Iraq and Afghanistan
Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies Gao ID: GAO-09-476T March 25, 2009From fiscal year 2001 through July 2008, Congress provided more than $808 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Global War on Terrorism, including military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, since fiscal year 2003, about $49 billion has been provided to U.S. agencies for reconstruction and stabilization in Iraq and $32 billion for similar efforts in Afghanistan since fiscal year 2002. In February 2009, President Obama announced a new U.S. strategy for Iraq and plans to develop a new comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan. This statement is based on GAO's extensive body of work--more than 150 products since 2003--examining U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
While U.S. efforts face unique circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan, success in both countries depends on addressing three common challenges: (1) establishing and maintaining a basic level of security, (2) building a sustainable economic foundation, and (3) holding governments accountable for political commitments and building their capacity to govern. These challenges underscore the need for comprehensive U.S. strategies that optimize U.S. strategic interests, host country priorities, and the international community's resources and expertise. In Iraq, much U.S.-funded reconstruction took place prior to July 2007 in an environment of deteriorating security. Oil, electricity, and water projects were subject to insurgent attacks and threats, which raised costs and caused delays. While violence has declined, security conditions remain fragile, according to DOD. Iraq's oil resources provide a foundation for economic growth. However, Iraq's investment in infrastructure has been limited, despite budget surpluses. The government's limited capacity to deliver services poses a challenge as well. The United States has held the government to commitments to pass key legislation and hold elections, but further progress in reconciliation, such as legislation to share oil and gas revenues and resolve claims over disputed territories, is needed. In Afghanistan, a lack of security has put U.S.-funded infrastructure projects, development of Afghan security forces, and other efforts at risk. Projects have been delayed and costs increased. The drug trade helps finance the Taliban and other insurgents and contributes to instability. Given Afghanistan's poor economy, the country's development will depend on foreign assistance. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy, established with U.S. and international support, is underfunded and may not be financially viable. The Afghan government's lack of capacity also hinders the country from meeting its development goals. The ministries do not have the personnel with the expertise to maintain U.S. and other donor-financed infrastructure projects, and corruption exacerbates this problem. As it further defines and develops its strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan, the Administration should incorporate characteristics of an effective national strategy. Both strategies should clearly define the objectives of U.S. efforts and measures to assess progress; identify risks; estimate costs; and integrate U.S., international, and host country efforts. For example, the strategy for Iraq should clarify what conditions the United States expects to achieve to ensure that troops are drawn down responsibly. The U.S. strategy for Afghanistan should estimate the cost of helping the country implement its development strategy. It should also assess the risk to U.S. infrastructure investments if Afghanistan does not obtain the donor assistance and technical capacity to maintain them. Finally, U.S. strategies should guide the development and implementation of interagency operational plans and sector level plans.
GAO-09-476T, Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Wednesday, March 25, 2009:
Iraq And Afghanistan:
Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts
Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies:
Statement of Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: Managing Director,
International Affairs & Trade:
GAO-09-476T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-476T, testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee.
Why GAO Did This Study:
From fiscal year 2001 through July 2008, Congress provided more than
$808 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Global War on
Terrorism, including military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Moreover, since fiscal year 2003, about $49 billion has been provided
to U.S. agencies for reconstruction and stabilization in Iraq and $32
billion for similar efforts in Afghanistan since fiscal year 2002. In
February 2009, President Obama announced a new U.S. strategy for Iraq
and plans to develop a new comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan.
This statement is based on GAO‘s extensive body of work”more than 150
products since 2003”examining U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
What GAO Found:
While U.S. efforts face unique circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan,
success in both countries depends on addressing three common
challenges: (1) establishing and maintaining a basic level of security,
(2) building a sustainable economic foundation, and (3) holding
governments accountable for political commitments and building their
capacity to govern. These challenges underscore the need for
comprehensive U.S. strategies that optimize U.S. strategic interests,
host country priorities, and the international community‘s resources
and expertise.
In Iraq, much U.S.-funded reconstruction took place prior to July 2007
in an environment of deteriorating security. Oil, electricity, and
water projects were subject to insurgent attacks and threats, which
raised costs and caused delays. While violence has declined, security
conditions remain fragile, according to DOD. Iraq‘s oil resources
provide a foundation for economic growth. However, Iraq‘s investment in
infrastructure has been limited, despite budget surpluses. The
government‘s limited capacity to deliver services poses a challenge as
well. The United States has held the government to commitments to pass
key legislation and hold elections, but further progress in
reconciliation, such as legislation to share oil and gas revenues and
resolve claims over disputed territories, is needed.
In Afghanistan, a lack of security has put U.S.-funded infrastructure
projects, development of Afghan security forces, and other efforts at
risk. Projects have been delayed and costs increased. The drug trade
helps finance the Taliban and other insurgents and contributes to
instability. Given Afghanistan‘s poor economy, the country‘s
development will depend on foreign assistance. The Afghanistan National
Development Strategy, established with U.S. and international support,
is underfunded and may not be financially viable. The Afghan
government‘s lack of capacity also hinders the country from meeting its
development goals. The ministries do not have the personnel with the
expertise to maintain U.S. and other donor-financed infrastructure
projects, and corruption exacerbates this problem.
As it further defines and develops its strategies for Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Administration should incorporate characteristics of
an effective national strategy. Both strategies should clearly define
the objectives of U.S. efforts and measures to assess progress;
identify risks; estimate costs; and integrate U.S., international, and
host country efforts. For example, the strategy for Iraq should clarify
what conditions the United States expects to achieve to ensure that
troops are drawn down responsibly. The U.S. strategy for Afghanistan
should estimate the cost of helping the country implement its
development strategy. It should also assess the risk to U.S.
infrastructure investments if Afghanistan does not obtain the donor
assistance and technical capacity to maintain them. Finally, U.S.
strategies should guide the development and implementation of
interagency operational plans and sector level plans.
What GAO Recommends:
Since 2003, GAO has made recommendations to DOD, the Department of
State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other
agencies to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. efforts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, GAO has recommended that the U.S.
government develop detailed and updated strategies and operational
plans to guide these efforts. The agencies have efforts under way to
implement some of these recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T] or key
components. For more information, contact Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers
at (202) 512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss challenges to rebuilding Iraq
and Afghanistan and the importance of comprehensive U.S. strategies and
plans to guide these efforts. U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
include building or repairing infrastructure needed to provide
electricity, water, and other essential services; developing security
forces; and strengthening government capabilities.
The Bush Administration established high-level goals--or desired end
states--for U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, U.S.
efforts were aimed at ensuring that no safe haven for terrorists exists
and fostering a peaceful, united, stable, and democratic country, well
integrated into the international community, and acting as a full
partner in the war on terror. In Afghanistan, the United States has
sought to eliminate a safe haven for terrorists and gain a reliable,
stable ally in the war on terror that was moderate and democratic, with
a thriving private sector economy, capable of governing its territory
and borders, and respectful of the rights of all its citizens. In
February 2009, President Obama announced a new U.S. strategy for Iraq
and stated that his administration was developing a new comprehensive
strategy for Afghanistan.
My statement today is based on GAO's extensive body of work examining
U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 2003, we have issued more
than 150 products related to these two countries, and currently have
additional work ongoing in both. We have conducted extensive on-the-
ground work in both countries, involving our office teams in Iraq and
multiple field visits. Our reports incorporate and analyze information
from and meetings with Iraqi and Afghan officials; U.S. officials in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., including the Departments of
Defense (DOD), State (State), Justice, Energy, and the Treasury
(Treasury); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the
Army Corps of Engineers; the Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Drug
Enforcement Administration. In addition, we obtained and analyzed
information from representatives of coalition military forces and
commands, including the U.S.-led Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and
international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), the
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Our work was conducted
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. A list of GAO reports and
testimonies related to these topics can be located at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/oif.html]. For further
information relating to our work on Iraq and Afghanistan, go to
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-294sp].
Background:
In Iraq, a U.S.-led coalition undertook military operations in 2003 and
removed the ruling Ba'ath regime from power. Since then, Iraq has
formed a constitutional government, and the United States has led
efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country. The United States has
employed numerous strategies and plans to address the security and
reconstruction needs of Iraq since late 2003. In January 2007, to
address the high levels of violence, the Bush Administration announced
The New Way Forward strategy. The documents that comprise this strategy
and the phase that follows clearly state the importance that the
administration placed on continued U.S. support for Iraq, but only
articulated goals and objectives for the near-term phase that ended in
July 2008. Under a November 2008 security agreement between the United
States and Iraq,[Footnote 1] the United States must withdraw all of its
forces by the end of 2011, unless the two countries mutually agree to
extend the deadline.
In Afghanistan, U.S.-led coalition forces forcibly removed the Taliban
regime from power in 2001 in response to its protection of al Qaeda
terrorists that attacked the United States. Less than 2 months later,
the UN established a framework for a new Afghan government. Since then,
Afghanistan has formed a constitutional government. Both the United
States and the international community have important roles in
stabilization and reconstruction efforts. In 2008, the Afghan
government, with the support and cooperation of the United States and
others in the international community, finalized the 5-year Afghanistan
National Development Strategy, defining the vision, principles, and
goals for the country's development. In the final days of the Bush
Administration, DOD issued a report to Congress that included "a
description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for
security and stability".[Footnote 2]
The United States faces fundamentally different economic situations in
its effort to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan. (See appendix I for
comparative information on the two countries.)
* By 2003, Iraq's infrastructure had deteriorated due to neglect from
the previous regime, international sanctions, and years of conflict.
However, Iraq's economy is based on the world's third largest oil
reserves, and, with a per capita income of about $4,000, it is
classified as a middle income country by the World Bank. Iraq has a
population of 29 million, about 74 percent of which is literate, and
life expectancy at birth is 70 years. The country has a network of
roads, railway service, and 19 airports with paved runways over 1,000
feet. About 67 percent of Iraq's population is urban. The country
consists predominantly of broad plains, and it has access to the
Persian Gulf.
* By 2001, almost 3 decades of war and years of drought had destroyed
Afghanistan's government, judicial and economic institutions, and its
infrastructure. Afghanistan has very limited accessible natural
resources and with a per capita income of about $800 is classified as a
low income country. It has a population of 33 million, approximately 28
percent of which is literate, and life expectancy at birth is 45 years.
The country has limited paved roads, no railway, and four airports with
paved runways over 1,000 feet. About 24 percent of Afghanistan's
population is urban. Afghanistan has a land area about one-third larger
than Iraq and is predominantly mountainous and land-locked.
The level of insurgent violence has changed drastically in both Iraq
and Afghanistan during the past several years, as illustrated in figure
1. In mid-2008, the number of enemy attacks per month in Afghanistan
first surpassed that of Iraq. As of February 2009, attack levels were
slightly higher in Iraq than Afghanistan.
Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan Per Month,
May 2003 through February 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
This graph plots the number of average daily attacks per month in Iraq
and in Afghanistan during the time period of June 2003 through February
2009.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.
[End of figure]
As of January 2009, the United States had about 144,000 troops in Iraq
as part of MNF-I. According to DOD and MNF-I officials, the United
States plans to reduce the number of combat troops to about 128,000 by
September 2009. This troop drawdown would represent two combat brigades
and their support units, reducing the number of U.S. brigades from 14
to 12.
The United States had about 32,800 troops in Afghanistan as of January
2009, including 13,900 deployed to the NATO-led ISAF and 18,900
deployed to U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom efforts. According to
DOD officials, an additional 17,700 U.S. troops will be deployed to
Afghanistan, most of them under ISAF command.
U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq Faced Security, Economic, and
Governance Challenges:
Establishing and Maintaining a Basic Level of Security Is Essential for
Progress in Reconstruction:
At the outset of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq, the United
States assumed that it would face a permissive security situation that
would enable reconstruction to progress quickly and steadily. However,
a lack of security, among other factors, undermined U.S. efforts to
restore essential services--oil production, electricity generation, and
water treatment--to a standard acceptable to and accessible by all
Iraqi citizens. Since 2003, U.S. agencies have provided about $10
billion for reconstruction activities in the oil, electricity, and
water sectors. Most U.S. reconstruction funds were spent in the
deteriorating security environment that existed in Iraq prior to July
2007. Numerous security problems resulted in delays in the design and
execution of projects, increased the cost of providing security
services for contractors and sites, and reduced scopes of work. In the
oil sector, insurgents attacked oil pipelines, destroyed other key
infrastructure, threatened workers, compromised the transport of
materials, and hindered project completion and repairs. In the
electricity sector, insurgents repeatedly sabotaged major transmission
and fuel lines, cutting power to various parts of the country.
Moreover, poor security has prevented the successful implementation of
long-term training programs for Iraqi citizens to create the local
capacity needed to operate and maintain U.S.-funded projects. Figure 2
illustrates the number of enemy-initiated attacks in Iraq since May
2003.
Figure 2: Enemy-Initiated Attacks Per Month in Iraq, May 2003 through
February 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
The following are plotted against a timeline of June 2003 through
February 2009:
Total average daily attacks;
Average daily attacks on coalition;
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces;
Average daily attacks on civilians.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.
[End of figure]
Although the security situation remains fragile, according to DOD,
violence has decreased significantly over the past 2 years: enemy-
initiated attacks decreased from a peak of about 180 per day in June
2007 to about 30 per day in February 2009. Security gains have largely
resulted from (1) the increase in U.S. combat forces that allowed a
change in tactics and the adoption of counterinsurgency techniques, (2)
the creation of nongovernmental security forces such as Sons of Iraq,
and (3) the Mahdi Army's declaration of a cease fire.
To help achieve security in Iraq and facilitate the eventual drawdown
of U.S. troops, the United States has provided about $22 billion since
2003 to develop Iraqi security forces and transfer security
responsibilities to the Iraqi government. Further, the Iraqi army and
police forces nearly doubled in size from about 320,000 personnel in
January 2007 to just over 600,000 in October 2008. Although many Iraqi
units are leading counterinsurgency operations, DOD reports that only
about 10 percent of all Iraqi army units are deemed capable of
performing operations without coalition assistance.[Footnote 3] Several
factors have complicated the development of capable Iraqi security
forces, including the lack of a single unified force, sectarian and
militia influences, continued dependence on U.S. and coalition forces
for combat support, and Iraqi training and leadership shortages.
Despite a Substantial Budget Surplus, Iraq Has Spent Few Resources on
Reconstruction Projects Necessary for Economic Growth:
The United States had assumed that, after an initial U.S. investment in
restoring Iraq's infrastructure, Iraq and the international community
would take financial responsibility for Iraqi reconstruction. However,
the Iraqi government's spending on infrastructure for the oil
production, electricity, and water sectors has not been adequate to
meet the needs of the Iraqi people for essential services.
With large oil reserves, Iraq possesses the resources to finance its
own reconstruction. Nevertheless, although Iraq has generated budget
surpluses since 2005, it has spent small percentages of its capital
investment budgets on needed infrastructure projects. As table 1
illustrates, from 2005 through 2008, Iraq generated an estimated $164
billion in cumulative revenues, primarily from crude oil export sales,
but spent only about $117 billion. As of December 2008, Iraq had
amassed an estimated cumulative surplus of about $47 billion.
Table 1: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surpluses, 2005-2008:
Total Revenues:
2005: $24.1 billion;
2006: $32 billion;
2007: $39.9 billion;
2008: $67.8 billion;
Total 2005-2008: $163.8 billion.
Ministry of Finance Expenditures:
2005: $17.6 billion;
2006: $22.8 billion;
2007: $26.6 billion;
2008: $49.3 billion;
Total 2005-2008: $116.5 billion.
Surplus:
2005: $6.5 billion;
2006: $9.2 billion;
2007: $13.3 billion;
2008: $18.3 billion;
Total 2005-2008: $47.3 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of CBI and IMF data and the Iraqi Ministry of
Finance's budget.
Note: GAO previously projected that Iraq could have a cumulative
surplus of between $67 billion and $79 billion by the end of 2008. The
revised estimate presented here reflects the impact of declining oil
prices and increased spending by the Iraqi government during the second
half of 2008.
[End of table]
The international community has offered Iraq almost $12 billion in
loans to help finance reconstruction projects. As of January 2009, Iraq
had entered into agreements to borrow only about one-third of this
amount. In addition, international donors have provided about $5.6
billion in bilateral or multilateral grants. To help Iraq attract
foreign investment, some official creditors have forgiven loans taken
under the previous regime. Treasury officials estimate that Iraq's debt
to foreign creditors has shrunk from about $120 billion at the end of
2004--an amount almost 5 times the size of Iraq's economy at the time-
-to between about $49 and $77 billion in January 2009.
Despite its substantial budget surplus and international assistance,
Iraq has not spent the resources it set aside for reconstruction
efforts essential to its economic recovery. As table 2 indicates, Iraq
has spent about 12 percent, or $2 billion, of the $17.2 billion it
allocated for reconstruction activities in the oil, electricity, and
water sectors. In contrast, U.S. agencies have spent almost 90 percent,
or $9.5 billion, of the $10.9 billion Congress made available for
investment activities in these sectors since fiscal year 2003.
Moreover, Iraqi ministries have consistently spent far higher
percentages of their operational budgets, which include employee
compensation, than they have of their investment budgets, which include
infrastructure construction costs.
Table 2: U.S. and Iraq Allocations and Spending for Selected Sectors
(U.S. dollars in billions):
Sector: Oil;
Investment Needed: $25-75[B] billion;
U.S. Government: March 2003-October 2008: $2.7 billion;
U.S. Government: March 2003-June 2008: $2.5 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008: $10.8 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008: $0.7 billion.
Sector: Electricity;
Investment Needed: $27-54[C] billion;
U.S. Government: March 2003-October 2008: $5.3 billion;
U.S. Government: March 2003-June 2008: $4.8 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008: $5.2 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008: $0.8 billion.
Sector: Water resources;
Investment Needed: $14[D] billion;
U.S. Government: March 2003-October 2008: $2.9 billion;
U.S. Government: March 2003-June 2008: $2.2 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008: $1.3 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008: $0.6 billion.
Total:
Investment Needed: $66-143 billion;
U.S. Government: March 2003-October 2008: $10.9 billion;
U.S. Government: March 2003-June 2008: $9.5 billion (87%);
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008: $17.2 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008: $2.0 billion (12%).
Source: GAO analysis of Iraq Ministry of Finance budgets and
expenditures and State, DOD, USAID, and Treasury data.
Note: The Iraqi figures refer to investment expenses that include
capital goods and capital projects. The sums may differ from totals due
to rounding.
[A] This refers to funds disbursed by U.S. agencies and funds expended
by the respective Iraqi ministries.
[B] Investment needed in the oil sector to achieve a production target
of 6 million barrels per day, according to the Ministry of Oil.
[C] Investment needed in the electricity sector to provide reliable
electricity across Iraq by 2015, according to the Ministry of
Electricity and U.S. government officials.
[D] World Bank estimate.
[End of table]
Oil exports account for about 90 percent of Iraq's revenue, and the
government's ability to fund reconstruction efforts and provide
essential services to its population depends, in part, on sustaining
and increasing oil production and exports. In the preliminary 2009
Iraqi budget, the Iraqi government projects a budget deficit of $16
million, in part due to lower expected oil revenues. According to
Treasury, Iraq's cumulative budget surpluses would sufficiently cover
this deficit.
Ensuring Political Commitment and Improving Government Capacity Are
Critical:
To promote national reconciliation and unify the country, the Iraqi
government committed in 2006 to address political grievances among
Iraq's Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd populations. In 2007, the Bush
Administration pledged to hold the Iraqi government to this commitment,
with some results. Since September 2007, after considerable debate and
compromise among Iraq's political blocs, the Iraqi government has
enacted five of seven laws intended to promote national reconciliation,
including de-Ba'athification reform, amnesty, provincial powers
legislation, and two election laws. In addition, the Iraqi government
has successfully held five elections since 2005, including provincial
elections in January 2009, intended to address Sunni concerns about
lack of representation on Provincial Councils.
Nonetheless, the Iraqi government still has key political commitments
to meet. In particular, it has not enacted hydrocarbon legislation,
which would define the sharing of oil and gas revenues for all Iraqis
and could promote international investment. Further, Iraq has not
completed a constitutional review or mandated processes to deal with
claims over disputed territories, especially oil-rich Kirkuk, where
political tensions remain high, according to a December 2008 DOD
report.[Footnote 4] Nor has Iraq passed a law to demobilize militias.
The success of the Iraqi government's efforts to increase its
legitimacy and counter the insurgent threat depend, in large part, on
its ability to expand oil exports and provide essential services, such
as electricity and clean water, to all Iraqi communities. However,
capacity problems have limited the Iraqi government's progress in
meeting the need for these services. For example, based on U.S. and UN
reporting, inadequate operating and maintenance practices and the lack
of skilled technicians inhibit an effective electrical infrastructure.
As a result, although improvements have been made, Iraq continues to
experience electrical shortages despite billions of dollars invested.
Iraq's government faces several challenges in building its capacity to
govern. Its ministries have significant shortages of personnel who can
formulate budgets, procure goods and services, and perform other vital
ministry tasks. U.S. mission assessments have noted the Iraqi
government's limited capacity to provide services to the Iraqi people
due to weak technical expertise, limitations in managers' skills, and
an inability to identify and articulate strategic priorities, among
other factors. Also, despite measures to strengthen the Inspectors
General and other Iraqi anti-corruption entities, corruption is
pervasive in the ministries. In 2008, Transparency International ranked
Iraq 178 out of 180 countries on its Corruption Perception Index--worse
than its 2005 ranking. According to a December 2008 DOD report, this
corruption is an impediment to reconstruction and stabilization.
[Footnote 5]
The United States has altered its approach to Iraqi government capacity
development over time. Since 2005, multiple U.S. agencies have led
individual efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq's ministries without
having an overall integrated strategy. In 2007, the U.S. strategy for
Iraq emphasized the need to build capacity in Iraq's ministries and
help the government execute its capital investment budgets. In
response, U.S. capacity development efforts shifted emphasis to helping
Iraqi ministries overcome their inability to spend their capital
investment budgets. In June 2008, State and Treasury created a new
Public Financial Management Action Group to help integrate and
coordinate U.S. government assistance to improve budget execution.
Also, State has hired a contractor to develop a strategic planning
document for ministry capacity development in Iraq.
U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan Face Security, Economic, and Governance
Challenges:
As Security Situation Worsens, U.S. Focuses on Building Afghan National
Security Forces and Combating Narcotics Trafficking:
Security and stability in Afghanistan have deteriorated in the past 3
years. In the first several years of the war, Afghanistan was
relatively stable and secure and attacks by Taliban insurgents on U.S.
soldiers were rare. However, since 2006, the insurgency has reasserted
itself, resulting in an escalation of violence, especially against U.S.
and coalition forces. As illustrated in figure 3, enemy attacks on
civilians as well as Afghan and coalition forces increased from an
average of about 5 per day in January 2006 to around 25 per day in
February 2009.
Figure 3: Enemy-Initiated Attacks Per Month in Afghanistan, May 2003
through February 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
The following are plotted against a timeline of June 2003 through
February 2009:
Total average daily attacks;
Average daily attacks on ISAF/coalition forces;
Average daily attacks on Afghanistan security;
Average daily attacks on civilians.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.
[End of figure]
Insurgents have increasingly used improvised explosive devices and
focused on infrastructure projects as their targets. This violence has
had deleterious effects on U.S. and allied security and support
operations as well as reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. For
example, DOD and State officials have reported that the efforts to
train Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are hindered by inadequate
force protection and a shortage of personnel. Furthermore, according to
USAID, a wide range of development programs, including road
reconstruction and power generation, faced significant cost increases
and were delayed or abandoned due to a lack of security.
Since 2002, the United States has provided about $18 billion for the
development of ANSF, which are comprised of the Afghan National Army
and the Afghan National Police. This has been a keystone effort in
achieving the long-term security that would allow the drawdown of U.S.
and allied security forces. However, progress has been relatively slow.
According to DOD, as of December 2008, only about 18 army units and 18
police units were considered fully capable of performing their
missions. We previously reported that ANSF development efforts face a
number of significant challenges, including:
* Addressing shortages in staff to train and equip the ANSF;
* Improving the recruitment and retention of ANSF personnel, especially
for leadership and specialty skill positions, such as those involving
logistics, medical support, and engineering;
* Completing the retraining of the Afghan police to address corruption
and improve professional standards;
* Developing the ability of ANSF units to fully safeguard and account
for weapons and sensitive equipment.
Counternarcotics in Afghanistan has been another key U.S. undertaking
to achieve a secure environment. Afghanistan provides over 90 percent
of the world's opium, which is refined into heroin. This drug trade
helps fund the Taliban and other anti-government groups and has
undermined the Afghan government's effort to address internal security
problems, build political stability, and establish legitimate economic
growth and the rule of law. Since 2002, the United States has provided
nearly $3 billion for counternarcotics programs. State, DOD, USAID, and
Department of Justice components, including the Drug Enforcement
Administration, have supported poppy eradication, interdiction, justice
reform and prosecution, public information, and alternative
development.
Since 2005, poppy cultivation has become more localized. Dramatically
reduced in northern Afghanistan, it has greatly increased in the south.
In 2008, 98 percent of Afghanistan's opium was cultivated in 7 of its
34 provinces, all in the south, where many of the insurgent attacks
occur. One province, Helmand, accounted for 66 percent of the total.
USAID's Alternative Development Program has had mixed results so far.
Although it exceeded targets for providing alternative employment and
agricultural training to Afghans in traditional poppy-growing regions,
it fell short of its goals for reducing the number of hectares devoted
to opium poppy production between 2005 and 2007, according to USAID's
Office of Inspector General.
In December 2008, acknowledging that global and regional terrorists
finance their activities with drug money, DOD changed its rules of
engagement for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, allowing DOD greater
involvement in counternarcotics, and ISAF has also expanded its role.
We have recently initiated a review of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan to assess their impact on the drug trade, security, and
economic development.
Given Weak Economic Conditions, Afghanistan Is Highly Dependent on
Sustained Foreign Development Assistance:
Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest countries and ranks near the
bottom in virtually every development indicator, including life
expectancy; literacy; nutrition; and infant, child, and maternal
mortality. Nearly three decades of war and extended drought have
devastated Afghanistan's infrastructure, economy, and government.
Furthermore, Afghanistan's prospects for growth are severely limited by
weak economic factors, such as low government revenue, high rates of
inflation, and limited access to credit for most Afghan citizens.
Given these circumstances, Afghanistan will be highly dependent for the
foreseeable future on foreign aid to achieve its economic development
objectives, which the Afghan government has articulated in its
Afghanistan National Development Strategy. However, this strategy does
not appear financially viable, given the country's fiscal constraints,
without additional foreign aid. As table 3 below shows, Afghanistan's
planned expenditures for economic development exceed anticipated
revenues, including both domestic revenues and donor contributions;
this shortfall is expected to increase over time. Donor assistance
accounts for about 90 percent of Afghanistan's total funding during the
2008-2009 budget year, but this assistance is expected to decline to
about 70 percent of total funding by the 2012-2013 Afghan budget year.
Table 3: Overall Funding and Expenditures for the Afghanistan National
Development Strategy by Budget Year, in Millions of U.S. Dollars:
Total funding:
2008/09: $7,400;
2009/10: $6,064;
2010/11: $6,165;
2011/12: $6,009;
2012/13: $5,819;
Total: $31,457.
Domestic revenue:
2008/09: $887;
2009/10: $1,104;
2010/11: $1,351;
2011/12: $1,611;
2012/13: $1,911;
Total: $6,864.
Total donor assistance:
2008/09: $6,513;
2009/10: $4,960;
2010/11: $4,814;
2011/12: $4,398;
2012/13: $3,908;
Total: $24,593.
Total expenditures:
2008/09: $7,903;
2009/10: $9,286;
2010/11: $10,236;
2011/12: $11,038;
2012/13: $11,637;
Total: $50,100.
Total shortfall:
2008/09: $503;
2009/10: $3,222;
2010/11: $4,071;
2011/12: $5,029;
2012/13: $5,818;
Total: $18,643.
Source: Afghanistan National Development Strategy.
[End of table]
The United States and other international partners have undertaken
numerous infrastructure and development projects with the Afghan
National Development Strategy as their guiding document. As of December
2008, the United States has provided nearly $9 billion for economic and
social development projects. However, the Afghan government lacks the
resources and capacity to sustain these projects. For example, as we
reported in 2008, although the United States and its international
partners have constructed a vital network of new roads in Afghanistan
to support trade and economic growth, the Afghan government did not
establish a sustainable maintenance program.[Footnote 6] Hence, for the
foreseeable future, the Afghan government will have to rely on
technical and financial assistance from the international community to
maintain the roads. To be effective over the long term, infrastructure
programs will need to be designed and implemented with an accompanying
stream of operational and maintenance funding.
USAID has reported some notable successes in basic education and health
development in Afghanistan. In 2008, according to USAID, more than 6
million children attended school in Afghanistan, including almost 2
million girls, compared with less than 1 million children and no girls
under the Taliban. In September 2008, 80 percent of the population had
access to health care, up from 8 percent in 2001. If sustained, these
types of improvements have the potential to help bolster Afghanistan's
long-term economic development.
Limited Government Capacity Impedes Afghanistan's Ability to Meet
Reconstruction Objectives:
The Afghanistan National Development Strategy established a
comprehensive set of objectives, which include bringing about peace and
security, eliminating corruption, developing the economy, increasing
the participation of women, and ensuring appropriate care of the
environment, among others. To help achieve these objectives, the Afghan
government has committed to a broad range of social, economic, and
government reforms, with the United States contributing nearly $2
billion since 2002 for democracy, governance, and rule of law
assistance.
A lack of Afghan capacity in almost all aspects of governance remains a
major constraint to fulfilling reform commitments and achieving the
objectives of the Afghan National Development Strategy. Afghanistan's
history of limited availability of education and essential services has
resulted in a widespread lack of literacy and job skills, which poses
problems for Afghan government ministries in recruiting qualified
government personnel, such as police, prosecutors, investigators, and
trained administrative staff. Often, even senior Afghan officials lack
basic computer skills, according to U.S. officials, making it difficult
to use modern management systems. U.S. and UN officials have noted a
lack of literacy among some senior provincial government officials.
Moreover, according to U.S. officials, retention of trained Afghan
staff has been difficult for government ministries, which must compete
with the international donor community for trained staff.
As a result, Afghanistan lacks the capacity to sustain and maintain
many programs and projects put in place by donors. For example, as we
reported in 2008, a fragmented institutional organization within the
Afghan government was a factor impeding the establishment of a
sustainable road maintenance program.[Footnote 7] In addition, USAID's
Inspector General found that, for a U.S.-funded project to establish
urban water and sanitation systems, Afghan system operators were not
adequately trained. In addition, the cognizant Afghan ministries did
not have adequate plans in place to ensure financial and operational
sustainability. According to U.S. officials, most major official
development programs include capacity building, and USAID has noted
overall improvement among government ministries and institutions in
recent years, particularly in the Ministries of Finance, Education,
Public Health, and Rural Rehabilitation and Development. However, none
was rated by USAID as capable of achieving its mission without
assistance.
Afghanistan's capacity problems are exacerbated by corruption, a
significant problem in the country. In 2008, Afghanistan was ranked 176
out of 180 countries on Transparency International's Corruption
Perception Index--worse than its 2005 ranking. According to the
Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the causes of corruption in
Afghan public administration can be attributed to a variety of factors,
including weak legislative and regulatory frameworks and limited
enforcement; nontransparent personnel policies and low wages for public
officials; and the availability of illegal profits through the opium
trade. Furthermore, the sudden influx of substantial amounts of donor
money into a system already weak from poorly regulated procurement
practices increases the risk of corruption and the waste of resources.
U.S. Efforts Should Be Guided by Comprehensive U.S. Strategies and
Operational Plans:
In February 2009, President Obama outlined a new strategy for Iraq
consisting of three parts: (1) the responsible removal of combat
brigades, (2) sustained diplomacy on behalf of a more peaceful and
prosperous Iraq, and (3) comprehensive U.S. engagement across the
region. According to DOD, the United States plans to reduce the number
of troops in Iraq to about 128,000 by September 2009 and to no more
than 50,000 by the end of August 2010. In Afghanistan, President Obama
announced plans to deploy 17,000 additional troops and indicated that
he intends to send more. He also announced plans to develop a new U.S.
strategy for Afghanistan.
In clarifying its new U.S. strategy for Iraq and developing a new
strategy for Afghanistan, the Administration should consider several
desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that we
identified in previous reports.[Footnote 8] These include discussion of
the strategy's goals, objectives, and measures; risks and threats;
future costs and resources needed; roles and responsibilities of U.S.
government agencies; and integration with international organizations
and host governments.
* Goals, objectives, and measures. Given the significant challenges in
both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Administration should clearly articulate
the overall objectives for U.S. efforts, such as the security,
economic, and political conditions it expects the countries to achieve
with U.S. assistance. Further, the Administration should measure
progress in achieving those conditions. For Iraq, the Administration
has emphasized the importance of a responsible drawdown of U.S. forces
but has not yet defined this term.[Footnote 9]
* Risks and threats. U.S. strategies should assess potential
vulnerabilities, such as internal and external risks to security,
economic, and governance conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Furthermore, the Administration should consider how to mitigate and
address these risks and threats. For example, the strategy for Iraq
should consider how the United States would respond if it does not
achieve the conditions for a responsible drawdown consistent with the
security agreement between the United States and Iraq. The strategies
should also assess the risk that the Iraqi and Afghan governments will
not be able to maintain U.S.-funded infrastructure investments due to a
lack of financial resources or technical capacity, particularly in
Afghanistan, where the national development plan is not financially
viable without donor assistance. For Afghanistan, the U.S. strategy
should address risks posed by neighboring countries that can profoundly
influence security and stability--particularly Pakistan. The
Administration should also develop strategies to minimize those risks.
In February 2009, we recommended that the United States establish a
comprehensive plan for countering terrorist threats in Pakistan that
have tended to destabilize Afghanistan.[Footnote 10]
* Future costs and resources. U.S. strategies should indicate the
funding resources needed to achieve their objectives, as well as the
troop levels the United States expects to commit and the length of time
it expects to provide these resources. For example, the costs of
drawing down U.S. forces in Iraq and ramping them up in Afghanistan
will be considerable but have not been fully estimated. In addition,
the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan should estimate the cost of helping
Afghanistan meet the goals of the Afghanistan National Development
Strategy.
* U.S. agency roles and responsibilities and integration with
international organizations and host governments. A wide variety of
U.S. agencies and international organizations have significant roles in
Iraq and Afghanistan, including DOD, the Departments of State,
Treasury, and Justice, USAID, the UN, and the World Bank. Comprehensive
U.S. strategies should discuss mechanisms and approaches for
integrating and coordinating their efforts. On a U.S. interagency
level, these mechanisms should help ensure that roles and
responsibilities are clearly defined and that all the elements of U.S.
national power, including military, diplomatic, intelligence, law
enforcement, economic, and development assistance, are focused
effectively on achieving U.S. objectives. Furthermore, in clarifying
the U.S. strategy in Iraq, the United States needs to consider how to
transition from a predominantly military presence to a civilian one as
U.S. forces draw down. On an international level, the role,
responsibilities, commitments, and activities of all the organizations
involved, including the host governments themselves, should be clearly
defined and coordinated to prioritize the spending of limited resources
and avoid unnecessary duplication.
U.S. national strategies guide the development and implementation of
operational plans. However, to date, U.S. government agencies have not
developed a comprehensive set of plans for U.S. operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. See figure 4 for a depiction of existing U.S. strategies,
operational and sector plans for Iraq and Afghanistan, and gaps we have
observed.
Figure 4: U.S. Strategies and Plans for Iraq and Afghanistan:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Iraq:
Strategies:
Country‘s strategy: International Compact for Iraq;
U.S. strategies and plans:
* The New Way Forward (Jan. 2007 – July 2008);
* President Obama outlined a new U.S. strategy in Feb. 2009.
Interagency operational plans:
U.S. strategies and plans: Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)/U.S.
Embassy; 2009 Joint Campaign Plan.
Sector level plans:
U.S. strategies and plans: Examples:
* Security forces development plan;
* Integrated energy plan has not been completed;
* Ministry capacity building plan has not been developed.
Afghanistan:
Strategies:
Country‘s strategy: Afghanistan National Development Strategy;
U.S. strategies and plans:
* DOD report under the Bush Administration described ’a comprehensive
[U.S.] strategy“ for Afghanistan;
* President Obama announced plans in Feb. 2009 to develop a new
comprehensive strategy.
Interagency operational plans:
U.S. strategies and plans: None identified.
Sector level plans:
U.S. strategies and plans: Examples:
* Counternarcotics strategy;
* Security forces development plans are not detailed and coordinated;
* USAID plan for 2005-2010 is being updated.
Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and USAID data.
[End of figure]
For Iraq, the United States established an interagency plan--the MNF-I/
U.S. Embassy Joint Campaign Plan--for the implementation of U.S.
efforts in Iraq. According to DOD, the United States is pursuing
efforts along five lines of operation: political, security, economic,
diplomatic, and rule of law. As the Administration further defines the
new U.S. strategy for Iraq, the 2009 Joint Campaign Plan should also be
revised and link the administration's high-level strategic objectives
to the objectives of tactics and activities on the ground. In
accordance with U.S. military doctrine and consistent with the U.S.
strategy, the updated plan should clearly articulate the end state for
U.S. military operations and the conditions to be achieved for drawing
down troops.[Footnote 11] State, DOD, USAID, and Department of Justice
officials we met with did not provide us a comparable interagency
operational plan for Afghanistan.
The United States has developed a number of operational plans at the
sector level to guide U.S. efforts, such as an interagency
counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan. However, plans are still
needed in other key areas. For Iraq, we recommended that State lead the
development of an integrated energy plan as well and a plan for
building ministry capacity.[Footnote 12] For Afghanistan, DOD and State
have not developed coordinated and detailed plans for building and
sustaining the ANSF. Without these plans, Congress cannot readily
assess progress of these efforts or conduct necessary oversight.
[Footnote 13] This is particularly important given the challenges
facing the ANSF development effort, its estimated cost of $2 billion
per year, and the recent decision to increase the Afghan army from
80,000 to 134,000 troops.
Conclusions:
Since 2003, GAO has made recommendations to DOD, State, USAID, and
other agencies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our recommendations address the wide
range of security, economic development, and governance challenges that
these agencies face. In responding to these challenges, we have
recommended that the U.S. government develop detailed and comprehensive
strategies, interagency operational plans, and sector plans to guide
its efforts. These strategies and plans should be updated as
circumstances change to reflect new considerations of U.S. strategic
objectives and interests, projected costs, risks, and other vital
factors.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jacquelyn
Williams-Bridger at (202) 512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov:
In addition, the following staff contributed to this testimony or the
GAO work upon which it is based: Johana Ayers; Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott;
Kathryn Bernet; Margaret Best; Ann Borseth; Monica Brym; Burns
Chamberlain; Joseph Carney; Carole Coffey; Thomas Costa; Lynn Cothern;
Laura Czohara; Aniruddha Dasgupta; Karen Deans; Martin de Alteriis;
Lucia DeMaio; Timothy DiNapoli; Mark Dowling; Mattias Fenton; Etana
Finkler; Walker Fullerton; Richard Geiger; Cindy Gilbert; Elizabeth
Guran; Rhonda Horried; David Hancock; Albert Huntington; John Hutton;
Julia Jebo; Hynek Kalkus; Bruce Kutnick; Drew Lindsey; Guy Lofaro;
Armetha Liles; Judy McCloskey; James Michels; Tetsuo Miyabara, Kathleen
Monahan; Mary Moutsos; Alise Nacson; Valérie Nowak; Marcus Oliver;
Suzanne Perkins; Sharon Pickup; Jason Pogacnik; Emily Rachman;
Elizabeth Repko; Michael Rohrback; Mona Seghal; Jena Sinkfield; Audrey
Solis; and William Solis; Pierre Toureille; and Sonja Ware.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comparative Information on Iraq and Afghanistan:
Indicator: Area;
Iraq: 166,858 square miles (about twice the size of Idaho);
Afghanistan: 250,001 square miles (slightly smaller than Texas).
Indicator: Border countries;
Iraq:
* Iran;
* Jordan;
* Kuwait;
* Saudi Arabia;
* Syria;
* Turkey;
Afghanistan:
* China;
* Iran;
* Pakistan;
* Tajikistan;
* Turkmenistan;
* Uzbekistan.
Indicator: Terrain;
Iraq: Predominantly broad plains;
Afghanistan: Mostly rugged mountains.
Indicator: Population;
Iraq: About 29 million;
Afghanistan: About 33 million.
Indicator: Ethnic groups;
Iraq: * Arab: 75% to 80%;
* Kurdish: 15% to 20%;
* Turkoman, Assyrian, or other: 5%;
Afghanistan:
* Pashtun: 42%;
* Tajik: 27%;
* Hazara: 9%;
* Uzbek: 9%;
* Aimak: 4%;
* Turkmen: 3%;
* Baloch 2%;
* Other 4%.
Indicator: Religions;
Iraq:
* Shia Muslim: 60%-65%;
* Sunni Muslim: 32%-37%;
* Christian or other: 3%;
Afghanistan:
* Sunni Muslim: 80%;
* Shia Muslim:19%;
* Other: 1%.
Indicator: Languages;
Iraq:
* Arabic;
* Kurdish (official in Kurdish Region);
* Turkoman;
* Assyrian (Neo Aramaic);
* Armenian;
Afghanistan:
* Afghan Persian or Dari (official): 50%;
* Pashto (official): 35%;
* Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen): 11%;
* 30 minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashai): 4%.
Indicator: Urban population as percentage of total population;
Iraq: 67%;
Afghanistan: 24%.
Indicator: Type of government;
Iraq: Parliamentary democracy;
Afghanistan: Islamic republic.
Indicator: Administrative divisions;
Iraq: 18 governorates (or provinces) and 1 region (Kurdistan Regional
Government);
Afghanistan: 34 provinces.
Indicator: Political Stability[A];
Iraq: 0.5 percentile;
Afghanistan: 1.4 percentile.
Indicator: Corruption Perception Index (CPI)[B];
Iraq: 1.3; Iraq is ranked 178 out of 180 countries;
Afghanistan: 1.5; Afghanistan is ranked 176 out of 180 countries.
Indicator: Gross domestic product (GDP) in billions of U.S. dollars
(official exchange rate);
Iraq: $93.8;
Afghanistan: $12.9.
Indicator: GDP purchasing power parity (PPP), in billions of U.S.
dollars;
Iraq: $113.9;
Afghanistan: $26.3.
Indicator: GDP per capita (PPP);
Iraq: $4,000;
Afghanistan: $800.
Indicator: Domestic revenue as percentage of GDP[C];
Iraq: 75.9%;
Afghanistan: 7%.
Indicator: Grants as a percentage of government revenue[C];
Iraq: 2.1%;
Afghanistan: 135.7%.
Indicator: Literacy (age 15 and over can read and write);
Iraq: 74% (male: 84.1%; female: 64.2%);
Afghanistan: 28% (male: 43.1%; female: 12.6%).
Indicator: Life expectancy at birth;
Iraq: 69.9 years;
Afghanistan: 44.6 years.
Indicator: Infant mortality rate;
Iraq: 44 deaths/1,000 live births;
Afghanistan: 152 deaths/1,000 live births.
Indicator: Average daily enemy-initiated attacks[D];
Iraq: About 30 in February 2009; high of about 180 in June 2007;
Afghanistan: About 25 in February 2009; high of about 45 in Sept. 2008.
Indicator: U.S. forces[E];
Iraq: 144,100 troops;
Afghanistan: 32,800 troops.
Indicator: Reconstruction and other assistance, in billions of U.S.
dollars[F];
Iraq: $26.24;
Afghanistan: $13.88.
Indicator: Assistance for development of security forces, in billions
of U.S. dollars[F];
Iraq: $22.47;
Afghanistan: $17.98.
Note: Data source is the CIA 2008 World Factbook unless otherwise
indicated.
[A] World Bank World Wide Governance Indicators, 2007. The political
stability and absence of violence indicator measures the perceptions of
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown
by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and
terrorism. Countries are ranked on a percentage basis from 0 to 100.
[B] Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2008. This
index measures the perceived levels of public-sector corruption in a
given country and is a composite index, drawing on different expert and
business surveys. The 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index scores 180
countries on a scale from zero (highly corrupt) to ten (highly clean).
[C] International Monetary Fund, 2007/2008 and GAO calculations.
[D] Defense Intelligence Agency, January 2009.
[E] DOD; data as of January 2009.
[F] GAO analysis of funding reports from Departments of State, Defense,
and the Treasury; Army Corps of Engineers; USAID; and the Special
Inspector General for Iraq.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the
Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in
Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008. The agreement took effect Jan. 1, 2009.
[2] DOD, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National
Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, P.L. 110-181), Report on
Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 2009).
[3] See DOD, Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of
Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law
110-252), Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 2008).
[4] See DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.
[5] See DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.
[6] See GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing
Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable
Maintenance Program Are Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-689] (Washington, D.C.: July 8,
2008).
[7] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-689].
[8] See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy
Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788], (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 11,
2006); Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004); and Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Periodic
Reporting Are Needed to Gauge Progress and Costs of DOD's Global
Posture Restructuring, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-486C] (Washington, D.C.: May 26,
2006).
[9] See GAO, Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-294SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 24,
2009).
[10] See GAO, Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks
Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe
Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2008).
[11] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-294SP].
[12] See GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity
Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide
Efforts and Manage Risk, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-117] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007);
and Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore
Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-677] (Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2007).
[13] See GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be
Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain
Capable Afghan National Security Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661] (Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2008).
[End of section]
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