Defense Acquisitions
Charting a Course for Lasting Reform
Gao ID: GAO-09-663T April 30, 2009
Since 1990, GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of its major weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area; however DOD's problems delivering weapon systems on time, at the estimated cost, in the planned amounts, and with the promised performance go back decades. Congress and DOD have continually explored ways to improve acquisition outcomes, yet problems persist. The committee asked GAO to testify on measures needed to reform the acquisition of major weapon systems and related legislative proposals. Specifically, this statement will describe the poor outcomes on weapon system investments that make reform imperative; attributes of the requirements, funding, and acquisition processes that will need to change for reform to be effective; and positive steps that Congress and DOD have taken to improve weapon program outcomes. The statement will also examine other factors that should be considered as the committee moves forward with its reform efforts. The testimony is drawn from GAO's body of work on DOD's requirements, funding, and acquisition processes. GAO has made numerous recommendations aimed at improving DOD's management of its major weapon acquisitions, but it is not making any new recommendations in this testimony.
DOD must get a better return on investment from its weapon system programs. Since fiscal year 2003, DOD has increased the number of major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. The cumulative cost growth for DOD's programs is higher than it was 5 years ago, but at $296 billion (fiscal year 2009 dollars), it is less than last year when adjusted for inflation. For DOD's 2008 portfolio of programs, research and development costs are now 42 percent higher than originally estimated and the average delay in delivering initial capabilities has increased to 22 months. These problems have roots in not only the acquisition process, but also in the requirements and funding processes. Collectively, these processes create pressures to demand high performance, keep cost estimates low, and proceed with calendar-driven versus knowledge-driven schedules. These processes also do not adequately prioritize needs from a joint, departmentwide perspective, respond to changing warfighter demands, or constrain the number of programs to a level that is supportable by available resources. Programs are allowed to enter and proceed through the acquisition process with requirements that are not fully understood, cost and schedule estimates that are based on optimistic assumptions, and a lack of sufficient knowledge about technology, design, and manufacturing. Congressionally-mandated and DOD-initiated changes to the acquisition system could provide the basis for sounder programs and improved acquisition outcomes. The committee's proposed legislation dealing with requirements, systems engineering, technology and integration risk assessment, and cost estimation--also address areas in need of reform. However, past reform efforts have failed to produce lasting change. To make the most out of this opportunity, the weapons acquisition environment and the incentives inherent within it will also have to be confronted and addressed.
GAO-09-663T, Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Lasting Reform
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 30, 2009:
Defense Acquisitions:
Charting a Course for Lasting Reform:
Statement of Paul Francis, Managing Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-09-663T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-663T, a testimony before the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 1990, GAO has designated the Department of Defense‘s (DOD)
management of its major weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area;
however DOD‘s problems delivering weapon systems on time, at the
estimated cost, in the planned amounts, and with the promised
performance go back decades. Congress and DOD have continually explored
ways to improve acquisition outcomes, yet problems persist.
The committee asked GAO to testify on measures needed to reform the
acquisition of major weapon systems and related legislative proposals.
Specifically, this statement will describe the poor outcomes on weapon
system investments that make reform imperative; attributes of the
requirements, funding, and acquisition processes that will need to
change for reform to be effective; and positive steps that Congress and
DOD have taken to improve weapon program outcomes. The statement will
also examine other factors that should be considered as the committee
moves forward with its reform efforts.
The testimony is drawn from GAO‘s body of work on DOD‘s requirements,
funding, and acquisition processes. GAO has made numerous
recommendations aimed at improving DOD‘s management of its major weapon
acquisitions, but it is not making any new recommendations in this
testimony.
What GAO Found:
DOD must get a better return on investment from its weapon system
programs. Since fiscal year 2003, DOD has increased the number of major
defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. The
cumulative cost growth for DOD‘s programs is higher than it was 5 years
ago, but at $296 billion (fiscal year 2009 dollars), it is less than
last year when adjusted for inflation. For DOD‘s 2008 portfolio of
programs, research and development costs are now 42 percent higher than
originally estimated and the average delay in delivering initial
capabilities has increased to 22 months.
Table: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios
(Fiscal Year 2009 Dollars):
Portfolio status: Number of programs;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 77;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 95;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 96.
Portfolio status: Total planned commitments;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: $1.2 trillion;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: $1.6 trillion;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: $1.6 trillion.
Portfolio status: Commitments outstanding;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: $724 billion;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: $875 billion;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: $786 billion.
Portfolio status: Change to total research and development costs from
first estimate;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 37 percent;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 40 percent;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 42 percent.
Portfolio status: Change in total acquisition cost from first estimate;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 19 percent;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 26 percent;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 25 percent;
Portfolio status: Estimated total acquisition cost growth;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: $183 billion;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: $301 billion;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: $296 billion.
Portfolio status: Share of programs with 25 percent or more increase in
program acquisition unit cost;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 41 percent;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 44 percent;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 42 percent.
Portfolio status: Average delay in delivering initial capabilities;
Fiscal year 2003 portfolio: 18 months;
Fiscal year 2007 portfolio: 21 months;
Fiscal year 2008 portfolio: 22 months.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
These problems have roots in not only the acquisition process, but also
in the requirements and funding processes. Collectively, these
processes create pressures to demand high performance, keep cost
estimates low, and proceed with calendar-driven versus knowledge-driven
schedules. These processes also do not adequately prioritize needs from
a joint, departmentwide perspective, respond to changing warfighter
demands, or constrain the number of programs to a level that is
supportable by available resources. Programs are allowed to enter and
proceed through the acquisition process with requirements that are not
fully understood, cost and schedule estimates that are based on
optimistic assumptions, and a lack of sufficient knowledge about
technology, design, and manufacturing.
Congressionally-mandated and DOD-initiated changes to the acquisition
system could provide the basis for sounder programs and improved
acquisition outcomes. The committee‘s proposed legislation dealing with
requirements, systems engineering, technology and integration risk
assessment, and cost estimation”also address areas in need of reform.
However, past reform efforts have failed to produce lasting change. To
make the most out of this opportunity, the weapons acquisition
environment and the incentives inherent within it will also have to be
confronted and addressed.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-663T] or key
components. For more information, contact Paul Francis at (202) 512-
4841 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's
(DOD) acquisition of major weapon systems and the legislation that is
being introduced by this committee. As you know, weapon systems
acquisition has been on GAO's high risk list since 1990. Prior to and
since that time, Congress and DOD have continually explored ways to
improve acquisition outcomes, yet problems persist. The opportunity for
meaningful change at this moment is significant, exemplified by the
Defense Acquisition Reform Panel established by this committee; your
recent legislative proposal to reform weapons acquisition; the Senate
Armed Services Committee's acquisition reform legislation; the Senate's
new Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight; DOD's revision of its
acquisition policy for major defense acquisition programs; and the
Secretary of Defense's recent call for acquisition reform and
recommendations for the fiscal year 2010 budget that could end all or
part of at least a half dozen major defense acquisition programs. Yet,
we must be mindful that there have been missed opportunities in the
past. The challenge today will be to address not only how to align
DOD's requirements, funding, and acquisition processes to get better
outcomes, but also how to confront the environment that has made the
area resistant to reform.
Today, I will discuss the (1) poor outcomes on weapon system
investments that make reform imperative; (2) attributes of the
requirements, funding, and acquisition processes that will need to
change for reform to be effective; and (3) positive steps that Congress
and DOD have taken to improve weapon program outcomes. The statement
draws from our extensive body of work on DOD's acquisition of weapon
systems. This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
The Case for Reform:
There can be little doubt that we can--and must--get better outcomes
from our weapon system investments. As can be seen in table 1 below,
cost growth and schedule delays in DOD's portfolio of weapon systems
have been significant.
Table 1: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios:
Fiscal year 2009 dollars.
Portfolio size: Number of programs;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 77;
Fiscal Year: 2007: 95;
Fiscal Year: 2008: 96.
Portfolio size: Total planned commitments;
Fiscal Year: 2003: $1.2 trillion;
Fiscal Year: 2007: $1.6 trillion;
Fiscal Year: 2008: $1.6 trillion.
Portfolio size: Commitments outstanding;
Fiscal Year: 2003: $724.2 billion;
Fiscal Year: 2007: $875.2 billion;
Fiscal Year: 2008: $786.3 billion.
Portfolio indicators: Change to total RDT&E costs from first estimate;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 37 percent;
Fiscal Year: 2007: 40 percent;
Fiscal Year: 2008: 42 percent.
Portfolio indicators: Change to total acquisition cost from first
estimate;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 19 percent;
Fiscal Year: 2007: 26 percent;
Fiscal Year: 2008: 25 percent.
Portfolio indicators: Total acquisition cost growth;
Fiscal Year: 2003: $183 billion;
Fiscal Year: 2007: $301.3 billion[A];
Fiscal Year: 2008: $296.4 billion.
Portfolio indicators: Share of programs with 25 percent increase in
program acquisition unit cost growth;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 41 percent;
Fiscal Year: 2007: 44 percent;
Fiscal Year: 2008: 42 percent.
Portfolio indicators: Average schedule delay in delivering initial
capabilities;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 18 months;
Fiscal Year: 2007: 21 months;
Fiscal Year: 2008: 22 months.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Data were obtained from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR)
(dated December 2002, 2006, and 2007). In a few cases data were
obtained directly from program offices. The number of programs reflects
the programs with SARs; however, in our analysis we have broken a few
SAR programs into smaller elements or programs. Not all programs had
comparable cost and schedule data and these programs were excluded from
the analysis where appropriate. Portfolio performance data do not
include costs of developing Missile Defense Agency elements or the
Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) program.
[A] The total acquisition cost growth for the 2007 portfolio was $295
billion in 2008 constant dollars.
[End of table]
Since 2003, DOD's portfolio of major defense acquisition programs has
grown from 77 to 96 programs and its investment in those programs has
grown from $1.2 trillion to $1.6 trillion (fiscal year 2009 dollars).
[Footnote 1] The total cost growth for DOD's portfolio of major defense
acquisition programs is higher than it was 5 years ago, but at $296
billion, it is actually less than the 2007 portfolio's cost growth of
$301 billion. For DOD's 2008 portfolio of programs, total research and
development costs are 42 percent higher than originally estimated, and
the average delay in delivering initial capabilities is 22 months. In
addition, 42 percent of the programs reported a 25 percent or more
increase in acquisition unit costs.[Footnote 2] DOD's performance in
some of these areas is driven by older, underperforming programs as
newer programs, on average, have not yet shown the same degree of cost
and schedule growth. Of the programs in the 2008 portfolio that
reported comparable cost data, 75 percent (69 programs) reported
increases in research and development costs since their first estimate,
and 69 percent (64 programs) reported increases in total acquisition
costs. Quantities have been reduced by 25 percent or more for 15 of the
programs in the 2008 portfolio.
The overall performance of this portfolio is one indicator of how well
DOD's acquisition system generates the return on investment it promises
to the warfighter, Congress, and the taxpayer. Another is the effect
cost increases have on DOD's buying power for individual systems, as
demonstrated by changes in program acquisition unit costs. Some
examples that illustrate the effect of lost buying power are shown in
table 2 below.
Table 2: Effect of Cost Increases on Buying Power:
Program: Joint Strike Fighter;
Total cost (fiscal year 2009 dollars in billions): First full estimate:
206.4;
Total cost (fiscal year 2009 dollars in billions): Current estimate:
244.8;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 2,866;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 2,456;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 38.4.
Program: Future Combat System;
Total cost (fiscal year 2009 dollars in billions): First full estimate:
89.8;
Total cost (fiscal year 2009 dollars in billions): Current estimate:
129.7;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 15;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 15;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 44.5.
Program: Space Based Infrared System High;
Total cost (fiscal year 2009 dollars in billions): First full estimate:
4.4;
Total cost (fiscal year 2009 dollars in billions): Current estimate:
12.2;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 5;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 4;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 244.7.
Program: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle;
Total cost (fiscal year 2009 dollars in billions): First full estimate:
8.8;
Total cost (fiscal year 2009 dollars in billions): Current estimate:
13.7;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 1,025;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 593;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 167.5.
Program: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft;
Total cost (fiscal year 2009 dollars in billions): First full estimate:
38.7;
Total cost (fiscal year 2009 dollars in billions): Current estimate:
55.5;
Total quantity: First full estimate: 913;
Total quantity: Current estimate: 458;
Acquisition unit cost: Percentage change: 185.9.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
There is no single measure that perfectly explains every variable
behind cost and schedule changes in weapon systems. For example, the
total cost of a weapon system can increase because more quantities are
added, without necessarily being indicative of a problem. On the other
hand, the total cost can stay the same while quantities are
significantly reduced--a clear indication of a problem. While there can
be legitimate debate over which set of measures are the best
explanation of the problem, as table 1 shows, there can be no debate
over the fact that the problem is significant and calls for action.
What Needs to Change?
DOD's key processes for setting requirements, providing funding, and
managing acquisition programs have institutionalized some underlying
causes for persistent problems in weapon system programs. As
illustrated in figure 1 below, collectively, these processes create
pressures to promise high performance, keep cost estimates low, and
proceed with calendar-driven versus knowledge-driven schedules.
Figure 1: Factors Influencing DOD's Ability to Manage Programs and
Improve Outcomes:
[Refer PDF for image: illustration]
Factor: Requirements process;
Pressure on decision makers to: promise high performance.
Factor: Funding process;
Pressure on decision makers to: promise low resource demands.
Factor: Acquisition process;
Pressure on decision makers to: move forward, get knowledge later.
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
DOD's processes for identifying warfighter needs, funding programs, and
developing and procuring weapon systems--which collectively define
DOD's overall weapon system investment strategy--do not work together
to provide the best value to the warfighter and to the taxpayer.
Instead, DOD largely continues to define warfighting needs and make
investment decisions on a service-by-service and individual platform
basis. As a result, DOD does not effectively address joint warfighting
needs and commits to more programs than it has resources for, thus
creating unhealthy competition for funding. At the individual program
level, a military service typically establishes and DOD approves a
business case containing requirements that are not fully understood and
cost and schedule estimates that are based on optimistic assumptions
rather than on sufficient knowledge. This makes it impossible to
successfully execute the program within established cost, schedule, and
performance targets. Because DOD's requirements, funding, and
acquisition processes are led by different organizations, it is
difficult to hold any one person or organization accountable for saying
no to a proposed program or for ensuring that the department's
portfolio of programs is balanced. Frequent turnover in leadership
positions in the department exacerbates the problem. As of March 2009,
the average tenure of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics over the past 22 years has been only about 20
months.[Footnote 3]
Requirements Process:
DOD's requirements determination process--the Joint Capabilities and
Integration Development System (JCIDS)--provides a framework for
reviewing and validating needs. However, it does not adequately
prioritize those needs from a joint, departmentwide perspective and
lacks the agility to meet changing warfighter demands. We recently
reviewed JCIDS documentation related to new capability proposals and
found that most were sponsored by the military services with little
involvement from the joint community, including the combatant
commands.[Footnote 4] By continuing to primarily rely on stovepiped
solutions to address capability needs, DOD may be losing opportunities
to improve joint warfighting capabilities and reduce the duplication of
capabilities in some areas. Furthermore, the vast majority of
capability proposals that enter the JCIDS process are validated or
approved without accounting for the resources or technologies that will
be needed to acquire the desired capabilities. As a result, the process
produces more demand for new weapon system programs than available
resources can support.
Funding Process:
The funding of proposed programs takes place through a separate
process--the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system,
which is not synchronized with JCIDS. We recently reviewed the impact
of the funding process on major defense acquisition programs and found
that the process does not produce an accurate picture of DOD's resource
needs for weapon system programs.[Footnote 5] The estimated cost of
many of the programs we reviewed exceeded the funding levels planned
for and reflected in the Future Years Defense Program--DOD's long-term
investment strategy. Rather than limit the number and size of programs
or adjust requirements, the funding process attempts to accommodate
programs. This creates an unhealthy competition for funds that
encourages sponsors of weapon system programs to pursue overly
ambitious capabilities and to underestimate costs. With too many
programs underway for the available resources and high cost growth
occurring in many programs, DOD must make up for funding shortfalls by
shifting funds from one program to pay for another, reducing system
capabilities, cutting procurement quantities, stretching out programs,
or in rare cases terminating programs. Such actions not only create
instability in DOD's weapon system portfolio, they further obscure the
true future costs of current commitments, making it difficult to make
informed investment decisions.
Acquisition Process:
At the program level, the key cause of poor outcomes is the approval of
programs with business cases that contain inadequate knowledge about
requirements and the resources--funding, time, technologies, and
people--needed to execute them. In a sense, the business cases are
compromised to reconcile the disparate pressures imposed by the
requirements and funding processes. We analyze the soundness of
individual business cases at various points in the acquisition process
through the lens of three knowledge points that are indicators of
technology, design, and production maturity. These knowledge points are
consistent with best practices for product development. Some key
observations on each follow.
Knowledge point 1: Resources and requirements match. Achieving a high
level of technology maturity by the start of system development is an
important indicator of whether this match has been made.[Footnote 6]
This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended
environment. In addition, the developer has completed a preliminary
design of the product that shows the design is feasible. DOD's
acquisition policy and statute both require that technologies should be
demonstrated in a relevant environment prior to starting development--
a slightly lower standard than the best practice. Since 2003, there has
been a significant increase in the technology maturity of DOD programs
at the start of system development; however, few programs have met the
best practices standard. In our most recent assessment, only 4 of the
36 programs that provided data on technology maturity at development
start did so with fully mature critical technologies.[Footnote 7] In
addition, only 4 of the 36 programs that held a preliminary design
review did so before development start; the remaining programs held the
review, on average, 31 months after development began.
Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when a
program determines that a product's design will meet customer
requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability targets. A
best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-level
critical design review, usually held midway through system development.
Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at this point
provides tangible evidence that the product's design is stable, and a
prototype demonstration shows that the design is capable of meeting
performance requirements. Of the 29 programs in our most recent
assessment that have held a system-level critical design review, 7
reported having a stable design. However, the level of design knowledge
attained by the critical design review has been increasing over time.
Knowledge point 3: Manufacturing processes are mature. This point is
achieved when it has been demonstrated that the developer can
manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A
best practice is to ensure that all critical manufacturing processes
are in statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable,
and capable of consistently producing parts within the product's
quality tolerances and standards--at the start of production.
Identifying key product characteristics and the associated critical
manufacturing processes is a key initial step to ensuring production
elements are stable and in control. In our most recent assessment, only
4 of the 23 programs that had made a production decision identified key
product characteristics or associated critical manufacturing
processes. However, it should also be noted that 4 of the 17 programs
that are scheduled to make a production decision in the next 3 years
have already identified key product characteristics or associated
critical manufacturing processes.
When programs do not follow a knowledge-based approach to acquisition,
high levels of uncertainty about requirements, technologies, and design
often exist at the start of a development program. As a result, cost
estimates and related funding needs are often understated. Our analysis
of service and independent cost estimates for 20 major weapon system
programs shows that while the independent estimates were somewhat
higher, both estimates were too low in most cases.[Footnote 8] The
programs we reviewed frequently lacked sufficient knowledge and detail
about planned program content for developing sound cost estimates.
Without this knowledge, cost estimators must rely heavily on parametric
analysis and assumptions. A cost estimate is then usually presented to
decision makers as a single, or point, estimate that is expected to
represent the most likely cost of the program but provides no
information about the range of risk and uncertainty or level of
confidence associated with the estimate. Second, the basic principles
of systems engineering are not being followed when preliminary and
critical design reviews are not conducted on time or with insufficient
information. Further, testing a fully integrated, capable, production-
representative prototype is essential to confirm the maturity of the
design and to minimize cost growth in production. Yet of the 33
programs in our most recent assessment that reported they plan to test
such prototypes, only 17 planned to do so before the production
decision.
Recent and Proposed Reform Efforts Could Improve Weapon Programs:
There is widespread recognition of the problems that affect the
acquisition system and DOD and the Congress have taken and proposed
several steps to remedy them. Changes have been introduced to improve
the department's processes for determining warfighter needs and funding
programs, establish sound business cases for starting acquisition
programs, and execute programs more effectively.
Efforts to Prioritize Needs and Manage Resources:
DOD has recently implemented measures to better address the needs of
the joint warfighter and align the demand for weapon systems with
available resources. The Joint Requirements and Oversight Council, for
example, has been doing more to seek out and consider input from the
combatant commands (COCOMs)--the principal joint warfighting customer
in DOD--through regular trips and meetings to discuss capability needs
and resource issues. This may help alleviate concerns that the COCOMs
have raised in the past that their needs have not been adequately
addressed through the department's requirements process. In addition,
DOD has taken action over the past few years to field capabilities that
are urgently needed for Iraq and Afghanistan, such as Unmanned Aerial
Systems and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. While these
efforts have helped DOD meet the needs of the warfighter, Secretary
Gates noted earlier this year that the department must figure out how
to institutionalize the acquisition of urgently-needed capabilities
rather than having to do so, on an ad hoc basis. Having greater
combatant command involvement in determining requirements, as
emphasized in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees' proposed
acquisition reform legislation, would help to ensure that near-term
needs are addressed. We have recommended additional actions that DOD
should take to balance the needs of the military services, COCOMs, and
other defense components, including establishing an analytic approach
to determine the relative importance of capabilities and providing the
COCOMs with additional resources to establish robust analytical
capabilities for identifying and assessing their warfighting needs.
DOD has also recently established a capability portfolio management
framework to facilitate more strategic choices for allocating resources
through the funding process. Capability portfolios have been set up to
advise the department on how to optimize investments within individual
capability areas, but portfolio managers do no have independent
decision-making authority over determining requirements and funding.
Although it is too soon to assess the impact of the portfolios,
according to some DOD officials, portfolio managers have provided key
input and recommendations during the budget process this year. However,
while these portfolio managers may improve the management of individual
capability areas, there still needs to be higher level DOD attention to
improving the match between the number of major defense acquisition
programs and available funding. The Secretary of Defense recently
recommended the termination of several major weapon programs, which
will help bring the portfolio into balance better and prioritize
capability needs. Sustaining a balance over the long term will require
DOD to improve the way it makes decisions about which programs to
pursue or not pursue. Legislative proposals to promote greater
consideration of trade-offs in the cost, schedule, and performance of
individual programs and the development of better mechanisms to ensure
this happens before a program begins could help make such decisions
part of a disciplined process versus the product of extraordinary
action.
Efforts to Establish Sound Programs:
Recognizing the need for more discipline and accountability in the
acquisition process, Congress and DOD have recently introduced several
initiatives that could provide a foundation for establishing sound,
knowledge-based business cases for individual weapon programs. These
initiatives require programs to invest more time and resources in the
front-end of the acquisition process--refining weapon system concepts
through early systems engineering, developing technologies, and
building prototypes--before starting system development. In the past,
weapon programs often rushed into systems development before they were
ready, in part because the department's acquisition process did not
require early formal milestone reviews and programs would rarely be
terminated once underway. If implemented, these changes could help
programs replace risk with knowledge, thereby increasing the chances of
developing weapon systems within cost and schedule targets while
meeting user needs. However, DOD must ensure that these changes to the
acquisition process are consistently implemented and reflected in
decisions on individual programs. Several of the provisions in the
proposed House and Senate legislation will codify DOD policies that are
not yet being implemented consistently in weapon programs. Some of the
key changes being introduced by DOD and the Congress to establish
knowledge-based business cases for weapon programs include:
* Increased emphasis on early systems engineering activities and the
enhancement of systems engineering capabilities within the department;
* A requirement for competitive prototyping of a proposed weapon system
or key system elements during the technology development phase;
* Certification that critical technologies have been demonstrated in a
relevant environment before the start of system development, employing
independent technology readiness assessments to make these
determinations;
* Early milestone reviews for programs going through the pre-systems
acquisition phase;
* Conducting preliminary design reviews before starting system
development;
* Requiring early cost estimates for the milestone decision to move
into technology development phase; and:
* Elevating the role of independent cost estimates in the acquisition
process, by establishing a director or principal advisor for cost
estimating who reports to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress.
Efforts to Improve Program Execution:
There have also been several policy and legislative provisions
introduced to improve the execution of weapon system programs. For
example, to address the problem of requirements creep that has often
plagued programs in the past, review boards are being established to
identify and mitigate technical risks and evaluate the impact of any
potential requirements changes on ongoing programs. In addition, to
improve accountability in managing programs, DOD has established a
policy instituting formal agreements among program managers, their
acquisition executives, and the user community setting forth common
program goals and the resources that will be provided to reach these
goals. Further, DOD acquisition policy now incorporates a requirement
that program managers sign tenure agreements so that their tenure will
correspond to the next major acquisition milestone review closest to 4
years. The House and Senate reform legislation introduces a number of
steps to monitor and oversee the progress of existing programs that
started before the recent certification requirements were put in place
for gaining approval to enter system development, and programs where
DOD waived the certification requirements for one reason or another.
The House proposal also includes establishing a principal advisor for
performance assessment--a position that will focus primarily on program
execution. In addition, requiring any program that the department
determines must be continued following a Nunn-McCurdy breach, to go
back through a major milestone review, should help ensure that programs
with significant cost problems are not allowed to continue without a
sound business case.
Concluding Observations on Achieving Lasting Reform:
I would like to offer a few thoughts about other factors that should be
considered so that we make the most out of today's opportunity for
meaningful change. First, I think it is useful to think of the
processes that affect weapon system outcomes (requirements, funding,
and acquisition) as being in a state of equilibrium. Poor outcomes--
delays, cost growth, and reduced quantities--have been persistent for
decades. If we think of these processes as merely "broken", then some
targeted repairs should fix them. I think the challenge is greater than
that. If we think of these processes as being in equilibrium, where
their inefficiencies are implicitly accepted as the cost of doing
business, then the challenge for getting better outcomes is greater.
Seen in this light, it will take considerable and sustained effort to
change the incentives and inertia that reinforce the status quo.
Second, while actions taken and proposed by DOD and Congress are
constructive and will serve to improve acquisition outcomes, one has to
ask the question why extraordinary actions are needed to force
practices that should occur normally. The answer to this question will
shed light on the cultural or environmental forces that operate against
sound management practices. For reforms to work, they will have to
address these forces as well. For example, there are a number of
proposals to make cost estimates more rigorous and realistic, but do
these address all of the reasons why estimates are not already
realistic? Clearly, more independence, methodological rigor, and better
information about risk areas like technology will make estimates more
realistic. On the other hand, realism is compromised as the competition
for funding encourages programs to appear affordable. Also, when
program sponsors present a program as more than a weapon system, but
rather as essential to new fighting concepts, pressures exist to accept
less than rigorous cost estimates. Reform must recognize and counteract
these pressures as well.
Third, decisions on individual systems must reinforce good practices.
Programs that have pursued risky and unexecutable acquisition
strategies have succeeded in winning approval and funding. If reform is
to succeed, then programs that present realistic strategies and
resource estimates must succeed in winning approval and funding. Those
programs that continue past practices of pushing unexecutable
strategies must be denied funding before they begin. This will take the
cooperative efforts of DOD and Congress.
Fourth, consideration should be given to setting some limits on what is
a reasonable length of time for developing a system. For example, if a
program has to complete development within 5 or 6 years, this could
serve as a basis to constrain requirements and exotic programs. It
would also serve to get capability in the hands of the warfighter
sooner.
Fifth, the institutional resources we have must match the outcomes we
desire. For example, if more work must be done to reduce technical risk
before development start--milestone B--DOD needs to have the
organizational, people, and financial resources to do so. Once a
program is approved for development, program offices and testing
organizations must have the workforce with the requisite skills to
manage and oversee the effort. Contracting instruments must be used
that match the needs of the acquisition and protect the government's
interests. Finally, DOD must be judicious and consistent in how it
relies on contractors.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have at this time.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] All dollars amounts used in this statement are in fiscal year 2009
constant dollars unless otherwise noted.
[2] The program acquisition unit cost is the total cost for development
and procurement of, and system-specific military construction for, the
acquisition program divided by the number of fully-configured end items
to be produced. 10 USC § 2432 (a)(1).
[3] The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition was
established in 1986 and the title was subsequently changed to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in
1999. As of March 2009, there have been 11 under secretaries.
[4] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination Process
Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2008).
[5] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could
Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619] (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2008).
[6] The start of system development, as used here, indicates the point
at which significant financial commitment is made to design, integrate,
and demonstrate that the product will meet the user's requirements and
can be manufactured on time, with high quality, and at a cost that
provides an acceptable return on investment. Under the revised 5000
series, this phase is now called engineering and manufacturing
development and begins at milestone B. Engineering and manufacturing
development follows the materiel solution analysis and technology
development.
[7] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009).
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619].
[End of section]
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