Environmental Contamination
Lessons Learned from the Cleanup of Formerly Used Defense and Military Munitions Sites Gao ID: GAO-09-779T June 10, 2009Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), the Department of Defense (DOD) has charged the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) with cleaning up 4,700 formerly used defense sites (FUDS) and active sites that were under its jurisdiction when they were initially contaminated. The 661-acre Spring Valley site in Washington, D.C is one such site. Like many other FUDS, the U.S. Army used the Spring Valley site during World War I for research and testing of chemical agents, equipment, and munitions. Most of the site is now privately owned and includes private residences, a hospital, and several commercial properties. The primary threats at the site are buried munitions, elevated arsenic in site soils, and laboratory waste; perchlorate was also found onsite. This testimony discusses GAO's past work relating to remediation efforts at FUDS and military munitions sites to provide context for issues at Spring Valley. Specifically, it addresses: (1) the impact that shortcomings in information and guidance can have on decision-making; (2) the impact that incomplete data can have on cost estimates and schedules; (3) how funding for a particular site may be influenced by overall program goals; and (4) how better coordination can increase public confidence in cleanups and facilitate effective decision-making. GAO has made several prior recommendations that address these issues, with which, in most cases, the agency concurred.
GAO's past work has found significant shortcomings in the Corps' use of available information and guidance for making decisions relating to cleanup of FUDS. For example, in 2002, GAO found that the Army determined that there was no evidence of large-scale burials of hazards remaining at Spring Valley before it had received all technical input. This experience is not unique. In a 2002 national study, GAO reported that the Corps did not have a sound basis for determining that about 1,468 of 3,840 FUDS properties--38 percent--did not need further study or cleanup action. GAO attributed these shortcomings to limitations in the Corps guidance that did not specify what documents or level of detail the agency should obtain to identify potential hazards at FUDS or how to assess the presence of potential hazards. GAO's past work has also shown that incomplete data on site conditions and emerging contaminants can interfere with the development of accurate cost and schedule estimates. At Spring Valley, the Corps' estimates of cleanup costs increased by about six fold, from about $21 million to about $124 million from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2001. As assumptions about site conditions changed and new hazards were discovered, the estimates continued to rise and currently stand at about $174 million. Again, these problems are not unique. In 2004, GAO evaluated DOD's cleanup of sites with military munitions and found several similar weaknesses in preliminary cost estimates for numerous sites across the country. GAO's past work has shown that funding available for specific sites may be influenced by overall program goals and other priorities. Spring Valley has received priority funding due to its proximity to a major metropolitan area and high visibility; however, GAO's past work shows that this is usually not the case with most FUDS sites. Over the past 10 years DOD has invested nearly $42 billion in its environmental programs, but it typically requests and receives a relatively smaller amount of funding for environmental restoration activities at FUDS sites compared to funding available for active sites. GAO's past work has found that better coordination and communication with regulators and property owners can increase public confidence and facilitate effective decision-making for contaminated sites. With regard to Spring Valley, GAO reported in 2002 that the Corps, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the District of Columbia had made progress because they had adopted a partnership approach to cleanup decisions. However, this kind of cooperation and coordination does not always occur nationwide. For example, in 2003, GAO reported that the Corps only informed states of upcoming work and requested input from them about half of the time. Similarly, GAO found that the Corps did not always communicate with property owners about the decisions it makes regarding contamination at FUDS sites and more often than not did not inform property owners about how to contact the Corps in the event that further hazardous substances were identified at the site.
GAO-09-779T, Environmental Contamination: Lessons Learned from the Cleanup of Formerly Used Defense and Military Munitions Sites
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the
District of Columbia; Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 10, 2009:
Environmental Contamination:
Lessons Learned from the Cleanup of Formerly Used Defense and Military
Munitions Sites:
Statement of Anu Mittal, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-09-779T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-779T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Federal Workforce, Postal Service and the District of Columbia;
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), the
Department of Defense (DOD) has charged the Army Corps of Engineers
(the Corps) with cleaning up 4,700 formerly used defense sites (FUDS)
and active sites that were under its jurisdiction when they were
initially contaminated. The 661-acre Spring Valley site in Washington,
D.C is one such site. Like many other FUDS, the U.S. Army used the
Spring Valley site during World War I for research and testing of
chemical agents, equipment, and munitions. Most of the site is now
privately owned and includes private residences, a hospital, and
several commercial properties. The primary threats at the site are
buried munitions, elevated arsenic in site soils, and laboratory waste;
perchlorate was also found onsite.
This testimony discusses GAO‘s past work relating to remediation
efforts at FUDS and military munitions sites to provide context for
issues at Spring Valley. Specifically, it addresses: (1) the impact
that shortcomings in information and guidance can have on decision-
making; (2) the impact that incomplete data can have on cost estimates
and schedules; (3) how funding for a particular site may be influenced
by overall program goals; and (4) how better coordination can increase
public confidence in cleanups and facilitate effective decision-making.
GAO has made several prior recommendations that address these issues,
with which, in most cases, the agency concurred.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s past work has found significant shortcomings in the Corps‘ use of
available information and guidance for making decisions relating to
cleanup of FUDS. For example, in 2002, GAO found that the Army
determined that there was no evidence of large–scale burials of hazards
remaining at Spring Valley before it had received all technical input.
This experience is not unique. In a 2002 national study, GAO reported
that the Corps did not have a sound basis for determining that about
1,468 of 3,840 FUDS properties––38 percent––did not need further study
or cleanup action. GAO attributed these shortcomings to limitations in
the Corps guidance that did not specify what documents or level of
detail the agency should obtain to identify potential hazards at FUDS
or how to assess the presence of potential hazards.
GAO‘s past work has also shown that incomplete data on site conditions
and emerging contaminants can interfere with the development of
accurate cost and schedule estimates. At Spring Valley, the Corps‘
estimates of cleanup costs increased by about six fold, from about $21
million to about $124 million from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year
2001. As assumptions about site conditions changed and new hazards were
discovered, the estimates continued to rise and currently stand at
about $174 million. Again, these problems are not unique. In 2004, GAO
evaluated DOD‘s cleanup of sites with military munitions and found
several similar weaknesses in preliminary cost estimates for numerous
sites across the country.
GAO‘s past work has shown that funding available for specific sites may
be influenced by overall program goals and other priorities. Spring
Valley has received priority funding due to its proximity to a major
metropolitan area and high visibility; however, GAO‘s past work shows
that this is usually not the case with most FUDS sites. Over the past
10 years DOD has invested nearly $42 billion in its environmental
programs, but it typically requests and receives a relatively smaller
amount of funding for environmental restoration activities at FUDS
sites compared to funding available for active sites.
GAO‘s past work has found that better coordination and communication
with regulators and property owners can increase public confidence and
facilitate effective decision-making for contaminated sites. With
regard to Spring Valley, GAO reported in 2002 that the Corps, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the District of Columbia had
made progress because they had adopted a partnership approach to
cleanup decisions. However, this kind of cooperation and coordination
does not always occur nationwide. For example, in 2003, GAO reported
that the Corps only informed states of upcoming work and requested
input from them about half of the time. Similarly, GAO found that the
Corps did not always communicate with property owners about the
decisions it makes regarding contamination at FUDS sites and more often
than not did not inform property owners about how to contact the Corps
in the event that further hazardous substances were identified at the
site.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-779T] or key
components. For more information, contact Anu Mittal at (202) 512-
3841or mittala@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work relating to the
Department of Defense's (DOD) remediation efforts at Formerly Used
Defense sites (FUDS) and sites with military munitions around the
country, which we believe will provide context for the issues faced by
the Spring Valley site, in Washington D.C. Spring Valley is one of
4,700 FUDS--properties that DOD owned or controlled and transferred to
private parties or other government entities prior to October 1986.
Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), DOD is
required to identify, investigate, and clean up environmental
contamination and other hazards at both active sites and FUDS that were
under its jurisdiction when they were initially contaminated. The FUDS
inventory includes sites with a variety of cleanup needs. These
properties may contain hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes in the
soil and water or in containers such as underground storage tanks.
Other hazards, including unexploded ordnance and unsafe buildings may
also be present. As you know, such hazards can contribute to deaths and
serious illness or pose a threat to the environment.
The Spring Valley site was originally known as the American University
Experiment Station, and covers approximately 661 acres in the northwest
section of Washington, D.C. Like many other FUDS, the U.S. Army used
the Spring Valley site during World War I for research and testing of
chemical agents, equipment, and munitions. After World War I, the
majority of the site was returned to private ownership and developed
for residential and other uses, becoming the Spring Valley
neighborhood. The site now includes American University, about 1,200
private residences, Sibley Hospital, numerous embassy properties, and
several commercial properties. During the 1950s and again in the 1980s,
American University and others raised concerns about buried munitions
in the Spring Valley neighborhood. An Army investigation concluded in
1986 that no large burials of ordnance remained on the site; however,
in 1993, the site received a FUDS designation after a contractor
unearthed buried military ordnance while digging a utility trench.
Investigations of the site expanded, and in 1996, the Army again
concluded there were no remaining large ordnance areas; however, follow-
on work found additional large-scale hazards, including more than 600
pieces of ordnance, arsenic contaminated soil, and lab waste. More
recently, perchlorate,[Footnote 1] an emerging contaminant--a term for
chemicals or materials lacking a federal regulatory standard, with a
potential threat to health or the environment--was also found on the
site. Perchlorate is known to cause health problems in certain
populations. The estimated total cost for completing the project was
$173.7 million in fiscal year 2007, according to the latest Defense
Environmental Program Annual Report to Congress.
Although GAO last reviewed the progress of the Spring Valley Cleanup in
2002, since that time we have conducted a number of reviews relating to
the management and cleanup challenges that DOD faces when addressing
contamination at FUDS and other sites with military munitions across
the country. We also currently have two ongoing reviews related to
FUDS--one addressing the management of FUDS broadly and one
specifically addressing the munitions cleanup program--the latter study
was mandated by the fiscal year 2009 National Defense Authorization
Act. These reports are expected for release in fiscal year 2010.
My testimony is based on this body of work and will address four main
themes and lessons learned that we believe provide context for
assessing the progress made at the Spring Valley site. The four themes
that my statement addresses include: (1) the impacts that shortcomings
in the use of available information and guidance can have on decision-
making; (2) the impacts that incomplete data on site conditions and
emerging contaminants can have on the development of accurate cost
estimates and schedules; (3) how funding available for a particular
site may be influenced by overall program goals and other priorities;
and (4) how better coordination with regulators and property owners can
increase public confidence in cleanups and facilitate effective
decision-making.
We conducted our work in accordance with GAO's Quality Assurance
Framework, which requires that we plan and perform each engagement to
obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to meet our stated
objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work. We believe that
the information and data obtained, and the analyses conducted, provided
a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions in these reports.
Background:
Under the DERP, DOD is authorized to identify, investigate and clean up
environmental contamination and other hazards at FUDS as well as active
installations. To that end, DOD has established restoration goals and
identified over 31,000 sites that are eligible for cleanup, including
more than 21,000 sites on active installations, more than 5,000 sites
on installations identified for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC),
and 4,700 FUDS. The DERP was established by section 211 of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) which
amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980. Under the DERP, DOD's activities
addressing hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants are
required to be carried out consistent with section 120 of CERCLA. DOD
delegated its authority for administering the cleanup of FUDS to the
Army, which in turn delegated its execution to the Army Corps of
Engineers (the Corps). Funding for cleanup activities comes from the
Environmental Restoration and BRAC accounts. The Environmental
Restoration account funds cleanup at active sites and FUDS properties
and, of the $1.4 billion obligated in fiscal year 2007, FUDS property
obligations totaled $116.5 million for addressing hazardous substances
and $102.9 million for munitions response.
To be eligible for FUDS cleanup, a property must have been owned by,
leased to, possessed by, or otherwise controlled by DOD during the
activities that led to the presence of hazards. These hazards may
include unsafe buildings, structures, or debris, such as weakened load-
bearing walls; hazardous, toxic, and radioactive substances, which
includes contaminants such as arsenic, certain paints, some solvents,
and petroleum; containerized hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste,
such as transformers and aboveground or underground storage tanks that
contain petroleum, solvents, or other chemicals which have been
released into the environment; and ordnance and explosive materials,
such as military munitions and chemical warfare agents. To determine if
a property is eligible for cleanup under the FUDS program, the Corps
conducts a preliminary assessment of eligibility to determine whether
the property was ever owned or controlled by DOD and if hazards caused
by DOD's use may be present. If the Corps determines that the property
was owned or controlled by DOD but does not find evidence of any
hazards caused by DOD, it designates the property as "no DOD action
indicated" (NDAI). If however, the Corps determines that a DOD-caused
hazard may be present, the Corps begins to further study and/or clean
up the hazard, consistent with CERCLA. The CERCLA process generally
includes the following phases: preliminary assessment, site inspection,
remedial investigation/feasibility study, remedial design/remedial
action, and long-term monitoring.
To address the release of hazardous substances, pollutants, or
contaminants resulting from past practices that pose environmental
health and safety risks on both active sites and FUDS, DOD established
the Installation Restoration Program (IRP) in 1985 under the DERP. In
fiscal year 2007, the Corps had 2,612 FUDS in the IRP.[Footnote 2]
Performance metrics and comprehensive goals have been developed by DOD
to assess progress toward the agency's IRP goals. These goals include
progress in reaching a CERCLA cleanup phase at the site level, progress
toward achieving a "remedy in place" or "response complete" status at
the installation level, and progress in achieving overall relative-risk
reduction. Specific targets are included in DOD's annual report to
Congress.
To better focus its munitions cleanup activities on both active sites
and FUDS, DOD established the Military Munitions Response Program
(MMRP) in September 2001, as part of the DERP, specifically to address
potential explosive and environmental hazards associated with
munitions. The objectives of the program include compiling a
comprehensive inventory of military munitions sites, establishing a
prioritization protocol for sequencing work at these sites, and
establishing program goals and performance measures to evaluate
progress. In December 2001, shortly after DOD established the program,
the Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2002, which, among other things, required DOD to develop an
initial inventory of defense sites, other than military ranges still in
operation, that are known or suspected to contain military munitions by
May 31, 2003, and to provide annual updates thereafter. DOD provides
these updates as part of its annual report to Congress on Defense
environmental programs; in its 2007 report DOD had identified 3,537
sites suspected or known to have munitions contamination, an increase
of 221 sites from fiscal year 2006. Table 1 provides a summary of DOD
performance goals for MMRP and IRP.
Table 1: Summary of DOD Performance Goals for MMRP and IRP:
Phase/priority: Preliminary assessment;
Target year for completing cleanup phase for all sites: Installation
restoration program (IRP): No goal established;
Target year for completing cleanup phase for all sites: Military
munitions response program (MMRP): 2007.
Phase/priority: Site inspections;
Target year for completing cleanup phase for all sites: Installation
restoration program (IRP): No goal established;
Target year for completing cleanup phase for all sites: Military
munitions response program (MMRP): 2010.
Phase/priority: For High Priority Sites: Remedy in Place or Response
Complete (RIP/RC), or cleaned up to a lower risk level;
Target year for completing cleanup phase for all sites: Installation
restoration program (IRP): 2007;
Target year for completing cleanup phase for all sites: Military
munitions response program (MMRP): No goal established.
Phase/priority: For Medium Priority Sites: RIP/RC (or cleaned up to a
lower risk level);
Target year for completing cleanup phase for all sites: Installation
restoration program (IRP): 2011;
Target year for completing cleanup phase for all sites: Military
munitions response program (MMRP): No goal established.
Phase/priority: For Low Priority Sites: RIP/RC (or cleaned up to a
lower risk level);
Target year for completing cleanup phase for all sites: Installation
restoration program (IRP): 2014 - Active; 2020 - FUDS;
Target year for completing cleanup phase for all sites: Military
munitions response program (MMRP): No goal established.
Source: Fiscal Year 2007 Annual Report to Congress, Department of
Defense, Defense Environmental Programs.
[End of table]
The Spring Valley Site:
The principal government entities involved in the Spring Valley cleanup
include the Corps, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the
District of Columbia. The Corps has led the effort of identifying,
investigating, and cleaning up contamination at the site, whereas EPA
primarily consulted with and provided technical assistance to the Corps
and the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia's Department of
Health has monitored the cleanup's status and adequacy, conducting such
actions as, according to the Department, assessing the human health
risks associated with any exposure to remaining hazards at Spring
Valley. Additionally, advisory entities were created to further
facilitate decision-making on technical topics.
In 2002, we reported that cleanup progress included the identification
and removal of a large number of hazards, including buried ordnance,
chemical warfare agents in glass containers, and arsenic-contaminated
soil.[Footnote 3] By April 2002 the Corps had identified and removed
5,623 cubic yards of arsenic-contaminated soil from 3 properties and
removed 667 pieces of ordnance--25 of which were chemical munitions--
and 101 bottles of chemicals. A March 2009 project overview report by
the Corps indicated that, in 2004, the Corps excavated 474 drums of
soil and recovered more than 800 items, such as construction debris,
ordnance scrap, and laboratory glassware and ceramic pieces. The report
also indicated that, by 2006, the Corps removed 5,500 cubic yards of
soil, 117 munitions debris items, 6 intact munitions items, and 31
intact containers; in addition, the excavation, backfilling, and
restoration of the debris field that contained these materials was
completed.
We reported in 2002 that the primary health risks that influenced
cleanup activities were (1) the possibility of injury or death from
exploding or leaking ordnance and containers of chemical warfare
agents; and (2) potential long-term health problems, such as cancers
and other health conditions, from exposure to arsenic-contaminated
soil. A study by the Department of Health and Human Services' Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry found no evidence of
significant exposure to arsenic in the individuals tested in 2002. In
2003, the Corps discovered perchlorate in groundwater at the site, and
installed at least 38 monitoring wells for sampling. Sampling results
identified elevated levels of perchlorate in the project area. Further
investigation is underway with more wells and sampling planned in 2009.
In April 2002, the Army estimated that the remaining cleanup activities
at Spring Valley would take 5 years to complete. Total costs for the
project were estimated at $145.9 million in fiscal year 2002; by fiscal
year 2007, the estimated total costs increased to $173.7 million.
Figure 1 presents information on the annual cost to complete[Footnote
4] and annual amounts spent to date from 2003 to the present at the
Spring Valley site.
Figure 1: Total Estimated Cost to Clean Up Spring Valley, Fiscal Years
2003 through 2007:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2003;
Total cost incurred through FY: $79.9 million;
Total cost to complete: $43.9 million.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Total cost incurred through FY: $92.1 million;
Total cost to complete: $62.6 million.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Total cost incurred through FY: $112.4 million;
Total cost to complete: $56.8 million.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Total cost incurred through FY: $123.5 million;
Total cost to complete: $45.4 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Total cost incurred through FY: $137.3 million;
Total cost to complete: $36.4 million.
Sources: Defense Environmental Restoration Program Annual Report to
Congress for Fiscal Year 2003. Defense Environmental Programs Annual
Reports to Congress for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007.
[End of figure]
Shortcomings in the Use of Available Information and Guidance Can Lead
to Poor Decision-making:
When we reviewed the Spring Valley cleanup in 2002, we found that the
Army determined that there was no evidence of large-scale burials of
hazards remaining at Spring Valley before it received all technical
input.[Footnote 5] For example, while the Army's Toxic and Hazardous
Materials Agency reviewed work done by American University and
documentation from additional sources, it also contracted with EPA's
Environmental Photographic Interpretation Center to review available
aerial photographs of the site taken during the World War I era.
However, the photographs were not received or reviewed prior to 1993,
according to EPA officials. Despite never having received technical
input from EPA on the aerial photographs, in 1986 the Army concluded
that if any materials were buried in the vicinity of the university,
the amounts were probably limited to small quantities and no further
action was needed. However, as we now know, subsequent investigations
by the Army discovered additional ordnance in large burial pits and
widespread arsenic-contaminated soil.
The experience at Spring Valley is by no means a unique occurrence. Our
review of other FUDS nationwide found significant shortcomings in the
Corps' use of available information and guidance for making decisions
relating to cleanup of contamination at these sites. For example, in
2002, we reported that the Corps did not have a sound basis for
determining that about 1,468 of 3,840 FUDS properties--38 percent--did
not need further study or cleanup action.[Footnote 6] Specifically, we
found:
* No evidence that the Corps reviewed or obtained information that
would allow it to identify all the potential hazards at these
properties or that it took sufficient steps to assess the presence of
potential hazards.
* That for about 74 percent of all NDAI properties, the site assessment
files were incomplete--i.e., the files lacked information such as site
maps or photos that would show facilities, such as ammunition storage
facilities, that could indicate the presence of hazards (e.g.
unexploded ordnance).
* That for about 60 percent of all NDAI properties the Corps may not
have contacted all the current owners to obtain information about
potential hazards present on the site.
* The Corps appeared to have overlooked or dismissed information in its
possession that indicated hazards might be present. For example, at a
nearly 1,900 acre site previously used as an airfield by both the Army
and the Navy, the file included a map showing bomb and fuse storage
units on the site that would suggest the possible presence of ordnance-
related hazards; however, we found no evidence that the Corps searched
for such hazards.
* The files contained no evidence that the Corps took sufficient steps
to assess the presence of potential hazards. For example, although
Corps guidance calls for a site visit to look for signs of potential
hazards, we estimated that the Corps did not conduct the required site
visit for 686 or about 18 percent of all NDAI properties.
We found that these problems occurred in part because the Corps'
guidance did not specify (1) what documents or level of detail the
agency should obtain when looking for information on the prior uses of
and the facilities located at FUDS properties to identify potential
hazards or (2) how to assess the presence of potential hazards. For
example, some Corps district staff stated that there was no guidance
showing the types of hazard normally found at certain types of
facilities. We concluded that, since many properties may have not been
properly assessed, the Corps did not know the number of additional
properties that may require cleanup, the hazards that were present at
those properties, the risk associated with these hazards, the length of
time needed for cleanup, or the cost to clean up the properties.
To address these problems, we recommended that the Corps develop more
specific guidelines and procedures for identifying and assessing
potential hazards at FUDS and to use them to review NDAI files and
determine which properties should be reassessed. DOD told us that it
has implemented this recommendation; however, according to one major
association of state regulators, problems persist in how the Corps
makes NDAI determinations in many cases. In 2008, the association
published a fact sheet indicating, among other things, that the
evidence collected is not adequate for making determinations.[Footnote
7] We will be reviewing some aspects of this decision making process as
part of our ongoing work on FUDS and MMRP.
Incomplete Data on Site Conditions and Emerging Contaminants Can
Interfere With the Development of Accurate Cost Estimates and
Schedules:
At Spring Valley, the Corps' estimate of the cost to complete cleanup
of the site increased by about six fold--from about $21 million to
about $124 million--from fiscal year 1997 through 2001. Factors such as
the future discovery of hazards made it inherently challenging for the
Corps to estimate the costs for completing cleanup activities at the
site. Future estimates of the cost to complete cleanup of the site also
depend on assumptions about how many properties require the removal of
arsenic-contaminated soil and how many properties need to be surveyed
and excavated to remove possible buried hazards. As these assumptions
have changed, the cost to cleanup Spring Valley has continued to rise
where the most recent estimate for fiscal year 2007 is $173.7 million.
The challenges of estimating the costs of the Spring Valley cleanup are
common to many FUDS, and our past work has shown that incomplete data
on site conditions and emerging contaminants can interfere with the
development of accurate cost and schedule estimates. For example, in
2004, we evaluated DOD's MMRP program and found several weaknesses in
preliminary cost estimates for numerous sites.[Footnote 8] We found
that a variety of factors, including the modeling tool used to compile
cost estimates, contributed to these weaknesses. Specifically, when
detailed, site-specific information was not available for all sites, we
found that DOD used estimates, including assumptions about the amount
of acreage known or suspected of containing military munitions when
preparing its cost projections. As a result, the cost estimates varied
widely during the life of some cleanup projects. For example, the Corps
confirmed the presence of unexploded ordnance at Camp Maxey in Texas,
and in 2000, estimated cleanup costs at $45 million. In its fiscal year
2002 annual report, DOD reported that the estimated total cost had
tripled and grown to $130 million, and then in June 2003, the estimate
decreased to about $73 million--still 62 percent more than the original
cost estimate. The main factors behind these shifting cost estimates,
according to the project manager, were changes in the acreage requiring
underground removal of ordnance and changes in the amount of ordnance
found.
To address the challenges of estimating costs, schedules, and other
aspects of munitions response, we made a number of recommendations
related to various elements of DOD's comprehensive plan for
identifying, assessing and cleaning up military munitions at
potentially contaminated sites. In its response to our 2004 report and
recommendations, DOD said that it was working on developing better cost
estimates, and that the Corps would designate 84 percent of its
environmental restoration budget in fiscal year 2007 for investigations
and cleanup actions. According to DOD, this funding would help the
Corps gather more site specific information, which in turn could be
used for better determining the expected cost to complete cleanup at
FUDS.
We found that these concerns are also not limited to just FUDS but also
affect operational ranges as well.[Footnote 9] When we reviewed the
development of DOD's cost estimates for addressing potential
liabilities associated with unexploded ordnance, discarded military
munitions, and munitions constituents on operational ranges, we found
that DOD's cost estimates for cleanup were questionable because the
estimates were based on inconsistent data and invalidated assumptions.
[Footnote 10]
The presence of newly identified contaminants at sites needing cleanup
further complicates DOD's efforts to develop reliable cost estimates.
In 2004, we found that DOD does not have a comprehensive policy
requiring sampling or cleanup of the more than 200 chemical
contaminants associated with military munitions on operational ranges.
Of these 200 contaminants, 20 are of great concern to DOD due to their
widespread use and potential environmental impact--including
perchlorate. According to our 2005 report, perchlorate has been found
in the drinking water, groundwater, surface water, or soil in 35
states, the District of Columbia (including the Spring Valley site),
and 2 commonwealths of the United States.[Footnote 11] In its 2007
Annual Report to Congress, DOD indicated that new requirements to
address emerging contaminants like perchlorate will drive its
investments in cleanup, and require modifications in plans and
programs, and adjustments to total cleanup and cost to complete
estimates. However, there is limited information on the potential costs
of addressing these emerging contaminants and how their cleanup may
affect overall site cleanup schedules. This is partly because none of
these munitions constituents are currently regulated by a federal
drinking water standard under the Safe Drinking Water Act, although
perchlorate, for example, is the subject of a federal interim health
advisory and several state drinking water standards. Our 2004 report
recommended that DOD provide specific funding for comprehensive
sampling for perchlorate at sites where no sampling had been conducted;
although DOD disagreed at the time, it recently took action to sample
hundreds of locations nationwide.
Funding Available for a Particular Site May Be Influenced by Overall
Program Goals and Other Priorities:
Spring Valley has received priority funding due to its proximity to the
nation's capitol and high visibility; however, our past work shows that
this is not the case with most FUDS. Over the past 10 years DOD has
invested nearly $42 billion in its environmental programs, which
include compliance, restoration, natural resources conservation, and
pollution prevention activities. In fiscal year 2007, DOD obligated
approximately $4 billion for environmental activities, but only $1.4
billion of this total was utilized for DERP environmental restoration
activities at active installations and FUDS. Of this amount, $1.2
billion funded cleanup of hazardous substances, pollutants and
contaminants from past DOD activities through the Installation
Restoration Program (IRP) and $215.8 million funded activities to
address unexploded ordnance, discarded military munitions and munitions
constituents through the Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP).
Figure 2 shows expenditures through fiscal year 2007, DOD's estimated
costs to complete, and the fiscal year 2007 obligations for the IRP and
MMRP at active sites and FUDS.
Figure 2: Funding Summary for IRP and MMRP Programs:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Program: Expenditure through FY 2007;
IRP: $19.8 billion;
MMRP: $0.9 billion.
Program: Cost to complete as of 2007;
IRP: $10.2 billion;
MMRP: $18.3 billion.
Program: FY 2007 obligation;
IRP: $1.2 billion;
MMRP: $0.2 billion.
Source: Defense Environmental Programs Annual Report to Congress for
Fiscal Year 2007.
[End of figure]
DOD requests separate funding amounts for active sites and FUDS cleanup
programs based on specific DERP restoration goals and the total number
of sites in each program's inventory. Goals are set separately for the
IRP and MMRP; target dates for cleanup of high priority sites are
different for these programs. Furthermore, while DOD has established
Department-wide goals, each service has its own goals, which may
differ, and determines the allocation of funds between IRP and MMRP.
Specifically, for the IRP, the DOD goal is to have a remedy in place or
response complete for all active sites and FUDS by fiscal year 2020.
However, DOD has requested much greater budgets for active sites than
for FUDS. For example, DOD requested $257.8 million for FUDS or only
one-fifth of the amount requested for active sites for fiscal year
2009. Similarly, obligations in fiscal year 2007 totaled $969.8 million
for active sites, whereas FUDS obligations only totaled $219.4 million.
According to the most recent annual report to Congress, DOD does not
expect to complete the IRP goal for FUDS until fiscal year 2060. DOD is
aiming to complete cleanup of IRP sites much earlier than MMRP sites,
even if higher-risk MMRP sites have not yet been addressed.
For MMRP, DOD's first goal was to complete preliminary assessments for
FUDS as well as active sites, by the end of fiscal year 2007.[Footnote
12] DOD reported that it has reached this goal for 96 percent of MMRP
sites. However, it is not clear if this percentage includes sites
recently added to the site inventory. DOD also has an MMRP goal of
completing all site inspections by the end of fiscal year 2010, but has
not yet set a goal for achieving remedy in place or response complete.
Our ongoing reviews of the FUDS and MMRP programs will include more in-
depth analyses of the prioritization processes used by DOD for active
sites and FUDS.
Better Coordination and Communication with Regulators and Property
Owners Can Increase Public Confidence and Facilitate Effective Decision-
making:
In our 2002 report on Spring Valley, we reported that the Corps, EPA
and the District of Columbia had made progress on site cleanup by
adopting a partnership approach for making cleanup decisions.[Footnote
13] Importantly, they established a systematic means of communicating
information to, and receiving input from, the residents of Spring
Valley and other interested members of the public. While the entities
did not agree on all cleanup decisions, officials of all three
entities--the Corps, the District of Columbia, and EPA--stated that the
partnership had been working effectively. However, we have found that
this kind of cooperation and coordination does not always occur at
other sites nationwide. For example:
* In 2003, we conducted a survey to determine how the Corps coordinates
with state regulators during the assessment and cleanup of FUDS. We
found that the Corps did not involve the states consistently, and that
EPA had little involvement in the cleanup of most FUDS.[Footnote 14] We
found that the Corps informed states of upcoming work at hazardous
waste projects 53 percent of the time and requested states' input and
participation 50 percent of the time. We reported that federal and
state regulators believed that better coordination with the Corps
regarding cleanup at FUDS would increase public confidence in the
cleanups and improve their effectiveness.
* Some state regulators told us that inadequate Corps coordination has
made it more difficult for them to carry out their regulatory
responsibilities at FUDS properties and that, because of their lack of
involvement, they have frequently questioned Corps cleanup decisions at
FUDS. Conversely, when Corps coordination has occurred, states have
been more likely to agree with Corps decisions. Several states also
told us that they would like to see EPA become more involved in the
cleanup process, for example, by participating in preliminary
assessments of eligibility or providing states with funds to review
Corps work. EPA also believed that a better-coordinated effort among
all parties would improve the effectiveness of cleanup at FUDS and
increase public confidence in the actions taken at these sites, but
emphasized it did not expect its involvement to be consistent across
all phases of work; rather, that it would increase its involvement at a
site when conditions warranted--for example, if there were "imminent
and substantial endangerment" or if it had concerns about the
appropriateness of the cleanup.
We also found that EPA and DOD disagreed on EPA's role in the FUDS
program. Although EPA is the primary regulator for the FUDS that are on
the National Priorities List, the states are typically the primary
regulatory agency involved for all other FUDS. EPA told us that its
role at some of these unlisted FUDS should be greater because it
believes it can help improve the effectiveness of the cleanups and
increase public confidence in the program. DOD and some states
disagreed with this position because they do not believe there is a
need for additional EPA oversight of DOD's work at unlisted FUDS
properties where the state is the lead regulator. We concluded in 2003
that the lack of a good working relationship between two federal
cleanup agencies may hamper efforts to properly assess properties for
cleanup and may, in some cases, result in some duplication of effort.
We also concluded in this 2003 report that a factor behind the
historical lack of consistency in the Corps coordination with
regulators could be that DOD and Corps guidance does not offer specific
requirements that describe exactly how the Corps should involve
regulators. To address these shortcomings, we recommended that DOD and
the Corps develop clear and specific guidance that explicitly includes,
among other things, what coordination should take place during
preliminary assessments of eligibility on projects involving ordnance
and explosive waste. We also recommended that DOD and the Corps assess
recent efforts to improve coordination at the national as well as
district level and promote wider distribution of best practices; and
work with EPA to clarify their respective roles in the cleanup of
former defense sites that are not on the National Priorities List. DOD,
representing the Corps and DOD, generally agreed with our
recommendations and has since implemented additional changes to improve
its coordination with regulators, including revising its guidance to
include step-by-step procedures for regulatory coordination at each
phase of FUDS cleanup. However, we have not reassessed DOD's efforts or
reviewed its coordination efforts since our 2003 report.
In addition to better coordination with regulators, our past work has
shown that the Corps frequently did not notify property owners of its
determinations that the properties did not need further action, as
called for in its guidance, or instruct the owners to contact the Corps
if evidence of DOD-caused hazards was found later. In 2002, we
estimated that the Corps failed to notify current owners of its
determinations for about 72 percent of the properties that the Corps
determined did not need further study or cleanup action.[Footnote 15]
Even when the Corps notified the owners of its determinations, we
estimated that for 91 percent of these properties it did not instruct
the owners to contact the Corps if evidence of potential hazards was
found later. In some cases, several years elapsed before the Corps
notified owners of its determinations. We concluded that this lack of
communication with property owners hindered the Corps' ability to
reconsider, when appropriate, its determinations that no further study
or cleanup action was necessary.
As a result of our findings, we recommended that the Corps consistently
implement procedures to ensure that owners are notified of NDAI
determinations and its policy of reconsidering its determinations if
evidence of DOD-caused hazards is found later. DOD has implemented this
recommendation although we have not reviewed its implementation.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, as we move forward on the cleanup of the
Spring Valley site, we believe that the lessons learned from DOD's
national environmental cleanup programs provides valuable insights that
could guide decision-making and also inform the oversight process. The
experience at the national level tells us that while not all the
information that DOD needs is always available, it is imperative that
the information that is available should be duly considered when
developing cleanup plans and estimates. Moreover, involving regulators
and property owners can also better ensure that DOD has the best
information on which to make its decisions. Finally, it is important to
recognize that emerging and unexpected situations can cause significant
changes in both cost and time schedules and this could have funding
implications as well for specific cleanup sites.
This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to respond to any
questions from you or other Members of the Subcommittee.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. For further
information about this testimony, please contact Anu Mittal at (202)
512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Key contributors to this testimony were
Diane Raynes, Elizabeth Beardsley, Alison O'Neill, Justin Mausel, and
Amanda Leisoo.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Perchlorate is the primary oxidizer in propellants, present in
varying amounts in explosives, and is highly soluble. Exposure to
perchlorate affects the human thyroid, and certain levels of exposure
may result in hyperthyroidism in adults and developmental delays in
children.
[2] There are also 422 Building Demolition/Debris Removal category
sites in the FUDS IRP program.
[3] GAO, Environmental Contamination: Many Uncertainties Affect the
Progress of the Spring Valley Cleanup, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-556] (Washington D.C.: June 6,
2002).
[4] DOD periodically estimates the remaining costs necessary to
complete restoration based on data about contamination and cleanup
requirements at each site; these estimates are known as "costs to
complete."
[5] GAO, Environmental Contamination: Many Uncertainties Affect the
Progress of the Spring Valley Cleanup, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-556] (Washington D.C.: June 6,
2002).
[6] GAO, Environmental Contamination: Corps Needs to Reassess Its
Determinations That Many Former Defense Sites Do Not Need Cleanup,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-658] (Washington D.C.:
Aug. 23, 2002).
[7] Military Munitions Response Program Preliminary Assessment/Site
Investigation Fact Sheet, a report prepared by the Association of State
and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials, (Washington, D.C.:
September 2008).
[8] GAO, Military Munitions: DOD Needs to Develop a Comprehensive
Approach for Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-147] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19,
2004).
[9] Operational ranges are areas used to conduct research, develop and
test military munitions, or train military personnel.
[10] GAO, DOD Operational Ranges: More Reliable Cleanup Cost Estimates
and a Proactive Approach to Identifying Contamination Are Needed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-601] (Washington D.C.:
May 2004).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-601].
[12] The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007 required the Secretary of Defense to set four goals for the MMRP:
(1) to complete preliminary assessments for active sites, other than
operational ranges, and FUDS by September 30, 2007; (2) to complete
site assessments at such sites by September 30, 2010; (3) to achieve
remedy in place or response complete at pre-2005 BRAC sites by
September 30, 2009; and (4) to achieve remedy in place or response
complete at active sites, FUDS, and 2005 BRAC sites by a date to be
established by the Secretary.
[13] GAO, Environmental Contamination: Many Uncertainties Affect the
Progress of the Spring Valley Cleanup, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-556] (Washington D.C.: June 6,
2002).
[14] GAO, Environmental Protection: DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve
Cleanup Coordination at Former Defense Sites but Clearer Guidance Is
Needed to Ensure Consistency, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-146], (Washington, D.C.: March
2003).
[15] GAO, Environmental Contamination: Corps Needs to Reassess Its
Determinations That Many Former Defense Sites Do Not Need Cleanup,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-658], (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 23, 2002).
[End of section]
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