Defense Acquisitions
Assessments Needed to Address V-22 Aircraft Operational and Cost Concerns to Define Future Investments Gao ID: GAO-09-482 May 11, 2009Since the 1980s, the V-22, developed to transport combat troops, supplies, and equipment for the U.S. Marine Corps and to support other services' operations, has experienced several fatal crashes, demonstrated various deficiencies, and faced virtual cancellation--much of which it has overcome. Although until recently deployed in Iraq and regarded favorably, it has not performed the full range of missions anticipated, and how well it can do so is in question. In view of concerns about the V-22 program, you asked us to determine if the V-22 will perform as promised, and if it will, at what cost. GAO reviewed (1) current MV-22 operations in Iraq; (2) strengths and deficiencies in terms of the capabilities expected of the V-22; and (3) past, current, and future costs. GAO reviewed a range of program documents and data, interviewed program officials, operators and others; and observed MV-22 operations in Iraq and shipboard.
As of January 2009, the 12 MV-22s (Marine Corps variant of the V-22) in Iraq successfully completed all missions assigned in a low threat theater of operations--using their enhanced speed and range to engage in general support missions and deliver personnel and internal cargo faster and farther than the legacy helicopters being replaced. Noted challenges to operational effectiveness raise questions about whether the MV-22 is best suited to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the helicopters it is intended to replace. Additionally, suitability challenges, such as unreliable component parts and supply chain weaknesses, led to low aircraft availability rates. MV-22 operational tests and training exercises identified challenges with the system's ability to operate in other environments. Maneuvering limits and challenges in detecting threats may affect air crew ability to execute correct evasive actions. The aircraft's large size and inventory of repair parts created obstacles to shipboard operations. Identified challenges could limit the ability to conduct worldwide operations in some environments and at high altitudes similar to what might be expected in Afghanistan. Efforts are underway to address these deficiencies, but some are inherent in the V-22's design. V-22 costs have risen sharply above initial projections--1986 estimates (stated in fiscal year 2009 dollars) that the program would build nearly 1000 aircraft in 10 years at $37.7 million each have shifted to fewer than 500 aircraft at $93.4 million each--a procurement unit cost increase of 148 percent. Research, development, testing, and evaluation costs increased over 200 percent. To complete the procurement, the program plans to request approximately $25 billion (in then-year dollars) for aircraft procurement. As for operations and support costs (O&S), the Marine Corps' V-22's cost per flight hour today is over $11,000--more than double the targeted estimate.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-482, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments Needed to Address V-22 Aircraft Operational and Cost Concerns to Define Future Investments
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2009:
Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments Needed to Address V-22 Aircraft Operational and Cost
Concerns to Define Future Investments:
GAO-09-482:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-482, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since the 1980s, the V-22, developed to transport combat troops,
supplies, and equipment for the U.S. Marine Corps and to support other
services‘ operations, has experienced several fatal crashes,
demonstrated various deficiencies, and faced virtual cancellation”much
of which it has overcome. Although until recently deployed in Iraq and
regarded favorably, it has not performed the full range of missions
anticipated, and how well it can do so is in question. In view of
concerns about the V-22 program, you asked us to determine if the V-22
will perform as promised, and if it will, at what cost. GAO reviewed
(1) current MV-22 operations in Iraq; (2) strengths and deficiencies in
terms of the capabilities expected of the V-22; and (3) past, current,
and future costs. GAO reviewed a range of program documents and data,
interviewed program officials, operators and others; and observed MV-22
operations in Iraq and shipboard.
What GAO Found:
As of January 2009, the 12 MV-22s (Marine Corps variant of the V-22) in
Iraq successfully completed all missions assigned in a low threat
theater of operations”using their enhanced speed and range to engage in
general support missions and deliver personnel and internal cargo
faster and farther than the legacy helicopters being replaced. Noted
challenges to operational effectiveness raise questions about whether
the MV-22 is best suited to accomplish the full repertoire of missions
of the helicopters it is intended to replace. Additionally, suitability
challenges, such as unreliable component parts and supply chain
weaknesses, led to low aircraft availability rates.
MV-22 operational tests and training exercises identified challenges
with the system‘s ability to operate in other environments. Maneuvering
limits and challenges in detecting threats may affect air crew ability
to execute correct evasive actions. The aircraft‘s large size and
inventory of repair parts created obstacles to shipboard operations.
Identified challenges could limit the ability to conduct worldwide
operations in some environments and at high altitudes similar to what
might be expected in Afghanistan. Efforts are underway to address these
deficiencies, but some are inherent in the V-22‘s design.
V-22 costs have risen sharply above initial projections”1986 estimates
(stated in fiscal year 2009 dollars) that the program would build
nearly 1000 aircraft in 10 years at $37.7 million each have shifted to
fewer than 500 aircraft at $93.4 million each”a procurement unit cost
increase of 148 percent. Research, development, testing, and evaluation
costs increased over 200 percent. To complete the procurement, the
program plans to request approximately $25 billion (in then-year
dollars) for aircraft procurement. As for operations and support costs
(O&S), the Marine Corps‘ V-22‘s cost per flight hour today is over
$11,000”more than double the targeted estimate.
Figure: V-22 Funding Profile (Then-Year Dollars)[A]:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Spending category: Research and development;
Appropriated and requested funds (program start through 2009): $9.6
billion;
Estimated future funding: $0.3 billion.
Spending category: Procurement;
Appropriated and requested funds (program start through 2009): $19.3
billion;
Estimated future funding: $24.8 billion.
Spending category: Operations and support costs;
Appropriated and requested funds (program start through 2009): 0;
Estimated future funding: $75.4 billion.
Spending category: Total;
Appropriated and requested funds (program start through 2009): $28.9
billion;
Estimated future funding: $100.5 billion.
Source: V-22 December 2007 Selected Acquisition Report.
[A] O&S expenditures to date are not reported in the SAR, O&S funding
includes past and future needs.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
The Secretary of Defense should require a new alternatives analysis of
the V-22 and determine how cost effective it is in meeting the Marine
Corps medium lift needs, and possibly other services‘ uses. DOD should
also require that the Marine Corps develop a prioritized strategy to
improve system suitability, reduce operational costs, and align future
budget requests accordingly. DOD concurred with the second
recommendation, but not the first. GAO believes both recommendations
remain valid.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-482] or key
components. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at 202-
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
MV-22 Operations in Iraq Demonstrated Effectiveness for Assigned
Missions but the Aircraft Continues to Experience Challenges:
Operational Tests and Training Exercises Have Revealed Other Challenges
to the MV-22 in Accomplishing Its Full Range of Possible Operations:
V-22 Business Case Challenged as Costs Have Risen While Performance
Requirements Have Been Modified:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: MV-22 Block Upgrade Definitions:
Table 2: CV-22 Block Upgrade Definitions:
Table 3: V-22 Cost, Quantity and Schedule Changes from Development
Start to 2007:
Table 4: Evolution of Significant MV-22 Performance Parameters:
Figures:
Figure 1: Views of V-22 Aircraft in Various Aspects of Use:
Figure 2: CH-46 and CH-53 Helicopters:
Figure 3: Comparison of MV-22 to CH-46E Combat Radius:
Figure 4: MV-22 Mission Capability Rates between October 2006 and
October 2008:
Figure 5: Attained Percentage of Predicted Mean Flight Hours before
Failure and Requisition Wait Time for Top 13 Parts Degrading MV-22
Mission Capability:
Figure 6: Iraq-Deployed MV-22 Squadrons' Average Engine Time on Wing:
Figure 7: MV-22 Troop Compartment:
Figure 8: V-22 Funding Profile (Then-Year Dollars):
Abbreviations:
COEA: Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOT&E: Director, Operational Test and Evaluation:
FMC: Full Mission Capability:
KPP: Key Performance Parameter:
KTAS: Knots True Airspeed:
MC: Mission Capability:
mm: Millimeter:
NM: Nautical Miles:
O&S: Operations and Support:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 11, 2009:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Chairman:
The Honorable John D. Dingell:
Chairman Emeritus:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chairman:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bart Stupak:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
Since the V-22 Osprey began development in the mid-1980s, it has
experienced several fatal crashes, demonstrated a variety of
deficiencies, and faced the virtual cancellation of the program--much
of which it has been able to overcome. There are two variants of the V-
22 tilt-rotor aircraft currently being used: the MV-22 variant for the
Marine Corps will replace the CH-46E helicopter as the Marine Corps'
medium-lift aircraft--to be used along with the heavy-lift CH-53
[Footnote 1]--to fulfill operational requirements such as transporting
combat troops, supplies, and equipment. The Air Force's CV-22 variant
will augment existing U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
aircraft and the MV-22. Until recently, the MV-22 was deployed in Iraq
and, while it accomplished assigned missions there, its usage did not
encompass the full range of tasks anticipated for the aircraft, and
identified operational challenges raise questions concerning how
effectively it can perform the full range of anticipated missions.
In view of our past work and others' highlighting concerns about the V-
22 program, you asked us to determine whether the V-22 will perform as
promised, and if it will, at what cost. To do this, we reviewed the V-
22 aircraft from a variety of perspectives: (1) its current operations
in Iraq; (2) its strengths and deficiencies in terms of the
capabilities expected of it; and (3) its past, current, and future
costs.
In the process of conducting our review, we examined how well the
aircraft has performed in theater since October 2007; key testing,
safety, and production quality issues that might affect its ability to
perform planned missions; its costs, schedule, and quantities since
1986; and changes in key performance parameters (KPP) and other
requirements.[Footnote 2] Throughout our report, "requirements" refers
to MV-22 capabilities stated in the Cost and Operational Effectiveness
Analysis (COEA), Joint Operational Requirement Documents (JORD), and
Capabilities Production Documents (CPD) and Capabilities Development
Documents (CDD).[Footnote 3] We reviewed a wide range of documents
containing MV-22 program data related to cost and other factors dating
from program start in 1986 to the present; past and current KPPs and
other critical requirements; test assessments, development and
operational tests, and internal program documents; and briefs and
reports. We interviewed a wide range of Department of Defense (DOD),
Marine Corps, V-22 program, and contractor officials; MV-22 operators,
maintainers, logisticians, combat troops and their commanders; and
others both in the United States and in Iraq. We also observed MV-22
shipboard operations during training off the coast of North Carolina
and operation of the 12 MV-22s deployed in Iraq. Our assessment focuses
on the MV-22 but in most instances applies to the CV-22, as the two
variants have a common airframe and engine, but avionics do vary.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 to May 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. An expanded version of the
methodology used to conduct this audit may be found in Appendix I.
Results in Brief:
As of January 2009, the 12 MV-22s in Iraq had successfully completed
all missions assigned to them in what is considered an established, low-
threat theater of operations.[Footnote 4] The deployments confirmed the
positive impact of the MV-22's enhanced speed and range, which enable
squadrons to engage in general support missions and deliver personnel
and internally carried cargo faster and farther than is possible with
the legacy helicopters the MV-22 is replacing. The MV-22 was also
called on to deliver external cargo a limited number of times, and
participated in a few "AeroScout" missions.[Footnote 5] However, some
challenges in operational effectiveness were noted that have raised
questions about whether the MV-22 is the aircraft best suited to
accomplish the full mission repertoire of the Marine Corps helicopters
it is intended to replace.[Footnote 6] In addition, aircraft
suitability challenges, such as unreliable parts and supply chain
weaknesses, drove system availability below minimum required levels.
[Footnote 7] As a result, in Iraq, the three MV-22 squadrons averaged
mission capability rates of about 68, 57, and 61 percent, while the
minimum capability rate requirement is 82 percent.[Footnote 8] In
addition, the engines on the MV-22s deployed in Iraq fell short of
their estimated "on-wing" service life.
In addition to the Iraq experience, operational tests and training
exercises have identified challenges with the MV-22's ability to
operate in threat environments higher than existed during the MV-22's
Iraq deployment. Maneuvering limits may affect air crew ability to
execute the correct evasive action. Efforts to ready the MV-22 for
deployment on Navy ships revealed that its large size and large
inventory of repair parts created obstacles to shipboard operations.
Furthermore, challenges have also been identified that could limit the
MV-22's ability to conduct worldwide operations in some environments
and at high altitudes similar to what might be expected in Afghanistan.
While efforts are underway to address these challenges, it is uncertain
how successful they will be, because some of these challenges are a
consequence of the V-22's design.
Cost, schedule, and performance assumptions included in the V-22's
original business case have eroded. The V-22's costs (stated in
constant fiscal year 2009 dollars) have risen sharply above initial
projections. Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) cost has
increased over 200 percent, from $4.2 to $12.7 billion, due, in part,
to development challenges. Total procurement costs also rose nearly 24
percent, from $34.4 to $42.6 billion, even though the program reduced
its planned total procurement buy by about 50 percent, from nearly
1,000 to fewer than 500, most of which will be procured for the Marine
Corps. The initial 1986 estimated procurement unit cost of $37.7
million each has increased by 148 percent to a 2007 estimate of $93.4
million each. To complete the total procurement, the program plans to
request approximately $25 billion (in then-year dollars) for aircraft
procurement. Furthermore, savings from using a multiyear procurement
contract may be offset by costs to modify and upgrade already produced
aircraft. The aircraft's operations and support costs, currently
reported at $75.4 billion (then-year dollars) for the life cycle of the
program, are just beginning and expected to rise. The MV-22's costs per
flight hour is over $11,000--more than double the target estimate and
140 percent higher than the CH-46E helicopter.[Footnote 9] Engine
sustainment contract coverage for some repairs is excluded when engines
are operated without the Engine Air Particle Separator (EAPS) turned on
and for compressor repairs on deployed aircraft outside the United
States regardless of EAPS operations.[Footnote 10] A new sustainment
contract is expected to be awarded after the current contract expires
in December 2009, and is likely to result in higher engine sustainment
costs and increased program support cost. Additionally, problems with
parts reliability have resulted in more maintenance activity than
expected, and if there is no improvement, overall cost and maintenance
hours may remain high.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense re-examine the V-22
by requiring a new alternatives analysis to determine the most cost
effective inventory of aircraft to meet the Marine Corps' current and
future medium-lift needs, possibly to include other services'
operational uses. This analysis should weigh V-22 capabilities and
costs against other alternatives and should consider budgetary
constraints.
Given the unresolved operational effectiveness and suitability issues
and increasing costs associated with the V-22 system, we are also
recommending that the Secretary of Defense require the Marine Corps to
develop a prioritized strategy to improve system suitability (including
identifying why measures such as component reliability and aircraft
availability are low), reduce operational costs, and align future
budget requests accordingly.
In its written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendation for the
development of a prioritized strategy to improve system suitability,
reduce operational costs, and align future budget requests accordingly.
DOD non-concurred with our recommendation for a new V-22 alternatives
analysis, stating that it supports validating required MV-22 quantities
and the proper mix of aircraft. It would do so, however, through the
annual review and update of the Marine Aviation Plan and not through a
new V-22 alternatives analysis. We believe, however, that this
recommendation remains valid--offering a fuller consideration of
alternatives and assuring congressional decision makers that a reasoned
business case exists that supports the planned acquisition of
additional V-22 aircraft.
Background:
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft--one that operates as a
helicopter for takeoffs and landings and, once airborne, converts to a
turboprop aircraft--developed to fulfill medium-lift operations such as
transporting combat troops, supplies, and equipment for the U.S. Navy,
Marine Corps and Air Force special operations. Figure 1 depicts V-22
aircraft in various aspects of use.
Figure 1: Views of V-22 Aircraft in Various Aspects of Use:
[Refer to PDF for image: four photographs]
Source: U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps.
[End of figure]
There are two variants of the V-22's design. The Marine Corps variant
(MV-22) was slated to replace the CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters (see
figure 2) to become the Marine Corps' only medium-lift, assault support
aircraft. Currently, the MV-22 is going to replace only the CH-46E. The
Air Force variant (CV-22) will augment existing U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) aircraft.
Figure 2: CH-46 and CH-53 Helicopters:
[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
The Osprey program was started in December 1981 to satisfy mission
needs for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Originally spearheaded by the
Army, the program was transferred to the Navy in 1982 when the Army
withdrew from the program citing affordability issues. The program was
approved for full-scale development in 1986, and the first aircraft was
flown in 1989. A month after the first flight, the Secretary of Defense
stopped requesting funds for the program due to affordability concerns.
In December 1989, DOD directed the Navy to terminate all V-22 contracts
because, according to DOD, the V-22 was not affordable when compared to
helicopter alternatives, and production ceased. Congress disagreed with
this decision, however, and continued to fund the project. Following a
crash in 1991 and a fatal crash in 1992 that resulted in seven deaths,
in October of 1992 the Navy ordered development to continue and awarded
a contract to a Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Helicopters joint
venture (Bell-Boeing) to begin producing production-representative
aircraft.
In 1994, the Navy chartered a medium lift replacement COEA, which
reaffirmed the decision to proceed with the V-22. It also provided an
analytical basis for KPPs to be proposed for the system. This analysis
defined the primary mission of a medium-lift replacement aircraft to be
the transport of combat troops during sea-based assault operations and
during combat operations ashore. Secondary missions included
transporting supplies and equipment during assault and other combat
operations as well as supporting Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
special operation forces, casualty and noncombatant evacuation
operations, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel operations,
combat search and rescue operations, and mobile forward area refueling
and re-arming operations. These original mission descriptions and
aircraft employment were reaffirmed by the Marine Corps in 2003 and
again in 2007. The existing medium-lift aircraft fleet needed to be
replaced due to inventory shortfalls and reduced aircraft reliability,
availability, and maintainability--needs accentuated by the increasing
age and limited capabilities of its current fleet of helicopters.
The analysis concluded that the V-22 should be the Marine Corps'
choice. The analysis considered a number of helicopter candidates--
including the CH-46E and CH-53D--and the V-22 tiltrotor--judging each
candidate based on their performance characteristics and expected
contribution to tactics and operations. A sensitivity analysis was
conducted which measured candidate aircraft against specific
performance parameters--including KPPs. The analysis used models to
assess research and development, production or procurement, and
operations and support cost and concluded that for non-assault
missions, such as medical evacuation missions, the V-22 was the most
effective option because of its greater speed, increased range, and
ability to deploy in one-third the time of the alternative candidates.
For assault missions, the analysis concluded the V-22 would build
combat power in the form of troops and equipment most quickly, was more
survivable, would maximize the arrival of forces and minimize
casualties, and would halve helicopter losses. In terms of
affordability, the analysis concluded that, holding V-22 and helicopter
force sizes equal, the V-22 would be the most effective but at a higher
cost. The analysis further noted that while the major factor in favor
of the V-22 was its speed, at short distances greater speed offers
little advantage.
Subsequently, Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) began with five
aircraft in 1997, increasing to seven each year in 1998 and 1999. In
2000, the program undertook operational evaluation testing, the results
of which led the Navy's operational testers to conclude that the MV-22
was operationally suitable for land-based operations and was
operationally effective. Later evaluations resulted in testers
concluding that the MV-22 would be operationally suitable on ships as
well. Based on the same tests, DOD's independent operational testers
concluded that the MV-22 was operationally effective but not
operationally suitable, due in part to reliability concerns. Despite
the mixed test conclusions, a Program Decision Meeting was scheduled
for December 2000 to determine whether the V-22 should progress beyond
LRIP production and into full-rate production. Following two fatal
crashes that occurred in 2000 and resulted in 23 deaths, the last one
occurring just before the full-rate production decision, the V-22 was
grounded and, rather than proceeding to full-rate production, the
program was directed to continue research and development at a minimum
sustaining production rate of 11 aircraft per year.
Before the V-22 resumed flight tests, modifications were made to
requirements and design changes were made to the aircraft to correct
safety concerns and problems. The aircraft nacelles[Footnote 11] were
redesigned to preclude line chafing; a robust software qualification
facility was built; and Vortex Ring State, a dangerous aerodynamic
phenomenon that all rotor wing aircraft are subject to and was reported
to have contributed to one of the fatal V-22 crashes in 2000, was
further investigated.[Footnote 12] Requirements for landings in
helicopter mode in which engine power had failed ("autorotation") and
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons protection among others were
eliminated, and some KPPs were modified, prior to conducting a second
round of operational testing with modified aircraft in June 2005.
[Footnote 13] Testers then recommended that the aircraft be declared
operationally effective and suitable for military use. The Defense
Acquisition Board approved it for military use as well as full-rate
production in September 2005. DOD is procuring the V-22 in blocks.
Block A is a training configuration, while later blocks are being
procured and fielded as the operational configurations. Tables 1 and 2
provide a summary of the upgrades to be incorporated in each block
configuration.
Table 1: MV-22 Block Upgrade Definitions:
Block: Block A;
Description: This upgrade includes those efforts necessary to return
the MV-22 to safe and operational fleet operations. This aircraft
represents the core Fleet Marine Force aircraft. These improvements
will include a redesign of hydraulic tubing and electrical wiring in
the engine nacelles, upgraded flight control software, and Reliability
and Maintainability (R&M) improvements. Capabilities are defined in the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-approved CPD.
Block: Block B;
Description: This upgrade provides correction of deficiencies
identified in previous operational tests. Improved maintenance access
to the engine nacelle, avionics and cockpit upgrades, hoist and
defensive weapons system capabilities are also included. Capabilities
are defined in the JROC-approved CPD.
Block: Block C;
Description: This upgrade incorporates mission enhancements while
continuing to provide R&M improvements. The improvements include but
are not limited to enhancements in communication, navigation, net-
readiness and interoperability.
Block: P3I;
Description: These upgrades will continue to build on the existing
blocks. Pre-Planned Product Improvements (P3I) include maturing
technologies to improve R&M and further expand capabilities.
Source: JROC Approved 2007 V-22 Capability Development Document.
[End of table]
Table 2: CV-22 Block Upgrade Definitions:
Block: Block 0;
Description: Provide basic special operations capability to the V-22
Osprey Tiltrotor by adding a self-protection Electronic Counter
Measures suite, Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance radar, and
communications interoperability with other Special Operations Forces,
as well as correction of deficiencies.
Block: Block 10;
Description: Provides improved Special Operations capability to the V-
22 by adding countermeasures capabilities.
Block: Block 20;
Description: Provides growth and expanded Special Operations capability
to the V-22 while continuing to provide R&M improvements.
Block: Block 30;
Description: Provides growth in net-readiness and interoperability.
Incorporates an advanced special operations forces radar.
Block: P3I;
Description: These upgrades will continue to build on the existing
blocks. Pre-Planned Product Improvements (P3I) include maturing
technologies to improve R&M and further expand capabilities.
Source: JROC Approved 2007 V-22 Capability Development Document.
[End of table]
The MV-22 Block B attained Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in June
2007 and was used in Iraq from October 2007 until April 2009 to support
operations from Al Asad Air Base in Iraq's Anbar province. Three Marine
squadrons used the same 12 MV-22s for three consecutive deployments.
[Footnote 14] In March 2008, the Navy awarded Bell-Boeing a 5-year,
$10.4 billion production contract for 141 MV-22s and 26 CV-22s. This
multiyear contract was awarded to achieve anticipated procurement cost
savings. In 2008, after undergoing operational testing, 4 Air Force
variant CV-22s self-deployed to participate in a multinational training
effort in a remote location in Mali, and were used to conduct simulated
long-range air-drop and extraction missions. The first shipboard
deployment of MV-22s is scheduled for mid-2009.
MV-22 Operations in Iraq Demonstrated Effectiveness for Assigned
Missions but the Aircraft Continues to Experience Challenges:
As of January 2009, the 12 MV-22s stationed in Iraq had successfully
completed all missions assigned to them in what is considered an
established, low-threat theater of operations. The deployments
confirmed that the V-22's enhanced speed and range enable personnel and
internal cargo to be transported faster and farther than is possible
with the legacy helicopters it is replacing. The aircraft also
participated in a few AeroScout missions and carried a limited number
of external cargo loads. However, questions have arisen as to whether
the MV-22 is best suited to accomplish the full mission repertoire of
the helicopters it is intended to replace. Some challenges in
operational effectiveness have been noted. Also, suitability
challenges, such as unreliable parts and an immature parts supply chain
drove availability significantly below minimum required levels.
[Footnote 15]
The MV-22 Successfully Completed Assigned Missions in Iraq, Although
Some Operational Challenges Were Identified:
The Marine Corps considers the MV-22 deployments in Iraq to have been
successful, as the three squadrons consistently fulfilled assigned
missions. Those missions were mostly general support missions--moving
people and cargo--in the low-threat operational environment that
existed in Iraq during their deployments. The aircraft's favorable
reviews were based largely on its increased speed and range compared
with legacy helicopters. According to MV-22 users and troop commanders,
its speed and range "cut the battlefield in half," expanding
battlefield coverage with decreased asset utilization and enabling it
to do two to three times as much as legacy helicopters could in the
same flight time. In addition, the MV-22's ability to fly at higher
altitudes in airplane mode enabled it to avoid the threat of small arms
fire during its Iraq deployment. Figure 3 compares the flight radius of
the MV-22 to that of legacy CH-46s.
Figure 3: Comparison of MV-22 to CH-46E Combat Radius:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
This illustration depicted the combat radius for the CH-46E and the MV-
22 overlaid on a map of the Middle East.
Source: GAO map based on USMC data; Map Resources, (map).
[End of figure]
Commanders and operators have noted that the speed and range of the
Osprey offered some significant advantages over the legacy platforms it
replaced during missions performed in Iraq, including missions that
would have been impossible without it. For example, it enabled more
rapid delivery of medical care; missions that had previously required
an overnight stay to be completed in a single day; and more rapid
travel by U.S. military and Iraqi officials to meetings with Iraqi
leaders, thus allowing greater time for those meetings.
While in Iraq, the MV-22 also conducted a few AeroScout raid and
external lift missions. These types of missions were infrequent, but
those that were carried out were successfully completed. Such missions,
however, were also effectively carried out by existing helicopters.
AeroScout missions are made by a combination of medium-lift aircraft
and attack helicopters with a refueling C-130 escort that, according to
Marine Corps officers, find suspicious targets and insert Marines as
needed to neutralize threats. In participating in these missions, the
MV-22 was limited by operating with slower legacy helicopters--thus
negating its speed and range advantages. Similarly, external lift
missions do not leverage the advantages of the V-22. In fact, most
Marine equipment requiring external transport is cleared only for
transit at speeds under 150 knots calibrated airspeed (kcas), not the
higher speeds at which the MV-22 can travel with internal cargo or
passengers. According to Iraq-based MV-22 squadron leadership, the CH-
53, which is capable of lifting heavier external loads, was more
readily available than the MV-22 to carry out those missions and, as
such, was generally called on for those missions, allowing the MV-22 to
be used more extensively for missions that exploit its own comparative
strengths.
The introduction of the MV-22 into Iraq in combination with existing
helicopters has led to some reconsideration of the appropriate role of
each. Battlefield commanders and aircraft operators in Iraq identified
a need to better understand the role the Osprey should play in
fulfilling warfighter needs. They indicated, for example, that the MV-
22 may not be best suited for the full range of missions requiring
medium lift, because the aircraft's speed cannot be exploited over
shorter distances or in transporting external cargo. These concerns
were also highlighted in a recent preliminary analysis of the MV-22 by
the Center for Naval Analysis, which found that the MV-22 may not be
the optimal platform for those missions.
The MV-22's Iraq experience also demonstrated some limitations in
situational awareness that challenge operational effectiveness. For
example, some MV-22 crew chiefs and troop commanders in Iraq told us
that they consider a lack of visibility of activity on the ground from
the V-22's troop cabin to be a significant disadvantage--a fact
previously noted in operational testing. They noted that the V-22 has
only two small windows. In contrast, combat Marines in Iraq stated that
the larger troop compartment windows of the CH-53 and CH-46 offer
improved ability to view the ground, which can enhance operations. In
addition, CH-53s and CH-46s are flown at low altitude in raid
operations. According to troop commanders this low altitude approach
into the landing zones combined with the larger windows in CH-53s and
CH-46s improves their (the troop commanders) situational awareness from
the troop compartments, compared with the situational awareness
afforded troop commanders in the MV-22s with its smaller windows and
use of high altitude fast descent approach into the landing zone. The V-
22 program is in the process of incorporating electronic situational
awareness devices in the troop cabin to off-set the restricted
visibility. This upgrade may not fully address the situational
awareness challenges for the crew chief, who provides visual cues to
the pilots to assist when landing. Crew chiefs in Iraq agree that the
lack of visibility from the troop cabin is the most serious weakness of
the MV-22.
Iraq Deployment Demonstrated Continuing Suitability Challenges:
Availability challenges continue to affect the MV-22. In Iraq, the V-
22's mission capability (MC) and full mission capability (FMC) rates
fell significantly below required levels and significantly below rates
achieved by legacy helicopters.[Footnote 16] The MV-22 has a stated MC
threshold (minimum acceptable) requirement of 82 percent and an
objective (desired) of 87 percent. In Iraq, the three MV-22 squadrons
averaged mission capability rates of about 68, 57, and 61 percent
respectively. This experience is not unique to the Iraq deployment, as
low MC rates were experienced for all MV-22 squadrons, in and out of
Iraq. The program has modified the MC requirement by stating that this
threshold should be achieved by the time the fleet completes 60,000
flight hours, which officials expect to occur sometime near the end of
2009. Figure 4 illustrates the MC rates between October 2006 and
October 2008.
Figure 4: MV-22 Mission Capability Rates between October 2006 and
October 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Date: October 2006;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 37.8%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: November 2006;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 48.83%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: December 2006;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 65.33%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: January 2007;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 60.8%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: February 2007;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 44.83%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: March 2007;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 49.01%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: April 2007;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 57.2%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: May 2007;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 60.2%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: June 2007;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 61.2%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: July 2007;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 61%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: August 2007;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 55.4%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: September 2007
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 61.1%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: [Empty];
Threshold: 82%.
Date: October 2007;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 58.7%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 76.3%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: November 2007;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 56.2%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 64.9%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: December 2007;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 55.4%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 63.2%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: January 2008;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 59.7%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 68.9%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: February 2008;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 61.1%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 65.7%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: March 2008;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 61.1%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 65.5%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: April 2008
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 58.2%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 60.3%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: May 2008;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 62.3%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 58.3%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: June 2008;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 56.7%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 51.2%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: July 2008;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 57.4%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 61.2%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: August 2008;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 45.8%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 43.3%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: September 2008;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 53.3%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 67.3%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: October 2008;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 50.0%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 62.5%;
Threshold: 82%.
Date: November 2008;
Mission capability rate, Fleet average: 52.7%;
Mission capability rate, Iraq average: 60.3%;
Threshold: 82%.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Navy data.
[End of figure]
By comparison, the mission capability rates of the Iraq-based CH-46Es
and CH-53s averaged 85 percent or greater during the period of October
2007 to June 2008.
Although FMC is no longer a formal requirement, it continues to be
tracked as an indicator of aircraft availability. The Osprey's FMC rate
of 6 percent in Iraq from October 2007 to April 2008 was significantly
short of the 75 percent minimum requirement established at the
program's outset. According to MV-22 officers and maintainers, the low
FMC rate realized was due in part to unreliability of V-22 Ice
Protection System (IPS) components. Although the faulty IPS had no
effect on the MV-22's ability to achieve missions assigned in Iraq, in
other areas, where icing conditions are more likely to be experienced-
-such as Afghanistan--IPS unreliability may threaten mission
accomplishment.
Repair Parts Issues and Maintenance Challenges Affected the
Availability of MV-22s in Iraq:
Although MV-22 maintenance squadrons stocked three times as many parts
in Iraq as the number of deployed MV-22 aircraft called for, they faced
reliability and maintainability challenges. Challenges were caused
mostly by an immature parts supply chain and a small number of
unreliable aircraft parts, some of which have lasted only a fraction of
their projected service life.
The MV-22 squadrons in Iraq made over 50 percent more supply-driven
maintenance requests than the average Marine aviation squadron in Iraq.
A lack of specific repair parts was a problem faced throughout the Iraq
deployments despite deploying with an inventory of spare parts to
support 36 aircraft, rather than the 12 MV-22 aircraft actually
deployed. Despite the preponderance of parts brought to support the MV-
22s in Iraq, only about 13 percent of those parts were actually used in
the first deployment. In addition, some aircraft components wore out
much more quickly in Iraq than expected, which led to shortages.
Thirteen MV-22 components accounted for over half the spare parts that
were not available on base in Iraq when requested. Those components
lasted, on average, less than 30 percent of their expected life, with
six lasting less than 10 percent of their expected life. The shortages
caused MV-22 maintainers to cannibalize parts from other MV-22s to keep
aircraft flying, and significantly increased maintenance hours. Parts
were cannibalized not only from MV-22s in Iraq but also from MV-22s in
the United States and from the V-22 production line. The shortages also
contributed to the low mission capability rates, as an aircraft in need
of maintenance or spare parts may not be considered mission capable.
Figure 5 depicts both the percentage of predicted mean flight hours
before failure achieved by these 13 parts and their average requisition
waiting time during the Iraq deployments.
Figure 5: Attained Percentage of Predicted Mean Flight Hours before
Failure and Requisition Wait Time for Top 13 Parts Degrading MV-22
Mission Capability:
[Refer to PDF for image: combination vertical bar and line graph]
Component: Trailing edge blade fairing, aircraft, left-hand
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 1%;
Average requisition wait time: 9.2 days.
Component: Trailing edge blade fairing, aircraft, right-hand
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 1%;
Average requisition wait time: 12.5 days.
Component: Standby attitude indicator
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 4%;
Average requisition wait time: 15 days.
Component: Primary lighting control unit
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 5%;
Average requisition wait time: 13.8 days.
Component: Central deice distributor bracket
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 7%;
Average requisition wait time: 15.1 days.
Component: Nacelle ice protection control unit
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 8%;
Average requisition wait time: 33.9 days.
Component: Shut-off valve
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 24%;
Average requisition wait time: 22.3 days.
Component: Signal data converter, Nacelle interface unit
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 28%;
Average requisition wait time: 12.3 days.
Component: Control, intercommunication
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 31%;
Average requisition wait time: 9.7 days.
Component: Variable frequency generator
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 34%;
Average requisition wait time: 15.3 days.
Component: Constant frequency generator
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 48%;
Average requisition wait time: 13.2 days.
Component: Swashplate actuator
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure: 76%;
Average requisition wait time: 15.2 days.
Component: Actuator linear, EAPS
Attained percentage of predicted mean flight hours before failure:
107%;
Average requisition wait time: 30.2 days.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data.
[End of figure]
The engines on the MV-22s deployed in Iraq also fell short of their
estimated "on-wing" service life, lasting less than 400 hours before
having to be replaced. The program estimated life is 500-600 hours. The
program office noted that there is no contractually documented
anticipated engine service life. Figure 6 illustrates the average
engine time on wing for the three MV-22 squadrons that have been
deployed to Iraq.
Figure 6: Iraq-Deployed MV-22 Squadrons' Average Engine Time on Wing:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
VMM-263:
Flight hours: 304;
Goal range: 500-600 hours.
VMM-162:
Flight hours: 355;
Goal range: 500-600 hours.
VMM-266[A]:
Flight hours: 384;;
Goal range: 500-600 hours.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Navy data.
[A] Data for VMM-266 squadron represent only a portion of the ongoing
deployment.
[End of figure]
Squadron maintainers explained that the lower engine life span has not
affected aircraft availability, as spare engines are readily available
and easily replaced. Program officials plan to replace the existing
power-by-the-hour engine sustainment contract with Rolls Royce, which
expires in December 2009, with a new sustainment contract.[Footnote 17]
According to the program office, the new engine sustainment contract is
likely to result in higher engine support costs--an issue further
discussed later in this report.
Operational Tests and Training Exercises Have Revealed Other Challenges
to the MV-22 in Accomplishing Its Full Range of Possible Operations:
While the MV-22 successfully accomplished missions assigned to it in
Iraq, those missions represent only a portion of the operations
envisioned for the system. Operational tests and training exercises
have provided additional insights into the aircraft's capabilities and
have identified challenges to the MV-22's ability to conduct operations
in high-threat environments, carry the required number of combat
troops, transport external cargo, operate from Navy ships, and conduct
missions operating in environments throughout the world. While efforts
are underway to address these challenges, how successful they will be
is uncertain, as some challenges arise from the inherent design of the
V-22.
MV-22 Faces Challenges in Operating in High-Threat Environments:
The Osprey was intended to operate across the full spectrum of
conflicts, facing a broad range of enemy land-and sea-based weapons.
Although the Iraq deployments validated the ability of the MV-22 to
conduct missions in Iraq's low-threat environment, its ability to
conduct operations and survive in higher threat environments is less
certain. Maneuvering limits may affect air crew ability to execute the
correct evasive action. Currently, the Marine Corps intends to employ
the aircraft in a manner that limits its exposure to threats--a change
from the original intent, that the system would be able to operate in
such environments. In addition, the MV-22 does not have an integrated
defensive weapon, a system requirement.
Although the speed, range, and altitude capabilities of the MV-22
reduce its overall susceptibility to threats as compared to legacy
transport helicopters, operational testers identified flight limits
that restrict the aircraft's flight parameters and could influence its
ability to respond to threats. Restricted maneuverability limits its
ability to perform defensive maneuvers. Flight limits have been imposed
while the aircraft is in helicopter mode to avoid a loss of controlled
flight.
Limits have been imposed to avoid Vortex Ring State (VRS), a condition
that can cause a loss of lift and control of the aircraft when it is in
helicopter mode. VRS can occur in any rotorcraft, and in the V-22 is
now considered well defined and avoidable when the aircraft's forward
speed and descent rate stay within prescribed ranges. However,
specifically in the V-22, VRS can result in loss of lift on one
proprotor and not the other, causing the aircraft to invert. Testers
previously recommended that follow-on tests should involve multiple
aircraft, at heavy weights, in close proximity as might be anticipated
in the conduct of a combat assault mission. The test could increase
confidence that appropriate, safe tactics exist to enable the MV-22s to
deliver assault forces to a small area in a short time while avoiding
undue exposure to enemy threats.
Although an integrated defensive weapon system--needed to suppress
threats while approaching a landing zone, disembarking troops within
the landing zone, or while leaving the landing zone--is a requirement,
the MV-22 does not have such a system. The MV-22 currently has only a
rear ramp-mounted defensive weapon system that is not integrated into
the aircraft and only covers its rear quadrants. Based on Iraq
experiences, this defensive weapon was viewed as lacking flexibility
due to its ability to only point in one direction when employed in the
"ground fire" position and because it was not of sufficient caliber to
be effective in all scenarios. Some air crews commented that the
capabilities of the MV-22 offset previous notions about the requirement
for defensive fire power. However, commanders stated that while the
current defensive weapon system was sufficient for the Iraq deployment,
many other scenarios are easily envisioned where an improved defensive
weapon system would be much preferred. A belly-mounted Interim
Defensive Weapon System (IDWS) capable of covering all quadrants is
being tested. However, in tests, the system jammed frequently.
Additionally, it will not be fully integrated into the aircraft systems
and is not currently compatible with the shipboard environment.
Furthermore, integration of the IDWS into MV-22s will result in a loss
of two combat troop seats to accommodate the IDWS avionics rack.
MV-22 Faces Challenges in Capacity to Transport Personnel and External
Cargo:
Additional missions for the MV-22 include internal and external
transport of supplies and equipment during assault and other combat
operations. Operational tests and shipboard training exercises have
determined that the capacity of the MV-22 to transport troops and
external cargo is, in some cases, below program requirements.
The ability to transport 24 troops equipped with a full combat load is
a key performance parameter for the MV-22. While officials and Marine
combat units who have flown in the MV-22 say it can carry 24 troops, a
Marine Corps after-action report indicates that the MV-22 can not carry
24 troops if they are equipped as intended. The MV-22 operational
requirements document based the 24 troop number for the MV-22 variant
on an assumption of an average weight for a fully equipped combat troop
of 240 pounds; however, improvements in body armor and equipment have
raised the weight projection for each Marine with combat equipment to
400 pounds. As a result, the aircraft's planned capacity to transport
fully loaded combat troops is 20 rather than 24.
Aircraft troop-carrying capacity may be further reduced in other
configurations and flight scenarios. As previously stated, the belly-
mounted interim defensive weapon system will reduce the number of
combat troops that can be transported by two. When the platoon of
Marines transported is configured with heavy weapons, the number of
embarked troops may be reduced due to limited cabin volume. Further,
according to a crew chief interviewed, when combat loads placed in the
aisle restrict crew chief movement, a second crew chief may be needed
to guide aircraft landings, reducing troop capacity. Figure 7
illustrates troops embarked in the MV-22 troop compartment.
Figure 7: MV-22 Troop Compartment:
[See PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Marine Corps document, MV-22B Capabilities and Planning
Considerations.
[End of figure]
External transport of cargo is another requirement of the MV-22.
However, most external loads have not been certified by DOD for high-
speed transport and thus would not leverage the V-22's speed.
Furthermore, according to a 2007 Center for Naval Analysis study, the
MV-22 will not be able to externally transport heavier equipment, such
as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle--which is to replace the Marine
Corps Humvee. The study concluded that there would be less need to use
the MV-22s for external lifting and an increased requirement for
heavier lift helicopters, such as the CH-53K.
Additionally, the program manager is currently tracking the projected
weight growth of the MV-22 Block C variant, and considers weight growth
a moderate risk to the program. External lift capability is likely to
be diminished if the weight of the MV-22 platform exceeds projected
weight growth. Furthermore, according to the MV-22 flight operations
manual, the current 10,000-pound maximum lift capacity of the MV-22 is
achievable at lower altitudes, but is reduced at higher altitudes.
Weight growth in the aircraft itself would further reduce the
aircraft's operational ability to transport loads into higher altitude
regions of the world, such as Afghanistan.
MV-22 Faces Challenges Operating on Navy Ships:
Efforts to ready the MV-22 for deployment on Navy ships identified
numerous challenges. Fewer MV-22s can operate on Navy flight decks. Its
larger size and large inventory of repair parts constrain hangar deck
space. In addition, safety concerns caused by its severe rotor downwash
have been documented during MV-22 ship-based testing and land-based
testing of the CV-22 variant.
The MV-22 is too large to operate in the same numbers (without altering
the ship's current aviation complement) from ships certified for the CH-
46 and CH-53 aircraft, including LHA-or LHD-class ships.[Footnote 18]
The MV-22 has a larger footprint than the CH-46, reducing the number of
aircraft that can be deployed on board any one ship. For example, the
22nd MEU will deploy with 10 MV-22s rather than 12 CH-46s that
previously deployed with the same ship. Furthermore, MV-22 deck spot
utilization also differs from that of the CH-46: the aircraft is not
cleared to take off and land using the two deck spots adjacent to the
tower of LHA-and LHD-class ships. As a result, the MV-22 is only
cleared to take off and land from four of the six operational deck
spots of the LHD-and LHA-class ships usable by CH-46s. According to
program officials, efforts are underway to try to approve operational
use of these deck positions for takeoff and landing on LHD ships.
The repair parts inventory that a squadron of MV-22s deploys with is
significantly greater in volume and weight than that of the legacy
helicopters it is replacing and will impinge on maintenance and other
operations in the ship's hangar space. The space needed for MV-22
repair parts is so large that some parts may need to be pre-positioned
ashore and not housed shipboard. Hangar space is used to conduct
maintenance on aircraft sheltered from the elements or if the
maintenance effort requires the use of heavy lifting cranes located in
the hangar deck ceiling. Training exercises found that the larger MV-22
reduced the number of spots that can be used in the hangar deck for
maintenance from four to three, and made movement of aircraft from the
hangar deck to the flight deck difficult if an MV-22's wings were
spread or an aircraft was on jacks undergoing repairs.
The MV-22's downwash has been described as significantly greater than
that of the CH-46. During prior operational tests, concerns were raised
about the effect of downwash on operations below the aircraft,
including troop embarkation and debarkation, hooking up external loads,
and fastroping.[Footnote 19] Recent shipboard tests have identified
safety issues related to MV-22 downwash, including dislodging equipment
such as life raft securing bands, and potentially blowing down the
sailor who stands on the flight deck of the ship guiding the aircraft
to a safe landing. To resolve these problems, life raft containers have
been replaced through ship alterations with containers intended to
withstand the downwash, and, during one training exercise on an L-class
ship, another person was assigned to physically hold in place the
sailor acting as the landing guide when MV-22s were landing. Downwash
of the MV-22 interacting with other aircraft was also noted onboard
ship. In one documented incident, downwash from a landing MV-22 exerted
such force on the helicopter next to it that the helicopter's pilot had
to take action to prevent his aircraft from lifting off the ship.
Downwash concerns, however, are not restricted to shipboard operations.
Recently completed tests on the CV-22 found that the significant
downwash also had various negative effects on the land-based missions.
Challenges Operating Globally in Extreme Environments:
At the start of its development, the V-22 was intended to operate in
many different environments. However, its current capability to conduct
worldwide operations in many environments is limited. It is not able to
conduct unrestricted operations in tactical nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) warfare; at high altitudes; or in adverse weather.
For example, the V-22 had a requirement that its fuselage and cockpit
design must restrict the entry of NBC contaminants into the aircraft
and must protect and isolate the primary flight crew during ground
operations. During developmental testing, numerous problems were
encountered with the seals intended to maintain the cabin pressure, so
the system was not used in operational testing in 2000. In the absence
of such a system, the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
found that operational MV-22s would be forced to avoid or exit areas of
suspected nuclear, biological, or chemical contamination and require
time to decontaminate affected aircraft--likely reducing their
availability and sortie capability. The NBC requirement has since been
dropped.
The MV-22 is intended to be capable of supporting diverse mission
requirements that will require it to fly during the day or at night, in
favorable or adverse weather, across a range of altitudes from close to
the ground to above 10,000 feet above mean sea level and to make
numerous takeoffs and landings on different and difficult terrain
conditions. Current V-22 performance charts do not support helicopter
operations above 10,000 feet. Furthermore, according to recent MV-22
tests, the V-22's IPS is not reliable. Flying through known or
forecasted icing conditions is currently prohibited. The status of the
IPS is one of the main issues preventing the MV-22 from being fully
mission capable. Additionally, the MV-22 currently does not have
weather radar. Incorporation of weather radar into a later Block
upgrade is planned to give the aircraft the ability to fly in other
adverse weather conditions that may be encountered.
V-22 Business Case Challenged as Costs Have Risen While Performance
Requirements Have Been Modified:
The V-22 entered development with performance requirements and expected
costs that constituted a business case for starting the program. The
original program cost estimates have changed significantly as research
and development and procurement costs have risen sharply above initial
projections. With regard to operations and support costs for the V-22,
the current Flying Hour Program (FHP) cost per flight hour of the MV-22
today is over $11,000--more than double the target estimate and 140
percent higher than the cost for the CH-46E. Furthermore, performance
standards and metrics for V-22 were modified throughout the development
effort.
V-22 Business Case and Acquisition Strategy Have Eroded as Costs Have
Increased Significantly and Are Expected to Continue to Rise:
From the start of initial development in 1986 through the end of 2007,
the program's RDT&E cost increased over 200 percent from $4.2 to $12.7
billion, while its procurement cost increased nearly 24 percent from
$34.4 to $42.6 billion.[Footnote 20] This increase in procurement cost
occurred at the same time that the number of aircraft to be procured
was significantly reduced--from nearly a thousand to less than 500
(most of which will be procured for the Marine Corps), resulting in a
148 percent increase in procurement unit cost for each V-22.
Furthermore, operations and support (O&S) cost will be higher than
anticipated. Table 3 details key aspects of the V-22 program's cost and
schedule experience from development start to 2007.
Table 3: V-22 Cost, Quantity and Schedule Changes from Development
Start to 2007 (Costs in millions of constant fiscal year 2009 dollars):
R&D:
1986: $4,211.8;
2007: $12,682.0;
Percentage Change: 201%.
Procurement:
1986: $34,362.9;
2007: $42,585.2;
Percentage Change: 24%.
Procurement unit cost:
1986: $37.7;
2007: $93.4;
Percentage Change: 148%.
Average program unit cost (RDT&E plus procurement)/Quantity:
1986: $42.3;
2007: $121.2;
Percentage Change: 186%.
Procurement quantities:
1986: 913;
2007: 456;
Percentage Change: -50.1%.
Production years:
1986: 1990-1999;
2007: 1997-2018.
Initial operational capability:
1986: 1992;
2007: June 2007.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Navy V-22 Selected Acquisition Reports.
[End of table]
In March 2008, the Navy awarded a 5-year procurement contract with the
expectation of achieving a savings of $427 million for a buy of 167
aircraft.[Footnote 21] To complete the total procurement, the program
plans to request approximately $25 billion (in then-year dollars) for
aircraft procurement beyond the $29 billion already appropriated and
planned for development and procurement. Design changes to the V-22 to
address identified shortcomings and reflect other upgrades to the
aircraft continue--even as the V-22 is in production--will incur costs
that may offset savings from the multiyear procurement contract. Design
changes and increased procurement and retrofit costs can be expected,
such as the $107.8 million requested in the fiscal year 2008 Global War
on Terrorism budget for the correction of deficiencies and upgrades to
aircraft already produced.
Operations and Support Cost for the MV-22 Will Be Higher Than
Anticipated:
Operations and support (O&S) cost--typically the largest portion of a
weapon system's total costs--are currently reported at $75.41 billion
for the life cycle of the program. O&S costs for the program are just
beginning and are expected to rise. An indication is the current cost
per flying hour, which is over $11,000--more than double the target
estimate for the MV-22 as well as 140 percent higher than the cost for
the CH-46E.[Footnote 22] The Osprey's Iraq experience demonstrated that
the rise in cost is due in part to unreliable parts, the cost of some
parts, and required maintenance. Figure 8 shows the program's current
funding profile.
Figure 8: V-22 Funding Profile (Then-Year Dollars):
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Spending category: Research and development;
Appropriated and requested funds (program start through 2009): $9.6
billion;
Estimated future funding: $0.31 billion.
Spending category: Procurement;
Appropriated and requested funds (program start through 2009): $19.26
billion;
Estimated future funding: $24.78 billion.
Spending category: Operations and support costs;
Appropriated and requested funds (program start through 2009): 0;
Estimated future funding: $75.42 billion.
Spending category: Total:
Appropriated and requested funds (program start through 2009): $28.86
billion;
Estimated future funding: $100.5 billion.
Source: V-22 December 2007 Selected Acquisition Report.
Note: O&S expenditures to date for the recently fielded MV-22 are not
reported in the Selected Acquisition Report. O&S funding represents
past and future funding needs. In fiscal year 2009 dollars, R&D would
be $12.6 billion in past funds and $0.3 billion in estimated future
funding; procurement would be $21 billion in past funds and $22.3
billion estimated future funding, and O&S would be $54.5 billion in
estimated future funding.
[End of figure]
According to Marine Corps officials, the presence of unreliable parts
contributed to reliability and maintainability issues for MV-22
deployed in Iraq. The inventory of repair parts needed to maintain the
MV-22 is large. Although the squadrons in Iraq were supported with a
parts inventory large enough for three times the number of aircraft
deployed, certain "high-demand, low-density items" were used and their
spare inventories depleted--driving the need for expensive and time-
consuming cannibalization of repair parts from other aircraft. A
reliability and maintainability program is in place to address
underperforming components. Efforts include a recently awarded joint
performance-based logistics contract to identify ways to improve
aircraft reliability and reduce the system's logistics footprint.
However, program management does not consider the current reliability
and maintainability strategy to be coherent. Problems with parts
reliability have resulted in more maintenance activity than expected,
and if there is no improvement, overall cost and maintenance hours may
remain high.
Changes to the current engine sustainment contract with Rolls Royce--
the V-22's engine manufacturer--could also affect the program's already
rising O&S costs. The government initially decided to use a commercial
engine and support approach. According to contractor officials, the
billing arrangement for the V-22 engine "power-by-the-hour" sustainment
contract with Rolls-Royce was originally based on complicated models
that attempted to estimate the degree of engine degradation that might
take place in a given number of flight hours, depending on the nature
of the mission. However, the MV-22 engines in Iraq are not lasting as
long as expected, and according to the program office, a new
sustainment contract is being negotiated with Rolls Royce.
In March 2008, a modification to the original contract with an option
for a 1 year extension was awarded--changing the original billing
arrangement. According to contractor officials, under this bridge
contract, engine sustainment billing is now to be based on a straight
flight hour basis. Contract coverage for some repairs are excluded when
engines are operated without the Engine Air Particle Separator (EAPS)
turned on and for compressor repairs on deployed aircraft outside the
United States regardless of EAPS operations.[Footnote 23] Currently the
excluded coverage accounts for 47 percent of total engine support cost.
In addition, the bridge contract expires in December 2009 and the power-
by-the-hour arrangement is expected to be replaced by a new sustainment
contract. According to the program office, this new sustainment
contract is likely to result in higher engine sustainment costs and
increased program support cost.
Key Performance Standards and Other Performance Metrics for MV-22
Modified:
Initially, the Marine Corps' proposed performance parameters for the
medium lift replacement (MLR) aircraft were focused on speed, range,
and payload. However, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council deferred
consideration of system requirements until after completion of the 1994
Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) that validated the V-
22 over other alternatives. Some KPPs used to analyze the MLR
alternative candidates were consolidated or modified as the V-22
progressed through development and operational testing, as shown in
table 4.
Table 4: Evolution of Significant MV-22 Performance Parameters:
Performance parameter: Cruise airspeed;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): 250 KTAS (threshold (T))[A];
1995 requirements: 240 KTAS (T)[A];
Current requirements: 240 knots (T)[A];
Requirement change: Speeds slightly lowered.
Performance parameter: Cruise airspeed;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): 270 KTAS (objective (O))[A];
1995 requirements: 270 KTAS (O)[A];
Current requirements: 270 knots (O)[A];
Requirement change: [Empty].
Performance parameter: Mission radius (five specified mission
profiles):
1. Amphibious troop lift;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): 50 NM (T)/110 NM (O) 24
troops; 2 round trips[A];
1995 requirements: 50 NM x 2 (T) 110 NM x 2 (O)[A];
Current requirements: 50 NM x 2 (T) 110 NM x 2 (O);
Requirement change: Consolidated.
2. Amphibious external lift;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): 50 NM (T)/110 NM (O) 10,000
lbs; 1 round trip[A];
1995 requirements: 50 NM x 1 (T) 110 NM x 1 (O)[A];
Current requirements: 50 NM x 1 (T) 110 NM x 1 (O);
Requirement change: Consolidated.
3. Land troop lift;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): 200 NM (T/O) 24 troops; 1
round trip[A];
1995 requirements: 200 NM x 1 (T)/(O)[A];
Current requirements: 200 NM x 1 (T)/(O);
Requirement change: Consolidated.
4. Land external lift;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): 50 NM (T)/110 NM (O) 10,000
lbs; 1 round trip[A];
1995 requirements: 50 NM x 1 (T) 110 NM x 1 (O)[A];
Current requirements: 50 NM (T) 110 NM (O)[A];
Requirement change: [Empty].
5. Amphibious pre-assault;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): 200 NM (T/O);
1995 requirements: [Empty];
Current requirements: 200 NM (T)[A];
Requirement change: [Empty].
Performance parameter: Internal payload;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): 24 troops (T/O)[A];
1995 requirements: 24 troops (T)/(O)[A];
Current requirements: 24 troops (T)[A];
Requirement change: [Empty].
Performance parameter: External payload;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): 10,000 lbs. (T); 15,000 lbs.
(O)[A];
1995 requirements: 10,000 lbs. (T); 15,000 lbs. (O)[A];
Current requirements: 10,000 lbs. 50 NM (T); 15,000 lbs. 50 NM (O)[A];
Requirement change: 50 NM distance added.
Performance parameter: Self-deployment;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): 2100 NM w/one refuel (T);
2100 NM w/o refuel (O)[A];
1995 requirements: 2100 NM w/one refuel (T); 2100 NM w/o refuel (O)[A];
Current requirements: 2100 NM w/one refuel (T); 2100 NM w/o refuel
(O)[A]; Requirement change: [Empty].
Performance parameter: Air refueling capability;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): Required[A];
1995 requirements: Required[A];
Current requirements: [Empty];
Requirement change: Consolidated.
Performance parameter: Vertical/short takeoff and landing capability;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): Required[A];
1995 requirements: Required[A];
Current requirements: [Empty];
Requirement change: Consolidated.
Performance parameter: Shipboard compatibility;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): Required[A];
1995 requirements: Required[A];
Current requirements: [Empty];
Requirement change: Consolidated.
Performance parameter: Survivability;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): Resistance to 12.7 NM (T)[A];
1995 requirements: 12.7MM @ 90% Velocity (T)[A];
Current requirements: 12.7MM @ 90% Velocity (T)[A];
Requirement change: [Empty].
Performance parameter: Survivability;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): Resistance to 14.5 NM (O)[A];
1995 requirements: 14.5MM @ 90% Velocity (O)[A];
Current requirements: 14.5MM @ 90% Velocity (O)[A];
Requirement change: [Empty].
Performance parameter: Net ready;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): [Empty];
1995 requirements: [Empty];
Current requirements: 100 percent of interfaces; services; policy-
enforcement controls; and data correctness, availability and processing
requirements designated as enterprise level or critical in the joint
integrated architecture. Block C (T); 100 percent of interfaces;
services; policy-enforcement controls; and data correctness,
availability and processing requirements in the joint integrated
architecture. (O)[A];
Requirement change: Added KPP.
Performance parameter: Force protection;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): [Empty];
1995 requirements: [Empty];
Current requirements: Permanently installed crashworthy internal fuel
tanks that must be self-sealing (lower one-third), and nitrogen
inerted. (T) Self-sealing entire tank. (O);
Requirement change: Added KPP.
Performance parameter: Reliability;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): Major components: flight
hours between removals: 1500 hours;
1995 requirements: Mean time between failures: 1.4 hours (T)/2.0 hours
(O);
Current requirements: Mean flight hours between aborts (MFHBA): 17
hours (T);
Requirement change: Metric change.
Performance parameter: Reliability;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): Mission reliability: 85%;
1995 requirements: Mission reliability: 85%;
Current requirements: [Empty];
Requirement change: No longer a metric.
Performance parameter: Maintainability;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): Maintenance man hours per
flight hour (MMH/FH) : 11 hr (Goal);
1995 requirements: Direct maintenance man hours per flight hour: 11
hours (O);
Current requirements: Direct maintenance man hours per flight hour: 20
hours (T)/11 hours (O);
Requirement change: Added threshold level.
Performance parameter: Availability: mission capable (MC) rate;
1993 requirements (at time of 1994 COEA): 85% (T) 90% (O);
1995 requirements: 82% (T) 87% (O);
Current requirements: 82% at maturity (60,000 hours) (T)/87% (O);
Requirement change: Added 60,000-hour limit only after which threshold
values are to be attained.
[A] Entries are key performance parameters:
Source: GAO analysis of V-22 requirements documents.
[End of table]
While operational tests reports state that the MV-22 is meeting all its
KPPs, according to program officials, modifications were made to
balance aircraft operational requirements against technical risks and
program costs. For example, the amphibious external lift KPP was
modified. In its 2000 operational test report, the office of the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) found the MV-22
operationally effective but noted that weight increase of the aircraft
could affect its performance against two KPPs: amphibious external lift
and land assault external lift. Projections by DOT&E indicated that a
1,000-pound increase in aircraft weight would reduce performance in
these metrics below threshold values. These two external lift KPPs of
concern to DOT&E were combined into the land assault external lift KPP
that had previously existed. This is one example of the 2001
modifications that consolidated 14 KPPs into 7 for the MV-22 variant.
In addition, during the 2000 operational test, DOT&E found the aircraft
not operationally suitable in part due to reliability concerns. Mission
capability (MC), one of the metrics used to measure suitability, was
also modified in 2004 such that the MC rate does not have to be met
until the aircraft reaches system maturity (60,000 flight hours).
According to Marine Corps Headquarters officials, the aircraft
currently has over 50,000 hours and may reach the 60,000 hour threshold
within a year.
Concerns about V-22 weight increase and how it may affect aircraft
performance have continued. In 2005, a DOT&E report on the second
operational test of the MV-22 predicted a drop in performance for Block
B aircraft due to weight increase. However, according to Navy
operational testers who tested the MV-22 Block B in 2007, performance
did not drop. DOT&E did not report on the 2007 Block B test. The
program office is currently tracking weight increase in the MV-22 Block
C as a moderate risk to the achievement of select KPPs.
Conclusions:
After more than 20 years in development and 14 years since the last
cost and operational effectiveness analysis was developed to reaffirm
the decision to proceed with the V-22 program in 1994, the MV-22
experience in Iraq demonstrated that it can complete missions assigned
in low-threat environments. Its speed and range were enhancements.
However, operational tests and training exercises suggest that
challenges may limit its ability to accomplish the full repertoire of
missions of the legacy helicopters it is replacing. If so, those tasks
will need to be fulfilled by some other alternative. Viewed more
broadly, the MV-22 has yet to fully demonstrate that it can achieve the
original required level of versatility. To be useful to the warfighter
in a variety of climates and places, its ability to address and resolve
a range of operational challenges must be evaluated. Furthermore,
suitability challenges that lower aircraft availability and affect the
operations and support funding that may be required to maintain the
fleet needs to be addressed. Based on the Iraq experience, the cost per
flight hour is more than double the target estimate. In addition,
savings in unit procurement cost expected as a result of the multiyear
procurement contract may be offset by modifications and upgrades
required on already-produced aircraft. DOD is therefore faced with the
prospect of directing more money to a program, the military utility of
which in some areas remains unproven.
The V-22 program has already received or requested over $29 billion in
development and procurement funds. The estimated funding required to
complete development and to procure additional V-22s is almost $25
billion (then-year dollars). In addition, the program continues to face
a future of high operations and support cost funding needs, currently
estimated at $75.4 billion for the life cycle of the program. This
estimate may not accurately reflect the high cost per flight hour
experienced by the MV-22 fleet so far. In light of the significant
funding needs of a program that has not yet achieved all expected
capabilities, now is a good time to consider the return on this
investment as well as other less costly alternatives that can fill the
current requirement.
To resolve this dilemma, the uses, cost, and performance of the V-22
need to be clarified and alternatives should be considered once again.
To what degree is the V-22 a suitable and exclusive candidate for the
operational needs of the Marine Corps and other services? How much will
it cost? How much can DOD afford to spend? To what degree can a
strategy be crafted for ensuring control over these future costs? If
the V-22 is not or is only partially suitable, to what degree can
another existing aircraft or some mixture of existing aircraft (even
including V-22s) or a new aircraft perform all or some of its roles
more cost effectively? Some consideration should be given to evaluating
the roles such aircraft play in today's theaters of war and whether
their performance warrant their cost.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions.
Given the difference between the now demonstrated and previously
expected operational capabilities and costs of the V-22, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense re-examine the V-22 by requiring a new
alternatives analysis to redefine and revalidate the proper mix of
aircraft to achieve the Marine Corps' current and future medium-lift
needs, possibly to include other services' operational uses. Such an
analysis should weigh V-22 capabilities and costs against the
capabilities and costs of other existing helicopters and aircraft,
upgrades to existing helicopters and aircraft, and potential future
acquisitions, such as the upgrade to the CH-53 currently under
development. This analysis should be conducted within the context of
anticipated future budgetary constraints, and the services should then
adjust total V-22 procurement and annual production and acquisition
plans accordingly.
Given the unresolved operational effectiveness and suitability issues
and increasing costs associated with the V-22 system, we also recommend
that the Secretary of Defense require the Marine Corps to develop a
prioritized strategy to improve system suitability (including
identifying why measures such as component reliability and aircraft
availability are low), reduce operational costs, and align future
budget requests accordingly.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are
reprinted in appendix II. DOD also separately provided technical
comments, which we reviewed and incorporated as appropriate. In its
written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendation for the
development of a prioritized strategy to improve system suitability,
reduce operational costs, and align future budget requests accordingly
and non-concurred with our recommendation for a new V-22 alternatives
analysis.
In its overall comments on our report, DOD wrote that "the report
properly identifies reliability and availability concerns and also
asserts that the operational effectiveness of the MV-22 may be
deficient in some other environments." DOD noted that correcting the
reliability and availability problems are a priority of the department
and that actions are being taken to address these issues. DOD further
commented that the MV-22 deployments in Iraq support "an assessment of
operational effectiveness in the situation that existed." DOD also
stated that our report leads to a similar conclusion. We note, however,
that DOD does not address the concerns expressed in our report about
operational challenges in "other environments."
DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a prioritized strategy
to improve system suitability, reduce operational costs, and align
future budget requests commenting that neither it nor the Marine Corps
are satisfied with current reliability of the aircraft. They stated
that their ability to adjust for components that have not achieved
reliability rates projected by analytical models has been very limited.
They further commented that the Program Manager's prioritization
strategy will be reviewed by the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics.
In non-concurring with our recommendation for a new V-22 alternatives
analysis, DOD stated that it supports validating required MV-22
quantities and the proper mix of aircraft, but not by means of a new V-
22 alternatives analysis. DOD states that planning for all elements of
Marine Corps aviation (including required quantities, location, and
employment of medium-lift assets) and total force affordability are
reviewed and updated annually in the Marine Aviation Plan. It notes
that previous aviation plans have adjusted required quantities of
aircraft and that more recently the fiscal year 2009 plan addressed the
needs created by sustained irregular combat and adjusted CH-53K, AH-1Z,
and UH-1Y quantities. It also comments that the Marine Aviation Plan is
formulated in a constrained budget environment which ensures that both
warfighting needs and affordability are weighed in deriving the optimum
aviation force structure and that the Navy budget is scrutinized yearly
during fall program reviews. While these studies provide useful
information to decision-makers on aviation readiness, transition
timetables, and the cost to acquire, maintain and support assets, they
do not offer a comparison of a fuller range of medium-lift
alternatives, including their costs, operational suitability, and
operational effectiveness under varying scenarios and threat levels.
Also, they do not include a sensitivity analysis to changes in key
assumptions as would an alternatives analysis. We still believe the
recommendation for a new V-22 alternatives analysis is warranted given
the difference between the now demonstrated and previously expected
operational capabilities and costs of the V-22. Furthermore, the
development of a V-22 alternatives analysis could assure congressional
decision-makers that a reasoned business case exists that supports the
acquisition of an additional 282 V-22s and an expenditure of almost $25
billion in procurement funds in fiscal years 2010 and beyond.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its issue date. We will then send copies of this report to the
Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
and the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy. This report will also be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report or need additional
information, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major
contributors to this report were Bruce H. Thomas, Assistant Director;
Jerry W. Clark; Kathryn E. Bolduc; Bonita J.P. Oden; Jonathan R.
Stehle; Johanna Ayers; Jason Pogacnik; Robert S. Swierczek; Hi Tran;
William Solis; and Marie P. Ahearn.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine how the V-22 performed while deployed to Iraq, we gathered
documents that identified the Osprey's performance requirements. By
examining the program's Joint Operational Requirements Document and
subsequent revisions, Capabilities Development Documents, and
operational test reports (with a particular emphasis on sections
pertaining to performance criteria), this allowed us to document
required V-22 performance capabilities and its intended operational
use. We interviewed officials at the Marine Corps Combat Development
Command, the V-22 Program Office, and Commander, Operational Test and
Evaluation Force to discuss the V-22 key performance parameters and
other performance measures. We gathered actual deployment data
(including aircraft missions flown, utilization rates, maintenance
actions, and logistics support needs) from interviews with deployed
squadrons and databases maintained at the squadron level, as well as
from presentations and briefings. In addition to the GAO headquarters
team meeting with officials from the first deployed squadron upon their
return to the United States, we leveraged support from our audit team
based in Iraq. The team interviewed deployed squadron officials,
operators, maintainers, and contractor support personnel, observed the
aircraft in operation, and had an opportunity to fly on the Osprey. We
also received information compiled by the deployed squadron, briefings,
lessons learned reports, after action reports, and consulted with other
organizations (officials at the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation and Center for Naval Analysis) currently monitoring the
aircraft. We compared expected to actual performance and during our
interviews discussed changes in performance metrics.
To identify challenges the V-22 is experiencing, we examined the
October 2000 Operational Evaluation/Operational Assessment report, the
August 2005 Operational Evaluation report on the Block A configuration,
and the June 2007 Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation report for
the MV-22 Block B. This allowed us to document deficiencies in the
aircraft's performance. To support the current status of the aircraft's
limitations, capabilities, and shortcomings, we obtained copies of the
Yellow Sheet deficiency reports, Defense Acquisition Executive
Summaries, the V-22 program office risk assessments, Naval Air Training
and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) flight manuals (which
identify operating limits for the aircraft), Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation assessments of the Osprey, and Defense Contract
Management Agency production reports along with aircraft acceptance
forms, listing deviations and waiver. We also reviewed the Air Force's
CV-22 Initial Operational Test & Evaluation report. We interviewed
officials from the V-22 test community (Commander, Operational Test and
Evaluation Force), program office, officials at Marine Corps
Headquarters assigned to the V-22 program, members of the crew and
contractor support personnel onboard the U.S.S. Bataan and maintainers
and operators that participated in the Realistic Urban Training
exercise and discussed the aircraft's capabilities and shortfalls.
To assess whether the V-22 can accomplish planned operations, we
reviewed the program's Joint Operational Requirements Document and
subsequent revisions, Capabilities Development and Production
Documents, the 1994 Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis for the
Medium Lift Replacement Aircraft (which concluded the V-22 was the most
cost-effective alternative) and the December 2003 Concept of
Employment. We compared assumptions regarding the aircraft's
characteristics and capabilities found in these studies to the V-22's
current status and discussed the aircraft's performance with officials
at the Marine Corps Headquarters, Center for Naval Analysis and in the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation office. We also examined
reports published by other organizations monitoring the V-22.
In assessing program cost and lowered performance requirements, we
evaluated actual cost data in the Selected Acquisition Reports from
1986 through 2007 and funding requests in the budget justification
support for the V-22 program. This allowed us to document the increase
in cost and expected funding needs over time and its impact on
procurement unit cost. Data is presented in fiscal year 2009 dollars
except for figure 8, which is in then-year dollars. In a note to figure
8, we provide those amounts in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars. To
arrive at these amounts, we used base year 2005 dollar amounts from the
December 2007 Selected Acquisition Report for the V-22 and escalated
those amounts to constant fiscal year 2009 dollars using an inflation
factor derived from the National Defense Budget Estimates For 2009. We
examined data regarding the cost to correct deficiencies and fund
planned upgrades, the multi-year procurement contract modification,
modifications to the engine sustainment contract, service life
expectancy for select aircraft components, Defense Contract Management
Agency reports, and the cost for unreliable parts. During our
interviews with deployed squadrons, we obtained cost data associated
with maintaining and operating the aircraft in Iraq. We held
discussions with the V-22 program office, officials at the Marine Corps
Headquarters, contractor staff representing the prime contractor and
the engine manufacturing company to better understand, factors
impacting operations and support costs, and efforts in place to
mitigate the risk of continued rising costs. We also examined the Navy
and industry's plan to address reliability and maintainability concerns
as documented in executive supportability summit briefings. In
assessing whether or not the aircraft has met key performance
parameters, we examined the 1994 Cost and Operational Effectiveness
Analysis for the Medium Lift Replacement Aircraft to gain an
understanding of the assumptions used in the study and their impact on
the V-22's effectiveness over the helicopter candidates along with each
candidate's life cycle cost estimates. Using recent requirements
documents, we identified changes in the V-22 performance parameters
since the 1994 COEA was published.
In performing our work, we focused our work efforts primarily on the MV-
22 and obtained information and interviewed officials from the V-22
Program Office, Patuxent River, Maryland; Headquarters United States
Marine Corps (Pentagon) Arlington, Virginia; Marine Medium Tiltrotor
Squadron (VMM 263 and 266), New River, North Carolina; Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, Arlington, Virginia; Center for Naval
Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia; Defense Contract Management Agency,
Amarillo, Texas; Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force,
Norfolk, Virginia; Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC),
Quantico, Virgina; Rolls Royce, NAVAIR and the Center for Naval
Analysis representatives on board the U.S.S. Bataan. Our audit team in
Iraq met with the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-West;
Commanding Officer - Third Marine Air Wing Forward Aviation Logistics
Department; Commanding Officer and personnel from the Regimental Combat
Team; Commanding Officer and personnel from HMM 161, CH-46 squadron;
VMM-266 (maintainers, operators, and crew chiefs); V-22 contractor
representatives; all located at Al Asad Air Base, Anbar Province.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 to May 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
April 24, 2009:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-09-482, "Defense Acquisitions: Assessments Needed to
Address V-22 Aircraft Operational and Cost Concerns to Define Future
Investments," dated April 7, 2009 (GAO Code 120746). Detailed comments
on the report recommendations are enclosed.
The DoD non-concurs with recommendation one and concurs with
recommendation two. The report properly identifies reliability and
availability concerns and also asserts that the operational
effectiveness of the MV-22 may be deficient in "some other
environments." Correcting the reliability and availability problems is
a priority for the Department and actions are being taken to address
these issues. But reliability and availability are factors that
contribute to operational suitability, not operational effectiveness.
Three successive MV-22 deployments in harsh environments provide
evidence that supports an assessment of operational effectiveness in
the situation that existed. The aircraft was pressed into combat
operations in Iraq at the first opportunity. It conducted every assault
support mission in theater in low to medium threat environments. The MV-
22 is arguably the most survivable, versatile, and capable medium-lift
airframe in the Iraq Theater. The speed, range, and endurance of the MV-
22B broadened Major General Kelly's (Commanding General, Multi-National
Forces - West) area of influence as articulated, "I could dominate Al
Anbar Province, because I had V-22s...I couldn't do what I did with
just helicopters." The evidence in the report leads to a conclusion
that the MV-22 was operationally effective in Iraq.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Technical
comments were provided separately for your consideration. My point of
contact for this effort is Mr. Michael Walsh, 703-695-1700,
Michael.Walsh@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated April 7, 2009:
GAO-09-482 (GAO Code 120746):
"Defense Acquisitions: Assessments Needed To Address V-22 Aircraft
Operational And Cost Concerns To Define Future Investments"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
GAO Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
re-examine the V-22 by requiring a new alternatives analysis to
redefine and revalidate the proper mix of aircraft to achieve the
Marine Corps' current and future medium lift needs, possibly to include
other Services' operational uses. (p.35/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Non-concur. DoD supports validating required MV-22
quantities and the proper mixture of aircraft, but not by means of a
new V-22 alternatives analysis. Planning for all elements of Marine
Corps aviation (including required quantities, location and employment
of medium lift assets) and total force affordability are reviewed and
updated annually in the Marine Aviation Plan. Previous Aviation Plan
updates have adjusted required quantities for KC-130Js and AV-8Bs. More
recently, the FY 2009 Aviation Plan addressed the needs created by
sustained irregular combat and adjusted CH-53K, AH-1Z and UH-1Y
quantities. The Marine Aviation Plan is formulated in a constrained
budget environment which ensures that both war fighting needs and
affordability are weighed in the derivation of the optimum aviation
force structure. Additionally, the Department of the Navy budget is
scrutinized yearly by the Office of the Secretary of Defense during
Fall programs reviews.
Performance attributes such as parts reliability, aircraft availability
and operating costs are monitored and factored into Aviation Plan
updates. As more is learned about the MV-22B's achieved performance and
how best to employ its inherently transformational capabilities within
the Marine Air Ground Task Force, future adjustments to planned
quantities of MV-22 may be appropriate.
GAO Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require the Marine Corps to develop a prioritized strategy to improve
system suitability, reduce operational costs, and align future budget
requests accordingly. (p.35/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. Neither DoD nor the Marine Corps is satisfied
with the current reliability, which translates into availability, nor
operating cost of the aircraft. With over 50% of the total program
flight hours accumulating in the last two years, the ability to adjust
for components that have not achieved Mean Time Between Failure rates
projected by analytical models has been very limited. The Under
Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will review the
Program Manager's comprehensive strategy to address aircraft readiness
and the Marine Corps funding allocation.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 30, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-467SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 31, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Practices and Processes for Multiyear
Procurement Should Be Improved. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-298]. Washington, D.C.: February 7,
2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-406SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-391]. Washington, D.C.:
March 31, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-301]. Washington, D.C.:
March 31, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-248]. Washington, D.C.: March 31,
2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-476]. Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Readiness of the Marine Corps' V-22 Aircraft for
Full-Rate Production. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-369R]. Washington, D.C.: February
20, 2001.
Navy Aviation: V-22 Cost and Capability to Meet Requirements Are Yet to
Be Determined. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-13]. Washington, D.C.: October
22, 1997.
Navy Aviation: V-22 Development--Schedule Extended, Performance
Reduced, and Costs Increased. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-94-44]. Washington, D.C.: January
13, 1994.
Naval Aviation: Status of V-22 Osprey Full-Scale Development.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-91-19]. Washington,
D.C.: April 11, 1991.
Naval Aviation: The V-22 Osprey--Progress and Problems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-91-45]. Washington, D.C.: October
12, 1990.
Defense Acquisition Programs: Status of Selected Systems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-90-30]. Washington, D.C.:
December 14, 1989.
DOD Acquisition Programs: Status of Selected Systems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-88-160]. Washington, D.C.: June
30, 1988.
DOD Acquisition: Case Study of the Navy V-22 OSPREY Joint Vertical Lift
Aircraft Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-86-45S-7]. Washington, D.C.: July
31, 1986.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] CH-53 helicopters are also being used, in part, to conduct medium-
lift operations for the Marine Corps.
[2] KPPs are attributes or characteristics of a system that are
considered critical or essential to the development of an effective
military capability.
[3] An Operational Requirements Document (ORD) is a formatted statement
containing performance and related operational parameters for the
proposed concept or system. The V-22 is being developed under a joint-
service ORD (JORD).
[4] Low threat includes sporadic small arms fire from random locations
(maximum caliber 7.62 mm/.30 cal), and automatic weapons (assault
rifles). Medium threat includes those threats, plus larger caliber
weapons (.50 cal/12.5 mm and 23mm, but not Anti-Aircraft Artillery
(AAA)) adapted for anti-aircraft fire, more sophisticated aiming
devices, and legacy man-portable air-defense systems. High threat
environment may include mobile and/or stationary surface-to-air
missiles, early warning radars, integrated AAA fire control systems,
and interceptor aircraft.
[5] AeroScout missions were developed for and conducted by legacy
helicopters. The concept arose prior to the V-22 arriving in Iraq.
AeroScout missions are made to identify suspicious targets and
neutralize those threats.
[6] Operational Effectiveness is the measure of the overall ability of
a system to accomplish a mission when used by representative personnel
in the environment planned or expected for operational employment of
the system.
[7] Operational Suitability is the degree to which a system can be
placed and sustained satisfactorily in field use.
[8] The current requirement is for the V-22 program to attain the
minimum required rate by the time the Marine Corps achieves 60,000
hours of V-22 flight time. The original requirement for the system did
not, however, specify a flight hour limitation. As of February 2009,
the Marines had logged in excess of 50,000 V-22 flight hours.
[9] Cost per flight hour is calculated by adding the total cost of
fuel, flight equipment, consumables and repairables then dividing by
the flight hours flown. Costs per flight hour for various aircraft
should be considered in the context of their capabilities, missions
flown, and actual usage.
[10] This exception applies to engines installed and operated outside
the United States in erosive/desert environments during the period of
performance (April 2008 through December 2009).
[11] The nacelle houses the engine, accessories, engine-driven gearbox,
and rotor drive system. It also includes flexible and rigid hydraulic
lines, proprotor flight control system actuators and critical
mechanical components.
[12] Vortex Ring State (VRS) or "power settling" is a phenomenon in
which the combination of low forward speed and high rate of descent
causes the upward flow of air around a rotor to approach the same
velocity as the downwash produced by the rotor. When this happens, the
rotor loses lift.
[13] See page 28 which discusses KPP modifications in more detail.
[14] Those three squadrons are VMM-263 (October 2007 to March 2008),
VMM-162 (April 2008 to September 2008) and VMM-266 (October 2008 to
April 2009).
[15] Suitability--comprised of maintainability, reliability, and
availability--is the degree to which a system can be placed and
sustained satisfactorily in field use.
[16] An aircraft that is mission capable (MC) is one that is in a
material condition to perform at least one of its designated missions,
while an aircraft that is fully mission capable (FMC) is in a material
condition to perform all of its designated missions.
[17] Under a power-by-the-hour arrangement, the contractor provides
fixed-cost maintenance based on the number of hours flown each year.
Using this concept, the customer provides a fixed level of funding and
expects, subject to some exclusions, to receive a given level of
support by the contractor. The contractor expects to be provided a
fixed level of funding up front and anticipates a long-term support
arrangement.
[18] LHA and LHD ships are the amphibious assault ships designed to
transport and land troops and essential combat equipment and supplies
by aircraft, amphibious craft, and vehicles.
[19] Fastroping is a method used by troops to quickly exit a hovering
aircraft.
[20] Amounts are in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars.
[21] Savings have been included in applicable lot aircraft prices.
[22] These data were gathered after the Material Support Date, October
1, 2008, when the Navy assumed responsibility for all spares and repair
parts needed to support a new weapons system, subsystem, or support
equipment end item at Fleet operational sites.
[23] The exception applies to engines installed and operated outside
the United States in erosive/desert environments during the period
coverage.
[End of section]
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