Contingency Contracting
DOD, State, and USAID Are Taking Actions to Track Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan Gao ID: GAO-09-538T April 1, 2009The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors to support troops and civilian personnel and carry out reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While recognizing the benefits of using contactors, GAO and others have noted the risks and challenges associated with relying on contractors. To help increase contractor oversight, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed DOD, State, and USAID to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan that identified a database to track information on contractor personnel and contracts performed in the two countries. In their July 2008 MOU, the agencies designated the Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker database (SPOT) as their system for tracking the required information. GAO's testimony addresses how contractor personnel and contract information can aid agencies in managing contracts and the status of SPOT's implementation. It is drawn from GAO's ongoing and prior contingency contracting work. This work involved meeting with agency officials, including those in Iraq, and reviewing agency documents. GAO obtained agency views on previously unreported information, which the agencies generally agreed with.
GAO has reported extensively on the management and oversight challenges related to using contractors in contingency operations and the need for decision makers to have contract and contractor personnel information as a starting point to address these challenges. The lack of such information limits agency planning efforts, increases costs, and introduces unnecessary risk. For example, GAO previously determined that by not considering contractor resources when developing an assistance strategy for Afghanistan, USAID's ability to make informed resource allocation decisions was impaired. Similarly, it was estimated in 2006 that DOD's lack of visibility on what government support contractors were entitled to cost an extra $43 million in Iraq as the government provided them free meals and a food allowance. Many of GAO's past recommendations focused on improving agency officials' ability to obtain contract and contractor personnel information. While actions have been taken to address GAO's recommendations, agency officials have noted that their ability to access information on contracts and contractor personnel still needs improvement and SPOT has the potential to bring information together so it can be used to better manage and oversee contractors. Although SPOT is capable of tracking contractor personnel and contracts as agreed to in the MOU, not all of the required information is being entered and the agencies continue to rely on other systems to obtain information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD, State, and USAID now require their contractors in Iraq to enter personnel data into SPOT, but only DOD and State require their contractors to do so in Afghanistan. A critical factor in prompting the use of SPOT was DOD's requirement that contractor personnel have SPOT-generated letters of authorization (LOA) to, among other things, enter Iraq or Afghanistan. However, not all personnel need SPOT-generated LOAs and are being entered into SPOT. USAID officials said that the lack of an LOA requirement for its contractors in Afghanistan is one reason they do not have to be entered into SPOT. Officials from the three agencies also acknowledged that data on Iraqi and Afghan nationals in SPOT are incomplete, which is in part because they typically do not need LOAs and are more difficult to track. Despite the agencies' progress in implementing SPOT, they continue to rely on other systems to obtain information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, DOD relies on a quarterly census of contractor personnel because it is regarded as more complete than SPOT whereas USAID relies entirely on ad hoc queries of its contractors. As the agencies consider how to use SPOT data to inform planning and management decisions, they have raised questions about what information needs to be in the system. For example, USAID officials have questioned the need to track information on contracts for which personnel do not need LOAs.
GAO-09-538T, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Are Taking Actions to Track Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, April 1, 2009:
Contingency Contracting:
DOD, State, and USAID Are Taking Actions to Track Contracts and
Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Statement of John P. Hutton, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-09-538T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-538T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on
contractors to support troops and civilian personnel and carry out
reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While recognizing the
benefits of using contractors, GAO and others have noted the risks and
challenges associated with relying on contractors.
To help increase contractor oversight, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed DOD, State, and USAID
to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan that identified a database to track information on
contractor personnel and contracts performed in the two countries. In
their July 2008 MOU, the agencies designated the Synchronized Pre-
Deployment and Operational Tracker database (SPOT) as their system for
tracking the required information.
GAO‘s testimony addresses how contractor personnel and contract
information can aid agencies in managing contracts and the status of
SPOT‘s implementation. It is drawn from GAO‘s ongoing and prior
contingency contracting work. This work involved meeting with agency
officials, including those in Iraq, and reviewing agency documents. GAO
obtained agency views on previously unreported information, which the
agencies generally agreed with.
What GAO Found:
GAO has reported extensively on the management and oversight challenges
related to using contractors in contingency operations and the need for
decision makers to have contract and contractor personnel information
as a starting point to address these challenges. The lack of such
information limits agency planning efforts, increases costs, and
introduces unnecessary risk. For example, GAO previously determined
that by not considering contractor resources when developing an
assistance strategy for Afghanistan, USAID‘s ability to make informed
resource allocation decisions was impaired. Similarly, it was estimated
in 2006 that DOD‘s lack of visibility on what government support
contractors were entitled to cost an extra $43 million in Iraq as the
government provided them free meals and a food allowance. Many of GAO‘s
past recommendations focused on improving agency officials‘ ability to
obtain contract and contractor personnel information. While actions
have been taken to address GAO‘s recommendations, agency officials have
noted that their ability to access information on contracts and
contractor personnel still needs improvement and SPOT has the potential
to bring information together so it can be used to better manage and
oversee contractors.
Although SPOT is capable of tracking contractor personnel and contracts
as agreed to in the MOU, not all of the required information is being
entered and the agencies continue to rely on other systems to obtain
information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. DOD, State, and USAID now require their contractors in
Iraq to enter personnel data into SPOT, but only DOD and State require
their contractors to do so in Afghanistan. A critical factor in
prompting the use of SPOT was DOD‘s requirement that contractor
personnel have SPOT-generated letters of authorization (LOA) to, among
other things, enter Iraq or Afghanistan. However, not all personnel
need SPOT-generated LOAs and are being entered into SPOT. USAID
officials said that the lack of an LOA requirement for its contractors
in Afghanistan is one reason they do not have to be entered into SPOT.
Officials from the three agencies also acknowledged that data on Iraqi
and Afghan nationals in SPOT are incomplete, which is in part because
they typically do not need LOAs and are more difficult to track.
Despite the agencies‘ progress in implementing SPOT, they continue to
rely on other systems to obtain information on contractor personnel and
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, DOD relies on a
quarterly census of contractor personnel because it is regarded as more
complete than SPOT whereas USAID relies entirely on ad hoc queries of
its contractors. As the agencies consider how to use SPOT data to
inform planning and management decisions, they have raised questions
about what information needs to be in the system. For example, USAID
officials have questioned the need to track information on contracts
for which personnel do not need LOAs.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-538T] for key
components. For more information, contact John P. Hutton at (202) 512-
4841 or huttonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss ongoing efforts by the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (State), and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to implement their
memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As you know, DOD, State, and USAID have relied extensively
on contractors to support troops and civilian personnel and to oversee
and carry out reconstruction efforts. Contractor personnel in the two
countries have provided a range of services for the three agencies,
such as interpretation, security, weapon systems maintenance,
intelligence analysis, facility operations support, advice to Iraqi and
Afghan ministries, and road and infrastructure construction. The use of
contractors in contingency operations is not new, but the number of
contractors and the work they are performing in Iraq and Afghanistan
represent an increased reliance on contractors to carry out agency
missions. While recognizing the benefits of using contractors, such as
increased flexibility, we and others have noted the risks associated
with the increased reliance on contractors and the challenges that
federal agencies have in managing and overseeing their growing numbers.
To help increase contractor oversight, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA FY2008) established a
requirement for DOD, State, and USAID to sign a MOU regarding matters
related to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the use of
common databases that will provide the three agencies and Congress with
information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq or
Afghanistan.[Footnote 1] The NDAA FY2008 also directed that we annually
report on DOD, State, and USAID contractor personnel and contracts in
Iraq and Afghanistan each year through 2010.[Footnote 2]
My statement today will focus on how information on contracts and
contractor personnel can assist agencies in managing and overseeing
their use of contractors and the status of DOD, State, and USAID's
implementation of the database that collects statutorily required
information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. This statement is drawn from our ongoing and prior work
related to contracting in contingency operations, including Iraq and
Afghanistan. As part of our ongoing work, we met with DOD, State, and
USAID headquarters officials, as well as those in Iraq, regarding their
current and planned use of the database and reviewed pertinent agency
documents. For work not previously reported, we obtained views from
DOD, State, and USAID on our findings, which the agencies generally
agreed with, and incorporated technical comments where appropriate.
Both our ongoing and prior performance audits were conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audits to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Section 861 of the NDAA FY2008 directed the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator to sign an MOU related
to contracting in Iraq or Afghanistan. The law specified a number of
matters to be covered in the MOU, including the identification of each
agency's roles and responsibilities for matters relating to contracting
in Iraq or Afghanistan, responsibility for establishing procedures for
the movement of contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan,
responsibility for collecting and referring information related to
violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), and identifying
common databases that will serve as repositories of information on
contract and contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan. The NDAA
FY2008 requires the databases to track, at a minimum,
* for each contract:[Footnote 3]
- a brief description,
- its total value, and:
- whether it was awarded competitively, and:
* for contractor personnel[Footnote 4] working under contracts in Iraq
or Afghanistan,
- total number employed,
- total number of personnel performing security functions,[Footnote 5]
and:
- total number of personnel who have been killed or wounded.
DOD, State, and USAID signed the MOU in July 2008.[Footnote 6] Under
the MOU, the three agencies agreed that DOD's Synchronized Pre-
Deployment and Operational Tracker database (SPOT) will be the system
of record for required contract and contractor personnel information.
SPOT is a Web-based system that was initially designed by DOD. The MOU
specified that SPOT will include information on DOD, State, and USAID
contracts with more than 14 days of performance in Iraq or Afghanistan
or valued at more than $100,000 as well as information on the personnel
working under those contracts. The NDAA FY2008, however, did not
specify a minimum dollar value threshold regarding which contracts
should appear in the database.
As agreed to in the MOU, DOD is responsible for all maintenance and
upgrades to SPOT.[Footnote 7] The agencies further agreed to negotiate
funding arrangements for any agency-unique requirements that only
benefit one agency and for specialized training requirements. Each
agency is responsible for ensuring that data elements related to
contractor personnel, such as the number of personnel employed on
contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan, are entered into SPOT and for
requiring its contractors to input that information accurately. Other
data elements related to the contract, such as its value and whether it
was awarded competitively, are to be imported into SPOT from the
Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which is
the federal government's current system for tracking information on
contracting actions.
Information on Contracts and Contractor Personnel Can Help Address
Contract Management and Oversight Challenges:
Given DOD, State, and USAID's extensive reliance on contractors to
support and carry out their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need
for accurate and complete information on contracts and contractor
personnel to inform decisions and oversee contractors is critical. We
have reported extensively on the management and oversight challenges
related to the use of contractors in support of contingency operations
and the need for decision makers to have accurate, complete, and timely
information as a starting point for addressing those challenges.
Although much of our prior work has focused on DOD, the lessons learned
can be applied to other agencies relying on contractors to help carry
out their missions. The agencies' lack of complete and accurate
information on contractors supporting contingency operations inhibits
officials and commanders from developing a complete picture of the
extent to which they rely on contractors, the tasks contractors are
performing, and the government's spending on contractors. These
limitations may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce
unnecessary risk, as illustrated in the following examples:
* Limited visibility over contractors obscures the extent to which
agencies rely on contractors to support operations and help carry out
missions. In our 2006 review of DOD contractors supporting deployed
forces, we reported that a battalion commander in Iraq was unable to
determine the number of contractor-provided interpreters available to
support his unit.[Footnote 8] Such a lack of visibility can create
challenges for planning and carrying out missions. Further, knowledge
of who is on their installation, including contractor personnel, helps
commanders make informed decisions regarding force protection and
account for all individuals in the event of hostile action.
* Without incorporating information on contractors into planning
efforts, agencies risk making uninformed programmatic decisions. As we
noted in our 2004 and 2005 reviews of Afghanistan reconstruction
efforts, when developing its interim development assistance strategy,
USAID did not incorporate information on the contractor resources
required to implement the strategy and the means to measure program
progress.[Footnote 9] Such information was contained in numerous
project and contract documents rather than in a comprehensive strategy.
We determined that the lack of a comprehensive strategy or adequate
financial data impaired USAID's ability to make informed decisions on
resource allocations as it developed the interim strategy.
* A lack of accurate financial information on contracts impedes
agencies' ability to create realistic budgets. As we reported in July
2005,[Footnote 10] despite the significant role played by private
security providers in enabling Iraqi reconstruction efforts, neither
State, DOD, nor USAID had complete data on the costs associated with
using private security providers. As a result, agency officials
acknowledged that security costs had diverted planned reconstruction
resources and led to a reduction in scope or cancellation of certain
reconstruction projects, including a USAID power generation-related
contract in which the agency cut $15 million from two projects to cover
security costs at another.
* Lack of insight into the contract services being performed increases
the risk of paying for duplicative services. In the Balkans, where
billions of dollars were spent for contractor support, we found in 2002
[Footnote 11] that DOD did not have an overview of all contracts
awarded in support operations. Until an overview of all contractor
activity was obtained, no one in DOD knew what the contractors had been
contracted to do and whether there was duplication of effort among the
contracts that had been awarded.
* Costs can increase due to a lack of visibility over where contractors
are deployed and what government support they are entitled to. In our
December 2006 review of DOD's use of contractors in Iraq, an Army
official estimated that about $43 million was lost each year to free
meals provided to contractor employees at deployed locations who also
received a per diem food allowance.[Footnote 12] Similarly, when senior
military leaders began to develop a base consolidation plan, they were
unable to determine how many contractors were deployed and ran the risk
of over-or underbuilding the consolidated bases.
Many of the recommendations from our prior work on contractors
supporting contingency operations focused on increasing agencies'
ability to track contracts and contractor personnel so that decision
makers--whether out in the field or at headquarters--can have a clearer
understanding of the extent to which they rely on contractors, improve
planning, and better account for costs. While actions have been taken
to address our recommendations, DOD, State, and USAID officials have
noted in their recent meetings with us that their ability to access
information on contracts and contractor personnel to inform decisions
still needs improvement. Specifically, information related to contracts
and the personnel working on them in Iraq and Afghanistan may reside
solely with the contractors, be stored in a variety of data systems, or
may exist only in paper form in scattered geographical regions. These
officials indicated that the implementation of the MOU and specifically
the use of SPOT have the potential to bring some of this dispersed
information together so that it can be used to better manage and
oversee contractors.
Agencies Have Made Progress in Implementing their Database to Track
Contractor Personnel and Contracts:
DOD, State, and USAID have made progress in implementing SPOT as agreed
upon in the MOU, but not all contractor personnel and contracts are
being entered into the system. The three agencies now require their
contractors to enter personnel data into SPOT, although the
requirements are not applied uniformly across the agencies or in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, SPOT has the capability to track
contract information, but there are differing views as to which
contracts should be tracked. As a result, the agencies continue to rely
on alternative sources for this information and have not yet begun to
incorporate SPOT data into their decision making.
Contractor Personnel:
Since signing the MOU, DOD, State, and USAID have taken actions to have
contractor personnel information entered into SPOT. Specifically, all
three agencies now require their contractors in Iraq to enter personnel
data into SPOT, but only DOD and State require their contractors to do
so in Afghanistan. While the MOU established the requirement for the
agencies to track their contractor personnel in SPOT, officials from
all three agencies explained that a separate DOD order issued in August
2008 was a critical factor in prompting the agencies and their
contractors to begin entering personnel information into SPOT,
particularly for Iraq. This order requires DOD contractor personnel to
have letters of authorization (LOA)[Footnote 13] generated in SPOT so
that they can, among other things, enter Iraq or Afghanistan, receive
military identification cards, travel on U.S. military aircraft, or,
for security contractors, receive approval to carry weapons. Though
DOD's order does not apply directly to non-DOD contractors, State and
USAID also began taking steps to have their contractor personnel
entered into SPOT and to issue them SPOT-generated LOAs to facilitate
their entry into the country and access to U.S. installations. As a
result of the LOA requirement, officials with all three agencies have
expressed confidence that most, if not almost all, contractor personnel
needing LOAs have been entered into SPOT.
The agencies acknowledge that despite their progress not all contractor
personnel are being tracked in SPOT. This is particularly true for
contractor personnel who do not need LOAs and for Iraqi and Afghan
local nationals working under U.S. government contracts. USAID
officials stated that one reason they do not yet require contractors in
Afghanistan to use SPOT is that they do not need LOAs since they
generally do not take U.S. military transport or access U.S.
facilities. One USAID official, citing the burden of fulfilling such a
requirement for the agency, questioned the value of requiring USAID
contractors in Afghanistan to use SPOT absent the need for a SPOT-
generated LOA. In addition, Iraqi and Afghan contractor personnel
typically do not need LOAs. As a result, there is little incentive for
the agencies or contractor firms to ensure that information on local
nationals is entered into SPOT. For example, a State contracting
officer informed us that Iraqis working on his contracts are not in
SPOT because they do not need LOAs. DOD officials further explained
that information on local nationals in SPOT is incomplete, in part,
because the number of Afghan and Iraqi nationals working under
contracts tends to fluctuate and local firms do not always keep precise
track of the individuals working on their projects. Also, USAID has
held off entering Iraqi nationals into SPOT because of concerns that
doing so could pose a threat to their safety should the database be
compromised. DOD officials informed us that they are currently
developing a classified version of SPOT, which could help address this
concern.
SPOT was upgraded in January to fulfill the NDAA FY2008 requirement to
track contractor personnel who have been killed or wounded. Using a
field in SPOT, contractors are able to indicate whether an individual
has been killed, is wounded, or is missing. According to DOD officials,
depending on the extent to which contractors record casualty
information in SPOT, all three agencies may be able to centrally and
systematically obtain such information, something they previously were
unable to do.
Contracts:
With respect to the three agencies' contracts performed in Iraq and
Afghanistan, DOD upgraded SPOT in January 2009 so that it can now
record information on each contact's value, the extent of competition,
and descriptions of the services provided. While the MOU specifies that
the information is to be imported from FPDS-NG, the competition and
description fields are not currently linked to FPDS-NG and that
information must be entered manually.[Footnote 14] While information on
contracts is now being entered into SPOT, there are differing views as
to which contracts need to be entered into the database. The agencies
agreed in the MOU to track contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan that have a
period of performance of more than 14 days or a total value of $100,000
or more. According to DOD officials, they would now like to increase
this value to $250,000. However, DOD currently requires contracts with
more than 30 days of performance or a total value over $25,000 to be
entered into SPOT. Yet in practice, DOD contracting officers have said
that contracts for which personnel need LOAs are entered into the
database even if they do not meet the thresholds. Similarly, the USAID
point of contact for SPOT's implementation said that the agency does
not believe it needs to enter those contracts for which personnel do
not need LOAs, even if the contracts meet the thresholds identified in
the MOU. These varying interpretations stem, in part, from differing
views on the agencies' need to collect and use data on certain
contracts. However, DOD officials informed us that when the agencies
established the MOU requirements, they did not conduct any analyses of
what an appropriate threshold should be given the potential costs and
benefits of obtaining and using such information.
Continued Reliance on Other Systems:
Although their use of SPOT has increased, the database is not yet the
agencies' primary means of obtaining data on contractor personnel or
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD continues to rely on its
quarterly census[Footnote 15] of contractor personnel to obtain
information on the number of U.S., third country, and local nationals
working in Iraq and Afghanistan and the contractor personnel performing
security functions. According to DOD officials in Iraq, the census
provides more complete information. They stated that this is
particularly the case for local nationals working on DOD contracts,
which is of special interest to commanders in Iraq for tracking the
progress of economic development efforts. Although State reported that
most of its contractor personnel are entered into SPOT, it continues to
conduct ad hoc inquiries of contractors to obtain a more complete view
of contractor personnel in the two countries. USAID officials informed
us that they rely entirely on ad hoc inquiries of its contractors to
determine how many personnel are working under each contract in Iraq
and Afghanistan. In responding to our recent requests for contract
data, the three agencies continue to rely on a combination of FPDS-NG,
agency-specific databases, and manually compiled lists as opposed to
using SPOT.
As they rely on other sources of information, the agencies have not
used SPOT data to inform planning or management decisions with limited
exceptions. Officials from both State and USAID told us that they were
uncertain of the extent of their access to SPOT to obtain data and
generate reports that could inform decisions. State officials were able
to provide us with a list of contractor personnel entered into SPOT,
but they said that any special data requests beyond that would need to
be submitted to the SPOT Help Desk and approved by DOD. Similarly, the
USAID official responsible for SPOT told us the agency has a great deal
to learn about using the system, and only after receiving assistance
from the SPOT Help Desk could he figure out how to obtain a SPOT-
generated report of USAID's contractor personnel. Further USAID
officials indicated that they have not yet determined how they can use
data from SPOT to inform various planning and management efforts. In
contrast, DOD is currently using SPOT to monitor contractor personnel
movements into and within Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite limited use
thus far, DOD and State have expressed plans to expand the use of SPOT
for a number of planning and management purposes. For example, DOD
would like to use SPOT to identify contractor personnel who eat at or
receive medical services from U.S. military facilities so that they can
be billed for any unauthorized use of these services. In addition, DOD
officials stated that other agencies, including the Departments of
Energy and the Treasury, have expressed an interest in using SPOT to
track their contractor personnel, while State has indicated a desire to
expand SPOT's use to countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan.
Concluding Observations:
The use of contractors in contingency operations is not new, but the
number of contractors and the work they are performing in Iraq and
Afghanistan represent an increased reliance on contractors to carry out
agency missions. By designating SPOT as their database to track
information on contracts and contractor personnel, DOD, State, and
USAID are not only addressing a statutory requirement, but when fully
implemented, they also have an opportunity to use this information to
help address some longstanding contract management challenges. Using
such information can provide decision makers with a clearer
understanding of the extent they rely on contractors, improve planning,
and better account for costs. However, at this time, agencies have
varying views on the level of detail and types of information to be
captured by the database and the usefulness of such data to better plan
for and oversee the use of contractors. It is important that DOD,
State, and USAID continue to work together to develop and implement a
database that is flexible enough to be applicable across agencies while
still providing detailed information to better manage and oversee
contractors.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
GAO Contacts and acknowledgement:
For further information about this statement, please contact John P.
Hutton (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions
to this statement include Johana R. Ayers, E. Brandon Booth,
Christopher Kunitz, Alise Nacson, and Karen Thornton.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 861, as amended.
[2] For our first report issued under this mandate (Pub. L. No. 110-
181, § 863) see GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID
Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1,
2008). Work on our second report under the mandate is currently
ongoing.
[3] Section 864 of the NDAA FY2008 defines a "contract in Iraq or
Afghanistan" as "a contract with the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, or the United States Agency for International
Development, a subcontract at any tier issued under such a contract, or
a task order or delivery order at any tier issued under such a contract
(including a contract, subcontract, or task order or delivery order
issued by another Government agency for the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, or the United States Agency for International
Development) if the contract, subcontract, or task order or delivery
order involves work performed in Iraq or Afghanistan for a period
longer than 14 days."
[4] The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009 (NDAA FY2009) (Pub. L. No. 110-417, §854) amended section 864
of the NDAA FY2008 to add a definition of "contractor personnel" as
"any person performing work under contract for the Department of
Defense, the Department of State, or the United States Agency for
International Development, in Iraq or Afghanistan, including
individuals and subcontractors at any tier."
[5] Section 864 of the NDAA FY2008 defines private security functions
as the "guarding of personnel, facilities or property of a Federal
agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a third party" and "any
other activity for which personnel are required to carry weapons in the
performance of their duties" under a U.S. government contract in an
area of combat operations.
[6] The NDAA FY2009 amended section 861 of the NDAA FY2008 by
specifying additional matters to be included in the MOU regarding UCMJ
and MEJA offenses and requiring the agencies to modify their MOU to
address these additional matters by February 11, 2009. However,
according to officials with the three agencies, the required
modifications to the MOU are still pending final approval
[7] DOD, as the system owner, currently pays all development and
maintenance costs for SPOT. However, DOD officials we spoke with said
that they are exploring options for having the agencies that use SPOT
pay for some of the maintenance costs.
[8] GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors
Supporting Deployed Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2006).
[9] GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited
Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-403] (Washington, D.C.:
June 2, 2004) and Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress,
Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten
Achievement of U.S. Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-742] (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2005).
[10] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private
Security Providers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-737]
(Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005).
[11] GAO, Defense Budget: Need to Strengthen Guidance and Oversight of
Contingency Operations Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-450] (Washington, D.C.: May 21,
2002).
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145].
[13] An LOA is a document issued by a government contracting officer or
designee that authorizes contractor personnel to travel to, from, and
within a designated area; and to identify any additional
authorizations, privileges, or government support the contractor is
entitled to under the contract.
[14] According to DOD officials, data on contract obligations can be
uploaded into SPOT based on reports provided from FPDS-NG. There are
plans to have a direct link between SPOT and FPDS-NG in 2011.
[15] DOD's Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for
overseeing U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, initiated
its quarterly census of contractor personnel in June 2007 as an interim
measure until SPOT is fully implemented. The census relies on
contractor firms to self-report their personnel data to DOD components,
which then aggregate the data and report them to CENTCOM at the end of
each quarter.
[End of section]
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