Nuclear Forensics
Comprehensive Interagency Plan Needed to Address Human Capital Issues Gao ID: GAO-09-527R April 30, 2009The detonation of a nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device (RDD) in the United States or elsewhere would cause decision makers to immediately demand information on the nature of the device--including its design, the materials used to build it, and the materials' source--as well as the identification of the perpetrators. Technical nuclear forensics--the analysis of nuclear or radiological materials that are intercepted or the radioactive debris and prompt output signals (such as gamma rays) produced by a nuclear event--can contribute to the identification of the sources of these materials and the processes used to create them. Analytical techniques developed to determine the nature of nuclear tests can be used if terrorists were to detonate a nuclear device or RDD and radioactive debris samples were recovered (known as "postdetonation" nuclear forensics). Nuclear forensic techniques also could potentially be used to determine the origin of nuclear or radiological materials or devices seized prior to their use in a weapon (known as "predetonation" nuclear forensics). The U.S. government's predetonation nuclear forensics capabilities have been demonstrated in investigations on seized nuclear material from illicit smuggling operations. In addition, it is important to note that nuclear forensics represents a key piece of the overall effort to identify specific perpetrators of a nuclear event, in a process known as attribution. The combination of nuclear forensics conclusions, law enforcement findings (e.g., traditional forensics, such as fingerprint analysis), and intelligence information can be used to attribute an event to specific perpetrators. The departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), and State (State), as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the intelligence community, would play key roles in a nuclear forensics investigation. The specific roles these agencies would play were established in August 2007 through a presidential decision directive. This directive also formally established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) within DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to coordinate planning, integration, assessment, and stewardship of the U.S. government's nuclear forensics capabilities. NTNFC has chartered a number of interagency groups to guide policy making for the National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF) program and has led the development of key interagency documents such as the NTNF strategic plan. In this context, Congress asked GAO to assess the (1) challenges the U.S. government faces in developing and maintaining a comprehensive nuclear forensics capability and (2) current and future costs associated with the U.S. government's nuclear forensics efforts.
Agencies implementing the NTNF program face challenges in reducing the time needed to arrive at nuclear forensics conclusions and addressing human capital shortages in key disciplines--such as radiochemistry--needed for nuclear forensics. Agencies are working to significantly reduce the time needed to collect, transport, and analyze nuclear forensics samples after an event. For example, DOD has supported a variety of research and development efforts to make sample collection more efficient. In addition, DOE national laboratories are engaged in research and development initiatives to automate laboratory techniques used to analyze radioactive samples and to modernize aging equipment. With regard to human capital challenges, agencies lack a comprehensive interagency plan to guide their efforts. DHS has led interagency efforts to promote the development of trained nuclear forensics experts, including funding summer schools and internships. However, the agency has not fully assessed the demand for these specialists from competing areas outside the NTNF program, such as private industry. In addition, DHS-led efforts to promote radiochemistry have not been well coordinated with similar programs at DOE and NRC. To address the human capital challenges facing the program, we are recommending that DHS work with other agencies to develop a comprehensive interagency plan. According to DHS, agencies implementing the NTNF program planned to spend about $60 million and $59 million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, respectively, but the future budgetary needs to support the program are unknown. Regarding current program costs, the projected spending total DHS provided underestimates the program's true costs because it does not include costs associated with many DOD, DOE, and State programs that are critical to supporting nuclear forensics. The long-term future budget for the NTNF program is undetermined, in part, because agencies have not developed a plan to mitigate any possible reductions in the funding streams for activities that currently pay for the infrastructure, equipment, and personnel upon which the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities depend. GAO is recommending that agencies more fully account for the amounts spent on other DOD, DOE, and State efforts that the NTNF program relies upon and take steps to mitigate potential effects of budget reductions for these efforts.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-527R, Nuclear Forensics: Comprehensive Interagency Plan Needed to Address Human Capital Issues
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GAO-09-527R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 30, 2009:
Congressional Requesters:
Subject: Nuclear Forensics: Comprehensive Interagency Plan Needed to
Address Human Capital Issues:
The detonation of a nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device
(RDD) in the United States or elsewhere would cause decision makers to
immediately demand information on the nature of the device--including
its design, the materials used to build it, and the materials' source-
-as well as the identification of the perpetrators. Technical nuclear
forensics--the analysis of nuclear or radiological materials that are
intercepted or the radioactive debris and prompt output signals (such
as gamma rays) produced by a nuclear event--can contribute to the
identification of the sources of these materials and the processes used
to create them. Analytical techniques developed to determine the nature
of nuclear tests can be used if terrorists were to detonate a nuclear
device or RDD and radioactive debris samples were recovered (known as
"postdetonation" nuclear forensics). Nuclear forensic techniques also
could potentially be used to determine the origin of nuclear or
radiological materials or devices seized prior to their use in a weapon
(known as "predetonation" nuclear forensics). The U.S. government's
predetonation nuclear forensics capabilities have been demonstrated in
investigations on seized nuclear material from illicit smuggling
operations. In addition, it is important to note that nuclear forensics
represents a key piece of the overall effort to identify specific
perpetrators of a nuclear event, in a process known as attribution. The
combination of nuclear forensics conclusions, law enforcement findings
(e.g., traditional forensics, such as fingerprint analysis), and
intelligence information can be used to attribute an event to specific
perpetrators.
The departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Homeland Security
(DHS), and State (State), as well as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the intelligence community, would play key
roles in a nuclear forensics investigation. The specific roles these
agencies would play were established in August 2007 through a
presidential decision directive. This directive also formally
established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC)
within DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to coordinate planning,
integration, assessment, and stewardship of the U.S. government's
nuclear forensics capabilities. NTNFC has chartered a number of
interagency groups to guide policy making for the National Technical
Nuclear Forensics (NTNF) program and has led the development of key
interagency documents such as the NTNF strategic plan.
In this context, you asked us to assess the (1) challenges the U.S.
government faces in developing and maintaining a comprehensive nuclear
forensics capability and (2) current and future costs associated with
the U.S. government's nuclear forensics efforts. In February 2009, we
reported to you on the results of our work in a classified report.
[Footnote 1] This letter summarizes certain aspects of our classified
report.
To address these objectives, we reviewed program documents and
interviewed officials from DOD; DOE; DHS; State; FBI; the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence; the Executive Office of the
President and, within that office, the Homeland Security Council and
the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC); the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and
eight DOE national laboratories that support the NTNF program. We
visited four of these national laboratories: Lawrence Livermore, Los
Alamos, Pacific Northwest, and Savannah River--as well as a DOD
facility involved in nuclear forensics. In addition, we observed part
of the October 2008 interagency nuclear forensics exercise at Ft.
Bragg, North Carolina. Regarding our examination of challenges facing
the NTNF program, we reviewed program documentation, including a report
from NTNFC's 2008 workshop on the national laboratories' human capital
requirements for nuclear forensics and surveys on the NTNF program's
manpower needs. We also reviewed documents from and had discussions
with six professors from five universities that award Ph.D. degrees for
study in radiochemistry. To select those professors, we used a
judgmental sample of academicians from major university programs that
grant Ph.D. degrees in radiochemistry. To assess the current and
expected budget for nuclear forensics activities, we met with officials
from DOD, DOE, DHS, State, and FBI to review budget information from
the NTNF program. We discussed and reviewed these data with budget and
program analysts at these agencies. In addition, we interviewed
knowledgeable officials on the reliability of these data, including
issues such as data entry, access, quality control procedures, and the
accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined that these data
were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this review.
We conducted the work for the classified report between January 2008
through February 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards, and we conducted our work for the unclassified
report in accordance with the same standards between March 2009 and
April 2009. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
Agencies implementing the NTNF program face challenges in reducing the
time needed to arrive at nuclear forensics conclusions and addressing
human capital shortages in key disciplines--such as radiochemistry--
needed for nuclear forensics. Agencies are working to significantly
reduce the time needed to collect, transport, and analyze nuclear
forensics samples after an event. For example, DOD has supported a
variety of research and development efforts to make sample collection
more efficient. In addition, DOE national laboratories are engaged in
research and development initiatives to automate laboratory techniques
used to analyze radioactive samples and to modernize aging equipment.
With regard to human capital challenges, agencies lack a comprehensive
interagency plan to guide their efforts. DHS has led interagency
efforts to promote the development of trained nuclear forensics
experts, including funding summer schools and internships. However, the
agency has not fully assessed the demand for these specialists from
competing areas outside the NTNF program, such as private industry. In
addition, DHS-led efforts to promote radiochemistry have not been well
coordinated with similar programs at DOE and NRC. To address the human
capital challenges facing the program, we are recommending that DHS
work with other agencies to develop a comprehensive interagency plan.
According to DHS, agencies implementing the NTNF program planned to
spend about $60 million and $59 million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009,
respectively, but the future budgetary needs to support the program are
unknown. Regarding current program costs, the projected spending total
DHS provided underestimates the program's true costs because it does
not include costs associated with many DOD, DOE, and State programs
that are critical to supporting nuclear forensics. The long-term future
budget for the NTNF program is undetermined, in part, because agencies
have not developed a plan to mitigate any possible reductions in the
funding streams for activities that currently pay for the
infrastructure, equipment, and personnel upon which the nation's
nuclear forensics capabilities depend. We are recommending that
agencies more fully account for the amounts spent on other DOD, DOE,
and State efforts that the NTNF program relies upon and take steps to
mitigate potential effects of budget reductions for these efforts.
We provided a draft of our classified report to DOD, DOE, DHS, FBI,
NRC, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, State, and
the Executive Office of the President. DOD and NRC provided written
comments, the unclassified portions of which can be found in enclosures
I and II, respectively. The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and State also provided classified written comments, which
cannot be included in this report. As discussed in our classified
report, DOD and State concurred with our recommendations and NRC and
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not comment on
our recommendations. DOD, DOE, FBI, and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence also provided classified technical comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS and the Executive Office of
the President did not comment on the draft of our classified report.
Background:
The scientific expertise and skills needed for predetonation and
postdetonation nuclear forensics can be found across a wide variety of
academic disciplines, such as radiochemistry, nuclear engineering and
physics, isotope geochemistry, materials science, and analytical
chemistry.[Footnote 2] In particular, radiochemistry forms the basis
for many of the techniques used to analyze radioactive debris from a
nuclear event. Concerns have been raised by academicians and experts
from nongovernmental organizations about the limited pool of
specialists in these areas at the national laboratories, which would be
called upon to perform critical analyses in a nuclear forensics
investigation. For example, NTNFC conducted a survey in 2008 that found
247 individuals at eight national laboratories are directly involved in
nuclear forensics activities. In addition, the survey showed that these
individuals spent an average of 10 percent of their time working on
nuclear forensics. Partly because the United States conducted its last
nuclear test in 1992, few scientists remain at the national
laboratories with hands-on experience in using radiochemistry
techniques on debris from a nuclear event and analyzing the results.
Those few experienced scientists are rapidly approaching, or have
already reached, retirement age. In February 2008, the American
Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Physical
Society reported that the difficulty in replacing these aging
scientists is exacerbated by a precipitous decline in the number of
advanced degree programs in radiochemistry at U.S. academic
institutions.[Footnote 3]
Many of the skills and techniques used in postdetonation nuclear
forensics were developed to support the U.S. government's nuclear test
program. Scientists at the national laboratories examined radioactive
debris and other information from these tests to determine nuclear
weapon characteristics, such as the explosive yield (i.e., the amount
of energy discharged when a nuclear weapon is detonated). Regarding
postdetonation nuclear forensics, DOD and national laboratory officials
told us the following activities would occur after an event:
* detecting the event and notifying decision makers;
* evaluating prompt output data, such as gamma, neutron, optical, radio
frequency, and electromagnetic pulse emissions;
* collecting air and ground samples;
* conducting analysis and screening procedures at the collection site
to try to ensure that the samples sent to the laboratories are of high
quality and contain the elements needed to perform nuclear forensics
work;
* transporting the samples from the site to the laboratories;
* chemical processing, including dissolution, separations,
radiochemical measurements, and data interpretation; and:
* reporting results and conclusions to decision makers.
Furthermore, the amount of time needed for these activities depends on
many variables, such as the type of event (i.e., whether the explosion
is a nuclear device or RDD) and the number and composition of the air
and ground samples taken. In addition, the answers to these types of
questions may not necessarily emerge sequentially or simultaneously, or
at all.
Predetonation nuclear forensics plays an important role in determining
the sources of illicitly trafficked nuclear and radiological materials.
[Footnote 4] According to IAEA, between 1993 and 2007, there were 1,340
confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking and unauthorized activities
involving nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. Eighteen of
these reported incidents involved nuclear material that could be used
to produce a nuclear weapon. Past confirmed incidents of illicit
trafficking involved seizures of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable
nuclear material, but most cases have involved very small quantities.
In some of these cases, it is possible that the seized material was a
sample of larger quantities available for illegal purchase. Among these
incidents were a number of high-profile seizures of smuggled nuclear
material in Europe in the early-and mid-1990s, which led to the further
development of predetonation nuclear forensics. These early nuclear
forensics efforts were led, in part, by an international group of
analytical laboratories known as the International Technical Working
Group on Nuclear Smuggling (ITWG). This group began in 1995 as an
informal association of nuclear forensics experts working with law
enforcement officers, first responders, and regulatory professionals.
Since the group's founding, approximately 30 member states and
organizations have participated in 13 ITWG annual meetings. In
addition, ITWG has sponsored two round-robin exercises testing
international predetonation nuclear forensics capabilities. The group
also works closely with IAEA to provide IAEA member states with support
for nuclear forensics analyses. To that end, ITWG developed a "model
action plan" for nuclear forensics, which was subsequently adopted by
IAEA in 2006 and serves as that agency's technical guidance on nuclear
forensics.
Agencies Face Challenges in Developing the NTNF Program:
Rapid nuclear forensics work is essential to ensure that decision
makers can promptly receive information that scientists are highly
confident is accurate. DOD and DOE national laboratories have begun
efforts to significantly reduce the amount of time needed to reach
nuclear forensics conclusions in a postdetonation scenario. However,
the agencies implementing the NTNF program face significant human
capital challenges. Despite this fact, DOE, NTNFC, and national
laboratory officials told us that no comprehensive interagency plan
exists to guide efforts to address these challenges.
Agencies Are Considering Ways to Shorten the Time Needed to Collect,
Transport, and Analyze Radioactive Debris Samples after a Nuclear or
Radiological Event:
In a postdetonation scenario, rapid nuclear forensics work is essential
so that decision makers can promptly receive information that
scientists are highly confident is accurate. DOD and DOE national
laboratories have begun efforts to significantly reduce the amount of
time needed to reach nuclear forensics conclusions in a postdetonation
scenario. For example, DOD is supporting a number of research and
development efforts, such as:
* rapid debris collection, dissolution, and chemical separations
techniques;
* innovative radionuclide assay and mass spectrometry approaches to
reduce timelines; and:
* the development of a new type of debris sampling pod.
Similarly, DOE funds a number of research and development efforts,
coordinated with DOD and other agencies, to improve the quality of
reported data and shorten the time required to provide nuclear
forensics information to decision makers. For example:
* Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has an initiative to develop
new technology for more quickly conducting chemical analysis on samples
collected after an event. Using this new technology, scientists would
be able to eliminate the process of chemical separation for parts of
their sample analysis. In addition, the laboratory has an initiative to
modernize and improve the efficiency of equipment used to conduct
chemical analyses.
* Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has initiatives to speed up
chemical analysis and is gradually acquiring faster analytical
instruments to analyze radioactive elements. It also is seeking to
automate some of the analysis performed during nuclear forensics
investigations. According to laboratory officials, performing chemical
analysis of samples from an event generates massive amounts of data
that currently require the full-time work of an experienced
radiochemist. Automation of some processes could shorten the time
required to complete this analysis.
Lack of a Comprehensive Interagency Plan Hinders Efforts to Ensure an
Adequate Supply of Trained Personnel for the NTNF Program:
As part of its interagency coordination and stewardship role, NTNFC
officials told us their organization is responsible for assuming a
leadership role in addressing the human capital challenges facing the
NTNF program. However, DOE, NTNFC, and national laboratory officials
told us that no comprehensive interagency plan exists to guide efforts
to address these challenges. Nonetheless, NTNFC has taken some steps to
analyze the current and future personnel needs for nuclear forensics
work at the national laboratories. Specifically:
* In the fall of 2008, NTNFC conducted a survey of manpower
requirements for the NTNF program and convened a workshop to discuss
human capital issues. The workshop was attended by academicians who
collaborate with the NTNF program on personnel issues and DOE
laboratory scientists. The survey and workshop discussions found that
the availability of Ph.D. radiochemists at the national laboratories is
in short supply for both the present and the near future. Furthermore,
the workshop participants concluded there is a clear need to recruit in
this area. DOE national laboratory officials told us that although
graduates of related nuclear sciences have been successfully trained at
the national laboratories to do radiochemistry work for nuclear
forensics, Ph.D. training in radiochemistry itself provides the most
suitable preparation for this work.[Footnote 5]
* The Nuclear Forensics Science Panel, Education Sub-Panel--a group of
active and retired national laboratory scientists and professors who
advise the NTNF program on human capital issues--wrote a paper in
October 2008 about strengthening the nuclear forensics workforce.
[Footnote 6] The leader of the group told us this paper was designed to
focus attention toward developing a plan to address shortages of Ph.D.
radiochemists in the NTNF program.
The Education Sub-Panel estimated that about 35 new nuclear forensics
scientists are needed for the NTNF program over the next 10 years,
primarily to replace those expected to retire. This includes scientists
hired into the general nuclear forensics area and the traditional
radiochemistry area. However, neither NTNFC's survey nor the Education
Sub-Panel's study fully assessed the short-or long-term supply and
demand for these newly graduated Ph.D. scientists, and the leader of
the study told us the NTNF program's actual future needs could be
significantly different than the panel's estimate. He said there will
be a shortage of Ph.D. radiochemists under any set of future
circumstances, although the shortage would probably be less acute if
analytical equipment at the national laboratories were modernized.
Additional factors could affect the adequacy of the supply of new Ph.D.
graduates who are qualified to work as nuclear forensics scientists.
For example, the Education Sub-Panel assumed that half of all these new
Ph.D. graduates would work as nuclear forensics scientists at the
national laboratories, while the other half would work in industry and
academia. However, the leader of the study told us this assumption may
require additional scrutiny because private companies, such as nuclear
energy firms, have become a very attractive and lucrative alternative
to working at DOE national laboratories. For example, he noted that at
one university, the last nine Ph.D. radiochemistry graduates have gone
to work in the nuclear energy industry. However, NTNFC has not
determined the effect of demand for Ph.D. radiochemists from the
nuclear energy industry or other areas on the human capital challenges
facing the NTNF program.
On December 18, 2008, after reviewing an early draft of our classified
report, NTNFC officials informed us they had begun to develop a
framework to guide their efforts. However, they noted these initial
steps have not been finalized. NTNFC officials acknowledged there is no
interagency plan to address this issue, and the agency has not yet
fully assessed the supply and demand needs for key disciplines that
support nuclear forensics. NTNFC officials also told us that in fiscal
year 2009 they intend to form an interagency committee to formally
coordinate activities to address human capital challenges facing the
NTNF program.
NTNFC also has led interagency efforts to promote the development of
trained radiochemists, including funding summer schools and
internships. For example, in fiscal year 2008, NTNFC provided $150,000
to fund a summer internship program in nuclear forensics for eight
students at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. However, NTNFC
officials told us their efforts to address these challenges have been
ad hoc and have not been guided by a comprehensive interagency plan.
Furthermore, NTNFC's efforts to promote the development of trained
radiochemists have not been well coordinated with some existing efforts
at DOE and NRC. For example:
* Through the American Chemical Society, DOE has funded and
administered undergraduate summer school programs at two universities
to interest students in going on to graduate study in radiochemistry.
However, according to the DOE manager for these summer schools, NTNFC
has not coordinated its nuclear forensics education efforts with the
DOE-funded radiochemistry summer school program.
* NRC has targeted radiochemistry as an area of national need through
its Nuclear Education Program, which received $15 million in fiscal
year 2008. Specifically, NRC awarded a 3-year faculty development grant
for $450,000 per year to a radiochemistry professor at Washington State
University in 2008. NTNFC officials told us they plan to promote
radiochemistry faculty development in the near future. However, NRC
officials told us there has been no coordination between the two
agencies' efforts.
Agencies Planned to Spend About $119 Million on Nuclear Forensics
Activities in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009, but Future Costs Are Largely
Unknown:
According to NTNFC, DOD, DOE, DHS, and FBI planned to spend about $60
million and $59 million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, respectively, to
implement the NTNF program. However, this amount underestimates the
program's true costs because it does not include costs associated with
many DOD, DOE, and State efforts that are critical to support nuclear
forensics. NTNFC officials noted that the NTNF Budget Crosscut--an
interagency planning document that displays the nuclear forensics
budgets of the agencies implementing the NTNF program--only covers the
budgets of the agencies and programs responsible for developing and
maintaining the operational capabilities needed to conduct nuclear
forensics investigations (see table 1). However, the document does not
include costs of related efforts that the program relies upon. For
example, NTNFC officials noted that the NTNF Budget Crosscut does not
include State spending on nuclear forensics outreach, which NTNFC does
not consider to be operational support for the NTNF program. State
officials told us the department planned to spend $450,000 in fiscal
year 2008 on nuclear forensics outreach, including promoting the IAEA
model action plan for nuclear forensics, conducting international
nuclear forensics workshops, and supporting ITWG, which promotes best
practices and builds networks among laboratory experts in nuclear
forensics.
Table 1: NTNF Budget Crosscut, Fiscal Years 2008-2009 (Dollars in
millions):
Agency: DOD;
Fiscal Year 2008: $14.8;
Fiscal Year 2009: $15.5.
Agency: DOE[A];
Fiscal Year 2008: $22.3;
Fiscal Year 2009: $18.4.
Agency: DHS;
Fiscal Year 2008: $15.0;
Fiscal Year 2009: $16.9.
Agency: FBI;
Fiscal Year 2008: $7.9;
Fiscal Year 2009: $8.2.
Agency: Total;
Fiscal Year 2008: $60.0;
Fiscal Year 2009: $59.0.
Source: NTNFC.
[A] DOE total does not include spending on nuclear-forensics-related
capabilities and readiness of facilities funded by DOE's Nuclear
Materials Information Program, Defense Programs, and Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation Program.
[End of table]
Interagency program managers meet biannually to discuss their agencies'
planned budgets for nuclear forensics activities. NTNFC officials told
us the process used to create the budget crosscut has been helpful in
identifying funding gaps, eliminating overlaps, and promoting
interagency collaboration. However, while NTNFC has the lead for
interagency coordination and planning for nuclear forensics, it has no
authority over the budgets for the other agencies' efforts that are
part of the NTNF program. As a result, NTNFC officials told us that, if
needed, they would have to "cajole and pressure" other agencies to make
changes to certain aspects of their nuclear forensics budgets.
The long-term resource needs for the NTNF program are undetermined, in
part, because the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities depend
heavily on the continued funding of equipment, infrastructure, and
personnel currently paid for by other programs, particularly those
associated with the maintenance of U.S. nuclear weapons. The agencies
implementing the NTNF program have not fully assessed the degree to
which the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities depend on the
continuation of funding for assets currently supplied by other
programs.[Footnote 7] As a result, the nation's ability to carry out
nuclear forensics investigations may be affected by reductions in the
budgets of programs that implementing agencies rely upon to carry out
their nuclear forensics missions. In particular, DOD, DOE, DHS, and
national laboratory officials told us that the NTNF program relies
heavily on the infrastructure, equipment, and personnel at the national
laboratories used to support the continued operation of U.S. nuclear
weapons. For example, Los Alamos National Laboratory officials told us
that most of the operation and maintenance costs for analytical
equipment and other infrastructure are paid for by DOE's Office of
Defense Programs--which supports the department's nuclear weapons
complex--and not by the NTNF program.
A senior DOE official told us the department faces an enormous
challenge in convincing the Congress that reducing funding for the
activities of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex directly damages the
national laboratories' ability to conduct nuclear forensics
investigations. DOE has proposed downsizing its nuclear weapons complex
and has proposed reductions to the budgets for related activities, but
these efforts may have the unintended consequence of harming the U.S.
government's nuclear forensics capabilities. For example, due to fiscal
constraints and the expectation of reduced budgets in the future,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory had a reduction in force in May
2008 of about 500 technical staff, including 9 scientists and
technicians who worked on nuclear forensics. While these scientists
worked only part time on nuclear forensics issues, their primary
responsibilities were to support the nuclear-weapons-related activities
of the laboratory, such as maintenance of the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile. The agencies implementing the NTNF program have not
developed a plan to mitigate the effects of planned budgetary
reductions for the nuclear weapons complex. As a result, the agencies
may face difficulties in ensuring they can effectively carry out their
nuclear forensics missions.
Conclusions:
The potential consequences of a terrorist attack using a nuclear or
radiological device are so severe that the U.S. government must
recognize the seriousness of these threats and take appropriate actions
to counter or reduce them. Therefore, a comprehensive and responsive
nuclear forensics capability is critical to the national security of
the United States because it provides a deterrent to other countries
that may provide nuclear materials to terrorists and can help attribute
a nuclear or radiological event to specific perpetrators. While DHS and
other implementing agencies have taken some initial steps to address
the human capital challenges facing the NTNF program, these efforts
have been limited in scope and, with respect to radiochemistry in
particular, not well coordinated with other existing U.S. government
efforts. Furthermore, the implementing agencies lack both a
comprehensive interagency plan to address this challenge and an
understanding of the demand for trained personnel in key disciplines
needed to support U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities.
Many of the capabilities used to support the NTNF program depend, in
large part, on the continued funding of infrastructure and personnel
that have historically been funded by other programs. As a result, the
nation's ability to carry out nuclear forensic investigations could be
severely affected by reductions or disruptions in support for these
efforts. Without a comprehensive assessment of the extent and impact of
these leveraged assets on the NTNF program, implementing agencies will
face uncertainties in determining their future budgetary needs to
support nuclear forensics.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the effectiveness of U.S. government efforts to address
challenges facing the NTNF program, we recommend that the Secretary of
Homeland Security, working with the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and
State, and the Director of the FBI, take the following three actions:
* capital deficiencies affecting the NTNF program. This plan should
include estimates of the long-term demand, from both the U.S.
government and private industry, for trained personnel in key
disciplines, such as radiochemistry, that support the NTNF program. The
plan should be linked with program requirements, address coordination
issues with existing federal efforts to promote radiochemistry, and
include cost estimates for each aspect of the plan.
* More fully account for the indirect costs borne by DOD, DOE, State,
and other agencies that are not currently reflected in the NTNF program
budget.
* Assess the potential impact of projected reductions in the budgets
for programs that the agencies rely upon to conduct their nuclear
forensics missions and take steps to mitigate any negative impacts.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of our classified report to DOD, DOE, DHS, FBI,
NRC, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, State, and
the Executive Office of the President. DOD and NRC provided written
comments, the unclassified portions of which can be found in enclosures
I and II, respectively. The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and State also provided classified written comments, which
cannot be included in this report. As discussed in our classified
report, DOD and State concurred with our recommendations and NRC and
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not comment on
our recommendations. DOD, DOE, FBI, and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence also provided classified technical comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS and the Executive Office of
the President did not comment on the draft of our classified report.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its issuance date. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and
State; the Director, FBI; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration; the Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report were
Glen Levis (Assistant Director), R. Stockton Butler, and Franklyn Yao.
Additional assistance was provided by Dr. Timothy Persons (GAO's Chief
Scientist), Rebecca Shea, and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
Enclosures:
List of Congressional Requesters:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and
Technology:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable James R. Langevin:
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Secret:
Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense:
Nuclear And Chemical And Biological Defense Programs:
3050 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3050:
February 19, 2009:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
This is the Department of Defense's response to the GAO Draft Report,
GAO-09-276C, "Nuclear Forensics: U.S. Efforts Hampered by Equipment,
Infrastructure, and Personnel Issues, and a Lack of Baseline Program
Requirements," dated January 16, 2009 (GAO Code 360921). The Department
concurs with the GAO recommendations. Detailed comments on the report
are enclosed.
If you need additional information, please do not hesitate to call me
at 703-697-1771. The point of contact for this action is Mr. Arthur
Beasley, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 703-767-4833,
arthur.beasley@dtra.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Fred S. Celec:
Enclosure: As stated:
Secret: Unclassified Upon Removal of Attachment.
[End of section]
Enclosure II: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001:
February 4, 2009:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
Thank you for the opportunity to review GAO draft report, GAO-09-276C.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a review of the
portion of the draft report that relates to NRC programs associated
with the educating and training of sufficient radio-chemists to meet
future national needs. The NRC has no comments regarding that portion
of the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
R. W. Borchardt:
Executive Director for Operations:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, (U) Nuclear Forensics: U.S. Efforts Hampered by Equipment,
Infrastructure, and Personnel Deficiencies, and a Lack of Baseline
Program Requirements, GAO-09-276C (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2009).
[2] For purposes of this report, the term "nuclear sciences" is used to
refer to these and other disciplines that support nuclear forensics. In
addition, the term "radiochemistry" refers to both nuclear chemistry in
general and radiochemistry, which is a specific area of study within
nuclear chemistry focusing on the chemistry of radioactive materials.
[3] Joint Working Group of the American Association for the Advancement
of Science and the American Physical Society, Nuclear Forensics: Role,
State of the Art, Program Needs (Washington, D.C., February 2008).
[4] Since 2002, we have issued several reports analyzing U.S. efforts
to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries. For example, GAO,
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination
Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection
Equipment to Other Countries, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-311] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14,
2006).
[5] For purposes of this report, scientists with doctoral degrees in
other disciplines who have been trained to perform radiochemistry work
for nuclear forensics and those with doctoral degrees in radiochemistry
may both be referred to as Ph.D. radiochemists.
[6] Nuclear Forensics Science Panel, Education Sub-Panel, A Plan for
Augmenting the Nuclear Forensics Workforce, Oct. 27, 2008.
[7] For purposes of this report, the term "assets" is used to refer to
the equipment and infrastructure needed to detect, collect, and analyze
radioactive debris samples and other data needed for nuclear forensics
investigations.
[End of section]
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