Defense Infrastructure
DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses Gao ID: GAO-09-336 March 30, 2009The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) establish 12 joint bases by consolidating the management and support of 26 separate installations, potentially saving $2.3 billion over 20 years. In response to a direction from the House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, GAO evaluated DOD's (1) efforts and expected costs to deliver installation support at joint bases and (2) funding for facility sustainment, which includes the maintenance and repair activities necessary to keep facilities in good working order, at all installations. GAO compared new support standards with the current support levels, visited nine installations that will become four joint bases, and compared facility sustainment funding levels with requirements and goals.
DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure consistent delivery of installation support at the planned joint bases, but the cost of installation support is expected to increase rather than decrease as forecasted by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. In January 2008, DOD began issuing joint base implementation guidance that for the first time established a set of common definitions and standards for installation support. The guidance defined 47 installation support areas (e.g., airfield operations, grounds maintenance, custodial services, and child and youth programs) and provided 267 standards to define the expected level of service in each area. DOD officials stated that the standards represented the service levels needed to meet mission and personnel requirements in view of DOD policies and guidance, commercial standards, other federal agency guidance, or in some cases, military judgment. However, contrary to the expectations of the commission, for two primary reasons installation support costs at the joint bases are expected to increase above the cost of support provided by the separate installations before consolidation. First, DOD has required the joint bases to deliver installation support in accordance with the new standards even though the military services have not previously funded installation support in the amounts needed to meet each of the standards. GAO's comparison of 40 selected standards to the service levels currently provided at the nine installations it visited showed that on average service levels would have to increase to meet the standards in about 27 percent of the areas compared. Second, in some instances the services' approach to implementing joint basing will result in additional administrative costs and the loss of some existing installation support efficiencies. Although DOD officials stated that the increased support costs at the joint bases might be at least partially offset over time as experience is gained and new efficiencies are identified and adopted, it is unclear whether joint basing will result in actual savings. The military services have not budgeted and spent sufficient funds to meet their facility sustainment requirements and goals and prevent facility deterioration at the installation level. Citing other budget priorities as the reason, the military services did not budget funds to meet about $2.3 billion (9 percent) of their total facility sustainment requirements during fiscal years 2005 through 2008 and, according to DOD, needed sustainment work that is not performed may eventually result in damaged facilities, shortened facility service lives, and increased future costs for facility restoration. The services have further exacerbated the sustainment funding issue by using some budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes. During fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the military services used about $2.6 billion (14 percent) of the funds budgeted for sustainment for other purposes, primarily to pay for unfunded facility restoration and modernization projects. Although service officials stated that these projects were needed, the consequence was that sustainment requirements were not met. During visits to nine installations, GAO found backlogs of deferred sustainment needs and some facilities that were not in good condition because funds were not available to pay for all needed sustainment work.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-336, Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2009:
Defense Infrastructure:
DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support Standards and Costs at Joint
Bases and Better Inform Congress of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses:
GAO-09-336:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-336, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended
that the Department of Defense (DOD) establish 12 joint bases by
consolidating the management and support of 26 separate installations,
potentially saving $2.3 billion over 20 years. In response to a
direction from the House Armed Services Committee report accompanying
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, GAO
evaluated DOD's (1) efforts and expected costs to deliver installation
support at joint bases and (2) funding for facility sustainment, which
includes the maintenance and repair activities necessary to keep
facilities in good working order, at all installations. GAO compared
new support standards with the current support levels, visited nine
installations that will become four joint bases, and compared facility
sustainment funding levels with requirements and goals.
What GAO Found:
DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure consistent delivery of
installation support at the planned joint bases, but the cost of
installation support is expected to increase rather than decrease as
forecasted by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.
In January 2008, DOD began issuing joint base implementation guidance
that for the first time established a set of common definitions and
standards for installation support. The guidance defined 47
installation support areas (e.g., airfield operations, grounds
maintenance, custodial services, and child and youth programs) and
provided 267 standards to define the expected level of service in each
area. DOD officials stated that the standards represented the service
levels needed to meet mission and personnel requirements in view of DOD
policies and guidance, commercial standards, other federal agency
guidance, or in some cases, military judgment. However, contrary to the
expectations of the commission, for two primary reasons installation
support costs at the joint bases are expected to increase above the
cost of support provided by the separate installations before
consolidation. First, DOD has required the joint bases to deliver
installation support in accordance with the new standards even though
the military services have not previously funded installation support
in the amounts needed to meet each of the standards. GAO‘s comparison
of 40 selected standards to the service levels currently provided at
the nine installations it visited showed that on average service levels
would have to increase to meet the standards in about 27 percent of the
areas compared. Second, in some instances the services‘ approach to
implementing joint basing will result in additional administrative
costs and the loss of some existing installation support efficiencies.
Although DOD officials stated that the increased support costs at the
joint bases might be at least partially offset over time as experience
is gained and new efficiencies are identified and adopted, it is
unclear whether joint basing will result in actual savings.
The military services have not budgeted and spent sufficient funds to
meet their facility sustainment requirements and goals and prevent
facility deterioration at the installation level. Citing other budget
priorities as the reason, the military services did not budget funds to
meet about $2.3 billion (9 percent) of their total facility sustainment
requirements during fiscal years 2005 through 2008 and, according to
DOD, needed sustainment work that is not performed may eventually
result in damaged facilities, shortened facility service lives, and
increased future costs for facility restoration. The services have
further exacerbated the sustainment funding issue by using some
budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes. During fiscal years 2006
through 2008, the military services used about $2.6 billion (14
percent) of the funds budgeted for sustainment for other purposes,
primarily to pay for unfunded facility restoration and modernization
projects. Although service officials stated that these projects were
needed, the consequence was that sustainment requirements were not met.
During visits to nine installations, GAO found backlogs of deferred
sustainment needs and some facilities that were not in good condition
because funds were not available to pay for all needed sustainment
work.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD (1) periodically review the newly established
installation support standards and joint base administrative costs to
help ensure economies and efficiencies and (2) report to Congress on
the estimated installation support costs at the joint bases and on
facility sustainment funds used for other purposes. DOD partially
agreed with the recommendations but did not indicate that it would take
steps to fully implement them. GAO believes that DOD needs to take
additional actions to fully implement the recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-336]. For more
information, contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or
leporeb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Made a Comprehensive Effort to Ensure Consistent Delivery of
Installation Support at Joint Bases, but Support Costs Are Expected to
Increase:
Facility Sustainment Funding Has Not Been Sufficient to Meet
Requirements and Prevent Facility Deterioration:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Methods Used by the Military Services to Allocate Facility
Sustainment Funds to the Installation Level:
Appendix III: List of Installation Support Functions and Number of
Associated Standards for Joint Bases:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: DOD's Planned 12 Joint Bases:
Table 2: Estimated Increase in Installation Support Costs before and
after Joint Basing:
Table 3: Comparison of Current and Standard Service Levels for Selected
Installation Support Areas:
Table 4: Facility Sustainment Requirements Not Budgeted in Fiscal Years
2005 through 2008:
Table 5: Installation Support Functions and Number of Associated
Standards for Joint Bases:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOD's Budgeted Fiscal Year 2009 Funding for Installation
Support:
Figure 2: Damaged Basement in the Command Headquarters Building at Fort
Story:
Figure 3: Leaking Windows Allow Water to Flow into Electrical Control
Panels at McChord Air Force Base:
Figure 4: Leaking Pipes Caused Mold and Mildew Damage at Naval
Amphibious Base Little Creek:
Figure 5: Damage from a Leaking Roof at the Public Works Building at
Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst:
Abbreviations:
BRAC: base realignment and closure:
DOD: Department of Defense:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 30, 2009:
Congressional Committees:
Estimating that $2.3 billion could be saved over a 20-year period,
[Footnote 1] the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC)
Commission recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) establish
12 joint bases by consolidating the management and support of 26
separate Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps installations.
[Footnote 2] The commission noted that, because all installations
perform common functions in support of installation personnel and
facilities and because these installations shared a common boundary or
were in close proximity, the joint bases could reduce duplication of
efforts and achieve greater efficiencies through economies of scale,
which could result in significant long-term savings in installation
support costs.[Footnote 3] For each of the joint bases, the commission
designated which military service would become the lead component with
responsibility for delivering installation support services for the
consolidated base. This arrangement--with one military service assuming
responsibility for supporting another military service's installation--
created concerns about the delivery of installation support at the
joint bases because DOD had not established common definitions and
standards for installation support functions and services. Instead,
each military service had its own long-standing policies and practices
on how each installation support function was defined and the level of
service typically provided in each area. In view of the differences, it
was not clear that the joint bases, scheduled to be fully implemented
by October 2010, would deliver installation support consistently and at
a level considered acceptable by each of the installations combining
into the joint bases.
One installation support area that has been of particular concern, not
only at the planned joint bases but at all military installations, is
facility sustainment, which includes the maintenance and repair
necessary to keep facilities in good working order. DOD is one of the
world's largest organizations in terms of physical plant, managing and
operating about 545,000 buildings and structures with a total
replacement value of about $706 billion. DOD determined that the most
cost-effective approach to managing its facilities is to fully fund
sustainment requirements because this method provides the most
performance over the longest period for the least investment. To
implement this approach, DOD developed a facilities sustainment model
that determines these requirements and established a goal that the
military services budget for sustainment in accordance with the model.
However, in an April 2008 report, we found that although DOD's model
provided reasonable and consistent requirements estimates, the military
services were not budgeting for sustainment in the amounts estimated by
the model.[Footnote 4] As a result, some installation facilities were
not being sustained at a level to keep them in good working order and
will likely experience reduced service lives, which in turn will lead
to more costly recapitalization requirements in the future.
The House Armed Services Committee cited our 2008 report in its report
accompanying the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009 and expressed concerns about the delivery of
installation support across the joint bases and the adequacy of
facility sustainment funding at all installations.[Footnote 5] The
committee directed that we perform an assessment of these areas. In
response, this report evaluates DOD's (1) efforts and expected costs to
deliver installation support at the planned joint bases and (2) funding
for facility sustainment at all installations.
To address these areas, we (1) reviewed DOD implementation plans,
guidance, and cost estimates associated with the delivery of
installation support at the planned joint bases and compared the levels
of service in selected support areas currently provided by the separate
installations with the levels of service to be provided by the joint
bases and (2) examined and compared DOD's requirements and goals for
facility sustainment funding with the amounts actually budgeted and
spent on sustainment. Also, to gain local-level insight into the
planned delivery and expected costs of installation support at the
joint bases as well as sustainment funding levels and facility
conditions, we visited 3 Army, 3 Navy, and 3 Air Force installations
that are consolidating into 4 of the 12 planned joint bases. We
selected bases for visits that had the highest potential reduction in
jobs according to DOD's 2005 BRAC report.[Footnote 6] We conducted this
performance audit from May 2008 through February 2009, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for more information on
our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure consistent delivery of
installation support at the planned joint bases, but the cost of
installation support at the joint bases is expected to increase rather
than decrease as forecasted by the 2005 BRAC Commission. In January
2008, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) began issuing a
series of joint basing implementation guidance that for the first time
established a set of common definitions and standards for the
installation support to be provided by each joint base. The guidance
defined 47 installation support functions--such as installation
security services, custodial services, and child care programs--and
provided 267 standards to help define the level of service that each
joint base is to provide in the support functions. OSD's guidance also
required that the installations forming joint bases complete a
memorandum of agreement defining the installation support relationship
between the components forming the joint base for fully implementing
the BRAC 2005 joint basing decisions, and that the lead component
deliver installation support in accordance with the new definitions and
standards. However, contrary to the expectations of the BRAC
Commission, DOD officials stated that installation support costs at the
joint bases are expected to increase, at least in the short term, above
the cost of installation support provided by the separate installations
before consolidation. For example, at the three joint bases that had
completed their agreements by January 2009, annual installation support
costs are expected to increase by about $24 million (7 percent) above
current support costs. Increased support costs are expected for two
primary reasons. First, OSD has required that the joint bases deliver
installation support in accordance with the new support standards even
though the military services have not previously funded installation
support in the amounts needed to meet each of the standards. Our
comparison of 40 selected standards to the service levels currently
provided at the installations we visited showed that on average service
levels would have to increase to meet the standards in about 27 percent
of the areas compared. In some support areas, judgment was used to
decide the standard level of service and, because support costs
normally increase as the level of service increases, such decisions
also involve trade-offs between alternative levels of service and
affordability. Second, in some instances the military services'
approach to implementing joint basing will result in additional
administrative costs and the loss of some existing installation support
efficiencies. In the long term, OSD and service headquarters officials
stated that the increased cost of installation support at the joint
bases might be at least partially offset as experience is gained and
best practices and new operational efficiencies are identified and
adopted over time. Nevertheless, the military services' estimate of the
potential 20-year savings from joint basing has already declined about
88 percent from the amount estimated by the BRAC Commission in 2005--
specifically, from $2.3 billion estimated by the commission to about
$273 million estimated by the military services in fiscal year 2009 (in
constant fiscal year 2005 dollars). On the basis of the higher
installation support cost estimates from the initial joint bases and as
long as installation support is delivered in accordance with the new
standards, the military services' estimates of potential savings will
likely continue to decline in the future and it is unclear whether
joint basing will result in any actual savings.
The military services have not budgeted and spent sufficient funds to
meet their facility sustainment requirements and goals and prevent
facility deterioration at the installation level. Citing other budget
priorities as the reason, the military services have not budgeted funds
in the amounts needed to fully fund their sustainment requirements
since budgeting goals were established in 2005. With a goal to budget
for 100 percent of their facility sustainment requirement in fiscal
year 2008, the Army budgeted 89 percent, the Navy budgeted 83 percent,
the Air Force budgeted 90 percent, and the Marine Corps budgeted 89
percent of their respective sustainment requirements. In total for
fiscal years 2005 through 2008, the military services did not budget
funds to meet about $2.3 billion (9 percent) of their total facility
sustainment requirements, and according to DOD, needed sustainment work
that is not performed may eventually result in damaged facilities,
shortened facility service lives, and increased future costs for
facility restoration. The military services have further exacerbated
the sustainment funding issue by spending some budgeted sustainment
funds for other purposes. During fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the
military services used about $2.6 billion (14 percent) of the funds
budgeted for sustainment for other purposes, primarily to pay for
unfunded facility restoration and modernization projects.[Footnote 7]
Although service officials stated that these projects were urgently
needed, the consequence was that additional sustainment requirements
were not met. Considering the levels budgeted for sustainment and the
use of some sustainment funds for other purposes, the amount actually
spent on facility sustainment at six of the nine installations we
visited was less than 75 percent of the estimated requirement during
fiscal years 2006 through 2008, and at three installations, the amount
spent was less than 60 percent of the estimated requirement. As a
result of less than full funding of sustainment requirements and the
use of some sustainment funds for other purposes, the military services
reported backlogs of deferred facility sustainment needs and some
installation facilities had fallen into disrepair. As long as the
military services do not budget sufficient funds to meet their facility
sustainment requirements and use some budgeted sustainment funds for
other purposes, some facilities will not be sustained at a level to
keep them in good working order and will likely experience reduced
service lives, which in turn will lead to more costly recapitalization
requirements in the future.
We are making several recommendations to address the expected increased
installation support costs from joint basing implementation and the use
of facility sustainment funds for purposes other than sustainment.
Specifically, we are recommending that DOD periodically review the
installation support standards as experience is gained with delivering
installation support at the joint bases and make adjustments, if
needed, to ensure that each standard reflects the level of service
necessary to meet installation requirements as economically as
possible; periodically review administrative costs as joint basing is
implemented to minimize any additional costs and prevent the loss of
existing installation support efficiencies; and complete a detailed
analysis of the estimated installation support costs from the initial
joint bases and report the results of the analysis to the Congress in
the department's documents supporting the administration's annual
budget submission or another document deemed appropriate. Also, to
increase the attention given to facility sustainment spending, we are
recommending that DOD summarize and report to the Congress the amount
of budgeted sustainment funds spent on other purposes in the
department's documents supporting the administration's annual budget
submission or another document deemed appropriate. In written comments
to a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with our
recommendations, but did not indicate that it would take additional
steps to implement them. We continue to believe that DOD's actions to
date related to the expected increase in joint bases support costs and
the use of sustainment funds will not fully address the intent of our
recommendations and that DOD needs to take additional actions to
implement them, such as directing periodic reviews of installation
support standards and reporting additional information to Congress. We
discuss DOD's comments in detail later in this report.
Background:
The 2005 BRAC Commission final report noted that all installations
employ military, civilian, and contractor personnel to perform common
functions in support of installation facilities and personnel and that
all installations execute these functions using similar or near similar
processes.[Footnote 8] The report also noted that, in areas where the
military services operated separate installations that share a common
boundary or were in close proximity, there was significant opportunity
to reduce duplication and costs by consolidating the installations.
Specifically, the report stated that by consolidating nearby
installations, savings in personnel and facilities costs could be
realized by eliminating duplication of efforts, paring unnecessary
management personnel, achieving greater efficiencies through economies
of scale, consolidating and optimizing existing and future service
contract requirements, establishing a single space management authority
that could achieve greater utilization of facilities, and reducing the
number of base support vehicles and equipment consistent with the size
of the combined facilities.
The report recommended that DOD establish 12 joint bases from 26
existing installations and estimated that the net present value of the
costs and savings from this effort over 20 years would be about $2.3
billion. For each of the joint bases, the report designated which
military service would become the lead component with responsibility
for delivering installation support services for the consolidated base.
To implement the recommendation, DOD established a schedule that
divided the 12 planned joint bases into two implementation phases. Five
joint bases involving 11 installations were placed into phase I with a
September 30, 2008, milestone for signing a joint base memorandum of
agreement, which would provide a detailed implementation plan including
the personnel and financial arrangements for the combined base, and an
October 1, 2009, milestone for full implementation, which included the
transfer of personnel and funds to the joint base. The remaining 7
joint bases involving 15 installations were placed into phase II with a
September 30, 2009, milestone for signing the joint base memorandum of
agreement and an October 1, 2010, milestone for full implementation.
Table 1 provides details on the planned joint bases.
Table 1: DOD's Planned 12 Joint Bases:
Name of joint base: Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst;
Location: New Jersey;
Implementation phase: I;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: McGuire Air Force
Base, Fort Dix, and Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst;
Component delivering installation support: Air Force.
Name of joint base: Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story;
Location: Virginia;
Implementation phase: I;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Naval Amphibious Base
Little Creek and Fort Story;
Component delivering installation support: Navy.
Name of joint base: Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington;
Location: Maryland;
Implementation phase: I;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Andrews Air Force Base
and Naval Air Facility Washington;
Component delivering installation support: Air Force.
Name of joint base: Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall;
Location: Virginia;
Implementation phase: I;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Fort Myer and
Henderson Hall;
Component delivering installation support: Army.
Name of joint base: Joint Region Marianas;
Location: Guam;
Implementation phase: I;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Navy Base Guam and
Andersen Air Force Base;
Component delivering installation support: Navy.
Name of joint base: Joint Base Lewis-McChord;
Location: Washington;
Implementation phase: II;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Fort Lewis and McChord
Air Force Base;
Component delivering installation support: Army.
Name of joint base: Joint Base Charleston;
Location: South Carolina;
Implementation phase: II;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Charleston Air Force
Base and Naval Weapons Station Charleston;
Component delivering installation support: Air Force.
Name of joint base: Joint Base Langley-Eustis;
Location: Virginia;
Implementation phase: II;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Langley Air Force Base
and Fort Eustis;
Component delivering installation support: Air Force.
Name of joint base: Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam;
Location: Hawaii;
Implementation phase: II;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Naval Station Pearl
Harbor and Hickam Air Force Base;
Component delivering installation support: Navy.
Name of joint base: Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson;
Location: Alaska;
Implementation phase: II;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Elmendorf Air Force
Base and Fort Richardson;
Component delivering installation support: Air Force.
Name of joint base: Joint Base Lackland-Sam Houston-Randolph;
Location: Texas;
Implementation phase: II;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Lackland Air Force
Base, Fort Sam Houston, and Randolph Air Force Base;
Component delivering installation support: Air Force.
Name of joint base: Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling;
Location: District of Columbia;
Implementation phase: II;
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Naval District
Washington and Bolling Air Force Base;
Component delivering installation support: Navy.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
DOD officials stated that, although none of the phase I joint bases met
the September 30, 2008, milestone for signing their memorandums of
agreement, joint bases Myer-Henderson Hall, Andrews-Naval Air Facility
Washington, and Little Creek-Fort Story had signed agreements by
January 2009. The officials stated that Joint Base McGuire-Dix-
Lakehurst and Joint Region Marianas are expected to sign agreements
later in 2009 and all phase I joint bases are still expected to meet
the October 1, 2009, milestone for full implementation.
Installation Responsibilities and Support Funding:
The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment has overall responsibility for DOD's installations and
facilities and by delegation has authority to approve and issue
guidance for joint basing. DOD's facilities portfolio includes about
545,000 buildings and structures worldwide with a total replacement
value of about $706 billion. During fiscal year 2009, DOD plans to
spend about $62 billion to support its facilities and installations.
DOD refers to this funding as installation support, which includes
broad categories of services, programs, and support activities, as
shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: DOD's Budgeted Fiscal Year 2009 Funding for Installation
Support:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Installation support: $62.08 billion:
* Base realignment and closure: $9.46 billion;
* Family housing: $3.20 billion;
* Facilities: $29.40 billion;
- Sustainment: $8.06 billion;
- Recapitalization: $6.56 billion;
- Disposal: $0.19 billion;
- Facilities operation services: $7.72 billion;
- New footprint: $6.87 billion;
* Installation services: $16.50 billion;
* Environment: $3.52 billion.
Appropriation: Operation and maintenance:
Amount: $33.36 billion;
Appropriation: Military construction:
Amount: $11.65 billion;
Appropriation: Military personnel:
Amount: $2.74 billion;
Appropriation: Procurement:
Amount: $0.45 billion;
Appropriation: Working capital fund:
Amount: $0.89 billion;
Appropriation: Family housing:
Amount: $3.20 billion;
Appropriation: Base realignment and closure:
Amount: $9.46 billion;
Appropriation: Other:
Amount: $0.34 billion;
Appropriation: Total:
Amount: $62.08 billion.
Source: DOD.
Note: The Congress appropriates funds according to the categories
listed under the appropriation heading, and DOD classifies funds for
installation support according to the categories in the figure. The
appropriation amounts do not total correctly due to rounding.
[End of figure]
The largest categories of installation support are installation
services and facilities. Installation services, funded primarily with
operation and maintenance appropriations, includes the personnel,
support equipment, contracts, and associated costs to plan, manage, and
deliver installation services and functions, such as installation
airfield and port operations; security; transportation; supply;
communications; information management; personnel management; food
services; administrative, legal, and financial services; unaccompanied
personnel housing management; family and quality of life programs; and
environmental compliance.
The facilities category is composed of five subcategories--facilities
operation services, sustainment, recapitalization, disposal, and new
footprint, which includes facility construction related to new or
expanded missions.
* Facilities operation services, funded primarily with operation and
maintenance appropriations, includes 10 facility-related services--
fire and emergency services, utilities, pavement clearance, refuse
collection and disposal, real property leases, grounds maintenance,
pest control, custodial services, real property management and
engineering services, and engineering readiness. DOD previously
referred to facility operations as real property services and, together
with installation services, family housing, and environment, were
referred to as base operations support. In general, the military
services' budgets continue to refer to funding for installation
services and facility operation services as base operations support
funding.
* Sustainment, funded primarily with operation and maintenance
appropriations, includes the maintenance and repair activities
necessary to prevent deterioration, maintain safety, and keep
facilities in good working order over their service lives. Sustainment
includes routine and preventive maintenance tasks and emergency
response and other service calls for minor repairs. Sustainment also
includes major repairs or replacement of facility components that are
expected to occur periodically throughout a facility's life cycle, such
as regular roof replacement; refinishing wall surfaces; repairing and
replacing electrical, heating, and cooling systems; and replacing tile
and carpets. Since fiscal year 2003, DOD has used a model--the
facilities sustainment model--to estimate annual facility sustainment
funding requirements in each military service. Although the Office of
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment
has overall responsibility for DOD's installations and facilities, the
individual military services are responsible for budgeting and
allocating facility sustainment funds to installations. Appendix II
summarizes each service's sustainment funding allocation process.
* Recapitalization, funded primarily with operation and maintenance and
military construction appropriations, provides for improving facilities
through restoration and modernization. Restoration includes repair and
replacement work needed to restore facilities degraded from several
causes, such as natural disaster, fire, accident, excessive age, or
inadequate sustainment. Modernization includes both renovation and
replacement of existing facilities to implement new or higher
standards, accommodate new functions, or replace building components
that typically last more than 50 years and are near the end of their
economic lives.
Prior GAO Reports:
Since 1997, we have identified management of DOD support infrastructure
as a high-risk area because infrastructure costs have affected the
department's ability to devote funds to other more critical programs
and needs. In a January 2009 update to our high-risk series, we noted
that although DOD has made progress in managing its support
infrastructure in recent years, a number of challenges remain in
managing its portfolio of facilities and reducing unneeded
infrastructure while providing facilities needed to support several
simultaneous force structure initiatives.[Footnote 9] Further, we noted
that because of these issues, DOD's management of support
infrastructure remains a high-risk area.
We have issued several reports on DOD's implementation of the
recommendations from the 2005 BRAC round. The reports generally found
that, compared with the original cost and savings estimates,
implementation costs were expected to increase and savings were
expected to decrease. For example, in a December 2007 report,[Footnote
10] we found that DOD planned to spend more, save less, and take longer
to recoup up-front costs than expected to implement the 2005 BRAC
recommendations due to increased construction cost estimates, the
effects of inflation, environmental clean-up costs not accounted for in
the original estimates, and other miscellaneous expenses including
operation and maintenance expenses. We also found that DOD's estimated
costs and savings to implement the recommendations were likely to
change further due to uncertainties surrounding certain implementation
details, potential increases in military construction costs, and likely
increases in the cost of environmental cleanup for some BRAC
properties. In a March 2008 report on two BRAC recommendations that
were intended to improve DOD's logistics systems, we found that DOD
would spend more, save less, and take longer than expected to recoup up-
front costs to implement those recommendations due to the use of
inaccurate or outdated data, misinterpretation of terms, and changes in
operational requirements.[Footnote 11] On January 30, 2009, we reported
that while DOD has made progress in implementing the BRAC 2005 round,
it faces challenges in its ability to meet the September 15, 2011,
statutory completion deadline.[Footnote 12] Further, DOD's fiscal year
2009 BRAC budget submission shows that DOD plans to spend more to
implement recommendations and save slightly less compared to the 2008
BRAC budget and that the potential remains for BRAC cost estimates to
continue to increase. DOD concurred with several recommendations from
these reports on ways that DOD could improve its development of BRAC
savings estimates.
We have also issued several reports over the past few years
highlighting the long-term challenges DOD faces in managing its
portfolio of installations and halting the degradation of facilities.
For example, in February 2003, we found that funds designated for
facilities sustainment were held back at the service headquarters,
major command, and installation levels to cover more pressing needs or
emerging requirements and that, as a result, facility deterioration
continued.[Footnote 13] DOD concurred with our recommendation that the
military services reassess the funding priorities attached to
sustaining and improving their facilities. In a June 2005 report, we
found that DOD did not have a common framework for identifying
installation support functions and funding requirements to ensure
adequate delivery of services, particularly in a joint environment.
[Footnote 14] We also found that, because of a lack of a common
terminology across the military services in defining installation
support functions and the lack of a mature analytic process for
developing credible and consistent requirements, the services moved
hundreds of millions of operation and maintenance dollars designated
for facilities sustainment and other purposes to pay for installation
support services. While such funding movements are permissible, we
found that they were disruptive to the orderly provision of
installation support and contributed to the overall degradation of
facilities. In an April 2008 report, we found that the military
services had not met all of DOD's goals for funding facility
sustainment and recapitalization at levels to prevent deterioration
and, because DOD continued to lack common definitions and performance
standards for installation support functions, each military service had
developed methods to determine its installation services requirements
and funding needs subject to its own definition of the types and levels
of services it deemed necessary.[Footnote 15] We also found that DOD's
facilities sustainment model provided a consistent and reasonable
framework for preparing estimates of DOD's annual facility sustainment
funding requirements, even though the reliability of the model's
estimates could be improved through increased accuracy of the model's
inputs. The 2005 and 2008 reports made recommendations related to
resolving the inconsistencies among the military services' definitions
of installation support functions and, with the joint basing guidance
issued during 2008, DOD completed the development of common
installation support definitions. DOD also concurred with
recommendations from the 2008 report that it will take several actions
to increase the facilities sustainment model's reliability.
DOD Has Made a Comprehensive Effort to Ensure Consistent Delivery of
Installation Support at Joint Bases, but Support Costs Are Expected to
Increase:
DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure that the 12 planned joint
bases deliver consistent installation support, but support costs are
expected to increase, at least in the short term, rather than decrease
as expected by the 2005 BRAC Commission. DOD's efforts to ensure
consistent support have included the issuance of detailed guidance,
which for the first time provided common installation support
definitions and standards, and the establishment of mechanisms to help
ensure that the joint bases comply with guidance requiring that the
bases deliver installation support in accordance with the new
definitions and standards. However, instead of decreasing, support
costs at the joint bases are expected to increase primarily because
past funding for installation support has been insufficient to provide
support at the levels called for by either existing or the new common
service standards, and in some instances the military services'
approach to implementing joint basing will result in additional
administrative costs and the loss of some existing installation support
efficiencies. In the long term, DOD officials stated that the increased
installation support costs might be at least partially offset as best
practices and new operational efficiencies are identified and adopted
over time. However, on the basis of the higher installation support
cost estimates from the initial joint bases and as long as installation
support is delivered in accordance with the new support standards, it
is unclear whether joint basing will result in any actual savings.
DOD Established Common Definitions and Standards to Help Ensure
Consistent Delivery of Installation Support:
Before January 2008, DOD had not established common definitions and
standards for installation support functions and services. Instead,
each military service had its own long-standing policies and practices
on how tasks in each installation support function were defined,
performed, and funded. The differences in the military services'
policies and practices for managing their installations had resulted in
differences in the emphasis placed on the various support areas and the
level of service typically provided in each area. In view of such
differences, it was not clear that the joint bases, scheduled to be
fully implemented by October 2010, would deliver installation support
services consistently and at levels considered acceptable by each of
the installations combining into the joint bases.
To address this issue, OSD began issuing a series of joint basing
implementation guidance in January 2008 that for the first time
established a set of common definitions and standards for the
installation support functions and services to be provided by each
joint base.[Footnote 16] After working with the military services to
develop and obtain concurrence with the new definitions and standards,
OSD issued guidance that defined 47 installation support functions--
such as installation security services, custodial services, and child
care programs--and provided 267 standards to help define the level of
service that each joint base is to provide in each area. The guidance
also required that only the joint bases deliver installation support in
accordance with the new definitions and standards.[Footnote 17] Thus,
the vast majority of military installations that are not involved with
joint basing are not required to deliver installation support in
accordance with the new definitions and standards at this time.
According to DOD, the new standards represented the service levels
needed to fully meet installation mission, facility, and personnel
needs in view of existing OSD and military service policies, guidance,
and practices; commercial industry standards; guidance from other
federal agencies; or military judgment. The standards include the
following.
* About 62 percent of the standards, in areas such as fire protection
and emergency services and airfield operations, were based on existing
OSD and military service policies and requirements.
* About 13 percent of the standards, in areas such as custodial
services and grounds maintenance and landscaping, were based on
commercial industry standards or guidance from other federal agencies.
* About 25 percent of the standards, in areas such as installation
chaplain services and legal support, were based on the judgment of
military subject matter experts. According to DOD, the standards
determined by military subject matter experts were in areas that were
not covered by DOD policy or other requirements and did not have
comparable commercial standards. To determine standards for these
areas, the subject matter experts generally reviewed the practices of
each military department and reached agreement on the service levels
needed that in their judgment would best meet installation mission and
personnel requirements. Judgment was used to decide the standard level
of service in view of mission, facility, personnel, and quality of life
factors. Also, because costs generally increase as the level of service
increases, some of these decisions also involved the consideration of
trade-offs between alternative levels of service and affordability.
Officials at OSD and each of the military services stated that the new
common standards called for service levels that were very close to each
military service's existing installation support standards or
practices. However, the officials also noted that because installation
support had not been fully funded in the past, military installations
normally did not provide support at the levels called for by all of
their existing standards.
The following examples illustrate a few of the installation support
function definitions and standards that DOD established for joint
basing, and appendix III provides a list of the 47 defined installation
support functions and the number of standards developed for each area.
* Information technology services management was defined to include the
personnel, contracts, and equipment necessary to plan, manage,
coordinate, and execute the delivery of services including fixed and
wireless voice, data, and video services. Twenty-six standards were
established to define the expected level of service for this support
function. For example, each joint base is to (1) maintain 99.99 percent
telephone dial tone availability, (2) provide wireless local mobile
radio service for 100 percent of the base's populated area and 85
percent of the total base area, (3) respond within 90 minutes to
critical circuit outages 99 percent of the time, and (4) resolve 95
percent of nonmission critical trouble calls within 4 days.
* Installation law enforcement operations was defined to include the
personnel, contracts, and support equipment necessary to enforce
federal, state, and military law; investigate crimes; apprehend and
detain suspects; manage traffic; and detect and prevent crime. Five
standards were established to define the expected level of service for
this support function. For example, within 15 minutes of a call the
joint base is to provide the first law enforcement patrol response and
within 30 days the joint base is to complete 90 percent of
investigations.
* Grounds maintenance and landscaping was defined to include all
associated landscaping and plant growth management activities for three
defined land categories--improved, semi-improved, and unimproved. Three
standards were established to define the expected level of service for
this support function. For example, for improved land, which includes
the grounds surrounding occupied buildings and permanent structures,
the joint base is to maintain the grass height at 2 to 4 inches and
accomplish necessary trimming, edging, pruning, and landscaping to
maintain healthy vegetation and a professional appearance.
* Facilities sustainment, which DOD had previously defined, includes
the maintenance and repair activities necessary to prevent
deterioration, maintain safety, and keep facilities in good working
order over their service lives. Seven standards were established to
define the expected level of service for this support function. For
example, the joint base is to (1) perform 90 percent of the preventive
maintenance called for by manufacturers' recommendations, (2) replace
90 percent of facility components in accordance with each component's
useful service life, (3) resolve 100 percent of emergency service calls
within 24 hours, and (4) resolve 90 percent of routine service calls
within 30 calendar days.
Officials at the nine installations we visited stated that in general
the definitions and standards adequately described the installation
support functions and provided reasonable metrics so that the expected
level of service in most areas was clearly understood. Installation
officials stated that in some cases the standards were not as detailed
or as clear as possible. Nevertheless, the officials stated that they
recognized that the standards provided the first common expectations
for installation support and believed that missing details and needed
clarifications would be provided as the standards are implemented at
the joint bases.
DOD Has Taken Additional Steps to Help Ensure That Joint Bases Deliver
Consistent Installation Support:
DOD has taken additional steps to help ensure that the joint bases will
deliver installation support in accordance with the new installation
support definitions and standards. First, OSD issued guidance that
requires the installations forming each joint base to complete a
memorandum of agreement that defines the installation support
relationship between the components forming the joint base for fully
implementing the BRAC 2005 joint base decisions. The guidance also
provides a template memorandum of agreement that, among other things,
commits the lead component to deliver installation support in
accordance with the support definitions and standards. Although
installations can request that OSD approve deviations from delivering
support in accordance with each standard during development of the
memorandums, OSD officials stated that no deviations were requested
from the installations consolidating into the phase I joint bases.
Second, to facilitate consistency in developing the memorandums, OSD
officials stated that they held workshops and conducted visits to the
installations involved in joint basing. Third, to ensure top management
support for the terms included in each memorandum, OSD's guidance
requires that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps approve and sign the
memorandum at each joint base involving their military service. Because
the memorandums include the expected joint base personnel and funding
requirements, the signatures of the Vice Chiefs are considered to be a
commitment that each involved military service will provide the
necessary personnel and funding to fully support the joint base and the
delivery of installation support services in accordance with the
definitions and standards. Fourth, OSD has established a framework,
termed the cost and performance visibility framework, which is designed
to collect and report cost and performance data pertaining to
installation support and also assess compliance with the terms of the
joint base memorandums of agreement. According to DOD officials, this
framework, as well as installation-level monitoring of joint base
implementation, will help ensure that any issues concerning the
delivery of support are quickly identified so that corrective steps can
be taken. Officials at the nine installations we visited stated that,
as long as necessary funding is provided, the joint bases will deliver
consistent installation support.
Installation Support Costs at the Joint Bases Are Expected to Increase:
Contrary to the expectations from the 2005 BRAC Commission, OSD and
service headquarters officials stated that installation support costs
at the joint bases are expected to increase, at least in the short
term, above the cost of installation support provided by the separate
installations before consolidation. Included in each joint base's
memorandum of agreement are estimates of the current cost of
installation support at the installations consolidating into joint
bases and the expected cost of installation support after
implementation of a joint base. As shown in table 2, at the three joint
bases that had completed their memorandums as of January 2009, annual
installation support costs are expected to increase by about $24
million (7 percent) above current support costs.
Table 2: Estimated Increase in Installation Support Costs before and
after Joint Basing (Fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions):
Joint bases with completed memorandums of agreement: Joint
Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story;
Estimated annual installation support costs: Before joint basing: $87
million;
Estimated annual installation support costs: After joint basing: $90
million;
Estimated increase in support costs: Amount: $3 million;
Estimated increase in support costs: Percentage: 3.
Joint bases with completed memorandums of agreement: Joint Base Andrews-
Naval Air Facility Washington;
Estimated annual installation support costs: Before joint basing: $154
million;
Estimated annual installation support costs: After joint basing: $173
million;
Estimated increase in support costs: Amount: $19 million;
Estimated increase in support costs: Percentage: 12.
Joint bases with completed memorandums of agreement: Joint Base Myer-
Henderson Hall;
Estimated annual installation support costs: Before joint basing: $101
million;
Estimated annual installation support costs: After joint basing: $103
million;
Estimated increase in support costs: Amount: $2 million;
Estimated increase in support costs: Percentage: 2.
Joint bases with completed memorandums of agreement: Total;
Estimated annual installation support costs: Before joint basing: $342
million;
Estimated annual installation support costs: After joint basing: $366
million;
Estimated increase in support costs: Amount: $24 million;
Estimated increase in support costs: Percentage: 7.
[End of table]
Source: DOD.
Officials at each of the nine installations we visited noted concerns
about the cost of installation support under joint basing. For example,
during our visit to McGuire Air Force Base, Fort Dix, and Naval Air
Engineering Station Lakehurst, installation officials stated that
installation support costs would increase after implementation of the
joint base primarily because support levels in some areas would be
increased to meet the new standards. An official estimate of the
expected increase in costs was not available in January 2009 because
these installations had not completed their memorandum of agreement.
However, during our visit, McGuire Air Force Base officials estimated
that an additional 194 personnel, along with the associated costs,
would be needed for the joint base to provide installation support in
accordance with the support standards. Similarly, during our visit to
Charleston Air Force Base and Naval Weapons Station Charleston, a phase
II joint base, installation officials also stated that they expected
support costs to increase under joint basing. Preliminary estimates by
Charleston Air Force Base officials showed that over 200 additional
personnel might be needed for the joint base to provide installation
support in accordance with the support standards.
Even before the initial three phase I joint bases had prepared their
cost estimates showing increased support costs, the military services
had already significantly reduced the estimate of the potential 20-year
savings from joint basing as compared to the savings estimate made by
the 2005 BRAC Commission. Specifically, in documents prepared to
support the fiscal year 2009 budget, the military services estimated
that the potential 20-year savings from joint basing was about $273
million in constant fiscal year 2005 dollars. This amount reflects a
reduction of about 88 percent from the $2.3 billion savings in constant
fiscal year 2005 dollars estimated by the commission. In view of the
increased cost estimates from the initial phase I joint bases, some DOD
officials stated that the military services' future estimates of the
potential long-term savings would most likely continue to decline.
Military Services Have Not Fully Funded Installation Support in the
Past:
A key reason that installation support costs at the joint bases are
expected to increase is that OSD has required that the joint bases
deliver installation support in accordance with the 267 new support
standards, even though the military services have not previously funded
installation support in the amounts needed to meet each of the
standards. Thus, additional costs will be incurred to meet the
standards. According to OSD officials, ideally all military
installations should provide support services in accordance with the
newly established definitions and standards. However, primarily because
of the significant increase in installation support funding that would
be needed for all installations to meet the service standards, OSD has
required that only the joint bases meet the standards at this time.
For many years, the adequacy of installation support funding has been a
concern for the military services. Army, Navy, and Air Force officials
stated that installation services funding for fiscal years 2005 through
2008 was less than the amounts needed to provide support at the levels
desired. For example, according to Army officials, installation and
facility operations support services--collectively classified as base
operations support in the Army's budget--were funded at about 80
percent, 82 percent, 87 percent, and 85 percent of requirements in
fiscal years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. Army officials
stated that, because of these funding levels, some installation
services were reduced and provided at lower than optimum levels at some
installations, which reduced the support provided to military
personnel.
To obtain some insight into how many areas might require increased
service levels at the installations consolidating into the joint bases,
we performed a comparison of current service levels to the joint base
standard service levels at the installations we visited. Specifically,
we judgmentally selected 40 of the 267 joint base service-level
standards and, at each installation we visited, compared the level of
service that the installation was currently providing with the new
standard. As shown in table 3, in about 27 percent of areas we
compared, the joint base will have to increase the level of service
provided to meet the standards.
Table 3: Comparison of Current and Standard Service Levels for Selected
Installation Support Areas:
Installation: Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek;
Number of support areas compared[A]: 38;
Current service level meets the standard: Number of areas: 23;
Current service level meets the standard: Percentage: 61;
Current service level is below the standard: Number of areas: 15;
Current service level is below the standard: Percentage: 39.
Installation: Fort Story; Number of support areas compared[A]: 37;
Current service level meets the standard: Number of areas: 27;
Current service level meets the standard: Percentage: 73;
Current service level is below the standard: Number of areas: 10;
Current service level is below the standard: Percentage: 27.
Installation: Fort Lewis; Number of support areas compared[A]: 40;
Current service level meets the standard: Number of areas: 26;
Current service level meets the standard: Percentage: 65;
Current service level is below the standard: Number of areas: 14;
Current service level is below the standard: Percentage: 35.
Installation: McChord Air Force Base; Number of support areas
compared[A]: 39;
Current service level meets the standard: Number of areas: 32;
Current service level meets the standard: Percentage: 82;
Current service level is below the standard: Number of areas: 7;
Current service level is below the standard: Percentage: 18.
Installation: McGuire Air Force Base; Number of support areas
compared[A]: 40;
Current service level meets the standard: Number of areas: 25;
Current service level meets the standard: Percentage: 63;
Current service level is below the standard: Number of areas: 15;
Current service level is below the standard: Percentage: 38.
Installation: Fort Dix; Number of support areas compared[A]: 38;
Current service level meets the standard: Number of areas: 31;
Current service level meets the standard: Percentage: 82;
Current service level is below the standard: Number of areas: 7;
Current service level is below the standard: Percentage: 18.
Installation: Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst; Number of
support areas compared[A]: 36;
Current service level meets the standard: Number of areas: 22;
Current service level meets the standard: Percentage: 61;
Current service level is below the standard: Number of areas: 14;
Current service level is below the standard: Percentage: 39.
Installation: Charleston Air Force Base; Number of support areas
compared[A]: 40;
Current service level meets the standard: Number of areas: 34;
Current service level meets the standard: Percentage: 85;
Current service level is below the standard: Number of areas: 6;
Current service level is below the standard: Percentage: 15.
Installation: Naval Weapons Station Charleston; Number of support areas
compared[A]: 38;
Current service level meets the standard: Number of areas: 31;
Current service level meets the standard: Percentage: 82;
Current service level is below the standard: Number of areas: 7;
Current service level is below the standard: Percentage: 18.
Installation: Total; Number of support areas compared[A]: 346;
Current service level meets the standard: Number of areas: 251;
Current service level meets the standard: Percentage: 73;
Current service level is below the standard: Number of areas: 95;
Current service level is below the standard: Percentage: 27.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by each installation.
[A] At each installation, we compared the current service level with
the standard for the same 40 judgmentally selected support areas.
However, at 6 of the 9 installations sufficient information was not
available to make the comparison in all 40 areas. Thus, the number of
comparisons actually made ranged from 36 to 40 among the installations
visited.
[End of table]
The following examples provide details on some of the support standards
and current service levels that we compared at the installations
visited.
* One standard for an installation's child care program calls for 100
percent of children to be placed in the program within 3 months of a
request. Officials at five of the nine installations we visited stated
that their installation was not currently meeting this standard and
that additional funding for facility construction and personnel will be
needed to meet the standard. According to OSD officials, this standard
was determined by military subject matter experts and was based
primarily on an existing Navy standard.
* One standard for an installation's youth program services calls for
35 percent of eligible youth to participate in service youth programs.
Officials at six of the nine installations we visited stated that their
installation was not currently meeting this standard and that
additional funding to increase facility capacity for youth programs
will be needed to meet the standard. According to OSD officials, this
standard originated in a DOD social compact, which was previously
adopted by the military service components.
* One standard for an installation's basic custodial services calls for
the restrooms to be cleaned three times per week, the floors to be
swept and mopped once per week, the carpets to be vacuumed once per
week, the floors to be buffed monthly, and the windows to be cleaned
annually. Officials at seven of the nine installations we visited
stated that their installation was not currently meeting this standard
and that additional funding for personnel will be needed to meet the
standard. According to OSD officials, this standard was based primarily
on an existing Air Force standard.
* One standard for an installation's facility sustainment activities
calls for 90 percent of facility components to be replaced in
accordance with the component's useful service life. Officials at seven
of the nine installations we visited stated that their installation was
not currently meeting this standard and that additional funding will be
needed to meet the standard. According to OSD officials, this standard
was based on recently issued DOD budgeting guidance.
Military Services' Approach to Joint Base Implementation Will Result in
Some Additional Installation Support Costs:
Another key reason that joint basing is expected to increase
installation support costs is that the military services' approach to
joint base implementation will result in some additional administrative
costs and the loss of some existing installation support efficiencies.
For example, additional costs for installation administration are
expected at the six joint bases where the Air Force will be the lead
component. DOD officials noted that the typical smaller Air Force
installation has one base commander who is responsible for both
installation support and the operational mission of the installation.
This differs from larger Air Force bases and typical Army and Navy
installations, which have separate commanders responsible for
installation support and for operational missions. Because of the
increased administrative workload associated with providing
installation support at a joint base, Air Force officials decided that
it would be preferable to have a commander solely responsible for
installation support at each joint base. To accomplish this, the Air
Force intends to establish a new organization unit, consisting of a
commander and supporting staff, which will be responsible for managing
installation support at six joint bases where the Air Force will be the
lead component. Although the Air Force did not have estimates of the
added costs for the new units, officials at McGuire Air Force Base
estimated that 19 additional administrative personnel will be needed to
establish the new unit that will manage installation support at Joint
Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, which will result in increased costs.
As another example, officials at some of the Army and Navy
installations we visited stated that in a few instances existing
installation support efficiencies will be lost at joint bases where the
Air Force will be the lead component. The officials stated that
currently their regional commands provided some support services to the
installation, such as certain personnel-and travel-related services,
which would become the responsibility of the Air Force under joint
basing where the Air Force is the lead component. However, the
officials stated that the efficiencies from these existing arrangements
will be lost because the joint base will begin to provide these
services and at the same time no reduction in personnel was expected at
the Army and Navy regions since the regions will continue to provide
services for the installations that are not involved with joint basing.
Officials at McGuire Air Force Base and Fort Dix cited another example
of increased support costs resulting from the way that Joint Base
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst is being implemented. As the lead component,
McGuire Air Force Base will become responsible for installation support
at this joint base and, in the area of delivering contract support, the
Air Force has decided that McGuire's existing contracting office will
be expanded in order to provide contracting services for the joint
base. However, according to McGuire Air Force Base and Fort Dix
officials, this approach will result in higher support costs compared
to an alternative approach. Specifically, the officials stated that an
existing contracting office at Fort Dix, which currently provides
contracting services to Fort Dix as well as to other Army reserve units
across the United States, could provide contracting services for the
joint base with fewer personnel and at less cost than McGuire Air Force
Base's contracting office. Although installation officials stated that
this alternative was feasible and less costly, Air Force decided not to
use the contracting office at Fort Dix primarily because the office is
outside the Air Force's direct chain of command and the Air Force will
ultimately be responsible for all joint base contracting services.
Officials Believe Increased Installation Support Costs Could Be Offset
in the Long Term:
In the long term, OSD officials stated that the increased cost of
installation support at the joint bases might be at least partially
offset as experience is gained and best practices and new operational
efficiencies are identified and adopted over time. However, as long as
support is provided at levels that meet the new support standards, OSD
officials stated that they did not expect that installation support
costs at the joint bases would fall below the current cost of
installation support provided by the separate installations before
consolidation. Thus, even in the long term, the officials did not
expect that joint basing would result in actual savings from
installation support spending levels prior to joint basing.
Facility Sustainment Funding Has Not Been Sufficient to Meet
Requirements and Prevent Facility Deterioration:
The military services have not budgeted and spent sufficient funds to
meet their facility sustainment requirements and goals and prevent
facility deterioration at installations throughout DOD. According to
DOD, full funding of sustainment requirements is the most cost-
effective approach to managing facilities because it provides the most
performance over the longest period for the least investment. For this
reason, DOD established a goal that the military services budget for
sustainment in accordance with requirements as determined by DOD's
facilities sustainment model. However, citing other budget priorities
as the reason, the military services have not budgeted funds in the
amounts needed to fully fund their sustainment requirements. In
addition, the services have often spent even less on sustainment than
they budgeted because they used some of the budgeted sustainment funds
for other purposes, primarily to pay for unfunded facility restoration
and modernization projects. As a result, the services have significant
backlogs of needed facility sustainment work and some installation
facilities have not been sustained at a level to keep them in good
working order. According to DOD, when facilities are not fully
sustained, the facilities will likely experience reduced service lives
and more costly recapitalization requirements in the future.
Full Funding of Sustainment Requirements Is Cost Effective:
According to DOD, full funding of sustainment requirements is the most
cost effective approach to managing facilities because it provides the
most performance over the longest period for the least investment.
However, as other important priorities, such as force modernization,
have competed for funding, DOD has been challenged to provide adequate
resources for sustaining and recapitalizing its facilities. In April
2007 testimony, DOD noted that full funding of facilities sustainment
had been and continued to be the foundation of the department's long-
term facilities strategy and goals in order to optimize DOD's facility
investment and ensure facility readiness.[Footnote 18] When full
sustainment funding is not provided, service officials noted that
facility deterioration accelerates, facility service lives shorten,
mission capabilities and quality of life decrease, and expected future
costs increase.
In view of these positions and recognizing that funding of sustainment
requirements had been a challenge because of competing budget
priorities, DOD's 2004 installations strategic plan established a goal
for the military services to fund sustainment at 95 percent of the
requirement determined by DOD's facilities sustainment model beginning
in fiscal year 2005, and at 100 percent of the requirement beginning in
fiscal year 2008. In April 2008, we reported on the reliability of the
facilities sustainment model.[Footnote 19] The report noted that even
though the reliability of the model's estimates could be improved, the
model provided a consistent and reasonable framework for estimating
sustainment requirements. Thus, use of the model for setting annual
funding goals at the military service level appears reasonable.
Military Services Have Not Budgeted for Sustainment at Levels to Meet
Requirements:
Citing other budget priorities as the reason, the military services
have not budgeted funds in the amounts needed to meet their sustainment
requirements. Although DOD established a sustainment budgeting goal in
fiscal year 2005, until fiscal year 2008 the goal called for the
services to budget 95 percent of their requirements, rather than 100
percent of their requirements. Thus, even though the services met the
goal in some years during fiscal years 2005 through 2007, they still
did not budget sufficient funds to meet all requirements as determined
by the facilities sustainment model. Further, none of the services met
the 100 percent goal for fiscal year 2008. Specifically, in fiscal year
2008, the Army budgeted 89 percent, the Navy budgeted 83 percent, the
Air Force budgeted 90 percent, and the Marine Corps budgeted 89 percent
of their respective facility sustainment requirements. In total during
fiscal years 2005 through 2008, the military services did not budget
funds to meet about $2.3 billion (9 percent) of their total facility
sustainment requirements. Table 4 provides details by service on the
amount of the facilities sustainment requirement that was not budgeted
during fiscal years 2005 through 2008.
Table 4: Facility Sustainment Requirements Not Budgeted in Fiscal Years
2005 through 2008:
Amount of sustainment requirements not budgeted by fiscal year:
Service: Army;
2005: $126 million;
2006: $290 million;
2007: $249 million;
2008: $302 million;
Total: $967 million.
Service: Navy;
2005: $63 million;
2006: $71 million;
2007: $61 million;
2008: $239 million;
Total: $434 million.
Service: Air Force;
2005: $108 million;
2006: $112 million;
2007: $291 million;
2008: $241 million;
Total: $752 million.
Service: Marine Corps;
2005: $26 million;
2006: $28 million;
2007: $35 million;
2008: $64 million;
Total: $153 million.
Service: Total;
2005: $323 million;
2006: $501 million;
2007: $636 million;
2008: $846 million;
Total: $2,306 million.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
While maintaining the goal that the services budget 100 percent of
their requirements as determined by the facilities sustainment model,
OSD officials stated that they issued guidance in 2007 that the
services budget at least 90 percent of their facilities sustainment
requirements in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. The budgeting floor was
set in order to provide a minimum funding level for sustainment across
DOD and more consistency across the services in sustainment budgeting.
According to OSD officials, affordability played a major role in
choosing 90 percent as the floor, and the risk of not budgeting at 100
percent was considered acceptable in light of other DOD priorities.
Military Services Have Used Some Budgeted Sustainment Funds for Other
Purposes:
The military services have further exacerbated the sustainment funding
issue by using some of the budgeted sustainment funds for other
purposes. OSD officials explained that even though the goal is for the
services to budget 100 percent of their sustainment requirements and
beginning in fiscal year 2009 the services are required to budget at
least 90 percent of their sustainment requirements, the services have
the flexibility to use budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes,
if they determine that such spending is necessary. OSD officials noted
that some spending flexibility is needed and is inherent in all
operations and maintenance funded programs, including facilities
sustainment.
According to information provided by the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,
and the Marine Corps, the services used about $2.6 billion (14 percent)
of the funds budgeted for sustainment for other purposes during fiscal
years 2006 through 2008.[Footnote 20] Specifically, of the funds
budgeted for sustainment during fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the
Army used about $1.5 billion (21 percent) for other purposes, the Navy
used about $900 million (25 percent) for other purposes, the Air Force
used about $200 million (4 percent) for other purposes, and the Marine
Corps did not use any budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes.
Service officials noted that nearly all of the sustainment funds used
for other purposes was used to pay for unfunded facility restoration
and modernization projects that they determined to be more urgent than
funding sustainment work.[Footnote 21] Restoration and modernization
work typically involves larger, more extensive projects that restore
facilities degraded from several causes, such as natural disaster or
inadequate sustainment, or renovate or replace facilities to implement
new or higher standards, accommodate new functions, or replace building
components that typically last more than 50 years and are near the end
of their economic lives. Thus, the funds were used for the benefit of
installation facilities. However, even though the officials stated that
these projects were needed and other funds to pay for the projects were
not available, the consequence was that additional sustainment
requirements went unmet. According to DOD, needed sustainment work that
is not performed may eventually result in damaged facilities, shortened
facility service lives, and increased future costs for facility
restoration.
Underfunding of Sustainment Requirements Has Resulted in Sustainment
Backlogs and Some Deteriorated Installation Facilities:
Because the military services have not budgeted to meet all sustainment
requirements and have used some of the funds budgeted for sustainment
for other purposes, the services have backlogs of needed sustainment
work and some facilities have fallen into disrepair. For example, the
Navy and the Air Force reported that their sustainment backlog at the
end of fiscal year 2008 was about $222 million and $362 million,
respectively. The Army did not report the amount of its sustainment
backlog. Instead, the Army stated that deferred sustainment work became
a restoration requirement, and at the end of fiscal year 2008, the Army
reported that its restoration and modernization backlog was $19.6
billion. For comparison, the Navy and the Air Force reported that their
restoration and modernization backlog was $28.7 billion and $10.2
billion, respectively, at the end of fiscal year 2008. The Marine Corps
also did not report a backlog of sustainment work but reported that its
restoration and modernization backlog was about $1.1 billion at the end
of fiscal year 2008.
Although many facilities were in good condition, service officials
stated that underfunding of sustainment requirements over many years
had resulted in some deteriorated facilities, which according to DOD
will likely result in reduced service lives and more costly
recapitalization requirements in the future. Army officials noted that
when sustainment funding is inadequate, planned projects are delayed,
which sometimes causes further deterioration, such as damage to
interior walls and floors from leaking roofs. Navy and Air Force
officials also stated that inadequate facility sustainment funding had
resulted in deteriorated facilities, reduced mission capabilities, and
lower quality of life for installation personnel. Navy officials stated
that in some instances installation aircraft runways have been closed
because sustainment funds were not available to perform needed repairs.
At the nine installations we visited, facility sustainment requirements
were not fully funded every year during fiscal years 2006, 2007, and
2008. At some installations, facility sustainment had benefited from
the use of some supplemental funding provided for the Global War on
Terrorism to pay for some related facility repairs. Still, considering
the levels budgeted for sustainment and the use of some sustainment
funds for other purposes, the amount actually spent on facility
sustainment at six of the nine installations we visited was less than
75 percent of the estimated requirement, as determined by DOD's
facilities sustainment model, during fiscal years 2006 through 2008,
and at three of these installations, the amount spent was less than 60
percent of the estimated requirement.[Footnote 22] Officials at the
nine installations reported a total of $376 million in backlogged
facility sustainment needs.
Although many facilities at the installations we visited were in good
condition, some facilities had fallen into disrepair because funds were
not available to pay for all needed sustainment work. The following
examples illustrate the deteriorated conditions of some facilities we
observed.
Officials at Fort Story, Virginia, stated that repairs costing about $2
million for the installation's command headquarters building had been
deferred because sustainment funds were not available. One needed
repair involved the building's basement, which had been damaged from
extreme moisture, mold, and termites (see fig. 2). Due to the severity
of the damage, the basement was not being used and, because the
building was occupied and in daily use, a support wall had to be
constructed to prevent the floor above the basement, which is the floor
of the building's entrance, from collapsing.
Figure 2: Damaged Basement in the Command Headquarters Building at Fort
Story:
[Refer to PDF for image: four photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Description of photographs, clockwise beginning with top left
photograph: exterior entrance to the headquarters building, building's
basement showing moisture and mold, support wall constructed in
basement to prevent the floor above the basement from collapsing, and
support beam to basement's ceiling showing termite damage.
[End of figure]
Officials at McChord Air Force Base, Washington, stated that window
repairs costing about $32,000 for the installation's steam plant had
been deferred because sustainment funding was not available. The
building's windows leak and allow water to flow onto the electrical
panels of some equipment in the plant. The leaks have occasionally
caused the panels to short out, which resulted in temporary electricity
outages to portions of the installation, potentially undermining
operations (see figure 3).
Figure 3: Leaking Windows Allow Water to Flow into Electrical Control
Panels at McChord Air Force Base:
[Refer to PDF for image: three photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Description of photographs, clockwise beginning with top left
photograph: exterior of steam plant building, tarp to help prevent rain
water from damaging equipment, and plastic sheet to help prevent rain
water from shorting out electrical panels.
[End of figure]
Officials at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Virginia, stated that
repairs costing about $650,000 at an administrative building had been
deferred because of inadequate sustainment funding. Extensive water
leaks from interior pipes in the building had caused excessive mold and
mildew throughout the building (see fig. 4). The officials stated that
one employee received medical treatment as a result of exposure to the
mold in the building and other employees had experienced breathing
difficulties.
Figure 4: Leaking Pipes Caused Mold and Mildew Damage at Naval
Amphibious Base Little Creek:
[Refer to PDF for image: three photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Description of photographs, clockwise beginning with top left
photograph: piping above ceiling showing mold and mildew, ceiling air
vent showing mold and mildew, and a bucket sitting on room air
conditioner to collect water and help prevent damage from leaking pipes
in ceiling.
[End of figure]
Officials at the Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, New Jersey,
stated that the roof of the public works building leaked and needed to
be replaced. However, work had been deferred because sustainment funds
were not available to complete the work, which was estimated to cost
about $200,000. The leaks had caused mold and damage in sections of the
building and, in a recently refurbished conference room, a video
display had to be covered with plastic sheeting to prevent damage from
the leaks (see fig. 5).
Figure 5: Damage from a Leaking Roof at the Public Works Building at
Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst:
[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Description of photographs, beginning with photograph on the
left: plastic sheet covering a conference room television monitor to
help prevent damage from leaks and side view of same television monitor
showing trash can on floor to catch dripping water.
[End of figure]
Conclusions:
While DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure consistent delivery
of installation support at the planned joint bases, the estimates of
potential savings will likely continue to decline and it is unclear
whether joint basing will result in any actual savings. The levels of
service called for by most standards were determined in view of DOD
policies and practices, industry standards, or from other federal
agencies, but judgment was also used to decide the standards in many
areas. Because such decisions involve trade-offs between alternative
levels of service and affordability, opportunities exist to review and,
if needed, adjust these standards as experience is gained to ensure
that the standards reflect the level of service necessary to meet
installation requirements as economically as possible. Similarly,
opportunities also exist to periodically review and address those
instances where the military services' approach to implementing joint
basing results in additional administrative costs or loss of existing
installation support efficiencies. Furthermore, in view of DOD's newly
established common support standards, the associated increase in the
cost of installation support, and the significant decrease in expected
long-term savings from joint basing, a detailed cost analysis of the
results from the initial joint bases could assist the Congress in its
oversight of this effort.
The military services have exacerbated the underfunding of facility
sustainment requirements by using some budgeted sustainment funds for
other purposes. Although using budgeted sustainment funds for other
purposes is permissible, the result is that additional sustainment
requirements are not met, and according to DOD, when facilities are not
fully sustained, the facilities will likely experience reduced service
lives and more costly recapitalization requirements in the future.
Until additional attention is focused on facility sustainment spending,
the military services might continue spending some sustainment funds on
other purposes, thus leaving more sustainment needs unmet, which leads
to greater recapitalization costs in the future. Furthermore, without
updates on the amount of budgeted sustainment funds spent on other
purposes, OSD will not be well positioned to effectively manage the
risk associated with the redirection of sustainment funds and the
Congress will lack the information needed to make informed decisions
and ensure proper congressional oversight of the administration's
annual budget submission for facility sustainment.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To address the expected increased installation support costs from joint
basing implementation and the use of budgeted facility sustainment
funds for purposes other than sustainment, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment) to take the following four actions:
* Periodically review the installation support standards as experience
is gained with delivering installation support at the joint bases and
make adjustments, if needed, to ensure that each standard reflects the
level of service necessary to meet installation requirements as
economically as possible.
* Periodically review administrative costs as joint basing is
implemented to minimize any additional costs and prevent the loss of
existing installation support efficiencies.
* Complete a detailed analysis of the estimated installation support
costs from the initial joint bases and report the results of the
analysis to the Congress in the department's documents supporting the
administration's annual budget submission or another document deemed
appropriate.
* Increase the attention given to facility sustainment spending by
summarizing and reporting to the Congress the amount of budgeted
sustainment funds spent on other purposes in the department's documents
supporting the administration's annual budget submission or another
document deemed appropriate.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) stated that our
report provided a comprehensive look into joint basing and facility
sustainment funding and that DOD partially agreed with the report's
four recommendations.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to periodically review the
installation support standards and make adjustments, if needed, to
ensure that each standard reflects the level of service necessary to
meet requirements as economically as possible. DOD agreed that the
standards may require refinement as mission requirements evolve,
organizational structures mature, and efficiencies improve installation
support delivery. However, because the joint base memorandum of
agreement template already requires periodic reviews to ensure that
installation support is delivered in accordance with appropriate,
common, output level standards, DOD stated that further action to
implement the recommendation was not necessary.
We agree that the memorandum of agreement template provides for the
individual joint bases to periodically review their delivery of
installation support and use of standards. However, while only the
joint bases are currently required to deliver services in accordance
with these standards, OSD officials told us that DOD developed the
standards to define the level of service that all military bases should
ideally provide in delivering installation support. Thus, because the
standards are DOD-wide standards and not merely joint base standards,
our recommendation calls for periodic reviews of these DOD-wide
standards and not of the standards at individual bases. Also, because
military judgment was used to decide many of the standards and support
costs generally increase as the level of service increases, we believe
that the trade-offs between alternative levels of service and
affordability should be reconsidered as experience is gained. For these
reasons, we continue to believe that DOD needs to take additional steps
to periodically review the standards from a DOD-wide perspective and
make adjustments, if needed, to ensure that the standards are
appropriate and economical.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to periodically review
administrative costs as joint basing is implemented to minimize any
additional costs and prevent the loss of existing installation support
efficiencies. DOD stated that it had already established a process to
periodically review joint basing costs as part of DOD's planning,
program, budget and execution system and that the joint base memorandum
of agreement template requires periodic reviews of mission and resource
impacts. Thus, DOD stated that further action to implement the
recommendation was not necessary.
DOD's response to our recommendation describes the processes DOD
intends to use to review costs after the joint bases have been
implemented. However, our recommendation calls for reviewing costs
during the joint base implementation process--not only after
implementation has been completed. As illustrated by the examples cited
in this report, the opportunity to reduce some joint base
administrative costs and prevent the loss of existing installation
support efficiencies exists during the time that the individual
installations are working out the details on how to combine into a
joint base. Thus, we continue to believe that DOD needs to take
additional steps to perform periodic reviews to try to avoid losing
existing efficiencies during the joint base implementation process and
to help ensure that each joint base is established as economically and
efficiently as possible.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to complete a detailed
analysis of the estimated installation support costs from the initial
joint bases and report the results of the analysis to the Congress. DOD
stated that it is collecting estimated installation support cost
information at the joint bases and that the information will be
provided if the Congress requests it. As discussed in this report,
installation support costs at the joint bases are expected to increase,
at least in the short term, compared to support costs before
consolidation. Because this outcome is the opposite of what was
expected by the BRAC Commission, we believe that the issue is
particularly noteworthy. As such, we believe that DOD should not only
collect joint base installation support costs, as DOD stated it is
doing, but also complete an analysis that compares the costs to the
original cost expectations for the initial joint bases. We believe that
the information in the analysis will assist the Congress in its
oversight of joint basing and, as such, we continue to believe that DOD
needs to proactively report the results of the analysis to the Congress
in the department's documents supporting the administration's annual
budget submission or another document deemed appropriate.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to increase the attention
given to facility sustainment spending by summarizing and reporting to
the Congress the amount of budgeted sustainment funds spent on other
purposes. DOD stated that it will collect and summarize the amount of
budgeted sustainment funds spent on other purposes and that the
information will be provided if the Congress requests it. This action
partially addresses the recommendation. However, because we believe
that the information will assist the Congress in its oversight of
sustainment spending, we also continue to believe that DOD should
proactively report the information in the department's documents
supporting the administration's annual budget submission or another
document deemed appropriate.
DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV. DOD also
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into this
report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of
the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any
questions on the information discussed in this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this
report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tim Johnson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable John M. McHugh:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Chet Edwards:
Chairman:
The Honorable Zach Wamp:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To evaluate the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts and expected
costs to deliver installation support at the planned joint bases, we
reviewed the justification supporting the 2005 Defense Base Closure and
Realignment (BRAC) Commission's recommendation that DOD establish 12
joint bases and examined DOD's implementation plans, guidance, and cost
estimates associated with the delivery of installation support at the
planned joint bases. In addition, we reviewed recently issued DOD
guidance that provided common installation support definitions and 267
support standards, and that required joint bases to deliver support in
accordance with the definitions and standards. We discussed with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service officials
the status of joint base implementation, the basis for the new
installation support standards, and mechanisms established to help
ensure that the joint bases comply with DOD's joint basing guidance. In
assessing expected changes in installation support costs at the joint
bases, we compared the military services' fiscal year 2009 estimate of
potential long-term savings from joint basing with the savings estimate
made by the 2005 BRAC Commission, compared support cost estimates
before and after joint basing at the three initial joint bases that had
completed such estimates, discussed joint base support cost
expectations and reasons for cost changes with OSD and military service
officials, and reviewed information from the military services
concerning past funding levels for installation support. To gain local
level insight into the planned delivery and expected costs of
installation support at the joint bases, we visited 3 Army, 3 Navy, and
3 Air Force installations that are consolidating into 4 of the 12
planned joint bases.[Footnote 23] We selected bases for visits that had
the highest potential reduction in jobs according to a DOD 2005 BRAC
report.[Footnote 24] At each installation visited, we discussed with
local officials their views on the delivery of installation support by
the joint bases and expectations regarding changes in support costs
before and after implementation of the joint bases. Also, to obtain
some insight into how many support areas might require increased
service levels at the joint bases, we compared current service levels
to the joint base support standards at each installation we visited.
Specifically, we judgmentally selected 40 of the 267 support standards
and compared the level of service that the installation was currently
providing to the level of service called for by the standard.
To evaluate DOD's funding for facility sustainment at all
installations, we examined and compared DOD's requirements and goals
for facility sustainment funding with the amounts actually budgeted and
spent on sustainment. Specifically, we reviewed DOD's facility
sustainment requirements for fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as
determined by DOD's facilities sustainment model; reviewed DOD's
installation strategic plans to identify DOD's goals for facility
sustainment budgeting; obtained OSD and military service information
for fiscal years 2005 through 2008 that showed the amounts budgeted for
sustainment, spent on sustainment, and budgeted for sustainment but
spent for other purposes; and compared the amounts budgeted and spent
to the corresponding requirements and goals. The amounts budgeted and
spent represented official OSD and military service information and we
did not independently verify the amounts. In cases where DOD goals were
not met and where sustainment funds were used for other purposes, we
interviewed OSD and service officials to discuss the reasons why and
any associated consequences, including the amounts of any deferred
facility sustainment backlogs. We also reviewed other DOD guidance
related to facility sustainment and interviewed OSD and service
headquarters officials to further assess DOD's goals, policies, and
practices related to facility sustainment, including the allocation of
sustainment funds to the installation level. We developed case studies
on facility sustainment requirements, funding allocations, and spending
at the installation level, and interviewed local officials about the
consequences if spending was less than requirements. To coordinate with
our joint basing work, we developed case studies at the nine
installations visited in connection with our joint basing work. Thus,
because the installations we visited were not randomly selected,
information from the case studies might not be representative of all
military installations. During the installation visits, we also
observed and took photographs of installation facilities that were in a
deteriorated condition because needed sustainment work had not been
performed.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2008 through February
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Methods Used by the Military Services to Allocate Facility
Sustainment Funds to the Installation Level:
According to officials in each of the military services, the Department
of Defense (DOD) facilities sustainment model is used as a tool to
allocate facility sustainment funds to the installation level. However,
some differences exist among the services' practices in allocating
sustainment funds. For example, according to Army officials, the Army
first considers each installation's facility sustainment requirement,
as determined by DOD's model. Then, the Army allocates funding to its
installations based on a set percentage of each installation's
requirements. The same percentage is used for all installations and,
historically, each installation has been allocated about 70 to 75
percent of its sustainment requirement. These funds are expected to be
used to pay for routine sustainment work, such as regular facility
inspections, preventive maintenance, and service calls, as well as some
larger sustainment projects, such as roof replacements. According to
Army officials, in the past few years all budgeted sustainment funds
were not allocated to the installations. Some funds were retained at
Army headquarters and used to pay for unfunded restoration and
modernization projects related to specific Army investment strategies,
such as barracks improvement and upgrades to transportation
infrastructure.
According to Navy officials, the Navy first considers the facility
sustainment requirement of all installations, as determined by DOD's
model, under each of the Navy's regional commands. Then, the Navy
allocates funding based on a set percentage of each region's total
sustainment requirement. The regions then allocate sustainment funds to
their installations. According to Navy officials, the percentage used
to allocate funds to the regions is determined by the amount of
sustainment funds that the Navy budgeted and the Navy's practice of
retaining a portion of the funds at headquarters to centrally pay for
some larger sustainment projects, maintenance dredging, specialized
inspections, demolition projects, and some unfunded restoration and
modernization projects. With this practice in fiscal year 2008, the
Navy allocated to each of its regional commands about 55 percent of
each region's total sustainment requirement. Some regional commands
reallocate all of the funds they receive to their installations based
on the same percentage of each installation's sustainment requirement.
Other regional commands retain a portion of the funds they receive to
pay for regional projects--such as design work on facility projects,
larger sustainment projects, and some unfunded restoration and
modernization projects. Installations use their sustainment funds to
pay for routine sustainment work and can submit to their regional
commands or Navy headquarters a prioritized list of needed larger
sustainment projects, which compete for funding based on Navy and
regional priorities.
According to an Air Force official, the Air Force first considers the
facility sustainment requirement of all Air Force active, guard, and
reserve installations, as determined by DOD's model. Then, the Air
Force allocates to each component about 90 percent of each component's
total sustainment requirement. The components, in turn, allocate
funding to their major commands based on the commands' specific mission
needs and their model-determined sustainment requirements, and the
commands allocate the funds to the installation level in accordance
with execution plans, unique funding priorities, and advice from
financial management and civil engineering experts.
According to a Marine Corps official, the Marine Corps first considers
the facility sustainment requirement of all installations, as
determined by DOD's facilities sustainment model, under each of the
Marine Corps' regions. Then, the Marine Corps allocates funding based
on a set percentage of each region's requirements. The same percentage
is used for all regions and, historically, each region has been
allocated about 60 percent of its sustainment requirement. The regions
then allocate sustainment funds to their installations based on their
specific knowledge of each installation's requirements. Installations
are expected to use these funds to pay for routine sustainment work,
such as regular facility inspections, preventive maintenance, and
service calls. According to Marine Corps officials, all budgeted
sustainment funds are not allocated to the regions. Some funds are
retained at Marine Corps headquarters and used to pay for larger
sustainment projects. Specifically, each installation can submit a
prioritized list of larger sustainment projects to Marine Corps
headquarters. Headquarters decides which projects to fund based on
Marine Corps priorities and the amount of funds available, which is the
amount of budgeted funds that was not initially allocated to the
regions.
[End of section]
Appendix III: List of Installation Support Functions and Number of
Associated Standards for Joint Bases:
The Department of Defense (DOD) issued joint basing implementation
guidance in January and April 2008 that for the first time established
a set of common definitions and standards for installation support. As
shown in table 5, the guidance defined 47 installation support
functions and provided 267 standards to help define the level of
service that each joint base is to provide for each of the support
functions.
Table 5: Installation Support Functions and Number of Associated
Standards for Joint Bases:
Installation support functions: 1; Airfield operations;
Number of standards: 14.
Installation support functions: 2; Child and youth programs;
Number of standards: 6.
Installation support functions: 3; Command management;
Number of standards: 26.
Installation support functions: 4; Installation public affairs;
Number of standards: 11.
Installation support functions: 5; Legal support;
Number of standards: 7.
Installation support functions: 6; Financial management;
Number of standards: 4.
Installation support functions: 7; Management analysis;
Number of standards: 4.
Installation support functions: 8; Procurement operations;
Number of standards: 6.
Installation support functions: 9; Installation safety;
Number of standards: 4.
Installation support functions: 10; Installation chaplain ministries;
Number of standards: 6.
Installation support functions: 11; Installation history and museums;
Number of standards: none[A].
Installation support functions: 12; Laundry and dry cleaning;
Number of standards: 2.
Installation support functions: 13; Food services;
Number of standards: 4.
Installation support functions: 14; Custodial services;
Number of standards: 3.
Installation support functions: 15; Emergency management;
Number of standards: 9.
Installation support functions: 16; Environmental compliance;
Number of standards: 5.
Installation support functions: 17; Environmental conservation;
Number of standards: 7.
Installation support functions: 18; Environmental pollution prevention;
Number of standards: 3.
Installation support functions: 19; Environmental restoration;
Number of standards: none[A].
Installation support functions: 20; Facilities demolition;
Number of standards: 1.
Installation support functions: 21; Facilities new footprint;
Number of standards: none[A].
Installation support functions: 22; Facilities restoration and
modernization;
Number of standards: 1.
Installation support functions: 23; Facilities sustainment;
Number of standards: 7.
Installation support functions: 24; Family housing services;
Number of standards: 2.
Installation support functions: 25; Fire protection and emergency
services;
Number of standards: 1.
Installation support functions: 26; Grounds maintenance and
landscaping;
Number of standards: 3.
Installation support functions: 27; Information technology services
management;
Number of standards: 26.
Installation support functions: 28; Lodging;
Number of standards: 6.
Installation support functions: 29; Military personnel services;
Number of standards: none[A].
Installation support functions: 30; Morale, welfare, and recreation;
Number of standards: 6.
Installation support functions: 31; Pavement clearance services;
Number of standards: 1.
Installation support functions: 32; Pest control services;
Number of standards: 1.
Installation support functions: 33; Port services;
Number of standards: 14.
Installation support functions: 34; Readiness engineering services;
Number of standards: none[A].
Installation support functions: 35; Real property management and
engineering services;
Number of standards: 8.
Installation support functions: 36; Real property leases;
Number of standards: none[A].
Installation support functions: 37; Refuse collection and disposal;
Number of standards: 3.
Installation support functions: 38; Installation law enforcement
operations;
Number of standards: 5.
Installation support functions: 39; Installation physical security
protection and services;
Number of standards: 4.
Installation support functions: 40; Small arms range management;
Number of standards: 8.
Installation support functions: 41; Supply, storage, and distribution
(munitions);
Number of standards: 13.
Installation support functions: 42; Supply, storage, and distribution
(non-munitions);
Number of standards: 8.
Installation support functions: 43; Base support vehicles and
equipment;
Number of standards: 9.
Installation support functions: 44; Installation movement;
Number of standards: 5.
Installation support functions: 45; Unaccompanied personnel housing
services;
Number of standards: 2.
Installation support functions: 46; Utilities;
Number of standards: 4.
Installation support functions: 47; Warfighter and family services;
Number of standards: 8.
Installation support functions: Total;
Number of standards: 267.
Source: DOD.
[A] DOD officials stated that the use of standards was not applicable
for this installation support function.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
March 18, 2009:
Mr. Brian J. Lepore:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Lepore:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-09-336, "Defense Infrastructure: DoD Needs to Periodically
Review Support Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform
Congress of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses," dated February 13, 2009
(GAO Code 351223). Detailed comments on the report recommendations and
technical comments are enclosed.
We thank you and your staff for the work in producing this
comprehensive look into Joint Basing and Facility Sustainment Funding.
If we can be of any additional assistance, my point of contact is Ms.
Patricia Bushway, (703) 571-9083, pat.bushway@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
[Illegible] for:
Wayne Amy:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment):
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report - Dated February 13 2009:
GAO Code 351223/GAO-09-336:
"Defense Infrastructure: DoD Needs to Periodically Review Support
Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of
Facility Sustainment Funding Uses"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Environment) to periodically review the installation support standards
as experience is gained with delivering installation support at the
joint bases and make adjustments, if needed, to ensure that each
standard reflects the level of service necessary to meet installation
requirements as economically as possible.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The strategic imperative of Joint
Basing is to provide consistent, high quality installation support. In
order to meet this imperative in a dynamic mission environment,
standards may require refinement as mission requirements evolve,
organizational structures mature, and efficiencies improve product
delivery. Therefore, joint base memoranda of agreement already mandate
a periodic review for mission, manpower and financial impacts, to
ensure delivery of installation support to appropriate common output
level standards. Direction by the Secretary of Defense is, therefore,
not necessary.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Environment) to periodically review administrative costs as joint
basing is implemented to minimize any additional costs and prevent the
loss of existing installation support efficiencies.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The implementation of Joint Basing
presents the Services with a significant opportunity to incorporate
more efficient and/or more effective best practices in installation
management. The Department has already established a process whereby it
will review Joint Basing costs periodically as part of the Planning,
Program, Budget and Execution System. Moreover, the Services are
required by their Memorandums of Agreement to conduct periodic reviews
for mission and resource impacts. Direction by the Secretary of Defense
is, therefore, not necessary.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Environment) to complete a detailed analysis of the estimated
installation support costs from the initial joint bases and report the
results of the analysis to the Congress in the Department's documents
supporting the Administration's annual budget submission or another
document deemed appropriate.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. The Department is collecting estimated
installation support cost information at the joint bases. That
information will be provided to Congress should they request it.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Environment) to increase the attention given to facility sustainment
spending by summarizing and reporting to the Congress the amount of
budgeted sustainment funds spent on other purposes in the Department's
documents supporting the Administration's annual budget submission or
another document deemed appropriate.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department will collect and
summarize the amount of budgeted sustainment funds spent on other
purposes. That information will be provided to Congress should they
request it.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant
Director; Kate Lenane; Jeanett Reid; Geoffrey Peck; Charles Perdue; and
Gary Phillips made significant contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Base Realignment and Closure:
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in
Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently Updating
Savings Estimates. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-217].
Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to
Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1010R]. Washington, D.C.: August 13,
2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower Savings
Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC Recommendations.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-315]. Washington, D.C.:
March 5, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations
Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-244R]. Washington, D.C.: January 18,
2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have Increased
and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-341T]. Washington, D.C.: December
12, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased
and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-159]. Washington, D.C.: December 11,
2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,
Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute
of Pathology. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-20].
Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,
and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics
Agency. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-121R].
Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor
Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1040]. Washington, D.C.:
September 13, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial
Personnel Growth. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1007].
Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the
2005 Round. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1203R].
Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers
Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and
Overcome Certain Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-304]. Washington, D.C.: June 29,
2007.
Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-641]. Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2007.
Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental
Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-166]. Washington, D.C.:
January 30, 2007.
Military Bases: Observations on DOD's 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
Selection Process and Recommendations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-905]. Washington, D.C.: July 18,
2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-785]. Washington, D.C.: July 1,
2005.
Defense Infrastructure:
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January
2009.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665]. Washington D.C.:
June 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Continued Management Attention Is Needed to
Support Installation Facilities and Operations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-502]. Washington, D.C.: April 24,
2008.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road
Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-602R]. Washington, D.C.: April 1,
2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Army and Marine Corps Grow the Force
Construction Projects Generally Support the Initiative. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-375]. Washington, D.C.: March 6,
2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and
Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-556]. Washington, D.C.: June 15,
2005.
Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to
Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-534]. Washington, D.C.: June 10,
2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic
Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-274]. Washington, D.C.:
February 19, 2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The 20-year savings estimate, also known as the 20-year net present
value, reflects constant fiscal year 2005 dollars (i.e., excludes
projected inflation).
[2] Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005 Base Closure
and Realignment Commission Report to the President (Arlington, Va.:
Sept. 8, 2005).
[3] Installation support includes many diverse categories of services
and support activities through which DOD manages and funds the life-
cycle of its installations. For example, installation support includes
installation airfield and port operations; base security; fire and
emergency services; transportation; supply; communications; information
management; personnel management; administrative, legal, and financial
services; unaccompanied personnel housing management; food services;
family and quality-of-life programs; environmental compliance
activities; utilities; real property management; refuse collection and
disposal; custodial services; grounds maintenance; and facilities
sustainment, restoration, and modernization.
[4] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Continued Management Attention Is
Needed to Support Installation Facilities and Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-502] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 24,
2008).
[5] H.R. Rep. No. 110-652, at 524-525 (2008).
[6] Department of Defense, Headquarters and Support Activities Joint
Cross-Service Group Base Realignment and Closure Report, Volume VII
Final BRAC 2005 Report (May 10, 2005).
[7] Compared to facility sustainment work, restoration and
modernization work typically involves larger, more extensive projects
that restore facilities degraded from several causes, such as natural
disaster and fire, or renovate or replace facilities to achieve new
standards, accommodate new functions, or replace building components
that typically last more than 50 years.
[8] Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005 Base Closure
and Realignment Commission Report to the President (Arlington, Va.:
Sept. 8, 2005).
[9] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January
2009).
[10] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have
Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-159] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11,
2007).
[11] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and
Lower Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC
Recommendations, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-315]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2008).
[12] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges
in Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently
Updating Savings Estimates, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-217] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30,
2009).
[13] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and
Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military
Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-274]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2003).
[14] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in
Managing and Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-556] (Washington, D.C.:
June 15, 2005).
[15] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-502].
[16] Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Transforming Through Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 - Joint Basing (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 22, 2008).
[17] The guidance provides a template memorandum of agreement that
among other things commits the lead component to deliver installation
support in accordance with the support standards. Although
installations can request that OSD approve deviations from delivering
support in accordance with each standard during development of the
memorandums, OSD officials stated that no deviations were requested by
the installations consolidating into the phase I joint bases.
[18] Statement of Mr. Philip W. Grone, Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Installations and Environment), before the Subcommittee on
Readiness and Management Support, Senate Armed Services Committee (Apr.
10, 2007).
[19] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-502].
[20] Service officials stated that in some years funds from other
sources, such as supplemental funds provided for the Global War on
Terrorism, were used to pay for some facility sustainment work. Thus,
the amount of budgeted sustainment funds that the services used for
other purposes in some years was partially offset, which lessened the
impact from using sustainment funds for other purposes.
[21] DOD officials noted that the explanatory statement accompanying
the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2009, required DOD to provide written notification
to the congressional defense committees of cumulative transfers in
excess of $15 million from specified operation and maintenance budget
subactivities, including the facilities sustainment, restoration, and
modernization budget subactivity. However, such notification is not
required if funds budgeted for sustainment are used for restoration and
modernization purposes because the funds would be used in the same
budget subactivity.
[22] At the installation level, comparisons of the amounts spent on
sustainment with sustainment requirements can be less precise than
similar comparisons at higher levels, such as at the military service
level. The reason is that the facilities sustainment model estimates
the average annual sustainment needs--not the actual annual sustainment
needs--for each facility in the real property inventory. Thus, a
particular facility's actual sustainment needs in a given year may vary
from its average sustainment needs because in some years more
sustainment work is needed than in other years. For example, in a year
that a facility needs a roof replacement, the actual needed work would
be more than the needed work in years when fewer repairs were needed.
However, according to DOD officials, the model's estimates become
increasingly precise as the sustainment needs of individual facilities
are summed to higher levels because individual facility fluctuations
from the average tend to offset each other.
[23] Specifically, we visited Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek and
Fort Story in Virginia; Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base in
Washington; McGuire Air Force Base, Fort Dix, and Naval Air Engineering
Station Lakehurst in New Jersey; and Charleston Air Force Base and
Naval Weapons Station Charleston in South Carolina.
[24] Department of Defense, Headquarters and Support Activities Joint
Cross-Service Group Base Realignment and Closure Report, Volume VII
Final BRAC 2005 Report (May 10, 2005).
[End of section]
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