Acquisition Workforce

DOD Can Improve Its Management and Oversight by Tracking Data on Contractor Personnel and Taking Additional Actions Gao ID: GAO-09-616T April 28, 2009

Since 2001, Department of Defense's (DOD) spending on goods and services has more than doubled to $388 billion in 2008, while the number of civilian and military acquisition personnel has remained relatively stable. To supplement its in-house workforce, DOD relies heavily on contractor personnel. If it does not maintain an adequate workforce, DOD places its billion-dollar acquisitions at an increased risk of poor outcomes and vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. This testimony is based on GAO's March 2009 report and addresses DOD's efforts to assess the sufficiency of the total acquisition workforce and to improve its management and oversight of that workforce. It also discusses selected practices of leading organizations that may provide DOD with insights for its efforts.

Although contractor personnel are a key segment of its total acquisition workforce, DOD lacks critical departmentwide information on the use and skill sets of these personnel. DOD also lacks information on why contractor personnel are used, which limits its ability to determine whether decisions to use contractors to supplement the in-house acquisition workforce are appropriate. GAO found that program office decisions to use contractor personnel are often driven by factors such as quicker hiring time frames and civilian staffing limits, rather than by the nature or criticality of the work. In comparison with DOD's practices, leading organizations maintain and analyze data on their contractor personnel and take a business-oriented approach to determining when to use contractor support. DOD also lacks key pieces of information that limit its ability to determine gaps in the acquisition workforce it needs to meet its missions. In addition to lacking information on contractor personnel, DOD lacks complete information on the skill sets of its in-house personnel. DOD also lacks information on the acquisition workforce it needs to meet its mission. Not having this information not only skews analyses of workforce gaps, but also limits DOD's ability to make informed workforce allocation decisions and determine whether the total acquisition workforce--in-house and contractor personnel--is sufficient to accomplish its mission. In comparison with DOD's practices, leading organizations identify gaps in the workforce by assessing the competencies of their workforces and comparing those with the overall competencies the organization needs to achieve its objectives. DOD recently initiated several efforts aimed at improving the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, such as plans for overseeing additional hiring, recruiting, and retention activities. DOD is also planning to increase its in-house acquisition workforce by converting 11,000 contractor personnel to government positions and hiring an additional 9,000 government personnel by 2015. The success of DOD's efforts to improve the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, however, may be limited without comprehensive information on the acquisition workforce it has and needs.



GAO-09-616T, Acquisition Workforce: DOD Can Improve Its Management and Oversight by Tracking Data on Contractor Personnel and Taking Additional Actions This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-616T entitled 'Acquisition Workforce: DOD Can Improve Its Management and Oversight by Tracking Data on Contractor Personnel and Taking Additional Actions' which was released on April 28, 2009. This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed version. 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Testimony: Before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: United States Government Accountability Office: GAO: For Release on Delivery: Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: Tuesday, April 28, 2009: Acquisition Workforce: DOD Can Improve Its Management and Oversight by Tracking Data on Contractor Personnel and Taking Additional Actions: Statement of John K. Needham, Director: Acquisition and Sourcing Management: GAO-09-616T: GAO Highlights: Highlights of GAO-09-616T, a testimony before the subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. Why GAO Did This Study: Since 2001, Department of Defense‘s (DOD) spending on goods and services has more than doubled to $388 billion in 2008, while the number of civilian and military acquisition personnel has remained relatively stable. To augment its in-house workforce, DOD relies heavily on contractor personnel. If it does not maintain an adequate workforce, DOD places its billion-dollar acquisitions at an increased risk of poor outcomes and vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. This testimony is based on GAO‘s March 2009 report and addresses DOD‘s efforts to assess the sufficiency of the total acquisition workforce and to improve its management and oversight of that workforce. It also discusses selected practices of leading organizations that may provide DOD with insights for its efforts. What GAO Found: Although contractor personnel are a key segment of its total acquisition workforce, DOD lacks critical departmentwide information on the use and skill sets of these personnel. DOD also lacks information on why contractor personnel are used, which limits its ability to determine whether decisions to use contractors to augment the in-house acquisition workforce are appropriate. GAO found that program office decisions to use contractor personnel are often driven by factors such as quicker hiring time frames and civilian staffing limits, rather than by the skills needed or the nature or criticality of the work. In comparison with DOD‘s practices, leading organizations maintain and analyze data on their contractor personnel and take a business-oriented approach to determining when to use contractor support. Table: Personnel in Acquisition-Related Functions as Reported by Selected Program Offices in 2008: Organization (number of program offices): Air Force (19); Total (military, civilian, and contractor personnel: 1,549; Contractor personnel, Number: 467; Contractor personnel, Percentage of total: 30. Organization (number of program offices): Army (12); Total (military, civilian, and contractor personnel: 1,723; Contractor personnel, Number: 373; Contractor personnel, Percentage of total: 22. Organization (number of program offices): Navy and Marine Corps (18); Total (military, civilian, and contractor personnel: 2,374; Contractor personnel, Number: 940; Contractor personnel, Percentage of total: 40. Organization (number of program offices): Joint Programs (9); Total (military, civilian, and contractor personnel: 1,460; Contractor personnel, Number: 688; Contractor personnel, Percentage of total: 47. Organization (number of program offices): Missile Defense Agency (8); Total (military, civilian, and contractor personnel: 1,656; Contractor personnel, Number: 809; Contractor personnel, Percentage of total: 49. Organization (number of program offices): Total (66); Total (military, civilian, and contractor personnel: 8,762; Contractor personnel, Number: 3,277; Contractor personnel, Percentage of total: 37. Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. [End of table] DOD also lacks key pieces of information that limit its ability to determine gaps in the acquisition workforce it needs to meet its missions. For example, DOD lacks information on the use and skill sets of contractor personnel, and lacks complete information on the skill sets of its in-house personnel. Not having this data not only skews analyses of workforce gaps, but also limits DOD‘s ability to make informed workforce allocation decisions and determine whether the total acquisition workforce”in-house and contractor personnel”is sufficient to accomplish its mission. In comparison with DOD‘s practices, leading organizations identify gaps in the workforce by assessing the competencies of its workforce and comparing those with the overall competencies the organization needs to achieve its objectives. DOD recently initiated several efforts aimed at improving the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, such as plans for overseeing additional hiring, recruiting, and retention activities. DOD is also planning to increase its in-house acquisition workforce by converting 11,000 contractor personnel to government positions and hiring an additional 9,000 government personnel by 2015. The success of DOD‘s efforts to improve the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, however, may be limited without comprehensive information on the acquisition workforce it has and needs. What GAO Recommends: In its March 2009 report, GAO recommended the Secretary of Defense, among other things, collect data on contractor personnel and identify the total acquisition workforce that the department needs to meet its missions. DOD concurred with three of the recommendations and noted that implementing the other requires careful consideration. View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-616T] or key components. For more information, contact John K. Needham at (202) 512- 5274 or needhamjk1@gao.gov. [End of section] Mister Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition workforce, which is responsible for planning, executing, and supporting DOD's acquisitions. Over the past several years, changes in the federal acquisition environment have created significant challenges to building and sustaining a capable acquisition workforce. From fiscal years 2001 to 2008, DOD's spending on goods and services more than doubled to $388 billion, and the number of weapon system programs has also grown. Despite this substantial increase, the number of civilian and military personnel in DOD's acquisition workforce has remained relatively stable. To supplement its in-house acquisition workforce, DOD relies heavily on contractor personnel. Both GAO and DOD have noted that without an adequate workforce to manage the department's billion-dollar acquisitions, there is an increased risk of poor acquisition outcomes and vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. Today I will discuss the limitations of DOD's assessment of the sufficiency of its total acquisition workforce and highlight some recent DOD efforts to improve the management and oversight of that workforce. I will also discuss selected practices of leading organizations that may provide DOD with insights for its efforts. I will conclude with some observations on what further actions the department should take to address these challenges. This testimony is based primarily on our recent report Department of Defense: Additional Actions and Data Are Needed to Effectively Manage and Oversee DOD's Acquisition Workforce,[Footnote 1] as well as other prior GAO products. We also conducted additional analyses on data we obtained during our recent review of DOD's acquisition workforce management and on updated data we obtained from DOD. This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Background: At the end of fiscal year 2008, the number of civilian and military personnel in DOD‘s acquisition workforce totaled nearly 126,000”of which civilian personnel comprised 88 percent.[Footnote 2] DOD defines its acquisition workforce to include 13 career fields, based on the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990.[Footnote 3] From fiscal years 2001 to 2008, the number of civilian and military acquisition personnel in these 13 fields declined overall by 2.6 percent; however, some career fields have increased substantially”test and evaluation”while others have shown dramatic declines”business, cost estimating and financial management. See appendix II for the number of military and civilian personnel in each of the acquisition career fields in fiscal years 2001 and 2008, and the percentage change between those years. Background: Our prior work has shown that DOD has relied heavily on contractor personnel to supplement its in-house workforce. While use of contractor personnel provides the government certain benefits, such as increased flexibility in fulfilling immediate needs, we and others have raised concerns about the federal government‘s contracting for services, in particular for professional and management support services, including acquisition support services. One key concern is the risk of loss of government control over and accountability for mission-related policy and program decisions when contractors provide services that closely support inherently governmental functions. Inherently governmental functions require discretion in applying government authority or value judgments in making decisions for the government. To the extent that the government does not have sufficient numbers or training in its acquisition workforce to properly oversee contractor personnel that are closely supporting inherently governmental functions, the greater the risk of contractor personnel inappropriately influencing the government‘ s control over and accountability for decisions that may be based, in part, on contractor work. In March 2008, we reported on DOD offices that used contractor personnel to perform the type of tasks closely associated with inherently governmental functions. For our review, we selected 21 offices cited by various DOD officials as having large contractor workforces and representing a cross-section of DOD organizations. In 15 of the offices, contractor personnel outnumbered DOD personnel and comprised as much as 88 percent of the workforce.[Footnote 4] In the other 6 offices, contractor personnel comprised between 19 and 46 percent of the workforce. Although this review did not focus on the acquisition workforce, many of the 21 offices had acquisition responsibilities. Other concerns that have been raised about using contractor personnel for services that closely support inherently governmental functions include the potential for the improper use of personal services contracts[Footnote 5] and the increased potential for conflicts of interest (both organizational and personal).[Footnote 6] An additional concern that has been raised about using contractor personnel is the risk that the government might pay more for the work than it would if the work were to be performed by government personnel. We noted, in March 2008, concern about one DOD component‘s hiring contractor personnel in reaction to a shortfall in the government workforce rather than as a planned strategy to help achieve its mission.[Footnote 7] In our case study, we found that one Army component was paying between 17 and 27 percent more on average for contractor personnel working as contract specialists than for its government employees who were doing equivalent work. Numerous components in DOD share policy and guidance responsibility for the workforce. Among the components, the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), is responsible for managing DOD‘s acquisition workforce, including tailoring policies and guidance specific to the acquisition workforce and managing the training and certification of that workforce. In addition, each military service has its own corresponding acquisition offices that develop additional service-specific guidance, and provide management and oversight of its workforce. Within each service, the program offices identify acquisition workforce needs, make decisions regarding the composition of the workforce (the mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel), and provide the day-to-day management of the workforce. AT&L Lacks Comprehensive Information on the Use of Contractor Personnel in Its Acquisition Workforce: DOD lacks critical departmentwide information on the use and skill sets of contractor personnel performing acquisition-related functions. While DOD planning documents state that the workforce should be managed from a ’total force“ perspective”which includes civilian, military, and contractor personnel[Footnote 8] ”DOD has only recently collected departmentwide data on contractor personnel[Footnote 9] performing acquisition-related functions. According to an AT&L official, DOD‘s baseline count shows that 52,000 contractor personnel are supporting the acquisition workforce. As such, contractor personnel comprise about 29 percent of DOD‘s total acquisition workforce. The AT&L official noted that the contractor personnel tracking system is still under development. Data we obtained from 66 program offices show that contractor personnel comprised more than a third of those offices‘ acquisition-related positions.[Footnote 10] Table 1 shows the data on contractor personnel reported by the 66 program offices (see appendix III for more detailed information). Table 1: Total and Contractor Personnel in Acquisition-Related Functions by Service as Reported by Selected Program Offices in 2008: Organization (number of program offices): Air Force (19); Total: (military, civilian, and contractor personnel): 1,549; Contractor personnel: Number: 467; Contractor personnel: Percentage of total: 30. Organization (number of program offices): Army (12); Total: (military, civilian, and contractor personnel): 1,723; Contractor personnel: Number: 373; Contractor personnel: Percentage of total: 22. Organization (number of program offices): Navy and Marine Corps (18); Total: (military, civilian, and contractor personnel): 2,374; Contractor personnel: Number: 940; Contractor personnel: Percentage of total: 40. Organization (number of program offices): Joint Programs[A] (9); Total: (military, civilian, and contractor personnel): 1,460; Contractor personnel: Number: 688; Contractor personnel: Percentage of total: 47. Organization (number of program offices): Missile Defense Agency (8); Total: (military, civilian, and contractor personnel): 1,656; Contractor personnel: Number: 809; Contractor personnel: Percentage of total: 49. Organization (number of program offices): Total (66); Total: (military, civilian, and contractor personnel): 8,762; Contractor personnel: Number: 3,277; Contractor personnel: Percentage of total: 37. Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. [A] Joint Programs can be staffed by personnel from multiple services. [End of table] DOD also lacks information on factors driving program offices‘ decisions to use contractor personnel rather than hire in-house personnel. DOD guidance for determining the workforce mix outlines the basis on which officials should make decisions regarding what type of personnel” military, civilian, or contractor”should fill a given position. [Footnote 11] The guidance provides instruction on factors that must be considered when deciding on a workforce mix, but does not advise on whether the function is needed to ensure institutional capacity. The guidance also states that using the least costly alternative should be an important factor when determining the workforce mix.[Footnote 12] However, when we asked program offices about their reasons for using contractor rather than civilian personnel, we found that cost was cited by only 1 program office. The 30 program offices, which provided reasons for using contractor personnel, cited the following key factors: * 22 cited a shortage of civilian personnel with a particular expertise, * 18 cited staffing limits on civilian personnel, * 17 cited that the particular expertise sought is generally not hired by the government, * 15 cited the ease or speed of bringing on contractor personnel, * 9 cited having a short-term requirement, * 8 cited funding not being available for civilian personnel, and, * 1 cited the cost of contractor personnel being less than civilian personnel. (See appendix IV for information on the number of program offices reporting the reasons for using contractor personnel by component.) In comparison with DOD‘s practices, we found that leading organizations maintain and analyze data on their contractor personnel in order to mitigate risks, ensure compliance with in-house regulations and security requirements, and ensure that reliance on contractor personnel creates value for the company. We also found that leading organizations take a business-oriented approach to determining when to use contractor support. For example, some companies generally use contractor personnel to facilitate flexibility and meet peak work demands without hiring additional, permanent, full-time employees. Some also place limits on their use of contractor personnel, such as limiting the use of contractor personnel to temporary support, to 1 year of operations, or to functions that are not considered as core pieces of the company‘s main business. AT&L Lacks Key Pieces of Information Necessary to Conduct Workforce Gap Analyses: AT&L lacks key pieces of information that hinder its ability to determine gaps in the number and skill sets of acquisition personnel needed to meet DOD‘s current and future missions. At a fundamental level, workforce gaps are determined by comparing the number and skill sets of the personnel that an organization has with what it needs. However, AT&L lacks information on both what it has and what it needs. Not having this information in its assessments not only skews analyses of workforce gaps, but also limits DOD‘s ability to make informed workforce allocation decisions. With regard to information on the personnel it has, AT&L lacks complete information on the skill sets of the current acquisition workforce” including the skill sets being fulfilled by contractor personnel”and whether these skill sets are sufficient to accomplish its missions. AT&L is currently conducting a competency assessment to identify the skill sets of its current in-house acquisition workforce. While this assessment will provide useful information regarding the skill sets of the current in-house acquisition workforce, it is not designed to determine the size, composition, and skill sets of an acquisition workforce needed to meet the department‘s missions. AT&L also lacks complete information on the acquisition workforce needed to meet DOD‘s mission. The personnel numbers that AT&L uses to reflect needs are derived from the budget. Because these personnel numbers are constrained by the size of the budget, they likely do not reflect the full needs of acquisition programs. Of the 66 program offices that provided data to us,[Footnote 13] reported that their authorized personnel levels were lower than those they requested. In comparison with DOD‘s practices, we found that leading organizations identify gaps in the workforce by assessing the competencies of its workforce and comparing those with the overall competencies the organization needs to achieve its objectives. An official from one company noted that such an assessment indicated that the company needed skill sets different from those it needed in the past, because the work in one of its lines of service had increased. Recent Workforce Initiatives May Not Yield the Additional Information DOD Needs: AT&L has begun several initiatives aimed at improving DOD‘s management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, including developing data, tools, and processes to more fully assess and monitor its acquisition workforce. Some of AT&L‘s recent initiatives include:[Footnote 13] * Drafting an addendum to the Implementation Report for the DOD Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan 2006-2010 that will lay out AT&L‘ s vision and key initiatives for managing and overseeing the acquisition workforce and an analysis of the status of the acquisition workforce.[Footnote 14] * Implementing the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, with efforts focused in three key areas: (1) recruiting and hiring, (2) training and development, and (3) retention and recognition.[Footnote 15] The largest proportion of the fund is currently slated for recruiting and hiring. * Developing a competency assessment for the acquisition workforce, which is scheduled to be completed in March 2010. * Establishing the Defense Acquisition Workforce Joint Assessment Team. According to an AT&L official, the team will now focus its efforts on identifying, tracking, and reporting information on contractor personnel supporting the acquisition workforce--including developing a common definition to be used across the department. * The Secretary of Defense recently announced that efforts will begin in fiscal year 2010 to increase the size of the acquisition workforce by converting 11,000 contractor personnel to government positions and hiring an additional 9,000 government personnel by 2015. According to an AT&L official, AT&L is working with the components to develop the plans for these efforts. Another DOD initiative aimed at improving the broader workforce may have the potential to enhance AT&L‘s efforts to obtain information on the skill sets of contractor personnel supporting the acquisition workforce. Specifically, DOD, through its components, is developing an annual inventory of contracts for services. The inventory is required to include, among other things, information identifying the missions and functions performed by contractors, the number of full-time contractor personnel equivalents, and the funding source for the contracted work. The Army issued its first inventory for fiscal year 2007. This initial inventory, however, does not include information on the skill sets provided by the contractor personnel and the functions they perform. Inventories for all DOD components are not scheduled to be completed before June 2011. Although these efforts are promising, their success in improving the management and oversight of DOD‘s acquisition workforce may be limited by DOD‘s lack of comprehensive information on the acquisition workforce it has and needs. Concluding Observations: DOD faces significant challenges in assessing and overseeing its acquisition workforce to ensure that it has the capacity to acquire needed goods and services and monitor the work of contractors. While DOD‘s recent and planned actions could help address many of these challenges, the department has yet to determine the acquisition workforce that it needs or develop comprehensive information about contractor personnel”including the skill sets provided, functions performed, or length of time for which they are used. Without having more comprehensive information on its total acquisition workforce on a departmentwide basis, DOD runs the risk of not having the right number and appropriate mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel it needs to accomplish its missions. In addition, without guidance on the appropriate circumstances under which contractor personnel may perform acquisition work, DOD runs the risk of not maintaining sufficient institutional capacity to perform its missions, or losing control over and accountability for mission-related policy and program decisions. In our report released March 25, 2009, we made several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to better ensure that DOD‘s acquisition workforce is the right size with the right skills and that the department is making the best use of its resources. We recommended that the Secretary: * Collect and track data on contractor personnel who supplement the acquisition workforce”including their functions performed, skill sets, and length of service”and conduct analyses using these data to inform acquisition workforce decisions. * Identify and update on an ongoing basis the number and skill sets of the total acquisition workforce that the department needs to fulfill its mission. * Review and revise the criteria and guidance for using contractor personnel to clarify under what circumstances and the extent to which it is appropriate to use contractor personnel to perform acquisition- related functions. * Develop a tracking mechanism to collect information on the reasons contractor personnel are being used so that DOD can determine whether the guidance has been appropriately implemented across the department. We are pleased that DOD has implemented part of the first recommendation by collecting departmentwide data on the number of contractor personnel that support the acquisition workforce. We are encouraged by DOD generally concurring with the rest of our recommendations, although the department noted that collecting information on the skill sets and length of service of contractor personnel needed to be carefully considered. We agree that the manner in which data on contractor personnel are to be collected should continue to be carefully considered. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that comprehensive data on contractor personnel are needed to accurately identify the department‘s acquisition workforce gaps and inform its decisions on the appropriate mix of in-house or contractor personnel. As DOD moves forward with its recently announced plans to increase the size of the acquisition workforce over the next few years, having comprehensive information about the acquisition workforce it both has and needs will become even more vital to ensure the department makes the most effective workforce decisions. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. [End of section] Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methods: This testimony is based primarily on our recent report Department of Defense: Additional Actions and Data Are Needed to Effectively Manage and Oversee DOD‘s Acquisition Workforce.[Footnote 16] This report (1) assessed DOD‘s ability to determine whether its acquisition workforce is sufficient to meet its national security mission, (2) assessed the department‘s recent initiatives to improve the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, and (3) discussed practices of leading organizations that could provide insights for DOD‘s acquisition workforce oversight. To conduct our review, we analyzed key DOD workforce documents, including the department‘s Implementation Report for the DOD Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan 2006-2010 and related assessment of the acquisition workforce. In addition, we met with representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), the Office of Civilian Personnel Policy within the Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, the three military services, and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). We also gathered data from 66 major weapon system program offices across all DOD components. To obtain more detailed information, we interviewed officials from 4 program offices, 1 from each service (Army‘s Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor, Air Force‘s Reaper, and Navy‘s Presidential Helicopter) and 1 from MDA (Airborne Laser). We selected the program offices, in part, because they were responsible for developing and acquiring major weapon systems, mostly in the development phase, and contained a mix of both contractor and civilian personnel. To better understand the workforce management practices of leading organizations, we met with representatives from six companies recognized as leaders for various aspects of workforce management: Deloitte; General Electric Company (General Electric); Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed Martin); Microsoft; Rolls-Royce, PLC (Rolls-Royce); and Valero Energy Corporation (Valero Energy). We also reviewed research on leading workforce practices or discussed workforce management issues with officials at a number of nonprofit and consulting organizations: Aerospace Industries Association, APQC,[Footnote 17] IBM Center for The Business of Government, National Academy of Public Administration, Partnership for Public Service, and the Society for Human Resource Management. [End of section] Appendix II: Department of Defense In-house Acquisition Workforce by Career Fields: Table 2: DOD Acquisition Workforce--Military and Civilian Personnel for Fiscal Years 2001 and 2008: Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Program Management; Fiscal year 2001: 14,031; Fiscal year 2008: 12,781; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: -8.9%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Contracting; Fiscal year 2001: 25,413; Fiscal year 2008: 26,680; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: 1.1%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Industrial/Contract Property Management; Fiscal year 2001: 620; Fiscal year 2008: 451; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: -27.3%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Purchasing; Fiscal year 2001: 4,121; Fiscal year 2008: 1,196; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: -71.0%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Facilities Engineering; Fiscal year 2001: 0; Fiscal year 2008: 4,920; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: n/a. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Production Quality and Manufacturing; Fiscal year 2001: 10,547; Fiscal year 2008: 9,138; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: -13.4%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Business, Cost Estimating and Financial Management; Fiscal year 2001: 10,279; Fiscal year 2008: 7,085; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: -31.1%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Life Cycle Logistics; Fiscal year 2001: 11,060; Fiscal year 2008: 13,361; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: 20.8%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Information Technology; Fiscal year 2001: 5,612; Fiscal year 2008: 3,934; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: -29.9%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: System Planning, Research, Development and Engineering--Systems Engineering; Fiscal year 2001: 34,899; Fiscal year 2008: 34,537; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: -1.0%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: System Planning, Research, Development and Engineering--Science and Technology Manager; Fiscal year 2001: 0; Fiscal year 2008: 480; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: n/a. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Test and Evaluation; Fiscal year 2001: 5,113; Fiscal year 2008: 7,420; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: 45.1%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Auditing; Fiscal year 2001: 3,457; Fiscal year 2008: 3,638; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: 5.2%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Unknown/Other; Fiscal year 2001: 4,097; Fiscal year 2008: 1,258; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: -69.3%. Acquisition workforce by functional career field: Total; Fiscal year 2001: 129,249; Fiscal year 2008: 125,879; Percentage change fiscal years 2001 to 2008: -2.6%. Source: DOD data. [End of table] [End of section] Appendix III: Department of Defense Personnel by Type and Function for Selected Program Offices: Table 3: Military, Civilian, and Contractor Personnel in Acquisition- Related Functions by Service as Reported by Selected Program Offices in 2008: Type of personnel by Function: Program Management: Military; Air Force: (19 program offices): 142; Army: (12 program offices): 146; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 37; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 35; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 33; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 393. Type of personnel by Function: Program Management: Civilian; Air Force: (19 program offices): 63; Army: (12 program offices): 88; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 93; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 56; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 31; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 331. Type of personnel by Function: Program Management: Contractor; Air Force: (19 program offices): 99; Army: (12 program offices): 42; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 43; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 53; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 8; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 245. Type of personnel by Function: Program Management: University/FFRDC[D]; Air Force: (19 program offices): 4; Army: (12 program offices): 0; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 1; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 6; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 3; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 14. Type of personnel by Function: Business (includes auditing, business, cost estimating, financial management, property management, and purchasing): Military; Air Force: (19 program offices): 17; Army: (12 program offices): 0; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 9; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 8; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 8; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 42. Type of personnel by Function: Business (includes auditing, business, cost estimating, financial management, property management, and purchasing): Civilian; Air Force: (19 program offices): 69; Army: (12 program offices): 135; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 150; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 42; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 54; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 450. Type of personnel by Function: Business (includes auditing, business, cost estimating, financial management, property management, and purchasing): Contractor; Air Force: (19 program offices): 79; Army: (12 program offices): 45; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 82; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 92; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 109; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 407. Type of personnel by Function: Business (includes auditing, business, cost estimating, financial management, property management, and purchasing): University/FFRDC; Air Force: (19 program offices): 1; Army: (12 program offices): 0; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 11; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 3; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 2; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 17. Type of personnel by Function: Contracting: Military; Air Force: (19 program offices): 13; Army: (12 program offices): 2; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 1; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 4; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 1; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 21. Type of personnel by Function: Contracting: Civilian; Air Force: (19 program offices): 75; Army: (12 program offices): 115; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 52; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 57; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 53; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 352. Type of personnel by Function: Contracting: Contractor; Air Force: (19 program offices): 23; Army: (12 program offices): 5; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 11; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 18; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 16; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 73. Type of personnel by Function: Contracting: University/FFRDC; Air Force: (19 program offices): 1; Army: (12 program offices): 0; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 0; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 0; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 0; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 1. Type of personnel by Function: Engineering and Technical (includes systems planning, research, development and engineering; lifecycle logistics; test and evaluation; production, quality and manufacturing; and facilities engineering): Military; Air Force: (19 program offices): 125; Army: (12 program offices): 40; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 136; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 100; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 72; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 473. Type of personnel by Function: Engineering and Technical (includes systems planning, research, development and engineering; lifecycle logistics; test and evaluation; production, quality and manufacturing; and facilities engineering): Civilian; Air Force: (19 program offices): 150; Army: (12 program offices): 784; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 901; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 325; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 421; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 2,581. Type of personnel by Function: Engineering and Technical (includes systems planning, research, development and engineering; lifecycle logistics; test and evaluation; production, quality and manufacturing; and facilities engineering): Contractor; Air Force: (19 program offices): 266; Army: (12 program offices): 281; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 804; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 525; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 677; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 2,552. Type of personnel by Function: Engineering and Technical (includes systems planning, research, development and engineering; lifecycle logistics; test and evaluation; production, quality and manufacturing; and facilities engineering): University/FFRDC; Air Force: (19 program offices): 422; Army: (12 program offices): 40; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 44; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 136; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 169; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 811. Type of personnel by Function: Totals: Military; Air Force: (19 program offices): 297; Army: (12 program offices): 188; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 183; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 147; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 114; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 929. Type of personnel by Function: Totals: Civilian; Air Force: (19 program offices): 357; Army: (12 program offices): 1,122; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 1,196; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 480; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 559; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 3,714. Type of personnel by Function: Totals: Contractor; Air Force: (19 program offices): 467; Army: (12 program offices): 373; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 940; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 688; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 809; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 3,277. Type of personnel by Function: Totals: University/FFRDC; Air Force: (19 program offices): 428; Army: (12 program offices): 40; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 56; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 145; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 174; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 843. Type of personnel by Function: Grand Total; Air Force: (19 program offices): 1,549; Army: (12 program offices): 1,723; Navy: (18 program offices)[A]: 2,374; Joint services: (9 program offices)[B]: 1,460; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 1,656; Total: (66 program offices)[C]: 8,762. Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. [A] Navy includes one Marine Corps program office. [B] Joint Programs can be staffed by personnel from multiple services. [C] Program offices reported additional administrative and other staff that we excluded from this table, as they would not be considered part of the acquisition workforce. [D] FFRDC personnel work in Federally Funded Research and Development Centers. [End of table] [End of section] Appendix IV: Department of Defense Reasons for Using Contractor Personnel in Selected Program Offices: Table 5: Number of Program Offices Reporting Reason for Using Contractor Personnel as Reported by Selected Program Offices in 2008: Ease or speed of bringing on contractor personnel (compared with hiring civilians): Air Force: (10 program offices): 2; Army: (3 program offices): 3; Navy and Marine Corps: (5 program offices): 3; Joint services: (4 program offices)[A]: 2; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 5; Total: (30 program offices): 15. Funding not available in budget accounts used for civilian personnel: Air Force: (10 program offices): 4; Army: (3 program offices): 0; Navy and Marine Corps: (5 program offices): 2; Joint services: (4 program offices)[A]: 1; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 1; Total: (30 program offices): 8. Overall staffing limits on civilian personnel: Air Force: (10 program offices): 8; Army: (3 program offices): 3; Navy and Marine Corps: (5 program offices): 3; Joint services: (4 program offices)[A]: 2; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 2; Total: (30 program offices): 18. Expertise does not exist--specialized skill/not generally hired: Air Force: (10 program offices): 5; Army: (3 program offices): 1; Navy and Marine Corps: (5 program offices): 4; Joint services: (4 program offices)[A]: 2; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 5; Total: (30 program offices): 17. Expertise does not exist--shortage of civilian personnel with this expertise: Air Force: (10 program offices): 6; Army: (3 program offices): 2; Navy and Marine Corps: (5 program offices): 4; Joint services: (4 program offices)[A]: 3; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 7; Total: (30 program offices): 22. Short-term requirement: Air Force: (10 program offices): 0; Army: (3 program offices): 2; Navy and Marine Corps: (5 program offices): 4; Joint services: (4 program offices)[A]: 2; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 1; Total: (30 program offices): 9. Cost of contractor personnel less than civilian personnel: Air Force: (10 program offices): 0; Army: (3 program offices): 1; Navy and Marine Corps: (5 program offices): 0; Joint services: (4 program offices)[A]: 0; Missile: Defense Agency: (8 program offices): 0; Total: (30 program offices): 1. Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. [A] Joint Programs can be staffed by personnel from multiple services. [End of table] [End of section] GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: John K. Needham, (202) 512-5274 or needhamjk1@gao.gov: In addition to the contact named above, Carol Dawn Petersen, Assistant Director, and Ruth "Eli" DeVan, Analyst-in-Charge, made key contributions to this report. [End of section] Related GAO Products: Department of Defense: Additional Actions and Data Are Needed to Effectively Manage and Oversee DOD's Acquisition Workforce. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-342]. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2009. Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Build on Recent Progress to Strengthen DOD's Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-235]. Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2009. High Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January 2009. Department of Homeland Security: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Better Ensure the Acquisition Workforce Can Meet Mission Needs. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-30]. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2008. Human Capital: Transforming Federal Recruiting and Hiring Efforts. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-762T]. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2008. Defense Contracting: Army Case Study Delineates Concerns with Use of Contractors as Contract Specialists. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-360]. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2008. Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-572T]. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008. Defense Contracting: Additional Personal Conflict of Interest Safeguards Needed for Certain DOD Contractor Employees. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-169]. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2008. Federal Acquisition: Oversight Plan Needed to Help Implement Acquisition Advisory Panel's Recommendations. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-515T]. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2008. The Department of Defense's Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan Does Not Meet Most Statutory Requirements. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-439R]. Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2008. Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Increased Reliance on Service Contractors Exacerbates Long-standing Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-621T]. Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2008. Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and Oversight Needed to Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected Services. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-990]. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2007. Federal Acquisitions and Contracting: Systemic Challenges Need Attention. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1098T]. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2007. Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management and Oversight Needed to Better Control DOD's Acquisition of Services. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-832T]. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2007. Highlights of a GAO Forum: Federal Acquisition Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-45SP]. Washington, D.C.: October 2006. Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function At Federal Agencies. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-218G]. Washington, D.C.: September 2005. A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002. [End of section] Footnotes: [1] GAO, Department of Defense: Additional Actions and Data Are Needed to Effectively Manage and Oversee DOD's Acquisition Workforce, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-342] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009). [2] DOD‘s acquisition workforce count does not include other contributors to acquisition, such as contracting officer representatives, and nongovernmental contributors, such as contractor personnel. [3] Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, 1202(a). [4] GAO, Defense Contracting: Additional Personal Conflicts of Interest Safeguards Needed for Certain DOD Contractor Employees, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-169] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2008). [5] Personal services contracts are characterized by the employer- employee relationship created between the government and the contractor‘ s personnel. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 37.104(a). Agencies are prohibited from awarding personal services contracts unless specifically authorized by statute. FAR 37.104(b). [6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-169]. Personal conflicts of interest can occur when contractor personnel can materially influence DOD‘s recommendations and/or decisions and, because of his/her personal activities, relationships, or financial interests, may lack or appear to lack objectivity or appear to be unduly influenced by personal financial interest. Organizational conflicts of interest can occur when a defense contractor has present or currently planned interests that either directly or indirectly relate to the work to be performed under a DOD contract and (1) may diminish its capacity to give impartial, technically sound, objective assistance or advice, or (2) may result in it having an unfair competitive advantage. [7] GAO, Defense Contracting: Army Case Study Delineates Concerns with Use of Contractors as Contract Specialists, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-360] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2008). [8] DOD, Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan 2006-2010 and Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Feb. 6, 2006). [9] Although university and Federally Funded Research and Development Center personnel are retained by DOD through contracts, for purposes of this report, we do not include them as contractor personnel because DOD tracks them separately. [10] For the purposes of this report, we defined acquisition-related functions to be those related to planning, executing, and supporting DOD‘s acquisitions, including: program management; business functions, such as auditing, business, cost estimating, financial management, property management, and purchasing; contracting; and engineering and technical, including systems planning, research, development and engineering, life-cycle logistics, test and evaluation, production, quality and manufacturing, and facilities engineering. [11] Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22, Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix, paragraph 1.1 (Apr. 6, 2007). [12] Department of Defense Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management, paragraph 3.2.3 (Feb. 12, 2005); Department of Defense Instruction 1100.2, Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix, paragraph 4 (Apr. 6, 2007). [13] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-342] for information on additional AT&L initiatives. [14] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required DOD to issue this addendum. See Pub. L. No. 110-181, 851 (2008). [15] Section 1705 of title 10 of the U.S. Code requires DOD to establish and fund the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. The fund is financed by an amount equivalent to a portion of the military services‘ and defense agencies‘ expenditures for certain types of service contracts. [16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-342]. [17] APQC was previously known as the American Productivity & Quality Center. [End of section] GAO's Mission: The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 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