Army Working Capital Fund
Actions Needed to Improve Budgeting for Carryover at Army Ordnance Gao ID: GAO-09-415 June 10, 2009From fiscal years 2004 through 2008, new orders received by the eight Army ordnance activities increased from $788 million to $1.5 billion. To the extent that the ordnance activities do not complete work at year end, the ordered and funded work is carried over into the next fiscal year. While past congressional defense committees recognized the need for carryover, the committees have on occasion raised concerns that carryover may be more than needed. GAO was asked to determine (1) whether the reported actual total carryover increased or decreased from fiscal years 2004 through 2008 and, if the carryover increased, the actions the Army is taking to reduce it; (2) the primary reasons for carryover at the eight ordnance activities; and (3) whether carryover amounts exceeded ceilings for fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, and whether the methodology used to calculate the ceiling for the ordnance activities was reasonable. GAO analyzed reported carryover and related data at the eight activities.
From fiscal years 2004 through 2008, the Army ordnance activities' carryover increased from $517 million to $1.2 billion--about 10 months of work. The carryover increased because new orders outpaced work performed. The carryover more than doubled even though the ordnance activities increased the number of employees by 20 percent and the direct labor hours of work performed by 30 percent from fiscal years 2004 through 2008. GAO analysis of reports and discussions with Army officials identified three primary reasons for carryover: (1) the Army ordnance budget underestimated the amount of new orders by $479 million, $696 million, and $688 million in fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively; (2) the activities accepted all orders received during the fiscal year regardless of the effect on carryover; and (3) the lead time to obtain some material or parts could be a year or longer because of the time needed to award contracts and for the vendors to produce the material or parts. As a result, the activities often did not work on items until the second year and, for items with longer lead times, the third year. The ordnance activities reported that they exceeded the carryover ceiling by $98 million in fiscal year 2006 and $180 million in fiscal year 2007. In fiscal year 2008, the activities reported they were under the ceiling by $145 million due to a DOD change in the methodology used to calculate the ceiling. Otherwise, the activities would have exceeded the ceiling by $79 million. The methodology change allowed the ordnance activities to use the second-year outlay rates for calculating the carryover ceiling for procurement-funded orders, which more accurately considers the source of funds used for the carried over work and reflects the lead time needed to obtain material.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-415, Army Working Capital Fund: Actions Needed to Improve Budgeting for Carryover at Army Ordance
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Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2009:
Army Working Capital Fund:
Actions Needed to Improve Budgeting for Carryover at Army Ordnance
Activities:
GAO-09-415:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-415, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
From fiscal years 2004 through 2008, new orders received by the eight
Army ordnance activities increased from $788 million to $1.5 billion.
To the extent that the ordnance activities do not complete work at year
end, the ordered and funded work is carried over into the next fiscal
year. While past congressional defense committees recognized the need
for carryover, the committees have on occasion raised concerns that
carryover may be more than needed. GAO was asked to determine (1)
whether the reported actual total carryover increased or decreased from
fiscal years 2004 through 2008 and, if the carryover increased, the
actions the Army is taking to reduce it; (2) the primary reasons for
carryover at the eight ordnance activities; and (3) whether carryover
amounts exceeded ceilings for fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, and
whether the methodology used to calculate the ceiling for the ordnance
activities was reasonable. GAO analyzed reported carryover and related
data at the eight activities.
What GAO Found:
From fiscal years 2004 through 2008, the Army ordnance activities‘
carryover increased from $517 million to $1.2 billion”about 10 months
of work. The carryover increased because new orders outpaced work
performed. The carryover more than doubled even though the ordnance
activities increased the number of employees by 20 percent and the
direct labor hours of work performed by 30 percent from fiscal years
2004 through 2008.
Figure: Analysis of New Orders and Revenue on Army Ordnance Carryover:
[Refer to PDF for image: combination vertical bar and line graph]
Fiscal year: 2004;
Revenue (work performed): $877 million;
New Orders: $788 million;
Carryover: $517 million.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Revenue (work performed): $974 million;
New Orders: $1,023 million;
Carryover: $567 million.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Revenue (work performed): $951 million;
New Orders: $1,106 million;
Carryover: $721 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Revenue (work performed): $1,099 million;
New Orders: $1,519 million;
Carryover: $1,141 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Revenue (work performed): $1,461 million;
New Orders: $1,543 million;
Carryover: $1,223 million.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
GAO analysis of reports and discussions with Army officials identified
three primary reasons for carryover: (1) the Army ordnance budget
underestimated the amount of new orders by $479 million, $696 million,
and $688 million in fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively;
(2) the activities accepted all orders received during the fiscal year
regardless of the effect on carryover; and (3) the lead time to obtain
some material or parts could be a year or longer because of the time
needed to award contracts and for the vendors to produce the material
or parts. As a result, the activities often did not work on items until
the second year and, for items with longer lead times, the third year.
The ordnance activities reported that they exceeded the carryover
ceiling by $98 million in fiscal year 2006 and $180 million in fiscal
year 2007. In fiscal year 2008, the activities reported they were under
the ceiling by $145 million due to a DOD change in the methodology used
to calculate the ceiling. Otherwise, the activities would have exceeded
the ceiling by $79 million. The methodology change allowed the ordnance
activities to use the second-year outlay rates for calculating the
carryover ceiling for procurement-funded orders, which more accurately
considers the source of funds used for the carried over work and
reflects the lead time needed to obtain material.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making three recommendations to the Department of Defense (DOD)
that are aimed at (1) improving the budgeting for carryover and (2)
updating the DOD Financial Management Regulation that contains guidance
on carryover. DOD concurred with all three recommendations and has
taken or plans to take action to implement them.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-415]. For more
information, contact Asif A. Khan at (202) 512-9095 or khana@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Army Ordnance Carryover More Than Doubled from Fiscal Year 2004 through
Fiscal Year 2008 Despite Actions to Reduce:
Three Primary Reasons for the Increase in Fiscal Years 2006 through
2008 Carryover:
Ordnance Activities' Carryover Exceeded Ceiling in Fiscal Years 2006
and 2007 but Not in Fiscal Year 2008:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Examples of Problems Experienced by Ordnance Activities
Contributing to Carryover:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: DOD Cumulative Outlay Rates for Army Procurement Appropriation
Accounts as a Percentage of Budget Authority:
Figures:
Figure 1: Analysis of Increases in New Orders and Revenue on Army
Ordnance Activities Carryover:
Figure 2: Army Ordnance Activities Dollar Amount and Percentage
Difference between Actual and Budgeted New Orders for Fiscal Years 2006
through 2008:
Figure 3: Actual Lead Times to Obtain Components for an 81 mm Visual
Light Round:
Figure 4: M119A2 Howitzer:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 10, 2009:
The Honorable Evan Bayh:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard Burr:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The eight Army ordnance activities[Footnote 1] support combat readiness
by providing services necessary to keep Army units operating worldwide.
These services include manufacturing, renovating, and demilitarizing an
array of defense-related materiel and components such as manufacturing
howitzers; producing large caliber ammunition, rockets, bombs,
missiles, and incendiary devices; and receiving, storing, and issuing
ammunition. Many of these weapon systems and munitions are used to
support the Army's current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. From fiscal
year 2004 through fiscal year 2008, the dollar value of new orders
received annually to perform these services increased from
approximately $788 million to $1.5 billion.
The eight Army ordnance activities operate under the working capital
fund concept where customers are charged for the anticipated full cost
of goods and services. To the extent that the ordnance activities do
not complete work at year-end, the funded work is carried into the next
fiscal year. Carryover is the reported dollar value of work that has
been ordered and funded (obligated) by customers but not completed by
the ordnance activities at the end of the fiscal year. Although the
congressional defense committees recognize that some carryover is
needed to ensure a smooth flow of work during the transition from one
fiscal year to the next, past congressional defense committee reports
raised concerns that the level of carryover may be too high. Excessive
amounts of carryover financed with customer appropriations are subject
to reductions by the congressional defense committees during the budget
review process. On occasion, Congress has reduced the services' budgets
because of excessive carryover, including a reduction in the Army's
fiscal years 2003 and 2006 operation and maintenance appropriations by
$48 million and $94.7 million, respectively.
As requested and agreed to with your office, our objectives were to
determine (1) whether the reported actual total carryover increased or
decreased from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2008 and, if the
carryover increased, the actions the Army is taking to reduce it; (2)
the primary reasons for carryover at the Army's eight ordnance
activities; and (3) whether reported carryover amounts exceeded
carryover ceilings[Footnote 2] for fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008,
and whether the methodology used to calculate the carryover ceiling for
the ordnance activities was reasonable. We conducted this performance
audit from June 2008 through June 2009 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. Most of the financial information in this report was
obtained from official Army budget documents and accounting reports. To
assess the reliability of the data, we (1) reviewed and analyzed the
factors used in calculating carryover for the completeness of the
elements included in the calculation, (2) interviewed Army officials
knowledgeable about the controls over the carryover data, and (3)
reviewed orders customers submitted to the ordnance activities to
determine whether they were adequately supported by documentation.
Further details on our scope and methodology are provided in appendix
I. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary
of Defense or his designee. Written comments from the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) are reprinted in appendix III.
Background:
The Army's eight ordnance activities include three arsenals, two
munitions production facilities, and three storage sites. These eight
activities perform a wide range of different types of work as described
below.
Arsenals:
* Pine Bluff Arsenal (Pine Bluff) produces, renovates, and stores over
60 different conventional ammunition products ranging in caliber from
40 millimeter (mm) to 175 mm. Pine Bluff also produces munitions
containing payloads for smoke, nonlethal, riot control, incendiary,
illumination, and infrared uses.
* Rock Island Arsenal-Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center (Rock
Island) manufactures weapons, weapon components, and mobile maintenance
systems. This includes manufacturing the M119A2 howitzer,[Footnote 3]
artillery, gun mounts, recoil mechanisms, small arms, aircraft weapon
subsystems, and weapon simulators.
* Watervliet Arsenal (Watervliet) is the premier cannon maker for the
Army. It produces armaments, mortars, cannons, and recoilless rifles.
Munitions production facilities:
* Crane Army Ammunition Activity (Crane) produces and renovates
conventional ammunition and ammunition-related components. Crane's
diverse manufacturing capabilities allow for the production of
detonators weighing only 20 grams to 40,000-pound cast shock-test
charges. Crane also stores, ships, demilitarizes, and disposes of
conventional ammunition.
* McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (McAlester) produces and renovates
conventional ammunition, bombs, warheads, rockets, missiles, and
ammunition-related components. It also receives, stores, ships,
demilitarizes, and disposes of conventional and missile ammunition and
related items.
Storage sites:
* Blue Grass Army Depot (Blue Grass) receives, stores, issues,
renovates, and disposes of conventional ammunition.
* Sierra Army Depot (Sierra) provides a complete range of logistical
support including receiving, storing, repairing, shipping,
containerizing, and fabricating assets.
* Tooele Army Depot (Tooele) receives, stores, issues, renovates, and
disposes of conventional ammunition.
The Army ordnance activities are part of the Army Working Capital Fund.
A working capital fund relies on sales revenue rather than direct
appropriations to finance its continuing operations. A working capital
fund is intended to (1) generate sufficient resources to cover the full
costs of its operations and (2) operate on a break-even basis over
time--that is, neither make a gain nor incur a loss. Customers use
appropriated funds to finance orders placed with the working capital
fund. Based on the order, the ordnance activity incurs costs, such as
material and labor, to perform the work.
Carryover is the reported dollar value of work that has been ordered
and funded (obligated) by customers but not completed at the end of the
fiscal year. Carryover consists of both the unfinished portion of work
started but not completed, as well as requested work that has not yet
begun. Too little carryover could result in some personnel not having
work to perform at the beginning of the fiscal year. On the other hand,
too much carryover could result in an activity receiving funds from
customers in one fiscal year but not performing the work until well
into the next fiscal year or subsequent years. By properly balancing
the amount of carryover, DOD can use its resources in the most
effective manner and minimize the "banking" of funds for work and
programs to be performed in subsequent years.
In 1996, DOD established a 3-month carryover standard for working
capital fund activities. In May 2001, we reported[Footnote 4] that DOD
did not have a basis for its 3-month carryover standard and recommended
that DOD determine the appropriate carryover standard for depot
maintenance, ordnance, and research and development activity groups. In
December 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised its carryover
policy. Under the 2002 policy,[Footnote 5] the allowable amount of
carryover was based on the outlay rate[Footnote 6] of the customers'
appropriations financing the work. According to the DOD regulation,
this carryover metric allowed for an analytically based approach that
held working capital fund activities to the same standard as general
fund execution and allowed for meaningful budget execution analysis.
In accordance with the revised DOD Financial Management Regulation,
[Footnote 7] (1) nonfederal orders, (2) non-DOD orders, (3) foreign
military sales, and (4) work related to base realignment and closure
are excluded from the carryover balance and calculation of the
carryover ceiling. Further, the Army has requested and the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) (Comptroller) has approved an
exemption of crash-and battle-damaged aircraft from these calculations
during wartime operations for the past few years. This has resulted in
tens of millions of dollars of orders and carryover being excluded from
the carryover calculation. DOD then compares the carryover balance (net
of exclusions) to the amount of allowable carryover to determine
whether the reported actual amount is over or under the allowable
carryover amount.
Army Ordnance Carryover More Than Doubled from Fiscal Year 2004 through
Fiscal Year 2008 Despite Actions to Reduce:
From fiscal years 2004 through 2008, the Army ordnance activities'
total carryover increased from $517 million to $1.2 billion.[Footnote
8] The $1.2 billion is equivalent to about 10 months of work that
carried over into fiscal year 2009. The carryover more than doubled
from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2008 even though the Army
ordnance activities increased (1) their personnel levels by 20 percent
and (2) the number of direct labor hours of work performed by 30
percent. The carryover increased because the dollar value of new orders
received over the 5-year period (about $6 billion) by the ordnance
activities exceeded the dollar value of work performed (about $5.4
billion) by the activities. Figure 1 illustrates how changes in fiscal
years 2004 through 2008 new orders and work performed (revenue)
[Footnote 9] have affected ordnance activities' carryover. From fiscal
years 2005 through 2008, orders exceeded work performed each year.
Figure 1: Analysis of Increases in New Orders and Revenue on Army
Ordnance Activities Carryover:
[Refer to PDF for image: combination vertical bar and line graph]
Fiscal year: 2004;
Revenue (work performed): $877 million;
New Orders: $788 million;
Carryover: $517 million.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Revenue (work performed): $974 million;
New Orders: $1,023 million;
Carryover: $567 million.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Revenue (work performed): $951 million;
New Orders: $1,106 million;
Carryover: $721 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Revenue (work performed): $1,099 million;
New Orders: $1,519 million;
Carryover: $1,141 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Revenue (work performed): $1,461 million;
New Orders: $1,543 million;
Carryover: $1,223 million.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 1, the dollar amount of new orders increased at a
greater pace than the dollar amount of revenue earned based on work
performed. Specifically, new orders increased 96 percent while the
amount of revenue earned increased by 67 percent. The net effect of
these actions was that carryover more than doubled and now represents
about 10 months of work.
To perform the work needed in support of the Global War on Terrorism,
the eight ordnance activities increased the number of employees from
6,554 to 7,881--a 20 percent increase--from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal
year 2008 and the number of direct labor hours from about 6.6 million
in fiscal year 2004 to about 8.6 million for fiscal year 2008--a 30
percent increase. For example, to perform more work during fiscal year
2007, the activities increased the number of employees by 134 and the
direct labor hours by 434,000 over fiscal year 2006 totals. In order to
meet the growing demand of work for fiscal year 2008, the ordnance
activities were expected to perform 34 percent more work than they
performed in the prior fiscal year. Our analysis of the ordnance
activities' revenue showed that the activities met their revenue goal
and performed $362 million more work in fiscal year 2008 than they
performed in fiscal year 2007. Nevertheless, carryover increased
because the work performed did not keep pace with the new orders
received.
Because the carryover has continuously increased, the Army established
a goal of reducing carryover from $1.1 billion at the end of fiscal
year 2007 to $671 million at the end of fiscal year 2008. However, our
analysis showed that the carryover increased to $1.2 billion because
the amount of actual new orders was $400 million more than the expected
amount. In October 2008, the Army established another goal of reducing
ordnance activities carryover to $705 million at the end of fiscal year
2009. The goal was based on the expectation of a reduction in new
orders by about $420 million over the fiscal year 2008 actual amount.
Our analysis of first-quarter fiscal year 2009 data for reported actual
new orders and the work performed indicates that the ordnance
activities will likely not meet their fiscal year 2009 goal for
reducing the carryover.
As discussed above, the Army ordnance activities' carryover amount has
more than doubled over the past 5 years; however, the increase in
carryover was not separately identified in the Army's Working Capital
Fund budgets to Congress. Prior to the fiscal year 2005 consolidation,
the Army Working Capital Fund budgets separately identified carryover
information, such as the dollar amount of carryover and the carryover
ceiling for the ordnance activities. In fiscal year 2005, the Army
consolidated the depot maintenance and ordnance activity groups under a
single activity group called the Industrial Operations activity group.
Prior to the consolidation, the ordnance activity group's carryover was
much smaller than it is today. Specifically, the dollar value of
carryover was $517 million at the end of fiscal year 2004, whereas at
the end of fiscal year 2008 it was $1.2 billion. Thus, the added
visibility that could be provided by separately reporting carryover
information for the ordnance activity group to Congress is especially
important at this time since the carryover balance has more than
doubled over the past 5 years.
Three Primary Reasons for the Increase in Fiscal Years 2006 through
2008 Carryover:
Our analysis of ordnance activities' reports and discussions with Army
officials identified three primary reasons for the increase in
carryover. First, during fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, the Army
ordnance budget significantly underestimated the dollar amount of new
orders to be received from customers and the work performed by the
ordnance activities did not keep pace with the increases in new orders.
Second, the ordnance activities accepted all orders during the fiscal
year regardless of the effect on carryover. Third, the lead time for
obtaining material and parts to manufacture weapons and munitions can
be extensive. We found that in some cases it took the ordnance
activities over a year to obtain material or parts because of the time
needed to enter into contracts and for the vendors to produce the
material or parts, resulting in funds being carried over for 2 or more
years.
New Orders for Work Consistently Exceeded Budget Estimates:
The Army ordnance activities budget underestimated the dollar amount of
new orders to be received by $479 million, $696 million, and $688
million in fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. For
example, while the budget shows that the activities expected to receive
$823 million in new orders in fiscal year 2007, the activities actually
received $1.5 billion in new orders. Figure 2 shows the dollar amount
and percentage difference between actual and budgeted new orders for
fiscal years 2006 through 2008.
Figure 2: Army Ordnance Activities Dollar Amount and Percentage
Difference between Actual and Budgeted New Orders for Fiscal Years 2006
through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Budgeted: $627 million;
Actual: $1,106 million;
Difference: $479 million (76%).
Fiscal year: 2007;
Budgeted: $823 million;
Actual: $1,519 million;
Difference: $696 million (85%).
Fiscal year: 2008;
Budgeted: $855 million;
Actual: $1,543 million;
Difference: $688 million (80%).
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Our analysis of the Army Working Capital Fund budget guidance for
fiscal year 2006 showed that the Army assumed that the fiscal year 2006
new orders would amount to approximately 50 percent of the fiscal year
2005 operation and maintenance supplemental budget. For fiscal years
2007 and 2008, the Army assumed that the supplemental orders would be
approximately 25 and 20 percent less than the fiscal year 2006 program,
respectively. In retrospect, these budget assumptions--made over a year
prior to the start of the fiscal years--was a major factor that
resulted in the reported actual orders exceeding budgeted orders for
fiscal years 2006 through 2008.
Army headquarters and Army Materiel Command officials told us that the
Army underestimated the amount of new orders received by the ordnance
activities because of (1) the lack of historical information to
indicate the amount of funds the ordnance activities would likely
receive in supplemental appropriations for ordnance work, (2) the
uncertainty related to the amount of funds the Army would receive in
supplemental appropriations for ordnance work, and (3) customers'
reluctance to commit in advance to the total dollar amount of orders
they planned to send during the year. The officials told us they
recognize the problem in accurately estimating orders and are working
on a solution to the problem. Without reliable budget estimates, the
Army ordnance activities cannot make the necessary adjustments to their
personnel and material in time to perform more work to better address
carryover and expected orders.
Ordnance Activities Accept All Orders:
Army ordnance officials at all eight activities told us that they
accept all orders during the fiscal year including orders received in
the fourth quarter. Our analysis showed that about 37 percent, 24
percent, and 20 percent of the orders were received in the fourth
quarter of fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. Ordnance
officials told us that their customers have already justified to DOD or
Congress the need for the funding to procure the goods ordered from the
ordnance activities. As long as the activities have the right type of
equipment or facilities to manufacture the goods requested and a
workforce with the appropriate skills to perform the work, the
activities will accept the orders and manufacture the goods regardless
of its impact on carryover balances. Officials also pointed out that
before the activities can begin the labor work on orders, they need to
contract with vendors to obtain material and parts. The activities
cannot enter into these contracts unless they have funded orders from
their customers. Thus, deferring acceptance of the orders would, in
effect, delay work on these orders, which may be critical. Given
procurement lead time, typically, little of the work on the orders
received in the fourth quarter will be completed by the end of the
current fiscal year and, as our work showed, even absent any unusual
delays, can extend into a third year prior to completion.
The ordnance activities' actions on accepting orders are consistent
with the DOD regulations, which identify the requirements to be met
before a working capital fund activity accepts an order.[Footnote 10]
For example, work to be performed under an order is expected to begin
within a reasonable amount of time after the order is accepted by the
performing DOD activity. The regulation also states, that as a minimum
requirement, it should be documented that when an order is accepted,
the work is expected to (1) begin without delay (usually within 90
days) and (2) be completed within the normal production period of the
specific work ordered. Further, the regulation recognizes that starting
work within a reasonable amount of time includes the action to procure
material or components.
Lead Time for Obtaining Material and Parts:
For ordnance activities, the material and parts are generally not in
the DOD supply system so the activities must obtain them from vendors.
Obtaining material and parts can take over a year because of the time
needed (1) by the Army to enter into contracts and (2) by the vendors
to manufacture the material and parts. As noted above, before the Army
ordnance activities can manufacture or assemble end items to satisfy
their customers' requirements, they must first accept funded orders
from customers. The ordnance activities cannot begin work--including
buying material from vendors--until they accept the order. Upon
accepting the orders, the activities begin the process of awarding
contracts or amending existing contracts to buy material or parts from
vendors, which can take several months. Once contracts are awarded to
vendors, the vendors need time to manufacture and deliver the material
and parts. The manufacturing process takes months, and in some cases
over a year, for the material or parts to be manufactured in accordance
with military specifications and shipped to the ordnance activities.
Adding time to the process is the possibility that vendors cannot
provide the material or parts in accordance with military
specifications. In such cases, the ordnance activities will terminate
these contracts and find other contractors to perform the work or
perform the work in-house. Because it can take over a year to receive
material and parts, funds can carryover on orders for 2 or more years.
For example, at the end of fiscal year 2008, about $330 million carried
over on orders that were 2 or more years old. A specific example of the
amount of time needed to obtain parts for the assembly of 81 mm visual
light mortar rounds is presented below. Additional examples of the lead
times and production problems experienced by activities are provided in
appendix II.
During the first quarter of fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps placed
an order with the Army to manufacture 51,663 visual light mortar rounds
(81 mm) to support its training and war reserve requirements. The
Marine Corps later directed the Army to increase the number of rounds
to 53,124. These rounds consist of 12 main components including fins,
tail cones, fuzes, candles, and about 40 minor items. In January 2007,
the Army issued orders totaling about $7.3 million to Pine Bluff to
purchase the minor items for the rounds and to load, assemble, and pack
the rounds by February 2009--25 months later. In addition, over the
next several months, the Army awarded contracts to vendors to procure
the main components needed in the production of the rounds and the Army
issued orders to Crane--one of the eight ordnance activities--totaling
about $6.7 million for the production of the candles.[Footnote 11]
According to Army officials, the schedule was set to accommodate the
lead time needed to acquire all of the components. The lead time
includes time for the (1) Army to amend existing or award new contracts
and (2) vendors to manufacture and deliver components. Figure 3 shows
the actual lead times to obtain components from vendors to manufacture
an 81 mm visual light round.
Figure 3: Actual Lead Times to Obtain Components for an 81 mm Visual
Light Round:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Fin: 10 months;
Ignition cartridge: 14 months;
Tail cone: 12 months;
Parachute: 6 months;
Body tube: 19 months;
Prop charge: 17 months;
Candle: 21 months;
Fuse: 18 months.
Source: Joint Munitions Command.
[End of figure]
Because Pine Bluff could not load, assemble, and pack the rounds until
the components were delivered to them, Pine Bluff carried over $7.2
million into fiscal year 2008. Crane also carried over about $6.7
million into fiscal year 2008 for work on the candles. The rounds are
currently planned to be completed by Pine Bluff in April 2009--about 27
months after the orders were issued to Pine Bluff for the production of
the visual light rounds. Because it took almost 2 years to obtain all
the parts, the work on these fiscal year 2007 orders will not be
completed until fiscal year 2009.
Ordnance Activities' Carryover Exceeded Ceiling in Fiscal Years 2006
and 2007 but Not in Fiscal Year 2008:
The Army ordnance activities reported that they exceeded the carryover
ceiling by $98 million in fiscal year 2006 and $180 million in fiscal
year 2007. In fiscal year 2008, the activities reported that they were
under the ceiling by $145 million. The activities were under the
ceiling because on December 31, 2008, the OUSD (Comptroller) approved
an Army request to change the outlay-rate methodology to allow the
activities to use second-year outlay rates for calculating the
carryover ceiling for procurement-funded orders, whereas previously
only first-year outlay rates were used. For the time needed to
manufacture items, the December 31, 2008, memorandum stated that the
Army's request was granted because the type of work performed required
an extended period of time to complete work in ordnance activities. For
comparability purposes, if OUSD (Comptroller) had not changed the
methodology, the activities would have exceeded the ceiling by $79
million for fiscal year 2008.[Footnote 12] The change to the
methodology reflects the long production cycle associated with this
type of work, which is typically financed with procurement
appropriations. While DOD plans to update the Financial Management
Regulation for this change, it has not yet done so.
The methodology used through fiscal year 2007 for calculating the
carryover ceiling did not take into account the lead time required by
the ordnance activities to obtain material and parts from vendors for
procurement-funded orders. As discussed, because material and parts can
take over a year to be received from vendors, in some cases, the
ordnance activities did not begin assembling the end items until the
second or third year after they had received the orders, meaning that a
significant amount of work was performed in the third year. Our
analysis of Army ordnance carryover data for fiscal years 2006, 2007,
and 2008 showed that 25 percent or more of the amounts the activities
carried over in each of the 3 years were associated with orders
accepted in prior years. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2008,
$332 million of the carryover (27 percent of the total carryover) was
for orders accepted in fiscal year 2007 or earlier.
While the Army ordnance activities carried over 25 percent or more of
their funded orders into the third year of the orders, the previous
outlay-rate methodology for calculating allowable carryover assumed
that the activities would complete all work on the orders by the end of
the second year. However, most of the Army ordnance carryover was
funded by procurement appropriations (which are available for
obligation for 3 years), which the Army has historically taken more
than 2 years to fully expend. Our analysis of fiscal years 2006, 2007,
and 2008 carryover data showed that 71 percent, 66 percent, and 61
percent, respectively, of the carryover was financed with procurement-
funded orders. As presented in DOD's Financial Summary Tables, the
outlay rate for procurement appropriations does not support the
assumption that work would be completed on procurement-funded orders at
the end of the second year (see table 1).
Table 1: DOD Cumulative Outlay Rates for Army Procurement Appropriation
Accounts as a Percentage of Budget Authority:
Army procurement appropriation accounts: Weapons & tracked combat
vehicles;
Cumulative outlay rates: First year: 10.00;
Cumulative outlay rates: Second year: 56.00;
Cumulative outlay rates: Third year: 89.00;
Cumulative outlay rates: Fourth year: 98.00;
Cumulative outlay rates: Fifth year: 99.00.
Army procurement appropriation accounts: Ammunition;
Cumulative outlay rates: First year: 11.07;
Cumulative outlay rates: Second year: 59.72;
Cumulative outlay rates: Third year: 89.38;
Cumulative outlay rates: Fourth year: 95.31;
Cumulative outlay rates: Fifth year: 97.88.
Source: Analysis of DOD Financial Summary Tables for fiscal year 2009
DOD budget published by the DOD Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller).
[End of table]
In table 1, the second-year cumulative outlay rate for the Army
procurement of ammunition appropriation account was about 60 percent.
In other words, this procurement appropriation account was just over
half expended within the first 2 years of the 3-year procurement
appropriation. It was not until the third year that the funds for this
account were mostly expended (almost 90 percent).[Footnote 13]
Conclusions:
Continuing problems in the Army ordnance activities' ability to control
the growth of carryover has resulted in carryover amounts that can span
2 or more years. While the Army has increased the number of employees
and the direct labor hours to perform more work, its carryover has more
than doubled from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008. A significant
factor that led to increased carryover was that the Army's budgets for
ordnance activities' significantly underestimated the dollar amount of
new orders that would be received from customers for several years. The
increase in carryover is also due to the amount of time it takes
ordnance activities to obtain material and component parts before they
can perform their work. In some cases, it takes over a year for the
ordnance activities to receive the material and component parts which,
in turn, results in the ordnance activities performing work in the
third year after receiving the procurement-funded orders. Further,
while the carryover amount has more than doubled over the past 5 years,
the carryover information on ordnance activities is not separately
identified in the Army Working Capital Fund budgets to Congress.
Without increased management attention on budgeting and reporting for
new orders that affects the dollar amount of carryover, Army ordnance
activities will continue to experience difficulties with managing the
dollar amount of carryover.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making three recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to (1)
improve the management of budgeting for carryover and (2) update the
DOD Financial Management Regulation that contains guidance on
carryover.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to take the following actions:
* Establish procedures requiring Army headquarters and Army Materiel
Command to develop more accurate estimates of new order data by
comparing budgeted orders to actual orders and consider these trends in
developing the following year's budget estimates for new orders.
* Report the allowable and actual amounts of carryover for the Army
ordnance activities as a separate item in the Army Working Capital Fund
annual budget to Congress.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller) to take the following action:
* Update methodology in the DOD Financial Management Regulation for
calculating the allowable amount of carryover for ordnance activities
in order to formally establish this new requirement, which was
contained in the December 31, 2008, memorandum.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. In its
comments, DOD concurred with the three recommendations in the draft
report and has taken or plans to take action to implement them. First,
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) stated that
DOD will issue a memorandum to the Army reiterating the importance of
accurately estimating the amount of new orders for budgeting purposes.
Second, DOD stated that it directed the Army to report separately the
allowable and actual amount of carryover for the Army ordnance
activities. The Army has complied with the guidance and has identified
the allowable and actual amounts of carryover for ordnance activities
in the May 2009 fiscal year 2010 President's Budget Request
Justification Books provided to Congress. Finally, DOD stated that it
will include in the next Financial Management Regulation update the
revised methodology for calculating the allowable amount of carryover
for ordnance activities.
We are sending copies of this report to the Senate Committee on Armed
Services; the Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on
Appropriations; the House Committee on Armed Services; the Subcommittee
on Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services; the House Committee on
Appropriations; and the Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on
Appropriations. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of the Army. The report also is available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact Asif A. Khan at (202) 512-9095 or khana@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Asif A. Khan:
Director, Financial Management and Assurance:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine whether the reported actual total carryover increased or
decreased from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2008 and, if the
carryover increased, the actions the Army is taking to reduce it, we
obtained and analyzed Defense Finance and Accounting Service reports
that contained information on Army ordnance activities' new order,
revenue, and carryover data for the 5-year period. Since the reported
actual total carryover increased over the 5-year period, we met with
Army officials to obtain, analyze, and discuss the Army's actions for
reducing carryover in fiscal year 2008. Specifically, we compared the
fiscal year 2008 new order, revenue, and carryover goals to the fiscal
year 2008 execution data to determine if the ordnance activities met
their fiscal year 2008 goals. We also analyzed the Army's fiscal year
2009 carryover reduction goals and first quarter fiscal year 2009
execution data to determine if the ordnance activities met their first
quarter fiscal year 2009 goals.
To determine the primary reasons for carryover at the Army ordnance
activities, we met with Army headquarters budget officials and
responsible budgeting, accounting, or production officials at the Army
ordnance activities. Based on those discussions, we obtained
information that affected carryover. First, we analyzed budgeted and
reported actual new orders for fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008. When
large differences occurred between budgeted and reported actual new
orders, we met with Army headquarters officials to determine the
reasons for these differences. We also obtained and analyzed Army
budget guidance on new orders expected to be received. Second, we
identified ordnance activities' position on accepting orders during the
fiscal year and the impact on carryover. Third, we identified orders
accepted by the ordnance activities that experienced material or parts
shortages to determine if these orders were contributing to carryover.
To determine whether reported carryover amounts exceeded carryover
ceilings for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 and whether the methodology
used to calculate the carryover ceiling for the ordnance activities was
reasonable, we obtained and analyzed the allowable amount of carryover
and reported actual year-end carryover for those years. We focused on
fiscal years 2006 through 2008 because during this time period
carryover significantly increased. When the reported actual carryover
exceeded the carryover ceiling, we met with responsible officials at
the Army ordnance activities, the Army Materiel Command, and Army
headquarters to ascertain why the ordnance activities exceeded the
ceiling. We also reviewed the methodology used by the ordnance
activities to calculate the carryover ceiling to determine if the
methodology was reasonable for the ordnance activities' operations. To
that end, we determined the appropriations that financed ordnance
activities' carryover for fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008 and
analyzed the outlay rates for the appropriations that financed the
orders. We also identified how the ordnance activities obtained
material and components to perform their work to determine if this
process contributed to work carrying over from one year to the next.
We performed our work at the headquarters of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Office of the Secretary of the
Army, Washington, D.C.; Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia;
Blue Grass Army Depot, Richmond, Kentucky; Crane Army Ammunition
Activity, Crane, Indiana; McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester,
Oklahoma; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Rock Island Arsenal-
Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center, Rock Island, Illinois;
Sierra Army Depot, Herlong, California; Tooele Army Depot, Tooele,
Utah; and Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, New York. We conducted this
performance audit from June 2008 through June 2009 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. Most of the financial information in
this report was obtained from official Army budget documents and
accounting reports. To assess the reliability of the data, we (1)
reviewed and analyzed the factors used in calculating carryover for the
completeness of the elements included in the calculation, (2)
interviewed Army officials knowledgeable about the controls over the
carryover data, and (3) reviewed orders customers submitted to the
ordnance activities to determine if they were adequately supported by
documentation. In reviewing these orders, we obtained the status of the
carryover at the end of the fiscal year. This included information on
the amount of the orders, the amount of revenue earned on the orders
(work performed), and the amount of the carryover on the orders. Based
on procedures performed, we have concluded that these data are reliable
enough for the purposes of this report. We requested comments on a
draft of this report from the Secretary of Defense or his designee. The
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) provided written
comments, which are presented in the Agency Comments and Evaluation
section of this report and are reprinted in appendix III.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Examples of Problems Experienced by Ordnance Activities
Contributing to Carryover:
This appendix contains specific examples showing those problems
experienced by the ordnance activities in obtaining material and parts
resulting in significant amounts of work being performed in the third
year after accepting the order.
M119A2 Howitzers:
Between May 2005 and August 2008, Rock Island accepted nine orders
totaling $205.6 million that were financed with Army procurement of
weapons and tracked combat vehicles appropriated funds to produce 336
M119A2 howitzers. Rock Island restarted production of the howitzers in
2005 after more than a 10-year break in its manufacturing line. Rock
Island determined that the manufacture of the redesigned howitzer
required over 2,500 parts and that it would manufacture about 1,200
parts and purchase the remaining parts from vendors located in 23
states and 2 foreign countries. One of the key components of the
howitzer is the trail tubes that provide stability to the artillery
unit. Each howitzer contains two tubes made of British stainless steel,
as depicted in figure 4.
Figure 4: M119A2 Howitzer:
[See PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Rock Island.
[End of figure]
According to Rock Island officials, British stainless steel is used for
the manufacture of the trail tubes because it contains properties that
allow the trail tubes to flex when the artillery unit is fired. Since
the trail tubes had not been made in over 10 years, Rock Island issued
a contract in July 2005 with a vendor to produce the tubes. However,
the vendor could not manufacture the tubes to meet the specification.
After about 16 months of working with the vendor, the contract was
terminated in December 2006. One month later, Rock Island issued a new
contract to a different vendor. The first vendor's manufacturing
problems created a significant delay in the program and increased Rock
Island's carryover. Rock Island carried over approximately $91.2
million out of a total of $111.5 million on order at the end of fiscal
year 2006 and $98.3 million out of a total of $136.1 million on order
at the end of fiscal year 2007.
Rock Island's problems obtaining trail tubes that met specifications
continued. When Rock Island received its first shipment of trail tubes
from the second vendor, the tubes were straight and needed to be bent
to meet design specifications. Two vendors tried to bend the tubes but
could not meet design specifications and the contracts were terminated.
This resulted in further delays to the program. In order to bend the
tubes, in the March or April 2008 time frame, Rock Island took a
bending machine out of storage that had not been used in over 10 years.
Rock Island is now bending the trail tubes. Due to the delays cited
above, by September 2008, Rock Island was about 70 units behind the
original schedule. Rock Island carried over about $108.6 million out of
the $205.6 million on order at the end of fiscal year 2008. As of
November 2008, the production of the 336th howitzer was scheduled to be
completed in February 2011. The Army plans to produce a total of 496
howitzers over the life of the program.
M20 Cannons:
Between July 2006 and July 2007, Watervliet accepted an order and
amendments from TACOM Rock Island totaling about $17.9 million to
manufacture 162 M20 cannons. The order was financed with fiscal year
2006 Army procurement of weapons and tracked combat vehicles
appropriated funds. The M20 cannons are a component of the M119A2
howitzer that is manufactured at Rock Island. Watervliet manufactures
the cannons from raw material obtained from contractors and delivers
the finished cannons to Rock Island. According to Watervliet officials,
it takes anywhere from 10 to 12 months to obtain the raw material from
contractors before they can begin production. Because of the lead time
required to obtain the raw material, Watervliet carried over $16.3
million into fiscal year 2007, and $10.5 million into fiscal year 2008.
Watervliet completed production and delivery of the fiscal year 2006
order in September 2008.
M110A2 White Phosphorous Projectiles:
Between February and July 2006, Pine Bluff accepted two orders and
amendments from the Army Program Manager for Combat Ammunition Systems
totaling $11.1 million to produce 36,621 M110A2 white phosphorous
projectiles. These orders were financed with fiscal year 2006 Army
procurement of ammunition appropriated funds. Pine Bluff originally
planned to deliver 6,000 projectiles in September 2007 and the
remaining quantities in fiscal year 2008. However, Pine Bluff
experienced significant problems in obtaining the M54A1 bursters--a
major component in the white phosphorous projectiles.[Footnote 14]
Because Pine Bluff could not load, assemble, and pack the white
phosphorous projectiles until they obtained the bursters, Pine Bluff
carried over $11.1 million into fiscal year 2007, $10.9 million into
fiscal year 2008, and $7.3 million into fiscal year 2009.
The problem with obtaining the M54A1 bursters was caused by contractors
that did not manufacture and deliver the projectiles in accordance with
technical requirements and the contract schedule. According to Army
officials, the bursters were last successfully produced at the Lone
Star Army Ammunition Plant, which is closing. The Army awarded two
contracts in July 2007 to produce bursters for the fiscal year 2006
program, but these contracts were terminated because the bursters
failed test requirements. The Army is now working with Crane to make
the bursters. Crane is scheduled to begin deliveries of the bursters in
August 2009. Pine Bluff anticipates that it will load, assemble, and
pack the orders by December 2009 once Crane completes delivery.
Kinetic Energy Electronically Timed Projectiles:
In August 2007, Crane accepted an order from the Navy totaling about
$3.6 million that was financed with Navy and Marine Corps procurement
of ammunition appropriated funds for the manufacture of 8,232 Kinetic
Energy Electronically Timed projectiles. These projectiles are fired
from 5-inch guns on Navy ships. In analyzing this order, we found that
because the order was received late in the fiscal year, Crane carried
over almost the entire amount of the order--$3.6 million--into fiscal
year 2008. In October 2007, Crane notified the Joint Munitions Command
contracting office that they required tungsten alloy pellets to
manufacture the projectiles. Six months later, the command awarded a
contract with scheduled delivery dates from June through August 2008.
In February 2008, Crane sent three additional requests to the Joint
Munitions Command for components (i.e., forward and aft aluminum
spacers and cover plates) that they needed to complete the order. The
command awarded contracts to vendors for the components in May and
September 2008. The expected delivery of the components was by January
2009--approximately 17 months after Crane accepted the order from the
Navy. Because of the long lead time needed to obtain the components,
Crane carried over into fiscal year 2009 about $1.6 million of the $5.1
[Footnote 15] million on order at the end of fiscal year 2008. Crane
expects to complete the manufacturing of the projectiles by May 2009.
Mobile Jettison Unit-57 Decoy Flares:
In February 2006, Crane accepted an order from the Navy for about $6.7
million that was financed with Navy and Marine Corps procurement of
ammunition appropriated funds for the manufacture of 18,090 Mobile
Jettison Unit-57 decoy flares. Decoy flares are used on Navy aircraft
to counter heat-seeking surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. In
order to manufacture the flares, Crane ordered components such as steel
tubes, tungsten ballasts, and o-rings in the spring and summer of 2006.
According to Crane officials, it took about 9 months to obtain the
components. Because of the time required to order and receive the
components, Crane carried over about $6.6 million into fiscal year
2007. In January 2007, the Navy changed the scope of the order to (1)
reduce the initial ordered amount of decoy flares to 10,560 and (2) use
the remaining funds to manufacture a new, lower cost version of the
decoy flare. In order to manufacture the new, lower cost version of the
flare, Crane ordered different components, delaying the program
further. Due to changes in the production requirements for the new,
lower cost flares and the lead time needed to obtain the additional
components, Crane carried over about $5.2 million into fiscal year
2008. During the design and test phases of the new flares, Crane
experienced design problems with the flare's igniter and fins. As a
result of these problems and the Navy's need for more flares to protect
its aircraft, the Navy amended the order and requested that Crane
manufacture the decoy flares on the initial order. Once again, Crane
shifted its production lines and ordered the components for the
manufacture of the initial decoy flares. Crane carried over about $2.5
million into fiscal year 2009. Crane expects to complete the order by
June 2009--more than 3 years after they received the initial order.
M18 Colored Smoke Grenades:
Between November 2005 and September 2006, Pine Bluff accepted 52 orders
from the Army Project Manager Close Combat Systems totaling $26.9
million to produce 564,428 M18 colored smoke grenades.[Footnote 16]
Almost all of these orders were financed with fiscal year 2006 Army
procurement of ammunition appropriated funds. In order to produce the
colored smoke grenades, Pine Bluff needed to obtain key components--
fuzes, bodies, and colored smoke dyes. According to Pine Bluff
officials, it took about 13 months to obtain these components from
contractors. Because of the time it took to obtain the components,
production and deliveries of the smoke grenades spanned the following 2
fiscal years. As a result, Pine Bluff carried over $23 million into
fiscal year 2007, and $15.4 million into fiscal year 2008. Pine Bluff
completed deliveries of the fiscal year 2006 orders by June 2008.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Comptroller (Program/budget):
1100 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-1100:
May 19, 2009:
Mr. Asif A. Khan:
Director:
Financial Management and Assurance:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Khan:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report 09-415, "Army Working Capital Fund: Actions Needed to Improve
Budgeting for Carryover at Army Ordnance Activities," dated April 20,
2009, (GAO Code 197065).
Actions to improve the budgeting for carryover noted in the draft
report are underway.
Sincerely,
John P. Roth:
Deputy Comptroller:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated April 20, 2009:
GAO-09-415 (GAO Code 197065):
’Army Working Capital Fund: Actions Needed To Improve Budgeting For
Carryover At Army Ordnance Activities“
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to establish procedures requiring Army
headquarters and Army Materiel Command to develop more accurate
estimates of new order data by comparing budgeted orders to actual
orders and consider these trends in developing the following year‘s
budget estimates for new orders. (p. 19/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) will soon issue a memorandum to the Army reiterating the
importance of accurately estimating the amount of new orders for
budgeting purposes.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to report the allowable and actual
amounts of carryover for the Army ordnance activities as a separate
item in the Army Working Capital Fund annual budget to Congress. (p.
20/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The Army was directed by the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) to report separately the allowable and actual
amounts of carryover for Army Industrial Operations by Army Ordnance
and Army Depot Maintenance. The Army has complied with guidance and has
identified the allowable and actual amounts of carryover for both Army
Depot Maintenance and Ordnance in their May 2009 FY 2010 President‘s
Budget Request Justification Books to Congress.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to update
methodology in the DoD Financial Management Regulation for calculating
the allowable amount of carryover for ordnance activities in order to
formally establish this new requirement that was contained in the
December 31, 2008, memorandum. (p. 20/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The policy has been changed for calculating
allowable carryover by the December 31, 2008, memorandum. The Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will include in the next Financial
Management Regulation update, during summer 2009, the revised
methodology for calculating the allowable amount of carryover for
Ordnance activities. The revised methodology is incorporated in the FY
2010 President‘s Budget to Congress.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Asif A. Khan, (202) 512-9095 or khana@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Greg Pugnetti, Assistant
Director; Richard Cambosos; Steve Donahue; Keith McDaniel; and Hal
Santarelli made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The eight ordnance activities are the Blue Grass Army Depot,
Richmond, Kentucky; the Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Crane, Indiana;
the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, Oklahoma; the Pine
Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arkansas; the Rock Island Arsenal-Joint
Manufacturing and Technology Center, Rock Island, Illinois; the Sierra
Army Depot, Herlong, California; the Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, Utah;
and the Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, New York.
[2] DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, vol. 2B, ch. 9, pp.
9-40, 9-41, contain the methodology for calculating the ceiling for the
amount of work that can be carried over from one fiscal year to the
next.
[3] See appendix II for a picture of the M119A2 howitzer.
[4] GAO, Defense Working Capital Fund: Improvements Needed for Managing
the Backlog of Funded Work, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-559] (Washington, D.C.: May 30,
2001).
[5] See DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, vol. 2B, ch. 9.
[6] The outlay rate is the percentage of actual expenditures for a
specific appropriation by year. These rates are contained in the DOD
Financial Summary Tables. The amount of allowable carryover using the
outlay rate is shown in the following example. Customers order $100 of
work, which is financed with a specific appropriation. If the outlay
rate for this appropriation at the appropriation level is 60 percent,
then this would result in the working capital fund activity group being
allowed to carry over $40 ($100 - $60 [$100 x 60 percent] = $40).
[7] See DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, vol. 2B, ch. 9,
p. 100, for orders excluded from carryover calculation.
[8] These balances are comprised of all carryover work, including those
amounts exempted from DOD calculations.
[9] According to DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, vol.
11B, ch. 11, p. 11-8, revenue and associated costs must be recognized
in the same accounting period. The percentage-of-completion method--
which reports revenue based on the ratio of work performed (costs
incurred to date) to the total amount--is required for all orders.
Therefore, revenue and work performed are equivalent in the context of
our analysis.
[10] See DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, vol. 11A, ch. 2
and 3.
[11] The candles produced by Crane have a limited shelf life to
mitigate safety issues associated with extended storage of pyrotechnics
and to mitigate the risk of expending dollars on candles that may not
be used if the rounds fail acceptance testing. For these reasons, the
candles are generally produced within 3 months of the expected start of
work by Pine Bluff.
[12] Army ordnance officials did not recalculate or otherwise estimate
how the new methodology would have affected the reported figures for
fiscal years 2006 and 2007.
[13] The procurement appropriation is available for 3 years for
obligation and an additional 5 years to liquidate unpaid obligations.
[14] The M54A1 burster is a cylindrical tube packed with an explosive
composition that fits inside the shell casing of an M110A2 projectile
filled with white phosphorous. The purpose of the burster is to explode
the shell casing and release the white phosphorous.
[15] In fiscal year 2008, Crane accepted two orders from the Navy
totaling approximately $1.5 million to cover material, labor, and
overhead due to the higher than expected costs for key components such
as tungsten alloy shot shell pellets.
[16] The colored (red, green, yellow, or violet) smoke grenades are
used by troops to communicate in the battlefield. When the grenade
ignites, the dye inside vaporizes to produce a colored smoke cloud.
[End of section]
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