 67 programs we individually assessed.
[20] See appendix I for our detailed scope and methodology on the
programs that responded to the questionnaire and data collection
instruments used in our analysis of cost estimating, requirements
changes, software management, and program office staffing.
[21] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best
Practices, but More Controls Are Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-53] (Washington, D.C: Nov. 10,
2003).
[22] This review is the post-critical design review. The milestone
decision authority, as constructed by the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), is an entity with
approval authority for a program's structure, including type and number
of decision points, and entry into major acquisition phases based on
milestone decisions. Each milestone decision, which typically addresses
program progress, risks, affordability, trade-offs, acquisition
strategy updates, and development of exit criteria for the next phase,
results in a decision to initiate, continue, advance, or terminate a
program work effort or phase.
[23] DAMIR Purview is an executive information system operated by the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics/Acquisition Resources and Analysis.
[24] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 establishes the requirement for unit cost
reports. If certain unit cost thresholds are exceeded (known as Nunn-
McCurdy breaches), DOD is required to report to Congress and, in
certain circumstances, if DOD determines that specific criteria are
met, certify the program to Congress.
[End of section]
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