Military Personnel
Army Needs to Focus on Cost-Effective Use of Financial Incentives and Quality Standards in Managing Force Growth Gao ID: GAO-09-256 May 4, 2009To ease the pace of overseas deployments, the President announced a plan in 2007 to grow the Army's end strength by about 7 percent by 2013. GAO was asked to evaluate the Army's management of this growth. Specifically, GAO determined the extent to which the Army has (1) made progress in growing the force, (2) awarded cost-effective bonuses to attract and retain enlistees, (3) maintained the quality of its enlisted force, and (4) directed growth in its officer force to areas of need and determined whether trade-offs it has made to alleviate shortages will have long-term effects. GAO reviewed the Army's growth plans, bonuses, waivers, and officer promotions, and interviewed Defense and Army officials.
Although the Army's Grow the Force plan originally called for growth to be completed by fiscal year 2013, the Army had met 99 percent of this growth goal by the end of fiscal year 2008. Since fiscal year 2005, when none of the Army components met recruiting goals, all have made steady progress. To achieve this growth, the Army substantially increased its number of recruiters and its funding of incentives. In addition, the active Army and Army Reserve exceeded their retention goals from fiscal years 2005 through 2008; the Army National Guard exceeded its goals in fiscal years 2006 and 2008 and achieved retention within the allowable margin in fiscal years 2005 and 2007. While the Army has increased its expenditures for bonuses by almost 75 percent since fiscal year 2005, it has not used available research to set bonuses at dollar amounts that are most cost-effective. Although a substantial body of research exists on how to cost-effectively use recruiting resources, the Army has not used this research to calculate bonus amounts. During GAO's review, Army officials stated that the main proof of success of the bonus program was that the Army had met its goals for accessions and retention. Also, because Defense guidance allows the Army to offer bonuses to enlistees in any occupation, the Army has been able to award and often has awarded bonuses to occupations that are not considered priority. Further, because each component makes decisions on bonuses independently, the amounts of bonuses awarded by different components vary widely. Since GAO completed its audit work, the Army states, however, that it has been reducing the numbers and amounts of bonuses offered enlistees. In fiscal years 2005 through 2008, the Army did not consistently meet quality goals for new recruits, as measured by the percentage who have high-school diplomas and who score in the upper half on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. The Army implemented some new programs to increase the market of eligible recruits, such as programs for overweight individuals or those without high-school diplomas. In addition, the Army has continued to use conduct waivers for candidates who fall short of entrance standards for reasons such as prior criminal misconduct. Existing analyses have shown that recruits with conduct waivers perform similarly to those without conduct waivers-- although they are more likely to be separated for adverse reasons; the Army lacks data on the cost of enlisting persons who require conduct waivers. The Army is experiencing shortages of captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels and projects that these shortages will continue. The Army has offered bonuses to captains; however, it has not offered incentives to majors or lieutenant colonels because those ranks are not considered to have retention problems. While the Army has research focused on incentive packages, this research has not been directed at calculating the most cost-effective bonus amounts. Also, the Army has no method of determining whether actions it has taken that deviate from congressional benchmarks will have any effect on the future Army officer corps.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-256, Military Personnel: Army Needs to Focus on Cost-Effective Use of Financial Incentives and Quality Standards in Managing Force Growth
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Report to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2009:
Military Personnel:
Army Needs to Focus on Cost-Effective Use of Financial Incentives and
Quality Standards in Managing Force Growth:
GAO-09-256:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-256, a report to the Subcommittee on Military
Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
To ease the pace of overseas deployments, the President announced a
plan in 2007 to grow the Army‘s end strength by about 7 percent by
2013. GAO was asked to evaluate the Army‘s management of this
growth.Specifically, GAO determined the extent to which the Army has
(1) made progress in growing the force, (2) awarded cost-effective
bonuses to attract and retain enlistees, (3) maintained the quality of
its enlisted force, and (4) directed growth in its officer force to
areas of need and determined whether trade-offs it has made to
alleviate shortages will have long-term effects. GAO reviewed the
Army‘s growth plans, bonuses, waivers, and officer promotions, and
interviewed Defense and Army officials.
What GAO Found:
Although the Army‘s Grow the Force plan originally called for growth to
be completed by fiscal year 2013, the Army had met 99 percent of this
growth goal by the end of fiscal year 2008. Since fiscal year 2005,
when none of the Army components met recruiting goals, all have made
steady progress. To achieve this growth, the Army substantially
increased its number of recruiters and its funding of incentives.In
addition, the active Army and Army Reserve exceeded their retention
goals from fiscal years 2005 through 2008; the Army National Guard
exceeded its goals in fiscal years 2006 and 2008 and achieved retention
within the allowable margin in fiscal years 2005 and 2007.
While the Army has increased its expenditures for bonuses by almost 75
percent since fiscal year 2005, it has not used available research to
set bonuses at dollar amounts that are most cost-effective. Although a
substantial body of research exists on how to cost-effectively use
recruiting resources, the Army has not used this research to calculate
bonus amounts. During GAO‘s review, Army officials stated that the main
proof of success of the bonus program was that the Army had met its
goals for accessions and retention. Also, because Defense guidance
allows the Army to offer bonuses to enlistees in any occupation, the
Army has been able to award and often has awarded bonuses to
occupations that are not considered priority. Further, because each
component makes decisions on bonuses independently, the amounts of
bonuses awarded by different components vary widely. Since GAO
completed its audit work, the Army states, however, that it has been
reducing the numbers and amounts of bonuses offered enlistees.
In fiscal years 2005 through 2008, the Army did not consistently meet
quality goals for new recruits, as measured by the percentage who have
high-school diplomas and who score in the upper half on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test. The Army implemented some new programs to
increase the market of eligible recruits, such as programs for
overweight individuals or those without high-school diplomas. In
addition, the Army has continued to use conduct waivers for candidates
who fall short of entrance standards for reasons such as prior criminal
misconduct.Existing analyses have shown that recruits with conduct
waivers perform similarly to those without conduct waivers” although
they are more likely to be separated for adverse reasons; the Army
lacks data on the cost of enlisting persons who require conduct
waivers.
The Army is experiencing shortages of captains, majors, and lieutenant
colonels and projects that these shortages will continue. The Army has
offered bonuses to captains; however, it has not offered incentives to
majors or lieutenant colonels because those ranks are not considered to
have retention problems. While the Army has research focused on
incentive packages, this research has not been directed at calculating
the most cost-effective bonus amounts.Also, the Army has no method of
determining whether actions it has taken that deviate from
congressional benchmarks will have any effect on the future Army
officer corps.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Army to (1) build on currently available analyses to enable the
Army to set cost-effective bonuses for enlisted personnel, (2) collect
data on the costs of recruiting and training soldiers with conduct
waivers who separate early, (3) build on currently available analyses
that will enable the Army to set cost-effective bonus amounts and other
incentives, and (4) track the effects on the officer corps of actions
taken to address shortages that involve deviations from congressional
benchmarks. The Department of Defense concurred with the first three
recommendations and partially concurred with the fourth.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-256]. For more
information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or
farrellb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Army Is Well Ahead of Schedule in Growing the Force:
The Army Has Dramatically Increased Bonus Expenditures but Does Not Use
Available Research to Calculate the Most Cost-Effective Bonus Amounts:
The Army Has Fallen Short of Its Quality Goals and Has Taken Steps to
Expand Its Recruiting Market:
The Army Lacks Support to Gauge the Effect on the Officer Corps of Its
Actions to Alleviate Shortages:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Enlistment Bonuses for Active Duty Soldiers:
Appendix III: GAO Review of Felony Waivers:
Appendix IV: Critical Shortages of Officers by Rank and Branch:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Army End Strength Goals and Growth Achieved under Original and
Accelerated Plans in Fiscal Years 2007-2013:
Table 2: Enlisted Accessions in Fiscal Years 2005-08, by Component:
Table 3: Active Army Enlisted Reenlistments, 2005-08:
Table 4: Enlisted Attrition for the Army Reserve and the Army National
Guard in Fiscal Years 2005-2008:
Table 5: Enlistment Bonuses Awarded to New Recruits by Each Army
Component in Fiscal Year 2008:
Table 6: Army Progress in Meeting Quality Benchmarks, Fiscal Years 2005-
08:
Table 7: Numbers of Recruits Accessed in Fiscal Year 2008 through the
Army's Initiatives to Expand the Recruiting Market:
Table 8: Number of Captains Participating in the Menu of Incentives,
September 2007 through November 2008:
Table 9: Number of Officers Participating in the Precommissioning
Incentive Program in Fiscal Years 2007-2009:
Table 10: Levels of Enlistment Bonuses Offered to Active Army Soldiers,
June 2008:
Table 11: Occupational Specialties Qualifying for Enlistment Bonuses
(as of June 2008):
Table 12: Examples of Felony Offenses Committed by Individuals Who
Received Waivers for Felony Convictions from the Army in Fiscal Year
2007:
Table 13: Fill Rates Below 85 Percent for Officers by Rank and Branch
at the End of Fiscal Year 2008:
Figures:
Figure 1: Numbers of Army Recruiters in Fiscal Years 2005-08:
Figure 2: The Active Army's Total Bonus Expenditures for Fiscal Years
2005 through 2008:
Figure 3: The Army Reserve's Total Bonus Expenditures for Fiscal Years
2005 through 2008:
Figure 4: The Army National Guard's Total Bonus Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2005 through 2008:
Figure 5: The Army's Estimate of the Size of the Population Eligible to
Enlist in Fiscal Year 2008:
Figure 6: Historical and Projected Shortages of Active Army Captains,
Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels, Fiscal Years 2003 to 2013:
Figure 7: Actual or Projected Promotion Rates Compared with Promotion
Rate Benchmarks in Fiscal Years 2004-2010:
Abbreviations:
AFQT: Armed Forces Qualification Test:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GED: General Educational Development:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 4, 2009:
The Honorable Susan A. Davis:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Joe Wilson:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Personnel:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Overseas Contingency Operation[Footnote 1] has dramatically
increased the scale of U.S. military operations and has accelerated the
pace of operations for soldiers who must deploy to Iraq and
Afghanistan. To help alleviate the burden on those most seriously
affected by these deployments, the President announced a plan in
January 2007 to grow the Army's end strength by 65,000 active-duty;
approximately 8,200 Army National Guard; and approximately 1,000 Army
Reserve personnel by fiscal year 2013.[Footnote 2] These planned
increases represent about a 7 percent increase in the total size of the
Army, from approximately 1.04 million personnel to a growth goal of
over 1.11 million personnel. In 2008, however, recognizing the
intensified demands on Army forces and the stress associated with their
long deployments, the Army decided to accelerate this planned growth
and complete it by fiscal year 2010. As the Army has increased its
forces, it has been faced with the added challenge of doing so in a
difficult recruiting environment, partly due to the long and repeated
deployments expected of Army servicemembers. To meet this challenge and
to successfully target youth who are qualified for service, the Army
has invested heavily in recruiting and bonuses. However, the nation is
now faced with difficult economic circumstances that are straining
government resources. In this context, all agencies, including the
Department of Defense (DOD), will need to rethink the way they do
business and demonstrate the best possible stewardship of federal
funds.
Given the extraordinary demands now being placed on the Army, you asked
us to examine the Army's ability to manage its planned growth in
personnel and meet its future personnel needs. This report addresses
the following questions. To what extent is the Army (1) making progress
in growing the force, (2) awarding cost-effective bonuses to attract
and retain enlistees in occupations of greatest need, (3) maintaining
the quality of its enlisted force, and (4) directing the growth in its
officer force to areas of need and determining whether short-term trade-
offs it has made to alleviate shortages will have any long-term effects
on its officer corps?
To assess the Army's progress in growing the force, we reviewed its
actual and projected end strength under both the original and the
accelerated Army growth plans. We also analyzed recruiting and
retention data from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for
active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard servicemembers. To
assess the extent to which the Army is awarding cost-effective bonuses
to attract and retain enlistees in occupations of greatest need, we
reviewed Army data on occupations with personnel shortages and observed
the Army's processes for allocating bonuses. To assess the efforts that
the Army is making to maintain the quality of its enlisted personnel,
we analyzed data from OSD on educational credentials and aptitude test
scores for these personnel, and we collected data from the U.S. Army
Recruiting Command and the National Guard Bureau on enlistees who were
accepted into the Army with waivers--permission to join the service
despite a formerly disqualifying factor such as prior misconduct. We
also reviewed the Army's and the RAND Corporation's analyses of the
outcomes for soldiers who had received waivers. In addition, we
collected information on the Army programs designed to widen the market
of eligible recruits. To assess the extent to which the Army is
directing its growth to areas of need in its officer corps, we reviewed
data on the shortages that exist within the officer corps and collected
information on the bonus programs and other incentives used by the Army
to address officer shortages. To understand the Army's efforts to
maintain the appropriate rank structure and experience levels of its
officer corps, we collected information on the officer evaluation
process and reviewed data on officer promotions from the U.S. Army
Human Resources Command. The data we reviewed for each of our research
objectives generally covered fiscal years 2005 through 2008; however,
our analysis of enlistment waivers was limited to fiscal year 2008 due
to limitations in waiver data from previous years, such as the system's
failure to capture some waivers and the overcounting of other waivers.
[Footnote 3]Except in the case of the enlistment waiver data, we found
the data for fiscal years 2005 through 2008 to be sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of this report. In addition to analyzing available
data and documents, we interviewed officials from the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and various
organizations within the Army, including the Army's Office of the Chief
of Staff for Programs, the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, the Army Budget Office, and the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Additionally,
we visited and interviewed officials from the U.S. Army Accessions
Command, U.S. Army Cadet Command, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, U.S.
Army Human Resources Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and National
Guard Bureau Headquarters. We conducted this performance audit from
February 2008 to March 2009 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
More information on our scope and methodology is available in appendix
I.
Results in Brief:
By the end of fiscal year 2008, the Army as a whole had already met 99
percent of its overall growth goal, whereas it had planned to complete
the growth by 2013 under the original Grow the Force plan and by 2010
under the accelerated plan. To attain this high rate of growth, the
Army made progress in meeting recruiting goals, increased its number of
recruiters and its funding for incentives, and exceeded its retention
goals. All of the Army's components have made steady progress in
recruiting personnel since fiscal year 2005, when all three fell short
of meeting recruiting goals. The Army increased the number of
recruiters from fiscal years 2005 through 2008, in the active Army by
almost 25 percent (from 5,454 to 6,589); in the Army Reserve by more
than 50 percent (from 1,117 to 1,739); and in the National Guard by 38
percent (from 3,700 to 5,100). The Army's growth has also depended
heavily on its ability to retain personnel, and in fiscal years 2005
through 2008 the active Army exceeded its retention goals for personnel
in each experience category for which retention goals were set. During
the same period, the Army Reserve attained attrition rates lower than
the established maximum. The Army National Guard kept its attrition
rates below the established maximum in fiscal years 2006 and 2008, and
while it had attrition rates slightly higher than the maximum in fiscal
years 2005 and 2007, these rates still fell within the 2 percentage
point margin of variance allowed by DOD.
During this period of heightened military operations, the Army was able
to dramatically increase its spending on enlistment and reenlistment
bonuses in fiscal years 2005 through 2008. However, as its spending for
bonuses went up, it did not use available research to determine whether
it was paying more than it needed to in order to get the same results.
The Army's annual expenditures on enlistment and reenlistment bonuses
increased from $671.5 million in fiscal year 2005 to approximately $1.2
billion in fiscal year 2008 for the active Army; from $123.5 million to
$290.7 million for the Army Reserve; and from $377 million to $595
million for the Army National Guard. According to DOD directives, the
intent of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses is to influence personnel
inventories in situations in which less costly methods have proven
inadequate or impractical.[Footnote 4] A substantial body of research
exists, dating from the 1960s to the present, exploring options for how
the services can estimate the extent to which enlistment and
reenlistment rates for particular segments of the force are likely to
be affected by alternative uses of resources. While this research has
provided much valuable information, it has focused on comparing
incentive packages--not on whether the Army's increasing spending on
bonuses is as cost-effective as it could be. During our audit work,
Army officials told us that the main proof of the success of the bonus
programs is that the Army has met its goals for accessions and
retention. Because the Army does not use available research to
determine whether it is setting bonus amounts at the most cost-
effective levels, it does not know whether they are excessive and
therefore cannot be assured that it is getting the maximum benefit from
bonus expenditures. Furthermore, the Army's guidance allows the
services the flexibility to award bonuses to occupations that are not
considered to be priorities in the Army's readiness assessment process.
The Army's Enlisted Incentives Review Board considers several factors
when deciding those occupational specialties for which it will award
bonuses, including the difficulty of recruiting for these positions,
the numbers of available training slots, and the rates at which these
occupations are filled. This process sometimes results in cases in
which bonuses are not offered for priority occupations but are offered
for nonpriority occupations. In addition, soldiers in the same
occupations may receive different bonuses depending on the component in
which they enlist. We are recommending that the Army build on currently
available analyses that will enable it to set cost-effective enlistment
and reenlistment bonuses. After our audit work was completed, Army
officials told us that they had begun, in fiscal year 2009, to reduce
the numbers and amounts of bonuses it offers and planned to reexamine
its bonus program. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD
concurred with this recommendation and reported that in February 2009,
DOD had contracted for a DOD-wide research study entitled "Recruiting
and Retention Effectiveness of Cash Incentives." The objective of this
research is to assess the impact on enlistment and reenlistment
propensity of military cash incentives used in the services.
During this period of rapid growth, the Army components have not
consistently been able to meet DOD's traditional quality goals, which
call for at least 90 percent of new recruits to have high-school
diplomas and at least 60 percent to have scores in the upper half on
the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). In fiscal year 2005, all
three components fell short of the high-school diploma goal, and the
Army National Guard fell short of the AFQT goal. Since then, components
have continued to struggle. In fiscal year 2008, only the National
Guard met the high-school diploma goal, and only the active Army met
the AFQT goal. The Army estimates that only 3 out of 10 youth aged 17
to 24 are qualified to join the Army without requiring a waiver for
medical conditions, conduct issues, or administrative reasons such as
the number of dependents--including those who have low educational
credentials or low aptitude scores. The Army has initiated new programs
to widen the pool of eligible recruits. For example, the Army has begun
to target potential recruits who are slightly overweight or do not have
high-school diplomas or equivalent degrees. In addition, all Army
components have continued their use of conduct waivers to admit
recruits who do not meet the standard entrance requirements for reasons
such as prior criminal misconduct. Approximately 12 percent of all new
recruits admitted by the active Army in fiscal year 2008 had a conduct
waiver; some of those waivers were granted to recruits with prior
felony charges.[Footnote 5] However, recruits with felony waivers
comprised less than 1 percent of accessions to the active Army and less
than 2 percent of accessions to the Army Reserve and the Army National
Guard. In 2006, the Army began to study the performance of recruits
with conduct waivers. For example, the Army conducted a study of
recruits with conduct waivers who were accessed during fiscal years
2003 through 2007, and the RAND Corporation conducted a study of Army
recruits with conduct waivers who were accessed during fiscal year 2002
through June 2005. Both the Army's and RAND's analyses showed that,
while the performance of these recruits was generally as good as that
of the recruits without conduct waivers, the former had a higher
likelihood of being separated for adverse reasons, such as behavioral
problems. As it continues to study soldiers admitted to the Army with
waivers, RAND will be analyzing whether their presence adversely
affects the behavior of other members of their units and will be
updating its prior work. However, as in its prior analysis, RAND does
not plan to consider in the scope of its work the costs associated with
soldiers who require conduct waivers, such as the costs of the waiver
review and approval processes and any early separations of these
soldiers from the Army for adverse reasons. Army officials told us that
they believe that the cost of the waiver review process is
"negligible." However, because the Army has not yet calculated the cost
of its multistep process and because research on enlistees with conduct
waivers is mixed, it is not yet clear whether the cost of the
recruiting, waiver, and training processes for recruits with conduct
waivers justifies the possible loss of these enlistees before the end
of their first terms. The Army therefore cannot be certain that it is
making the most prudent use of its resources. To enable the Army to do
so, we are recommending that it collect data on the cost-effectiveness
of its policies related to recruits who have conduct waivers and use
these data to inform its waiver policies. In commenting on a draft of
this report, DOD concurred with this recommendation and reported that
in February 2009, the Army Audit Agency had begun a study of waiver
policy.
To help alleviate shortages in the officer corps, the Army has offered
incentives to several groups of officers, increased promotion rates,
and shortened time-in-service requirements. While the Army seeks to
fill all authorized officer positions, it is currently experiencing
shortages of captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels, and it projects
that shortages at some ranks will continue through 2013. For example,
at the end of fiscal year 2008, the Army was short by 1,208 captains;
3,112 majors; and 529 lieutenant colonels. To help alleviate these
shortages, through November 2008, the Army offered captains a choice of
incentives to remain in the Army: a cash bonus of up to $35,000; a
choice of graduate school; a choice of military or language training; a
choice of branch (or career area of expertise); or a choice of
location. The Army is authorized to offer bonuses, but DOD Directive
1304.21 states that it is wasteful to authorize the use of financial
incentives when less costly but equally effective methods are
available. However, as in the case of enlisted personnel, while the
Army has conducted research to explore possible incentive packages, it
has not demonstrated that the package it offered was the most cost-
effective. In other efforts to alleviate officer shortages, since 1992,
the Army has been exceeding congressional benchmarks for promotion
rates and reducing time-in-service requirements for promotion. The Army
has made these short-term trade-offs to alleviate current and future
shortages but has not yet assessed what effect, if any, these trade-
offs may be having on its officer corps. We are recommending that,
should the Army decide to offer incentives to officers in the future,
it build on currently available analyses that will enable the Army,
with the direction and assistance of the Secretary of Defense, to set
cost-effective bonus amounts and other incentives. We are further
recommending that the Army track the effects on the officer corps of
its actions to alleviate shortages, particularly when it has deviated
from benchmarks described in Senate Report 96-375, which accompanied
the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). In commenting on
a draft of this report, DOD stated that it concurred with our
recommendation that the Army build on available analyses to set cost-
effective bonus amounts and other incentives, adding that it requires
the services to provide detailed business cases before employing
retention bonuses. Regarding our recommendation that the Army track the
effects on its officer corps of deviating from DOPMA benchmarks, DOD
partially concurred, stating that these benchmarks are not intended to
serve as fixed mandates. We agree but continue to believe that the Army
should monitor the effect of its deviation from these benchmarks to
determine whether this deviation will have a negative effect on the
future officer corps.
Background:
DOD-wide, military personnel costs make up 23 percent of defense
spending. According to GAO estimates, in fiscal year 2000 the average
compensation for an active-duty soldier in terms of cash and noncash
benefits and deferred benefits such as healthcare in retirement was
$101,537. In fiscal year 2007, it cost about $125,000 a year to
compensate an active-duty soldier, a rise of about 23 percent.[Footnote
6]The Army must annually recruit and retain more than twice the number
of uniformed personnel needed by any other military service, and it has
budgeted approximately $51.8 billion for military personnel in fiscal
year 2009. Each fiscal year, the Army determines its quantity goals--
the number of uniformed personnel it must recruit into the active Army,
the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard--based on the difference
between the congressionally authorized end strength for each of these
components and the projected number of currently serving personnel
expected to continue their military service through the end of the
fiscal year. In addition, requirements specific to the military
services' officer corps set out in law--specifically the Defense
Officer Personnel Management Act--guide the Army's management of these
personnel.[Footnote 7] For example, the act sets the upper limit on the
number of officers that the Army may have at any given time,[Footnote
8] and Senate Report No. 96-375 describes benchmarks for officer
promotion rates. Congressional reports accompanying the Defense Officer
Personnel Management Act also contain information intended to guide
management of the officer corps.[Footnote 9] Since 2004, two major Army
initiatives--one to restructure the Army and another to expand its
size--have influenced the Army's needs for both enlisted and officer
personnel.
* In 2004, the Army began its multiyear modular force restructuring,
sometimes referred to as "Army Modularity," which involves the total
redesign of the operational Army. It was initiated, in part, to support
current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The foundation of modular
restructuring is the creation of new, standardized, modular units that
change the Army's division-based force structure to a structure in
which smaller, more numerous brigade formations are embedded within
significant support elements. These new modular Brigade Combat Teams
and Multi-Functional Support Brigades are designed to be self-
sufficient, stand-alone units that are more rapidly deployable and
better able to conduct joint and expeditionary combat and support
operations than were their larger division-based predecessors. These
units, along with Functional Support Brigades and modular Headquarters
Units, comprise the Army's new modular force. In most cases, modular
brigades require a different personnel skill level mix than did the
brigades they replace.
* In January 2007, the President announced an initiative--called Grow
the Force--intended to expand the size of the Army in order to meet
strategic demands and help reduce stress on the force. Subsequently, in
October 2007, the Chief of Staff of the Army announced a plan to
accelerate the original Grow the Force completion date from fiscal year
2013 to fiscal year 2010. The original plan called for an increase in
active Army end strength of 65,000 personnel, bringing it to 547,400;
an increase in Army National Guard end strength of approximately 8,200
personnel, bringing it to 358,200; and an increase in Army Reserve end
strength of approximately 1,000, bringing it to 206,000. The
accelerated plan calls for the active Army and the Army National Guard
to achieve their target end strengths by fiscal year 2010--3 years
earlier than initially planned; the accelerated plan does not affect
the Army Reserve's timeline. As we have previously reported, based on
the original timeline, the Army's preliminary cost estimate indicated
that expanding the Army would require approximately $70.2 billion from
fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2013 for military personnel,
operations and maintenance, procurement, and military construction
costs.[Footnote 10] The Army also anticipates that it will need
additional supplemental funding to meet the accelerated timeline.
The Army has control over some but not all of the factors that affect
recruiting. For example, to increase the number of recruits, the Army
may choose to increase the size of its recruiting force or to use
incentives, such as enlistment bonuses or educational benefits.
However, according to the Congressional Budget Office, the combination
of the duration of ongoing operations, the length and frequency of
deployments, and the generally difficult nature of deployments has led
to some concerns about the continuing effects of these factors on
recruiting and retaining the force.[Footnote 11]Additionally, as we
have previously reported, recent conditions present some of the most
difficult recruiting and retention challenges DOD has experienced in
recent history. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
United States, DOD has launched three major military operations
requiring the deployment of significant numbers of military
servicemembers. These are Operation Noble Eagle, which covers military
operations related to homeland security; Operation Enduring Freedom,
which includes ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and certain
other countries; and Operation Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing
military operations in Iraq. These military operations have greatly
increased the rate at which personnel have been deployed, especially in
the active Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and the Marine
Corps, which have provided the bulk of the military servicemembers for
operations in Iraq.[Footnote 12] On the other hand, the recent downturn
in the U.S. economy may increase potential recruits' interest in
military service, as DOD has historically found that more youth are
willing to consider military service during periods of high
unemployment. While unemployment rates in the United States dropped
from 2003 through 2007--falling from 6 percent in 2003 to 4.6 percent
in 2007--as of January 2009, the unemployment rates had risen to 7.6
percent.
The Army Is Well Ahead of Schedule in Growing the Force:
By the end of fiscal year 2008, the Army had almost reached its overall
growth goal, although the original Grow the Force plan called for the
growth to be completed by 2013. The Army decided to accelerate this
planned growth and complete it by fiscal year 2010. In fiscal year
2008, two Army components--the active Army and the Army National Guard-
-exceeded their fiscal year 2008 growth goals under the accelerated
growth plan. All Army components have made progress in meeting their
recruiting goals since fiscal year 2005, when none of them met
recruiting goals. In 2008, all components exceeded their recruiting
goals. The active Army and the Army Reserve also exceeded their
retention goals each year from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year
2008. The Army National Guard exceeded its goals in fiscal years 2006
and 2008 and fell within the allowable margin of variance for meeting
its goals in the other 2 fiscal years.
The Army Has Almost Met Its Overall Growth Goal, and Two Components
Have Exceeded Their Annual Goals under the Accelerated Growth Plan:
By the end of fiscal year 2008, the Army as a whole had met 99 percent
of its overall growth goal, whereas it had initially planned to
complete the growth by fiscal year 2013 under the original Grow the
Force plan and by 2010 under the accelerated plan. Specifically, the
Army's total end strength at the end of fiscal year 2008 stood at
1,101,020 personnel, and its final end-strength goal under the Grow the
Force plan is 1,111,600 personnel.
Under the Army's accelerated growth plan, the goal for the active Army
was to reach an end strength of 547,400 personnel by the end of fiscal
year 2010; the active Army ended fiscal year 2008 with a total of
543,645 personnel (see table 1). As table 1 also shows, the active Army
exceeded its 2008 goals under both the original and the accelerated
growth plans. At the end of fiscal year 2008, the active Army needed to
grow only by an additional 3,755 to reach its overall end-strength goal
of 547,400 personnel. Officials said that at this rate of growth, the
active Army is well on track to reach its overall end strength goal by
fiscal year 2010.
Table 1: Army End Strength Goals and Growth Achieved under Original and
Accelerated Plans in Fiscal Years 2007-2013 (Numbers in thousands):
Active Army: Original plan;
Fiscal year: 2007: 518.4;
Fiscal year: 2008: 525.4;
Fiscal year: 2009: 532.4;
Fiscal year: 2010: 539.4;
Fiscal year: 2011: 546.4;
Fiscal year: 2012: 547.4;
Fiscal year: 2013: 547.4.
Active Army: Accelerated plan;
Fiscal year: 2007: 522.0;
Fiscal year: 2008: 529.2;
Fiscal year: 2009: 537.5;
Fiscal year: 2010: 547.4;
Fiscal year: 2011: 547.4;
Fiscal year: 2012: 547.4;
Fiscal year: 2013: 547.4.
Active Army: End strength achieved;
Fiscal year: 2007: 522.0;
Fiscal year: 2008: 543.6.
Army National Guard: Original plan;
Fiscal year: 2007: 350.0;
Fiscal year: 2008: 351.3;
Fiscal year: 2009: 352.6;
Fiscal year: 2010: 353.9;
Fiscal year: 2011: 355.3;
Fiscal year: 2012: 356.8;
Fiscal year: 2013: 358.2.
Army National Guard: Accelerated plan;
Fiscal year: 2007: 352.7;
Fiscal year: 2008: 358.0;
Fiscal year: 2009: 358.0;
Fiscal year: 2010: 358.2;
Fiscal year: 2011: 358.2;
Fiscal year: 2012: 358.2;
Fiscal year: 2013: 358.2.
Army National Guard: End strength achieved;
Fiscal year: 2007: 352.7;
Fiscal year: 2008: 360.4.
Army Reserve: Original plan;
Fiscal year: 2007: 200.0;
Fiscal year: 2008: 198.3;
Fiscal year: 2009: 205.0;
Fiscal year: 2010: 205.0;
Fiscal year: 2011: 205.0;
Fiscal year: 2012: 205.0;
Fiscal year: 2013: 206.0.
Army Reserve: End strength achieved;
Fiscal year: 2007: 189.9;
Fiscal year: 2008: 197.0.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Notes: The Army National Guard is seeking permission from OSD to
increase its force size to 370,700 personnel to better meet its
operational needs.
The end strength authorized for the Army Reserve prior to 2007 was
205,000. The Grow the Force plan called on the Army Reserve to increase
its force size by only 1,000 personnel--to 206,000. However, because
the Army Reserve's actual end strength has been below the 205,000 that
was authorized, the force size of the Army Reserve increased by
approximately 7,000 by the end of fiscal year 2008. The Army Reserve is
not subject to the accelerated growth plan.
[End of table]
The Army National Guard has also had success in growing well ahead of
the schedule. By the end of fiscal year 2008, the National Guard had
met 100.6 percent of its overall growth goal. As shown in table 1, the
goal for the Army National Guard was to reach an end strength of
358,200 personnel by the end of fiscal year 2010 under the accelerated
growth plan; however, the Army National Guard ended fiscal year 2008
with a total of 360,351 personnel. Army National Guard officials
attributed their ability to exceed growth goals to their successes with
recruiting and retaining personnel.
The Army Reserve is not subject to the accelerated plan, but the
original plan called on it to grow to 206,000 personnel by the end of
fiscal year 2013. By the end of fiscal year 2008, the Army Reserve had
met approximately 96 percent of this goal, with an end strength of
197,024. As shown in table 1, the Army Reserve increased its number of
personnel by approximately 7,000 by the end of fiscal year 2008, but it
still fell slightly short of its 2008 end strength goal of 198,268.
Army Reserve officials acknowledged that the Army Reserve has struggled
in meeting its annual end-strength goal. They told us that despite the
Army's need to accelerate the growth in personnel in order to reduce
the burden of frequent and lengthy deployments, the Army Reserve was
not included in the acceleration plans because of the difficulties it
was experiencing in meeting its end-strength goals.
Army Components Have Made Progress in Meeting Their Recruiting Goals
Since 2005:
The Army manages its overall end strength by setting goals for
recruiting new personnel and retaining existing personnel. Since fiscal
year 2005, when all Army components fell short of their recruiting
goals, the components have made progress toward meeting their annual
recruiting goals. To help accomplish this, they have increased the size
of their recruiting force. As shown in table 2, the active Army met
approximately 92 percent of its recruiting goal in fiscal year 2005,
while the Army National Guard met approximately 80 percent of its goal
and the Army Reserve met approximately 84 percent of its goal. Since
fiscal year 2005, all three components have made steady progress toward
meeting their recruiting goals. As shown in table 2, the active Army
exceeded its annual goal of 80,000 new recruits from fiscal years 2006
through 2008. The Army National Guard met more than 95 percent of its
goal in both fiscal years 2006 and 2007 and exceeded its goal in fiscal
year 2008. The Army Reserve met approximately 95 percent of its goal in
fiscal year 2006 and exceeded its goal in both fiscal years 2007 and
2008.
Table 2: Enlisted Accessions in Fiscal Years 2005-08, by Component:
Component: Active Army: Goal;
Fiscal year: 2005: 80,000;
Fiscal year: 2006: 80,000;
Fiscal year: 2007: 80,000;
Fiscal year: 2008: 80,000.
Component: Active Army: Achieved;
Fiscal year: 2005: 73,373;
Fiscal year: 2006: 80,635;
Fiscal year: 2007: 80,407;
Fiscal year: 2008: 80,517.
Component: Active Army: Percentage of goal achieved;
Fiscal year: 2005: 91.7;
Fiscal year: 2006: 100.8;
Fiscal year: 2007: 100.5;
Fiscal year: 2008: 100.6.
Component: Army National Guard: Goal;
Fiscal year: 2005: 63,002;
Fiscal year: 2006: 70,000;
Fiscal year: 2007: 70,000;
Fiscal year: 2008: 63,000.
Component: Army National Guard: Achieved;
Fiscal year: 2005: 50,219;
Fiscal year: 2006: 69,042;
Fiscal year: 2007: 66,652;
Fiscal year: 2008: 65,192.
Component: Army National Guard: Percentage of goal achieved;
Fiscal year: 2005: 79.7;
Fiscal year: 2006: 98.6;
Fiscal year: 2007: 95.2;
Fiscal year: 2008: 103.5.
Component: Army Reserve: Goal;
Fiscal year: 2005: 28,485;
Fiscal year: 2006: 36,032;
Fiscal year: 2007: 35,505;
Fiscal year: 2008: 37,500.
Component: Army Reserve: Achieved;
Fiscal year: 2005: 23,859;
Fiscal year: 2006: 34,379;
Fiscal year: 2007: 35,734;
Fiscal year: 2008: 39,870.
Component: Army Reserve: Percentage of goal achieved;
Fiscal year: 2005: 83.8;
Fiscal year: 2006: 95.4;
Fiscal year: 2007: 100.6;
Fiscal year: 2008: 106.3.
Component: Total: Goal;
Fiscal year: 2005: 171,487;
Fiscal year: 2006: 186,032;
Fiscal year: 2007: 185,505;
Fiscal year: 2008: 180,500.
Component: Total: Achieved;
Fiscal year: 2005: 147,451;
Fiscal year: 2006: 184,056;
Fiscal year: 2007: 182,793;
Fiscal year: 2008: 185,579.
Component: Total: Percentage of goal achieved;
Fiscal year: 2005: 86.0;
Fiscal year: 2006: 98.9;
Fiscal year: 2007: 98.5;
Fiscal year: 2008: 102.8.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
[End of table]
In working toward achieving its recruiting goals, the Army increased
its number of recruiters from 10,271 in fiscal year 2005 to 13,428 in
fiscal year 2008, a total increase of more than 30 percent. The number
of recruiters also grew within each Army component during this period.
For example, the number of recruiters in the active Army grew from
5,454 in fiscal year 2005 to 6,589 in fiscal year 2008, an increase of
more than 20 percent. The number of recruiters in the Army Reserve grew
by more than 50 percent between fiscal years 2005 and 2008 (from 1,117
to 1,739). For the Army National Guard, the number of recruiters grew
by approximately 38 percent during that period (from 3,700 to 5,100)
(see figure 1).
Figure 1: Numbers of Army Recruiters in Fiscal Years 2005-08:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple vertical bar graph]
Active Army:
Fiscal year 2005: 5,454;
Fiscal year 2006: 6,490;
Fiscal year 2007: 6,362;
Fiscal year 2008: 6,589.
Army Reserve:
Fiscal year 2005: 1,117;
Fiscal year 2006: 1,643;
Fiscal year 2007: 1,627;
Fiscal year 2008: 1,739.
Army National Guard:
Fiscal year 2005: 3,700;
Fiscal year 2006: 5,100;
Fiscal year 2007: 5,100;
Fiscal year 2008: 5,100.
Source: GAO analysis of Army Budget Office, Army Reserve, and National
Guard Bureau data.
[End of figure]
Army Components Met Their Retention Goals in Recent Years:
Despite concerns that the increased length and frequency of deployments
could cause soldiers to leave the Army, the Army components met their
retention goals between fiscal years 2005 and 2008. The active Army
uses soldiers' reenlistments as a measure of retention. The active Army
exceeded its retention goals at each experience level every year from
fiscal years 2005 through 2008 (see table 3).[Footnote 13]
Table 3: Active Army Enlisted Reenlistments, 2005-08:
Fiscal year 2005: Initial term;
Goal: 26,935;
Reenlistments achieved: 27,818;
Percentage of goal achieved: 103.3.
Fiscal year 2005: Midcareer;
Goal: 23,773;
Reenlistments achieved: 24,407;
Percentage of goal achieved: 102.7.
Fiscal year 2005: Career;
Goal: 13,454;
Reenlistments achieved: 17,287;
Percentage of goal achieved: 128.5.
Fiscal year 2005: Total;
Goal: 64,162;
Reenlistments achieved: 69,512;
Percentage of goal achieved: 108.3.
Fiscal year 2006: Initial term;
Goal: 26,490;
Reenlistments achieved: 28,081;
Percentage of goal achieved: 106.0.
Fiscal year 2006: Midcareer;
Goal: 24,510;
Reenlistments achieved: 24,562;
Percentage of goal achieved: 100.2.
Fiscal year 2006: Career;
Goal: 13,200;
Reenlistments achieved: 14,664;
Percentage of goal achieved: 111.1.
Fiscal year 2006: Total;
Goal: 64,200;
Reenlistments achieved: 67,307;
Percentage of goal achieved: 104.8.
Fiscal year 2007: Initial term;
Goal: 25,502;
Reenlistments achieved: 29,828;
Percentage of goal achieved: 117.0.
Fiscal year 2007: Midcareer;
Goal: 21,770;
Reenlistments achieved: 23,314;
Percentage of goal achieved: 107.1.
Fiscal year 2007: Career;
Goal: 14,928;
Reenlistments achieved: 16,635;
Percentage of goal achieved: 111.4.
Fiscal year 2007: Total;
Goal: 62,200;
Reenlistments achieved: 69,777;
Percentage of goal achieved: 112.2.
Fiscal year 2008: Initial term;
Goal: 27,900;
Reenlistments achieved: 31,866;
Percentage of goal achieved: 114.2.
Fiscal year 2008: Midcareer;
Goal: 21,500;
Reenlistments achieved: 24,455;
Percentage of goal achieved: 113.7.
Fiscal year 2008: Career;
Goal: 15,600;
Reenlistments achieved: 17,592;
Percentage of goal achieved: 112.8.
Fiscal year 2008: Total;
Goal: 65,000;
Reenlistments achieved: 73,913;
Percentage of goal achieved: 113.7.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
[End of table]
Like the active Army, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard were
successful in retaining personnel each year from fiscal years 2005
through 2008. Both of these components use attrition rates--the number
of losses from a component during a given period compared to the
component's average end strength during that period--as a measure of
retention, striving to keep attrition below an established maximum
rate, or ceiling.[Footnote 14] However, DOD allows a 2 percentage point
margin of variance from the established ceiling in assessing whether or
not attrition goals have been met. As table 4 shows, the attrition rate
for the Army Reserve remained at rates below the ceiling each year from
fiscal years 2005 through 2008. The Army National Guard had attrition
rates above the ceiling in fiscal years 2005 and 2007, but the rates
during these 2 years fell to within the 2 percentage point margin of
variance allowed by DOD. The Army National Guard also succeeded in
keeping attrition rates below the ceiling in fiscal years 2006 and 2008
(thus exceeding its goals).
Table 4: Enlisted Attrition for the Army Reserve and the Army National
Guard in Fiscal Years 2005-2008:
Component: Army Reserve;
Attrition ceiling: 28.6%;
Attrition in fiscal year 2005: 23.4% (below ceiling);
Attrition in fiscal year 2006: 21.5% (below ceiling);
Attrition in fiscal year 2007: 24.4% (below ceiling);
Attrition in fiscal year 2008: 21.1% (below ceiling).
Component: Army National Guard;
Attrition ceiling: 19.5%;
Attrition in fiscal year 2005: 20.2%; (above ceiling; Falls within
margin of variance);
Attrition in fiscal year 2006: 18.8% (below ceiling);
Attrition in fiscal year 2007: 19.7%; (above ceiling; Falls within
margin of variance);
Attrition in fiscal year 2008: 18.9% (below ceiling).
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
Note: Arrows indicate whether the attrition rate for the year was above
or below the ceiling. The goal for each component is to maintain
attrition at rates below the ceiling. However, DOD allows a 2
percentage point margin of variance from the established ceiling.
Therefore, the Army National Guard met its goals in fiscal years 2005
and 2007, even though its attrition rates were slightly above the
established ceiling. An official with the Army National Guard told us
that it is not uncommon for attrition rates to vary from year to year,
as they reflect all types of losses, including retirements and medical
discharges that fluctuate annually.
[End of table]
Army officials attributed the generally high retention rates among
enlisted personnel to their strong commitment to the mission and their
pride in the military service. Also, several Army officials said that
the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan provide soldiers with
opportunities to take advantage of their training and to put their
combat skills to use, thus increasing satisfaction with their Army
careers. Focus groups conducted with soldiers returning from 15-month
combat tours and their families from December 2007 through February
2008 also found that soldiers and their family members expressed great
pride in their service, and soldiers indicated that they were doing
what they had originally joined the Army to do.
At the same time, deployments that are too long or too frequent may
start having an adverse effect on retention, as pressure on personnel
and their families increases. Participants in the focus groups reported
that 15-month deployments are too long and 12-month dwell time[Footnote
15] is too short to fully integrate with family and prepare for the
next deployment. Top Army leaders acknowledge the strain on soldiers
and families, and the Army has recently reduced deployments to 12
months, followed by 12 months at home for active-duty soldiers.
Officials we interviewed said that the accelerated rate of growth in
Army end strength is helping them move toward the goal of shorter
deployments and longer dwell time.
The Army Has Dramatically Increased Bonus Expenditures but Does Not Use
Available Research to Calculate the Most Cost-Effective Bonus Amounts:
Since fiscal year 2005--the last year in which the Army failed to meet
its end-strength mission--it has dramatically increased expenditures
for enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. However, while the Army has
completed or contracted for extensive analysis of the effectiveness of
various recruiting tools, it has not integrated the results of its
research to calculate the most cost-effective bonus amounts. That is,
the Army cannot determine whether or not it is paying more in bonuses
than it needs to pay. Also, these bonuses are not always targeted as
precisely as they could be. The Army's process for determining whether
to award a bonus to a specific occupational specialty is based on a
number of factors, including whether the Army is having difficulty
recruiting for and needs to fill training slots for the specialty and
whether the occupation's fill rates indicate shortages. (Fill rates are
the rates at which occupational specialties are filled in relation to
the existing number of vacancies.) The Army's current system results in
(1) soldiers in occupations of varying priority or responsibility
sometimes getting the same bonus amounts; (2) all soldiers who are
eligible for and apply for reenlistment while they are in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Kuwait receiving bonuses, regardless of their
occupational specialties; and (3) soldiers in the same occupational
specialties getting different bonus amounts depending on which
component they join. After we had completed our audit work, OSD and the
Army reported that the worsening U.S. economy had resulted in their
ability to decrease bonus amounts and the numbers of occupations
offered bonuses. In March 2009, they stated that in this fiscal year,
they had contracted for analyses to be done on the effectiveness of
cash incentives and on bonus prediction models.
The Army Has Substantially Increased Its Expenditures on Bonuses:
In fiscal year 2005, the Army's total enlistment and reenlistment bonus
expenditures stood at approximately $1.2 billion; in fiscal year 2008,
they had increased by almost 75 percent, to approximately $2.0 billion.
Bonus expenditures also grew within each of the Army's components.
Active Army:
As figure 2 shows, the active Army spent $165.9 million on enlistment
bonuses in fiscal year 2005; by fiscal year 2008, it had almost tripled
its enlistment bonus expenditures, spending approximately $466.7
million. The active Army also spent $505.6 million on reenlistment
bonuses in fiscal year 2005; by fiscal year 2008, it had increased
these expenditures by more than 35 percent, to $689.9 million.
Figure 2: The Active Army's Total Bonus Expenditures for Fiscal Years
2005 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2005;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $505.6 million;
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $165.9 million.
Total expenditures: $671.5 million.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $736.9 million.
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $353.1 million;
Total expenditures: $1,090.1 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $566.1 million;
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $472.7 million;
Total expenditures: $1,028.8 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $689.9 million;
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $466.7 million.
Total expenditures: $1,156.6 million.
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Army Budget Office.
[End of figure]
Army Reserve:
The Army Reserve has also significantly increased its spending on
bonuses to soldiers since fiscal year 2005. As figure 3 shows, the Army
Reserve spent $59.6 million on enlistment bonuses in fiscal year 2005.
By fiscal year 2008, it had almost tripled this amount, to $169.7
million. Additionally, the Army Reserve spent $63.9 million on
reenlistment bonuses in fiscal year 2005, nearly doubling its fiscal
year 2008 expenditures, to $121 million.
Figure 3: The Army Reserve's Total Bonus Expenditures for Fiscal Years
2005 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2005;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $63.9 million;
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $59.6 million.
Total expenditures: $123.5 million.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $140.0 million.
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $83.4 million;
Total expenditures: $223.4 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $146.6 million;
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $99.5 million;
Total expenditures: $246.1 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $121.0 million;
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $169.7 million.
Total expenditures: $290.7 million.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Army Budget Office.
[End of figure]
Army National Guard:
The Army National Guard almost tripled its spending on enlistment
bonuses from $141.8 million in fiscal year 2005 to $392.1 million in
fiscal year 2008. It also increased total reenlistment bonus
expenditures from $235.1 million in fiscal year 2005 to $375.8 million
in fiscal year 2007, before curtailing reenlistment bonus spending for
fiscal year 2008 (see figure 4).[Footnote 16]
Figure 4: The Army National Guard's Total Bonus Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2005 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2005;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $235.1 million;
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $141.8 million.
Total expenditures: $377.0 million.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $308.0 million.
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $209.5 million;
Total expenditures: $5174 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $375.9 million;
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $327.7 million;
Total expenditures: $703.5 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Reenlistment bonus expenditures: $202.8 million;
Enlistment bonus expenditures: $392.1 million.
Total expenditures: $595.0 million.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Army Budget Office.
[End of figure]
Army officials stated that the use of incentives, such as bonuses, is
an integral part of a comprehensive recruiting and retention strategy.
OSD officials said that the increase in bonus expenditures over the
past several years has been necessary to overcome a recruiting
environment made difficult by factors such as the declining propensity
of youth to enter the military service, the decreasing number of youth
who meet the Army's entrance standards, and the reality of recruiting
during a time of overseas military conflicts. Up until now the Army has
been able to dramatically increase the amounts it spends on enlistment
and reenlistment bonuses. However, the current level of bonus
expenditures may prove difficult to sustain in the tighter fiscal
environment expected in the next several years. Also, rising
unemployment rates in the civilian sector may make it easier to attract
recruits and retain soldiers.
The Army Has Not Used Research to Calculate What Bonus Amounts Would Be
Most Cost-Effective:
While the Army has conducted extensive research on the use of cash and
other incentives such as choice of branch or graduate school, this
research has been focused on comparing different incentive plans. It
has not been directed at determining the most cost-effective bonus
amounts. The Army therefore cannot determine whether or not it is
paying more than it needs to pay in enlistment and retention bonuses.
DOD Directive 1304.21 establishes policies for administering enlistment
and reenlistment bonuses for military servicemembers, and DOD
Instruction 1304.29 provides guidance on implementing these policies.
[Footnote 17] These directives state that bonuses should be used in
situations in which less costly methods have proven inadequate or
impractical. DOD Directive 1304.21 further states that it is wasteful
to authorize the use of financial incentives when less costly but
equally effective incentives are available. In determining what bonus
amounts to offer active-duty enlistees, the Army has established seven
different amount levels based on the occupation that the enlistee would
fill. (See table 10 in appendix II for a listing of the bonus amounts.)
Bonus levels 1 through 7, as defined by the U.S. Army Recruiting
Command, have been adjusted over the years. The current amounts range
from $2,000 to $35,000, depending on the bonus level under which an
occupation falls and the length of the enlistment contract signed by
the recruit. For example, a recruit who enters the active Army in a
level 3 occupational specialty and signs a 2-year contract would
receive an enlistment bonus of $3,000. A recruit who enters the active
Army in a level 1 occupational specialty--the highest bonus category--
and signs a 6-year contract would receive an enlistment bonus of
$35,000.
Although a substantial body of research exists on how analysts can
estimate the extent to which enlistment and reenlistment rates for
particular segments of the force are likely to be affected by
alternative uses of resources, the Army has not integrated this
research into its decisionmaking process in setting the most cost-
effective bonus amounts.[Footnote 18] Accordingly, officials told us
that the Army is not able to determine whether it is paying more than
it needs to and therefore getting a cost-effective return on its
investment. In light of the tighter fiscal environment expected in the
next few years, it will become more important to determine whether it
is paying bonuses to persons who would have joined or stayed in the
Army without them. In fact, after we had completed our audit work, the
Army stated that in fiscal year 2009, it had begun to decrease the
number of occupational specialties that receive bonuses and the amounts
spent for this purpose.
The Army's Process Leads to Cases in which Occupations of Different
Priority Levels Receive Similar Bonuses and Bonuses Vary by Component:
To determine the occupational specialties for which active-duty
enlistees should be offered enlistment bonuses, the Army has formed an
Enlisted Incentives Review Board--made up of officials from the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command,
and the U.S. Army Human Resources Command--which meets four times a
year. Occupational fill rates, or the percentages of an occupation's
positions that are filled, are a major factor in the board's
determination of whether to offer enlistment bonuses for a particular
occupational specialty. However, other factors are also considered,
such as the Army's future planned growth, decreases in the need for an
occupational specialty, the success of any previously offered bonuses
in attracting the required numbers of enlistees, and the availability
of training slots. The Army has a list of priority occupations that is
compiled by field commanders when they assess their units' personnel
needs, but given the various factors considered by the Enlisted
Incentives Review Board, situations arise in which some priority
occupations do not receive bonuses or in which different occupations
with varying degrees of responsibility are awarded the same amount. For
example, of the 35 occupational specialties on the Army's priority
list, 9 were not designated to receive enlistment bonuses at the time
of the June 2008 Enlisted Incentives Review Board meeting.[Footnote 19]
However, at the same meeting the Enlisted Incentives Review Board
identified 52 nonpriority occupational specialties that would be
offered some level of bonus. (See table 11 in appendix II for a list of
occupational specialties that were selected to receive bonuses.)
The board's system for determining enlistment bonuses also sometimes
results in cases in which occupations with varying degrees of
responsibility receive the same bonus. For example, in June 2008, Food
Service Specialists were eligible to receive the same bonus as
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialists, even though the Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Specialist was listed as a priority occupational
specialty and was tasked with more dangerous responsibilities.
Similarly, Infantrymen, an occupational specialty listed by the Army as
a priority specialty, received the same level of enlistment bonus as
Army band musicians. Army officials told us that these decisions were
based on factors such as the difficulty of recruiting for some
occupations and the availability of training slots for them. DOD
guidance allows the services to grant bonuses to occupations that the
services have not deemed "priority" but that are experiencing shortages
or for which total accession objectives have not been met.[Footnote 20]
Like enlistment bonuses, reenlistment bonuses are not always targeted
at priority occupational specialties. For example, in fiscal years 2007
and 2008, the active Army awarded tax-free reenlistment bonuses of up
to $15,000 to all soldiers, regardless of occupational specialty, who
were deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait while they were in
theater. Army officials reported that in fiscal year 2007, 15,984
soldiers received these reenlistment bonuses, which averaged $10,700.
As of April 2008, 4,483 soldiers had received these bonuses during
fiscal year 2008; the average 2008 bonus was $12,700. Army officials
linked these tax-free reenlistment bonuses to the Army's ability to
attain high levels of retention. For example, they reported that
recently deployed units or units currently deployed to Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Kuwait have reenlistment rates at 110 to 120 percent
of their yearly goals.
Furthermore, because the Army's components manage their enlistment
bonus programs separately, soldiers in the same occupations might
receive bonuses of different amounts, depending on the component in
which they serve. One prominent difference among the bonuses offered by
Army components is the difference between what is offered to an active-
duty enlistee and an enlistee who enters under the National Guard's
Active First incentive program.[Footnote 21] All Active First recruits
get a bonus of at least $20,000 if they sign up for 2 years in the
active Army; $30,000 if they sign up for 3 years; and $40,000 if they
sign up for 4 years. Because all Active First enlistees are eligible
for bonuses, an enlistee in a specific occupational specialty may find
that he or she is eligible for a bonus for joining the Active First
program but not eligible for a bonus for joining the active Army.
[Footnote 22] According to data provided by the U.S. Army Recruiting
Command, such differences in bonuses offered by the Army's three
components resulted in a divergence in the average dollar amount of
bonus per enlistee in fiscal year 2008. As table 5 shows, bonuses
ranged from $18,304 for an active-duty enlistee to $36,966 for an
enlistee in the National Guard's Active First Program.[Footnote 23]
Table 5: Enlistment Bonuses Awarded to New Recruits by Each Army
Component in Fiscal Year 2008:
Component: Number of accessions awarded an enlistment bonus;
Active Army: 46,927;
Army Reserve: 21,681;
National Guard: 39,905;
National Guard Active First: 2,119.
Component: Average enlistment bonus;
Active Army: $18,304;
Army Reserve: $19,524;
National Guard: $20,000;
National Guard Active First: $39,966.
Source: U.S. Army Recruiting Command.
[End of table]
The Army Has Fallen Short of Its Quality Goals and Has Taken Steps to
Expand Its Recruiting Market:
The Army components have not consistently met their quality goals for
the percentage of new recruits who have high-school diplomas[Footnote
24] and who score in the upper half on the AFQT. The Army estimates
that only 3 out of 10 youth aged 17 to 24 are qualified to join the
Army without a waiver, even including those who have low educational
credentials or low aptitude. This has led the Army to experiment with
some initiatives to expand its recruiting market to individuals who
before now might have been considered ineligible for service, for
example recruits who do not meet standard entrance requirements for
reasons such as body fat and age requirements. While its programs to
expand the recruiting market appear promising, the Army has not yet had
time to collect long-term data on the performance of individuals
admitted through these programs.
Army Components Have Not Consistently Met Quality Benchmarks for
Recruits with High-School Diplomas and Scores on the Upper Half on the
AFQT:
In fiscal years 2005 through 2008, the Army components did not
consistently meet the quality benchmarks set for the services by DOD.
Historically, DOD has used two primary measures to identify quality
recruits: possession of a high-school diploma and a score in the upper
half on the AFQT. These benchmarks require that at least 90 percent of
recruits each year have a high-school diploma, at least 60 percent
score in the upper half on the AFQT, and no more than 4 percent score
in the bottom 30 percent on the AFQT. In fiscal year 2005, none of the
Army's components met DOD's 90 percent benchmark for recruits with high-
school diplomas (see table 6). The active Army and the Army Reserve met
the benchmark for 60 percent of enlistees scoring in the upper half on
the AFQT, but the Army National Guard did not. Since fiscal year 2005,
only the active Army has met the benchmark for 60 percent of its
recruits scoring in the upper half on the AFQT. The Army National Guard
has consistently met the high-school diploma benchmark since fiscal
year 2005, while the active Army and the Army Reserve have not. In
fiscal years 2006 through 2008, 91 percent of the Army National Guard's
recruits had high-school diplomas.
Table 6: Army Progress in Meeting Quality Benchmarks, Fiscal Years 2005-
08:
Army component: Active Army;
Quality indicator: Percentage with high-school diplomas;
Fiscal year 2005: 87%;
Fiscal year 2006: 81%;
Fiscal year 2007: 79%;
Fiscal year 2008: 83%.
Army component: Active Army;
Quality indicator: Percentage at or above the 50th percentile on the
AFQT;
Fiscal year 2005: 67%;
Fiscal year 2006: 61%;
Fiscal year 2007: 61%;
Fiscal year 2008: 62%.
Fiscal year
Quality indicator Percentage at or below the 30th percentile on the
AFQT;
Fiscal year 2005: 4.0%;
Fiscal year 2006: 3.8%;
Fiscal year 2007: 4.0%;
Fiscal year 2008: 3.5%.
Army component: Army Reserve;
Quality indicator Percentage with high-school diplomas;
Fiscal year 2005: 88%;
Fiscal year 2006: 90%;
Fiscal year 2007: 86%;
Fiscal year 2008: 89%.
Army component: Army Reserve;
Quality indicator: Percentage at or above the 50th percentile on the
AFQT;
Fiscal year 2005: 67%;
Fiscal year 2006: 59%;
Fiscal year 2007: 57%;
Fiscal year 2008: 58%.
Army component: Army Reserve;
Quality indicator: Percentage at or below the 30th percentile on the
AFQT;
Fiscal year 2005: 3%;
Fiscal year 2006: 4%;
Fiscal year 2007: 4%;
Fiscal year 2008: 3%.
Army component: Army National Guard;
Quality indicator Percentage with high-school diplomas;
Fiscal year 2005: 83%;
Fiscal year 2006: 91%;
Fiscal year 2007: 91%;
Fiscal year 2008: 91%.
Army component: Army National Guard;
Quality indicator: Percentage at or above the 50th percentile on the
AFQT;
Fiscal year 2005: 57%;
Fiscal year 2006: 57%;
Fiscal year 2007: 57%;
Fiscal year 2008: 59%.
Army component: Army National Guard;
Quality indicator: Percentage at or below the 30th percentile on the
AFQT;
Fiscal year 2005: 5%;
Fiscal year 2006: 4%;
Fiscal year 2007: 4%;
Fiscal year 2008: 1%.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
[End of table]
All three components have met DOD's benchmark that no more than 4
percent of enlistees score in the bottom 30th percentile on the AFQT,
with one exception: in fiscal year 2005, 5 percent of the Army National
Guard's recruits were in this category.
The Army Has Implemented Initiatives to Expand Its Recruiting Market:
Given the challenges the Army faces in meeting DOD quality benchmarks
and because the Army estimates that only about 3 out of 10 youth aged
17 to 24--including those who have low educational credentials or low
aptitude--do not need a waiver to join the Army, it has recently
introduced initiatives to assess the quality of potential recruits by
other measures and to expand its traditional market for recruiting. The
Army currently estimates that of the approximately 32 million young
people in the United States aged 17 to 24, only 9.7 million (or
approximately 3 out of 10) are qualified without requiring a waiver for
medical conditions, conduct issues, or administrative reasons such as
the number of dependents.[Footnote 25] However, the Army emphasizes
that some of these fall into a category subject to a DOD percentage cap
restriction for enlistment because they have AFQT percentile scores
below 31 or lack high-school diplomas.[Footnote 26] Therefore, the Army
estimates that only about 2 out of 10, or 6.2 million, can be
considered fully qualified and eligible to enlist at any given time
(see figure 5). Each year, the Army tries to recruit approximately
176,000 of these individuals, meaning that the Army needs almost 3
percent of this population to enlist.
Figure 5: The Army's Estimate of the Size of the Population Eligible to
Enlist in Fiscal Year 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Unqualified because of a medical, conduct, or administrative reason
(22.4 million): 69.8%;
Have an AFQT score at or below the 30th percentile or do not have a
high-school diploma (3.5 million): 10.5%;
Fully qualified without a waiver or other restriction (6.2 million):
19.4% (Less than 2 in 10 are fully qualified).
Source: U.S. Army Accessions Command.
[End of figure]
Individuals fall outside of the Army's target market for recruiting for
a variety of reasons, including physical factors (such as body fat) or
educational factors (such as not having a high-school diploma). To help
meet its recruiting goals, however, the Army has targeted its efforts
to some individuals who do not fully meet its entrance criteria,
especially those who are over the body fat limit, do not possess high-
school diplomas, or are ages 41 and 42[Footnote 27] but fully qualified
otherwise.
The Army has implemented four initiatives to expand its recruiting
market.[Footnote 28] One of these focuses on overweight individuals.
The Army has traditionally rejected individuals whose body fat exceeds
a prescribed limit, but it has now begun to admit individuals who,
although their body fat exceeds the limit, have other characteristics
that have been found to be predictors of success in the Army. To screen
for these characteristics, the Army has developed an Assessment of
Recruit Motivation and Strength test, which assesses an individual's
physical fitness and motivation and identifies promising individuals
who would otherwise have been denied entry. The Army has also
implemented a second and third program to target individuals without
high-school diplomas. In 2005, the Army implemented a Tier Two
Attrition Screen, used to screen individuals without high-school
diplomas for characteristics such as motivation and mental and physical
fitness--indicators linked to relatively low rates of attrition. In
addition to the Tier Two Attrition Screen, the Army Preparatory School
was opened in August 2008 to help promising individuals without high-
school diplomas earn General Educational Development (GED) certificates
in 4 weeks and to prepare them for basic training. The school is open
to youth without high-school diplomas who have scored in the upper half
on the AFQT, who need no other waivers, and who have passed the Tier
Two Attrition Screen. The Army also implemented a fourth initiative to
expand the recruiting market by increasing the maximum recruitment age
from 40 to 42.[Footnote 29] According to the Army, individuals in this
category often bring a range of experiences that can benefit both the
Army and their fellow soldiers. This expansion of the pool provides a
larger segment of the population with a chance to serve.
As table 7 shows, the active Army and the Army Reserve have accessed
several thousand recruits through these initiatives to expand its
recruiting market. However, many of the recruits who entered through
these programs have not yet completed their first enlistment terms, and
the Army is still evaluating each program's long-term impact and
effectiveness.
Table 7: Numbers of Recruits Accessed in Fiscal Year 2008 through the
Army‘s Initiatives to Expand the Recruiting Market:
Expansion program: Assessment of Recruit Motivation and Strength;
Active Army accessions: 998;
Army Reserve accessions: 366.
Expansion program: Tier Two Attrition Screen;
Active Army accessions: 6,580;
Army Reserve accessions: 884.
Expansion program: Army Preparatory School;
Active Army accessions: 362;
Army Reserve accessions: 41.
Expansion program: Enlistment of persons aged 41-42;
Active Army accessions: 283;
Army Reserve accessions: 313.
Expansion program: Total;
Active Army accessions: 8,223;
Army Reserve accessions: 1,604.
Source: GAO's analysis of data provided by the U.S. Army Accessions
Command.
[End of table]
The Army has accessed nearly 1,000 recruits in fiscal year 2008 as a
result of the Assessment of Recruit Motivation and Strength program,
and the Army Reserve has accessed 366. Initial findings from this
program indicate that females who exceeded the body fat standards but
were allowed to enlist as a result of passing the Assessment of Recruit
Motivation and Strength test had attrition rates similar to those of
fully qualified females; attrition among males who exceeded the body
fat standards but passed the test was slightly higher compared to the
attrition of fully qualified males. However, these recruits had not
completed their terms of enlistment at the time of the study, and the
Army plans to conduct analyses with a larger number of subjects in the
future. In fiscal year 2008, the Army accessed 6,580 soldiers for the
active Army and nearly 1,000 for the Army Reserve through the Tier Two
Attrition Screen, and initial program evaluation results show that
these recruits had attrition rates higher than those with high-school
diplomas but lower than those with GEDs. However, because this
initiative was first implemented in 2005, the Army has not yet gathered
sufficient data to prove the long-term success of this program in
predicting recruits' attrition behavior. From August 2008, when the
Army Preparatory School first opened, to the end of fiscal year 2008,
the Army also reported graduating and accessing 362 new recruits in the
active Army and 41 new recruits in the Army Reserve entering through
this program, but performance in the long term has yet to be assessed.
The Army Has Continued to Grant Conduct Waivers for New Recruits and
Analyzes the Outcomes of Recruits Entering with Conduct Waivers:
The Army has continued to grant conduct waivers to recruits who do not
meet some of the Army's entrance standards for reasons such as prior
criminal misconduct. In fiscal year 2008, approximately 12 percent of
new recruits admitted by the active Army had conduct waivers, compared
with approximately 6 percent in the Army Reserve and 3 percent in the
Army National Guard.[Footnote 30] According to the Army, enlistment
waivers offer opportunities to individuals who have the potential to be
good soldiers but who may not otherwise have been given a chance to
serve. Some officials also acknowledged that waivers are necessary,
given the Army's efforts to grow and the ongoing challenges in the
recruiting environment.
Through fiscal year 2008, the Army granted conduct waivers for various
types of offenses: felonies,[Footnote 31] serious or minor
misdemeanors, and serious or minor traffic offenses.[Footnote 32] Army
data show that waivers for serious misdemeanors comprise the largest
category of conduct waivers granted by all components in fiscal year
2008, followed by waivers for felonies for the active Army and the Army
Reserve and by waivers for minor traffic offenses for the Army National
Guard. Waivers for felonies--the most serious type of offense that may
qualify for a waiver--comprised approximately 13 percent of all conduct
waivers for the active Army, 14 percent for the Army Reserve, and 10
percent for the Army National Guard. We reviewed the files of all of
those personnel accessed by the active Army or Army Reserve in fiscal
year 2007 with waivers for felony convictions. Appendix III provides
examples of the felonies committed by these recruits. Overall, however,
the percentage of recruits entering with felony waivers was small. For
example, recruits with felony waivers comprised less than 1 percent of
overall accessions to the active Army and less than 2 percent of
overall accessions to the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.
In fiscal year 2006, the Army began to collect and analyze data on the
performance outcomes of recruits with conduct waivers. DOD Instruction
1304.26 states that the underlying purpose of moral character standards
is to minimize the enlistment of persons who are likely to become
disciplinary cases. Initial analyses conducted by the Army and the RAND
Corporation have shown that, while those with conduct waivers tend to
perform as well as those without conduct waivers, they are more likely
to be separated for adverse reasons, such as behavioral issues.
[Footnote 33] All of these studies, however, examined accessions with
waivers from fiscal years 2002 through 2007, years when, according to
Army officials, the waiver data were subject to certain data
reliability problems, including the overcounting of conduct waivers and
the miscoding of some misdemeanors as felonies.[Footnote 34] Since that
time, the Army has made improvements to the waiver data, and results of
any forthcoming studies should provide a more reliable assessment of
the conduct waiver population.
At the Army's request, in 2009, RAND will assess whether the presence
of soldiers with waivers adversely affects the behavior of other
members of their units. In addition, RAND plans to update its analysis
of how recruits with conduct waivers are performing.[Footnote 35] An
Army official told us that the Army's own analyses and the work
undertaken by RAND provide a comprehensive view of the Army's waiver
policies and a mechanism for identifying the need for any changes.
According to Army officials, the administrative cost of the waiver
review process is "negligible." They added that the primary cost metric
used to measure the return on investment for enlistees with waivers is
comparing the attrition rates of those with waivers to the rates of
those without waivers. They stated that in 2006, the Army found that
there were no significant differences in attrition rates between these
two groups. However, Army officials also acknowledge that the findings
regarding the performance of those with and without conduct waivers are
"mixed." As stated earlier, the Army has found evidence that some
enlistees who entered the Army in fiscal year 2007 were more likely to
be separated early for adverse reasons. Because the waiver process
involves several different administrative layers, the cost of this
process may be found to be more than originally estimated. Also,
because research results on the performance of enlistees with and
without conduct waivers are not definitive, the issue of whether
granting these waivers is cost-effective is not yet clear. Completed
and planned work on waivers does not consider the costs associated with
the Army's separation of soldiers who were granted conduct waivers and
were later separated early for adverse reasons. Studying these issues
is important, given that the recruiting and training of individuals
involves substantial expenditures on the part of the Army.[Footnote 36]
After our audit work was complete, Army officials told us that in
February 2009, the Army Audit Agency had begun a study of waiver
policy.
The Army Lacks Support to Gauge the Effect on the Officer Corps of Its
Actions to Alleviate Shortages:
In part as a result of the increased demand for officers created by
Grow the Force and Army Modularity efforts, the Army is faced with
shortages of captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels. To find ways to
address these shortages, the Army contracted a study to predict the
appeal to junior officers of different incentive packages. This study
compared incentive packages that ranged in cost-per-person from $14,000
to $165,000. Despite this research, it is not clear how the package
ultimately offered to Army officers represented the most cost-effective
one from the standpoint of the Army or whether the Army could have
achieved the same results with less money. Also to alleviate shortages
in its officer force, the Army has recently promoted officers at above-
average rates, reduced time-in-service requirements for promotion, and
suspended a performance indicator for its junior officers that it had
previously used to identify the best-performing officers relative to
their peers. These actions have had an immediate effect on alleviating
some of the shortages, but the Army has not yet assessed whether the
short-term measures it has taken will have long-term effects on its
officer corps in the future.
The Army Has Experienced Shortages of Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant
Colonels:
The Army's efforts to grow the force have exacerbated preexisting
shortages in the officer corps, and the Army projects that some
shortages will continue until fiscal year 2018. At the end of fiscal
year 2008, the Army had a shortage of 1,208 captains; 3,112 majors; and
529 lieutenant colonels. The Army had an excess of captains in fiscal
year 2005, but since then it has fallen short of its requirements for
captains. The Army has had a shortage of majors since at least 2003,
and this shortage more than doubled from fiscal years 2003 through
2008. Likewise, there has been a shortage of lieutenant colonels since
at least 2003. According to Army officials, shortages have grown
because the Army's modular structure requires more midlevel officers
per brigade, and the Army has increased its requirements for officers
in general as part of its Grow the Force initiative. (See figure 6 for
the numbers of Army requirements for captains, majors, and lieutenant
colonels compared with the numbers of these officers the Army had in
its operating strength from fiscal years 2003 through 2013.)
Figure 6: Historical and Projected Shortages of Active Army Captains,
Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels, Fiscal Years 2003 to 2013 (Number of
officers in thousands):
[Refer to PDF for image: combined line and vertical bar graph]
Captains:
Fiscal year: 2003;
Historical operating strength: 19,467;
Historical authorizations: 19,719.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Historical operating strength: 20,109;
Historical authorizations: 19,845.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Historical operating strength: 20,436;
Historical authorizations: 21,265.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Historical operating strength: 21,074;
Historical authorizations: 21,032.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Historical operating strength: 22,145;
Historical authorizations: 21,370.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Historical operating strength: 22,469;
Historical authorizations: 21,261.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Projected operating strength: 23,027;
Projected authorizations: 21,019.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Projected operating strength: 23,335;
Projected authorizations: 21,875.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Projected operating strength: 23,737;
Projected authorizations: 23,099.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Projected operating strength: 23,770;
Projected authorizations: 24,101.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Projected operating strength: 23,835;
Projected authorizations: 25,121,
Majors:
Fiscal year: 2003;
Historical operating strength: 13,520;
Historical authorizations: 12,262.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Historical operating strength: 14,043;
Historical authorizations: 12,540.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Historical operating strength: 14,260;
Historical authorizations: 13,245.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Historical operating strength: 14,567;
Historical authorizations: 13,624.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Historical operating strength: 15,387;
Historical authorizations: 13,212.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Historical operating strength: 15,905;
Historical authorizations: 12,793.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Projected operating strength: 16,367;
Projected authorizations: 13,190.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Projected operating strength: 16,436;
Projected authorizations: 13,452.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Projected operating strength: 16,559;
Projected authorizations: 13,265.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Projected operating strength: 16,546;
Projected authorizations: 13,184.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Projected operating strength: 16,577;
Projected authorizations: 13,228.
Lieutenant Colonels:
Fiscal year: 2003;
Historical operating strength: 8,721;
Historical authorizations: 8,375.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Historical operating strength: 8,869;
Historical authorizations: 8,451.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Historical operating strength: 8,829;
Historical authorizations: 8,655.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Historical operating strength: 8,848.
Historical authorizations: 8,642.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Historical operating strength: 9,258;
Historical authorizations: 8,746.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Historical operating strength: 9,445;
Historical authorizations: 8,916.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Projected operating strength: 9,622;
Projected authorizations: 9,133.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Projected operating strength: 9,631;
Projected authorizations: 9,292.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Projected operating strength: 9,655;
Projected authorizations: 9,436.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Projected operating strength: 9,649;
Projected authorizations: 9,464.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Projected operating strength: 9,651;
Projected authorizations: 9,438.
Source: GAO analysis of data prepared by the Army‘s Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.
Note: Operating strength refers to the number of officers the Army
needs to conduct operations and maintain the force. For example,
operating strength does not include officers in training or in transit.
[End of figure]
As figure 6 shows, the Army projects the shortages of captains, majors,
and lieutenant colonels to continue. Our analysis of these projections
shows that by fiscal year 2012, the supply of captains will have caught
up with the demand. The shortage of majors, however, is projected to
remain more severe and to continue beyond 2013 with no significant
change in the operating strength of majors, despite growing
authorizations. According to projections, the shortage of lieutenant
colonels will have lessened but also will continue through the end of
fiscal year 2013.
Aside from the general shortage of officers at these two ranks,
officers are in short supply in particular career areas. When the rate
at which a career area, or branch,[Footnote 37] is filled falls below
85 percent, the Army considers the branch to have a critical shortage.
On the basis of calculations performed on Army data, Army officials
believe that there are several areas where the Army does not have
enough officers to meet current demand, including transportation,
military intelligence, foreign area expertise, and the special
branches.[Footnote 38] (See appendix IV for a list of branches with
fill rates below 85 percent.)
The Army Has Offered Incentives to Address Critical Shortages of
Midlevel Officers but Lacks Data to Assess Their Effectiveness:
The Army initiated an incentive program for captains and continues to
offer incentives to cadets just prior to their commissioning. DOD
Directive 1304.21 states that bonuses should be awarded only when less
costly methods have proven inadequate or impractical and, similarly,
that it is wasteful to authorize the use of financial incentives when
less costly but equally effective methods are available. In order to
fill immediate needs for captains, the Army offered a "menu of
incentives" to 23,053 captains in branches with fill rates below 90
percent who began service as officers between 1999 and 2005. From
September 2007 until March 2008--phase one of this program--the Army
offered these captains a choice of five incentives in return for taking
on extended service obligations: (1) a cash bonus of up to $35,000;
[Footnote 39] (2) a graduate education; (3) a choice of branch; (4) a
choice of location; or (5) military school.[Footnote 40] In phase two,
from April 2008 until November 2008, the Army did not offer captains
the choice of branch or choice of location, and it limited the military
school option to language training. Captains were offered these
incentives in exchange for committing to at least 3 additional years of
active-duty service. Of the 15,317 captains who accepted one of these
incentives, 94.6 percent chose the cash bonus (see table 8). According
to the most recent Army estimate, the cash bonus has cost the Army
$443.5 million; based on that estimate, the average bonus was $30,488.
[Footnote 41]
Table 8: Number of Captains Participating in the Menu of Incentives,
September 2007 through November 2008:
Total number of contracts;
Cash bonus: 14,497;
Graduate school: 243;
Choice of branch: 320;
Choice of location: 185;
Special training: 72;
Total participants: 15,317.
Percentage of total contracts;
Cash bonus: 94.6%;
Graduate school: 1.6%;
Choice of branch: 2.1%;
Choice of location: 1.2%;
Special training: 0.5%;
Total participants: 100.0%.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel.
[End of table]
Although 15,317 captains have taken advantage of one of these
incentives, the Army did not collect data that would allow it to
determine the most cost-effective amount for the cash bonus. Also,
despite the requirement to use less costly measures first, the Army did
not determine whether offering less costly measures--for example,
offering the menu of incentives without the cash bonus option or the
choice of graduate school--would have similar results. Before selecting
this incentive package, the Army contracted with Chadwick, Martin, and
Bailey in 2006 to explore different options.[Footnote 42] The
contractor conducted an online questionnaire involving about 2,000
officers who had entered the Army in 2003, 2004, and 2005. The
questionnaire asked the officers to choose among different incentive
packages, which included incentives that ranged in cost from $14,000
per person to $165,000 person. The incentive costing the least involved
offering the officer his or her branch or functional area of choice,
and the incentive costing the most involved offering the officer a
choice of graduate school and a degree from a list of options. While
the study predicted the likely results of the Army's offering of
different incentive packages, it did not recommend a package that
represented the most cost-effective use of Army resources, and it is
not clear how the Army selected the incentive package it ultimately
offered its officers. Because the Army did not use such data to
determine which incentives would be most cost-effective, it cannot
provide evidence that its policy is in line with DOD Directive 1304.21.
Without such data, the Army cannot determine how best to allocate the
money it spends on incentives to achieve maximum effect.
The Army has also attempted to alleviate what it expects to be a future
demand for captains and majors by offering a precommissioning incentive
to cadets at the United States Military Academy and in the Reserve
Officer Training Corps. Under this incentive program, in return for a
commitment to at least 3 additional years of service, cadets are
offered (1) a chance to attend graduate school, (2) a choice of branch,
or (3) a choice of location. This program did not include the option of
a cash bonus but did offer cadets a graduate school education, which
the Chadwick, Martin, and Bailey study had estimated would cost
$165,000 per person, the most expensive of the incentives examined.
When cadets are first commissioned, they are obligated to serve 3 to 5
years, depending on whether they were accessed through the Military
Academy, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, or the Officer Candidate
Schools. By adding 3 years to their initial obligations, officers who
participate in this program will be required to stay in the Army until
they have been captains for several years. Some, particularly if they
choose the graduate school option, will become majors before completing
their service obligations.[Footnote 43] Army officials have stated that
participation in this precommissioning program to date has been
promising; they believe the program will significantly increase the
retention of officers at the rank of captain and beyond and close the
future gap without the need for additional retention incentives for
officers. According to the Army's calculations, the program will
increase the percentage of officers accessed in 2007 and 2008 who will
complete 8 years of service from 47 percent to 66 percent. Table 9
provides information on the number of officers who participated in the
precommissioning incentive program.
Table 9: Number of Officers Participating in the Precommissioning
Incentive Program in Fiscal Years 2007-2009:
Commissioning source: U.S. Military Academy;
Incentive: Graduate school: 605;
Incentive: Branch of choice: 354;
Incentive: Post of choice: 61;
Total: 1,020.
Commissioning source: Reserve Officer Training Corps;
Incentive: Graduate school: 718;
Incentive: Branch of choice: 1,971;
Incentive: Post of choice: 409;
Total: 3,098.
Commissioning source: Total;
Incentive: Graduate school: 1,323;
Incentive: Branch of choice: 2,325;
Incentive: Post of choice: 470;
Total: 4,118.
Source: Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.
[End of table]
As of November 2008, the Army had not implemented any programs
specifically targeted at majors or lieutenant colonels. An Army
official stated that the Army has not offered incentives to majors or
lieutenant colonels because officials do not believe there is a
retention problem with majors or lieutenant colonels.
The Army Has Not Yet Assessed the Effects on Its Officer Corps of Short-
Term Actions to Alleviate Shortages:
In addition to offering incentive programs, the Army has been promoting
officers at faster-than-recommended rates and reducing time-in-service
requirements. However, the Army has not yet determined whether these
actions will have a negative effect on its future officer corps.
Because the Army operates in a closed system, it can only promote from
within; this limits the actions the Army can take and makes it
important to identify trends that may need to be addressed as early as
possible. House Report 96-1462 on the Defense Officer Personnel
Management Act describes the complexity of the promotion system and
emphasizes that any change to one variable affects the others. The
report concludes that in order to maintain a high-quality officer
corps, changes to the system must be made very carefully. While the
Army provided data regarding the quality of officers at the time of
their accession--such as a bachelor's degree or Scholastic Aptitude
Test score--the Army had no data that could demonstrate whether the
performance of its officers had changed over time or whether actions it
had taken, such as promoting at higher rates, would have an effect on
the officer corps in the future.
Since 1992, in order to meet the increased demand for officers, the
Army has dramatically increased its promotion rates for officers,
exceeding the benchmarks set forth in 1980 in Senate Report No. 96-375,
which accompanied the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act.
[Footnote 44] In order to maintain the rank structure outlined in the
act and simultaneously provide officers with rewarding career tracks,
the established promotion rates (which are lower as officers proceed up
the ranks)--as well as the "up-or-out" system--guide the Army in
promoting the best-qualified officers to higher ranks, with the
understanding that some fully qualified officers will not be promoted.
[Footnote 45] The Secretary of the Army issues guidance defining what
the Army considers to be important experience, and the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel determines which officers are to be considered for
promotion. The Army promotes only officers who have been determined by
promotion boards to be fully qualified to serve at the next higher
rank.
The Army expects to continue this practice of promoting officers at
certain ranks at rates higher than recommended benchmarks through
fiscal year 2010. Figure 8 shows comparisons between promotion rates
established in Senate Report No. 96-375 and the Army's actual or
expected promotion rates in fiscal years 2004-2010 for captains,
majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels.
Figure 7: Actual or Projected Promotion Rates Compared with Promotion
Rate Benchmarks in Fiscal Years 2004-2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: four vertical bar graphs]
Lieutenant to Captain: Congressional committee benchmark: 95%;
Year: 2004: 92.3%;
Year: 2005: 98.4%;
Year: 2006: 98.8%;
Year: 2007: 98.0%;
Year: 2008: 98.0%;
Year: 2009: 98.0%;
Year: 2010: 98.0%.
Captain to Major: Congressional committee benchmark: 80%;
Year: 2004: 96.9%;
Year: 2005: 97.7%;
Year: 2006: 98.0%;
Year: 2007: 94.3%;
Year: 2008: 91.0%;
Year: 2009: 92.8%;
Year: 2010: 90.8%.
Major to Lieutenant Colonel: Congressional committee benchmark: 70%;
Year: 2004: 76.9%;
Year: 2005: 86.2%;
Year: 2006: 90.9%;
Year: 2007: 90.9%;
Year: 2008: 87.2%;
Year: 2009: 87.3%;
Year: 2010: 87.7%.
Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel: Congressional committee benchmark: 50%;
Year: 2004: 52.6%;
Year: 2005: 58.5%;
Year: 2006: 59.4%;
Year: 2007: 61.0%;
Year: 2008: 57.5%;
Year: 2009: 49.3%;
Year: 2010: 49.2%.
Source: GAO analysis of data from Senate Report 96-375 and the Army's
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.
[End of figure]
While promoting at these high rates, the Army has reduced the time that
it requires officers to remain at certain ranks before they are
promoted. For example, as of November 2008, the Army was promoting
officers to the rank of captain after they had served 3 years and 2
months as lieutenants, while the other services were promoting officers
to captain or the equivalent rank only after they had served for 4 or
more years. Likewise, as of November 2008, the Army had reduced its
time-in-service requirement for promotion to major to 9 years of
service, while the other services were requiring between 9 years, 8
months; and 10 years, 2 months of service. While shortening its time-
in-service requirements for promotion to captain, the Under Secretary
of Defense suspended the requirement that first lieutenants serve 2
years before being promoted to captain, shortening the requirement to
18 months. For all other promotions, the Army's requirements are within
those established in Title 10 of the United States Code, which call for
officers to serve 18 months as second lieutenants and 3 years at the
rank of captain, major, and lieutenant colonel before being considered
for promotion.[Footnote 46]
In addition to reductions in the standard time-in-service requirements
for promotion, early promotions for majors and lieutenant colonels are
on the rise. Early promotions are given to officers who, although they
have less time in service than the officers identified to be considered
for promotion in a particular year, are judged to be clearly better
choices for promotion. Early promotions do not increase the number of
officers promoted; rather, the Army draws from officers having 1 fewer
year of experience to select candidates for promotion. From fiscal
years 2006 through 2008, early promotions to major rose from 7.5
percent to 12.5 percent. Likewise, from fiscal years 2006 through 2008,
early promotions to lieutenant colonel rose from 7.4 percent to 14.8
percent. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act requires
authorization by the Deputy Secretary of Defense if early promotions
account for over 10 percent of promotions, and the Army has acquired
this authorization.[Footnote 47] The act also requires that early
promotions not exceed 15 percent of all promotions, and the Army has
stayed within this benchmark. Early promotions to lieutenant colonel
are moving more majors up the ranks faster. However, although this
helps to prevent shortages of lieutenant colonels, it exacerbates the
shortage of majors.
As House Report 96-1462 stated, officer management is a complex system,
and any changes must be made carefully. While the Army moves away from
the legislative benchmarks and changes previous standards to meet the
current demands for officers, it has not yet assessed the long-term
effect of these actions on the officer corps. As a result, the Army is
missing critical data to inform its decisions and to allow it to
identify and address any trends in the officer corps while taking
appropriate force-shaping actions.
Conclusions:
The Army has been successful in finding innovative ways to meet its
goals for increasing end strength. However, its expenditures for
bonuses and incentives have not been as effectively targeted as they
could be. While the Army has access to various studies and data, it is
not clear that the Army has used this information to set the most cost-
effective bonus amounts. For example, although its expenditures for
enlistment and reenlistment bonuses have grown by about 75 percent, the
Army does not know whether these bonuses are set at amounts that are
sufficient to meet its enlistment and reenlistment goals and at the
same time do not result in excessive payments to achieve these results.
Initial results of the effect of admitting individuals who do not meet
the Army's standard eligibility requirements appear positive, and the
Army has begun efforts to analyze the performance outcomes of recruits
with conduct waivers. While the studies conducted by the Army,
including the one it has contracted out to RAND, may provide useful
information on the performance of those admitted with conduct waivers
during a certain period of time, it will be important for the Army to
continue monitoring this population closely, including assessing the
cost-effectiveness of investing in those who require conduct waivers in
order to determine whether it is making prudent use of its valuable
resources in recruiting and training these individuals and whether any
modifications to its waiver policies are needed. This is especially the
case given that, even though data show that recruits with conduct
waivers are strong performers, other evidence indicates that they are
more likely to exhibit disciplinary problems and to be separated for
adverse reasons than those who do not need conduct waivers.
Faced with a wartime environment, restructuring efforts that result in
the need for additional officers, and a system for developing leaders
that requires years of forward planning, the Army has been required to
promote officers at a much faster rate than it has in the past and to
offer new incentives to retain officers. While there is no easy
solution to the shortage of midlevel officers, there are trade-offs
involved with each action to alleviate the shortage. Without using
research that will allow the Army to assess the cost-effectiveness of
its new incentives and the metrics to identify trends to help shape the
force appropriately, the Army will not be in a position to make
informed decisions about the choices it makes and the risks it assumes
as it manages the future officer force.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to take the following four actions:
* To enhance its existing processes to recruit and retain sufficient
numbers of enlisted personnel and to avoid making excessive payments to
achieve desired results, build on currently available analyses that
will enable the Army to set cost-effective enlistment and reenlistment
bonuses.
* To enable the most efficient use of recruiting resources, collect
data on the cost-effectiveness of the Army's conduct waiver polices--
including costs associated with the waiver review and approval process
and with future separations of soldiers with conduct waivers for
adverse reasons--and use these data to inform the Army's waiver
policies.
* Should the Army decide to offer incentives to officers in the future,
build on currently available analyses that will enable the Army, with
the direction and assistance of the Secretary of Defense, to set cost-
effective bonus amounts and other incentives.
* To enable the Army to make informed decisions regarding the
management of its officer corps over time, track--and if necessary
correct--any effects that its actions to alleviate shortages may have
on the officer corps, particularly in cases in which the Army has
deviated from benchmarks established in the Defense Officer Personnel
Management Act.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided the Department of Defense with a draft of this report for
review and comment. In response to our draft, DOD concurred with the
first three recommendations and partially concurred with the fourth.
Regarding our recommendation that the Army conduct further study on the
cost-effectiveness of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, DOD stated
that in February 2009, it had contracted for a study that will cover
all the military services and is entitled "Recruiting and Retention
Effectiveness of Cash Incentives." DOD expects to receive the first
draft of this study in June 2009. Regarding our recommendation that the
Army collect and use data on the cost-effectiveness of its waiver
policies, DOD stated that the Army Audit Agency had begun an audit in
February 2009 of the Army components' granting of enlistment waivers.
In response to our recommendation that the Army consider the cost-
effectiveness of any future incentives offered to its officer corps,
DOD concurred, stating that DOD requires the military services to
provide a detailed business case before it grants the services the
authority to employ a retention bonus. In response to our
recommendation that the Army track the effects of its short-term
actions to alleviate shortages on its officer corps, DOD partially
concurred, stating that the DOPMA guidelines are not intended to serve
as fixed mandates. We agree and state this in our report. However, we
continue to believe that if these guidelines are no longer valid, the
Army should monitor the effect of not maintaining these benchmarks in
managing its future officer corps. DOD's comments in their entirety
appear in appendix V.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees. This report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3604 or by e-mail at farrellb@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to the report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Brenda S. Farrell:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the Army's progress in growing the force and identify
strategies that the Army has used to accomplish this progress, we
obtained and analyzed data on the actual and proposed end strength for
the Army as a whole, as well as for each component. Specifically, we
reviewed the Army's original and accelerated Grow the Force plans to
identify proposed end strength numbers for each fiscal year of the
plans. For the original plan, this included fiscal years 2007 through
2013; for the accelerated plan, this included fiscal years 2007 through
2010. We obtained information from the Army's Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Programs on the actual end strength that the Army
had achieved in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and compared the proposed
end strength to the actual end strength achieved. Further, to describe
the extent to which the active Army, the Army National Guard, and the
Army Reserve have met their target recruiting and retention goals for
fiscal years 2005 through 2008, we obtained data on these metrics from
the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness.
To determine the extent to which the Army is directing the growth in
its enlisted force to areas of most critical need, we obtained data
from the Army's Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army,
Financial Management and Comptroller, on how much the components spent
on enlistment and reenlistment bonuses given to Army recruits and
soldiers for fiscal years 2005 through 2008. To determine how the Army
identifies priority occupational specialties and which ones should be
awarded bonuses, we interviewed officials from the U.S. Army Human
Resources Command; the U.S. Army Recruiting Command; and the Army's
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Enlisted Career
Systems Division. We also observed two working sessions of the Enlisted
Incentives Review Board. We reviewed data provided by the members of
that Board, as well as other documents showing fill rates, recruiting
goals, and bonus levels for the various enlisted occupational
specialties.
To determine the extent to which the Army is maintaining the quality of
its enlisted force, we obtained and reviewed data describing the extent
to which the active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve
had met DOD's quality benchmarks for fiscal years 2005 through 2008. We
also reviewed the estimates made by the Army and others to determine
the size of the target recruiting market and discussed the Army's
methodology in applying the conclusions reached with knowledgeable Army
officials. We also obtained data on active Army and Army Reserve
programs to expand the youth target market population from the U.S.
Army Recruiting Command. Additionally, we obtained information on the
numbers and types of enlistment waivers granted by the active Army, the
Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard in fiscal years 2005 through
2008. Types of enlistment waivers include conduct waivers, drug and
alcohol waivers, administrative waivers, and medical waivers. The U.S.
Army Recruiting Command provided data on waivers granted to recruits
enlisting into the active Army and the Army Reserve. The National Guard
Bureau provided data on waivers granted to recruits enlisting into the
Army National Guard. However, the U.S. Army Accessions Command holds
responsibility for maintaining these data for all components, and
waiver information stored in the U.S. Army Accessions Command's
database originates and is entered at Military Entrance Processing
Stations. After interviewing relevant officials from the U.S. Army
Recruiting Command, we determined that the waiver data from fiscal
years 2005 through 2007 had limitations that precluded us from
presenting these data in our report. Among the problems cited by
officials were the data system's failure to capture all waivers for
recruits with multiple waivers, the overcounting of other waivers, and
the miscoding of some misdemeanors as felonies. We determined that the
Army had adequately addressed these problems for the fiscal year 2008
waiver data, and we found this year's data to be sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of our report. To obtain information on the
performance of recruits with and without enlistment waivers, we (1)
reviewed the Army's 2007 and 2008 studies of the performance of the
conduct waiver population and obtained additional information about
these studies' findings and methodology through interviews with
relevant Army officials and (2) reviewed RAND's 2008 study of the
performance of recruits with waivers and obtained additional
information on RAND's ongoing and planned efforts in the area of
conduct waivers from relevant RAND and Army officials. We also reviewed
DOD and Army policies pertaining to enlistment waivers--specifically
the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness' June 2008 Directive-Type Memorandum 08-018 on enlistment
waivers and Army Regulation 601-210, "Personnel Procurement: Active and
Reserve Components Enlistment Program" (June 7, 2007).
To assess the extent to which the Army is directing the growth in its
officer force to areas of need and the extent to which it has
determined whether short-term tradeoffs to alleviate shortages will
have long-term effects on its officer corps, we analyzed various data
related to officer demand, strength levels, promotions, and retention.
We reviewed the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980,
Senate Report No. 96-375, House Report No. 96-1462, and corresponding
provisions of Title 10 of the U.S. Code in order to ascertain
legislated benchmarks for officer strength, promotion rates, and
options available to the Army to address shortages. We obtained data on
officer authorizations and strength levels, as well as information on
programs to address officer shortages from the Army's Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. We compared authorizations and
strength levels to identify shortages in specific ranks and specific
branches. We analyzed existing and projected trends in officer demand
and supply for fiscal years 2003-13. We reviewed documentation and
reports on incentive programs for captains and cadets prior to their
commissioning. Additionally, we talked to Army officials about their
intent behind these programs. Furthermore, we received information on
actual promotion rates from the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel, which we compared to the promotion benchmarks in
Senate Report No. 96-375.
The data we reviewed for each of our research objectives generally
covered fiscal years 2005 through 2008; however, our analysis of
enlistment waivers was limited to fiscal year 2008 due to limitations
in waiver data from previous years, such as the system's failure to
capture some waivers and the overcounting of other waivers. Except in
the case of the enlistment waiver data, we found the data for fiscal
years 2005 through 2008 to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report. We interviewed officials and, where appropriate, obtained
documentation at the following locations:
Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness:
* Defense Manpower Data Center:
Department of the Army:
* Army National Guard:
* Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and
Comptroller:
* Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, United States Military
Academy:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel:
* Office of the Chief of Staff for Programs:
* U.S. Army Accessions Command:
* U.S. Army Cadet Command:
* U.S. Army Human Resources Command:
* U.S. Army Recruiting Command:
* U.S. Army Reserve Command:
Other Government Agencies:
* Congressional Budget Office:
* Congressional Research Service:
The RAND Corporation:
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 through March
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Enlistment Bonuses for Active Duty Soldiers:
Table 10 shows the amounts of enlistment bonuses offered to active-duty
Army soldiers at the time of the Army's June 2008 Enlisted Incentives
Review Board's meeting.
Table 10: Levels of Enlistment Bonuses Offered to Active Army Soldiers,
June 2008:
Bonus level: Level 1;
Length of enlistment contract: 2 years: $10,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 3 years: $20,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 4 years: $25,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 5 years: $30,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 6 years: $35,000.
Bonus level: Level 2;
Length of enlistment contract: 2 years: $7,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 3 years: $15,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 4 years: $20,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 5 years: $25,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 6 years: $30,000.
Bonus level: Level 3;
Length of enlistment contract: 2 years: $3,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 3 years: $10,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 4 years: $15,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 5 years: $20,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 6 years: $25,000.
Bonus level: Level 4;
Length of enlistment contract: 2 years: $0;
Length of enlistment contract: 3 years: $5,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 4 years: $10,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 5 years: $15,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 6 years: $20,000.
Bonus level: Level 5;
Length of enlistment contract: 2 years: $0;
Length of enlistment contract: 3 years: $4,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 4 years: $5,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 5 years: $10,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 6 years: $15,000.
Bonus level: Level 6;
Length of enlistment contract: 2 years: $0;
Length of enlistment contract: 3 years: $3,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 4 years: $4,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 5 years: $5,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 6 years: $10,000.
Bonus level: Level 7;
Length of enlistment contract: 2 years: $0;
Length of enlistment contract: 3 years: $2,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 4 years: $3,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 5 years: $4,000;
Length of enlistment contract: 6 years: $5,000.
Source: U.S. Army Human Resources Command.
[End of table]
Table 11 shows occupational specialties that were determined to qualify
for bonuses at the June 2008 meeting of the Enlisted Incentives Review
Board.
Table 11: Occupational Specialties Qualifying for Enlistment Bonuses
(as of June 2008):
Bonus level: 1;
Occupational Specialty: 09L - Interpreter/Translator;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): not listed;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 1;
Occupational Specialty: 13D - Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems
Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 94;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 1;
Occupational Specialty: 14E - Patriot Fire Control Enhanced
Operator/Maintainer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 88;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 1;
Occupational Specialty: 25P - Microwave Systems Operator/Maintainer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 86;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 1;
Occupational Specialty: 25S - Satellite Communication Systems
Operator/Maintainer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 88;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 1;
Occupational Specialty: 35W - Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence
Recruit;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 57;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 2;
Occupational Specialty: 13R - Field Artillery Firefinder Radar
Operator;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 91;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 2;
Occupational Specialty: 14J - Air Defense Tactical Operations Center
Operator/Maintainer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 101;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 2;
Occupational Specialty: 14T - Patriot Launching Station Enhanced
Operator/Maintainer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 97;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 2;
Occupational Specialty: 18X - Special Forces Recruit;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 102;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 2;
Occupational Specialty: 25Q - Multichannel Transmission Systems
Operator;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 102;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 2;
Occupational Specialty: 25U - Signal Support Systems Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 101;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 2;
Occupational Specialty: 88M - Motor Transportation Operator;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 93;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 2;
Occupational Specialty: 92F - Petroleum Supply Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 90;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 2;
Occupational Specialty: 94A - Land Combat Electronic Missile System
Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 98;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 2;
Occupational Specialty: 94E - Radio and Communications Security
Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 91;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 2;
Occupational Specialty: 94S - Patriot System Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 102;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 3;
Occupational Specialty: 13F - Fire Support Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 100;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 3;
Occupational Specialty: 35H - Common Ground Station Analyst;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 90;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 3;
Occupational Specialty: 63J - QM and Chemical Equipment Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 106;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 3;
Occupational Specialty: 89D - Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 99;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 3;
Occupational Specialty: 92G - Food Service Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 99;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 3;
Occupational Specialty: 94F - Computer Detection Systems Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 100;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 3;
Occupational Specialty: 94M - Radar Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 102;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 3;
Occupational Specialty: 94Y - Integrated Family of Test Equipment
Operator and Maintainer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 103;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 4;
Occupational Specialty: 13B - Cannon Crew Member;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 95;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 4;
Occupational Specialty: 21U - Topographic Analyst;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 101;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 4;
Occupational Specialty: 35G - Imagery Analyst;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 105;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 4;
Occupational Specialty: 35T - Military Intelligence Systems
Maintainer/Integrator;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 97;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 4;
Occupational Specialty: 37F - Psychological Operations Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 96;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 4;
Occupational Specialty: 42RN - Keyboard Player;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): not listed;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 4;
Occupational Specialty: 92R - Parachute Rigger;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 98;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 11X - Infantryman;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 103;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 25N - Joint Networking Nodal System
Operators/Maintainers;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 101;
On Priority List?: Bonus level: Yes.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 35N - Signals Intelligence Analyst;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 102;
On Priority List?: Bonus level: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 42R9B - Cornet or Trumpet Player;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): not listed;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 42R9D - French Horn Player;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): not listed;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 42R9H - Oboe Player;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): not listed;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 42R9J - Clarinet Player;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): not listed;
On Priority List?:No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 42R9K - Bassoon Player;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): not listed;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 42R9T - Guitar Player;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): not listed;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 42R9U - Electric Bass Guitar Player;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): not listed;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 52D - Power Generator Equipment;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 99;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 68K - Medical Laboratory Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 105;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 68S - Preventive Medicine Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 99;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 74D - Chemical Biological Radiological and
Nuclear Operations Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 105;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 89A - Ammunition Stock Control and Accounting
Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 115;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 89B - Ammunition Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 115;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 5;
Occupational Specialty: 94T - Avenger System Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 118;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 13M - Multiple Launch Rocket System/High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System Crew Member;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 78;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 19K - M1 Abrams Armor Crew Member;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 100;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 21C - Bridge Crewmember;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 92;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 21D - Diver;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 102;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 21Y - Geospatial Engineer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 0;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 27D - Paralegal Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 81;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 31B - Military Police;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 101;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 35S - Signals Collector/Analyst;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 108;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 45G - Fire Control Rep;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 101;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 63M - Bradley Fighting Vehicle System;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 92;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 68W - Healthcare Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 99;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 6;
Occupational Specialty: 94H - Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic
Equipment Support Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 89;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 13P - Multiple Launch Rocket System Automated
Tactical Data Systems Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 76;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 14S - Air and Missile Defense;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 117;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 15B - Aircraft Powerplant Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 101;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 15G - Aircraft Structural Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 100;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 15J - OH-58D Armament/Electrical/Avionics
System Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 101;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 15Q - Air Traffic Control Operator;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 82;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 21B - Combat Engineer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 101;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 21E - Heavy Construction Equipment;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 99;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 25C - Radio Operator Maintainer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 96;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 25R - Visual Information/Audio Equipment
Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 92;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 31E - Internment/Resettlement Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 105;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 35F - Intelligence Analyst;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 105;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 46Q - Journalist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 98;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 63B - Light Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 103;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 92W - Water Treatment Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 87;
On Priority List?: No.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 92Y - Unit Supply Specialist;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 102;
On Priority List?: Yes.
Bonus level: 7;
Occupational Specialty: 94R - Avionic and Survivability Equipment
Repairer;
Year-to-date fill rate (in percentages): 106;
On Priority List?: No.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Army Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, and U.S. Human Resources
Command.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Review of Felony Waivers:
Through the end of fiscal year 2008, the Army granted conduct waivers
to some enlistees who had histories of felony charges, and it has a
multi-step review process in place to make these determinations.
[Footnote 48] In fiscal year 2008, a fairly small number of individuals
were admitted into the Army with a felony waiver. Specifically, 1,048
recruits with felony waivers entered the active Army in fiscal year
2008 (or less than 2 percent of overall accessions). The number of
recruits entering the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard with
felony waivers in fiscal year 2008 stood at 196 and 128, respectively,
or less than 1 percent of these components' overall accessions for that
year.[Footnote 49] While the Army grants felony waivers in some cases,
officials said that the Army does not admit serious criminals who may
pose harm to others and to the Army's larger mission. According to Army
documents, the Army does not consider applicants convicted of the most
serious felonies, such as murder, sexually violent crimes, domestic
violence,[Footnote 50] and drug dealing, as well as alcoholism and drug
dependency. The Army also excludes individuals on probation or parole,
in confinement, awaiting criminal charges, and ordered to enter the
military in lieu of (or as a result of) being prosecuted.[Footnote 51]
Army officials said that the Army's waiver approval process is designed
so that only the most deserving candidates are awarded waivers. In
assessing an individual for a conduct waiver, the Army uses the "whole
person concept," considering factors such as employment stability,
success in school, accomplishments in the community, references from
others in the community who have come to know the applicant, and signs
of remorse and changed behavior since the incident occurred. The
process involves a series of steps and multiple layers of review. Each
individual's waiver request is typically reviewed at 6 different levels
for misdemeanors and traffic offenses and at 10 different levels for
felonies. All felony waivers and certain serious misdemeanor waivers
must be approved at the level of the Deputy Commanding General of the
U.S. Army Recruiting Command for active Army and Army Reserve recruits
and at the level of the Director of the Army National Guard for Army
National Guard recruits.
The Army reported that the top five offenses that receive felony
waivers are burglary, narcotics and drug charges, aggravated assault,
larceny, and unlawful breaking or entering. Our review of the waiver
files for all those accessed by the active Army or Army Reserve in
fiscal year 2007 with waivers for felony convictions identified
examples within each of these categories. Table 12 provides examples of
the various offenses that we found in reviewing the waiver files.
Table 12: Examples of Felony Offenses Committed by Individuals Who
Received Waivers for Felony Convictions from the Army in Fiscal Year
2007:
Offense category: Burglary;
Example: At age 19, an individual was charged with burglary after he
and a friend opened the door of the restaurant where a friend worked
and took the safe. He served probation and paid a fine. He was 25 years
old when the waiver application was reviewed.
At age 20, an individual was charged with burglary for attempting to
steal $1,547.50 from a store. He completed 56 weekends in jail, served
probation, and paid a fine. He was 24 when the waiver application was
reviewed.
Offense category: Narcotics/drug charges;
Example: At age 17, an individual was charged with possession of drugs
and drug paraphernalia after the search of the car he was driving
resulted in the police's finding a bag of marijuana and an empty bag of
heroin. He paid relevant fines. He was 20 years old when the waiver
application was reviewed.
At age 18, an individual was found to have methamphetamines in his
possession. He started using marijuana at the age of 12, later moving
on to methamphetamines. He served probation, paid a fine, and completed
community service. At the age of 22, he was also charged with Driving
While Intoxicated, for which he served one day in jail and paid a fine.
He was 23 years old when the waiver application was reviewed.
Offense category: Aggravated assault;
Example: At age 18, an individual was charged with aggravated assault
for pulling out a pocket knife and swinging it at a group of
individuals who he claims attacked him, striking one of them in the
leg. He served probation. He was 20 years old when the waiver
application was reviewed.
At age 16, an individual was charged with aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. He claimed that he had come home and seen his mother
being physically assaulted by her boyfriend. He called the police,
grabbed a gun that was in the house, and threatened to use it. He
served probation and completed community service. He was 18 years old
when the waiver application was reviewed.
Offense category: Other types of assault;
Example: At age 16, an individual was charged with assault with a
deadly weapon for accidentally poking his friend with a tool from a
metal class. He served probation. He was 18 years old when the waiver
application was reviewed.
At age 19, an individual was charged with assault with intent to
inflict serious bodily injury for punching another individual who he
assumed dented the rear of his car. The individual claimed that when he
threw a punch, he forgot that he also had a bat in his hand. He served
probation. He was 22 years old when the waiver application was
reviewed.
Offense category: Larceny/theft;
Example: At age 31, an individual was convicted for larceny over $500.
He was a manager at a store at the time and was informed that he would
be laid off. Out of anger and frustration, he took $26,000 from the
store the day before he left. He returned the money, as well as paid a
fine and served probation. He was 32 years old when the waiver
application was reviewed.
At age 22, an individual was arrested for grand theft after she wrote a
check to pay for a motorcycle but did not have money in the bank. She
paid court costs and restitution, as well as completed probation. A few
months after this incident, she wrote another "hot check" for food. She
was 33 years old when the waiver application was reviewed.
Offense category: Robbery/armed robbery;
Example: At age 18, an individual was charged with robbery when he and
a friend took items from a convenience store while carrying handguns.
He paid restitution, as well as served confinement and parole. He was
27 years old when the waiver application was reviewed.
At age 18, an individual was charged with robbery with a firearm when
he and a friend robbed a local fast food restaurant. They took the gun
that belonged to the friend's father and told the manager, at gunpoint,
to hand over the money. They were also charged with grand theft of the
motor vehicle when they took the manager's car to get away. He paid a
fine, served a prison sentence, and served probation. He was 24 years
old when the waiver application was reviewed.
Offense category: Breaking and entering;
Example: At age 18, an individual was charged with breaking and
entering. He claimed he was homeless and broke into a high school
building to use a bathroom and a shower. He served probation and paid a
fine. He was 21 years old when the waiver application was reviewed.
At age 20, an individual was charged with residential entry after he
and a friend went inside his girlfriend's beach house without
permission and stayed there through the night. He served a jail
sentence and probation, as well as paid a fine. He was 22 years old
when the waiver application was reviewed.
Offense category: Sexual offenses;
Example: At age 21, an applicant was dating a coworker. The applicant
claimed he did not know that she was under the age of 18 and was
charged with corruption of a minor. He completed community service and
paid a fine. He was 23 years old when the waiver application was
reviewed.
At age 17, an applicant had consensual sex with a 17-year-old girl.
After her mother became aware of the incident, he was arrested and
charged with having sex with a child. He paid a fine, as well as served
a jail sentence of 2-1/2 months and probation. He was 18 years old when
the waiver application was reviewed.
Source: GAO review of fiscal year 2007 waiver files from the U.S. Army
Recruiting Command. These files covered all waivers granted in fiscal
year 2007 to active Army and Army Reserve recruits with felony
convictions.
Note: All of these examples were based on the information provided by
waiver analysts at the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, reflecting the
waiver analysts' interpretations of the events. Substantial amounts of
the information in the files were redacted, and it is not clear what
evidence the Army used to determine the individuals' eligibility for a
waiver.
[End of table]
According to the Army, waivers will always be considered in the
enlistment process because a one-time incident may not accurately
reflect the true character of a person whom the Army ultimately decides
to admit. Officials told us that those applying for conduct waivers are
strong candidates whose qualifications are high enough to motivate the
Army to undertake this rigorous process on their behalf. However, some
of the waiver files that we reviewed showed that the waiver applicants
did not have high school diplomas or had fairly low AFQT scores.
[Footnote 52]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Critical Shortages of Officers by Rank and Branch:
The table below shows fiscal year 2008 fill rates, or rates at which
specific officer career areas, or branches, are currently filled, as
well as the numbers of unfilled positions in those career areas. The
Army considers a career area to be experiencing a shortage if it has a
fill rate below 85 percent.
Table 13: Fill Rates Below 85 Percent for Officers by Rank and Branch
at the End of Fiscal Year 2008:
Regular Army (total);
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 80% (3,112);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Combat Arms (total); Aviation;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: 62% (181);
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: [Empty];
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Combat Support (total); Percentage of authorizations filled (number of
positions unfilled): Lieutenants: [Empty]; Captains: [Empty]; Majors:
83% (324); Lieutenant colonels: [Empty]; Colonels: [Empty].
Combat Support: Military Police;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: [Empty];
Lieutenant colonels: 83% (34);
Colonels: [Empty].
Combat Support: Military Intelligence;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 78% (196);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Combat Support: Chemical;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 82% (33);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Combat Support: Combat Service Support (total);
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: 81% (510);
Majors: 56% (540)[A];
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Combat Support: Civil Affairs;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 71% (52);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Combat Support: Adjutant General Corps;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: 80% (156);
Majors: [Empty];
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Combat Support: Transportation Corps [A];
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: 68% (181)[A];
Majors: 2% (285)[A];
Lieutenant colonels: 0% (122)[A];
Colonels: 0% (32)[A].
Combat Support: Ordnance[A];
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: 76% (191)[A];
Captains: 68% (170)[A];
Majors: 2% (189)[A];
Lieutenant colonels: 0% (83)[A];
Colonels: 0% (30)[A].
Combat Support: Quartermaster Corps [A];
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: 72% (144)[A];
Majors: 3% (214)[A];
Lieutenant colonels: 1% (77)[A];
Colonels: 6% (17)[A].
Special Branches (total);
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 83% (747);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Special Branches: Judge Advocate General's Corps;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 61% (176);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: 84% (20).
Special Branches: Medical Corps;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: 0% (1);
Captains: 83% (263);
Majors: [Empty];
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Special Branches: Dental Corps;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 52% (116);
Lieutenant colonels: 48% (141);
Colonels: 78% (60).
Special Branches: Medical Specialist Corps;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: 60% (45);
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: [Empty];
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Special Branches: Nurse Corps;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 77% (171);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Special Branches: Medical Service Corps;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 82% (169);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Functional Areas (total): Systems Engineering;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 63% (44);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Functional Areas (total): Information Operations;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 54% (96);
Lieutenant colonels: 68% (27);
Colonels: 72% (5).
Functional Areas (total): Strategic Intelligence;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 80% (20);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Functional Areas (total): Space Operations;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: [Empty];
Lieutenant colonels: 71% (19);
Colonels: [Empty].
Functional Areas (total): Human Resource Management [B];
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: 0% (20)[B];
Majors: 0% (139) [B];
Lieutenant colonels: 1% (69) [B];
Colonels: 0% (22) [B].
Functional Areas (total): Comptroller [B];
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: 0% (66) [B];
Majors: 0% (117) [B];
Lieutenant colonels: 0% (79) [B];
Colonels: 0% (32) [B].
Functional Areas (total): U.S. Military Academy Stabilized Faculty;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: [Empty];
Lieutenant colonels: 59% (25);
Colonels: [Empty].
Functional Areas (total): Foreign Area Officer;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: 59% (154);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Functional Areas (total): Operations Research/Systems Analysis;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: 48% (61);
Majors: 74% (63);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Research, Development and Acquisition;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: 84% (44);
Majors: [Empty];
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Functional Areas (total): Force Development;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: [Empty];
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: 81% (5).
Functional Areas (total): Systems Automation Officer;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: 63% (88);
Majors: 62% (90);
Lieutenant colonels: [Empty];
Colonels: [Empty].
Functional Areas (total): Simulations Operations;
Percentage of authorizations filled (number of positions unfilled):
Lieutenants: [Empty];
Captains: [Empty];
Majors: [Empty];
Lieutenant colonels: 67% (24);
Colonels: 70% (6).
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel.
[A] The Army is in the process of combining Transportation Corps,
Ordnance, and Quartermaster Corps under the functional area Logistics.
While there may not be enough officers in the specific branch,
positions in Transportation Corps, Ordnance, and Quartermaster Corps
can be filled by Logistics officers. Therefore, these numbers do not
accurately reflect the fill rate for these positions. These types of
changes also distort the fill rates shown in the Combat Service Support
branch.
[B] These are new categories the Army created in 2007 to replace the
Financial Management category. The Army is still working to transfer
officers to these new categories. Therefore, these numbers do not
accurately reflect the fill rates for these positions.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Personnel And Readiness:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
April 23, 2009:
Ms. Brenda S. Farrell:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Farrell:
This letter is the Department of Defense's response to the draft
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, Military Personnel: Army
Needs to Focus on Cost-Effective Use of Financial Incentives and
Quality Standards in Managing Force Growth, dated May 2009, (GAO Code
351131/GAO-09-256).
Please see the enclosure for our specific responses to each of the
recommendations. Questions regarding this response should be addressed
to the OSD (MPP) action officer, Lt Col Greg Brown at 693-3939 or
greg.brown@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
William J. Carr:
Deputy Under Secretary (Military Personnel Policy):
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated May, 2009:
GAO Code 351131/GAO-09-256:
"Military Personnel: Army Needs to Focus on Cost-Effective Use of
Financial Incentives and Quality Standards in Managing Force Growth"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to enhance its existing processes to
recruit and retain sufficient numbers of enlisted personnel and to
avoid making excessive payments to achieve desired results, build on
currently available analyses that will enable the Army to set cost-
effective enlistment and reenlistment bonuses.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department policy is: The intent of bonuses
is to influence personnel inventories in specific situations in which
less costly methods have proven inadequate or impractical. The Military
Services must exercise this authority in the most cost-effective
manner, considering bonus employment in relation to overall skill,
training, and utilization requirements. Military skills selected for
the award of enlistment, accession, reenlistment, or retention bonuses
must be essential to the accomplishment of defense missions." [DoDD
1304.21, January 2005]. Moreover, Army regularly responds to the
Department of Defense in justifying new bonuses or defending changes to
existing incentives. Admittedly, oversight and refinement is essential
in assuring successful policy compliance. To that end, in February 2009
the Department contracted a DoD-wide research study entitled
"Recruiting and Retention Effectiveness of Cash Incentives." The
explicit objective of this research is to assess the impact on
enlistment and reenlistment propensity of military cash incentives used
in the Services. The assessment of bonuses will cover scope of
application, growth trends, and cost-effectiveness relative to other
resources utilized to improve recruiting and retention. The Department
expects to receive the first draft of this research in June of 2009.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to enable the most efficient use of
recruiting resources, collect data on the cost-effectiveness of the
Army's conduct waiver polices including costs associated with the
waiver review and approval process and with future separations of
soldiers with conduct waivers for adverse reasons-and use these data to
inform the Army's waiver policies.
DOD Response: Concur. We note that, on February 17, 2009, Army Audit
Agency began an audit of the Army Recruiting Waiver Program that will,
among other things, examine whether the Active, Reserve, and National
Guard components are using appropriate and uniform standards for
granting and processing enlistment waivers.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to, should the Army decide to offer
incentives to officers in the future, build on currently available
analyses that will enable the Army, with the direction and assistance
of the Secretary of Defense, to set cost-effective bonus amounts and
other incentives.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department policy is: The intent of bonuses
is to influence personnel inventories in specific situations in which
less costly methods have proven inadequate or impractical. The Military
Services must exercise this authority in the most cost-effective
manner, considering bonus employment in relation to overall skill,
training, and utilization requirements. Military skills selected for
the award of enlistment, accession, reenlistment, or retention bonuses
must be essential to the accomplishment of defense missions. " [DoDD
1304.21, January 2005]. The Department's oversight of officer retention
is rigorous and demands that the Military Services provide a detailed
business case before the Office of the Secretary of Defense grants the
requesting service the authority to employ a retention bonus.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army, to enable it to make informed
decisions regarding the management of its officer corps over time,
track-and if necessary correct-any effects that its actions to
alleviate shortages may have on the officer corps, particularly in
cases in which the Army has deviated from benchmarks established in the
Defense Officer Personnel Management Act.
DOD Response: Partially-concur. DOPMA officer promotion "benchmarks"
represent generalized guidelines but are not intended, under present
law and policy, to serve as fixed mandates. Moreover, OSD policy
(Enclosure 2 of DoDI 1320.13, June 1996) already is explicit in
defining desired promotion timing and opportunity. In the course of
managing officer experience and grade profiles, the Secretaries of the
Military Departments are permitted to vary actual promotion opportunity
and timing (by competitive category and grade) to meet these
requirements. Oversight is important, and these data are tracked
annually by OSD staff, through Service inputs and data systematically
assembled and submitted from the Defense Manpower Data Center.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, David Moser, Assistant Director,
Natalya Barden, Catherine Brown, Renee Brown, Tim Carr, Brandon Hunt,
Joanne Landesman, Julia Matta, Lonnie McAllister, Charles Perdue, Terry
Richardson, Bev Schladt, and Rajneesh Verma made key contributions to
this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Formerly referred to as the Global War on Terror.
[2] The President's plan also included increasing the size of the
Marine Corps by 27,000 active-duty personnel. The Marine Corps now
expects to complete its growth and reach its active-duty end strength
goal of 202,000 by fiscal year 2011.
[3] In addition, we conducted a qualitative review of the waiver files
for all those accessed by the active Army or Army Reserve in fiscal
year 2007 with waivers for felony convictions. The purpose of this
review was to obtain examples of the offenses committed by those who
were ultimately admitted by the Army.
[4] DOD Directive 1304.21, "Policy on Enlistment Bonuses, Accession
Bonuses for New Officers in Critical Skills, Selective Reenlistment
Bonuses, and Critical Skills Retention Bonuses for Active Members"
(Jan. 31, 2005); and DOD Instruction1304.29, "Administration of
Enlistment Bonuses, Accession Bonuses for New Officers in Critical
Skills, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, and Critical Skills Retention
Bonuses for Active Members" (Dec. 15, 2004).
[5] After we had completed our audit work, Army officials told us that
in fiscal year 2009, they had suspended the granting of adult felony
waivers.
[6] Compensation costs are reported in constant fiscal year 2007
dollars. These costs have been updated and adjusted for inflation and
are based on costs reported in [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-798], Military Personnel: DOD Needs
to Improve the Transparency and Reassess the Reasonableness,
Appropriateness, Affordability, and Sustainability of Its Military
Compensation System (Washington, D.C: July 19, 2005).
[7] Pub. L. No. 96-513 (1980), as amended.
[8] 10 U.S.C. § 523.
[9] H. Rep. No. 96-1462 and S. Rep. No. 96-375.
[10] GAO, Force Structure: Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's
Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-354R] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18,
2008).
[11] U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Recruiting, Retention, and
Future Levels of Military Personnel (October 2006).
[12] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted
Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-134] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17,
2005).
[13] The Army tracks retention rates for soldiers in three categories:
initial term (for those serving in their first enlistments and having
fewer than 6 years of service); midcareer (for those serving on their
second or subsequent enlistments and having fewer than 10 years of
service); and career (those serving on their second or subsequent
enlistments and having 10 or more years of service).
[14] Unlike the active Army, the Army Reserve and the Army National
Guard calculate losses regardless of whether personnel have a service
obligation remaining on their contract.
[15] Dwell time refers to the amount of time between deployments.
[16] These figures do not include bonuses paid to Army National Guard
members who enlisted through the Active First program. Under the Active
First program, an enlistee joins the Army National Guard but in fact
serves first in the active Army for 2 to 4 years. After serving on
active duty, the soldier goes into the National Guard. Bonuses given to
those entering through the Active First program were funded in the
active Army's budget.
[17] "Policy on Enlistment Bonuses, Accession Bonuses for New Officers
in Critical Skills, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, and Critical Skills
Retention Bonuses for Active Members" (Jan. 31, 2005). Department of
Defense Instruction 1304.29, "Administration of Enlistment Bonuses,
Accession Bonuses for New Officers in Critical Skills, Selective
Reenlistment Bonuses, and Critical Skills Retention Bonuses for Active
Members" (Dec. 15, 2004).
[18] This body of research dates back to the 1960s and 1970s, when
various organizations were researching the cost of an all-volunteer
force. GAO cites many of these studies, conducted by RAND and other
researchers in GAO's report, Military Draft: Potential Impacts and
Other Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-88-102]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 1988). Other studies include An Enlisted
Force Management System Model to Predict the Effects of Bonus Decisions
(1988); A System for Allocating Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (1989);
National Research Council, Attitudes, Aptitudes, and Aspirations of
American Youth (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003);
RAND, Have Improved Resources Increased Military Recruiting and
Retention? (2004); Chadwick, Martin, and Bailey, Incorporated, U.S.
Army Accessions Command: Active Duty Recruitment Incentive Study Report
of Findings (Apr. 2005); Orvis, B. Issues for Discussion Re Changing
the Value of the Enlistment Bonus. (Washington, D.C.: Army Staff
Decision Brief, 2005); Greenston, P, Diaz, M. & Sticha, Raising the Cap
on Enlistment Bonus Programs: Forecasted Impact on Army Accessions
(Washington, D.C., Army Research Institute, 2006); Center for Naval
Analysis, The Effect of Enlistment and Reenlistment Bonuses on
Participation in the Navy Selected Reserve (Apr. 2006); The Effect of
Bonuses on Participation in the Navy Selected Reserve: Regression
Results (May 2006); Congressional Budget Office, Recruiting, Retention,
and Future Levels of Military Personnel (Oct. 2006); and Pionk, J.
Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Army Cash Enlistment Bonus
Incentives. Doctoral Dissertation. (Prescott, AZ: Northcentral
University, 2009).
[19] These were 11C, Indirect Fire Infantry; 15R, AH-64 Helicopter
Repairer; 15S, OH-58D Helicopter Repairer; 15T, UH-60 Helicopter
Repairer; 15U, CH-47 Helicopter Repairer; 19D, Cavalry Scout; 25B,
Information Systems Operator-Analyst; 35K, UAV Operator; and 35M, Human
Intelligence Collector.
[20] Department of Defense Instruction Number 1304.29, "Administration
of Enlistment Bonuses, Accession Bonuses for New Officers in Critical
Skills, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, and Critical Skills Retention
Bonuses for Active Members" (Dec. 15, 2004), allows the services to
award bonuses to occupational specialties that are experiencing
shortages, even if they are not considered to be critical occupations
on the basis of other factors. In 2002, we reported that the services,
including the Army, were paying reenlistment bonuses to occupations
that were not considered critical (GAO, Military Personnel: Management
and Oversight of Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Needs
Improvement, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-149]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 25, 2002)). In that report, we recommended that
DOD require the Army to establish criteria for selecting critical
specialties and that it issue an instruction to the services with
guidance for administering and selecting specialties for inclusion in
their reenlistment programs. In its written response to our report, DOD
stated that the criteria for selecting specialties for inclusion in
reenlistment programs were already sound because they were written to
provide flexibility for the management of critical skills to meet
shortfalls in the services' inventories.
[21] Under the Active First program, an enlistee joins the Army
National Guard but serves first in the active Army for 2 to 4 years.
After serving on active duty, the soldier goes into the National Guard.
[22] Both regular Army and Active First enlistees have total military
service obligations of 8 years, meaning that their total obligation
period on active and reserve duty together is 8 years.
[23] After we had completed our audit work, the Army reported that
effective October 1, 2008, all Active First accessions received the
same bonus as active Army accessions.
[24] This group excludes persons with General Educational Development
certificates.
[25] This calculation is based on a study by the Lewin Group, which, in
its report to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, stated that
the study could be improved for more accuracy. For example, the report
stated that refining the estimated aptitude levels, which are based on
1997 data, would lead to a larger eligible population. Likewise,
refining the way the system determines when youth are disqualified for
more than one reason could reduce the disqualified population by
several percentage points, thereby increasing the qualified market.
[26] While the Army is allowed to recruit individuals without high-
school diplomas, DOD's benchmark is that at least 90 percent of
recruits each year have high-school diplomas. Likewise, the Army can
recruit individuals whose AFQT percentile scores fall between 10 and
30, but DOD's policy requires that no more than 4 percent of these
individuals be admitted each year. While the Army has not consistently
met these benchmarks set by DOD, it is restricted in how many of these
individuals can be admitted. Furthermore, anyone with an AFQT
percentile score below 10 is not permitted to enlist.
[27] In 2007, the Army increased the maximum age for enlistees from 40
to 42.
[28] In February 2009, after we had completed our audit work, the
Secretary of Defense authorized the military services to recruit
certain legal aliens whose skills are considered to be vital to the
national interest. This "Military Accessions Vital to National
Interest" program is a pilot program that will continue for up to 12
months and involve recruiting up to 1,000 personnel with critical
skills, such as physicians, nurses, and experts in languages with
associated cultural backgrounds.
[29] Army Regulation 601-210, section 2-3, states that all Army
applicants with no prior service must enlist and ship prior to their
42nd birthday. Army Regulation 601-210, "Active and Reserve Components
Enlistment Program" (June 7, 2007).
[30] The Army also grants waivers for reasons such as certain medical
conditions or having a large number of dependents. In fiscal year 2008,
conduct waivers comprised approximately 49 percent of all waivers given
by the active Army, 29 percent of all waivers given by the Army
Reserve, and 20 percent of all waivers given by the Army National
Guard.
[31] In March 2009, after we had completed our audit work, the Army
stated that waivers for adult felonies had been suspended for the
active Army and the Army Reserve. Prior to that date, the Army National
Guard had already suspended felony waivers.
[32] According to Army Regulation 601-210, examples of waiverable
felonies include burglary, narcotics or habit-forming drug charges,
aggravated assault, larceny (more than $500), and breaking and
entering. The Army further indicated that waiverable serious
misdemeanors include two or more charges of Driving Under the
Influence, two or more charges for possession of marijuana, leaving the
scene of an accident or hit and run, contributing to the delinquency of
a minor, and larceny (less than $500). Officials explained to us that
examples of waiverable minor misdemeanors include one charge of Driving
Under the Influence, one charge for possession of marijuana, an altered
drivers' license or identification charge, disorderly conduct, and
violation of probation. The number of offenses that would necessitate a
waiver depends on the severity level of the offense. For example, the
following offenses would require a waiver: one felony conviction, one
or more serious misdemeanor convictions, and five or more minor
misdemeanor convictions. Individuals with more than one felony
conviction are permanently disqualified from entry.
[33] An analysis conducted by the Army in the fall of 2008 showed that
active Army soldiers who entered with conduct waivers between 2003 and
2007 generally did not differ in their length of stay, reenlistment
rates, or separation rates due to unsatisfactory performance from those
who entered during the same period without conduct waivers. When
soldiers who entered the Army in fiscal year 2003 were analyzed
separately from soldiers who entered in other years, no statistical
difference in reenlistment rates was found between soldiers who had
conduct waivers and those who did not have conduct waivers. However,
when reenlistment rates for all soldiers who entered the Army in fiscal
years 2003 through 2006 were analyzed, soldiers with conduct waivers
were found to have slightly lower reenlistment rates than those without
conduct waivers. This result also held for the analysis of soldiers who
entered in fiscal year 2007.
At the same time, these soldiers had higher rates of separation for
adverse reasons such as misconduct, alcohol rehabilitation failure, and
separation in lieu of trial by court martial, and they had a higher
percentage of court martial cases than soldiers without conduct waivers
who entered the Army during the same period.
An analysis conducted by the RAND Corporation used data on accessions
from fiscal years 2002 through June 2005 in order to follow recruits
for at least 3 years; unlike the Army, RAND controlled for the effect
of demographic factors. RAND's study results, like the Army's,
indicated that those with conduct waivers showed evidence of early
success in terms of their performance, followed by a greater likelihood
of serious behavioral problems and separation for adverse reasons. We
have not independently assessed the reliability of the study conducted
by RAND.
[34] The Army has since implemented controls to correct these
deficiencies, and we have found the latest waiver data, from fiscal
year 2008, to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Moreover, in
an effort to improve the consistency of waiver reporting across all the
services and service components, OSD issued a new policy in June 2008
on how waivers should be categorized. Directive-Type Memorandum 08-018,
"Enlistment Waivers," describes the new policy, including standardized
terminology, reporting requirements, and specific codes that the
services should use for tracking and reporting waiver data.
[35] A RAND official overseeing the work on waivers told us that a
draft report is expected in the fall of 2009. The official also told us
that RAND does not plan to continue analyzing this issue after 2009,
unless there is a specific request from the Army for more work.
[36] Documentation provided to us by the Army in 2008 indicated that
the total initial investment per new recruit ranges from $53,976 to
$66,376, depending on the training option. This estimate includes the
cost of recruiting, processing, and basic and follow-up training.
[37] Army officer branches refer to the various categories of jobs
performed by officers.
[38] The Transportation Corps was singled out by Army officials as one
area with particular need. Special branches facing critical shortages
of majors include the Judge Advocate General's Corps, Dental Corps,
Nurse Corps, and Medical Service Corps.
[39] Depending on the fill rates for their particular branches,
captains' cash bonuses were $25,000, $30,000, or $35,000.
[40] Under phase one, captains were offered the chance for special
training, for example, to attend a military school or language
training. However, during phase two, the special training offer was
limited to language training.
[41] The cost estimate provided by the Army was based on more recent
data that showed 14,547 bonus contracts, whereas the final data
reported in table 8 were the most recent comprehensive data available
on all contracts.
[42] The resulting report was "U.S. Army Jr. Officer Retention
Incentive Study: Presentation of Findings," September 14, 2006.
[43] Under the graduate school option, an officer incurs an additional
3 years of service, plus the additional time incurred for time spent in
graduate school, which is a 3-to-1 ratio (i.e., for every 1 month in
graduate school, the officer is required to serve an additional 3
months in the Army).
[44] S. Rep. No. 96-375 (1979).
[45] Pub. L. No. 96-513, Dec. 12, 1980.
[46] 10 U.S.C. § 619.
[47] 10 U.S.C. § 616.
[48] In March 2009, after we had completed our audit work, the Army
stated that waivers for adult felonies had been suspended for the
active Army and the Army Reserve. Prior to that date, the Army National
Guard had already suspended felony waivers.
[49] As of December 6, 2007 (less than 3 months into fiscal year 2008),
the Army National Guard had stopped granting waivers for adult-level
felonies in an attempt to increase the quality of its soldiers.
[50] Army Regulation 601-210, section 4-7, defines a crime of domestic
violence as an offense that involves the use or attempted use of
physical force; threatened use of a deadly weapon by a current or
former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim; by the person with
whom the victim shares a child in common; by a person who is cohabiting
with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian;
or by a person who was similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim. Army Regulation 601-210, "Active and Reserve
Components Enlistment Program" (June 7, 2007).
[51] Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense acknowledged
that it may not be possible for the Army to know if someone was told by
a judge to enter the Army in lieu of being prosecuted, unless the
individual discloses this information.
[52] The limited amount of information from the waiver files that was
made available to GAO precluded us from assessing all the other
qualifications that were taken into consideration when officials
approved felony waiver requests for particular applicants. We did not
independently assess the adequacy of the Army's process or the internal
controls applied at different steps in the process.
[End of section]
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