Iraq
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight Gao ID: GAO-09-294SP March 24, 2009To assist the 111th Congress, this report presents a series of issue papers for consideration in developing congressional oversight agendas and determining the way forward in securing and stabilizing Iraq. These papers are based on the continuing work of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the more than 130 Iraq-related products we have issued since May 2003. Since fiscal year 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for military efforts primarily in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The majority of this amount has been for military operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Moreover, since fiscal year 2003, about $49 billion has been provided to U.S. agencies for stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including developing Iraq's security forces, enhancing Iraq's capacity to govern, and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electricity, and water sectors, among other activities. This report expands on issues discussed on GAO's transition Web site. In January 2007, President Bush announced The New Way Forward in Iraq to stem violence and enable the Iraqi government to foster national reconciliation. To support the strategy, the United States increased its military presence through a surge of brigade combat teams and associated forces. In June 2008, we reported that the United States had made some progress in reducing overall violence in Iraq and working with the Iraqi government to pass legislation promoting national reconciliation. In February 2009, President Obama described a new strategy for Iraq consisting of three parts: (1) the responsible removal of combat brigades, (2) sustained diplomacy on behalf of a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq, and (3) comprehensive U.S. engagement across the region. According to DOD, the United States plans to reduce the number of combat troops from about 140,000 projected in March 2009 to about 128,000 by September 2009--a difference of 12,000 troops representing two brigades and their support units. Under the schedule announced by the President, U.S. force levels would decline further by August 31, 2010, to no more than 50,000 troops. Under the November 2008 bilateral security agreement6 between the United States and Iraq, the United States must remove all of its remaining forces by December 31, 2011.
Key issues that should be considered in further defining the new strategy and its supporting operational plans are as follows: (1) The security agreement establishes dates for repositioning U.S. forces in Iraq and removing them from the country--a significant change from the United States' prior, conditions-based strategy for Iraq. A responsible drawdown in Iraq will need to balance the timetable established in the security agreement, military doctrine that calls for the delineation of conditions that must exist before military operations can end, and the wishes of the Iraqi government. (2) If the United States adheres to the timetable contained in the security agreement, DOD will need to remove about 140,000 troops by the end of 2011. The redeployment of these forces and the removal of their equipment and material will be a massive and expensive effort. (3) The large U.S. military presence has provided vital support to civilian operations and has undertaken many traditionally civilian tasks. In moving forward, the United States will need to consider how to transition from a predominantly military presence to a civilian one as U.S. forces draw down. (4) As U.S reconstruction efforts end, Iraq will need to develop the capacity to spend its resources, particularly on investment that will further economic development and deliver essential services to its people. GAO estimates that the Iraqi government had a cumulative budget surplus of $47 billion at the end of 2008.
GAO-09-294SP, Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2009:
Iraq:
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight:
GAO-09-294SP:
Contents:
Letter:
Next Steps for U.S. Engagement in Iraq:
Enclosure I: Determining What Conditions Need to Be Met to Undertake a
Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces:
Enclosure II: Implementing Key Operational Requirements of the U.S.-
Iraq Security Agreement:
Enclosure III: Managing the Redeployment of U.S. Forces and Equipment
from Iraq:
Enclosure IV: Managing and Overseeing U.S. Government Contractors in
Iraq during a Drawdown:
Enclosure V: Determining the Department of Defense's Future Costs for
Iraq:
Enclosure VI: Transitioning from a Predominantly Military to a Civilian
Presence in Iraq:
Enclosure VII: Rightsizing the U.S. Civilian Presence in Iraq:
Enclosure VIII: Considering the Level of Engagement of the
International Community:
U.S. Efforts to Help Iraq Govern and Address Its People's Needs:
Enclosure IX: Building Iraq's Capacity to Assume a Greater Cost Share
of Its Security, Reconstruction, and Economic Needs:
Enclosure X: Building Iraq's Capacity to Improve Critical Service
Sectors:
Enclosure XI: Enacting Iraqi Legislation to Promote National
Reconciliation:
Enclosure XII: Assisting Iraq's Refugees:
Appendices:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Levels of Violence and U.S. Force Levels in Iraq:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Treasury:
Appendix IV: Related GAO Products:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 24, 2009:
Congressional Committees:
To assist the 111th Congress, we have enclosed a series of issue papers
for consideration in developing congressional oversight agendas and
determining the way forward in securing and stabilizing Iraq. These
papers are based on the continuing work of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and the more than 130 Iraq-related products
we have issued since May 2003.
Since fiscal year 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the
Department of Defense (DOD) for military efforts primarily in support
of the Global War on Terrorism.[Footnote 1] The majority of this amount
has been for military operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Moreover, since fiscal year 2003, about $49 billion[Footnote 2] has
been provided to U.S. agencies for stabilization and reconstruction
efforts in Iraq, including developing Iraq's security forces, enhancing
Iraq's capacity to govern, and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electricity, and
water sectors, among other activities. This report expands on issues
discussed on GAO's transition Web site, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-294sp].
In January 2007, President Bush announced The New Way Forward in Iraq
to stem violence and enable the Iraqi government to foster national
reconciliation. This strategy established goals and objectives through
July 2008 and reasserted the long-term goal or end state for Iraq: a
unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain
itself and is an ally in the war on terror. To support the strategy,
the United States increased its military presence through a surge of
brigade combat teams and associated forces. In June 2008, we reported
that the United States had made some progress in reducing overall
violence in Iraq and working with the Iraqi government to pass
legislation promoting national reconciliation. However, many unmet
goals and challenges remained, including building capacity in Iraq's
ministries, helping the government execute its capital investment
budgets, and providing essential services to the Iraqi people.[Footnote
3]
With the completion of The New Way Forward and the end of the military
surge in July 2008, we recommended that the Administration develop an
updated strategy that clearly articulates U.S. goals, objectives, roles
and responsibilities, and the military and civilian resources needed to
build on security and legislative gains. Furthermore, in a second
report,[Footnote 4] we recommended revisions to the Joint Campaign Plan
for Iraq--an operational plan for U.S. military and civilian activities
in Iraq developed by the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and the U.S.
Embassy Baghdad--that would help Congress assess progress in achieving
the conditions that would allow for the continued drawdown of U.S.
forces in Iraq. Specifically, we recommended that DOD and the
Department of State (State) identify and prioritize the conditions that
must be achieved in each phase of the campaign to enable a drawdown;
report the number of U.S. combat brigade teams and other forces
required for each campaign phase; and estimate the time needed to reach
the desired end state and end the military portion of the campaign. The
strategic level actions we called for in our first report would guide
revisions to the Joint Campaign Plan.[Footnote 5]
In February 2009, President Obama described a new strategy for Iraq
consisting of three parts: (1) the responsible removal of combat
brigades, (2) sustained diplomacy on behalf of a more peaceful and
prosperous Iraq, and (3) comprehensive U.S. engagement across the
region. According to DOD, the United States plans to reduce the number
of combat troops from about 140,000 projected in March 2009 to about
128,000 by September 2009--a difference of 12,000 troops representing
two brigades and their support units. Under the schedule announced by
the President, U.S. force levels would decline further by August 31,
2010, to no more than 50,000 troops. Under the November 2008 bilateral
security agreement[Footnote 6] between the United States and Iraq, the
United States must remove all of its remaining forces by December 31,
2011.
The issues discussed in the enclosures to this report should be
considered in further defining the new strategy and its supporting
operational plans. Key issues include:
* The security agreement establishes dates for repositioning U.S.
forces in Iraq and removing them from the country--a significant change
from the United States' prior, conditions-based strategy for Iraq.
[Footnote 7] A responsible drawdown in Iraq will need to balance the
timetable established in the security agreement, military doctrine that
calls for the delineation of conditions that must exist before military
operations can end, and the wishes of the Iraqi government.
* If the United States adheres to the timetable contained in the
security agreement, DOD will need to remove about 140,000 troops by the
end of 2011. The redeployment of these forces and the removal of their
equipment and material will be a massive and expensive effort.
* The large U.S. military presence has provided vital support to
civilian operations and has undertaken many traditionally civilian
tasks. In moving forward, the United States will need to consider how
to transition from a predominantly military presence to a civilian one
as U.S. forces draw down.
* As U.S reconstruction efforts end, Iraq will need to develop the
capacity to spend its resources, particularly on investment that will
further economic development and deliver essential services to its
people. GAO estimates that the Iraqi government had a cumulative budget
surplus of $47 billion at the end of 2008.
We obtained information from agency documents and interviews with U.S.
officials in Iraq and Washington, D.C., including DOD, State, and the
Departments of Energy and the Treasury; the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID); the Army Corps of Engineers; MNF-I;
and the Defense Intelligence Agency. We conducted this performance
audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
contains additional details about our scope and methodology. Appendix
II provides updated information on the levels of violence in Iraq, as
measured by the number of enemy-initiated attacks, and on the number of
U.S. troops in Iraq. Appendix IV contains a list of GAO products
directly related to this letter and each of the enclosures.
The Department of the Treasury provided written comments on a draft of
this report, which are reprinted in appendix III. Treasury agreed that
although Iraq's end-2008 cumulative surplus fell short of GAO's earlier
projection, Iraq's budget surpluses will sufficiently cover its
projected 2009 budget deficit. Treasury also agreed that Iraq's
inability to fully execute its budgets hampers the government's efforts
to further reconstruction and economic growth. Treasury, DOD, State,
and USAID also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated
as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the congressional committees
listed below. In addition, we are sending copies of this report to the
President and Vice President of the United States, and executive branch
agencies. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you have any questions, please
contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov, or
the individual(s) listed at the end of each enclosure. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be
found on the last page of this report. For press inquiries, please
contact Chuck Young at (202) 512-4800. Key contributors to this report
are included in appendix V.
Signed by:
Gene L. Dodaro:
Acting Comptroller General of the United States:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chair:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chair:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chair:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chair:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Vice Chairman:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chair:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chair:
The Honorable John M. McHugh:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chair:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chair:
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chair:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman:
Chair:
The Honorable Dan Burton:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Chair:
The Honorable Kay Granger:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Determining What Conditions Need to Be Met to Undertake a
Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces:
Background:
In November 2008, the United States and Iraq signed a bilateral
security agreement, which governs the operations of U.S. forces in
Iraq. The security agreement entered into force on January 1, 2009.
Issue:
The security agreement between the United States and Iraq establishes a
timetable--but no conditions--for drawing down U.S. forces from Iraq by
the end of 2011. Adopting a drawdown timetable marks a major change
from the prior U.S. approach of drawing down forces based on security
and other conditions in Iraq. Military doctrine states that effective
campaign planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the
conditions that must exist to draw down forces. In February 2009, the
President described a new strategy in Iraq, calling for a responsible
drawdown of U.S. forces. In further defining this strategy and revising
the Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq, the administration will need to
clarify what conditions need to be met to undertake this drawdown
responsibly.
Key Findings:
Under Prior Administration, Conditions-based Strategy Shifted to a
Time-based Approach for Drawing Down U.S. Forces:
Before signing the security agreement with Iraq, the prior
administration had linked the drawdown of U.S. forces to the
achievement of security, political, economic, and diplomatic
conditions. Meeting these conditions would enable the United States to
achieve its strategic goal for Iraq: a unified, democratic, and federal
Iraq that could govern, defend, and sustain itself and become an ally
in the war on terror. Some conditions the United States sought to
achieve in Iraq included an improved security situation; more capable
Iraqi security forces; improved essential services such as access to
clean water and reliable electricity; and the passage of legislation
promoting national reconciliation, such as laws governing the
distribution of oil revenues and amnesty for former insurgents.
As GAO has previously reported, progress toward achieving these
conditions has been mixed. For example, while the security situation
remains tenuous, violence has decreased significantly over the past 2
years: enemy-initiated attacks decreased from a peak of almost 180 per
day in June 2007 to about 27 per day in January 2009 (see app. II).
Further, the number of Iraqi army and police forces nearly doubled from
about 320,000 in January 2007 to just over 600,000 in October 2008.
However, according to the Department of Defense (DOD), over the same
period, the number of Iraqi army units capable of conducting operations
independently remained at about 10 percent of total units.
The November 2008 security agreement marked a major shift from a
conditions-based strategy to a time-based approach for drawing down
U.S. forces. The security agreement sets a two-phase timetable--but
with no security, political, economic, or other conditions--for
removing U.S. forces from Iraq over a 3-year period, primarily because
the Iraqi government did not agree to include conditions, according to
DOD and State officials:
* June 30, 2009: U.S. combat forces must withdraw from Iraqi cities,
villages, and localities. According to DOD officials, U.S. combat
forces would continue to conduct combined operations in these areas
from bases located outside Iraqi cities, villages, and localities.
Further, some U.S. forces who train Iraqi forces may be co-located with
Iraqi units in these areas.
* December 31, 2011: All U.S. forces must leave Iraq. According to DOD
and Department of State (State) officials, the agreement does not
envision any U.S. forces remaining in Iraq after that date.
Iraq and the United States Could Move Forward or Extend the Drawdown
Time Frame:
Either government can unilaterally terminate the security agreement by
providing 12 months advance notice. Without a security agreement or
other mandate, U.S. forces would lack the authority to continue
operating in Iraq and would have to leave. For example, if Iraqis
reject the security agreement in a referendum that may be held in July
2009, the Iraqi government has said it would abide by the results of
this referendum. Thus, Iraq would likely terminate the security
agreement, and U.S. forces would have to leave Iraq by as early as July
2010.
In addition, DOD and State officials noted that the U.S. and Iraqi
governments can amend the security agreement by mutual agreement. Such
amendments could include an extension of the drawdown timetable or an
authorization of a residual U.S. force to continue training Iraqi
security forces after 2011. However, according to officials at State
and DOD, the Iraqi government did not agree to include conditions-based
provisions in the security agreement due to political pressure against
a continued U.S. presence.
The Administration Should Further Define What Conditions Must Be
Achieved to Allow a Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces:
The new administration has emphasized the importance of a responsible
drawdown of U.S. forces but has not yet defined this term. In February
2009, the President announced a significant drawdown of U.S. forces by
August 31, 2010 and, consistent with the security agreement, the
removal of all U.S. forces by the end of 2011. According to DOD and
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) officials, the United States plans to
reduce the U.S. force level from about 140,000 projected in March 2009
to about 128,000 by September 2009, where it would remain through
Iraq‘s national election scheduled at the end of 2009. Based on
conditions in Iraq, the MNF-I Commanding General may recommend further
reductions prior to the election. A few months after the election, the
United States plans to reduce forces to no more than 50,000 troops by
August 2010 (see appendix II).
Military doctrine states that effective planning cannot occur without a
clear understanding of the end state for U.S. operations and the
conditions that must exist to end military operations and draw down
forces. According to doctrine, military operations generally should be
driven by conditions rather than time requirements. However, DOD
officials stated they are well aware that a 3-year timetable now exists
for removing all U.S. forces from Iraq.
In further defining a new U.S. strategy and revising the Joint Campaign
Plan for Iraq, the administration must establish the parameters of a
responsible drawdown, including clarifying the end state for U.S.
military operations and prioritizing the conditions that would allow
U.S. troops to draw down. It should also consider how the United States
would respond if it does not achieve the conditions necessary for a
responsible drawdown within the security agreement timetable. The
administration must work with the Iraqi government in further defining
the new strategy for Iraq.
Oversight Questions:
1. How does the administration define a responsible drawdown from Iraq?
2. What is the current strategic goal for Iraq and how does it differ
from the prior goal of a unified, democratic, and federal Iraq that can
govern, defend, and sustain itself and become an ally in the war on
terror?
3. To what extent will the administration's plans for removing U.S.
forces be based on achieving specified conditions in Iraq?
4. To what extent will the United States attempt to renegotiate
provisions of the security agreement if security conditions deteriorate
or other conditions are deemed insufficient to draw down responsibly?
5. What are the U.S. contingency plans in the event that Iraqis vote
against the security agreement in July 2009?
Point of Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure II: Implementing Key Operational Requirements of the U.S.-
Iraq Security Agreement:
Background:
The U.S.-Iraq security agreement provides the basis for a U.S. military
presence in Iraq, which previously was authorized by United Nations
(UN) Security Council resolutions. It also defines legal jurisdiction
over U.S. servicemembers and DOD civilians and contractors in Iraq,
which previously were covered by a Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) order.
Issue:
In addition to setting a timetable for drawing down U.S. forces, the
security agreement governs the operations of U.S. forces supporting
Iraqi efforts to maintain security and stability. It requires Iraqi
agreement for U.S. military operations; defines U.S. and Iraqi legal
jurisdiction over individual members of U.S. forces, Department of
Defense (DOD) civilian employees, and U.S. forces' contractors in Iraq;
and generally requires all U.S.-held detainees to be released or
transferred to Iraqi custody. However, many implementing details remain
to be resolved. In further defining the U.S. strategy and Joint
Campaign Plan for Iraq, the administration will need to accommodate the
substantial changes in U.S. operational authority in Iraq.
Key Findings:
Iraqi Government Must Agree to All U.S. Military Operations in Iraq:
The security agreement marks a change in the nature and authority of
the U.S. military presence in Iraq; its implementation will require a
shift in how U.S. forces plan, coordinate, and execute operations in
the country. From 2003 through 2008, the UN Security Council authorized
the U.S.-led multinational force to take all necessary measures to
maintain security and stability in Iraq. Acting under this mandate,
U.S. forces were able to conduct combat operations against violent
groups, search for and secure weapons, and detain Iraqis and others
considered to be a threat to Iraq's security and stability.
Under the security agreement, all U.S. military operations in Iraq must
be conducted with the Iraqi government's concurrence and fully
coordinated with Iraqi authorities through a new Joint Military
Operations Coordinating Committee. For example, U.S. forces must obtain
Iraqi warrants or other legal authorization to detain individuals and
search homes, except during combat operations undertaken with Iraqi
concurrence. U.S. forces retain the right of self-defense in Iraq, as
defined in international law.
According to DOD and Department of State (State) officials, many
implementing details in the security agreement must be resolved. For
example, it is unclear whether U.S. forces will have a "blanket"
authorization to conduct certain types of operations, such as medical
evacuations or routine joint patrols. As of mid-January 2009, the new
joint coordinating committee had held two initial meetings to develop
details on implementing the security agreement's requirements for U.S.
military operations in Iraq.
Security Agreement Defines U.S. and Iraqi Legal Jurisdiction over U.S.
Military Servicemembers and DOD Civilians and Contractors:
The security agreement covers individual U.S. military service members,
DOD civilian employees, and U.S. contractors and subcontractors, as
well as their employees in Iraq that supply goods, services, and
security to or on behalf of U.S. forces under a contract with or for
those forces. Before the security agreement, CPA Order 17 granted
immunity from the Iraqi legal process to U.S. military personnel under
the multinational force and to U.S. contractors operating in Iraq for
acts performed pursuant to the terms and conditions of their contracts.
Under the security agreement, Iraq has the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over members of U.S. forces and the civilian component for
as-yet-unspecified, grave premeditated felonies, when such crimes are
committed outside agreed facilities and duty status. The United States
has jurisdiction over all other crimes. The security agreement requires
Iraqi authorities to notify U.S. authorities immediately if they detain
U.S. service members or DOD civilians and transfer them to U.S. custody
within 24 hours.
Under the security agreement, Iraq has the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over U.S. forces' contractors, subcontractors, and their
employees in Iraq. In addition, Iraqi authorities have recently
suspended CPA Order 17, making all U.S. and foreign contractors and
their employees in Iraq subject to Iraqi law, according to U.S.
officials. According to State, a joint U.S.-Iraqi committee is working
to establish procedures and guidelines for exercising Iraqi
jurisdiction for private contractors operating in Iraq, including those
covered by the security agreement.
Reports Raise Concerns about Iraqi Judicial System:
DOD, UN, and human rights reports have identified significant
shortcomings in Iraq's judicial system. A December 2008 Human Rights
Watch report, for example, concluded Iraq's central criminal court
"seriously" failed to meet international standards of due process and
fair trials. Some of these reports raise concerns that detainees in
Iraqi custody may be tortured or mistreated because Iraqi officials
often rely on coerced confessions instead of physical evidence,
particularly in criminal cases. Whether contractors could renegotiate
their contracts given the changes in circumstances would depend on the
terms of their contracts, according to DOD officials. These officials
said that U.S. contractors and their employees are subject to host
government jurisdiction in other countries where U.S. forces operate
under a status of forces agreement. Moreover, they note that many U.S.
contractor employees are Iraqi nationals and, as such, would be subject
to Iraqi jurisdiction.
Security Agreement Requires U.S. Forces to Release or Transfer
Detainees:
The security agreement requires the release or transfer to Iraqi
authorities of all detainees held by U.S. forces in Iraq unless
otherwise requested by the Iraqi government. Acting under UN mandate,
U.S. forces detained thousands of Iraqis and others considered a threat
to Iraq's security and stability. As of January 2009, more than 15,000
detainees remained in U.S. custody, according to State and DOD. DOD
officials plan to release or transfer to Iraqi custody about 1,200 to
1,500 detainees per month based on their assessment of Iraqi
authorities' ability to process and absorb these transfers. Under the
security agreement, U.S. forces are to provide available information
about all detainees in their custody to Iraqi authorities, who will
then obtain arrest warrants for persons wanted by those authorities.
U.S. forces are to transfer custody of those detainees subject to an
arrest warrant and release the remaining detainees unless otherwise
requested by the Iraqi government. According to DOD and State, many
implementing details for this process must be resolved.
Oversight Questions:
1. To what extent will the change in authority for the U.S. military
operations affect U.S. planning efforts in Iraq?
2. To what extent will the security agreement's provisions granting
Iraq primary legal jurisdiction over U.S. contractors and their
employees in Iraq affect the availability and cost of contractors to
support U.S. forces?
3. What kinds of legal protection, if any, could the United States
provide to contractors in Iraq given the current state of the Iraqi
judicial system?
4. To what extent have Iraqi and U.S. officials identified appropriate
legal authority and developed options for detaining individuals that
pose continuing security threats to Iraqi or U.S. forces?
5. What possible amendments to the security agreement, if any, should
the United States seek to negotiate with Iraq?
Point of Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure III: Managing the Redeployment of U.S. Forces and Equipment
from Iraq:
Background:
Department of Defense (DOD) guidance emphasizes the importance of early
planning for redeploying U.S. forces and equipment.
Issue:
The exact pace for redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq has yet to be
determined. If the United States adheres to the timeline contained in
the security agreement, DOD will need to remove about 140,000 troops by
the end of 2011. In addition, the redeployment of U.S. forces and the
removal of their equipment and material will be a massive and expensive
effort. As of March 2008, the United States had in place about 170,000
pieces of equipment worth about $16.5 billion that would need to be
removed from Iraq.
Key Findings:
DOD's Initial Plans for Redeploying U.S. Forces from Iraq Focused on
Three Key Assumptions:
It is unclear how the timeline in the security agreement and operations
in Afghanistan will affect DOD plans for redeploying U.S. forces and
equipment from Iraq. As of September 2008, DOD's redeployment plans for
Iraq were based on three key assumptions that may no longer be
applicable:
* Any redeployment will be based on Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
and Department of State assessments of security and other conditions in
Iraq.
* There will be sufficient lead time to refine redeployment plans once
an order with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued.
* The redeployment of forces will be deliberate and gradual, predicated
on a 180-day process for units leaving Iraq and an estimated flow of no
more than 2.5 brigades' worth of equipment and materiel out of Iraq
through Kuwait each month.
DOD Should Consider Key Issues in Developing a Comprehensive Plan for
Redeploying U.S. Forces from Iraq:
Based on discussions with DOD officials and an analysis of planning
efforts, GAO found that the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD's
redeployment efforts will depend on the extent to which it develops
plans that address several issues. For example:
* Roles and responsibilities for managing and executing the return of
materiel and equipment. Although the U.S. Central Command has
designated an executive agent to coordinate the redeployment of U.S.
forces from the Iraqi theater, no unified structure exists to
coordinate the teams and units engaged in efforts to manage and execute
the return of materiel and equipment. This results in confusion on the
ways in which those teams should be utilized. Joint doctrine states
that an unambiguous chain of command and clear responsibilities and
authorities are necessary for any such effort. In September 2008, GAO
recommended that DOD take steps to clarify a unified or coordinated
chain of command over logistical operations. In commenting on our draft
report, DOD indicated it was taking steps to implement this
recommendation.
* Time and cost estimates for base closures. Closing or handing over
U.S. installations in Iraq will be time consuming and costly. As of
November 2008, there were 283 U.S. installations in Iraq that will need
to be closed or turned over to Iraqi forces. According to U.S. Army
officials, experience has shown that it takes 1 to 2 months to close
the smallest platoon-or company-size installations, which contain
between 16 and 200 combat soldiers or marines. However, MNF-I has never
closed large, complex installations--such as Balad Air Force Base,
which contains about 24,000 inhabitants and has matured over 5 years.
U.S. Army officials estimate it could take longer than 18 months to
close a base of that size.
* Uncertainties regarding redeployment of contractors. Maintaining
accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S. government
property under the control of contractors may present challenges to
redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq. According to Defense Contract
Management Agency officials, there is at least $3.5 billion worth of
contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq. From late 2007
through July 2008, planning for the redeployment of U.S. forces did not
include a theater-wide plan for redeploying contractors.
* Use of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring countries. The pace
at which units can be redeployed and U.S. equipment returned would be
governed by the capacity of facilities in neighboring countries, and
restrictions on their use. According to DOD, Kuwait is the main point
of exit for all personnel, equipment, and materiel in Iraq. There are
nine installations that the United States uses to support operations in
Iraq, and the U.S.-Kuwait Defense Cooperation Agreement governs their
use. Any redeployment must consider the terms of this agreement,
particularly given Kuwait's desire to limit the U.S. footprint in
Kuwait, according to DOD.
* Availability of transportation and security assets and route
restrictions. The availability in theater of military owned and
operated heavy equipment transports and convoy security assets,
combined with limits on the primary supply route, could inhibit the
flow of materiel out of Iraq. According to DOD, two types of heavy
equipment transports support U.S. forces in the Iraqi theater of
operations: commercially contracted unarmored transports and armored
military transports. Any increase in the number of civilian transports
without a corresponding increase in military transports to facilitate
control and security increases the risk of accidents. However, DOD
officials have reported shortages of military transports in theater.
Oversight Questions:
1. To what extent has planning begun for the drawdown of U.S. forces
from Iraq in accordance with the security agreement?
2. What are the plans and processes by which U.S. installations in Iraq
will be turned over to the Iraqis?
3. What are the plans and processes for determining the disposition of
contractor-managed, U.S.-government-owned property in Iraq?
4. To what extent will neighboring countries be able to support the
drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq in accordance with timelines outlined
in the security agreement?
5. What effect, if any, will the expansion of operations in Afghanistan
have on the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq?
Point of Contact:
William Solis, 202-512-8365, solisw@gao.gov.
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure IV: Managing and Overseeing U.S. Government Contractors in
Iraq during a Drawdown:
Background:
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) have relied heavily
on contractors in Iraq to support troops, civilian personnel, and
reconstruction efforts. As of October 2008, DOD estimated it had more
than 163,000 contractors under its contracts. Contractors have provided
security services, life support, and facilities maintenance, among
other things.
Issue:
Over the past 6 years, contractors have played a key role in U.S.
efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. As the U.S. and Iraqi
governments implement the November 2008 security agreement that governs
the presence, activities, and drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq, DOD
and State will need to assess the type and level of contractor support
needed during the drawdown of U.S. forces. At the same time, both
departments will need to overcome challenges in providing a sufficient
number of trained personnel to effectively manage and oversee
contractor performance. As the administration further defines its plans
for Iraq, it will need to consider the implications of the changing
nature of contractor support, as well as ways to enhance DOD's and
State's management capacity.
Key Findings:
DOD and State Have Had Difficulties Managing and Overseeing Contractors
in Iraq:
Both DOD's and State's ability to effectively manage their contractors
in Iraq has been hindered by several challenges. The challenges
experienced by one or both of these agencies include a failure to
adequately plan for the use of contractors and clearly define their
requirements, a lack of acquisition and trained contract management and
oversight personnel with experience working in contingency operations,
and a lack of policies and procedures. Further, both DOD and State have
had difficulties identifying the number of contractor personnel in
Iraq. The lack of visibility makes it difficult for commanders and
other senior leaders to make informed decisions on the food, housing,
and security needed for contractors who reside on U.S. facilities. In
July 2008, DOD and State entered into an agreement to use a common
database to track contractor personnel in Iraq; however, DOD officials
have acknowledged that there are weaknesses in the systems designed to
track contractor personnel in theater.
DOD's and State's Capacity to Provide Personnel to Oversee Contractors
Remains Uncertain:
The lack of a sufficient number of trained acquisition and contractor
oversight personnel continues to present a considerable challenge to
both DOD and State. This has contributed to higher costs and schedule
delays and has hindered operations. For example,
* In September 2008, GAO reported that the lack of qualified personnel
to oversee contracts, including those providing linguistic services and
maintaining the military equipment used in Iraq, hindered efforts to
oversee and, as necessary, correct poor contractor performance in a
timely manner. For example, in many cases, the contractor presented
military equipment that failed government inspection and had to be
repaired again at additional expense and time to the government. DOD
personnel indicated they lacked the resources to perform data analyses,
identify trends in contractor performance, and improve quality
processes.
* In July 2008, GAO raised concerns about whether DOD could sustain
increased levels of oversight on its private security contractors. GAO
found, for example, that the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA),
which had been recently tasked to provide contract administration over
private security contracts, increased the number of its personnel in
Iraq by shifting personnel from other locations and had no strategy for
sustaining this increase.
* In January 2009, State's Office of the Inspector General reported
that the department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security did not have a
strong control environment to ensure its primary security service
contract in Iraq is effectively managed due, in part, to frequent
changes in management personnel and understaffing combined with a
drastic increase in workload. In response, State noted that it planned
to increase the number of contract oversight personnel in Iraq for its
private security contract and develop additional policy and guidance to
better manage these contractors.
Level and Nature of Future Contractor Support Needs to Be Assessed:
As the drawdown of U.S. military forces occurs, DOD will need to assess
the proper mix, roles, and responsibilities of military, civilian, and
contractor personnel during this transitional period. Our prior work
has shown that the nature and relative degree of contractor support can
change as the military's mission changes. For example, in Bosnia and
Kosovo, contractors assumed responsibility for certain support
functions that had been previously performed by military personnel.
Moreover, State's reliance on contractors may increase as the
department currently depends on DOD to provide some services. The U.S.-
Iraq security agreement complicates this assessment because it changes
the conditions under which contractors operate. For example, the
agreement includes several provisions that affect U.S. contractors
working for DOD, such as providing the Iraqi government the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. contractors in the enforcement
of criminal and civil laws. Similar agreements could also affect U.S.
contractors working for DOD, particularly State's security contractors.
Oversight Questions:
1. To what extent are DOD and State taking actions to improve their
ability to track and identify contractor personnel in Iraq? To what
extent do the departments know the functions these contractors are
performing?
2. What are the desired mix, roles, and responsibilities of military,
civilian, and contractor personnel in light of the planned drawdown of
U.S. forces? What actions are needed to achieve this desired mix?
3. What process is DOD using to assess the impact of the November 2008
security agreement and its implementation on DOD's use of U.S.
contractors to support deployed forces or other key functions? What
plans has DOD developed in the event that contractors providing
essential services withdraw their employees?
4. Is DCMA's workforce sufficient in terms of size and skill level to
support contingency operations without degrading its ability to oversee
contractor performance in the United States and elsewhere?
5. Have DOD and State (1) assessed whether the drawdown of U.S. forces
in Iraq will increase its reliance on contractors and (2) taken action
to ensure they have sufficient numbers of contract oversight personnel?
6. What action is State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security taking to
ensure the effective oversight of its security contractors?
Points of Contact:
William Solis, 202-512-8365, solisw@gao.gov.
John Hutton, 202-512-7773, huttonj@gao.gov.
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure V: Determining the Department of Defense's Future Costs for
Iraq:
Background:
Since 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the Department
of Defense (DOD) for military efforts in support of the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT). The majority of this amount has gone to military
operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Issue:
DOD has reported substantial costs for Iraq and can expect to incur
significant costs in the foreseeable future, even as the United States
develops plans to scale back its presence in Iraq. GAO has found
problems with DOD processes for cost reporting and estimating--
processes that will be of critical importance to making sound decisions
about the defense budget. In addition to the need for better cost
information, moving funding that is currently outside the annual budget
process into DOD's base budget would enable decision makers to better
weigh priorities and assess trade-offs.
Key Findings:
Near-term Costs for Iraq Are Likely to Be Considerable:
U.S. military commitments in Iraq, and their associated costs, will
continue to be substantial, particularly in the near term. These types
of costs include procurement of new and replacement equipment and
operation and maintenance costs, which include items such as housing,
food, and services; the repair of equipment; and transportation to move
people, supplies, and equipment. The magnitude of DOD costs will depend
on several factors and, in some cases, assumptions and decisions that
have not been made. For example, these costs will likely be affected
by:
* implementation of the U.S.-Iraq security agreement and associated
troop redeployment plans;
* the nature and extent of continued U.S. military and civilian
presence in Iraq;
* types of facilities needed to support troops remaining in and around
Iraq and costs associated with turning facilities over to Iraq;
* availability of transportation and security assets to remove materiel
from Iraq; and:
* the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced.
Although reducing troops would appear to lower costs, GAO has seen from
previous operations in the Balkans and Kosovo that costs could rise in
the near term. For example, as GAO reported in February 2008, the U.S.
Army estimated it would cost $12 billion to $13 billion a year for at
least 2 years after the operation ends to repair, replace, and rebuild
the equipment used in Iraq. Moreover, as GAO reported in September
2008, the cost of closing the large number of installations in Iraq
will likely be significant, according to U.S. Army officials. However,
these costs are difficult to estimate due to uncertainties related to
the management of hazardous materials and waste, as well as the
transfer of personal property. Finally, after deployed units return
home, DOD will need to invest in training and equipment to return these
units to levels capable of performing "full spectrum operations"--all
of which could increase war-related costs.
Reliable Cost Reporting and Cost Estimating Processes Are Critical for
Sound Defense Funding and Budgetary Decision Making:
As of September 2008, DOD has reported about $508 billion in
obligations for operations in and around Iraq as part of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. However, our prior work has shown that the data in DOD‘s
monthly report of GWOT obligations are of questionable reliability. GAO
was unable to ensure that DOD‘s reported obligations for GWOT were
complete and accurate. Therefore, these reported obligations, including
obligations for specific operations, should be considered
approximations. For example, GAO found numerous problems with DOD‘s
processes for recording and reporting its war-related costs, including
long-standing deficiencies in DOD‘s financial management systems and
business processes, the use of estimates instead of actual cost data,
and the lack of adequate supporting documentation. DOD has taken some
steps to address these issues, but problems remain. Meanwhile, DOD uses
these reported obligations to develop funding estimates for many types
of costs associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom, such as procurement
and some types of equipment reset. Without transparent and accurate
cost information, Congress and DOD will not have reliable information
on how much the war is costing, sufficient details on how appropriated
funds are spent, or the reliable historical data needed to develop and
provide oversight of future funding needs.
Funding for operations in support of GWOT, including Operation Iraqi
Freedom, has been provided through annual appropriations, as well as
supplemental appropriations that are outside the annual budget process.
With U.S. commitments in Iraq continuing for the foreseeable future,
requiring decision makers to make difficult decisions, GAO has
recommended that DOD consider moving recurring costs into the baseline
budget, as it has done with other operations. As costs for an operation
reach a known level of effort and costs become more predictable,
additional funding should be built into the baseline budget to provide
decision makers with more transparent information. GAO has made
recommendations to improve transparency and fiscal responsibility
related to funding the war on terrorism and to help Congress and the
administration establish priorities and make trade-offs among those
priorities in defense funding. DOD has taken steps to address several
of GAO‘s recommendations in order to improve the reliability and
transparency of its reported cost information and some progress has been
made. However, until all DOD efforts are more fully implemented, it is
too soon to know the extent to which these changes will improve the
reliability of DOD‘s cost reporting.
Oversight Questions:
1. To what extent has DOD estimated the future costs of any continued
military involvement in Iraq?
2. How will the redeployment of U.S. forces and equipment from Iraq
affect funding needs and requirements?
3. What steps is DOD taking to move recurring GWOT costs into its
baseline budgets?
4. What steps is DOD taking to accurately report costs by operation?
5. How will DOD balance funding requirements for Iraq with funding
needs to support other military operations, such as in Afghanistan?
6. What, if any, steady state funding will be required to support DOD
activities in Iraq following the eventual drawdown of U.S. combat
forces?
Point of Contact:
Sharon Pickup, 202-512-9619, pickups@gao.gov:
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure VI: Transitioning from a Predominantly Military to a Civilian
Presence in Iraq:
Background:
A May 2004 presidential directive affirmed, upon the termination of the
Coalition Provisional Authority, that the Chief of Mission would assume
responsibility for all U.S. employees, policies, and activities in
Iraq, except those under an area military commander. It also gave the
U.S. Central Command responsibility for U.S. security and military
operations in Iraq, and U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces.
Issue:
The United States had a projected 140,000 military personnel deployed
in Iraq in March 2009 (see appendix II). In addition, there are about
1,300 authorized U.S. personnel assigned to the U.S. embassy in
Baghdad--one of the largest in the world--including about 450 civilian
personnel at 28 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) at the provincial
and neighborhood levels. The large U.S. military presence has provided
vital support to civilian operations and has undertaken many
traditionally civilian tasks. In further defining its strategy for
Iraq, the administration needs consider how to transition from a
predominantly military presence to a civilian one as U.S. forces draw
down.
Key Findings:
U.S. Military Has an Extensive Organizational and Basing Footprint in
Iraq:
The projected 140,000 U.S. military personnel in Iraq are part of the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I). This U.S.-led force operates under
the U.S. Central Command and consists of three major units--the
Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which is
responsible for organizing Iraqi security forces; the Multinational
Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the tactical unit responsible for command and
control of operations throughout Iraq; and the Gulf Region Division,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which provides engineering, program, and
project management support for civil and military construction
throughout Iraq (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Organization of Multinational Force-Iraq:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Secretary of Defense:
U.S. Central Command:
Multinational Force - Iraq (Lead: United States):
* Multinational Security Transition Command - Iraq (Lead: United
States);
* Multinational Corps - Iraq (Lead: United States);
- Multinational Force - West (Lead: United States);
- Multinational Division - North (Lead: United States);
- Multinational Division - South East (Lead: United Kingdom);
- Multinational Division - Baghdad (Lead: United States);
- Multinational Division - Center (Lead: United States);
* Gulf Regional Division U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Lead: United
States).
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and Multinational Force-Iraq documents.
[End of figure]
MNF-I has an extensive basing footprint in Iraq. According to a DOD
report, as of March 2009, MNF-I had a total of 51 larger bases--known
as contingency operation bases and sites--throughout the country.
Contingency operating bases are usually occupied by an element larger
than a brigade combat team, typically serve as a hub for command and
control or logistics, and may include an airfield that can accommodate
C-130 aircraft. MNF-I also has about 232 smaller bases, known as
contingency operation locations, that are usually occupied by a
battalion-size element capable of quick response to operations,
security, civic assistance, and humanitarian assistance relief.
Large Military Presence Has Supported U.S. Civilian Operations and Has
Undertaken Many Civilian Tasks:
In addition to conducting counterinsurgency operations, U.S. military
personnel under MNF-I and its subordinate commands have performed a
wide range of activities in Iraq, including supporting U.S. civilian
operations, rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, and training and
equipping Iraqi security forces. For example:
* U.S. military forces provide PRTs--most of which are located on U.S.
military bases--with extensive security, food, housing, medical
evacuation, and other support. The military commander has authority
over the security and movement of embedded PRTs. Many others provide
security for PRTs that are collocated with U.S. military units. As U.S.
forces draw down, the Department of State (State) will have to play a
larger role in providing security and other support for U.S. civilians.
* The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, and MNC-I
have played key roles in reconstructing Iraq. As of January 2009, the
Gulf Region Division had overseen nearly $7 billion in reconstruction
projects in such areas as electricity, oil, water, hospitals, and
schools. Further, from fiscal years 2004 through 2008, DOD obligated
about $3.3 billion in Commander's Emergency Response Program funds for
projects that are intended to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and
reconstruction requirements at the brigade and battalion levels. This
program has funded about 34,400 education, electricity, sanitation, and
other projects. In comparison, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID)--the primary U.S. foreign assistance agency--has
obligated $7.2 billion on reconstruction projects in several areas in
Iraq from fiscal year 2003 through the end of December 2008. It is
unclear what assistance USAID will provide after U.S. forces leave
Iraq.
* Two MNF-I subordinate commands support the development of capable
Iraqi security forces. MNSTC-I is responsible for organizing, training,
equipping, and mentoring Iraqi military and police, as well as advising
Iraq's Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense. Brigades under
MNC-I partner with Iraqi army units during operations. This arrangement
differs from other countries where a DOD security cooperation
organization manages security assistance programs for the military and
State manages and funds police training under the direction and
supervision of the Chief of Mission.
Oversight Questions:
1. How does the U.S. government plan to provide security, housing,
medical evacuation, and life support for its civilian personnel in Iraq
as U.S. forces draw down and eventually leave Iraq?
2. What additional resources, if any, would State, USAID, or other
civilian agencies require to compensate for the loss of military
support to civilian government operations and tasks?
3. What is DOD and State's plan for transitioning assistance to Iraqi
security forces from MNF-I to a traditional security cooperation
organization and police training program under Chief of Mission
authority?
Points of Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure VII: Rightsizing the U.S. Civilian Presence in Iraq:
Background:
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is one of the largest U.S. embassies in the
world. As of March 2009, it had about 1,300 authorized U.S. civilian
positions.
Issue:
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad was established under extraordinary
circumstances in a war zone environment. Normalizing embassy
operations, including determining appropriate staffing levels, will be
a challenge. Security vulnerabilities and escalating costs have led to
calls to evaluate and realign--or rightsize--the number and location of
staff at U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide. A clearly defined
strategy for U.S. efforts in Iraq will be critical for the rightsizing
exercise at Embassy Baghdad.
Key Findings:
State Has Adopted GAO's Rightsizing Framework:
In 2002, GAO developed a framework that provides a systematic approach
for assessing overseas civilian government workforce size and
identifying options for rightsizing. The framework links staffing
levels to the mission's priorities and requirements, physical security,
and operational costs. The rightsizing framework encourages
consideration of a range of options for meeting workload requirements
after an analysis of mission, security, and cost trade-offs. Decision
makers are then able to determine whether to add, reduce, or change the
staff mix at an embassy. The Office of Management and Budget and
Department of State (State) have adopted this framework. State has used
it as the basis for rightsizing reviews at more than 120 embassies.
Embassy Baghdad Is Scheduled to Conduct a Rightsizing Review in 2009:
Embassy Baghdad is scheduled to conduct a rightsizing review in the
fall of 2009 to link its long-term staffing needs to key mission goals.
The embassy should consider the following as part of this review:
* Assessing mission priorities and requirements. The placement and
composition of staff overseas must reflect the highest priority goals
of U.S. foreign policy, both in terms of worldwide presence, and within
a specific post. The 2009 rightsizing review will require a long-term,
strategic assessment of Embassy Baghdad priorities and allow State and
other agencies to determine their workload requirements.
* Determining the appropriate mix of staff. As of March 2009, Embassy
Baghdad had about 1,300 authorized U.S. civilian positions and a mix of
contractors, third country nationals, and locally hired Iraqis. Unlike
most other posts, State has faced challenges in hiring and retaining
Iraqi employees, as association with the U.S. government continues to
place Iraqi embassy staff at risk. Thus, State has had to rely more
extensively on U.S. direct-hire civilians and contractors than is
customary at other U.S. embassies--a more costly approach than hiring
local Iraqis.
* Determining the future role of temporary U.S. civilian entities in
Iraq. The number of U.S. civilians in Iraq has been, in part, driven by
the need to staff temporary entities in Iraq. For example, as of March
2009, the U.S. government had about 450 personnel deployed to U.S.-led
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Iraq, which aim to increase
Iraq's capacity to govern and deliver public services. According to
State, PRTs will eventually draw down, but there is currently no
determination as to what residual form, if any, the PRTs will take.
Furthermore, in 2007, State established the temporary Iraq Transition
Assistance Office (ITAO) to help maintain an effective diplomatic
presence in Iraq. ITAO was tasked with supporting U.S. agencies in Iraq
in their implementation of U.S. foreign assistance, including hiring
temporary U.S. employees. At Embassy Baghdad, according to State, there
are about 100 such positions. It is unclear what role, if any,
temporary entities such as PRTs and ITAO will play in the future.
* Providing security for U.S. civilian personnel during and after the
U.S. military transition. According to State, Embassy Baghdad has more
security requirements than other U.S. embassies. Keeping staff secure,
yet productive, remains one of the largest challenges for State's
diplomatic security agents, who are responsible for securing the
embassy's personnel, facilities, and information. According to State,
in addition to diplomatic security agents, the department obligated
about $1.1 billion from fiscal years 2006 through 2008 to fund
approximately 1,400 security contractors in Iraq. To secure the embassy
personnel and safeguard embassy information, State also has relied on
support from the U.S. military. As the U.S. military transitions out of
Iraq, State's workload--and thus its resource requirements--will
increase.
* Assessing the costs of Embassy Baghdad operations. State has called
for the consolidation of as many administrative and programmatic
activities at overseas posts as possible to contain costs and expose
fewer employees to security risks. The International Consolidated
Administrative Support Services (ICASS) system offers a standard method
of sharing administrative costs such as motor pool, utilities, and
information technology services. According to State, ICASS is not
operational in Iraq due to the mission's security needs. Some agencies
may need to reassess their staffing levels in Iraq once they are
required to pay their share of administrative costs.
Oversight Questions:
1. What type of diplomatic mission does the administration envision in
Iraq and how does it plan to provide for the security of its personnel,
facilities, and information?
2. To what extent does State have contingency plans in place if Embassy
Baghdad is unable to decrease its reliance on U.S. civilian government
personnel over the next 5 years?
3. To what extent does State have plans in place to balance priorities
for temporary entities in Iraq, such as PRTs, and any future consulates
in Iraq against the security requirements and costs of operations?
4. When should non-State agencies at Embassy Baghdad be expected to
contribute to the full-cost recovery of administrative support
services?
Points of Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov.
Jess Ford, 202-512-4268, fordj@gao.gov.
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure VIII: Considering the Level of Engagement of the
International Community:
Background:
Since 2003, 38 countries have participated in the coalition to help
secure Iraq. In addition, 42 nations and international organizations
have provided direct financial assistance in the form of grants or
loans for reconstruction efforts. Several nations have also forgiven
some of Iraq's outstanding debt to help Iraq finance its reconstruction
efforts.
Issue:
The international community is an important partner in Iraq's
reconstruction and economic development efforts, providing varying
levels of military and financial assistance since 2003. Since January
2004, the United States' 38 coalition partners have collectively
contributed as many as 25,600 troops to help stabilize the security
situation. International organizations and several countries also
pledged substantial financial assistance for reconstruction efforts,
offering Iraq almost $12 billion in loans and providing $5.6 billion in
grants. The Paris Club and commercial creditors have forgiven most of
Iraq's Saddam Hussein regime debt, as Iraq seeks relief from its high
debt burden. As the United States further defines its assistance
strategy for Iraq, it must coordinate its efforts with those of the
international community.
Key Findings:
Non-U.S. Coalition Troops Expected to Leave Iraq by July 2009:
By December 2003, the multinational force in Iraq included 34 nations
and almost 151,000 troops--about 24,000 of which were provided by
coalition partners.[Footnote 8] As the security situation has improved
and the United Nations (UN) mandate for the multinational force
expired, most coalition partners have removed their troops. As of March
2009, only three coalition partners remain in Iraq--Australia, Romania,
and the United Kingdom. These coalition partners have an agreement with
Iraq to remove their troops by July 2009 (see figure 1). At that time,
the United States will be the sole remaining nation with troops
stationed in Iraq.
Figure 1: Non-U.S. Coalition Troops in Iraq:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a line graph plotting the number of non-U.S. coalition
troops against the dates of January 2004 through July of 1009
(projected troop levels from current date through July).
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
The International Community Has Provided Reconstruction Funding:
To support reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure and essential
services, international donors have offered Iraq almost $12 billion in
loans and provided about $5.6 billion in grants. As of January 2009,
the Iraqi government had entered into agreements to borrow more than
$3.7 billion from Italy, Iran, Japan, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and the World Bank, according to the Department of State
(State). Of the $5.6 billion given in grants, almost one-third--or $1.8
billion--has been deposited in the International Reconstruction Fund
Facility for Iraq, which is composed of two trust funds, one run by the
UN Development Group and the other by the World Bank. Almost all of
these funds have been committed to almost 160 projects that will be
completed by 2010. In February 2009, the UN and World Bank presented
plans to commit the remaining funds and close out the trust funds by
2013. Both organizations plan to fund any additional assistance to Iraq
through other funding streams, according to State.
As the security situation has improved, international organizations
have increased their assistance and re-examined their strategies. In
August 2008, the UN released its Iraq Assistance Strategy for Iraq
2008-2010 that defines how the UN will support Iraq's reconstruction in
various sectors, including governance, education, and economic reform
through projects and technical assistance. In the last year, the UN
also has added staff and is considering opening offices in Kirkuk,
Najaf, Ramadi, and Mosul to support its increased assistance
activities. Similarly, the World Bank is developing an updated
assistance strategy to replace its current strategy from August 2005.
Some of Iraq's Creditors Have Supported Reconstruction through Debt
Relief:
To help attract investment needed to finance its economic
reconstruction, Iraq has sought debt forgiveness for loans taken under
the Saddam Hussein regime. At the end of 2004, Iraq owed about $120
billion to foreign creditors--an amount almost five times the size of
its economy at the time. Of that external debt, Iraq owed about $36
billion to members of the Paris Club,[Footnote 9] who committed to
forgive 80 percent of that debt if Iraq agreed to follow an IMF reform
program. Iraq received the final tranche of Paris Club debt relief in
late 2008. Nevertheless, Department of the Treasury officials estimate
that Iraq owes between $49 and $77 billion in bilateral debt. In
addition to these debts, Iraq owes $29 billion in compensation claims
for damages and losses resulting from Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait in 1990.[Footnote 10] Iraq's oil revenues are currently immune
from garnishment, liens, and other judgments that would compel Iraq to
pay these debts and claims, but this immunity will expire in December
2009 absent further UN Security Council action.
Oversight Questions:
1. What efforts are under way to help Iraq coordinate any future
bilateral assistance, including the United States, for meeting its
reconstruction and development needs?
2. How will U.S. strategic planning reflect the efforts of the UN and
other international organizations in such areas as elections
assistance, resolution of disputed internal boundaries, and electricity
production?
3. How is the United States helping Iraq in its efforts to secure
relief from its remaining Saddam Hussein regime debts?
Point of Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure IX: Building Iraq's Capacity to Assume a Greater Cost Share
of Its Security, Reconstruction, and Economic Needs:
Background:
Oil export revenues are critical to Iraq's economy, accounting for over
half of the country's gross domestic product and over 90 percent of
revenues. From 2005 through 2008, Iraq generated an estimated $152
billion in revenues from crude oil export sales.
Issue:
From 2005 through 2007, Iraq had an estimated cumulative budget surplus
of $29 billion, in part due to limited spending of its investment
budgets. The need for Iraq to spend its own resources has become
increasingly critical as U.S. agencies have obligated nearly 90 percent
of the $49 billion in U.S. appropriations since fiscal year 2003 for
reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq. Agencies have
disbursed nearly 80 percent of these appropriations, as of December
2008. Iraq's substantial oil reserves and current budgetary resources
offer the government of Iraq the potential to better finance more of
the costs of its own security, reconstruction, and economic needs.
Key Findings:
Iraqi Government Accumulated Surpluses from 2005 through 2008:
As of June 2008, the Iraqi government had accumulated financial
deposits of $39.6 billion (a 33 percent increase from December 2007),
held in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) at the New York Federal
Reserve Bank and central government deposits at the Central Bank of
Iraq (CBI) and Iraq's commercial banks. This balance is the result, in
part, of an estimated cumulative budget surplus from 2005 through 2008.
This amount does not include funds in Iraq's foreign exchange reserves,
funds held at the New York Federal Reserve Bank intended for Foreign
Military Sales purchases, or funds disbursed from the DFI to J.P.
Morgan Chase and Citibank for payment on letters of credit.
For 2008, the Iraqi government generated an estimated $68 billion in
total revenues, of which crude oil export sales accounted for about $62
billion. As displayed in table 1, Iraq ended 2005 through 2007 with a
cumulative budget surplus of $29 billion. GAO estimates that Iraq ended
2008 with another budget surplus of $18.3 billion. As a result, the
Iraqi government had a cumulative budget surplus of about $47.3 billion
at the end of 2008. This is less than GAO's prior projection of a
cumulative surplus of between $67 billion and $79 billion and reflects
declining oil prices and an increase in Iraqi spending. In the
preliminary 2009 Iraqi budget, the Iraqi government projects a budget
deficit of $16 billion, which would indicate that it plans to spend a
portion of the accumulated surpluses from prior years.
Table 1: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surpluses, 2005-2008:
Total revenues;
2005: $24.1 billion;
2006: $32 billion;
2007: $39.9 billion;
Total; 2005-2007: $96.0 billion;
2008: $67.8 billion;
Total 2005-2008: $163.7 billion.
MoF expenditures;
2005: $17.6 billion;
2006: $22.8 billion;
2007: $26.6 billion;
Total; 2005-2007: $67.0 billion;
2008: $49.5 billion;
Total 2005-2008: $116.5 billion.
Surplus;
2005: $6.5 billion;
2006: $9.2 billion;
2007: $13.3 billion;
Total; 2005-2007: $29.0 billion;
2008: $18.3 billion;
Total 2005-2008: $47.3 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of CBI and IMF data and Iraqi Ministry of Finance
Budget (MoF).
Note: Total revenues for 2008 are based on actual crude oil export
receipts and IMF projections for other revenues, such as taxes and
domestic oil sales. Sums may differ from totals due to rounding.
[End of table]
Iraqi Government Has Been Unable to Spend All of Its Investment Budget:
Iraq's inability to spend its resources, particularly on investment
activities, limits the government's efforts to further economic
development and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. From
2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government spent an estimated $67 billion
on operating and investment activities. Ninety percent was spent on
operating expenses, such as salaries and goods and services, and the
remaining 10 percent on investments, such as structures and vehicles.
While total expenditures grew from 2005 through 2007, Iraq was unable
to spend all of its budgeted funds. For example, in 2007, Iraq spent 80
percent of its $29 billion total operating budget and 28 percent of its
$12 billion total investment budget. However, the central government
ministries[Footnote 11] responsible for providing essential services to
the Iraqi people spent a smaller share, 11 percent, of their $8 billion
investment budgets. In 2008, Iraq's investment expenditures have
increased as compared to 2007. Iraq spent 39 percent of its $24 billion
investment budget, while the central government ministries have spent
23 percent of their $16 billion investment budget. According to U.S.
government, coalition, and international officials, a number of factors
continue to affect the Iraqi government's ability to spend more of its
revenues on capital investments and effectively manage resources. These
factors include the shortage of trained staff, weak procurement and
budgeting systems, and violence and sectarian strife.
U.S. Has Funded Capacity Building Activities Since 2005 but Lacks
Integrated Strategy:
Since 2005, multiple U.S. agencies have led individual efforts to
improve the capacity of Iraq's ministries without having an overall
integrated strategy. In 2007, The New Way Forward emphasized the need
to build capacity in Iraq's ministries and help the government execute
its capital investment budgets. In response, U.S. capacity development
efforts shifted their emphasis from long-term institution-building
projects to an immediate effort to help Iraqi ministries overcome their
inability to spend their capital investment budgets.
In October 2007, GAO recommended that Congress consider conditioning
future appropriations on the completion of an integrated strategy for
U.S. capacity development efforts. In June 2008, State and Treasury
created a new Public Financial Management Action Group to help
integrate and coordinate U.S. government assistance to improve budget
execution. In addition, in September 2008, State hired a contractor to
draft a strategic planning document for ministry capacity development.
As of March 2009, State is reviewing the contractor's proposals.
Oversight Questions:
1. How do U.S. capacity-building efforts and future foreign assistance
programs in Iraq address the government of Iraq's ability to spend its
resources on investment and maintenance activities?
2. What strategy does the United States have for transferring remaining
defense and reconstruction costs to the government of Iraq as current
U.S. appropriations for these rebuilding activities ends?
3. What budgetary resources can the government of Iraq provide to
increase its support for security, economic, and reconstruction efforts
in the country?
Point of Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure X: Building Iraq's Capacity to Improve Critical Service
Sectors:
Background:
Following the 2003 invasion, U.S. and Iraqi authorities inherited an
infrastructure that had deteriorated due to the previous regime's
neglect, international sanctions, and years of conflict, leaving many
Iraqis with limited or no access to essential services.
Issue:
The Iraqi government's efforts to increase its legitimacy and counter
the insurgent threat depend, in large part, on its ability to expand
its oil exports and provide essential services such as electricity and
clean water to all Iraqi communities. Given that appropriated U.S.
funds for rebuilding these sectors have largely been expended,
continued reconstruction and sustainability will be dependent on an
Iraqi government that can resolve the challenges it faces in delivering
essential services. As the administration further defines its plans for
Iraq, it will need to consider how best to support the Iraqi
government's efforts and address these challenges.
Key Findings:
Oil Production and Exports Have Increased but More Investment Is
Needed:
Oil production and exports account for about 90 percent of Iraq's
revenue. The Iraqi government's ability to fund reconstruction efforts
and provide for its citizens depends, in part, on increasing oil
production and exports. Iraqi and U.S. government investments in the
oil sector have increased production and exports since 2003, but U.S.
officials have stated that insufficient focus on security limited the
impact of the initial U.S. investment. Iraq's oil production increased
from an annual average of 1.3 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 2003 to
2.36 mbpd as of March 2009. According to the Departments of Defense and
State (State), investment in Iraq's oil sector is below the minimum
required to sustain current production; additional foreign and private
investments are needed. The Ministry of Oil has indicated that
investments between $25 billion and $75 billion are needed to achieve
its production target of 6 mbpd. In 2008, the Ministry of Oil spent
$421 million, or 19 percent of its investment budget for that year.
Electricity Production Has Increased, but Demand Continues to Outstrip
Capacity:
Restoring the electrical infrastructure is critical to reviving the
Iraqi economy and ensuring productivity of the oil sector; however,
demand has grown substantially and continues to outstrip capacity. For
2008, supply met around 52 percent of demand, even with increased
generation. As a result, Iraq continues to experience electrical
shutdowns despite billions of dollars invested. According to State, at
the end of November 2005, average hours of power per day were 8.7 hours
in Baghdad and 12.6 hours nationwide; by the end of November 2008,
Baghdad averaged 15.4 hours and the rest of the country averaged 14.6
hours. The Iraqi Ministry of Electricity estimated in its 2006-2015
plan that it would need $27 billion over the next 6 to 10 years to
provide reliable electricity across Iraq by 2015. However, U.S.
government officials working with the ministry estimate twice that
amount will be needed for power generation, transmission, distribution,
and other infrastructure. Based on U.S. and United Nations reporting,
inadequate operating and maintenance practices, as well as the lack of
skilled technicians, inhibit an effective electrical infrastructure.
Even with Additional Capacity, Many Iraqis Remain without Potable
Water:
In the water sector, as of July 2008, U.S.-funded projects had the
capacity to provide an additional 8.1 million Iraqis with potable
water, short of the goal of 8.5 million. Even with the additional
capacity, many Iraqis are without water or have access to water that
puts them at risk of diseases such as cholera and dysentery, as
evidenced by outbreaks in 2007 and 2008. According to the United
Nations, only 40 percent of children have reliable access to safe
drinking water; with water treatment plants operating at only 17
percent capacity, large volumes of untreated waste are discharged into
Iraq's waterways. The health risks associated with a lack of access to
potable water and proper sewage treatment are compounded by the
shortage of medical professionals in Iraq's health care system. The
World Bank has estimated $14.4 billion is needed to rebuild the Iraqi
public works and water system.
Iraqi Government Has Spent Little on Improving Essential Services and
Faces Challenges in Sustaining Existing Projects:
Iraq has not followed through on commitments to spend more of its own
money on reconstruction efforts and faces challenges sustaining U.S.-
funded projects. As table 1 indicates, U.S. agencies have spent 87
percent, or about $9.5 billion, of the $10.9 billion allocated since
fiscal year 2003 for reconstruction activities in the oil, electricity,
and water sectors. In contrast, Iraq has spent about 12 percent, or
about $2.0 billion of the $17.2 billion allocated for investment
activities in these sectors. In addition, Iraq has faced difficulties
in sustaining U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. According to U.S.
officials, Iraqi managers lack the skill level and authority to create
plans and buy the materials necessary to sustain projects in the energy
and water sectors. Moreover, poor security has prevented the successful
implementation of long-term training programs to create the local
capacity needed to operate and maintain U.S.-funded projects.
Table 1: Comparison of U.S. and Iraqi Allocations and Spending for
Selected Sectors (in billions of U.S. dollars):
Sector: Oil;
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-2008, allocated: $2.7 billion;
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-June 2008, spent[A]: $2.5 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, allocated: $10.8 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, spent[A]: $0.7 billion.
Sector: Electricity;
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-2008, allocated: $5.3 billion;
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-June 2008, spent[A]: $4.8 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, allocated: $5.2 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, spent[A]: $0.8 billion.
Sector: Water resources;
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-2008, allocated: $2.9 billion;
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-June 2008, spent[A]: $2.2 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, allocated: $1.3 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, spent[A]: $0.6 billion.
Sector: Total;
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-2008, allocated: $10.9 billion;
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-June 2008, spent[A]: $9.5 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, allocated: $17.2 billion;
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, spent[A]: $2.0 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of Iraq Ministry of Finance budgets and
expenditures, and Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury and
U.S. Agency for International Development data.
Note: The Iraqi figures refer to investment expenses which include
capital goods and capital projects. The sums may differ from totals due
to rounding.
[A] This refers to funds disbursed by U.S. agencies and funds spent by
the respective Iraqi ministries.
[End of table]
Oversight Questions:
1. What activities are under way to strengthen the Iraqi government's
ability to operate and maintain its essential services infrastructure,
particularly for those efforts funded by the U.S. government?
2. How much additional investment in Iraq's oil infrastructure is
needed to ensure sustained production and export levels? What actions
is Iraq
taking to encourage foreign investment?
3. While the capacity for providing potable water has increased, what
steps are being taken to ensure both sustainable delivery and quality
of water throughout Iraq?
Point of Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure XI: Enacting Iraqi Legislation to Promote National
Reconciliation:
Background:
In 2007, The New Way Forward identified Iraqi political compromise as
crucial to promoting national reconciliation and stabilizing the
country. The U.S. and Iraqi governments stated that passage of
legislation to address core Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurd grievances and to
share hydrocarbon resources equitably was essential.
Issue:
Since 2007, the Iraqi government has passed legislation allowing some
former members of the Ba'ath party to work for the government, granted
amnesty to Iraqis accused of or in prison for certain crimes, defined
provincial powers, and passed and implemented a provincial elections
law. These actions could address grievances by Sunnis and others,
namely that they have been removed from government, unfairly arrested,
and underrepresented in provincial councils. However, Iraq has not
fully implemented some of these laws, passed hydrocarbon legislation,
or a law to demobilize militias. Finally, Iraq has not completed the
constitutional review or the constitutionally mandated process to deal
with claims over disputed areas, especially Kirkuk. In further defining
the U.S. strategy for Iraq, the administration should consider how to
support Iraq's reconciliation efforts.
Key Findings:
Despite Sectarian Differences, the Iraqi Government Has Passed Key
Legislation:
Figure 1 shows the steps Iraq has taken as of February 2009 to enact
key laws intended to promote national reconciliation.
Figure 1: Status of Enacting Iraqi Legislation:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
De-Ba‘athification:
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check];
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee:
[Check];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Check];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Check];
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Check];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Check];
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Check].
Amnesty:
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check];
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee:
[Check];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Check];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Check];
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Check];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Check];
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Check].
Provincial powers:
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check];
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee:
[Check];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Check];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Check];
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Check];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Check];
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Check].
Elections: Electoral commission:
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check];
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee:
[Check];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Check];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Check];
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Check];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Check];
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Check].
Elections: Provincial election law:
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check];
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee:
[Check];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Check];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Check];
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Check];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Check];
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Check].
Hydrocarbon laws: Framework:
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check];
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee:
[Check];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Empty];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty];
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Empty].
Hydrocarbon laws: Revenue sharing:
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed:
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee:
[Empty];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Empty];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty];
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Empty].
Hydrocarbon laws: Ministry of Oil Restructuring:
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed:
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee:
[Empty];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Empty];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty];
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Empty].
Hydrocarbon laws: Iraq National Oil Company: [Check];
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: No legislation drafted;
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee:
[Empty];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Empty];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty];
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Empty].
Disarmament and demobilization:
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: No legislation drafted;
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee:
[Empty];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Empty];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty];
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Empty].
Check = Steps taken since February 2009.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense,
United Nations, and Iraqi government data.
[End of table]
Implementation of Legislation Has Been Slow:
Although Iraq has enacted laws on de-Ba'athification, amnesty, and
provincial powers, it has been slow to fully implement them. For
example, the Iraqi government passed de-Ba'athification reform in
February 2008, but as of January 2009, the Council of Ministers had not
nominated individuals to head the new commission to implement the law.
The amnesty law provides for the release of Iraqis sentenced to prison
and those under investigation or trial, provided they are not involved
in certain crimes such as kidnapping or murder. According to the
Department of State (State), Iraqi courts have granted amnesty to many,
but releases are slow. Also, the Iraqi and U.S. governments are working
to transfer detainees held by U.S. forces to Iraqi facilities, as
required by this law and the November 2008 security agreement with
Iraq, so that the provisions of the amnesty law can be applied to them.
U.S. forces held approximately 15,000 Iraqi detainees, as of January
2009, according to State and Department of Defense (DOD) officials. In
addition, Iraq held provincial elections in 14 provinces on January 31,
2009.
Some Legislation Has Yet to Be Enacted and Constitutional Issues Have
Not Been Resolved:
The Iraqi government has not enacted laws to share oil revenues and
disarm militias, and has not resolved issues in its constitutional
review.
* Hydrocarbon legislation consists of four separate laws, but the key
framework law is stalled, according to State. This law defines the
control and management of Iraq‘s oil and gas sector. According to
State, the delay illustrates struggles between the federal government
and the Kurdistan Regional Government about how much control the
Kurdistan Regional Government will have over its oil resources.
* As of February 2009, a law to disarm and demobilize militias had not
passed. According to State, no legislation has been proposed, but
militia activity, specifically from Jaysh al-Mahdi, has substantially
declined. According to a December 2008 DOD report, some militias
are considering reconciliation with the government.
* Iraq‘s Constitution was approved in a national referendum in October
2005, but this did not resolve several contentious issues, including the
powers of the presidency versus the prime minister, claims over
disputed areas such as oil-rich Kirkuk, and the relative powers of the
regions versus the federal government. Among these issues, a resolution
on the status of Kirkuk remains a key issue for the Kurdistan Regional
Government and the United Nations; Kurdistan Regional Government
officials want resolved the issue of whether Kirkuk is to be part of
Kurdistan. As of February 2009, the United Nations was working with a
special committee to recommend mechanisms for sharing power in Kirkuk.
Oversight Questions:
1. To what extent have new provincial elections helped stabilize Iraq
and support national reconciliation?
2. What are the prospects of resolving the impasse on hydrocarbon
legislation?
3. What challenges remain to implementing the laws that have already
been passed?
4. What actions should the United States take to encourage the Iraqi
government to pass the remaining legislation intended to promote
national reconciliation?
Point of Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of enclosure]
Enclosure XII: Assisting Iraq's Refugees:
Background:
The United Nations (UN) reports that about 4.8 million Iraqis have been
displaced from their homes, with about 2 million fleeing to neighboring
countries. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Iraqi refugees pose an unprecedented burden on the economies and social
infrastructures of the countries hosting them.
Issue:
Despite security improvements, UNHCR has reported that conditions are
not yet suitable for the safe return of Iraqi refugees, and most
refugees that do return are settling in areas controlled by their
particular sect. According to the Department of State (State), the
United States has recognized the need to take the lead in mitigating
the effects of this humanitarian crisis. As the administration further
defines its plan for Iraq, it will need to consider how best to support
the Iraqi government and the international community in addressing the
needs of Iraqis displaced within Iraq, as well as those who have fled
to neighboring countries.
Key Findings:
Lack of Reliable Needs Assessments Impedes Assistance:
Figure 1: Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees:
[Refer to PDF for image: map of the Middle East]
Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees:
Egypt;
Europe;
Gulf States;
Islamic Republic of Iran;
Jordan;
Lebanon;
Syrian Arab Republic;
Turkey.
According to UNHCR, the majority of Iraqi refugees went to Syria and
Jordan.
Sources: GAO based on maps from the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
The lack of reliable needs estimates impedes U.S. and international
efforts to assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria. Official
Jordanian and Syrian government estimates on the number of Iraqi
refugees in each country may be overstated, with each country
estimating up to 500,000 and 1,500,000 Iraqi refugees, respectively, in
their countries. This is in contrast to the approximately 54,000 and
220,000 Iraqis that UNHCR had officially registered in Jordan and
Syria, respectively, as of September 2008. Neither country has enabled
an independent and comprehensive survey of refugees to be undertaken,
asserting that assistance should not be targeted toward Iraqi refugees
while they have populations that need help. Both countries have based
requests for refugee assistance primarily on their countries‘ health and
education needs rather than on the numbers of displaced Iraqis in their
countries, and the U.S. government and UN have included Iraqi refugees
and host country populations in their assistance programs. Donor country
representatives further noted that the lack of objective and complete
information on the numbers and needs of refugees has made it difficult
to garner support for these efforts.
U.S. Government Resettles Iraqis, but Lasting Solutions Remain a
Challenge:
The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges offering lasting solutions
for Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the
preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for
Iraqis to return. The Iraqi government has cited improvements in
security and offered financial incentives to returning families, but
there is no clear trend on the number of Iraqis returning to or leaving
Iraq. Difficulties renewing visas, lack of funds, and limited access to
employment and public services affect Iraqis‘ decisions to stay in or
return to Iraq. Another solution is resettlement in the host countries,
though Jordan and Syria consider Iraqi refugees ’guests“ who should
return to Iraq once the security situation improves. Resettlement to a
third country is another option, according to State. The U.S.
government has made progress resettling Iraqis under its U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program. In 2007, the United States admitted 1,608 Iraqi
refugees but did not achieve State‘s expectation of admitting 2,000 to
3,000 refugees; however, the U.S. government surpassed its fiscal year
2008 goal of 12,000 with the admission of 13,823 Iraqi refugees.
According to UNHCR, as of September 30, 2008, other countries resettled
5,852 Iraqi refugees in calendar years 2007 through 2008.
A related issue for Congress to consider is the plight of Palestinian
Iraqis who have been living, mostly under very harsh conditions, in
three refugee camps in Syria and Iraq for about 3 years. As of December
31, 2008, about 2,540 refugees remained in these camps. About 446 camp
refugees were resettled in 2007 and 2008, mostly in Chile and Europe.
According to UNHCR, during the fall of 2008, Australia, Canada, the
United States, and several European countries expressed interest in
resettling these refugees.
GAO subsequently will issue a more detailed report on U.S. and
international efforts to assist Iraqi refugees, including some of the
key challenges faced in planning and delivering this assistance, such
as determining the amount of funding provided for Iraqi refugee
programs by the United States, Iraq, and UN agencies. GAO plans to
issue a second report in 2009 that will discuss the challenges in
assisting internally displaced persons within Iraq.
Oversight Questions:
1. To what extent is the U.S. government helping Iraq address the needs
of displaced Iraqis, bilaterally and in coordination with UN assistance
efforts?
2. As U.S. military forces in Iraq draw down, how will the U.S.
government aid Iraq in ensuring the security of internally displaced
and returning Iraqis and support their access to housing and essential
services?
3. How is the U.S. government working with the international community
to improve conditions for Palestinian Iraqis in refugee camps and
facilitate their eventual resettlement?
Point of Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of enclosure]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The issues discussed in the 12 enclosures are based on completed and
ongoing GAO work on Iraq security and reconstruction issues. They
incorporate information from agency documents and interviews with U.S.
officials in Iraq and Washington, D.C., including the Departments of
Defense (DOD), Energy (Energy), State (State), and the Treasury
(Treasury); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the
Army Corps of Engineers; the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I); and
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Enclosure I: Determining What Conditions Need to Be Met to Undertake a
Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces:
To discuss the change in approach that the U.S.-Iraq security agreement
represents from prior strategies, we relied on previous GAO reporting
and reviewed the security agreement and Strategic Framework Agreement
that the U.S. and Iraqi governments signed in November 2008. We
interviewed DOD and State officials to clarify the language and
application of the agreements.
To present the levels of violence, we used MNF-I data on enemy-
initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners obtained
from DIA. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for
establishing general trends in the number of enemy-initiated attacks in
Iraq. To determine the reliability of the data, we reviewed MNF-I's
attacks reporting guidance, compared the unclassified data to
classified sources, and discussed how the data are collected, analyzed,
and reported with DIA officials.
To report on the growth of Iraqi security forces, we relied upon DOD
updates to weekly State reports. We used DOD's number of trained and
equipped personnel for January 2007 data to represent the number of the
Iraqi security forces. DOD changed its reporting metrics in November
2007 from "trained and equipped" forces to "authorized," "assigned,"
and "trained" forces. GAO determined that "assigned" data, based on
payroll data, are the closest figures to the number of Iraqi security
forces and are sufficiently reliable and similar to establish a general
trend of growth in those forces under the previous metric. "Assigned"
numbers show the same trend as other measures of Iraqi security forces
growth--"trained" and "authorized" forces. However, as we have noted in
previous reports, GAO recognizes limitations to these reported data. To
display the change in Iraqi capabilities, we relied on unclassified DOD
reporting of Iraqi Army units' "Operational Readiness Assessments." We
have reviewed the Operational Readiness Assessments and, to the extent
possible, corroborated the trends with classified data.
We based our discussion of administration plans for a responsible
drawdown on public statements.
Enclosure II: Implementing Key Operational Requirements of the U.S.-
Iraq Security Agreement:
To discuss the implementation of the security agreement, we reviewed
the text of agreement and the strategic framework agreement that the
U.S. and Iraqi governments signed in November 2008, Coalition
Provisional Authority Order 17, and the United Nations (UN) Security
Council resolutions authorizing the U.S. presence in Iraq. We also
interviewed State and DOD officials to clarify our understanding of the
specific language and application of the agreements. We used our prior
reports as background information for this enclosure.
Enclosure III: Managing the Redeployment U.S. Forces and Equipment from
Iraq:
To assess DOD's ability to manage the redeployment of U.S. troops from
Iraq, we reviewed relevant documents, including command briefings and
in-progress reviews, orders, joint and Army doctrine, relevant sections
of the U.S. Code, and staff analyses that we obtained from several DOD
organizations including U.S. Central Command, MNF-I, and U.S. Army
Central. We also interviewed officials who were directly involved in
the logistical planning efforts to determine the status and scope of
these efforts. We traveled to Kuwait in May 2008 and met with DOD
officials from a variety of organizations to discuss planning efforts.
We also visited locations at which various aspects of the redeployment
and removal process are performed and spoke with local commanders and
on-site supervisors about their experiences and challenges.
Enclosure IV: Managing and Overseeing U.S. Government Contractors in
Iraq during a Drawdown:
To assess DOD's capacity to manage and oversee contractor performance,
we relied extensively on our prior reports. In preparing these reports,
we reviewed applicable DOD policies and guidance; interviewed DOD and
contractor personnel in the United States, Iraq, and other locations;
and reviewed contract-related information. We also reviewed the
security agreement to identify provisions applicable to DOD's use of
U.S. contractors in Iraq. We obtained updated information from DOD on
the number of contractor personnel working under DOD contracts of as
October 2008. Our prior work concluded that complete and reliable data
on contractor personnel data were not available, but we presented the
reported data along with their limitations as they established a
minimum number of contractor personnel and provided insight into the
extent to which agencies had information on the number of contractor
personnel. Given the limitations we previously found, the data
presented should not be used to reach conclusions about the total
number of contractor personnel in Iraq.
Enclosure V: Determining the Department of Defense's Future Costs for
Iraq:
To discuss the costs associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom, we relied
extensively on our prior reports related to reporting of overall Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT) costs, estimating of GWOT funding needs,
spending associated with the reset of equipment, and the redeployment
of U.S. forces from Iraq, among others. Our prior work has found the
data in DOD's reported obligations for GWOT to be of questionable
reliability. Consequently, we are unable to ensure that DOD's reported
obligations are complete, reliable, and accurate, and therefore any
reported obligations contained in this enclosure should be considered
approximations.
Enclosure VI: Transitioning from a Predominantly Military to a Civilian
Presence in Iraq:
To present the number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq, we relied on
personnel data provided by DOD Joint Staff. We determined the data were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes by comparing unclassified U.S.
troop numbers to classified sources and discussing how the data are
collected and reported with DOD officials. To determine the
organization, missions, and tasks of U.S. military forces in Iraq, we
reviewed documents from DOD, MNF-I, and MNF-I subordinate commands.
Enclosure VII: Rightsizing the U.S. Civilian Presence in Iraq:
To develop the elements of the rightsizing framework, we analyzed
previous reports on overseas staffing issues, including those of the
Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP).[Footnote 12] We interviewed
officials from the Office of Management and Budget to discuss
rightsizing initiatives in relation to the President's Management
Agenda.[Footnote 13] We discussed embassy staffing with rightsizing
experts, including the Chairman of OPAP and former Undersecretaries of
State for Management. We also interviewed officials from the State,
DOD, Treasury, and the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
Agriculture, among others. To further develop and test the framework,
we conducted a case study at the U.S. embassy in Paris (see our July
2002 report[Footnote 14] for more details about this case study).
In the enclosure, we describe how elements of the rightsizing framework
could be applied to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. We obtained agency
documents and interviewed officials from State's Office of Rightsizing,
the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security regarding rightsizing challenges at Embassy Baghdad. We
obtained data on the staffing levels at Embassy Baghdad from State's
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, as its data were the most
comprehensive. To assess the reliability of these data, we talked with
agency officials about data limitations. We determined the data were
sufficiently reliable to demonstrate that Embassy Baghdad is one of the
largest U.S. embassies worldwide with an estimated 1,300 total
authorized positions.
Enclosure VIII: Considering the Level of Engagement of the
International Community:
To present the number of non-U.S. troops participating in the
coalition, we analyzed data from State and DOD from December 2003 to
December 2008. The departments did not have information on coalition
troops in Iraq from March to November 2003. We determined that the data
were sufficiently reliable for estimating the number of troops
contributed by other countries.
To discuss the international community's financial contributions to
Iraq's reconstruction, we updated information previously reported by
reviewing State documentation and consulting with State and UN
officials.
To report on Iraq's foreign debt, we examined documents from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Paris Club of international
creditors, and relevant U.S. agencies and international organizations.
To determine the amount of outstanding debt in 2004 (prior to debt
restructuring) and 2006, we used official IMF estimates of Iraq's
external debt. Since the IMF estimates for 2006 included debt
restructuring by non-Paris Club official creditors that had not been
completed, we used the IMF estimate from 2004 for these countries. We
worked with Treasury officials to update this information.
Enclosure IX: Building Iraq's Capacity to Assume a Greater Cost Share
of Its Security, Reconstruction, and Economic Needs:
To identify Iraq's estimated revenues and expenditures from 2005
through 2008, and Iraq's financial deposits and budget surpluses
through 2008, we relied on the data sources and methodology outlined in
our August 2008 report.[Footnote 15] To update 2008 revenues, we used
actual crude oil export revenues data through December 2008 as reported
by the Central Bank of Iraq and provided by Treasury and a December
2008 update of the IMF's forecast of net revenues from oil-related
public enterprises and taxes and other revenues. To update total
expenditures for 2008, we reviewed Iraqi Ministry of Finance monthly
budget and expenditure data through December 2008, which were provided
by Treasury.
Enclosure X: Building Iraq's Capacity to Improve Critical Service
Sectors:
To assess Iraq's capacity to provide essential services, we relied
extensively on our prior reports and updated the information as
necessary. To do so, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents
from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, DOD, and the UN. We have determined
that the data were sufficiently reliable for identifying production
goals and whether actual production is meeting these goals. We updated
the data on U.S. and Iraqi spending for the oil, electricity, and water
sector that we used in our August 2008 report. Our data on U.S.
spending includes appropriations for the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief
Fund, Iraq Security Forces fund, Economic Support Fund, Commander's
Emergency Response Program, Iraq Freedom Fund, Democracy Fund, other
agency program funds used for Iraq activities, and operating expenses
from the Coalition Provisional Authority.
Enclosure XI: Enacting Iraqi Legislation to Promote National
Reconciliation:
To determine progress made on actions related to Iraq's constitutional
review and enacting and implementing key legislation, we used prior GAO
reporting and updated information where appropriate. In updating the
information, we reviewed reports and documentation and spoke with
officials from the UN, the U.S. Institute for Peace, nongovernmental
organizations, USAID, DOD, and State. We reviewed draft laws and
enacted legislation, as well as analyses of the laws.
Enclosure XII: Assisting Iraq's Refugees:
To identify key challenges to providing humanitarian assistance and
offering solutions to Iraqi refugees, we reviewed and analyzed reports
and data from the U.S. government, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), other UN agencies, foreign governments, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and research institutes. During our fieldwork in
Washington, D.C., we met with officials from State and the Department
of Homeland Security regarding refugee assistance, refugee admissions,
special immigrant visa programs, and the challenges they have
encountered. We also met with research institutions and NGOs and held
discussion groups with NGOs conducting work in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq
to discuss strategic planning and program implementation challenges.
Through our fieldwork in Geneva, Switzerland; Rome, Italy; Amman,
Jordan; and Damascus, Syria, we met with officials from the U.S.,
Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi governments; UNHCR and other UN umbrella
agencies, including the World Food Program and IOM; international and
local NGOs; and research institutions. Also, with the help of UNHCR, we
held discussion groups with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria to
discuss their situations, needs, assistance received, and challenges
encountered. We toured and observed assistance projects and activities
in resettlement processing centers. We analyzed U.S. funding, refugee
admissions, and visa data, and found the data to be sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Levels of Violence and U.S. Force Levels in Iraq:
This appendix provides information on (1) the levels of violence in
Iraq, as measured through trends in enemy-initiated attacks from May
2003 through January 2009 and (2) the number of U.S. troops deployed to
Iraq from January 2006 through January 2009 and projected troop levels
through October 2010.
Levels of Violence:
As shown in figure 1, security conditions in Iraq deteriorated
following the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra,
but then improved following the surge of U.S. forces in Iraq during
2007. Specifically, the average daily number of enemy-initiated attacks
has declined from about 180 in June 2007 to about 25 in October 2008
and has remained about the same through January 2009. This change
accounts for a decrease of about 85 percent over a period of a year and
a half--primarily due to decreases in violence in Baghdad and Anbar
provinces. From 2003 through 2007, enemy-initiated attacks had
increased around major political and religious events, such as Iraqi
elections and Ramadan. In 2007 and 2008, attacks did not significantly
increase during Ramadan. According to early reporting from the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the provincial elections in January
2009 were not associated with significant increases in violence.
Figure 1: Average Daily Enemy Initiated Attacks, May 2003 through
December 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
The following are plotted against a timeline of May 2003 through
January 2009:
Total average daily attacks;
Average daily attacks on coalition;
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces;;
Average daily attacks on civilians.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense Intelligence Agency-reported
Multinational Force-Iraq data, January 2009.
[End of figure]
The enemy-initiated attacks counted in the Defense Intelligence
Agency's (DIA) reporting include car, suicide, and other bombs;
ambushes; murders, executions, and assassinations; sniper fire;
indirect fire (mortars or rockets); direct fire (small arms or rocket-
propelled grenades); surface-to-air fire (such as man-portable air
defense systems, or MANPADS); and other attacks on civilians. They do
not include violent incidents that coalition or Iraqi security forces
initiated, such as cordon and searches, raids, arrests, and caches
cleared.
According to DIA, the incidents captured in military reporting do not
account for all violence throughout Iraq. For example, they may
underreport incidents of Shi'a militias fighting each other and attacks
against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq and other areas with few
or no coalition forces. DIA officials stated, however, that they
represent a reliable and consistent source of information that can be
used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security
situation.
Reports from the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, as well as the
United Nations, have attributed the reduction in violence since June
2007 to three key factors. First, the U.S. surge of troops allowed a
change of tactics and contributed to improvements in the security
environment (see the following section). Second, according to DOD and
MNF-I reports, the establishment of local nongovernmental security
forces that oppose al Qaeda in Iraq has helped decrease the levels of
violence in parts of Iraq, most notably in Anbar province. Third, the
cease-fire declared in August 2007 by Moqtada al Sadr, the leader of
the Mahdi Army, an extremist Shi'a militia, contributed significantly
to the decline in violence in the second half of 2007, according to DOD
and UN reports.
U.S. Force Levels in Iraq:
In January 2007, the prior administration called for an increase of
over 20,000 U.S. combat and other forces, including an additional five
brigades, to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods and protect the
local population. Figure 2 shows the increase of U.S. forces in Iraq
from about 131,500 in December 2006 to about 169,000 in August 2007, an
overall increase of about 37,500 troops--almost 30 percent above the
December 2006 force level.
Figure 2: U.S. Troops in Iraq, January 2006 through October 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Number of troops plotted against a timeline of January 2006 through
October 2010 (projected). Specific points in time depicted are:
Presurge number of troops: 131,500;
December 2006, Month before surge: 131,500 troops;
August 2007, Peak of surge: 169,000 troops;
July 2008, Declared end of surge; goal of 140,000 troops: 147,500
troops;
January 2009: 144,000 troops;
March 2009: 140,000 troops[A] (projected);
December 2009: 128,000 troops (projected);
August 31, 2010: 50,000 troops (projected).
Sources: DOD, Joint Staff, and State Department data, and Presidential
speech Feb. 27, 2009.
Note: Projections of troop drawdowns between March 2009 and October
2009 and between March 2010 and August 31, 2010 reflect an average rate
of troop reductions over that period.
[A] DOD has not yet provided the final, unclassified number of U.S.
troops in Iraq for February and March 2009. The March 2009 number is
based on a projection provided by DOD officials.
[End of figure]
In September 2007, President Bush announced that the United States
would draw down the surge forces by July 2008--the end of The New Way
Forward strategy--resulting in a decline in U.S. brigade combat teams
from 20 to 15 and a projected force level of about 140,000 U.S. troops.
By December 2008, another brigade combat team was removed from Iraq,
bringing the total number of brigade combat teams in Iraq to 14, as of
March 2009. The number of U.S. troops in Iraq has remained above
projected levels for the end of the surge, and as of January 2009,
there were about 144,000 U.S. troops in Iraq.
In February 2009, the President announced a significant drawdown of
U.S. forces by August 31, 2010. According to DOD and MNF-I officials,
the United States plans to reduce the number of combat troops from
about 140,000 projected in March 2009 to about 128,000 by September
2009. This troop drawdown would represent 2 combat brigades and their
support units, reducing the number of U.S. brigades from 14 to 12.
Based on conditions in Iraq, the MNF-I Commanding General may recommend
further reductions prior to Iraq's national election scheduled for
December 2009. A few months after the election, the United States plans
to further reduce U.S. forces to at most 50,000 troops by August 31,
2010. According to DOD officials, the remaining force will consist of 6
brigades and additional support units.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Treasury:
Note: GAO's comment supplementing those in the report text appears at
the end of this appendix.
Department Of The Treasury:
Assistant Secretary:
Washington:
March 13, 2009:
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
Dear Mr. Christoff,
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the March 2009
draft of the GAO's report, Iraq - Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight. We welcome the GAO's close attention to the way forward in
Iraq, and particularly the fiscal issues that impact Iraq's
reconstruction, economic stability, and self-reliance. Treasury
continues to be closely engaged with the Iraqi Ministry of Finance,
other ministries, and the provincial governments on improving Iraq's
fiscal processes to help ensure that Iraq's resources are being spent
efficiently and responsibly for the betterment of the Iraqi people.
Despite lower oil prices and a changing fiscal environment, Iraq is
still able to shoulder the burden of its own development,
reconstruction, and security programs in 2009. The report correctly
states that although Iraq's end-2008 cumulative surplus fell well short
of the GAO's earlier projection of $67-79 billion, Iraq's $45 billion
in cumulative budget surpluses will sufficiently cover the budgeted
2009 budget deficit of about $16 billion. However, if oil prices remain
at current levels, Iraq will likely have difficulty financing large
fiscal deficits in 2010 and 2011, which could impact spending on
security and reconstruction. Therefore, in addition to improving budget
execution, Iraq will need to better prioritize spending to help
maintain fiscal sustainability in the medium term. [See comment 1]
Iraq's expenditures have increased significantly in 2008:
The report is correct to point out that Iraq's inability to fully
execute its budgets hampers the government's efforts to further
reconstruction and economic growth. But the report should draw
attention to the significant improvements Iraq has recently made in
budget execution. In 2008, Iraq made the following improvements in
budget execution, particularly in spending its investment budget.
* Iraq spent $50 billion in 2008, compared to just $27 billion in 2007
(an 86% increase). While public sector wage increases contributed to
the higher spending, spending on goods and services and investment
projects also increased substantially. In Iraqi dinar terms, government
spending increased by 77%, taking into account the 5% appreciation of
the Iraqi dinar in 2008.
* Iraq's investment spending was almost $9 billion in 2008, which is
150% greater than 2007 investment spending. Including commitments,
total investment spending in 2008 likely approached $12 billion
(compared to roughly $6 billion in 2007).
* Iraq approved one-third of the investment budget in the August 2008
supplemental. Fully executing the original budget plus the supplemental
by the end of the year would be very ambitious by any standard.
Integrated strategy to help improve Iraq's budget execution:
Nonetheless, Iraq has further work to do to improve its ability to
spend its own resources promptly and effectively. This issue remains a
key priority for Treasury. We appreciate the report's highlighting of
Treasury's work with the Embassy to deliver coordinated technical
assistance to help improve Iraqi budget execution. The U.S. Government
created the Public Financial Management Action Group (PFMAG) to better
integrate the many U.S. civilian and military parties active in budget
execution assistance. The group is dedicated to achieving four goals
that are critical to facilitating Iraq's reconstruction:
* Partnering with the Iraqis to mobilize Iraq's substantial financial
resources;
* Supporting budget formulation and execution through a broad-based
engagement with ministries, provincial governments, and other spending
units;
* Facilitating the development of a coherent budgetary framework in
Iraq, incorporating municipal, provincial, and ministerial spending;
and;
* Integrating coalition public financial technical assistance into a
coherent capacity-building effort across all levels of the Iraqi
Government.
Treasury's technical advisors area critical piece of the PFMAG, as they
work with Iraqi officials at the ministries, at the Council of
Representatives, and in the provinces to help achieve these stated
goals. Treasury's cadre of technical advisors will continue to support
the Iraqis in 2009 as the Iraqis further develop their budget
formulation, execution, and monitoring processes. However, Treasury
agrees with the GAO's assertion that agencies may need to reassess
staffing levels if they are required to pay ICASS costs related to
security and other expenses.
Signed by:
Andy Baukol:
Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs:
U.S. Department of the Treasury:
The following is GAO's comment to the Department of the Treasury's
letter dated March 13, 2009.
GAO Comment:
1. GAO's estimate of Iraq's cumulative surplus differs from the
Department of the Treasury's estimate because we use different sources
to determine a small a portion of Iraq's 2008 government revenues--
specifically, non-oil export related revenues. GAO and Treasury both
use data from the Central Bank of Iraq concerning revenue generated
from exports of crude oil, which represents about 90 percent of the
government's revenue. However, GAO uses the International Monetary
Fund's estimate of Iraq's government revenue that is derived from all
other sources, such as oil-related public enterprises and taxes. In
contrast, Treasury is utilizing information gathered by the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad. GAO asked Treasury officials for documentation
validating their estimate, but they could not do so in time for this
report's publication. GAO will work with Treasury to validate the
Ministry of Finance's data for subsequent work in this area.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Related GAO Products:
Letter and Enclosure I: Determining What Conditions Need to Be Met to
Undertake a Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008.
Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Should Identify and Prioritize the Conditions
Necessary for the Continued Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Iraq.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-700C]. Washington, D.C.:
June 2008.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units
as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully
Developed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-143R].
Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2007.
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development
Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage
Risk. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-117]. Washington,
D.C.: October 1, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not
Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1195]. Washington, D.C.: September
4, 2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help
Achieve U.S. Goals. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788]. Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2006.
Plans for Stabilizing Iraq. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-152C]. Washington, D.C.: October 18,
2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and
Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-868C]. Washington, D.C.: September
29, 2005.
Enclosure II: Implementing Key Operational Requirements of the U.S.-
Iraq Security Agreement:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1021T]. Washington, D.C.: July 23,
2008.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP]. Washington, D.C.: January 9,
2007.
Enclosure III: Managing the Redeployment of U.S. Forces and Equipment
from Iraq:
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for
Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-930]. Washington, D.C.: September
10, 2008.
Enclosure IV: Managing and Overseeing U.S. Government Contractors in
Iraq during a Drawdown:
Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for Operational
Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-114R]. Washington, D.C.:
November 20, 2008.
Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19]. Washington, D.C.: October 1,
2008.
Rebuilding Iraq: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and
Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further
Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-966]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2008.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on
Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-572T]. Washington, D.C.:
March 11, 2008.
Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other
Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Oversight and Management of Contractors
in Future Operations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-436T]. Washington, D.C.: January 24,
2008.
Enclosure V: Determining the Department of Defense's Future Costs for
Iraq:
Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of
Defense. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-233R].
Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2008.
Enclosure VI: Transitioning from a Predominantly Military to a Civilian
Presence in Iraq:
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-86R]. Washington, D.C.: October 1,
2008.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection
for Commander's Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in
Iraq. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-736R]. Washington,
D.C.: June 23, 2008.
Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has
Reached Iraqi Security Forces. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-711]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2007.
Enclosure VII: Rightsizing the U.S. Civilian Presence in Iraq:
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-86R]. Washington, D.C.: October 1,
2008.
Embassy Construction: State Has Made Progress Constructing New
Embassies, but Better Planning Is Needed for Operations and Maintenance
Requirements. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-641].
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.
Overseas Staffing: Rightsizing Approaches Slowly Taking Hold but More
Action Needed to Coordinate and Carry Out Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-737]. Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2006.
Embassy Management: Actions Are Needed to Increase Efficiency and
Improve Delivery of Administrative Support Services. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-511]. Washington, D.C.: September 7,
2004.
Overseas Presence: Rightsizing Is Key to Considering Relocation of
Regional Staff to New Frankfurt Center. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-1061]. Washington, D.C.: September
2, 2003.
Overseas Presence: Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at U.S.
Diplomatic Posts in Developing Countries. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-396]. Washington, D.C.: April 7,
2003.
Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can
Support Rightsizing Initiatives. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-780]. Washington, D.C.: July 26,
2002.
Enclosure VIII: Considering the Level of Engagement of the
International Community:
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and
Surplus. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1031].
Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2008.
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International
Donor Commitments. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-827T]. Washington, D.C.: May 9,
2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: International Donor Pledges for Reconstruction Efforts
in Iraq. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-365R].
Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-876]. Washington, D.C.:
July 28, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services,
and Oversight Issues. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-902R]. Washington, D.C.: June 28,
2004.
Enclosure IX: Building Iraq's Capacity to Assume a Greater Cost Share
of Its Security, Reconstruction, and Economic Needs:
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures and
Surplus. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1144T].
Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2008.
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and
Surplus. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1031].
Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2008.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008.
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate
Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-568T]. Washington, D.C.: March 11,
2008.
Iraq Reconstruction: Better Data Needed to Assess Iraq's Budget
Execution. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-153].
Washington, D.C.: January 15, 2008.
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development
Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage
Risk. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-117]. Washington,
D.C.: October 2007.
Enclosure X: Building Iraq's Capacity to Improve Critical Service
Services:
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and
Surplus. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1031].
Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2008.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection
for Commander's Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in
Iraq. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-736R]. Washington,
D.C.: June 23, 2008.
Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore
Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-677]. Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services,
and Oversight Issues. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-902R]. Washington, D.C.: June 28,
2004.
Enclosure XI: Enacting Iraqi Legislation to Promote National
Reconciliation:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008.
Enclosure XII: Assisting Iraq's Refugees:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP]. Washington, D.C.: January 9,
2007.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition, the following staff contributed to the report: Judith
McCloskey, Assistant Director; Johana Ayers; Kathryn Bernet; Margaret
Best; Ann Borseth; Monica Brym; Burns Chamberlain; Joseph Carney;
Carole Coffey; Lynn Cothern; Martin de Alteriis; Timothy DiNapoli;
Walker Fullerton; Richard Geiger; Rhonda Horried; John Hutton; Bruce
Kutnick; Drew Lindsey; Guy Lofaro; Mae Liles; Tetsuo Miyabara; Kathleen
Monahan; Mary Moutsos; Valérie Nowak; Suzanne Perkins; Jason Pogacnik;
Michael Rohrback; Audrey Solis; and William Solis. In addition,
Kathleen Arredondo provided technical assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] This figure includes appropriations for domestic and overseas
military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, such as
Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, as well as stabilization and reconstruction appropriations for
Iraq and Afghanistan. See GAO, Global War on Terrorism: Reported
Obligations for the Department of Defense, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-233R] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15,
2008).
[2] Of this $49 billion, about $22 billion was provided to DOD for
improving Iraqi security forces and is included in the $808 billion
provided primarily in support of the Global War on Terrorism.
[3] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report:
Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837] (Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008).
[4] GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Should Identify and Prioritize the
Conditions Necessary for the Continued Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Iraq,
GAO-08-700C (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008). In December 2008, DOD
declassified the recommendations GAO made in this report. The body of
the report remains classified.
[5] Activities at the strategic level include establishing national and
multinational military objectives, as well as defining limits and
assessing risks for the use of military and other instruments of
national power. In contrast, activities at the operational level
establish objectives that link tactics on the ground to high-level
strategic objectives.
[6] Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the
Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in
Iraq, November 17, 2008, that took effect January 1, 2009. DOD also
refers to the security agreement as a status of forces agreement
(SOFA).
[7] The agreement also defines Iraqi jurisdiction over U.S. forces, DOD
civilian employees, and U.S. forces' contractors in Iraq.
[8] Subsequently, four countries joined the coalition.
[9] The Paris Club is a group of 19 creditor nations and includes the
United States.
[10] Under UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 5 percent of Iraq's
annual oil export revenue is earmarked to finance payment of these
reparations.
[11] The central government ministries include the ministries of oil,
water, electricity, public works, health, housing and construction,
defense, and interior. These figures therefore exclude the Kurdistan
Regional Government and provincial governments.
[12] Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright established OPAP
following the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa to consider the
organization of U.S. embassies and consulates. Department of State,
America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, The Report of the
Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[13] Office of Management and Budget, The President's Management
Agenda, Fiscal Year 2002 (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).
[14] GAO, Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff
Levels Can Support Rightsizing Initiatives, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-780] (Washington, D.C.: July 26,
2002).
[15] GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues,
Expenditures, and Surplus, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1031] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5,
2008).
[End of section]
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