Defense Acquisitions
Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems Gao ID: GAO-09-520 July 30, 2009From 2008 through 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest over $16 billion to develop and procure additional unmanned aircraft systems. To more effectively leverage its acquisition resources, DOD recognizes that it must achieve greater commonality among the military services' unmanned aircraft programs. Doing so, however, requires certain trade-offs and complex budget, cost, and schedule interactions. GAO was asked to assess the progress of selected unmanned aircraft acquisition programs, examine the extent to which the services are collaborating and identifying commonality among those programs, and identify key factors impacting the effectiveness their collaboration. GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and performance data for eight unmanned aircraft systems--accounting for over 80 percent of DOD's total planned investment in unmanned aircraft systems from 2008 through 2013--and two payload programs.
While proving successful on the battlefield, DOD's unmanned aircraft acquisitions continue to incur cost and schedule growth. The cumulative development costs for the 10 programs GAO reviewed increased by over $3.3 billion (37 percent in 2009 dollars) from initial estimates--with nearly $2.7 billion attributed to the Air Force's Global Hawk program. While 3 of the 10 programs had little or no development cost growth and 1 had a cost reduction, 6 programs experienced significant growth ranging from 60 percent to 264 percent. These outcomes are largely the result of changes in program requirements and system designs. Procurement funding requirements have also increased for most programs, primarily because of increases in the number of aircraft being procured, changes in system requirements, and upgrades and retrofits to equip fielded systems with capabilities that had been deferred. Overall, procurement unit costs increased by 12 percent, with unit cost increases of 25 percent or more for 3 aircraft programs. Finally, several programs have experienced significant delays in achieving initial operating capability, ranging from 1 to nearly 4 years. Several of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs GAO reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage resources and gain efficiencies. For example, the Marine Corps chose to procure the Army's Shadow system after it determined Shadow could meet its requirements, and was able to avoid the cost of initial system development and quickly deliver capability to the warfighter. Also, the Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance system will use a modified Global Hawk airframe. However, other programs have missed opportunities to achieve commonality and efficiencies. The Army's Sky Warrior--which is a variant of the Air Force's Predator, is being developed by the same contractor, and will provide similar capabilities--was initiated as a separate development program in 2005. Sky Warrior development is now estimated to cost nearly $570 million. DOD officials continue to press for more commonality in the two programs, but the aircraft still have little in common. Although several unmanned aircraft programs have achieved airframe commonality, service-driven acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration are key factors that have inhibited commonality among subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. For example, the Army chose to develop a new sensor payload for its Sky Warrior, despite the fact that the sensor currently used on the Air Force's Predator is comparable and manufactured by the same contractor. To support their respective requirements, the services also make resource allocation decisions independently. DOD officials have not quantified the potential costs or benefits of pursuing various alternatives, including common systems. To maximize acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD have increasingly pushed for more commonality among unmanned aircraft systems.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-520, Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems
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[On July 31, 2009, figure 1 on page 8, was revised to correct a
typographical error in the reported cost difference for the UCAS-D
(Navy) program.]
Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2009:
Defense Acquisitions:
Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies
among Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
GAO-09-520:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-520, a report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
From 2008 through 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest
over $16 billion to develop and procure additional unmanned aircraft
systems. To more effectively leverage its acquisition resources, DOD
recognizes that it must achieve greater commonality among the military
services‘ unmanned aircraft programs. Doing so, however, requires
certain trade-offs and complex budget, cost, and schedule interactions.
GAO was asked to assess the progress of selected unmanned aircraft
acquisition programs, examine the extent to which the services are
collaborating and identifying commonality among those programs, and
identify key factors impacting the effectiveness their collaboration.
GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and performance data for eight unmanned
aircraft systems”accounting for over 80 percent of DOD‘s total planned
investment in unmanned aircraft systems from 2008 through 2013”and two
payload programs.
What GAO Found:
While proving successful on the battlefield, DOD‘s unmanned aircraft
acquisitions continue to incur cost and schedule growth. The cumulative
development costs for the 10 programs GAO reviewed increased by over
$3.3 billion (37 percent in 2009 dollars) from initial estimates”with
nearly $2.7 billion attributed to the Air Force‘s Global Hawk program.
While 3 of the 10 programs had little or no development cost growth and
1 had a cost reduction, 6 programs experienced significant growth
ranging from 60 percent to 264 percent. These outcomes are largely the
result of changes in program requirements and system designs.
Procurement funding requirements have also increased for most programs,
primarily because of increases in the number of aircraft being
procured, changes in system requirements, and upgrades and retrofits to
equip fielded systems with capabilities that had been deferred.
Overall, procurement unit costs increased by 12 percent, with unit cost
increases of 25 percent or more for 3 aircraft programs. Finally,
several programs have experienced significant delays in achieving
initial operating capability, ranging from 1 to nearly 4 years.
Several of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition
programs GAO reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage
resources and gain efficiencies. For example, the Marine Corps chose to
procure the Army‘s Shadow system after it determined Shadow could meet
its requirements, and was able to avoid the cost of initial system
development and quickly deliver capability to the warfighter. Also, the
Navy‘s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance system will use a modified
Global Hawk airframe. However, other programs have missed opportunities
to achieve commonality and efficiencies. The Army‘s Sky Warrior”which
is a variant of the Air Force‘s Predator, is being developed by the
same contractor, and will provide similar capabilities”was initiated as
a separate development program in 2005. Sky Warrior development is now
estimated to cost nearly $570 million. DOD officials continue to press
for more commonality in the two programs, but the aircraft still have
little in common.
Although several unmanned aircraft programs have achieved airframe
commonality, service-driven acquisition processes and ineffective
collaboration are key factors that have inhibited commonality among
subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. For example, the
Army chose to develop a new sensor payload for its Sky Warrior, despite
the fact that the sensor currently used on the Air Force‘s Predator is
comparable and manufactured by the same contractor. To support their
respective requirements, the services also make resource allocation
decisions independently. DOD officials have not quantified the
potential costs or benefits of pursuing various alternatives, including
common systems. To maximize acquisition resources and meet increased
demand, Congress and DOD have increasingly pushed for more commonality
among unmanned aircraft systems.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD (1) direct a comprehensive analysis and develop
a strategy to gain commonality among current unmanned aircraft programs
and (2) require new programs to demonstrate that opportunities for
commonality were adequately assessed. DOD agreed with the
recommendations except for the need for a comprehensive analysis. GAO
believes this recommendation remains valid.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-520] or key
components. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202)
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Unmanned Aircraft Acquisitions Have Experienced Cost Growth, Schedule
Delays, and Performance Problems:
Efforts to Achieve Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft
Programs Have Had Mixed Success:
Service-Driven Acquisition Processes and Ineffective Collaboration Have
Reduced Opportunities for Commonality:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Program Ongoing and Future
Efforts:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Table 1: DOD's Unmanned Aircraft by Class:
Table 2: Procurement Cost and Quantity Changes in Selected Programs:
Table 3: Changes in Development Schedule for Selected Unmanned Aircraft
Programs:
Table 4: Commonality among Selected Unmanned Aircraft Programs:
Table 5: OSD and Service Efforts to Achieve Predator and Sky Warrior
Commonality:
Table 6: Characteristics of Selected Tactical and Theater-Level
Unmanned Aircraft:
Table 7: Comparison of Key System Capabilities:
Table 8: DOD Planned Investment for Global Hawk, Fiscal Years 2008-
2013:
Table 9: DOD Planned Investment for Reaper, Fiscal Years 2008-2013:
Table 10: DOD Planned Investment for Shadow, Fiscal Years 2008-2013:
Table 11: DOD Planned Investment for Sky Warrior, Fiscal Years 2008-
2013:
Table 12: DOD Planned Investment for Predator, Fiscal Years 2008-2013:
Table 13: DOD Planned Investment for VTUAV, Fiscal Years 2008-2013:
Table 14: DOD Planned Investment for BAMS, Fiscal Years 2008-2013:
Table 15: DOD Planned Investment for UCAS-D, Fiscal Years 2008-2013:
Table 16: DOD Planned Investment for ASIP, Fiscal Years 2008-2013:
Table 17: DOD Planned Investment for MP-RTIP, Fiscal Years 2008-2013:
Figure 1: Development Cost Changes in Selected Programs:
Figure 2: RQ-4 Global Hawk:
Figure 3: MQ-9 Reaper:
Figure 4: RQ-7B Shadow 200 (Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle):
Figure 5: MQ-1C Extended Range Multi-Purpose UAS (Sky Warrior):
Figure 6: MQ-1 Predator:
Figure 7: Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle
(Navy Fire Scout):
Figure 8: FCS XM157 Class IV Unmanned Aircraft System (Army Fire
Scout):
Figure 9: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System:
Figure 10: Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration:
Figure 11: Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload:
Figure 12: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program:
Abbreviations:
ASIP: Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload:
AT&L: Acquisition, Technology and Logistics:
BAMS: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance:
BCT: Brigade Combat Team:
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOT&E: Director of Operational Test and Evaluation:
FCS: Future Combat Systems:
ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
JCIDS: Joint Capability Integrated Development System:
JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System:
J-UCAS: Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems:
LCS: Littoral Combat Ship:
LRIP: Low Rate Initial Production:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
MP-RTIP: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program:
RDT&E: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation:
SIGINT: Signals Intelligence:
TCDL: Tactical Common Data Link:
UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System:
UCAS-D: Unmanned Combat Aircraft System Demonstration:
VTUAV: Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle:
WIN-T: Warfighter Information Network - Tactical:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 30, 2009:
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie:
Chairman:
The Honorable Roscoe Bartlett:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
From 2002 through 2008, the number of unmanned aircraft in the
Department of Defense's (DOD) inventory increased from 167 to more than
6,000 in an effort to meet growing warfighter demand for these
capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD has noted that meeting this
demand has been difficult because of the highly dynamic nature of
supporting ongoing combat operations while developing new and emerging
capabilities. The department plans to invest more than $16 billion from
2008 through 2013 to develop and procure additional unmanned aircraft
systems. However, the growing number of national priorities competing
for federal dollars will continue to challenge DOD's efforts to meet
escalating demands for unmanned systems.
DOD recognizes that to more effectively leverage its acquisition
resources, it must achieve greater commonality and efficiency among the
military services' various unmanned system acquisition programs.
Achieving commonality, however, can be difficult. We have reported in
the past that programs that involve more than one service require
complex budget, cost, and schedule interactions and are likely to
require the services to make more trade-offs than a single service
development would.[Footnote 1] We have also found that joint
development efforts have often been hampered by an inability to obtain
and sustain commitments and support from the military services and
other stakeholders.[Footnote 2] However, given your interest in how DOD
is establishing requirements for new intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities--including unmanned aircraft systems--and
considering opportunities to leverage existing capabilities or achieve
commonality, you asked us to assess DOD's tactical and theater-level
unmanned aircraft acquisition programs. Specifically, we (1) assessed
the cost, schedule, and performance progress of selected tactical and
theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs; (2) examined the
extent to which the military services are collaborating and identifying
commonality among those programs; and (3) identified the key factors
influencing the effectiveness of their collaboration.
To conduct our work, we collected and analyzed cost, schedule, and
performance data for 10 acquisition programs: eight unmanned aircraft
systems--Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow, Predator, Sky Warrior, Fire
Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), and Unmanned Combat
Aircraft System Demonstration (UCAS-D)--and two payload development
programs--Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP)
and Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP). Collectively, the
eight aircraft programs account for more than 80 percent of DOD's total
planned investment in unmanned aircraft systems from fiscal year 2008
through fiscal year 2013. To determine the extent to which the military
services are collaborating and identifying commonality and the factors
affecting that collaboration, we reviewed and analyzed key program
documents and prior GAO work and conducted numerous interviews with and
received briefings from relevant DOD and contractor officials. For
additional details on how we performed our review, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to July 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
Most of the unmanned aircraft programs we reviewed have experienced
cost increases, schedule delays, performance shortfalls, or some
combination of these problems. Development cost estimates for the 10
programs we assessed, collectively, have increased more than $3.3
billion (37 percent in 2009 dollars) from initial estimates--with $2.7
billion attributed to the Air Force's Global Hawk program. Global Hawk
development cost estimates have increased more than 260 percent from
original estimates, in large part to acquire a larger and unproven
airframe with immature technologies. Procurement funding requirements
have also increased for most programs, primarily because of increases
in the number of aircraft being procured, changes in system
requirements, and upgrades and retrofits to equip fielded systems with
capabilities that had been deferred. Overall, procurement unit costs
increased by 12 percent, with three aircraft programs experiencing unit
cost increases of 25 percent or more. Four programs have reported
delays of 1 year or more in delivering capability to the warfighter.
The Army's Sky Warrior has already slipped its projected delivery date
by nearly 4 years. Four unmanned aircraft systems--Global Hawk,
Predator, Reaper, and Shadow--have been used in combat operations with
notable success and key lessons learned. However, in some cases,
rushing aircraft into service has led to performance issues and caused
delays in development and operational testing and verification.
DOD's unmanned aircraft acquisition programs are collaborating and
identifying areas of commonality to varying degrees. In some cases,
programs have been able to leverage resources and achieve efficiencies.
For example, the Marine Corps determined that the Army's Shadow system
could sufficiently meet its current requirements and chose to procure
the existing Army system. By pursuing a common solution, the Marine
Corps was able to avoid the cost of initial system development and
quickly deliver useful capability to the warfighter. While the Navy
expects to save time and money on BAMS by using the existing Global
Hawk airframe, as well as payloads and subsystems from other programs,
risks remain. A Navy official noted that the Navy plans to spend over
$3 billion in development, primarily to integrate payloads, make
airframe modifications, and purchase aircraft. The Army and Air Force
have not effectively collaborated on their Sky Warrior and Predator
programs. Greater savings could have been achieved given that the Sky
Warrior is a variant of the Predator and is being developed by the same
contractor. The Army initiated the Sky Warrior development program,
which is estimated to cost nearly $570 million in 2005 despite the fact
that Predator was already successfully providing reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities to the warfighter.
DOD officials continue to press for more commonality in these two
programs, but the two aircraft still have little in common.
Service-driven requirements and funding processes and ineffective
collaboration are key factors that have limited the achievement of
commonality. While several unmanned aircraft programs have achieved
airframe commonality, most are pursuing service-unique subsystems,
payloads, and ground control stations. Despite DOD's efforts to
emphasize a more joint approach to identifying and prioritizing
warfighting needs and to encourage commonality among programs, the
services continue to drive program requirements. Service officials we
spoke with cited specific reasons for service-unique requirements--some
of which have raised concerns about potential inefficiencies caused by
unnecessary duplication. For example, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) is concerned that the Army and Air Force are
unnecessarily developing two different electro-optical and infrared
sensor payloads for Sky Warrior and Predator when a common payload
could be achieved--currently the basic sensors are 80 percent common
and manufactured by the same contractor. However, according to Army
officials, the Air Force sensor is more expensive and has capabilities,
such as high-definition video, for which the Army has no requirements.
Therefore, the Army does not believe a fully common solution is
warranted. Likewise, the services independently make resource
allocation decisions to support their respective requirements. DOD
officials have not quantified the potential costs or benefits of
pursuing various alternatives, including common systems. In general,
the services have been reluctant to collaborate and efforts to do so
have produced mixed results. However, to maximize acquisition resources
and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD have increasingly pushed
for more commonality among unmanned aircraft systems.
To achieve the goal of more effectively leveraging resources and
increasing the efficiency in unmanned aircraft acquisition programs, we
are making two key recommendations. First, the Secretary of Defense
should direct a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the requirements
for current unmanned aircraft systems to identify areas where further
commonality can be achieved, and develop a strategy for making systems
and subsystems more common. The findings of this analysis should be
reported to Congress. Second, we are recommending that before
initiating new unmanned aircraft development programs, the Secretary
should require the services to demonstrate in their acquisition plans
and strategies that they are taking an open systems approach and that
the potential for commonality has been rigorously examined. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with the
first recommendation and agreed with the second. The department agreed
that there is significant cost benefit to leveraging commonality, but
believes that sufficient analyses have been conducted and that a
separate comprehensive analysis across all unmanned systems, with the
specific purpose of identifying opportunities for commonality, is not
needed. While the various analyses cited by DOD have identified
opportunities for commonality on a case-by-case basis, we believe that
the department would benefit from a more comprehensive, quantitative
analysis that focuses on subsystems, payloads, and ground control
stations across the unmanned aircraft portfolio.
Background:
The intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities
provided by unmanned aircraft systems have proven to be a key asset in
accomplishing combat missions in the Middle East. DOD is planning to
expand unmanned aircraft capabilities to include persistent ground
attack, electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses, cargo
airlift, and other missions. Unmanned aircraft systems generally
consist of (1) multiple aircraft, which can be expendable or
recoverable and can carry lethal or nonlethal payloads; (2) a flight
control station; (3) information and retrieval or processing stations;
and (4) in some cases, wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and
recovery platforms. Unmanned aircraft fall into one of three classes:
small, tactical, and theater (see table 1). From 2002 through 2008, the
total number of unmanned aircraft in DOD's inventory increased from 167
to over 6,000. Most of the increase has been in small aircraft, with
the more complex and expensive tactical and theater-level aircraft
increasing from 127 to 521.
Table 1: DOD's Unmanned Aircraft by Class:
Class: Small;
Gross takeoff weight, in pounds: Less than 55;
Typical level of operational control: Ground combat teams;
Mission focus: Individual team priorities.
Class: Tactical;
Gross takeoff weight, in pounds: From 55 to 1,320;
Typical level of operational control: Operational units;
Mission focus: Battalion or brigade priorities.
Class: Theater;
Gross takeoff weight, in pounds: Greater than 1,320;
Typical level of operational control: Joint Force Commander;
Mission focus: Combatant Commander's priorities.
Source: DOD, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032.
[End of table]
Four major systems--Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, and Shadow--have
been deployed and used successfully in combat. Given this success,
warfighters have demanded more systems and in many cases enhanced
capabilities. However, we recently reported that some unmanned aircraft
were not designed to meet joint service requirements or
interoperability communications standards and, as a result, cannot
easily exchange data, even within the same military service.[Footnote
3] Additionally, certain electromagnetic spectrum frequencies that are
required for wireless communications are congested because a large
number of unmanned aircraft and other weapons or communications systems
use them simultaneously. Furthermore, DOD has been unable to fully
optimize the use of its unmanned aircraft in combat operations because
it lacks an approach to allocating and tasking them that considers the
availability of all assets in determining how best to meet warfighter
needs.
To manage the increased demand for unmanned aircraft systems and
encourage collaboration among the military services, the department has
created the Office of Unmanned Warfare, the Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Task Force, and other entities. In addition, DOD has published the
Unmanned Systems Roadmap (Roadmap) that provides a framework for the
future development of unmanned systems and related technologies. The
Roadmap states that there is the potential for an unprecedented level
of collaboration to meet capability needs and reduce acquisition costs
by requiring greater commonality among the military services' unmanned
systems. We have reported that taking an open systems[Footnote 4]
approach and designing systems with common subsystems and components
can reduce both production and life cycle costs as well as improve
interoperability among systems. For maximum benefit, commonality should
be incorporated into the design of a system when requirements are being
established.[Footnote 5] Unmanned aircraft systems can potentially
achieve commonality in design and development, ranging from a complete
system to a subsystem or component, as well as commonality in
production facilities, tooling, and personnel.
Unmanned Aircraft Acquisitions Have Experienced Cost Growth, Schedule
Delays, and Performance Problems:
Despite the proven success of unmanned aircraft on the battlefield and
the growing demand for them, these acquisitions continue to incur cost
and schedule growth (see figure 1). The cumulative development cost for
the 10 programs we reviewed increased by over $3 billion, or 37
percent, from initial estimates. While 3 of the 10 programs had little
or no development cost growth and 1 had a cost reduction, 6 experienced
substantial growth ranging from 60 percent to 264 percent. In large
part, this cost growth was the result of changes in program
requirements and system designs after initiating development. Total
procurement funding requirements have grown in the past because of
increased quantities; however, many of the programs have also
experienced growth in procurement unit costs. Finally, a number of
these programs have experienced problems in testing and in performance
that required additional development that contributed to cost growth
and schedule delays (see appendix II for more detailed information
about each program).
Figure 1: Development Cost Changes in Selected Programs (dollars in
millions):
[Refer to PDF for image: table]
Aircraft programs: Global Hawk (Air Force):
Initial estimate: $1,006.1;
Current estimate: $3,657.5;
Cost difference: $3,651.4;
Percentage difference: 284%.
Aircraft programs: Reaper (Air Force):
Initial estimate: $195.4;
Current estimate: $385.5;
Cost difference: $190.1;
Percentage difference: 97%.
Aircraft programs: Shadow (Army/Marine Corps):
Initial estimate: $198.1;
Current estimate: $356.6;
Cost difference: $158.5;
Percentage difference: 80%.
Aircraft programs: Sky Warrior (Army);
Initial estimate: $333.1;
Current estimate: $568.5;
Cost difference: $235.4;
Percentage difference: 71%.
Aircraft programs: Predator (Air Force);
Initial estimate: $267.3;
Current estimate: $428.2;
Cost difference: $160.9;
Percentage difference: 60%.
Aircraft programs: Fire Scout (Navy)[A]:
Initial estimate: $577.5;
Current estimate: $605.0;
Cost difference: $27.5;
Percentage difference: 5%.
Aircraft programs: BAMS (Navy):
Initial estimate: $3,049.1;
Current estimate: $3,049.1;
Cost difference: 0;
Percentage difference: 0.
Aircraft programs: UCAS-D (Navy)[B]:
Initial estimate: $1,474.9;
Current estimate: $1,474.9;
Cost difference: 0;
Percentage difference: 0.
Payload programs: ASIP (Air Force):
Initial estimate: $219.5;
Current estimate: $461.0;
Cost difference: $241.5;
Percentage difference: 110%.
Payload programs: MP-RTIP (Air Force):
Initial estimate: $1,735.1;
Current estimate: $1,334.5;
Cost difference: -$400.6
Percentage difference: -23%.
Sources: DOD and contractor (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[A] Data only represent the Navy portion of the Fire Scout program. The
Army funding for Fire Scout is included in its Future Combat Systems
funding and cannot be individually separated.
[B] UCAS-D is a demonstration effort and is not an official system
development program.
[End of figure]
In most cases, development cost growth was the result of beginning
system development with unclear or poorly defined requirements,
immature technologies, and unstable designs--problems we have
frequently found in other major acquisition programs.[Footnote 6] The
Global Hawk program is a good example. In 2001, the Air Force began the
Global Hawk program based on knowledge gained from a demonstration
program and planned to incrementally integrate more advanced
technologies over time. However, within a year, the Air Force
fundamentally restructured and accelerated the program to pursue a
larger and unproven airframe with multi-mission capability relying on
immature technologies. The final design of the new airframe required
more substantial changes than expected. Ultimately, frequent and
substantive engineering changes drove development costs up nearly
threefold. While BAMS has reported no cost growth, the program is just
1 year into its 7-year development, and the Navy plans to spend over $3
billion in development to modify the airframe--which is the existing
Global Hawk airframe--and integrate payloads and other key equipment,
modify ground stations, and purchase two developmental and three low
rate production aircraft. BAMS program officials told us that they
anticipate that the bulk of the development cost will result from
modifying the size and shape of the existing radar payload to fit the
Global Hawk airframe. Historically, similar weapons development efforts
have had difficulty managing risk. Estimated development costs for MP-
RTIP decreased 23 percent in large part because of a significant
reduction in requirements caused by the termination of another aircraft
program for which the radar was being developed.
Procurement costs also increased for six of the seven systems that
reported procurement cost data, a large portion of which is due to the
planned procurement of additional aircraft (see table 2). For example,
the Air Force planed to procure an additional 272 Predators, and the
Army planed to procure an additional 84 Sky Warriors. As a result, unit
costs for the Predator and Sky Warrior decreased by 41 percent and 9
percent, respectively.[Footnote 7] However, Reaper and Shadow had unit
cost growth despite increased quantities. Reaper's unit costs increased
in part because requirements for missiles and a digital electronic
engine control were added--which resulted in design changes and
increased production costs. Unit cost increases in the Shadow program
were largely the result of upgrades to the airframe that were needed to
accommodate the size, weight, and power requirements for integrating a
congressionally mandated data link onto the aircraft.[Footnote 8] The
Army is also retrofitting fielded systems with capabilities that it had
initially deferred, such as a heavy fuel engine. The procurement unit
cost for Global Hawk increased the most, in large part because the Air
Force not only increased the program's requirements but also reduced
the number of aircraft it intended to purchase.
Table 2: Procurement Cost and Quantity Changes in Selected Programs
(2009 dollars in millions):
Program: Global Hawk;
Initial cost estimate: $4,171.4;
Initial quantity: 63;
Current cost estimate: $5,929.7;
Current quantity: 54;
Percentage procurement unit cost change: 66%.
Program: Reaper[A];
Initial cost estimate: $508.7;
Initial quantity: 33;
Current cost estimate: $2,405.7;
Current quantity: 118;
Percentage procurement unit cost change: 32%.
Program: Shadow;
Initial cost estimate: $447.0;
Initial quantity: 160;
Current cost estimate: $1,640.7;
Current quantity: 460;
Percentage procurement unit cost change: 28%.
Program: Fire Scout[B];
Initial cost estimate: $1,625.1;
Initial quantity: 168;
Current cost estimate: $1,743.0;
Current quantity: 168;
Percentage procurement unit cost change: 7%.
Program: BAMS;
Initial cost estimate: $9,048.6;
Initial quantity: 65;
Current cost estimate: $9,048.6;
Current quantity: 65;
Percentage procurement unit cost change: 0.
Program: Sky Warrior;
Initial cost estimate: $647.5;
Initial quantity: 48;
Current cost estimate: $1,614.2;
Current quantity: 132;
Percentage procurement unit cost change: -9%.
Program: Predator;
Initial cost estimate: $642.8;
Initial quantity: 48;
Current cost estimate: $2,546.4;
Current quantity: 320;
Percentage procurement unit cost change: -41%.
Program: Total;
Initial cost estimate: $17,091.1;
Initial quantity: 585;
Current cost estimate: $24,928.3;
Current quantity: 1,317;
Percentage procurement unit cost change: 12% (average).
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
Notes: MP-RTIP and ASIP procurement is managed and funded by the host
platform program offices, primarily Global Hawk. Further, the Navy does
not have any projected procurement costs or quantities for UCAS-D
because it is a demonstration effort and not an official development
program.
[A] Initial cost estimate provided for Reaper was based upon 33
aircraft. However, the Air Force initially planned for 63 aircraft.
[B] Data only represent the Navy portion of the Fire Scout program. The
Army funding for Fire Scout is included in its Future Combat System
funding and cannot be individually separated.
[End of table]
Four programs have also experienced delays in achieving initial
operational capability by 1 to almost 4 years (see table 3). In some
cases, program delays have been the result of expediting limited
capability to the warfighter. For example, the production decision for
the Sky Warrior was delayed by 2 years, and the Army now expects to
deliver initial operational capability[Footnote 9] to the warfighter
almost 4 years later than originally planned. Similarly, initial
operational testing to prove the larger Global Hawk airframe works as
intended has been delayed by nearly 3 years. Delays for these two
programs and BAMS and Fire Scout average more than 27 months--6 months
longer than the average delays we found in our recent assessment of
other major weapons acquisitions.[Footnote 10] In contrast, the Reaper
program expects to achieve initial operational capability 4 months
earlier than originally planned--in large part because the Air Force
expedited aircraft production to meet wartime demands.
Table 3: Changes in Development Schedule for Selected Unmanned Aircraft
Programs:
Program: Sky Warrior;
Original planned initial operational capability: May 2009;
Current planned initial operational capability: April 2013;
Change in achieving initial operational capability: 47 months.
Program: Global Hawk[A];
Original planned initial operational capability: January 2007;
Current planned initial operational capability: October 2009;
Change in achieving initial operational capability: 34 months.
Program: BAMS;
Original planned initial operational capability: August 2014;
Current planned initial operational capability: December 2015;
Change in achieving initial operational capability: 16 months.
Program: Fire Scout[B];
Original planned initial operational capability: September 2008;
Current planned initial operational capability: September 2009;
Change in achieving initial operational capability: 12 months.
Program: Predator;
Original planned initial operational capability: March 1999;
Current planned initial operational capability: March 1999;
Change in achieving initial operational capability: 0 months.
Program: Shadow;
Original planned initial operational capability: December 2002;
Current planned initial operational capability: September 2002;
Change in achieving initial operational capability: -3 months.
Program: Reaper;
Original planned initial operational capability: December 2009;
Current planned initial operational capability: August 2009;
Change in achieving initial operational capability: -4 months.
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
Note: UCAS-D was not included in this assessment because it is a
demonstration effort and has not established an initial operational
capability date.
[A] Global Hawk does not report its initial operational capability
dates, so its schedule slip was assessed using completion of initial
operational testing.
[B] Fire Scout data represent the Navy portion of the program only. The
Army Fire Scout is managed within the Army's Future Combat Systems
program--which has experienced significant schedule delays.
[End of table]
While Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, and Shadow have been deployed with
notable successes in theater--as well as identified lessons learned--
rushing to field these capabilities resulted in a number of performance
shortfalls and in some cases ultimately delayed meeting requirements.
For example, Predator--the oldest program in our sample--directly
transitioned from a successful technology demonstration program into
production, skipping the development process entirely. Because little
emphasis was placed on testing, performance requirements, and
producibility, Predator experienced numerous problems when it was
initially produced and deployed, such as unreliable communications and
poor targeting accuracy.
Given the importance of supporting combat operations, Global Hawk
demonstrators and early production aircraft were also quickly placed
into operational service. Program officials noted that as a result, the
availability of test resources and time for testing were limited, which
delayed the operational assessment of the original aircraft model by 3
years. Similarly, in February 2009, the Air Force reported that initial
operational testing for the larger more capable Global Hawk aircraft
and the program's production readiness review had schedule breaches.
Air Force officials cite the high level of concurrency between
development, production, and testing; poor contractor performance;
developmental and technical problems; system failures; and bad weather
as key reasons for the most recent schedule breach. In a recent letter
to the Global Hawk contractor, the Air Force's Chief Acquisition
Executive noted that unless the program's problems are resolved
quickly, the Air Force may have to consider deferring authorization of
future production lots, terminating future modernization efforts, and
canceling development and production of the aircraft that are planned
to carry the MP-RTIP radar. According to program officials, they are
currently in the process of developing a plan to address the schedule
breaches.
Efforts to Achieve Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft
Programs Have Had Mixed Success:
Consistent with DOD's framework for acquiring unmanned systems, several
of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition
programs we reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage
resources and gain efficiencies. However, others share little in common
and have missed opportunities to achieve commonality and efficiencies.
Even those programs that have achieved some commonality may have
additional opportunities to leverage resources. Table 4 compares the
levels of commonality for three of our case examples.
Table 4: Commonality among Selected Unmanned Aircraft Programs:
Program: Shadow;
Services: Army and Marine Corps;
Airframe: [Check];
Payloads: [Check];
Ground control station: [Check].
Program: BAMS/Global Hawk;
Services: Navy and Air Force;
Airframe: [Check];
Payloads: [Empty];
Ground control station: [Empty].
Program: Predator/Sky Warrior;
Services: Air Force and Army;
Airframe: [Empty];
Payloads: [Empty];
Ground control station: [Empty].
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
The Army and Marine Corps Have Achieved Full Commonality in the Shadow
Program:
In assessing options for replacing an aging tactical unmanned aircraft
system,[Footnote 11] the Marine Corps determined that the Army's Shadow
system could meet its requirements for reconnaissance, surveillance,
and target acquisition capabilities without any service-unique
modifications. An official from DOD's Office of Unmanned Warfare
emphasized that the Marine Corps believed that Shadow represented a
"100 percent" solution. The Marine Corps also found that it could use
the Army's ground control station to pilot the Shadow aircraft as well
as other Marine Corps unmanned aircraft. A memorandum of agreement was
established in July 2007 to articulate how the Marine Corps and the
Army would coordinate to acquire Shadow systems. The agreement details
the management structure, lines of accountability, and funding
arrangements between the two services, and establishes that the Marine
Corps will procure systems directly off the Army contract. While formal
decisions to pursue common systems were made at the service executive
level, Army officials told us that collaboration initiated at the
program office level was the primary driver in achieving commonality.
By forgoing any service-unique modifications in order to achieve a high
level of commonality, the Marine Corps was able to avoid the costs of
developing the Shadow. Those costs were borne by the Army and totaled
over $180 million. The Marine Corps plans to spend almost $9 million
from fiscal years 2009 through 2015 to support development of
additional capabilities for the Shadow, to include a backup takeoff
mechanism for the automatic takeoff and landing system. Additionally,
the Marine Corps and Army are likely to realize some benefits in
supporting and maintaining the systems because the components are
interchangeable. According to an official at the Navy, the Marine Corps
has been able to realize savings or cost avoidance in other areas such
as administration, contracting, and testing, although quantitative data
on these savings were not available. The Army's Shadow program office
agreed that commonality has allowed the two services to realize
economies of scale while meeting each service's needs.
Maintaining a high level of commonality in the Shadow program will
require continued commitment from the services and careful management.
Specifically, as the Army and Marine Corps explore ways to add
additional capabilities to Shadow, the services will need to continue
to collaborate to maximize efficiencies. For example, in order to
maintain commonality with the Army, the Marine Corps is spending money
to add capabilities that meet Shadow requirements established by the
Army. Likewise, the Army is interested in adopting capabilities that
the Marine Corps developed for Shadow. Army officials told us that the
Marine Corps is exploring ways to retrofit the Shadow so that it can
carry a weapons payload. They stated that although the Army does not
have a requirement for a weapons payload and has no plans to spend
money on its development, the Army would be interested in acquiring
this capability.
BAMS and Global Hawk Have Achieved Some Commonality, but Greater
Efficiencies Are Possible:
The Navy BAMS and Air Force Global Hawk programs have achieved some
commonality between their unmanned aircraft systems--specifically, the
airframes for the two systems are common. However, the payload and
subsystem requirements differ; and while some BAMS ground station
requirements are common with those of the Global Hawk, the BAMS
contractor noted that the Navy also has some unique requirements. To
meet its requirement for persistent maritime intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capability, the Navy awarded the
development contract to the Global Hawk contractor, which had proposed
a variant of the Global Hawk airframe. Given the commonality between
the two airframes, the Navy expects to avoid some development costs and
gain efficiencies in production. Since the development contract award,
the Navy and Air Force have worked together to identify commonalities
to gain additional efficiencies where possible. According to a Navy
official, one of the goals of this partnership is for the BAMS program
to benefit from lessons learned by the Global Hawk program and thereby
avoid the types of problems Global Hawk experienced during development.
[Footnote 12] Officials from the Defense Contract Management Agency
emphasized the importance of using these lessons.
The BAMS payload and subsystem requirements differ from those of Global
Hawk. However, the Navy has identified opportunities to achieve
commonality with other aircraft programs rather than developing a
service-unique solution. For example, the Navy plans to equip BAMS with
the same electro-optical and infrared sensor used on the Air Force's
Reaper unmanned aircraft. In addition, the Navy plans to equip BAMS
with a maritime search radar based on radars used on the Air Force's F-
16 and F-22 aircraft. BAMS will also rely on communications equipment
that has been fielded on multiple weapon systems. Furthermore, BAMS
will use an open systems approach in developing its payloads. A BAMS
program official told us that the Navy expects to gain efficiencies in
development, operations, training, and manpower.
Even with these areas of commonality, the Navy anticipates spending
more than $3 billion on development, a substantial portion of which
will be used to modify the airframe and ground stations and to
integrate payloads, including the radar, to meet Navy-specific needs.
According to a program official, the radar technology is mature because
it has proven to be functional on fighter aircraft. However, the radar
will require modifications to both size and shape before it can be
integrated onto the airframe; these modifications are expected to
constitute a large portion of the BAMS development cost. Although OSD
certified that all BAMS critical technologies were mature at the start
of development, OSD officials recently told us that they have some
concerns about the radar's level of maturity. The Navy also plans to
upgrade existing Global Hawk ground stations, in large part to allow
analysts to view and assess information more quickly. This ground
station upgrade will require both hardware and software development.
Greater efficiencies may also be possible in production. While
production of the first two BAMS aircraft will occur at the same
California facility where Global Hawk is currently produced, the
remaining BAMS aircraft are expected to be produced at another facility
in Florida. We believe that this approach has the potential to create
duplication in production by having two facilities staffed and equipped
to conduct essentially the same work. However, contractor officials
point out that while the California facility has the capacity to
accommodate BAMS production, having two separate facilities would
minimize the impact of potential work surges. They also note that using
the California facility for initial BAMS production will give them time
to gain knowledge that could help get the Florida facility up and
running. Yet neither contractor nor Navy officials provided an analysis
to justify using the Florida facility. According to an official with
the BAMS program office, the Navy considers this a contractor business
decision, and according to contractor officials, the official analysis
will not be done for several years. In the meantime, it is unclear
whether the benefits of a second production facility outweigh the
costs--such as additional tooling and personnel.
The Army and Air Force Have Missed Opportunities to Achieve Commonality
and Efficiencies between Sky Warrior and Predator:
OSD's efforts to consolidate and achieve greater commonality between
the Army Sky Warrior and the Air Force Predator have generally not been
successful. In 2001 the Army began defining requirements for a
replacement to the aging Hunter unmanned aircraft system. According to
the Army, the limited number of unmanned aircraft in DOD's inventory
and its lack of direct control over these assets drove its decision to
pursue the development of Sky Warrior. The aircraft was originally
intended to satisfy the Army's requirement for wide-area, near real-
time reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition capability.
However, both the Air Force and the Joint Staff responsible for
reviewing Sky Warrior's requirements and acquisition documentation
raised concerns about duplicating existing capability--specifically,
capability provided by Predator. Nevertheless, the program received
approval to forgo an analysis of alternatives that could have
determined if existing capabilities would meet its requirements. The
Army noted that such an analysis was not needed and not worth the cost
and effort. Instead, it conducted a source selection competition and
began the Sky Warrior development program, citing battlefield
commanders' urgent need for this capability.
In 2005, the Army awarded the Sky Warrior development contract to the
same contractor working with the Air Force to develop and produce
Predators and Reapers. As a variant of Predator, Sky Warrior is now
being assembled in the same facility. In 2006, the Army and Air Force
signed a memorandum of understanding to work together to identify
complementary requirements for the Sky Warrior and Predator programs.
Despite this memorandum, limited progress was made, and in 2007, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the two services to combine their
respective programs into a single acquisition program. The services
subsequently signed a formal memorandum of agreement. However, the
services have maintained separate program offices and funding for their
respective programs and the two aircraft still have little in common.
Sky Warrior is larger, longer, and heavier; has a wider wing span; and
has significantly more payload capacity than Predator. The Air Force is
also acquiring the Reaper--formerly Predator B--which is even larger
and more capable than both the Sky Warrior and Predator.[Footnote 13]
However, all three systems have similar missions to seek, target, and
attack enemy forces.
Although the ground control station the Army is developing for Sky
Warrior is expected to be used to control other Army unmanned aircraft,
it will not be common with the Predator and Reaper ground control
station used by the Air Force. According to Army officials, however,
they are currently using legacy ground control stations that are
essentially the same as the Air Force's. The Army officials further
noted that the Sky Warrior systems that the Army plans to deploy this
summer will each be deployed with both an Army-unique ground control
station and a legacy ground control station, to provide backup takeoff
and landing capability in case the automatic takeoff and landing
technology on Sky Warrior encounters problems.
The Army and Air Force are pursuing service-specific payloads and
subsystems for these aircraft. For example, the services are pursuing
separate solutions to meet similar requirements for a signals
intelligence capability.[Footnote 14] Specifically, the Army is
developing a unique signals intelligence payload for Sky Warrior, while
the Air Force is developing the Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload
for Predator, Reaper, and Global Hawk. Further, the Army is developing
its own electro-optical and infrared sensor for Sky Warrior--and
potentially other Army aviation platforms--and awarded an $11 million
sensor development contract to the same contractor producing the
Predator's electro-optical and infrared sensor.
Service-Driven Acquisition Processes and Ineffective Collaboration Have
Reduced Opportunities for Commonality:
While several of the unmanned aircraft programs we examined have
achieved commonality at the airframe level, factors such as service-
driven acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration have
resulted in service-unique subsystems, payloads, and ground control
stations. Despite DOD's efforts to emphasize a more joint approach to
identifying and prioritizing warfighting needs and to encourage
commonality among the programs, the services continue to drive
requirements and make independent resource allocation decisions on
their respective platforms. DOD officials have not quantified the
potential costs or benefits of pursuing various alternatives, including
systems with commonalities. With some notable exceptions, the services
have been reluctant to collaborate and efforts to do so have produced
mixed results. However, to maximize acquisition resources and meet
increased demand, Congress and DOD have increasingly pushed for more
commonality among unmanned aircraft systems.
Officials Cite the Need for Service-Unique Requirements:
In 2003, DOD implemented a new requirements generation system intended
to identify warfighter needs from a joint, departmentwide perspective--
not from an individual service or program perspective. This process,
referred to as the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development
System (JCIDS), provides a framework for reviewing and validating
capability needs. However, as we reported in 2008,[Footnote 15]
requirements continue to be driven primarily by the individual services
with little involvement from the combatant commands,[Footnote 16] which
are largely responsible for planning and carrying out military
operations. In reviewing JCIDS documentation related to new capability
proposals, we found that most--nearly 70 percent--were sponsored by the
military services with little involvement from the joint community.
[Footnote 17] By continuing to rely on capability needs defined
primarily by the services individually, DOD may be losing opportunities
to improve joint warfighting capabilities and to reduce duplication of
capabilities. In a separate report issued that same year,[Footnote 18]
we also noted that DOD did not have key management tools needed to
ensure that its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
investments reflected enterprisewide priorities and strategic goals. We
further noted that DOD lacked assurance that its investments in
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities--including
those in unmanned aircraft--were providing solutions that best minimize
inefficiency and redundancy.
For the unmanned aircraft systems we reviewed, the services established
requirements that were often so specific that they demanded service-
unique solutions--thereby precluding opportunities for commonality. Yet
none of the programs were able to provide us quantitative analyses to
justify pursuing their unique solutions or to show why common solutions
would not work.
In some cases, service-unique requirements appear to be necessary. For
example, the Navy requires BAMS for maritime missions, which are
distinct from the land missions of its counterpart, Global Hawk.
Specifically, radar functionality depends on the operational
environment--that is, water, a moving surface, compared to land, a
relatively static surface. Distinct radar capabilities are required to
create images of sufficient quality to recognize a target in these
unique environments. The Navy is also modifying the Global Hawk design
to accommodate BAMS's altitude agility requirements. Unlike Global
Hawk, which is designed to fly continuously at high altitudes, BAMS is
intended to fly at low, medium, and high altitudes during a mission.
Consequently, the wings on the airframe need to be structurally
reinforced to handle the loads and wind gusts associated with frequent
changes in altitude. Altitude changes also make BAMS more susceptible
to icing conditions, and therefore require a de-icing capability for
the wing, tail, and engine. Such differences in requirements have
limited commonality in BAMS and Global Hawk beyond the basic airframe.
[Footnote 19]
While some of the differences between Global Hawk and BAMS requirements
appear to be necessary, an OSD official we spoke with noted that there
is concern that other distinctions in requirements that the services
cited for other systems could lead to duplication and inefficiencies.
For example, an Army official cited the need to develop an electro-
optical and infrared sensor for the Army's Sky Warrior that had unique
capabilities from the sensor the Air Force uses on the Predator. The
Army noted that it does not need specific sensor capabilities that the
Air Force is pursuing, such as high-definition video, which could
require costly upgrades to existing Army systems. Currently, however,
Predator's sensor does not use high-definition video and thus could be
employed by the Sky Warrior system. Concerned that the government is
paying a premium to build two separate sensors with essentially the
same capability--the two systems are 80 percent common--OSD directed
the services to evaluate the feasibility of and potential savings
associated with purchasing a common sensor. An Army official, however,
pointed out that the Army had negotiated a unit cost for its version of
the sensor that is nearly $450,000 cheaper than unit cost of the Air
Force sensor. Similarly, Army and Air Force officials cited the need
for unique flight control requirements for Sky Warrior and Predator--
"point and click" versus "stick and rudder"--because the Army uses
enlisted operators to fly the aircraft, whereas the Air Force uses
actual trained pilots. These different approaches require the services
to develop and acquire unique ground control stations as well as other
capabilities, such as automatic takeoff and landing capability, that
have not been used before, resulting in additional cost and schedule
risk.
In some cases, the services collaborated to identify common
configuration, performance, and support requirements, but ultimately
did not maximize efficiencies. For example, the Army and Navy have
different data link requirements for their respective variants of Fire
Scout, primarily because of the Army's requirement for its Fire Scout
to operate within the Future Combat Systems network. However, the
Future Combat Systems has been beset with problems and delays--which
may not be resolved until 2015--and as a result, there are eight
manufactured Fire Scouts sitting in storage that according to the Fire
Scout contractor, could be equipped with the same data link as the Navy
Fire Scout and the Army's Shadow and Sky Warrior systems. Though the
services could not agree on a common data link, the Army and Navy
settled on common Fire Scout requirements for the air vehicle, engine,
radar, navigation, and some core avionics subsystem requirements. The
services also agreed to use one contract to procure the airframe.
DOD's Funding Process Can Hinder Collaboration and Commonality:
The majority of needs that the military services identify are validated
and approved without accounting for the necessary resources to achieve
desired capabilities. The funding of proposed programs takes place
through a process called the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution system, which is not synchronized with JCIDS but is similarly
service-driven. Within the funding system each service has the
responsibility and authority to prioritize its own budget, which allows
it to make independent funding decisions supporting unique
requirements. Therefore, once a service concludes that a unique
solution is warranted, the service has the authority to budget for that
unique solution, to the exclusion of other possible solutions that
could achieve greater commonality and efficiency among the services.
While DOD collectively reviews the individual service budgets, this
review does not occur until the end of the funding process, at which
point it is difficult and disruptive to make changes, such as
terminating programs.
For example, OSD has directed the Army and the Air Force to merge their
respective Sky Warrior and Predator programs. However, the services
have concluded that continuing separate programs is warranted to meet
their individual service needs. According to Air Force officials, the
Air Force does not have a requirement for Sky Warrior, and it is not
clear if the system would meet the service's current operational needs.
Therefore, the Air Force has moved forward with its plan to end
Predator procurement entirely and transition to an all Reaper fleet.
DOD officials noted that the Air Force's future year budget plans have
accordingly eliminated funding for Predator and increased the Reaper
budget. OSD was concerned about the implications of this plan from a
requirements and acquisition standpoint. Nevertheless, the Air Force
will continue to procure its unique Reaper system and the Army will
proceed with the development and production of its unique Sky Warrior
system.
Efforts to Encourage Collaboration Have Had Limited Effect:
Seven of the 10 programs we reviewed have established memorandums of
agreement to foster collaboration and drive the programs toward
commonality. However, these agreements generally lacked rigor and did
not specify areas of commonality to be pursued. Therefore, it is
unclear to what extent these agreements have helped programs leverage
resources, particularly considering that little commonality has been
achieved. The agreements often included caveats that allowed the
services to deviate from the agreement if they determined that service-
unique requirements had to be met. In some cases, the agreement was so
explicit about service-unique needs and requirements that there was
little incentive to pursue common solutions. In contrast, the
memorandum of agreement between the Army and the Marine Corps for the
Shadow program has specific statements that highlight their intention
to meet both services' requirements. For example, the memorandum states
that the two services would procure a fully common aircraft off the
same contract, assume the same requirements, and use the same
documentation.
At the department level, OSD established the Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Task Force and the Office of Unmanned Warfare primarily to facilitate
collaboration and encourage greater commonality among unmanned aircraft
programs. While the two groups act as advisors and have implemented
OSD's recommendations regarding areas where further commonality might
be achieved--most prominently, for the Sky Warrior and Predator
programs--key officials from these groups emphasized to us that they do
not have direct decision-making or resource allocation authority.
[Footnote 20] OSD has repeatedly directed the services to collaborate
on these two programs, and in recent memos has clearly expressed
disapproval with the services' amount and pace of progress in doing so.
Despite this direction, the services have continued to pursue unique
systems. In response to OSD's most recent direction to merge their
service-unique signals intelligence payload efforts into a single
acquisition program, the Army and Air Force concluded that continuing
their separate programs was warranted, and recommended that OSD direct
an objective, independent organization--such as a federally funded
research and development center--to conduct a business case analysis to
assess the impact of merging the two programs. Table 5 summarizes OSD's
directions and the services' responses over the past few years.
Table 5: OSD and Service Efforts to Achieve Predator and Sky Warrior
Commonality:
November 2006;
OSD: Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L establishes goal for the
programs to have a common aircraft, propulsion system, and avionics
configuration.
September 2007;
OSD: Deputy Secretary of Defense directs the services to combine the
programs into a single acquisition program and to migrate to a single
contract by October 2008.
February 2008;
Services: Army and Air Force program executive officers sign a
memorandum of agreement.
May 2008;
OSD: Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L reiterates the Deputy
Secretary of Defense's directive to combine the programs into a single
acquisition program, states that fiscal year 2009 funds can only be
used to purchase a common airframe, and expresses dissatisfaction with
the progress made on achieving a common electro-optical and infrared
sensor.
October 2008;
OSD: Undersecretary of Defense for AT&L grants a waiver to the Air
Force to buy 20 additional Predators, but also directs the Air Force to
buy five common airframes and noted that no additional waivers would be
granted.
January 2009;
OSD: Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology and the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) for Portfolio,
Programs, and Resources direct the services to conduct a comprehensive
business case analysis to assess the impacts of migrating to a single
signals intelligence payload acquisition program.
February 2009;
Services: Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology) and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition) issue a joint memorandum, noting that despite more than
15 months of work and a dozen meetings, neither service supports the
assertion that a joint program makes sense, and recommend that an
objective, independent agency or organization do the business case
analysis.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Congress and DOD Continue to Direct Increased Collaboration and
Commonality:
In section 144 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009, Congress directed "[t]he Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [to]
establish a policy and an acquisition strategy for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance payloads and ground stations for
manned and unmanned aerial vehicle systems. The policy and acquisition
strategy shall be applicable throughout the Department of Defense and
shall achieve integrated research, development, test, and evaluation,
and procurement commonality."[Footnote 21] The Act further identifies
the objectives that Congress expects the policy and acquisition
strategy to achieve. Those objectives include, among others, the
procurement of common payloads by vehicle class, achieving commonality
of ground system architecture by vehicle class, common management of
vehicle and payload procurements, ground station interoperability
standardization, and common standards for exchanging data and metadata.
Finally, DOD was directed to deliver a report containing the policy and
acquisition strategy to Congress no later than 120 days after the
enactment of the authorization act, which occurred on October 14, 2008.
However, as of May 15, 2009, OSD had not issued the report. An OSD
official within the Office of Unmanned Warfare told us that the
department had requested an extension on the report.[Footnote 22]
In an acquisition decision memorandum issued on February 11, 2009, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
(AT&L) identified the opportunity to adopt a common unmanned aircraft
ground control station architecture that supports future capability
upgrades through an open system and modular design. The memo notes that
adopting a common DOD architecture using a core open architecture model
would provide a forum for competition among companies to provide new
capabilities. It also states that the military services can be given
flexibility to adjust the man-to-machine interfaces for their
respective ground control stations while still maintaining commonality
on the underlying architecture and computing hardware. In addition, the
memo identifies an opportunity to implement common technologies, such
as autonomous takeoff and landing, across the military services. The
military services are directed to work together--and with OSD in one
instance--to assess various aspects of ground control station and
technology commonality, and to report their findings to OSD. As of May
15, 2009, the services had not yet reported their findings.
Similar to OSD's approach to ground control stations, the Air Force
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force--which is currently developing a
long-term unmanned aircraft plan--expects future unmanned aircraft to
be developed as open, modular systems to which new capabilities can be
added instead of developing entirely new systems each time a new
capability is needed. It anticipates that this open systems approach
will allow the Air Force to hold competitions for new payloads that can
simply be plugged into the aircraft--or "plug-and-play" payloads. In
addition, the Air Force recognizes the need for more joint unmanned
aircraft solutions and increased teaming among programs and services. A
leading task force official told us that given the limited resources
DOD has to work with, it is imperative that the services explore more
joint solutions and work together and find commonality--which the
official noted must begin in the requirements process. He also noted
that DOD should be focused on providing incremental capabilities to the
warfighter and upgrading them later as the need arises and the
technology matures. He pointed out that for most missions the
warfighters do not need an optimal system--a 100 percent solution--they
usually only need one or two of the functions the system can provide.
Conclusions:
DOD is challenged to meet the warfighter's ever-increasing demand for
unmanned aircraft systems within available resources. Many of DOD's
tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs have
experienced significant cost growth, schedule delays, and performance
shortfalls. DOD recognizes that to more effectively leverage its
acquisition resources it must achieve greater commonality among the
military services' various unmanned system programs. While the Army and
the Marine Corps achieved a high level of commonality in the Shadow
program, other programs had less success. In general, the military
services continue to establish unique requirements and prioritize
resources without fully considering opportunities to achieve greater
efficiencies. As a result, commonality has largely been limited to
system airframes and in most cases has not been achieved among
payloads, subsystems, or ground control stations. An objective,
independent examination of DOD's current unmanned aircraft portfolio
and the methods for acquiring future unmanned aircraft could go a long
way to ensuring that DOD gets a better return on every dollar it
invests in unmanned aircraft.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To more effectively leverage resources and increase the efficiency in
unmanned aircraft system acquisition programs, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
* Direct a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the requirements for
current unmanned aircraft programs, develop a strategy for making
systems and subsystems among those programs more common, and report the
findings of this analysis to Congress. At a minimum, this analysis
should quantify the costs and benefits of alternative approaches,
identify specific actions that need to be taken, and summarize the
status of DOD's various ongoing unmanned aircraft-related studies.
* Prior to initiating any new unmanned aircraft program, require the
military services to identify and document in their acquisition plans
and strategies specific areas where commonality can be achieved, take
an open systems approach to product development, conduct a quantitative
analysis that examines the costs and benefits of various levels of
commonality, and establish a collaborative approach and management
framework to periodically assess and effectively manage commonality.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report DOD partially agreed with
the first recommendation and agreed with all elements of the second.
DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III.
Regarding our first recommendation to conduct a comprehensive analysis
of requirements and opportunities for commonality among current
unmanned aircraft systems, the department agreed that there is
significant cost benefit to leveraging commonality, but noted that the
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force had conducted such analyses.
Therefore, the department did not agree that a separate comprehensive
analysis across all unmanned systems with the specific purpose of
identifying opportunities for commonality was needed. Going forward, we
believe that the department could benefit from a more comprehensive,
quantitative analysis that looks across unmanned aircraft systems and
focuses on subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations as well as
airframes. The analyses DOD has done to date have been done on a case-
by-case basis, and have primarily resulted in airframe commonality.
DOD agreed with each element of our second recommendation related to
specific actions that the military services should be required to take
before initiating new unmanned aircraft programs. The department
believes that current requirements and acquisition policies and
processes--some of which were recently revised--satisfy the intent of
our recommendation. To ensure that resources are effectively leveraged
to gain efficiencies, DOD must ensure the consistent and disciplined
implementation of these policies and processes.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of
the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget. The report also is available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. A list of key contributors to this
report can be found in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report examines the Department of Defense's (DOD) development and
acquisition of unmanned aircraft systems. The primary focus of this
work is to identify practices and policies that lead to successful
collaborative efforts to field unmanned aircraft systems to the
warfighter at the right time and for the right price. Specifically, our
objectives were to (1) assess the cost, schedule, and performance
progress of selected tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft
acquisition programs; (2) examine the extent to which the military
services are collaborating and identifying commonality among those
programs; and (3) identify the key factors influencing the
effectiveness of their collaboration.
We selected 10 programs to include in our review: eight unmanned
aircraft programs and two payload development programs. The eight
unmanned aircraft programs included in our review--Global Hawk, Reaper,
Shadow, Predator, Sky Warrior, Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance (BAMS), and Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (UCAS)--make
up more than 80 percent of DOD's planned investment in unmanned
aircraft systems from 2008 through 2013. The two payloads--Multi-
Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) and Airborne
Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP)--are being developed for use on
unmanned aircraft.
To assess the extent to which selected tactical and theater-level
unmanned aircraft systems are meeting their cost, schedule, and
performance targets, we compared current data to baseline cost,
schedule, and performance data for the 10 programs in our review. We
collected and reviewed data from acquisition program baselines,
acquisition decision memorandums, selected acquisition reports,
presidential budget documents, and technology and operational
assessments. We worked with knowledgeable GAO staff to ensure the use
of current, accurate data and incorporated information, where
applicable, from our recent assessment of major weapon programs.
[Footnote 23]
To examine the extent to which the military services are collaborating
and identifying commonality among those programs, we reviewed key
documents such as acquisition decision memorandums and policy
directives, as well as program acquisition strategies and program
briefings. We examined the acquisition approaches of the 10 programs
included in our review to identify any collaborative efforts taken
among programs. We also reviewed relevant DOD and Joint Staff policies
and guidance to identify established criteria for effective
collaboration. As part of our analysis, we compared and contrasted
requirements for the systems in our review in order to assess areas of
potential or apparent similarity as possible opportunities for
collaboration. We did not assess the validity of the military services'
requirements for the selected unmanned aircraft programs in our review.
To identify and assess which factors influenced the effectiveness of
collaboration among the selected programs in our review, we examined
the roles and responsibilities of DOD and military service acquisition
and requirements organizations in fostering collaboration among
programs. We examined the impact that officials and organizations
within the acquisition and requirements communities have on
collaboration. We also reviewed recent DOD acquisition initiatives,
such as portfolio management and configuration steering boards, as well
as service-level plans and activities related to collaboration and
commonality among unmanned aircraft programs.
In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed
unmanned aircraft systems program officials from Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio; Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; Redstone
Arsenal, Alabama; and Patuxent River, Maryland, and officials from the
Air Force, Army, and Navy acquisition and requirements organizations,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff
offices, Washington, D.C. Further, we interviewed officials from the
UAS Joint Center of Excellence, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the Air
Force UAS Task Force, Washington, D.C.; and U.S. Central Command,
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. We also met with officials from
defense contractors General Atomics in Rancho Bernardo, California, and
Northrop Grumman, in San Diego and Palmdale, California, to obtain
information on the development and production efforts of seven of the
eight unmanned aircraft system programs in our review.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to July 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Program Ongoing and Future
Efforts:
This appendix provides additional information about the eight unmanned
aircraft[Footnote 24] and two payload programs assessed in the body of
this report. Each program summary in this appendix includes an aircraft
photo, a brief description of the system's mission and program status
and our observations on program execution and outcomes, and where
applicable, the summaries also highlight recent GAO work. To provide
additional insights into the magnitude of recent and expected future
investments in these programs, the summaries include details on DOD's
planned investment from 2008 through 2013 as contained in the
department's fiscal year 2009 budget.[Footnote 25] The budget
information in tables 8 through 17 is expressed in then year dollars,
and due to rounding the numbers may not add exactly. The fiscal year
2008 funding shown in the tables has been appropriated by Congress. The
funding requested in DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget submission for each
program is captured in notes to the tables--DOD's fiscal year 2010
budget did not contain any funding projections beyond 2010. Tables 6
and 7 detail many key characteristics and compare the capabilities of
the systems discussed in this appendix.
Table 6: Characteristics of Selected Tactical and Theater-Level
Unmanned Aircraft:
Aircraft: Predator;
Length (feet): 27;
Wing span (feet): 55;
Gross weight (pounds): 2,250;
Payload capacity (pounds): 450;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 24+;
Maximum altitude (feet): 25,000.
Aircraft: Sky Warrior;
Length (feet): 28;
Wing span (feet): 56;
Gross weight (pounds): 3,200;
Payload capacity (pounds): 800;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 40;
Maximum altitude (feet): 25,000.
Aircraft: Reaper;
Length (feet): 36;
Wing span (feet): 66;
Gross weight (pounds): 10,500;
Payload capacity (pounds): 3,750;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 24;
Maximum altitude (feet): 50,000.
Aircraft: Shadow;
Length (feet): 11;
Wing span (feet): 14;
Gross weight (pounds): 375;
Payload capacity (pounds): 60;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 6;
Maximum altitude (feet): 15,000.
Aircraft: Fire Scout;
Length (feet): 23;
Wing span (feet): 28;
Gross weight (pounds): 3,150;
Payload capacity (pounds): 600;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 6+;
Maximum altitude (feet): 20,000.
Aircraft: Global Hawk[B];
Length (feet): 48;
Wing span (feet): 131;
Gross weight (pounds): 32,250;
Payload capacity (pounds): 3,000;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 28;
Maximum altitude (feet): 60,000.
Aircraft: BAMS;
Length (feet): 48;
Wing span (feet): 131;
Gross weight (pounds): 32,250;
Payload capacity (pounds): 3,200;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 34+;
Maximum altitude (feet): 60,000.
Aircraft: UCAS-D;
Length (feet): 38;
Wing span (feet): 62;
Gross weight (pounds): 46,000;
Payload capacity (pounds): 4,500;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 9;
Maximum altitude (feet): 40,000.
Sources: DOD, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007 - 2032, and BAMS program
office.
[A] Endurance capacity reported here is the maximum endurance possible,
without external payloads. For some aircraft, the addition of external
payloads can affect endurance capacity.
[B] Information on the RQ-4B Global Hawk is presented in this table.
[End of table]
Table 7: Comparison of Key System Capabilities:
System: Global Hawk;
Imagery intelligence: Electro-optical/infrared: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Synthetic aperture radar: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Full motion video: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Communications intelligence: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Electronic intelligence: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Weapons: [Empty].
System: Predator;
Imagery intelligence: Electro-optical/infrared: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Synthetic aperture radar: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Full motion video: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Communications intelligence: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Electronic intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Weapons: [Check].
System: Reaper;
Imagery intelligence: Electro-optical/infrared: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Synthetic aperture radar: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Full motion video: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Communications intelligence: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Electronic intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Weapons: [Check].
System: Sky Warrior;
Imagery intelligence: Electro-optical/infrared: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Synthetic aperture radar: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Full motion video: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Communications intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Electronic intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Weapons: [Check].
System: Shadow;
Imagery intelligence: Electro-optical/infrared: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Synthetic aperture radar: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: Full motion video: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Communications intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Electronic intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Weapons: [Empty].
System: Fire Scout - Navy;
Imagery intelligence: Electro-optical/infrared: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Synthetic aperture radar: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: Full motion video: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Communications intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Electronic intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Weapons: [Empty].
System: Fire Scout - Army;
Imagery intelligence: Electro-optical/infrared: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Synthetic aperture radar: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Full motion video: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Communications intelligence: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Electronic intelligence: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Weapons: [Empty].
System: BAMS;
Imagery intelligence: Electro-optical/infrared: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Synthetic aperture radar: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Full motion video: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Communications intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Electronic intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Weapons: [Empty].
System: ASIP;
Imagery intelligence: Electro-optical/infrared: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: Synthetic aperture radar: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: Full motion video: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Communications intelligence: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Electronic intelligence: [Check];
Signals intelligence: Weapons: [Empty].
System: MP-RTIP;
Imagery intelligence: Electro-optical/infrared: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: Synthetic aperture radar: [Check];
Imagery intelligence: Full motion video: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Communications intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Electronic intelligence: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Weapons: [Empty].
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
Note: While we also assessed the Navy's Unmanned Combat Aircraft System
Demonstration (UCAS-D) as part of our review, UCAS-D is a demonstration
effort and will not be equipped with any mission payloads.
[End of table]
Figure 2: RQ-4 Global Hawk:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The Global Hawk system is a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned
aircraft with an integrated sensor suite and ground segment that
provides intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities. The system is intended to provide high-resolution, high-
quality, digital synthetic aperture radar to include ground moving
target indicator, plus electro-optical and infrared imagery of targets
and other critical areas of interest. A signals intelligence payload
and advanced radar are also being developed.
Program Status:
Global Hawk is being developed and procured in four configurations.
Block 10 aircraft, designated RQ-4A, are based on an airframe similar
to the original demonstrators and employ imaging intelligence sensors
(synthetic aperture radar, electro-optical, and infrared). The other
three configurations are larger and more capable systems, designated RQ-
4B. Block 20 aircraft employ enhanced imaging intelligence sensors.
Block 30 aircraft provide multiple intelligence capabilities--signals
intelligence as well as the enhanced imaging intelligence sensors.
Block 40 aircraft will employ an advanced radar being developed by the
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program.
According to the original contract, the contractor was expected to
deliver 19 Global Hawk systems by the end of December 2008. However, as
of January 2009, the contractor had only delivered 14 systems, 9 of
which were more than 8 months late. All seven Block 10 aircraft have
been delivered to the Air Force and have supported ongoing military
operations. All six Block 20 aircraft have also been delivered. The
Block 20 aircraft are currently in testing and recently underwent an
operational assessment. DOD's top acquisition official noted that the
assessment provided useful insight into the performance of the enhanced
integrated sensor suite. Block 20 initial operational test and
evaluation (IOT&E) was expected to be completed in October 2009.
However, the Air Force reported in February 2009 that operational
testing had slipped beyond the acquisition program baseline threshold
date, but did not specify the expected length of the delay. According
to program officials a high level of concurrency in the program--
concurrent development, production, and testing--coupled with
developmental testing delays, unforeseen system failures, and excessive
weather-related flight test cancellations were to blame for the
schedule slip.
The Air Force received the first of a planned purchase of 26 Block 30
aircraft from the contractor in November 2007--10 months later than the
original contract delivery date. The aircraft was subsequently equipped
with an Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP) sensor, and began
developmental flight testing in September 2008. While ASIP
developmental testing on the Global Hawk has gone relatively well,
Block 30 IOT&E has been delayed in concert with Block 20.
According to the contractor, the critical design review for Block 40
has been completed, and the first Block 40 aircraft is in the final
stages of assembly. Contractor officials also noted that the MP-RTIP
sensor will be integrated onto Global Hawk and begin testing in May
2009. Block 40 operational testing--which was originally expected to
begin no later than November 2010--has been delayed, and no new date
has been established. The Air Force currently plans to purchase a total
of 15 Block 40 Global Hawks.
GAO Observations:
Global Hawk concurrently entered development and limited production of
the RQ-4A in March 2001, after completing a successful demonstration
program. One year later, the Air Force chose to pursue the larger, more
capable RQ-4B airframe. Although the two airframes were expected to
have substantial commonality, differences were much more extensive than
anticipated. The final design of the RQ-4B required more substantial
changes than expected to the fuselage, tail, and landing gear. Frequent
and substantive engineering changes during the first year of production
increased development and airframe costs and delayed delivery and
testing schedules. The system unit cost has more than doubled since
development began, and the program has been restructured three times.
Completion of Block 20 operational testing has been delayed more than 3
years from initial estimates. Developmental test results indicate that
the Block 20 aircraft's enhanced sensors did not achieve the desired
level of clarity. However, DOD's top acquisition official in an October
2008 acquisition decision memorandum directed the Air Force to go ahead
with the procurement of the Block 20 sensors--noting that the sensor
performance requirement was a subjective measure and current
performance was satisfactory. The Air Force expects to have purchased
more than 60 percent of total Global Hawk quantities before Block 20
testing is complete.
In October 2008, 1 month after beginning Block 30 ASIP testing, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) issued an acquisition decision
memorandum stating that the ASIP development appeared to be on track to
meet user requirements and approving the purchase of a limited number
of sensors--pending successful completion of the sensor calibration.
According to ASIP program officials, sensor calibration and
developmental testing are finished. They also noted that they were
planning to conduct dedicated ASIP operational testing on the U-2,
which they believe will further reduce risk in the program before
beginning Global Hawk Block 30 operational testing, which has been
delayed indefinitely in concert with Block 20 operational testing.
According to a recent Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
(DOT&E) report, the Air Force's plan to complete Block 40 development
in 2010 is in jeopardy because development of the advanced MP-RTIP
radar has experienced delays. The report cites a failure to design
useful sensor calibration and poor system software stability as the
primary culprits. In addition, the DOT&E notes that the potential
exists for the contractor to deliver up to 6 of the 15 planned Block 40
systems before MP-RTIP will be able to deliver any operational
capability.
The Air Force's 2009 budget request contained over $5 billion for
Global Hawk development and procurement. The Global Hawk procurement
budget includes funding to purchase and integrate the ASIP and MP-RTIP
payloads. ASIP and MP-RTIP development are funded separately.
Table 8: DOD Planned Investment for Global Hawk, Fiscal Years 2008-2013
(Then year dollars in millions):
RDT&E[A];
FY 2008: $274.7;
FY 2009: $284.3;
FY 2010: $243.9;
FY 2011: $195.9;
FY 2012: $168.7;
FY 2013: $170.7;
Total: $1,338.2.
Procurement[B];
FY 2008: $580.9;
FY 2009: $712.2;
FY 2010: $517.0;
FY 2011: $533.5;
FY 2012: $558.7;
FY 2013: $475.1;
Total: $3,377.4.
Total;
FY 2008: $855.6;
FY 2009: $996.5;
FY 2010: $760.9;
FY 2011: $729.4;
FY 2012: $727.4;
FY 2013: $645.8;
Total: $5,186.4.
Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget.
[A] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
funding amount of $268.6 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget
request of $245.4 million for Global Hawk.
[B] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 procurement funding amount of $710.0 million and a
fiscal year 2010 procurement budget request of $667.8 million for
Global Hawk.
[End of table]
Figure 3: MQ-9 Reaper:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper is a multi-role, medium-to-high-altitude,
long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at
faster speeds and higher altitudes than its smaller predecessor, the MQ-
1 Predator. While Predator is primarily a surveillance and
reconnaissance asset, Reaper is designed for armed reconnaissance
missions. It is expected to provide around-the-clock capability to
detect, attack, and destroy mobile, high-value, time-sensitive targets.
Reaper will carry missiles, laser-guided bombs, and the Joint Direct
Attack Munition. Reaper also will support net-centric military
operations. Each system consists of four aircraft, a ground control
station, and a satellite communications suite.
Program Status:
Because of recent budget increases, the Reaper program may soon be
designated a major defense acquisition program. Based on current
projections, Reaper will achieve initial operational capability in
August 2009. Its full-rate production decision was recently postponed
over a year, pending the decision about its acquisition category. It
recently completed initial operational testing, receiving a rating of
partially mission capable. The Air Force has taken delivery of 27
aircraft to date. Total aircraft quantity requirements have increased
from 63 to 118, and may increase even further since the Air Force plans
to increase procurement in its upcoming budget submission. Reaper's
second increment, comprising the small diameter bomb and automatic
takeoff and landing capability, is scheduled to begin development in
late fiscal year 2010.
GAO Observations:
The Reaper program began in January 2002 in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Since inception, Reaper--
designated an urgent operational need--has followed a nontraditional
acquisition path, resulting in concurrent development and production
and increased risk. Shortly after development began, the user required
accelerated aircraft deliveries to achieve an interim combat
capability. Two years later, the user required additional aircraft for
an even more robust early fielding capability. In response to user
demands, the Air Force has contracted for over 30 percent of the total
quantity before completing initial operational testing.
Performance enhancements, such as adding missiles and a digital
electronic engine control, increased the weight of the aircraft,
requiring stronger landing gear, fuselage, and flight control surfaces.
In addition to requirements changes, the aircraft quantity increased 87
percent since the start of development. The increase--from 63 to 118
aircraft--was due in part to demands of the war on terror. The quantity
may increase even further because the Air Force plans to curtail future
Predator procurement and buy only Reapers. Despite the significant
quantity increase, procurement unit costs have not decreased; they have
increased about 32 percent since development began. This cost growth is
due to inefficiencies associated with the early fielding process and
requirements changes.
Although initial operational testing was completed in August 2008, two
of three key capabilities were not fully assessed. Reaper was effective
in destroying targets, but radar problems prevented the test team from
completing an assessment of its ability to detect and identify targets.
The net-centric operations support capability was not assessed at all.
Other areas of concern included operator workload, off-board
communications, and system reliability. Because tests were limited by
weather, climate, and radar reliability and training, additional
testing will be required to assess these capabilities. The Air Force
testers gave Reaper a rating of partially mission capable; DOD's
independent test organization has not yet completed its assessment of
the test results.
Reaper has been funded under the Predator program element since its
inception. In its fiscal year 2008 budget, the Air Force began
reporting Reaper as a separate program element, thereby isolating
program costs.
Table 9: DOD Planned Investment for Reaper, Fiscal Years 2008-2013
(Then year dollars in millions):
RDT&E[A];
FY 2008: $63.9;
FY 2009: $43.6;
FY 2010: $37.7;
FY 2011: $37.2;
FY 2012: $19.7;
FY 2013: $20.1;
Total: $222.2.
Procurement[B];
FY 2008: $58.1;
FY 2009: v161.4;
FY 2010: $193.4;
FY 2011: $193.0;
FY 2012: $144.8;
FY 2013: $147.2;
Total: $897.9.
Modifications;
FY 2008: $20.4;
FY 2009: $24.6;
FY 2010: $30.2;
FY 2011: $31.5;
FY 2012: $31.0;
FY 2013: $31.5;
Total: $169.2.
Supplemental;
FY 2008: $340.7;
FY 2009: [Empty];
FY 2010: [Empty];
FY 2011: [Empty];
FY 2012: [Empty];
FY 2013: [Empty];
Total: $340.7.
Total;
FY 2008: $483.1;
FY 2009: $229.6;
FY 2010: $261.3;
FY 2011: $261.7;
FY 2012: $195.5;
FY 2013: $198.8;
Total: $1,630.0.
Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget.
[A] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding amount of $46.4 million and a fiscal
year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $39.2 million for Reaper.
[B] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 procurement funding amount of $248.6 million and a
fiscal year 2010 procurement funding request of $489.5 million for
Reaper.
[End of table]
Figure 4: RQ-7B Shadow 200 (Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The Shadow 200 unmanned aircraft system provides reconnaissance,
surveillance and target acquisition and force protection at the Army
brigade level. One Shadow system consists of four air vehicles and
associated ground control equipment, including two ground control
stations and an air vehicle launcher.
Shadow is equipped with automatic takeoff and landing capability and
operates at up to 15,000 feet in various weather conditions. The air
vehicle has electro-optical/infrared capabilities. Planned system
upgrades include integration of the Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL)
and the Army's heavy fuel engine. As a brigade-level asset, the Shadow
aircraft is intended to allow for mission payloads to be changed on the
aircraft within 30 minutes.
Program Status:
The Shadow program is an acquisition category II program and grew out
of an advanced concept technology demonstration program. The Shadow
program entered full-rate production in 2002 without the TCDL or the
heavy fuel engine. Program funding after 2002 has been used for Shadow
fleet upgrades, such as integrating the heavy fuel engine. TCDL
development is ongoing; retrofitting is scheduled to begin in 2009.
According to program officials, 252 Shadow aircraft have been fielded
to the Army, with an additional 104 aircraft procured but not yet
delivered to the warfighter. The Army plans to procure a total of 460
aircraft. In addition, the Marine Corps signed a memorandum of
agreement with the Army in 2007 to acquire 52 Shadow aircraft. The
Marine Corps systems are identical to the Army's, and are being
procured through the existing Army contract.
GAO Observations:
Shadow systems were intended to be fielded as quickly as possible with
"no bells and whistles," eventually evolving into more capable systems
with the TCDL and heavy fuel engines. According to program officials,
initial research and development funding was designated for the basic
Shadow system, which program officials estimated to cost $198.1
million. Program officials told us that when Shadow achieved initial
operational capability in 2002--effectively ending development--the
Army had only spent $181.2 million, or 9 percent less than the initial
estimate. Officials stated that development funding since 2002 has been
used to upgrade the basic Shadow system. The cost of these upgrades,
officials told us, was initially estimated at $99.1 million, but the
current estimate has risen to $175.4 million.
According to the program office, total research and development costs
for the Shadow system have increased 80 percent since program start in
1999, while total procurement costs have increased 267 percent. Program
officials stated that increases in the number of aircraft being
procured, which has nearly tripled from 164 to 460, along with upgrades
and retrofits have contributed to cost growth in the Shadow program.
By following an incremental approach for the Shadow program, the Army
was able to minimize program risk by delivering basic capability to the
warfighter within the initial development cost estimate. To field a
more capable, robust system, the program has continued to pursue
development of additional capabilities that were not available when the
system was initially fielded, such as the TCDL and heavy fuel engine.
However, risk remains as the costs for retrofit and upgrade activities
have increased.
The Marine Corps has benefited from the Army's development of the
Shadow system by avoiding the costs of initial development and
purchasing a mature system. However, as the Army upgrades and retrofits
Shadow, the Marine Corps will also have to fund these efforts if it
wants to maintain the same level of commonality with the Army. Program
officials told us that the Marine Corps is exploring ways to add
additional capabilities to Shadow aircraft to allow it to carry a
weapons payload. Although the Army has no requirement for this
capability, the service would be interested in retrofitting Shadow
systems with a weapons payload if the capability were developed.
Consequently, we believe that the Army and Marine Corps need to
carefully manage how they maintain commonality.
Table 10: DOD Planned Investment for Shadow, Fiscal Years 2008-2013:
(Then year dollars in millions):
RDT&E[A];
FY 2008: $7.9;
FY 2009: $8.2;
FY 2010: $7.9;
FY 2011: $8.1;
FY 2012: $9.1;
FY 2013: [Empty];
Total: $41.2.
Procurement[B];
FY 2008: $72.7;
FY 2009: 0.0;
FY 2010: $258.3;
FY 2011: $58.9;
FY 2012: [Empty];
FY 2013: [Empty];
Total: $389.9.
Supplemental;
FY 2008: $223.9;
FY 2009: [Empty];
FY 2010: [Empty];
FY 2011: [Empty];
FY 2012: [Empty];
FY 2013: [Empty];
Total: $223.9.
Total;
FY 2008: $304.5;
FY 2009: $8.2;
FY 2010: $266.2;
FY 2011: $67.0;
FY 2012: $9.1;
FY 2013: [Empty];
Total: $655.0.
Sources: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget and Army Shadow program office.
Note: This includes Army funding only.
[A] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding amount of $12.2 million and a fiscal
year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $70.8 million for Shadow, of which
$29.5 million is for overseas contingency operations.
[B] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 procurement funding amount of $87.9 million and a
fiscal year 2010 procurement budget request of $609.4 million for
Shadow, of which $326 million is for overseas contingency operations.
[End of table]
Figure 5: MQ-1C Extended Range Multi-Purpose UAS (Sky Warrior):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The Extended Range Multi-Purpose unmanned aircraft system (Sky Warrior)
is intended to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition missions at the Army division level. Additionally, Sky
Warrior is equipped with four missiles. One Sky Warrior system consists
of 12 MQ-1C air vehicles along with associated ground equipment,
including five ground control stations.
Operating at 25,000 feet in a near all-weather environment, Sky Warrior
will be equipped with automatic takeoff and landing capability.
Communications with the Sky Warrior system will be via the TCDL. The
air vehicle will be equipped with electro-optical/infrared and
synthetic aperture radar capabilities, as well as a signals
intelligence payload.
Program Status:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics elevated the Sky Warrior program to an acquisition category I
program in a May 2008 memorandum. This directive supported the OSD
decision that the Army Sky Warrior and Air Force Predator unmanned
aircraft system programs migrate to a single contract for airframe
procurement. Currently, Predator is built on an airframe designated the
MQ-1B, but OSD is pushing the Air Force to transition its Predators to
the same airframe the Army is using for the Sky Warrior, designated the
MQ-1C. While the Air Force is planning to procure 5 MQ-1C airframes--in
response to recent OSD direction--it is in the process of assessing how
many additional airframes, if any, it needs to purchase.
According to program officials, the demand for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to meet current
operational needs has resulted in concurrent development and production
of the Sky Warrior system. The Army has purchased 40 interim Sky
Warrior air vehicles, 21 of which are built on the existing Predator
airframes. Although the remaining 19 air vehicles are built on the new
MQ-1C airframe they do not provide full Sky Warrior capability.
According to the Army, these interim air vehicles are intended to
provide some capability to the warfighter until the full Sky Warrior
system is fielded. A February 2009 memorandum from OSD authorizes the
Army to procure four production-ready MQ-1C air vehicles to begin
initial testing for the full Sky Warrior system.
GAO Observations:
The Sky Warrior program has experienced both cost growth and schedule
delays, which, according to program officials, can be explained by the
need to deliver systems to the warfighter as quickly as possible.
Production quantities have increased from 4 systems at program start to
11 systems; total program costs have increased over 138 percent.
Milestone C--the point at which a system is approved to begin
production--has been delayed by 2 years; therefore, the full Sky
Warrior system will not enter low-rate production until November 2009.
Furthermore, because the systems being fielded early do not possess all
of the intended capabilities of a full system, costs will likely
increase as other capabilities are integrated into the existing
systems. Additionally, Sky Warrior has been designated an acquisition
category I program and is currently undergoing a program rebaseline.
This new baseline, once completed, may incorporate further schedule
delays and cost increases.
OSD approved the Sky Warrior program's acquisition strategy in January
2009, despite the fact that the synthetic aperture radar the Army
planned to use on the system had proven to be unreliable. The radar's
poor performance forced the Army to select a new radar entirely.
However, according to the program office, given the Army's acquisition
strategy, the new radar will not be ready until after Sky Warrior
finishes initial operational testing in 2011 and a full-rate production
decision has been made. This approach greatly increases the risk in the
program.
During the most recent GAO annual assessment of DOD major weapon
programs, the Sky Warrior program office indicated that all four of the
system's critical technologies were mature. However, a recent
independent Army test concluded that three of the four technologies are
not yet mature, including the automatic takeoff and landing system and
the TCDL. As of May 2009, Army officials recognized that the automatic
takeoff and landing system was still an immature technology. As a
result, the Army will deploy each of its early Sky Warrior systems this
summer with two ground control stations, an Army One Ground Control
Station and a legacy ground control station--with stick and rudder
controls--as a backup system in case the auto takeoff and land
capability fails. Much of our prior work in DOD weapon systems
acquisition and commercial best practices has shown that conducting
technology development concurrent with product development greatly
increases cost, schedule, and performance risks.
Table 11: DOD Planned Investment for Sky Warrior, Fiscal Years 2008-
2013 (Then year dollars in millions):
RDT&E[A];
FY 2008: $48.7;
FY 2009: $12.7;
FY 2010: $3.9;
FY 2011: $4.1;
FY 2012: $6.4;
FY 2013: $6.6;
Total: $82.4.
Procurement[B];
FY 2008: $137.8;
FY 2009: $189.7;
FY 2010: $339.0;
FY 2011: $316.2;
FY 2012: $123.8;
FY 2013: $128.9;
Total: $1,235.4.
Total;
FY 2008: $186.5;
FY 2009: $202.4;
FY 2010: $342.9;
FY 2011: $320.3;
FY 2012: $130.2;
FY 2013: $135.5;
Total: $1,317.8.
Sources: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget and Sky Warrior program office.
Note: RDT&E and Procurement include funding for weaponizing the Sky
Warrior air vehicle.
[A] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding amount of $61.767 million and a fiscal
year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $83.571million for Sky Warrior.
[B] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 procurement funding amount of $239 million and a
fiscal year 2010 procurement budget request of $666.2 million for Sky
Warrior, of which $250 million is for overseas contingency operations.
[End of table]
Figure 6: MQ-1 Predator:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The Air Force's MQ-1 Predator is a single-engine, propeller-driven,
remotely piloted aircraft designed to operate at medium altitudes for
long-endurance missions. The program began in 1994 as an advanced
concept technology demonstration, and the aircraft proved its military
utility with a successful operational deployment in Bosnia. Its
original mission was to provide continuous ISR coverage to the theater
commander/joint warfighter. In 2001, the Air Force added weapons to
Predator, thus expanding its role to include a limited strike
capability. Predator provides full-motion video of the battlefield with
high-resolution sensors in near real time. Each Predator system
includes four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite
communications suite.
Program Status:
Future procurement of the Predator is uncertain. After more than a
decade of operational use, it is now considered a legacy program. The
Army is procuring a more modern, capable variant of Predator--Sky
Warrior. In 2007, OSD directed the services to merge these two
programs, using the newer Army platform as the baseline configuration.
However, because of differences in service requirements and operations,
the Army and Air Force have made limited progress. For example, the
Army needs a tactical capability that operates with existing Army
platforms like the Apache helicopter. In contrast, the Air Force needs
a strategic capability that satisfies the needs of the joint
warfighter. The Air Force has not completed testing of the newer Sky
Warrior aircraft, and in fact is planning to purchase another variant--
Reaper--as a replacement for Predator.
GAO Observations:
Because Predator transitioned directly from a technology demonstrator
into production, it did not follow a typical acquisition process. Its
performance and quantity requirements have changed significantly since
inception. For example, Predator was initially designed to provide the
warfighter continuous ISR and targeting information. The user
subsequently required that it carry missiles, giving it a limited
strike capability. In addition, Predator's quantity requirements have
more than doubled since it began. The Air Force originally planned to
procure 12 systems (48 aircraft), but because of the increasing demand
for its capability, the total quantity has been increased to 26
systems.
With the addition of MQ-9 Reaper and the Army's Sky Warrior, the
contractor's business base has significantly expanded. This expansion
raised concerns about the contractor's capacity, particularly given its
history of late aircraft deliveries. Last year, however, the contractor
delivered 10 Predator aircraft ahead of schedule. According to program
officials, these aircraft were completed early to provide time for the
contractor to move its equipment into newly expanded facilities.
Despite these deliveries, the contractor's more recent aircraft
deliveries have once again been late. Although the Air Force was
directed to begin purchasing the newer MQ-1C aircraft--the Sky Warrior
configuration--it plans to buy Reapers in lieu of Predators. Given the
lingering uncertainty about how many of which configurations will be
purchased, program officials are concerned that future aircraft
deliveries will be affected.
Early Predator cost data are limited. Once Predator became an
acquisition program, the Air Force projected an acquisition cost of
$910 million (base year 2009 dollars) for 12 systems. Since that time,
the number of operational systems has more than doubled, the
performance and payload requirements have changed, and the flying hours
and attrition rates have increased. This hampers a direct comparison.
The total program cost is about $3.61 billion (base year 2009 dollars).
Table 12: DOD Planned Investment for Predator, Fiscal Years 2008-2013
(Then year dollars in millions):
RDT&E[A];
FY 2008: $33.8;
FY 2009: $24.8;
FY 2010: $21.0;
FY 2011: $20.7;
FY 2012: $21.1;
FY 2013: $21.5;
Total: $142.9.
Procurement[B];
FY 2008: $276.1;
FY 2009: $378.7;
FY 2010: $247.7;
FY 2011: $149.1;
FY 2012: $131.8;
FY 2013: $109.9;
Total: $1,293.3.
Modifications;
FY 2008: $74.2;
FY 2009: $148.5;
FY 2010: $138.9;
FY 2011: $137.5;
FY 2012: $101.3;
FY 2013: $100.1;
Total: $700.5.
Total;
FY 2008: $384.1;
FY 2009: $552.0;
FY 2010: $407.6;
FY 2011: $307.3;
FY 2012: $254.2;
FY 2013: $231.5;
Total: $2,136.7.
Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget.
[A] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding amount of $36.906 million and a fiscal
year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $18.101 million for Predator.
[B] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 procurement funding amount of $377.674 million and no
procurement funding in fiscal year 2010 for Predator.
[End of table]
Figure 7: Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle
(Navy Fire Scout):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The U.S. Navy Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air
Vehicle (VTUAV) will provide local commanders real-time imagery and
data to support ISR requirements. A VTUAV system is composed of up to
three air vehicles with associated electro-optical/infrared/laser
designator-rangefinder sensors, two ground control stations, one
recovery system, and associated spares and support equipment. The air
vehicle launches and recovers vertically and operates from ships and
land. Interoperability is achieved through use of a common data link
and standard communications.
VTUAV is being designed as a modular, reconfigurable system to support
various operations, including potential surface, antisubmarine, and
mine warfare missions. Future capabilities currently under
consideration include surface search radar, signal intelligence,
enhanced data and communications relay, and integration of weapons.
Program Status:
The Navy expects the VTUAV to achieve initial operational capability in
late fiscal year 2009. The program began in fiscal year 2000, after
market research and a competitive ship-based vertical takeoff and
landing demonstration were conducted. A competitive contract was
awarded to Northrop Grumman for delivery of system development air
vehicles and the first lot of low-rate initial production (LRIP)
systems. During fiscal year 2002, the program was de-scoped to a
technology demonstration effort, and two LRIP options were not
exercised.
In fiscal year 2003, the VTUAV program was restructured to support the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), and received increased funding from
Congress in fiscal year 2004 toward that goal. The restructured program
was expected to cost about $2.3 billion, and as a result in August 2006
it was designated as an acquisition category IC program. The program
received Milestone C approval in May 2007 to procure up to 4 air
vehicles in the first lot of LRIP. The Navy plans to procure a total of
168 air vehicles, plus 9 developmental LRIP vehicles. VTUAV is
currently undergoing test and evaluation.
GAO Observations:
The VTUAV program was restructured in 2004 to support the LCS. At the
time of the restructuring, Congress authorized funding for an upgraded
VTUAV variant, the MQ-8B, which addressed requirement shortfalls--
including time on station--of an earlier version, the RQ-8A. In
February 2008, after being advised of at least a 2-year delay in the
LCS program, the Navy decided to continue VTUAV development using an
alternate ship--a frigate. Navy officials estimated that the move to
the alternate ship would require $42.6 million of additional funding
and result in a 9-month schedule delay.
VTUAV efforts are funded under cost-type contracts for system
development and firm-fixed price for production. The program uses
common, mature technologies as much as possible. The air vehicles are
based on a commercial manned helicopter that has been in service for
over 20 years. The MQ-8B is undergoing developmental and operational
testing and has landed successfully aboard ship.
The Army, in September 2003, chose VTUAV to meet Future Combat System
(FCS) unmanned aerial requirements. According to contractor officials,
the two services were able to achieve about 97 percent commonality for
the airframe. However, service-specific payloads will hinder further
collaboration.
Furthermore, FCS delays could affect Fire Scout production efficiency.
According to Northrop Grumman officials, they need to produce a minimum
number of airframes per year to break even; they are currently
producing three airframes per year for the Navy to support system
development. If FCS continues to delay the Army portion of the Fire
Scout program (or other potential buyers do not make a purchase),
airframe production will be difficult to sustain.
Table 13: DOD Planned Investment for VTUAV, Fiscal Years 2008-2013
(Then year dollars in millions):
RDT&E[A];
FY 2008: $32.8;
FY 2009: $9.7;
FY 2010: $26.2;
FY 2011: $5.0;
FY 2012: $1.3;
FY 2013: $1.4;
Total: $76.4.
Procurement[B];
FY 2008: v38.6;
FY 2009: $62.3;
FY 2010: $73.8;
FY 2011: $76.1;
FY 2012: $97.1;
FY 2013: $103.6;
Total: $451.5.
Total;
FY 2008: $71.4;
FY 2009: $72.0;
FY 2010: $100.0;
FY 2011: $81.1;
FY 2012: $98.4;
FY 2013: $105.0;
Total: $527.9.
Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget.
[A] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding amount of $9.6 million and a fiscal year
2010 RDT&E budget request of $25.6 million for VTUAV.
[B] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 procurement funding amount of $57.1 million and a
fiscal year 2010 procurement budget request of $80.0 million for VTUAV.
[End of table]
Figure 8: FCS XM157 Class IV Unmanned Aircraft System (Army Fire
Scout):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The XM157 Class IV unmanned aircraft system (UAS) will provide
reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, mine detection, communications
relay, wide area surveillance, chemical detection, and meteorological
survey capabilities for the FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The Class IV
UAS will operate in conjunction with manned aircraft. The air vehicle
will vertically take off and land from unprepared surfaces, and will be
controlled by light tactical vehicles equipped with launch control
units and by command and control manned ground vehicles within the FCS
BCT over the FCS network.
The Class IV UAS is part of the FCS family of systems made up of
integrated, advanced, networked combat and sustainment systems;
unmanned ground and air vehicles; and unattended sensors and munitions.
Complementary programs external to FCS development provide many of the
major Class IV UAS subsystems and payloads, including communications
equipment such as the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T)
and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).
Program Status:
The Army is pursuing a joint acquisition strategy with the Navy. The
Army, in September 2003, chose the Navy Fire Scout for its Class IV
UAS. Program officials indicated that the Navy is the lead service for
system development. The Army purchases common airframes under a
separate line item in the Navy contract, and then provides the
airframes to the FCS lead system integrator as government-furnished
equipment. The Army is leveraging Navy testing to mitigate risk and
provide early test data; its own first developmental flight testing is
not scheduled to begin until the second quarter of fiscal year 2011.
The Army plans to support 15 BCTs, each equipped with 32 Class IV air
vehicles, and will procure 500 air vehicles overall, including 20 for
development and low-rate initial production. The Army has taken
delivery of eight airframes.
The Class IV UAS schedule depends on complementary programs--
specifically WIN-T and JTRS--and the overall FCS schedule, which has
slipped. The fiscal year 2011 first flight date represents a 42-month
delay from the Army's original baseline estimate.
GAO Observations:
According to contractor officials, the Army and Navy achieved about 97
percent commonality for the airframe. A Defense Contract Management
Agency official estimated about $125 million in development cost
savings attributable to commonality. Contractor representatives
maintain that operations and maintenance would provide greater
opportunity for cost savings from commonality.
However, the Army's requirements for FCS-based, mission-specific
subsystems and payloads are hindering further collaboration. According
to both program and contractor officials, the delivered airframes were
intended for testing, but they cannot be tested without WIN-T and JTRS,
which are not currently available. WIN-T will be the data link that
allows control of the Class IV UAS from mobile ground stations, and
JTRS will provide a communication relay capability. Neither program nor
contractor officials seemed confident that these subsystems would be
available soon. Furthermore, DOD's recent proposal to terminate the FCS
ground segment raises additional uncertainty over the Army's plans.
While the Navy identified an alternate ship to continue Fire Scout
development when it learned that the projected host platform was
delayed, the Army seems to be holding to FCS standards. Contractor
representatives believe the Army is forgoing providing capability to
the warfighter as a result. They envision the Class IV UAS not being
available to the warfighter until 2015. In their opinion, however, were
the Army to install an existing data link and payload into the
aircraft, they would be useful, for example, in detecting improvised
explosive devices in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Because it is a part of the FCS program, the Class IV UAS is funded
through the FCS reconnaissance platforms budget, which also includes
the Class I UAS. Therefore, we are unable to provide details on the
Class IV UAS budget projections using the fiscal year 2009 budget.
However, DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, contains
an RDT&E budget request of $44.005 million in fiscal year 2010
specifically for the Class IV UAS.
Figure 9: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph/illustration]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) unmanned aircraft system
will give DOD a unique persistent capability to detect, classify, and
identify targets over a wide area of maritime battlespace. Operating
both independently and cooperatively with other assets, it will provide
a more effective and supportable ISR capability than currently exists.
Along with future systems--the P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft and
the EP-X electronic surveillance aircraft--BAMS will be part of a
maritime patrol and reconnaissance force family of systems integral to
the Navy's recapitalization of its airborne ISR. The Navy intends to
position BAMS mission crews with maritime patrol and reconnaissance
personnel to closely coordinate missions and use a common support
infrastructure. To meet its objectives, the BAMS program is modifying a
version of the Air Force Global Hawk air vehicle.
Program Status:
DOD approved the start of system development for BAMS in April 2008,
but the source selection was subject to a bid protest that delayed
system development to August 2008. The program briefed the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council on the source selection results, joint
efficiencies being pursued, and potential future synergies in December
2008 and conducted the System Requirements Review in January 2009. The
LRIP contract award is planned for fiscal year 2013, and the Navy
expects to purchase 70 total aircraft--2 in development, 3 in low-rate
production, and 65 in production.
BAMS is being developed using the Global Hawk airframe; however, the
Navy plans to make upgrades, such as a wing de-icing technology, to
accommodate the maritime operations. It also plans to use different
subsystems, such as sensors and communications equipment. Program
officials explained that the BAMS air vehicle is about 78 percent
common with Global Hawk and uses sensor components or entire subsystems
from other existing platforms. The BAMS program is leveraging lessons
learned from the Global Hawk program to avoid similar cost, testing,
and technology problems, and the two programs have established a
memorandum of agreement.
Northrop Grumman is currently considering whether to assemble BAMS in
two locations: Palmdale, California, where the Global Hawk is being
assembled, and a new facility in St. Augustine, Florida. Though the
Palmdale facility has the capacity to assemble BAMS, contractor
officials told us that the decision will be based on both economic and
program risk-level assessments. They were not able to provide
quantitative analysis associated with their pending decision to
assemble BAMS in two locations and told us that the calculations will
not be made until the 2011-2012 time frame.
GAO Observations:
In February 2008, before initiating development, DOD and the Navy
concluded that all BAMS technologies were approaching maturity--that
is, they had been demonstrated in a relevant environment. Therefore,
the Navy insists that the BAMS program has no critical technologies.
Despite repeated requests, Navy officials did not provide us with the
list of technologies that were assessed for maturity. Nevertheless, the
program office has identified six subsystems, such as radar software,
that could cause cost, schedule, or performance issues during
development. Program officials indicated that they are monitoring
development risks for these subsystems. The Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics' decision allowing the
program to begin development also required that an independent
technology readiness assessment be conducted at the completion of
preliminary design review and that the results be submitted for DOD
review.
While there is a benefit to using an existing airframe, the Navy plans
to make changes to Global Hawk that introduce additional risk to the
program. Already the initial operational capability has been delayed
from August 2014 to December 2015, but program officials are planning
to achieve full operational capability by 2019--in time to avoid a
capability gap that otherwise would be created by the retirement of the
P-3C Orion aircraft.
Table 14: DOD Planned Investment for BAMS, Fiscal Years 2008-2013 (Then
year dollars in millions):
RDT&E[A];
FY 2008: $115.9;
FY 2009: $480.1;
FY 2010: $557.0;
FY 2011: $462.8;
FY 2012: $383.7;
FY 2013: $279.2;
Total: $2,278.8.
Procurement;
FY 2008: [Empty];
FY 2009: [Empty];
FY 2010: [Empty];
FY 2011: [Empty];
FY 2012: [Empty];
FY 2013: [Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Total;
FY 2008: $115.9;
FY 2009: $480.1;
FY 2010: $557.0;
FY 2011: $462.8;
FY 2012: $383.7;
FY 2013: $279.2;
Total: $2,278.8.
Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget.
[A] OSD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding amount of $432.5 million and a fiscal
year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $465.8 million for BAMS.
[End of table]
Figure 10: Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) program will
demonstrate critical technologies for operating a low observable
unmanned aerial system from aircraft carriers. The first capabilities
to be proven are launch and recovery and deck surface operations. The
demonstration will inform a follow-on acquisition decision at Milestone
A or B.
In the 2020-2025 time frame, the Navy plans to change program focus to
a strike-fighter aircraft possibly to replace F/A-18 aircraft in a
future Carrier Air Wings mix with the Joint Strike Fighter. The Navy
wants a carrier-based, air-refueled, very long-endurance aircraft
capable of operating at greater distances from the carrier battle
group, defeating heavily defended targets, expanding payload options,
and providing continuous maneuvers.
Program Status:
The Navy conducted a limited source selection between two contractors
that had been involved in prior UCAS-related efforts, and in August
2007 awarded Northrop Grumman a $635.9 million contract to design,
develop, integrate, test, and demonstrate two unmanned combat air
systems. The contract includes cost, technical, and schedule
incentives. The first flight is planned for November 2009 at Edwards
Air Force Base, and the first landing on an aircraft carrier is
expected to occur at the end of 2011.
Navy UCAS-D is only a demonstration effort; no acquisition program has
been approved, and no milestone events have been scheduled. However,
the program is trying to mitigate risks through modeling and
simulation, surrogate flight testing, and shore-based testing before
conducting sea trials. Additionally, the demonstration aircraft will
use various systems already in use on other aircraft, such as F-18
landing systems and F-16 engines, according to officials.
The program appears generally to be on schedule and within budget.
According to program officials, the program has the funding needed to
complete the demonstration by fiscal year 2013 as planned, despite a
funding reduction of almost $400 million in the 2009 President's
budget.
GAO Observations:
Navy UCAS-D can trace its origin to Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) unmanned combat air vehicle advanced technology
demonstration programs started in the late 1990s. In 2003, OSD
established a joint Navy and Air Force program, designated the Joint
Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS), to be managed by DARPA. In 2005,
the joint program transitioned from DARPA to the Air Force. However, a
late 2005 program decision memorandum recommended terminating the J-
UCAS program and funding separate Navy and Air Force programs. As a
result, the Navy initiated the Navy UCAS-D program in 2006.
Prior to holding a Milestone B decision, the program is leveraging
DARPA's J-UCAS efforts in conjunction with current risk mitigation
efforts, to evolve required technologies to the level at which DOD
considers technology to be mature. While risk mitigation is a positive
step, and the program seems to be on schedule, significant challenges
remain. For example, development of an airborne data network radio that
is critical to carrier landing and aerial refueling operations has been
suspended indefinitely, according to program officials. While the
program is proceeding with an earlier version of the radio, program
officials note that the future is uncertain. Furthermore, the Defense
Contract Management Agency expressed concern about the UCAS-D program
entering system development; the program may use different technologies
than are currently being demonstrated, likely resulting in significant
additional development costs.
In addition to the $1.4 billion in funding detailed in table 1, we
noted fiscal year 2007 funding of $97.1 million, and program officials
identified $1.3 billion of known funding for either the Navy UCAS-D or
DARPA J-UCAS programs before fiscal year 2007--yet acknowledged the
amount may not represent total previous funding. DOD, assuming no
future cost increases, will have spent at least $2.8 billion for two
demonstration aircraft.
Table 15: DOD Planned Investment for UCAS-D, Fiscal Years 2008-2013
(Then year dollars in millions):
RDT&E[A];
FY 2008: $158.2;
FY 2009: $275.8;
FY 2010: $315.8;
FY 2011: $271.9;
FY 2012: $222.1;
FY 2013: $170.4;
Total: $1,414.2.
Procurement;
FY 2008: [Empty];
FY 2009: [Empty];
FY 2010: [Empty];
FY 2011: [Empty];
FY 2012: [Empty];
FY 2013: [Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Total;
FY 2008: $158.2;
FY 2009: $275.8;
FY 2010: $315.8;
FY 2011: $271.9;
FY 2012: $222.1;
FY 2013: $170.4;
Total: $1,414.2.
Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget.
[A] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding amount of $274.7 million and a fiscal
year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $311.2 million for UCAS-D.
[End of table]
Figure 11: Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The Air Force's Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP) is a
common, scalable family of sensors designed for medium-and high-
altitude aircraft. ASIP is expected to provide the warfighter with
automatic, real-time, battlefield surveillance, situational awareness,
and intelligence information that may be composed of communications and
electronic signals--commonly referred to as signals intelligence
(SIGINT).
Within the ASIP program, the Air Force is developing three different
sensor variants: (1) a baseline variant to be integrated onto the U-2
and unmanned Global Hawk aircraft; (2) a scaled-down variant,
designated the ASIP 1C, to be integrated onto the unmanned Predator;
and (3) a midsized variant, the ASIP 2C, to be integrated onto Reaper
and potentially the Army's Sky Warrior, which are also unmanned
aircraft. The ASIP program office is responsible for developing and
testing the sensors, while the individual aircraft program offices will
be responsible for sensor production and integration.
Program Status:
The ASIP baseline sensor underwent an operational assessment in
February 2008. The results of that assessment indicated that the
program was on track to meet its effectiveness and suitability
requirements. The program completed developmental testing in February
2009 and plans to begin operational testing using a U-2 aircraft in
March 2009. Officials noted that the Air Force intends to use the
operational testing on the U-2 to assess the baseline sensor's
readiness for initial operational testing on Global Hawk. Depending on
the results of the U-2 tests, the Air Force may leave the developmental
unit on the U-2 for continuing operational use.
Flight testing on Global Hawk began in September 2008, and initial
operational testing is scheduled to begin in late fiscal year 2009.
However, the Global Hawk program officials recently indicated that the
program will not meet its planned starting date for operational
testing, and according to the ASIP Program Manager, it will most likely
not begin until early 2010. The Global Hawk program office plans to
purchase a total of 25 ASIP sensors for its Block 30 aircraft beginning
in fiscal year 2009. According to the program office, those ASIP-
equipped aircraft will not be fielded, however, until 3 years later,
because of sensor production and integration. In October 2008, DOD
approved the purchase of 2 sensors and the program will seek approval
for an additional 3 sensors in spring 2009, depending upon successful
completion of developmental testing.
Integration and developmental testing of the ASIP 1C sensor will begin
in summer 2009. According to the program office, the total number of
ASIP 1C sensors to be produced is critically linked to the Air Force's
Predator purchases and has not yet been finalized. Regardless, ASIP
program officials are operating under the assumption that ASIP 1C
production will begin in 2010.
Air Force officials noted that uncertainties about 1C and 2C production
quantities are in large part the result of uncertainties about the
number of Predators and Reapers the Air Force will ultimately purchase.
In addition, officials stated that if the Air Force purchases the
Army's Sky Warrior airframe to upgrade its Predators, it will have to
purchase more 2C sensors and fewer 1Cs. However, according to DOD
officials, the Air Force is planning to end Predator procurement and
pursue an all-Reaper fleet.
ASIP program officials noted that developmental efforts on the 1C
sensor will continue regardless of final production decisions because
knowledge gained from the 1C sensor is an integral part of the 2C
sensor's development. Because of the modular design of ASIP and the
high level of commonality between the three ASIP variants, the program
office plans to seek approval to bypass a formal 2C development program
and enter directly into production.
Under DOD's direction, all three ASIP sensor efforts have been combined
under one major defense acquisition program--recently designated
Acquisition Category ID. However, officials stated that the Air Force
will continue to manage the program as though it were three separate
programs.
GAO Observations:
According to the program office, the ASIP baseline sensor has
experienced 110 percent cost growth from its original estimate,
primarily because of capability enhancements, schedule impacts, and
increased hardware deliveries. Program officials stated that although
the baseline sensor's development is on schedule, the program is
affected by fluctuations within Global Hawk. Since Global Hawk's
schedule has continued to slip, ASIP program officials recently sought
and received approval to begin ASIP operational testing on the U-2. The
program office noted that the Air Force had not originally planned to
conduct ASIP operational tests, but given the disconnect between ASIP
developmental test completion and the beginning of Global Hawk initial
operational testing, officials believe that additional operational
testing on the U-2 would allow them to gain knowledge and further
reduce risk before beginning Global Hawk testing.
In January 2009, DOD directed the Army and the Air Force to analyze
ASIP and the Army's Tactical SIGINT Payload in an effort to move to a
common SIGINT sensor. However, in response the services emphasized that
after 15 months of collaboration, a joint program does not make sense
and recommended that an independent organization conduct the analysis
and provide further direction.
Table 16: DOD Planned Investment for ASIP, Fiscal Years 2008-2013 (Then
year dollars in millions):
RDT&E[A];
FY 2008: $66.197;
FY 2009: $110.252;
FY 2010: $106.963;
FY 2011: $102.455;
FY 2012: $99.846;
FY 2013: $105.384;
Total: $591.097.
Procurement;
FY 2008: [Empty];
FY 2009: [Empty];
FY 2010: [Empty];
FY 2011: [Empty];
FY 2012: [Empty];
FY 2013: [Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Total;
FY 2008: $66.197;
FY 2009: $110.252;
FY 2010: $106.963;
FY 2011: $102.455;
FY 2012: $99.846;
FY 2013: $105.384;
Total: $591.097.
Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget.
Note: Procurement funding for the sensors is included in the
procurement budgets of the respective host platforms.
[A] Because they are part of the same program element, ASIP Baseline
and 1C-2C efforts are reported together. DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget,
released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding amount
of $107.6 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $119.2
million for the ASIP program.
[End of table]
Figure 12: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph/illustration]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The Air Force's Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-
RTIP) is being designed as a modular, scalable, two-dimensional active
electronically scanned array radar. The Global Hawk MP-RTIP variant
will provide persistent imaging on a long-endurance platform, with
improved ground moving target indicator, limited air moving target
indicators, and synthetic aperture radar imaging over current
capability.
MP-RTIP was originally intended for multiple platforms, including the E-
10A multi-sensor command and control aircraft, a large variant of the
Boeing 767 aircraft. However, the E-10A program was canceled in 2007
and all current development efforts are directed to integrating the
radar into the Block 40 configuration of the Air Force Global Hawk
unmanned aerial vehicle. The weight and power restrictions of the
Global Hawk platform require a smaller radar than the variant designed
for the E-10A aircraft.
Program Status:
In September 2006, flight testing began after installation of a Global
Hawk MP-RTIP development unit on a Proteus, a surrogate test bed
aircraft. Proteus flight testing is planned to be complete in March
2009, which is a delay from September 2007. According to program
officials, radar antenna calibration issues caused significant delays
in maturing software. By June 2009, the MP-RTIP program plans to
deliver one MP-RTIP development unit to the Global Hawk program for
developmental testing though officials told us that delivery could be
delayed further if Global Hawk is not ready to receive the radar at
that time. Thereafter, the MP-RTIP program office will support the
Global Hawk program through completion of initial operational testing,
which is planned to start no later than November 2010. The Air Force
currently funds development of the radar through the MP-RTIP program,
while production will be funded through the Global Hawk program.
Furthermore, officials told us that the Air Force continues to
investigate other platforms for the radar.
GAO Observations:
According to program officials, the MP-RTIP program office coordinates
with the Global Hawk program office to prepare to integrate the radar
on the Global Hawk Block 40 configuration in June 2009. Officials also
told us that the two offices coordinated the fit tests for the radar in
fall 2008, and continue coordination as they conducted radar system
performance-level verification through March 2009.
Development costs for MP-RTIP have decreased, largely because of the E-
10A program cancellation, according to officials. In total, these costs
have decreased by 23 percent, from $1.7 billion at the program's
December 2003 start to $1.3 billion as of December 2007.
Table 17: DOD Planned Investment for MP-RTIP, Fiscal Years 2008-2013
(Then year dollars in millions):
RDT&E[A];
FY 2008: $38.664;
FY 2009: $42.215;
FY 2010: 0;
FY 2011: 0;
FY 2012: 0;
FY 2013: 0;
Total: $80.879.
Procurement;
FY 2008: [Empty];
FY 2009: [Empty];
FY 2010: [Empty];
FY 2011: [Empty];
FY 2012: [Empty];
FY 2013: [Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Total;
FY 2008: $38.664;
FY 2009: $42.215;
FY 2010: 0;
FY 2011: 0;
FY 2012: 0;
FY 2013: 0;
Total: $80.879.
Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget.
[A] DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a
fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding amount of $42.1 million and a fiscal
year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $71.9 million for Global Hawk.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Undersecretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
July 23, 2009:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-09-520, "Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to
Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft
Systems," dated June 19, 2009 (GAO Code 120762).
The DoD partially concurs with the draft report's first recommendation
and concurs with recommendations two through five. The rationale for
the DoD's position is enclosed.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Technical
comments were provided separately for your consideration. Should you
have any questions, please contact Mr. Edward Wolski, Unmanned Warfare
Office, Edward.Wolski@osd.mil, 703-695-8778.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure: As stated.
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated June 19, 2009:
GAO-09-520 (GAO Code 120762):
"Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist To Achieve Greater
Commonality And Efficiencies Among Unmanned Aircraft Systems"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the requirements for
current unmanned aircraft programs, develop a strategy for making
systems and subsystems among those programs more common, and report the
findings of this analysis to Congress.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department does not agree that a
separate comprehensive analysis needs to be conducted across all
unmanned systems with the specific purpose of identifying opportunities
for commonality. The Department agrees that there is significant cost
benefit in leveraging commonality where appropriate in acquisition of
weapons systems. Where commonality may not be achievable, the strategy
has been to maintain interoperability at critical interfaces that
support warfighting capability needs. Within the Department, the
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Task Force has been tasked to identify
opportunities for increased commonality and interoperability across
current and future LAS programs. In this role, the UAS Task Force has
conducted robust analyses of requirements to identify specific
opportunities to utilize commonality to reduce lifecycle costs. In
unmanned aircraft programs, the most significant opportunities for
commonality are those highlighted by the GAO in this report: MQ-I
Predator and MQ-1C Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ER/MP); RQ-4B Global
Hawk and Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS); MQ-8B Fire
Scout; and RQ-7 Shadow. Of these systems, the UAS Task Force with
support from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has
completed a comprehensive analysis of the potential for commonality
between the Predator and ER/MP programs and provided findings as
recommendations to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The resultant
decisions were documented in Acquisition Decision Memoranda (ADMs) and
provided in the DoD Report to Congress in response to Section 144 of
the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Additional
commonality between Army and Navy Fire Scout configurations depends on
the endstate sensor and network requirements for Army MQ-8B to be
compatible with Future Combat System (FCS) as rightfully pointed out by
the GAO in this report. Finally, the Marine Corps has adopted an
identical configuration for Army Shadow.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the JROC have also expressed a strong desire
to maximize commonality between the Air Force Global Hawk and Navy BAMS
programs in written memoranda. The UAS Task Force and OUSD(AT&L) in
coordination with the Joint Staff are to conduct a rigorous review of
the BAMS and Global Hawk programs in the fall of 2009 that will result
in a strategy for increased commonality between the two programs. The
findings from this review are expected by winter 2009 and will be
reflected in the acquisition strategies for both programs. Both the
USD(AT&L) and the JROC have expressed a clear desire for commonality in
UAS programs where it enables warfighter requirements to be met more
efficiently and at lower lifecycle costs.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require the military services to identify and document in their
acquisition plans and strategies specific areas where commonality can
be achieved.
DOD Response: Concur. See response to recommendation 5.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require the military services to take an open systems approach to
product development.
DOD Response: Concur. The requirement for the military departments to
take an open systems approach is already documented. The Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.02 requires program managers to employ Modular
Opens Systems Architecture (MOSA) to design for affordable change,
enable evolutionary acquisition, and rapidly field affordable systems
that are interoperable in the joint battle space.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require the military services to conduct a quantitative analysis that
examines the costs and benefits of various levels of commonality.
DOD Response: Concur. The quantitative analysis that examines cost
benefit is required to be completed during the Analysis of Alternatives
(AoA) where existing and proposed programs are examined. The results of
the AoA inform the system's Capabilities Development Document (CDD)
which is reviewed and approved by the JROC. In the new Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.02, the AoA takes place in the Materiel
Solutions Analysis phase which begins with the Materiel Development
Decision (MDD). The MDD is a formal entry point into the acquisition
process and is mandatory for all programs. By implementing the MDD, the
new 5000.02 gives the Milestone Decision Authority the ability to
ensure that the appropriate analytical rigor is instilled in the
program at initiation and that the costs and benefits of viable
alternatives are examined and allowed to shape the ultimate capability
requirements documented in the CDD.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require the military services to establish a collaborative approach and
management framework to periodically assess and effectively manage
commonality.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department has a process in place for
identifying and managing commonality. The ability for the military
departments to leverage commonality begins with the determination that
compatible capability requirements exist between systems. Currently,
the military departments are required to analyze and validate
requirements utilizing the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS). The JCIDS process was created to support
the statutory responsibility of the JROC to validate joint warfighting
requirements. The primary objective of the JCIDS process is to ensure
the capabilities required by the joint warfighter are identified with
their associated operational performance criteria in order to
successfully execute the missions assigned. The JCIDS process also
supports the acquisition process by identifying and assessing
capability needs and associated performance criteria to be used as a
basis for acquiring the right capabilities.
Once a program has been initiated and is in development, commonality
between military department acquisition programs is identified in
acquisition strategies and documented via signed Memoranda of Agreement
(MOAs). In the case of the Navy Fire Scout and Army FCS Class IV
programs, an Executive Steering Group (ESG), chaired by respective Flag-
/General officer level Program Executive Officers, has been established
to monitor commonality of the Fire Scout airframe. An ESG has also been
formally chartered to manage commonality between the Air Force Predator
and Army ER/MP programs. In the fall of 2009, the Navy and Air Force
will be requested to identify their proposed framework to
collaboratively manage commonality between the BAMS and Global Hawk
programs.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Michael J. Sullivan (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, principal contributors to this
report were Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Travis Masters; Rae
Ann Sapp; Karen Sloan; Leigh Ann Nally; Raffaele Roffo; Brian Smith;
and Laura Jezewski.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 30, 2009.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve
Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-175]. Washington, D.C.:
November 14, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination Process Has Not
Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060]. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve
Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619]. Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2008.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess
and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR
Requirements. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374].
Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-578]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2007.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary
Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New
Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-596T]. Washington, D.C.: April 19,
2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful
Development of the Army's Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-593]. Washington, D.C.: May 19,
2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies
Can Help Address Operational Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-610T]. Washington, D.C.: April 6,
2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts
to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-447]. Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in
Nunn-McCurdy Report. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-222R]. Washington, D.C.: December
15, 2005.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-49]. Washington, D.C.: December 13,
2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning
Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-395T]. Washington, D.C.: March 9,
2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy
Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-6]. Washington, D.C.: November 5,
2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: More Common Systems and Components
Could Result in Cost Savings, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-101] (Washington, D.C.: May
21, 1999).
[2] For one example of these challenges, see GAO, Defense Acquisitions:
Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges
Remain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-955]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2006).
[3] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to
Improve Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter
Needs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-175] (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 14, 2008).
[4] Open systems allow the use of commercially available and widely
accepted standard products from multiple vendors, rather than
developing unique components. GAO/NSIAD-99-101.
[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-101].
[6] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009).
[7] According to OSD, Air Force, Army, and contractor officials we
spoke with, the Air Force no longer plans to procure additional
Predators beyond 2009. This plan is clearly reflected in the Air
Force's fiscal year 2010 budget submission, in which it requested
funding to procure 38 aircraft in 2009 and then no funding for
procurement in 2010.
[8] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, § 141.
[9] DOD defines initial operational capability as the date the
warfighter first has the means to effectively employ a new weapon
system or equipment item operated by an adequately trained, equipped,
and supported military unit.
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP].
[11] Shadow was identified as a replacement system for the Marine Corps
Pioneer unmanned aircraft. Specifically, the cost for maintaining the
Pioneer fleet was cited as a reason for selecting the Shadow. The
Marine Corps is considering a future replacement to the Shadow, which
is not expected before 2015.
[12] GAO, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's
Acquisition Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-6] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2004),
and Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in
Nunn-McCurdy Report, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-222R] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15,
2005). Additionally, we have addressed problems with the Global Hawk
program in our annual assessment of weapon systems. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP].
[13] Reaper is designed to provide a ground attack capability to find,
fix, track, target, engage, and assess mobile or fixed targets, and is
capable of flying at greater speeds and higher altitudes than Predator.
For more information on Reaper and Predator, see appendix II.
[14] Signals intelligence is derived from communications, electronic,
and foreign instrumentation signals, regardless of how they are
transmitted.
[15] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination
Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 25, 2008).
[16] Combatant commands are joint commands comprised of military
equipment and personnel from each of the military services. Six
combatant commands have geographic responsibilities to plan and execute
military operations in their respective regions. Four combatant
commands have functional responsibilities, for example, providing
transportation services.
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060].
[18] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can
Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of
Future ISR Requirements, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24,
2008).
[19] The BAMS program is leveraging technologies of other systems, like
the radar from the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter and the electro-
optical and infrared sensor from Reaper.
[20] GAO recently reported [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-175] that the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics created the task
force in 2007 to lead a DOD-wide effort to coordinate critical unmanned
aircraft systems issues and develop a way ahead to enhance operations
and streamline acquisitions.
[21] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 144.
[22] On July 6, 2009, we received a copy of the Department of Defense
Report to Congress on Common Control Stations and Payloads for Manned
and Unmanned Aircraft Systems that was issued in late June 2009.
[23] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009).
[24] The appendix contains 11 program summaries because the Navy and
Army Fire Scout programs are reported separately.
[25] Because the Army Fire Scout is considered a part of the Future
Combat Systems program, no funding details are presented in the program
summary.
[End of section]
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