Defense Infrastructure
DOD Needs to Improve Oversight of Relocatable Facilities and Develop a Strategy for Managing Their Use across the Military Services Gao ID: GAO-09-585 June 12, 2009The concurrent implementation of several major Department of Defense (DOD) force structure and infrastructure initiatives has stressed the ability of traditional military construction to provide enough permanent living and working space for servicemembers and other DOD personnel. As a result, the services are using some movable--or relocatable--facilities as barracks, administrative offices, medical facilities, dining halls, and equipment maintenance facilities to meet short-term needs. In Senate Report 110-77, the Senate Committee on Armed Services directed GAO to review the subject. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is providing oversight of the services' use of relocatable facilities to meet physical infrastructure needs, and (2) DOD has a strategy for managing such facilities. GAO assessed data reported to OSD on relocatable use and cost as well as visited seven defense installations selected from those identified as having a sizeable number of relocatable facilities.
Although DOD considers the use of relocatable facilities a temporary measure to meet short-term physical infrastructure needs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is not providing effective oversight of the number or cost of its relocatable facilities. OSD officials told GAO in March 2008 that they did not have information about how many relocatable facilities were being used, how many defense installations had them, or how much it has cost to acquire them. Subsequently, the military services reported to OSD that they have acquired over 4,000 relocatable facilities at an estimated cost of about $1.5 billion over a 5-year period. However, GAO's assessment of these data showed that the data were inaccurate and incomplete. At six of the seven installations visited, GAO found discrepancies between the number of relocatable facilities located on those installations and the numbers that the services had reported to OSD. For instance, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, installation officials told GAO the installation had about 170 relocatable facilities, which is about 80 more than the Marine Corps headquarters reported to OSD. Such discrepancies occurred in part because OSD has not provided the services with a clear definition of relocatable facilities. In addition, OSD lacks a mechanism for collecting and maintaining reliable data on these facilities. A clear, ongoing requirement for OSD to collect and maintain consistent data on relocatable facilities would better enable it to manage the use of these facilities to provide working and living space for military personnel. OSD has not developed a comprehensive strategy for managing relocatable facilities departmentwide. Although the military services plan to replace many of their relocatable facilities with permanent construction, some officials GAO spoke with expressed skepticism that the planned replacement funds will become available. In addition, GAO found that these facilities at many installations have been in use longer than the 3 years DOD's guidance states it normally expects. Furthermore, some Army officials told GAO that due to several force structure and infrastructure initiatives, it expects that the influx of more military personnel at some installations could exacerbate the shortage of facilities, which could mean more relocatable facilities might be needed. Meanwhile, some DOD installations may be planning to acquire new relocatable facilities at market cost at the same time that other installations are disposing of them. Although the Army is moving in the direction of centralizing its management of relocatable facilities, none of the other military service headquarters told GAO they have initiated similar efforts. Because OSD does not have a comprehensive DOD-wide strategy for managing the use of relocatable facilities--including the transfer of relocatables from one location to another--the services could unnecessarily spend DOD funds by simultaneously acquiring new facilities at some locations while auctioning off or incurring costs to store or demolish similar facilities at other locations.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-585, Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Improve Oversight of Relocatable Facilities and Develop a Strategy for Managing Their Use across the Military Services
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2009:
Defense Infrastructure:
DOD Needs to Improve Oversight of Relocatable Facilities and Develop a
Strategy for Managing Their Use across the Military Services:
GAO-09-585:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-585, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The concurrent implementation of several major Department of Defense
(DOD) force structure and infrastructure initiatives has stressed the
ability of traditional military construction to provide enough
permanent living and working space for servicemembers and other DOD
personnel. As a result, the services are using some movable”or
relocatable”facilities as barracks, administrative offices, medical
facilities, dining halls, and equipment maintenance facilities to meet
short-term needs.
In Senate Report 110-77, the Senate Committee on Armed Services
directed GAO to review the subject. This report assesses the extent to
which (1) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is providing
oversight of the services‘ use of relocatable facilities to meet
physical infrastructure needs, and (2) DOD has a strategy for managing
such facilities. GAO assessed data reported to OSD on relocatable use
and cost as well as visited seven defense installations selected from
those identified as having a sizable number of relocatable facilities.
What GAO Found:
Although DOD considers the use of relocatable facilities a temporary
measure to meet short-term physical infrastructure needs, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is not providing effective oversight of
the number or cost of its relocatable facilities. OSD officials told
GAO in March 2008 that they did not have information about how many
relocatable facilities were being used, how many defense installations
had them, or how much it has cost to acquire them. Subsequently, the
military services reported to OSD that they have acquired over 4,000
relocatable facilities at an estimated cost of about $1.5 billion over
a 5-year period. However, GAO‘s assessment of these data showed that
the data were inaccurate and incomplete. At six of the seven
installations visited, GAO found discrepancies between the number of
relocatable facilities located on those installations and the numbers
that the services had reported to OSD. For instance, at Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina, installation officials told GAO the installation had
about 170 relocatable facilities, which is about 80 more than the
Marine Corps headquarters reported to OSD. Such discrepancies occurred
in part because OSD has not provided the services with a clear
definition of relocatable facilities. In addition, OSD lacks a
mechanism for collecting and maintaining reliable data on these
facilities. A clear, ongoing requirement for OSD to collect and
maintain consistent data on relocatable facilities would better enable
it to manage the use of these facilities to provide working and living
space for military personnel.
OSD has not developed a comprehensive strategy for managing relocatable
facilities departmentwide. Although the military services plan to
replace many of their relocatable facilities with permanent
construction, some officials GAO spoke with expressed skepticism that
the planned replacement funds will become available. In addition, GAO
found that these facilities at many installations have been in use
longer than the 3 years DOD‘s guidance states it normally expects.
Furthermore, some Army officials told GAO that due to several force
structure and infrastructure initiatives, it expects that the influx of
more military personnel at some installations could exacerbate the
shortage of facilities, which could mean more relocatable facilities
might be needed. Meanwhile, some DOD installations may be planning to
acquire new relocatable facilities at market cost at the same time that
other installations are disposing of them. Although the Army is moving
in the direction of centralizing its management of relocatable
facilities, none of the other military service headquarters told GAO
they have initiated similar efforts. Because OSD does not have a
comprehensive DOD-wide strategy for managing the use of relocatable
facilities”including the transfer of relocatables from one location to
another”the services could unnecessarily spend DOD funds by
simultaneously acquiring new facilities at some locations while
auctioning off or incurring costs to store or demolish similar
facilities at other locations.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to improve OSD‘s oversight and management
of the services‘ use of relocatable facilities by clarifying its
definition of these facilities, developing a mechanism for collecting
data on them, and developing a strategy for using, disposing of, and
redistributing them. DOD generally agreed with GAO‘s recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-585] or key
components. For more information, contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-
4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
OSD Does Not Have Complete Oversight of the Services' Use of
Relocatable Facilities to Meet Infrastructure Needs:
OSD Does Not Have a Strategy for Managing the Use and Disposal of
Relocatable Facilities:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Examples of Various Relocatable Facilities in Use at Seven
Military Installations GAO Visited:
Figure 2: Pictures of Sprung Shelter Relocatable Facilities at Two
Military Installations:
Figure 3: Pictures of Relocatable Facilities Arriving and Being
Installed at a Defense Installation:
Figure 4: A Relocatable Facility Consisting of 33 Trailers at Eglin Air
Force Base, Florida:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
June 12, 2009:
Congressional Committees:
The Department of Defense's (DOD) concurrent implementation of several
major force structure and infrastructure initiatives has stressed the
traditional military construction processes to provide needed living
and working space for servicemembers and other DOD personnel. These
initiatives--such as the continued transformation of the Army's force
structure from an organization based on divisions to more rapidly
deployable, combat brigade-based units; the implementation of about 800
Base Realignment and Closure actions by 2011; the planned increase in
the active-duty end strength of the Army and the Marine Corps by a
combined 92,000 military members; and the planned drawdown of troops
from Iraq--will place new and changing demands on DOD's capability to
provide sufficient living and working space at many installations by
the time these initiatives and actions are expected to be completed.
The military services, in response to current shortages in physical
infrastructure, are using a large number of movable--or relocatable--
facilities as barracks, administrative offices, medical facilities,
dining halls, and equipment maintenance facilities. Such relocatable
facilities can consist of a single trailer, or a set of trailers
assembled together to form a larger, modular-type structure.
In Senate Report 110-77, the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed
concern about DOD's use and cost of temporary facilities and the
possibility that such facilities would eventually be considered an
acceptable working or living standard.[Footnote 1] The committee
directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to report in July 2008 to the congressional defense
committees on the use of such facilities within DOD. The committee also
directed us to analyze and report on the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's (OSD) report within 90 days of the OSD report issuance.
However, as of May 2009, OSD had not issued its report to the
congressional defense committees; therefore we have not evaluated OSD's
report. The committee also stipulated that we may conduct independent
research and make independent findings and recommendations.
Accordingly, this report discusses DOD's use of relocatable facilities
to meet its physical infrastructure needs. Specifically, we assessed
the extent to which (1) OSD is providing oversight of the military
services' use of relocatable facilities to meet physical infrastructure
needs, and (2) DOD has a strategy for managing such facilities.
To address these objectives, we reviewed DOD and military service
guidance on the use of relocatable facilities; obtained and reviewed
inventory and cost data on relocatable facilities from each of the
military services, which they reported to OSD for use in its pending
report; and interviewed OSD and service headquarters officials
responsible for overseeing the use of relocatable facilities. To gain
insight into the numbers, costs, and disposal plans for relocatable
facilities at the installation level, we visited seven installations,
mostly focusing on the Army and the Marine Corps installations because
the data they reported to OSD showed more extensive use of relocatable
facilities than the Navy and the Air Force reported. We selected these
installations to visit from those identified by service headquarters
officials as having a sizable number of relocatable facilities. The
Senate committee report limited DOD's review by excluding nonpermanent
or temporary facilities used overseas at forward operating sites or
cooperative security locations, thus we did not include the services'
use of relocatable facilities at overseas locations. Our analysis of
the seven installation visits cannot be generalized to other military
installations. At each installation we visited, we compared
installation data on the number and cost of relocatable facilities with
similar data provided by each service headquarters to OSD and discussed
any discrepancies identified. We also visited the Army Installation
Management Command-West, Texas, to discuss the Army's use of
relocatable facilities. We conducted this performance audit from
February 2008 to June 2009, in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A
more detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in
appendix I of this report.
Results in Brief:
Although DOD considers the use of relocatable facilities a temporary
measure to meet short-term physical infrastructure needs, OSD has not
provided effective oversight of the number or cost of its inventory of
relocatable facilities across the military services. In March 2008, OSD
officials told us that they did not have information about how many
relocatable facilities were being used, how many defense installations
had them, or how much it has cost to acquire them. Subsequently, OSD
began to collect that information from the military services in
response to direction from the Senate Armed Services Committee. The
services responded with data indicating that DOD has procured or leased
over 4,000 relocatable facilities over a 5-year period.[Footnote 2]
However, our assessment of these data showed some inaccuracies and
indications that the data are incomplete. At six of the seven
installations we visited, we found discrepancies between the number of
relocatable facilities located on those installations and the numbers
that the military services had reported to OSD. For instance, during
our visit to Fort Bliss, Texas, installation officials showed us over
100 relocatable facilities that had not been included in the Army
headquarters data provided to OSD. Similarly, during our visit to Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina, installation officials told us that the
installation had about 170 relocatable facilities, which is about 80
more than Marine Corps headquarters reported to OSD. Such discrepancies
occur in part because OSD has not provided the services with a clear
definition of relocatable facilities. Officials we spoke with at Navy
headquarters, for example, expressed confusion about whether structures
like equipment sheds and rain shelters should be counted as relocatable
facilities. In addition, OSD lacks a mechanism for collecting and
maintaining reliable data on the number and costs of these facilities
on an ongoing basis. Although the services reported to OSD data
indicating that DOD has spent about $1.5 billion over 5 years to
acquire relocatable facilities, some service officials told us that
collecting accurate cost data was difficult given that cost records
were not always available. For example, at the Marine Corps and Air
Force installations we visited, officials told us that their cost data
were incomplete. A clear, ongoing requirement for the services to
collect and maintain consistent data on the number and cost of
relocatable facilities would better enable OSD to manage the military
services' use of relocatable facilities to provide working and living
space for military personnel. Thus, we are recommending that OSD
clarify the definition of a relocatable facility and develop a
mechanism for collecting and maintaining consistent and reliable data
on the number and costs of such facilities across the military
services.
OSD has not developed a comprehensive strategy for ensuring sound
management of relocatable facilities departmentwide. DOD Instruction
4165.56 states that relocatable facilities may be used when these
facilities constitute the most feasible and economical means of
satisfying an interim facility requirement, which is defined in this
instruction as a short-term, normally 3 years or less, requirement to
meet urgent or peak facilities requirements. Although the military
services plan to replace many of their relocatable facilities with
permanent construction and some funds have been programmed to do so in
fiscal years 2010 to 2013, some officials we spoke with across DOD
expressed skepticism that the planned replacement funds will become
available. For example, Navy officials at Little Creek Naval Amphibious
Base, Virginia, told us that funds are planned for 2012 to begin
permanent construction to replace some of the installation's current
stock of relocatable facilities; however, the officials expect its
relocatable facilities to be in use well beyond 2014, since these
facilities are being used for administrative buildings, which officials
told us historically do not compete well for military construction
appropriations. In addition, we found that these facilities at many
installations have already been in use for longer than 3 years. The
Army recently issued guidance indicating that it normally expects its
relocatable facilities to be used for no more than 6 years, and
officials at Fort Bliss, Texas, told us that about 550 of its nearly
600 relocatables, which are already more than 3 years old, will be used
until at least 2014 for new incoming missions due to shortages of
permanent facilities. Furthermore, some Army officials told us that, if
the proposed drawdown of troops from Iraq occurs as planned--on top of
DOD's implementation of other force structure initiatives--the influx
of more military personnel could exacerbate the shortage of facilities
already stressing some installations, which consequently could mean
more relocatable facilities might be needed. Additionally, OSD does not
have a strategy to manage the disposal or relocation of those
facilities once they are no longer needed in their current location.
For instance, Army officials at Fort Drum, New York, which has about
140 relocatable facilities, told us that once their installation no
longer needs those facilities, they plan to disassemble and store the
buildings on base, whereas Army officials at Fort Bliss, Texas, which
has about 600 relocatables, told us that they plan to auction off as
many of their relocatable buildings as possible when they are no longer
needed. Meanwhile, some other DOD installations may be planning to
acquire new relocatable facilities at market cost at the same time that
installations are disposing of them. Although the Army is moving in the
direction of centralizing its management of these facilities, none of
the other service headquarters told us they have initiated similar
efforts. Without a comprehensive DOD-wide strategy for effectively
managing the use of relocatable facilities--including the transfer of
relocatables from one location to another across the services--the
services could unnecessarily spend DOD funds by simultaneously
acquiring new facilities at some locations while auctioning off or
incurring costs to store or demolish similar facilities at other
locations. We are recommending that OSD develop a strategic DOD-wide
view for managing the use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable
facilities across all the services.
In written comments to a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with
two of our three recommendations and agreed to take action. While DOD's
written comments indicated partial agreement with another
recommendation, based on its response and our subsequent follow-up
discussion with an OSD official, we believe DOD's planned action meets
the intent of our recommendation. DOD's comments are reprinted in
appendix II of this report. Also, DOD provided one technical comment on
a draft of this report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
According to DOD, a relocatable facility is a building designed to be
readily moved, erected, disassembled, stored, and reused.[Footnote 3]
In classifying buildings as relocatable, the estimated costs for
average building disassembly, repackaging, and nonrecoverable building
components, including typical foundations, may not exceed 20 percent of
the building acquisition cost. DOD has stated that these facilities may
be used when they constitute the most feasible and economical means of
satisfying an interim facility requirement, which they have defined as
a short-term, normally 3 years or less, requirement due to transitory
peak military missions, deployments, military contingency operations,
disaster relief; or urgent requirements, pending approval and
construction of facilities through normal military construction
programs.[Footnote 4] Such facilities can consist of a single trailer,
or a set of trailers assembled together to form a larger, modular-type
structure. The military services acquire relocatable facilities by
either buying or leasing them, depending on the results of an economic
analysis to determine the most economical approach.
In response to OSD's request for data on the military services' use of
relocatable facilities over the past 5 years,[Footnote 5] the services
reported that they have bought or leased over 4,000 relocatable
facilities and have spent about $1.5 billion to acquire them. According
to these data, the Army and the Marine Corps have relied on relocatable
facilities the most, reporting to OSD that they have about 2,800 and
800 of these facilities respectively. The Navy and the Air Force
reported to OSD that they have about 400 and 200 relocatables
respectively. Typically, the military services are using relocatable
facilities as barracks, administrative offices, medical facilities,
dining halls, and equipment maintenance facilities. Some relocatable
facilities we saw during our installation visits are shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Examples of Various Relocatable Facilities in Use at Seven
Military Installations GAO Visited:
[Refer to PDF for image: seven photographs]
* Barracks at Fort Bliss, Texas.
Source: DOD.
* Barracks for about 600 soldiers at Fort Drum, New York.
Source: GAO.
* Barracks at Fort Hood, Texas.
Source: GAO.
* Training management space at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
Source: GAO.
* Counseling center at Camp Pendleton, California.
Source: GAO.
* Administrative space for about 60 people at Naval Amphibious Base
Little Creek, Virginia.
Source: GAO.
* Administrative space at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Oversight and Guidance:
The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment issues guidance on relocatable facilities. DOD last
issued guidance on relocatable buildings in 1988. According to that
guidance, unlike other nonpermanent buildings, relocatable facilities
are to be accounted for as personal property rather than real property,
unless these facilities are authorized for procurement using
construction procedures, in which case the buildings should be
accounted for as real property.[Footnote 6] Additionally, the guidance
states that in classifying a building as relocatable, it must meet a
requirement known as the "20 percent rule." This rule generally means
the estimated costs for disassembling the building and repackaging it
for storage or reuse, among other cost considerations, may not exceed
20 percent of the cost to acquire the facility. Generally, relocatable
facilities are acquired as personal property using procurement or
operation and maintenance appropriations. If other buildings do not
meet the 20 percent rule, they are acquired as real property with
military construction or with operation and maintenance appropriations.
In addition to DOD's guidance, each of the military services have also
developed specific guidance to govern the management, acquisition, and
disposition of relocatable facilities. For example, to provide more
specific guidance on funding relocatables, the Army has issued its own
amplifying guidance. This guidance follows DOD Instruction 4165.56 that
states that relocatable buildings procured and accounted for in a
particular manner are considered personal property. The Army used the
funding limits for procurement of equipment when it outlined the funds
to be used for relocatable facility acquisition in both an Army
regulation and interim policy for relocatable buildings.[Footnote 7] If
the cost to buy or lease relocatables is under $250,000, the Army is to
use funds from its Operation and Maintenance appropriations, however if
the cost is $250,000 or more, it is to use funds from its Other
Procurement, Army, appropriation. In contrast, if the Army is acquiring
other buildings, meaning real property, it generally uses funds from
its Military Construction appropriations for projects over $750,000.
[Footnote 8]
Committee Interest on Relocatable Facilities:
In addition to the committee interest that led to our review,[Footnote
9] other congressional committees have previously expressed interest in
DOD's use of relocatable facilities, specifically within the Department
of the Army. For example:
* In 2005, the Senate Armed Services Committee[Footnote 10] expressed
concern that the Army had not included funds to sustain or replace
trailers with permanent facilities, among other issues.
* Also in 2005, the House Armed Services Committee[Footnote 11] noted
that it was troubled by the Army's reliance on temporary facilities to
support its modularity initiative and the Army's failure to budget for
permanent construction to replace temporary facilities. The House Armed
Services Committee further directed the Army to report on several
issues related to the use and replacement of temporary facilities, and
the Army provided its report in March 2006.[Footnote 12]
More recently, the House Armed Services Committee directed OSD to
submit to the defense committees by March 1, 2009, the department's
plan to replace relocatable buildings with permanent facilities by
fiscal year 2015.[Footnote 13] OSD officials told us they planned on
providing these committees with this report as well as the report
directed by the Senate Armed Services Committee that was due in July
2008, although they had not yet done so as of May 2009. To develop
these reports, OSD requested that the military services provide data,
and the services generally did the following in response to OSD's data
request:
* Army headquarters officials stated that the Army updated its
information on relocatable facilities in March 2008 by requesting data
from its installations. Officials noted that these data were compared
to data in the Army's real property database to supplement its
completeness. The Army provided its data to OSD in the summer of 2008.
* Navy headquarters officials stated that the Navy used its database on
facilities to obtain information on the number of relocatable
facilities it is using. The Navy then provided these data to each of
its 13 regions to review and supplement with data not contained in the
database. The Navy provided its data to OSD during the summer of 2008.
* Marine Corps headquarters requested data from its major commands,
citing that it was the responsibility of its commands to obtain data on
relocatable facility use. The Marine Corps provided its data to OSD in
the fall of 2008.
* Air Force headquarters requested the civil engineer for each of its
major commands, who in turn tasked the civil engineer for each Air
Force installation, to provide data on relocatable facility use. The
Air Force provided its data to OSD in the summer of 2008.
OSD Does Not Have Complete Oversight of the Services' Use of
Relocatable Facilities to Meet Infrastructure Needs:
Although military services are relying on relocatable facilities to
meet shortages in their physical infrastructure needs, OSD lacks
oversight over how many of these facilities are being used on defense
installations and how much DOD has spent on such facilities. Neither
OSD nor the services have a complete or accurate accounting of the
number or cost of relocatable facilities because OSD has not issued
clear guidance on how the military services should define relocatable
facilities, and it lacks a mechanism for collecting and maintaining
consistent use and cost data across the services.
OSD Does Not Fully Know How Many Relocatable Facilities the Services
Are Using to Meet Physical Infrastructure Needs:
OSD does not have accurate and complete data on the number of
relocatable facilities that the services are using to meet current
shortages in their physical infrastructure needs. Although the military
services recently reported to OSD that they have bought or leased over
4,000 relocatable facilities over a 5-year period, our assessment of
the data uncovered many discrepancies. At six of the seven
installations we visited, including locations representing each of the
military services, we found discrepancies between the number of
relocatable facilities located on those installations and the number
that the service headquarters had reported to OSD. For instance:
* At Fort Bliss, Texas, officials showed us over 100 relocatable
facilities located on the installation that were not included in Army's
data provided to OSD on relocatable facilities. Army headquarters did
not know about these facilities until shortly prior to our visit.
* At Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, officials told us that the
installation had about 170 relocatable facilities, which was about 80
more than Marine Corps headquarters had reported to OSD. Marine Corps
headquarters officials told us they had no way to reconcile the
discrepancies and suggested we ask the Marine Corps Forces Command,
which was tasked to collect inventory data on relocatable facilities
for its installations. Those officials stated that there is a lot of
subjectivity in the definitions of relocatable facilities, which is
contributing to data discrepancies.
* At Camp Pendleton, California, officials told us they only had 2
relocatable facilities; however, Marine Corps headquarters reported to
OSD that the installation had a total of 330 relocatables and other
nonpermanent facilities. Marine Corps headquarters officials told us
there is confusion as to how many relocatable facilities are actually
at Camp Pendleton. Based on our audit work, we believe there are
several factors contributing to the data discrepancies. First, Marine
Corps headquarters included both relocatable facilities as well as
other nonpermanent facilities in their numbers in response to OSD's
data request. Second, Marine Corps headquarters also included future
requirements for these facilities at Camp Pendleton even before
obtaining the relocatable facilities. Third, Camp Pendleton officials
told us they changed the property classification on their relocatable
facilities from personal property to real property based on
communications from Marine Corps headquarters officials. Camp Pendleton
officials told us they properly classified these facilities although
Marine Corps headquarters officials told us the reclassification was
not correct. As of April 2009, Camp Pendleton officials told us their
data had not changed.
* At Fort Hood, Texas, we found over 25 facilities that appeared to us
to be relocatable facilities but were not accounted for as such. After
our review of the installation's facility records, Fort Hood officials
agreed that the facilities we had questioned should have been included
in its count of relocatable facilities.
* We found other instances of data discrepancies at two other
installations we visited. Although these discrepancies were minor, they
nonetheless still represent an inaccurate count. At Naval Amphibious
Base Little Creek, Virginia, officials told us that they had three
fewer relocatable facilities than the data reported to OSD showed.
Also, at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, service officials told us they
had two fewer relocatable facilities than the data reported to OSD
showed, citing that one facility was counted twice and one facility was
no longer at the installation.
Similar data discrepancies in the number of relocatable facilities on
some Army installations were also reported on by the Army Audit Agency.
[Footnote 14] At the request of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Financial Management and Comptroller), the Army Audit Agency recently
conducted a review on the Army's management of its relocatable
facilities and reported on its use at five Army installations--Fort
Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Drum, New York; Fort Huachuca, Arizona;
Fort Riley, Kansas; and Fort Stewart, Georgia. The Army Audit Agency
reported that it found discrepancies in the inventory of relocatable
facilities at all five installations it reviewed. For example, the Army
Audit Agency reported that Fort Bragg actually had about 20 more
relocatable facilities than what was recorded in Army's database. As a
result, the Army Audit Agency reported that Fort Bragg had lost
visibility and accountability for relocatable facilities that could
result in incorrect decisions on the management of these facilities.
In addition, both the Army and the Marine Corps--two of the military
services that rely on relocatable facilities the most, according to
data these services provided to OSD--told us there might be
relocatables located at their installations that they do not know
about. For example, Army officials told us they do not know if Army
National Guard installations and readiness centers have relocatable
facilities given that the Army National Guard manages its own facility
needs and Army headquarters does not have readily available data on
such use. In addition, Army officials said that some tenants on an
installation might be using relocatable facilities that have not been
accounted for at the host installation. These officials told us that
tenants, like DOD's Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary School
system, could be using relocatable facilities on an installation that
the installation might not be aware of, which also presents challenges
in maintaining a complete and accurate inventory of these facilities.
Also, Army officials told us that they do not know the extent to which
relocatable facilities might be on Army training ranges given the
millions of acres of land in the ranges and that an accurate count
would be difficult to verify. Moreover, Marine Corps headquarters
officials told us they were not sure if their inventory count of
relocatable facilities was complete since they do not routinely
maintain data on relocatables at the headquarters level.
Furthermore, Navy headquarters told us its data provided to OSD did not
include all of its relocatable facilities located at its installations.
For example, Navy officials told us they did not collect and report
data on relocatable facilities from four of its major commands--Naval
Air Systems Command; Naval Sea Systems Command; Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command; and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery--although the
Navy estimated that these four commands had about 200 relocatable
facilities. Navy officials told us they did not collect and report data
on relocatables for these four Navy commands because OSD was
independently seeking the data. However, OSD officials told us they did
not request data specifically from these Navy commands and that its
expectation was that each service would collect its own data covering
the entire service. Also, Navy officials told us they could not verify
their data collection on relocatables by major command because all of
the collected data was accidentally lost when a computer failed and
that the Navy does not routinely maintain data on relocatables at the
headquarters level. Air Force officials, on the other hand, told us it
does routinely collect data on relocatable facilities at the
headquarters level for inclusion in its annual report;[Footnote 15]
however, the Air Force last reported on the use of relocatable
facilities in fiscal year 2006 and has not issued its annual reports on
its usage in fiscal years 2007 or 2008.
Also, some service officials expressed confusion about whether other
types of facilities should be included in their count of relocatables.
For example, some officials asked us if certain types of structures,
such as equipment sheds and rain shelters, should be counted as
relocatable facilities. We also found that the Air Force does not count
a certain type of facility called Sprung shelters--which are generally
a rigid frame structure covered by heavy tension fabric--as relocatable
facilities if it buys them, but will count them if it leases them. On
the other hand, the other three military services count these
facilities as relocatables depending on the proper application of the
relocatable definition.[Footnote 16] DOD's instruction on relocatable
buildings does not address these structures.[Footnote 17] Two examples
of Sprung shelters are shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Pictures of Sprung Shelter Relocatable Facilities at Two
Military Installations:
[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs]
Sprung shelter relocatable facilities used as administrative and
training management space at Fort Hood, Texas, and a dining facility at
Fort Bliss, Texas.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
OSD does not have adequate oversight over the military services' use of
relocatable facilities to meet its physical infrastructure shortages
based on our observations on the difficulty some of the services had to
collect data on these facilities and our assessment that these data are
inaccurate and incomplete. DOD's Instruction 4165.56 on relocatable
facilities prescribes policies and procedures for the acquisition and
use of these facilities; however, officials with the Navy and the
Marine Corps headquarters and several officials at installations we
visited told us OSD's guidance on defining relocatable facilities was
confusing to distinguish relocatables from other types of nonpermanent
facilities because the definition of these types of facilities was not
clear. This distinction is important because DOD generally considers
relocatable facilities to be personal property--like vehicles and other
equipment--which is acquired using either procurement or operation and
maintenance appropriations--whereas other types of buildings, including
temporary buildings, are considered real property, which are funded
mostly through military construction appropriations and, in some cases,
operation and maintenance appropriations. Furthermore, without a clear
definition of relocatable facilities, DOD will not be able to reliably
determine the extent to which the services are relying on these
facilities to meet shortages in needed facilities.
OSD Does Not Fully Know How Much the Services Have Spent to Acquire
Relocatable Facilities:
Although some of the services' headquarters have begun to capture the
cost of acquiring relocatable facilities, based on our analysis we
believe these data are not reliable and the total cost of relocatable
facilities acquired by the military services is uncertain. According to
cost data we obtained from the services, DOD estimates it has spent
about $1.5 billion over a 5-year period[Footnote 18] to acquire
relocatable facilities, yet service officials told us that because the
number of relocatable facilities was uncertain, then the associated
cost to acquire these facilities was also uncertain. Also, some service
officials told us that collecting acquisition cost data was difficult
given that reliable records on these costs were not always available
and that maintaining information on these costs had not been a
priority. For example, Navy and Marine Corps headquarters told us that
they did not maintain any cost information on relocatable facilities,
although they told us cost information on relocatables should be
readily available at the installation. However, during our visit to
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base,
Virginia, officials at both installations told us that their cost data
to acquire relocatable facilities were incomplete. Marine Corps
officials at Camp Lejeune told us that they did not retain cost
information on their relocatable facilities prior to March, 2007, thus
they could not provide acquisition cost data covering the last 5 years
as requested by OSD. Likewise, Navy officials at Little Creek Naval
Amphibious Base told us that their cost data on relocatable facilities
were their best estimates given that they did not maintain the
contracts for all of their leased relocatable facilities.
Army officials stated that although the service updated its cost data
for their relocatable facilities in March 2008, the data are not
complete for all installations. According to these officials, the cost
information reported represents the best available data.
The Air Force, in response to direction from the Secretary of the Air
Force, is to produce an annual report that captures the costs of
acquiring relocatable facilities; however, the most recently completed
annual report was for 2006. Air Force officials noted that a 2007
report was never officially completed, and as of February 2009, it had
not begun to gather the data needed for the 2008 report. The officials
told us they were relatively unconcerned about the size or cost of
their inventory of relocatable facilities compared to other physical
infrastructure issues, given the low use of relocatables located on
their installations.
Limited Oversight of Relocatable Facilities Hindered OSD's Ability to
Respond to Congressional Request for Information:
OSD does not have adequate oversight over the military services' use or
cost to acquire relocatable facilities although it sets policy and
develops overarching instructions on relocatable use. As a result,
OSD's limited oversight over the military services' use of relocatable
facilities has hindered its ability to respond to congressional
requests for such information. For example, OSD was expected to issue
its report in response to direction from the Senate Armed Services
Committee in July 2008; however, it had not yet done so by May 2009.
When we talked to OSD officials in March 2008, these officials told us
they did not have information about how many relocatable facilities
were being used, how many defense installations had them, nor how much
it had cost to acquire them. OSD requested information from each of the
military services but OSD officials told us they had experienced some
data-collection problems.
Despite receiving information from the services, our work has shown
that OSD still does not have reliable information given a number of
identified discrepancies among the installations, service headquarters,
and information provided to OSD on relocatable facilities numbers and
associated acquisition cost. DOD's guidance states that DOD-owned
equipment and other accountable property, such as relocatable
facilities, should be properly inventoried, records should reflect
current status, and documentation should be maintained to permit
validation of information such as the purchase cost.[Footnote 19]
Although the military services provided data in response to OSD's
request indicating they had acquired over 4,000 relocatable facilities
over a 5-year period recently, it will be difficult for OSD to know the
extent the services are relying on these facilities because it lacks a
mechanism for collecting and maintaining such information as required
by its own guidance.
OSD Does Not Have a Strategy for Managing the Use and Disposal of
Relocatable Facilities:
OSD does not have a strategy for managing the military services' use
and disposal of relocatable facilities, even though many of these
facilities most likely will be used for longer than the 3 years that is
normally expected for relocatables. In the absence of such a strategy,
the services are at risk of managing these facilities in an inefficient
manner.
Military Services Expect to Use Relocatable Facilities Longer than
Called for by DOD Guidance:
Recognizing that the services would prefer to use permanent buildings
to meet their infrastructure needs, some relocatable facilities could
remain in use for many years. According to DOD guidance, the military
services are expected to use relocatable facilities when they
constitute the most feasible and economical means of satisfying an
interim facility requirement, which is a short-term--normally 3 years
or less--requirement for facilities in order to meet urgent or peak
facilities requirements.[Footnote 20] However, we found that
relocatable facilities at many installations have already been in use
for longer than 3 years. The Army recently issued guidance indicating
that it normally expects its relocatable facilities to be used for no
more than 6 years, and officials at Fort Bliss, Texas, told us that
about 550 of its nearly 600 relocatables, which are already more than 3
years old, will be used at least 5 more years until 2014 to meet new
incoming missions due to the lack of permanent facilities. Similarly,
Marine Corps headquarters officials noted that rapid growth, changes in
missions, and reorganizations have created new facility requirements
that outstrip the Marine Corps' ability to meet the requirements
through permanent construction. Thus, the Marine Corps continues to
look to the use of relocatable facilities as the only available option
to meet the needs. The officials stated that most likely relocatable
facilities will be used at many installations for longer than 3 years.
Services Plan to Replace Relocatable Facilities with Permanent
Buildings, but Could Face Management Challenges:
Although the services plan to eventually replace many of their
relocatable facilities with permanent buildings, and military
construction funds have been programmed to do so in fiscal years 2010
to 2013, some service officials expressed skepticism that the planned
replacement funds will become available, potentially further prolonging
the need for relocatables. Even if planned military construction funds
are appropriated in the later years, some of these relocatable
facilities will have been in use beyond the normal amount of time as
indicated in DOD's instruction. For example:
* Navy officials at Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, Virginia, told
us that they expect to obtain funding in fiscal year 2012 to begin
permanent construction to replace some of the installation's
relocatable facilities. However, for many of their relocatable
facilities, they said they might not receive funding until fiscal year
2014. Once funding is received, the officials told us it generally
takes about 2 years to build a permanent facility. Thus these
relocatable facilities, acquired in November 2004, will be
approximately 12 years old when replaced. Furthermore, these officials
also expect some existing relocatable facilities to be used beyond 2014
because they are being used as administrative buildings, which the
officials told us have not competed well historically for military
construction appropriations within DOD.
* Army officials at Fort Bliss, Texas, told us they are currently using
about 550 relocatable facilities to house a combat brigade pending
permanent construction to replace these facilities. The officials said
they plan to use these facilities, which were acquired in 2006, until
at least 2014, at which time these facilities will be approximately 9
years old.
* Air Force officials at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, provided us
information that shows 27 of their 36 relocatables are currently over 5
years old. In fact, 3 of these facilities were acquired in March 1984,
making them 25 years old. The officials noted that these facilities
were scheduled to be replaced in 2009; however, they said the
facilities will continue to be used for administrative purposes to
support a training range.
Of the military services, the Army and the Marine Corps are the most
affected by the implementation of DOD's force structure and
infrastructure initiatives and will be challenged the most to find ways
to meet their physical infrastructure needs in the short term. With the
recent passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
[Footnote 21] DOD plans to spend about $7 billion in funds on numerous
infrastructure projects, among other items and activities, which in
turn, holds the possibility that certain funded projects could lessen
the need to rely on relocatable facilities at certain installations
although it still might be too early to quantify such effects. On the
other hand, other recent decisions could increase the use of
relocatables. For example, officials at Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Drum,
New York; and at Army Installation Management Command-West, Texas, told
us that, if the proposed drawdown of troops from Iraq occurs as
planned--on top of DOD's other force structure initiatives-- the influx
of more military personnel could exacerbate the shortage of facilities
at these and other installations. Meeting these facility needs could
result in an increased use of relocatable facilities and the continued
use of these facilities for longer than normally called for by DOD
guidance.
Army officials told us that installation commanders generally consider
relocatables to be the property of their installations. Thus, even
though plans exist to replace relocatable facilities with permanent
construction, some installation commanders might be resistant to
transferring their relocatables to another installation that needs them
or even to disposing of them once the planned permanent buildings have
been constructed, in case they are subsequently needed again. Although
the Army has not yet redistributed any relocatables from one location
to another, Army officials told us that they are in the process of
trying to redistribute some relocatable facilities from Fort Irwin,
California--an installation in which the Army believes it no longer
needs its relocatable facilities--to Fort Sill, Oklahoma--an
installation that currently needs relocatable facilities to address
some of its facility space shortages. Although the Army plans to
centralize its management of these facilities, neither the other
service headquarters nor OSD have similar plans. Without a DOD strategy
for managing relocatables that includes the redistribution of
relocatables from one location to another when needed and when
appropriate, installations with unneeded relocatables could
unnecessarily spend defense funds disposing of facilities while another
installation that needs them is spending defense funds to acquire them.
When appropriate to dispose of relocatable facilities, neither OSD nor
the services have completed disposal strategies nor budgeting for the
cost involved to remove these facilities. Officials told us relocatable
facilities used today are often not facilities that can be easily towed
away or sold at on-site auctions, such as would be true with single
trailers with attached wheels. Rather, some installation officials told
us that disposing of these facilities by auctioning them off in the
local community might be more challenging than what is currently
expected given these facilities normally arrive on flat-bed trucks and
are either largely preassembled or assembled at the installation, as
shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: Pictures of Relocatable Facilities Arriving and Being
Installed at a Defense Installation:
[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
For example, officials at Fort Bliss, Texas, told us they expect to
incur costs to dispose of or demolish their relocatable facilities,
citing doubts that enough of their facilities could be auctioned off in
the local community given the large quantities (about 600) of
relocatable facilities at the installation. Officials at Fort Hood
expressed similar views regarding the salvage value of the relocatable
facilities at their installation, given the large quantities (nearly
300) of relocatable facilities that will need to be disposed of.
Officials at Fort Drum, New York, told us that once their installation
no longer needs its relocatable facilities (about 140), they plan to
disassemble them and store the facilities on base, which officials said
will likely incur cost to do.
Furthermore, the numbers of relocatable facilities for DOD to
eventually dispose of could be more challenging given the actual size
of some of these relocatable facilities. DOD currently counts as
relocatables multiple trailers, which can be joined together, as one
facility. For example, according to Air Force data, a facility at
MacDill Air Force Base in Florida is actually made up of 72 trailers.
We saw a similar situation at Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base,
Virginia, in which officials there counted 146 trailers, many of which
were connected to one another, as 23 relocatable facilities. Also, at
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, one relocatable facility--representing
about 35,000 square feet of space--was actually comprised of 33
individual trailers, as shown in figure 4.
Figure 4: A Relocatable Facility Consisting of 33 Trailers at Eglin Air
Force Base, Florida:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
DOD's guidance states that relocatable facilities accounted for as
personal property, upon becoming excess to DOD, shall be redistributed
or disposed of.[Footnote 22] However, OSD has not effectively
communicated guidance on how the services are to manage its reliance on
relocatable facilities because OSD does not have a strategy to manage
the use, disposal, and redistribution of these facilities across all
the services, including projected costs. Our prior work has shown that
management control should be designed to provide reasonable assurance
against unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of an agency's
assets.[Footnote 23] One way to accomplish this is an adequate means of
communicating with and obtaining information from stakeholders that may
have an effect on the agency achieving its goals. Collectively, OSD has
a unique set of challenges in managing its current inventory of over
4,000 relocatable facilities; however, without a strategy that includes
provisions for the disposal of relocatable facilities, including
projected costs, some relocatable facilities could remain in place for
years to come. Without a comprehensive DOD strategy for managing
relocatables--including the transfer of relocatables from one location
to another--a military service could unnecessarily spend funds by
simultaneously acquiring new facilities while another military service
is incurring costs to store or demolish similar facilities. In
addition, if this strategy does not include a consistent, common
measure for estimating disposal costs based on size of the facility,
DOD might not be planning for this expense in the most accurate and
efficient way possible.
Conclusions:
The pace of growth at some installations is exceeding the ability of
traditional military construction to provide permanent facilities.
Without a complete and accurate accounting of how many relocatable
facilities DOD actually has or how much it spent to acquire them; DOD
will continue to have a limited ability to oversee and manage the steps
the services are taking in response to personnel growth at some
installations. Until OSD develops clear guidance for the services to
follow on what it expects to count as a relocatable facility, along
with an expectation for the services to provide a complete and accurate
accounting of them, OSD and Congress will continue to have incomplete
information on the extent to which these relocatable facilities are
being used on defense installations as interim solutions to facility
infrastructure shortages. In addition, without a mechanism to
accurately record and monitor its inventory of relocatable facilities,
along with its cost to acquire them, OSD will not have reliable data
for making effective choices on funding decisions.
Similar to DOD's experience with World War II-era wooden buildings,
which were expected to be in use no more than 5 years, but of which
many are still in use today, DOD's use of relocatable facilities could
outlast the services' current expectations, especially in an
increasingly competitive budget environment that could delay needed
military construction funds beyond current expectations. In addition to
the cost of acquiring relocatable facilities, DOD is likely to incur
costs to store, dispose of, or relocate them. Without a comprehensive
strategy to effectively manage the services' use of relocatable
facilities, DOD may be unprepared to reliably budget for these costs.
Finally, without a more strategic DOD-wide view of the services' plans
to acquire and dispose of relocatable facilities, OSD may not be in a
position to coordinate or to ensure the services transfer used
relocatables from one location to another when appropriate, in lieu of
acquiring new relocatable facilities at one location needing them,
thereby avoiding waste.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve OSD's oversight and management of the military services' use
of relocatable facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to take the following three actions:
* clarify its guidance on the definition of relocatable facilities;
* develop a mechanism for collecting and maintaining complete and
reliable data on the number of relocatable facilities used by the
military services and on the costs of acquiring them once OSD clarifies
the guidance on the definition of relocatable facilities; and:
* develop and implement a strategy to help effectively manage the use,
disposal, and redistribution of relocatable facilities across all the
services when redistribution is appropriate, including projected costs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments to a draft of this report, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) fully agreed with
two of our three recommendation and stated it would take actions to
implement them. The Deputy Under Secretary partially agreed with our
recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics develop and implement a strategy to help
effectively manage the use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable
facilities across all the services when redistribution is appropriate,
including projected costs, citing that the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should not be involved in
implementation but rather should promulgate policy and monitor
implementation on the use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable
facilities across all the services when redistribution is appropriate.
In a follow-up discussion with an OSD official regarding DOD's written
response to a draft of this report, the official noted that OSD will
promulgate policy, which includes directing the military services to
redistribute relocatable facilities across the services when
redistribution is appropriate, and will monitor implementation on the
use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable facilities across all
services when redistribution is appropriate. As such, we believe DOD's
planned action meets the intent of our recommendation. DOD's comments
are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. Also, DOD provided one
technical comment on a draft of this report, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-4523 or by e-mail at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
are on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tim Johnson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Chet Edwards:
Chairman:
The Honorable Zach Wamp:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) is providing oversight of the military services' use of
relocatable facilities to meet physical infrastructure needs, we
reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance on the authorization,
acquisition, use, and disposition of relocatable facilities and the
military services' policies and procedures that implement DOD's
guidance. We obtained and reviewed inventory and cost data on
relocatable facilities as reported to OSD by each military service.
Although service headquarters officials stated that their data
reflected information collected from their installations, we found that
the data were not reliable because they were not always complete and
accurate. Examples of the data reliability issues are included in this
report. To gain insight into the numbers, costs, and disposal plans for
relocatable facilities at the installation level, we visited seven
defense installations. We selected installations to visit from those
identified by service headquarters' officials as having a sizable
number of relocatable facilities. We focused mostly on Army and Marine
Corps installations because they use relocatable facilities to a
greater extent than the Navy and the Air Force. Specifically, we
visited Fort Hood and Fort Bliss in Texas; Fort Drum in New York; Naval
Amphibious Base Little Creek in Virginia; Eglin Air Force Base in
Florida; Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in North Carolina; and Marine
Corps Base Camp Pendleton in California. At each installation we
visited, we obtained data on the number and cost of purchasing or
leasing relocatable facilities. We compared the installation's
inventory of relocatable facilities to the numbers the service
headquarters reported to OSD and documented and discussed any
discrepancies with installation and service headquarters officials. Our
analysis of the seven installation visits cannot be generalized to
other military installations. We also visited the Army Installation
Management Command-West in Texas to discuss the Army's relocatable
facilities. Furthermore, we interviewed OSD and military service
headquarters officials managing relocatable facilities to discuss the
primary reasons for acquiring and using relocatable facilities, the
process used to acquire them, and plans for their disposal. The Senate
committee report limited DOD's review by excluding nonpermanent or
temporary facilities used overseas at forward operating sites or
cooperative security locations, thus we did not include the services'
use of relocatable facilities at overseas locations. Also, we did not
include the use of trailers by construction contractors or associated
with any ongoing construction projects at defense installations.
To determine the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive strategy for
managing relocatable facilities, we interviewed OSD and military
service officials to discuss whether they have a plan to track whether
relocatable facilities are used for time periods that exceed DOD's or
the service's length of use criteria, the implications of using
relocatable facilities longer than called for in the guidance, and any
issues regarding the disposal of relocatable facilities. At the
installations we visited, we obtained information on the relocatable
facilities that were in use longer than called for in DOD guidance and
ascertained the reasons why. We also discussed with installation
officials their plans for replacing relocatables with permanent
buildings and the potential for costs to dispose of relocatable
facilities.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to June 2009, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
May 28, 2009:
Mr. Brian J. Lepore:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Lepore:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Defense Infrastructure: DoD Needs to Improve Oversight of
Relocatable Facilities and Develop a Strategy for Managing Their Use
across the Military Services," dated May 4, 2009, (GAO Code 351177/GAO-
09-585). Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed.
The Department concurs with recommendations 1 and 2, and partially
concurs with recommendation 3. We appreciate your efforts in conducting
this review, and we thank the members of your staff for their
comprehensive work.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Wayne Arny:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense:
(Installations and Environment):
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report - Dated May 4, 2009:
GAO Code 351177/GAO-09-585:
"Defense Infrastructure: DoD Needs to Improve Oversight of Relocatable
Facilities and Develop a Strategy for Managing Their Use across the
Military Services"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics to clarify its guidance on the definition of relocatable
facilities.
DOD Response: Concur. The existing guidance needs to be updated and
clarified.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics to develop a mechanism for collecting and maintaining
complete and reliable data on the number of relocatable facilities used
by the military services and on the costs of acquiring them once OSD
clarifies the guidance on the definition of relocatable facilities.
DOD Response: Concur. DoD agrees that collecting and maintaining
reliable data on the number of relocatable facilities acquired and the
costs associated with acquiring them is necessary. We will look into
how best to address this requirement and will attempt to leverage
existing information technology system modernization efforts.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics to develop and implement a strategy to help effectively
manage the use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable facilities
across all the services when redistribution is appropriate, including
projected costs.
DOD Response: Partially concur. Rather than being directly involved in
implementation, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics should promulgate policy and monitor
implementation on the use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable
facilities across all the services when redistribution is appropriate,
including projected costs.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Laura Talbott, Assistant
Director; Leslie Bharadwaja; Susan Ditto; Mary Jo LaCasse; Katherine
Lenane; Clara Mejstrik; Charles Perdue; and Sharon Reid made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] S. Rep. No. 110-77 (2007), 585-586.
[2] On May 16, 2008, OSD requested each service provide information on
the number and cost of its relocatable facilities acquired over the
past 5 years. OSD did not specify which 5-year period. Service
officials from the Army and Navy noted that they reported data on
calendar years 2003-2007 in their response; Air Force officials
reported data on calendar years 2004-2008; and Marine Corps officials
told us they reported data on fiscal years 2004-2008.
[3] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings" (Apr. 13, 1988).
[4] DOD guidance further states that in addition to the use of
relocatable buildings for interim facility requirements, relocatable
buildings may also be used instead of conventional, permanent
construction when the duration of the requirement is uncertain.
[5] See footnote 2.
[6] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings."
[7] Army Regulation 420-1, "Army Facilities Management" (Feb. 12,
2008); and Army Memorandum, "Interim Policy Change on Relocatable
Buildings for Paragraphs 6-13 through 6-17 in AR 420-1, Army Facilities
Management" (Feb. 19, 2008).
[8] There are two authorities available to DOD to use operation and
maintenance funds to carry out military construction projects. Section
2805(c) of Title 10, U.S. Code, permits DOD to use operation and
maintenance funds to carry out an unspecified minor military
construction project costing not more than $750,000, or up to
$1,500,000 in the case of a project intended solely to correct a
deficiency that threatens life, health, or safety. DOD also possesses
temporary, limited authority to obligate up to $200,000,000 (and under
certain circumstances, up to $500,000,000) of operation and maintenance
funds in a fiscal year to carry out construction projects that meet a
specified set of conditions. Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 2808(a) (2003), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 2810 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-163, §
2809 (2006); Pub. L. No 109-364, § 2802 (2006); Pub. L. No. 110-181, §
2801 (2008); and Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 2812 (2008).
[9] S. Rep. No. 110-77 (2007), 585-586, directed the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to report to the
congressional defense committees on the use of temporary facilities
within DOD. Specifically, the Under Secretary was required to report on
(1) a list of the acquisition or leasing actions of temporary
facilities in each service over the past 5 years; (2) amounts spent on
temporary facilities in the following categories: (a) operation and
maintenance funding obligated in service contracts; (b) operation and
maintenance funding obligated solely for nonpermanent, temporary
facility construction or procurement; (c) operation and maintenance
funding obligated for leases of nonpermanent, temporary facilities; and
(d) procurement funding spent to procure nonpermanent, temporary
facilities; (3) the plan for the construction of permanent facilities
to replace each temporary facility acquired or leased in the DOD
inventory to include project title, planned budget year, and estimated
cost; and (4) the number of nonpermanent, temporary facilities
previously leased by the department or the military services that were
later purchased, and the costs associated with these arrangements.
Although these reporting requirements do not specifically state
relocatable facilities, OSD told us it plans to report data on
relocatables given that the questions are mostly relevant to only
relocatable facilities.
[10] S. Rep. No. 109-69 (2005), 434.
[11] H.R. Rep. No. 109-89 (2005), 443-4.
[12] Department of the Army, Report to Congress on Permanent Facilities
for new Army unit (For Official Use Only) (March 2006).
[13] H.R. Rep. No. 110-652 (2008), 476-7.
[14] The Army Audit Agency issued six separate reports on relocatable
facilities--one for each of the five installations audited along with a
summary report. These reports are: U.S. Army Audit Agency, Management
of Relocatable Facilities Fort Bragg, North Carolina, A-2008-0292-ALO
(Alexandria, Va., Sept. 30, 2008); Management of Relocatable Facilities
Fort Drum, New York, A-2008-0268-ALO (Alexandria, Va., Sept. 29, 2008);
Management of Relocatable Facilities Fort Huachuca, Arizona, A-2008-
0268-ALO (Alexandria, Va., Sept. 29, 2008); Management of Relocatable
Facilities Fort Riley, Kansas, A-2008-0235-ALO (Alexandria, Va., Sept.
2, 2008); Management of Relocatable Facilities Fort Stewart and Hunter
Army Airfield, Georgia, A-2008-0236-ALO (Alexandria, Va., Sept. 2,
2008); and Management of Relocatable Facilities, A-2009-0065-ALO
(Alexandria, Va., Mar. 4, 2009).
[15] Department of the Air Force Memorandum, Annual Comprehensive
Temporary Use Facilities Report (Feb. 8, 2007).
[16] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings," states that in
classifying a building as relocatable, the estimated costs for
disassembling the building and repackaging it for storage or reuse,
among other cost considerations, may not exceed 20 percent of the cost
to acquire the facility.
[17] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings."
[18] See footnote 2.
[19] DOD Instruction 5000.64, "Accountability and Management of DOD-
Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property" (Nov. 2, 2006).
[20] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings," § 3.1. Section
4.2 of the instruction further states that in addition to the use of
relocatable buildings for interim facility requirements, relocatable
buildings may also be used instead of conventional, permanent
construction when the duration of the requirement is uncertain.
[21] Pub. L. No. 111-5 (2009).
[22] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings," § 5.3.1.
[23] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[End of section]
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