Reserve Forces
Army Needs to Reevaluate its Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces Gao ID: GAO-09-720 July 17, 2009The Army's strategy for training its reserve component calls for units to conduct training on the primary missions for which they were organized and designed as well as the missions units are assigned in support of ongoing operations. The training is to be conducted over a 5-year cycle with a focus on primary missions during the early years and assigned missions during the later years. In response to mandates, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the Army is able to execute its strategy for training reserve component forces for their primary and assigned missions; (2) mobilization and deployment laws, regulations, goals, and policies impact the Army's ability to train and employ these forces; and (3) access to military schools and skill training facilities and ranges affects the preparation of reserve component forces. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed relevant training strategies and policies, laws, and data and surveyed 22 Army reserve component units returning from deployments in the past 12 months.
The Army is able to execute the portion of its reserve component training strategy that calls for units to effectively train for their assigned missions in support of ongoing operations, but faces challenges in executing the portion of the strategy that calls for units to effectively train on primary missions. Unit training for assigned missions, which is conducted in the later years of the 5-year training cycle, is generally effective because the Army prioritizes its available resources to support units that are preparing to deploy for ongoing operations--units receive increased training time; mission requirements and personnel levels are stabilized; and personnel and equipment shortages are addressed while support is increased. Conversely, units training for their primary missions in the early years of the cycle receive less time to train and experience equipment and personnel shortages, which adversely affect teamwork and unit cohesion. Also, support for their training is limited. These challenges limit the effectiveness of primary mission training and could impact their ability to conduct their primary missions within the current strategy's time frames. While DOD's current 12-month mobilization policy has not hindered the Army's overall ability to train its reserve component forces and has reduced the length of deployments, it has not fully achieved its intended purpose of reducing stress on the force by providing predictability to soldiers. Because units must spend part of their mobilization periods in training, they are actually deploying for about 10 months under this 12-month mobilization policy, whereas they typically deployed for periods of 12 to 15 months under the previous policy. Under the current policy, the Army's reserve component forces are deploying more frequently and spending more time away from home in training when they are not mobilized. Moreover, unit leaders and personnel GAO interviewed said that the 12-month mobilization policy has decreased predictability and increased stress for individuals. GAO noted alternate approaches that can improve predictability. For example, the Air Force recently developed a deployment model categorizing five grouped occupational specialties based on operational requirements and length of time home between deployments. The model is intended to increase predictability for its forces and thus reduce their stress. Reserve component forces are generally receiving access to training facilities necessary to prepare them for their assigned missions, but the Army lacks capacity to prepare all of its forces for the full range of training requirements. In addressing capacity shortages, the Army has given priority to deploying units and personnel. As a result, active and reserve component forces without assigned missions often experience delays in accessing training for their primary missions. Although the Army is reviewing some aspects of its training capacity, it has not fully identified its training requirements and capacity and therefore will not have a sound basis for prioritizing available resources and cannot be assured that the initiatives it has under way will fully address gaps in its training capacity.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-720, Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Reevaluate its Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2009:
Reserve Forces:
Army Needs to Reevaluate its Approach to Training and Mobilizing
Reserve Component Forces:
GAO-09-720:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-720, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Army‘s strategy for training its reserve component calls for units
to conduct training on the primary missions for which they were
organized and designed as well as the missions units are assigned in
support of ongoing operations. The training is to be conducted over a 5-
year cycle with a focus on primary missions during the early years and
assigned missions during the later years. In response to mandates, GAO
assessed the extent to which (1) the Army is able to execute its
strategy for training reserve component forces for their primary and
assigned missions; (2) mobilization and deployment laws, regulations,
goals, and policies impact the Army‘s ability to train and employ these
forces; and (3) access to military schools and skill training
facilities and ranges affects the preparation of reserve component
forces. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed relevant training
strategies and policies, laws, and data and surveyed 22 Army reserve
component units returning from deployments in the past 12 months.
What GAO Found:
The Army is able to execute the portion of its reserve component
training strategy that calls for units to effectively train for their
assigned missions in support of ongoing operations, but faces
challenges in executing the portion of the strategy that calls for
units to effectively train on primary missions. Unit training for
assigned missions, which is conducted in the later years of the 5-year
training cycle, is generally effective because the Army prioritizes its
available resources to support units that are preparing to deploy for
ongoing operations”units receive increased training time; mission
requirements and personnel levels are stabilized; and personnel and
equipment shortages are addressed while support is increased.
Conversely, units training for their primary missions in the early
years of the cycle receive less time to train and experience equipment
and personnel shortages, which adversely affect teamwork and unit
cohesion. Also, support for their training is limited. These challenges
limit the effectiveness of primary mission training and could impact
their ability to conduct their primary missions within the current
strategy‘s time frames.
While DOD‘s current 12-month mobilization policy has not hindered the
Army‘s overall ability to train its reserve component forces and has
reduced the length of deployments, it has not fully achieved its
intended purpose of reducing stress on the force by providing
predictability to soldiers. Because units must spend part of their
mobilization periods in training, they are actually deploying for about
10 months under this 12-month mobilization policy, whereas they
typically deployed for periods of 12 to 15 months under the previous
policy. Under the current policy, the Army‘s reserve component forces
are deploying more frequently and spending more time away from home in
training when they are not mobilized. Moreover, unit leaders and
personnel GAO interviewed said that the 12-month mobilization policy
has decreased predictability and increased stress for individuals. GAO
noted alternate approaches that can improve predictability. For
example, the Air Force recently developed a deployment model
categorizing five grouped occupational specialties based on operational
requirements and length of time home between deployments. The model is
intended to increase predictability for its forces and thus reduce
their stress.
Reserve component forces are generally receiving access to training
facilities necessary to prepare them for their assigned missions, but
the Army lacks capacity to prepare all of its forces for the full range
of training requirements. In addressing capacity shortages, the Army
has given priority to deploying units and personnel. As a result,
active and reserve component forces without assigned missions often
experience delays in accessing training for their primary missions.
Although the Army is reviewing some aspects of its training capacity,
it has not fully identified its training requirements and capacity and
therefore will not have a sound basis for prioritizing available
resources and cannot be assured that the initiatives it has under way
will fully address gaps in its training capacity.
What GAO Recommends:
To help assure that the Army maximizes the efficiency and effectiveness
of its training, GAO recommends that DOD and the Army evaluate and
adjust its training strategy and mobilization policy, and determine the
range of resources and support necessary to fully implement the
training strategy. DOD generally concurred with GAO‘s recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-720] or key
components. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202)512-
9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Army Faces Challenges in Executing Its Reserve Component Training
Strategy:
DOD's Mobilization Policy Has Presented Challenges as the Army Trains
and Deploys Its Reserve Component Forces:
Reserve Component Forces Assigned Missions in Support of Ongoing
Operations Have Access to the Training Needed, But Constraints Delay
and Limit Training Opportunities for Some Forces:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Percentage of Army National Guard Soldiers Awaiting Individual
Training:
Table 2: Number of Schools Where Required Seats Exceed Reserved Seats:
Figures:
Figure 1: Reserve Component Training Strategy under the Army's
Traditional Mobilize-Train-Deploy Model:
Figure 2: Reserve Component Training Strategy under the Army's current
Train-Mobilize-Deploy Model:
Figure 3: Status of Resources and Support During a Reserve Component 5-
year Cycle:
Figure 4: Deployment Rotation Requirements Based on 12-and 9-Month
Deployments:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 17, 2009:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the
involvement of large numbers of Army National Guard and Army Reserve
personnel and demands on the Army's reserve component forces are
expected to continue for the foreseeable future.[Footnote 1] In
addition, the high demand for ground forces has led DOD to retrain some
units for missions that are outside of their core competencies.
[Footnote 2] Our past reports have noted a number of personnel,
equipment, and training challenges that the Army's reserve component
forces have faced since the start of the global war on terrorism in
2001.[Footnote 3] For example, we have noted that preparation for
ongoing operations has often required different types of training as
units are being tasked to perform assigned missions such as convoy
security or detainee operations, which may differ significantly from
their primary missions, such as artillery.
The Army has changed the approach it uses to train its reserve
component forces. The Army had traditionally viewed its reserve
component forces as a strategic reserve, and its training strategy
called for 39 days of training per year,[Footnote 4] which was to be
followed by extensive training after mobilization and prior to
deployment.[Footnote 5] All of this training was supposed to prepare
units for the primary missions they were designed or organized to
perform. In the last two decades, the Army's reserve component forces
have been called upon to support operational requirements in the
Balkans and then the Middle East. The Army now views the reserve
component as an operational reserve that regularly supports deployment
requirements. Furthermore, the Army has made adjustments to its actual
training of reserve component forces in order to support operational
requirements. Specifically, it increased the amount of time forces
spend in training prior to mobilization, referred to as pre-
mobilization training, and training became more focused on units'
assigned missions (i.e., missions that units are assigned to perform in
support of current or ongoing operations) rather than their core or
primary missions. In 2008, the Army issued two updated field manuals--
3-0 Operations and 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations--which
called for units to be trained and ready to operate across a full
spectrum of operations. In accordance with that guidance, the Army's
reserve components developed strategies that called for their forces to
conduct training on both primary and assigned missions in order to
progressively build capabilities across a 5-year cycle. During the
early years of the cycle, the strategy calls for training which is
similar to the traditional strategy--39 days of training focused on
primary missions. However, in the later stages of the cycle, the
current strategy calls for training that differs from the traditional
strategy. Specifically, the new strategy calls for increased training--
up to 109 days a year--prior to unit mobilizations and decreased
training after units are mobilized. In addition, both the increased pre-
mobilization training and the decreased post-mobilization training are
to focus on assigned missions rather than units' primary missions.
Several variables can affect the numbers of forces that are available
to support ongoing operations, including the size and structure of
active and reserve component forces and policies concerning the length
of deployments and reserve component mobilizations. On January 19,
2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum[Footnote 6] that
changed DOD's mobilization and deployment policies. It eliminated a
previous policy that had limited involuntary mobilizations to 24
cumulative months and thus made virtually all reserve component
personnel available on an indefinite recurrent basis. However, the
policy also limited involuntary mobilizations to a maximum of 12 months
at a time.[Footnote 7]
Section 344 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009 directed GAO to report on the correlation between the
preparation and operational use of the Army's reserve component forces
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of
Representatives.[Footnote 8] This report addresses that mandate and
also responds to a portion of Section 343 that directs GAO to report on
training constraints that limit access to military schools and skill
training as well as facilities and ranges, including the combat
training centers, and that could provide challenges to the reserve
components in their role as an operational reserve. In responding to
both mandates, our objectives are to determine the extent to which 1)
the Army is able to effectively implement its strategy for training
reserve component forces for their primary and assigned missions, 2)
mobilization and deployment laws, regulations, goals, and policies
impact the Army's ability to train and employ reserve component forces,
and 3) access to military schools and skill training, facilities, and
ranges affect the preparation of reserve component forces.
To address these objectives we obtained and analyzed documentation
concerning reserve component training strategies, policies, laws, and
goals, and data associated with the mobilizing, and deploying of the
Army's reserve component forces. We also interviewed Army and other DOD
officials concerning the impact of the current strategies, guidance,
and goals. We surveyed 22 Army National Guard or Army Reserve units who
returned from deployments in the last 12 months and conducted follow-up
interviews with officials from 15 of these units. Our survey, based on
a non-probability sample, and interviews addressed a range of issues
including deployment notification time lines; the timing and
effectiveness of pre-deployment, post-deployment, and in-theater
training; and access to training facilities, schoolhouses, and ranges.
Additionally, we interviewed leaders and personnel from two Army
National Guard brigade combat teams during their training exercises at
the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and at Camp
Blanding, Florida. We assessed the reliability of training,
mobilization, and attrition data used in this report and determined the
data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We
conducted this performance audit from September 2008 through May 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. The scope and methodology
used for this audit are described in further detail at appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The Army is able to execute the portion of its reserve component
training strategy that calls for units to effectively train for their
assigned missions in support of ongoing operations, but it faces
challenges in executing the portion of the strategy that calls for
units to effectively train for their primary missions. The Army's Field
Manual 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations defines effective
training as that which builds proficiency, teamwork, confidence,
cohesiveness, and allows organizations to achieve their training
objectives. The manual also specifies that organizations should train
the way they intend to operate and efficiently make the best use of
available training resources, including training time. The Army
currently prioritizes its available training resources and time to
support units that are preparing to deploy to meet operational
requirements. As a result, the unit training for assigned missions,
which is conducted in the later stages of the Army's 5-year training
cycle, is generally effective. Units conduct up to 109 days training in
the year prior to mobilization. Personnel levels are stabilized through
policies that prevent personnel from leaving units and transfer
additional personnel into the deploying units. Equipment shortages are
addressed, and units receive additional training support including
personnel who support unit training events by acting as observers,
controllers, and trainers. Conversely, units which are training for
their primary missions in the early years of the cycle face challenges,
in part, because they do not receive prioritized support. They conduct
39 days of training per year. In addition, annual reserve component
attrition rates that typically approach 20 percent limit the
effectiveness of unit training that is conducted to build teamwork and
unit cohesion. Because the training strategy calls for a 5-year
training cycle and attrition occurs each year, unit training that is
conducted early in the cycle and designed to build teamwork and unit
cohesion will become less beneficial with each passing year, as team
members depart the unit. Units that are training for primary missions
during the early stages of the cycle also experience personnel and
equipment shortages, often because they are tasked to give up personnel
and equipment to support deploying units. Finally, they receive less
support for their training. For example, the Army's active component
does not provide observers, controllers, and trainers for these units
to support their training events. All these challenges have limited the
effectiveness of the collective training for primary missions, which is
conducted during the early years of the cycle. They also make it
unlikely that units would be adequately prepared to deploy and conduct
their primary missions following a reduced post-mobilization training
period that is called for under the current reserve component training
strategy. To ensure the Army has an executable strategy for effectively
training its reserve component forces, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to reevaluate and adjust
the Army's reserve component training strategy to fully account for the
factors that limit the effectiveness of unit training for primary
missions in the early years of the 5-year cycle.
While DOD's 12-month mobilization policy has not hindered the Army's
overall ability to train its reserve component forces and has reduced
the length of deployments, it has not fully achieved its intended
purpose of reducing stress on the force by providing predictability.
Because units must spend part of their mobilization periods in
training, they are actually deploying for shorter periods of about 10
months under the current 12-month mobilization policy, whereas they
typically deployed for periods of 12 to 15 months under the previous
policy. However, under the current policy, the Army's reserve component
forces are deploying more frequently and spending more time away from
home in training when they are not mobilized in order to meet combatant
commanders' requirements for forces. Leaders and soldiers in one of the
larger units we contacted said that the 12-month mobilization policy,
which has led to more frequent deployments and training periods, has
actually increased stress and decreased predictability. DOD's
mobilization policy includes a goal of eventually achieving a tempo of
1-year mobilized to 5-years demobilized; however, for the foreseeable
future, this goal will be difficult to achieve because operational
demands for reserve component forces are expected to remain high and
force structure levels are expected to remain relatively constant. We
found that alternate approaches can improve predictability. For
example, the Air Force recently developed a flexible deployment model
that grouped occupational specialties into five different "tempo bands"
based on ongoing operational requirements. Personnel in the first band
should expect to be deployed about the same length of time as they are
home between deployments. Personnel in the fifth band can expect to be
home 5 times longer than they are deployed. The Air Force expects this
model to increase predictability for its forces and thus reduce their
stress. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense reevaluate
DOD's mobilization policy for Army reserve component personnel to
determine whether there should be a more flexible policy that allows
variations in the length of mobilizations or that establishes
deployment goals based on occupational specialty or unit type in order
to better meet the policy's goals of increasing predictability and
reducing stress on the force.
In accordance with DOD Directive 1200.17, which states that training
facilities should be available to support reserve component training
requirements, reserve component forces are generally receiving the
access to training facilities that is necessary to prepare them for
their assigned missions. However, the Army's training facilities lack
the capacity necessary to prepare all of the Army's forces for the full
range of individual and unit training requirements, including those
associated with primary as well as assigned missions. In addressing its
capacity shortages, the Army has given priority access to personnel and
units that have established mobilization dates or assigned missions. As
a result, active and reserve component forces without assigned missions
often experience delays in gaining access to training needed to prepare
them for their primary missions. For example, the Army prioritizes
access to its collective training sites that are used for unit training
based on units' assigned mission requirements. It also prioritizes
access to individual training sites based on missions and mobilization
dates. As a result of the individual training capacity limitations, 22
percent of the Army National Guard's soldiers were awaiting individual
training in March 2009, compared to a goal of 15 percent. While the
Army is exploring or has several initiatives under way to address
training constraints, it has not identified the total requirements
associated with its reserve component training strategy or the training
capacity necessary to support the strategy. In November 2008, the
Secretary of Defense directed the Secretaries of the military
departments to review the capacity of their training institutions to
determine if they were properly resourced to prepare all military
members to meet mission requirements.[Footnote 9] However, the Army's
ongoing reviews do not fully account for personnel and equipment
constraints that have limited individual training in the past, and the
Army's range requirements have been understated because they were based
on planned mobilizations that have been lower than actual
mobilizations. Until the Army fully identifies its training
requirements and available training capacity, it will not know whether
it has the resources needed to fully execute its reserve component
training strategy, and it will not have a sound basis for prioritizing
available resources. In addition, it cannot be assured that the
initiatives it has under way will fully address any gaps in current
training capacity. Therefore, we are recommending that the Army
determine the range of resources and support that are necessary to
fully implement its reserve component training strategy including
personnel, equipment, and facilities and their costs.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or
partially concurred with all of our recommendations. A discussion of
DOD's comments and our evaluation of those comments appears later in
this report. Additionally, the full text of DOD's written comments is
included at appendix II.
Background:
The Army has two reserve components, the Army National Guard and the
Army Reserve. Both reserve components are composed primarily of citizen
soldiers who balance the demands of civilian careers with military
service on a part-time basis. During the Cold War, it was expected that
the reserve forces would be a strategic reserve to supplement active
forces in the event of extended conflict. However, since the mid-1990s,
the reserves have been continuously mobilized to support operations
worldwide, including those in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq. In today's strategic environment, the Army's
reserve components have taken on a variety of different overseas
missions as well as traditional and emerging domestic missions.
The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are part of the total
Army, which also includes the active component. The Army Reserve is a
federal force that is organized primarily to supply specialized combat
support and combat service support skills to combat forces. The Army
National Guard is composed of both combat forces and units that supply
support skills. The Army National Guard, when mobilized for a federal
mission, is under the command and control of the President. When not
mobilized for a federal mission, Army National Guard units act under
the control of the governors for state missions, typically responding
to natural disasters and more recently protecting state assets from
terrorist attacks.
Individual training is a building block of the Army training process.
It includes basic military training as well as occupational specialty
training. Acquiring advanced individual skills enables a soldier to
move into a unit, but acquisition of such skills does not necessarily
equate with operational preparedness. It must be integrated with unit
training in a group situation, which is referred to as collective
training, to achieve operational objectives.
Traditionally, the Army used a mobilize-train-deploy strategy to
prepare its reserve component units to act as a strategic reserve that
was available to augment active forces during a crisis. Figure 1 shows
that the traditional reserve component strategy called for a constant
level of training until a unit was mobilized and underwent extensive
post-mobilization training to prepare for deployment.
Figure 1: Reserve Component Training Strategy under the Army's
Traditional Mobilize-Train-Deploy Model:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Reserve component training strategy under the Army‘s traditional
Mobilize-Train-Deploy model:
Primary mission training: Undefined time frame;
4 years prior to mobilization: Yearly military training 39 days;
3 years prior to mobilization: Yearly military training 39 days;
3 years prior to mobilization: Yearly military training 39 days;
1 year prior to mobilization: Yearly military training 39 days;
Unit learns that the Army plans to mobilize and deploy the unit in the
future in order to meet operational requirements.
Mobilization and deployment:
Mobilization;
Postmobilization training: up to 180 days;
Deploy for up to the remainder of the allowable 24-month mobilization
period.
Deployment:
End of deployment.
Total training for 4 years prior to mobilization: 156 days.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of figure]
Under the traditional training strategy, all training was focused on a
unit's primary missions and units were to be deployed to perform their
primary missions.
As reserve component requirements increased in recent years, the Army
began to move away from its traditional strategy and began adopting a
train-mobilize-deploy strategy that prepares reserve component forces
to serve as an operational reserve, which regularly supports deployment
requirements. Figure 2 shows that the Army's current reserve component
training strategy is based on a 5-year cycle during which training is
increased to build capabilities.[Footnote 10]
Figure 2: Reserve Component Training Strategy under the Army's current
Train-Mobilize-Deploy Model:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Reserve component training strategy under the Army‘s current Train-
Mobilize-Deploy model:
Primary mission training:
4 years prior to mobilization: Yearly military training: 38-39 days;
4 years prior to mobilization: Yearly military training: 39 days;
Unit learns that the Army plans to mobilize and deploy the unit in the
future in order to meet operational requirements;
Assigned mission training:
2 years prior to mobilization: Yearly military training: 45-48.5 days;
1 year prior to mobilization: Yearly military training 50-109 days.
Mobilization and deployment:
Mobilization followed by up to 60 days of post-mobilization training;
Deploy for the remainder of the 12-month mobilization period;
End of deployment.
Total training for 4 years prior to mobilization: up to 232 days.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of figure]
The current train-mobilize-deploy strategy is designed to train
individuals and units to a prescribed level of readiness prior to
mobilization in order to limit post-mobilization training.
Several variables can affect the numbers of forces that are available
to support ongoing operations, including the size and structure of
active and reserve component forces and policies concerning the length
of deployments and reserve component mobilizations. On January 19,
2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that changed DOD's
mobilization and deployment policies.[Footnote 11] It eliminated a
previous policy that had limited involuntary mobilizations to 24
cumulative months and thus made virtually all reserve component
personnel available on an indefinite recurrent basis. However, the
policy also limited involuntary mobilizations to 12 months at a time.
[Footnote 12] It also established a reserve component unit planning
objective of 1 year mobilized to 5 years demobilized, and created a
requirement for mobilizations, including training and deployment, to be
managed on a unit basis.
In January 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
recommended that the Secretary of Defense ensure that training
institutions and facilities were resourced to meet the needs of the
total force.[Footnote 13] In particular, it recommended that
institutions meet the current training needs of the reserve component
personnel and that each service reassess the number of training and
administrative days the reserve component units and members need prior
to activation. The Commission further recommended that the services
fund and implement policies to increase pre-mobilization training and
focus training on mission requirements. The commission also stated that
training equipment should be sufficient to give service members regular
access to modern warfighting equipment so that they could train,
develop, and maintain proficiency on the same types of equipment that
they would use when deployed.
In February 2009, the Army Audit Agency reported that Army National
Guard and Army Reserve units often were unable to complete pre-
mobilization training tasks because they were not able to stabilize
staffing levels and obtain equipment needed for training.[Footnote 14]
They further reported that units did not execute training requirements
in the most efficient manner.
The Army Faces Challenges in Executing Its Reserve Component Training
Strategy:
The Army is able to effectively execute the portion of its reserve
component training strategy that calls for training units on their
assigned missions, but faces challenges in effectively executing the
portion of the strategy that calls for training units on their primary
missions.
The Army's new training strategy is based on a five-year cycle that
mirrors the former strategy in the early years of the cycle, but calls
for alterations to the type and amounts of training conducted in the
later years of the cycle. Specifically, in the early years of the
cycle, units conduct 39 days of training that is focused on their
primary missions just as they did under the former strategy. However,
under the new strategy, after a unit is notified--generally in the
middle to later stages of the training cycle (1 or 2 years prior to
mobilization)--that it will be deploying for an operational mission,
all the unit's training becomes focused on that assigned mission, and
training increases, up to 109 days in the year prior to mobilization.
New Training Strategy Contains a Number of Assumptions:
The Army's Field Manual 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations
defines effective training as that which builds proficiency, teamwork,
confidence, cohesiveness, and allows organizations to achieve their
training objectives. The manual also specifies that organizations
should train the way they intend to operate and be efficient by making
the best of use of training resources, including training time. The
Army's reserve component training strategy contains a number of
assumptions related to effective and efficient training. First, the
strategy explicitly assumes that the amount of training conducted after
mobilization can be reduced because of the increased training that is
conducted prior to mobilization. Second, it implicitly assumes that the
training conducted in the early years of the cycle lays a foundation
that can be built upon throughout the later stages of the cycle. Third,
it implicitly assumes that units will have the necessary time,
personnel, equipment, and support to conduct effective training on both
individual and unit tasks throughout the training cycle.
Conditions for Effective Unit Training Occur Late in the Cycle:
The Army currently prioritizes its available training resources and
time to support units that are preparing to deploy for ongoing
operations. As a result, unit training for assigned missions, which is
conducted in the later stages of the Army's 5-year training cycle, is
generally effective. Table 1 shows the typical status of reserve
component units with respect to available training time, personnel,
equipment, and training support throughout the 5-year cycle. The table
shows that during the later stages of the cycle, units have the
necessary training time, and necessary personnel, equipment, and
support to support effective unit training.
Figure 3: Status of Resources and Support During a Reserve Component 5-
year Cycle:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Years 3 and 4 prior to mobilization:
Training days per year (prior to mobilization): 39;
Personnel: Units typically have annual attrition of about 20 percent.
They are also often tasked to provide personnel to deploying units;
Equipment: Based on deployment priorities, not component status, units
have lower priorities for equipment and may be tasked to give up
equipment to deploying units;
Training support: Units receive limited external support from higher
headquarters and training commands.
Notification of sourcing[A]:
Training days per year (prior to mobilization): N/A;
Personnel: Attrition continues;
Equipment: The unit‘s priority for equipment begins to increase;
Training support: External training support begins to increase.
Between notification of sourcing and deployment:
Training days per year (prior to mobilization): 45-109;
Personnel: Stop loss has stabilized personnel levels and units often
receive personnel from non-deploying units;
Equipment: Higher headquarters work to fill equipment shortages. The
units may begin receiving new equipment from non-deploying units;
Training support: Units receive external training support from U.S.
Army Forces Command and First Army.
After deploying:
Training days per year (prior to mobilization): N/A;
Personnel: If additional personnel are required, the unit is brought up
to the required personnel levels prior to assuming its assigned mission
in theater;
Equipment: Units deploying to the U.S. Central Command theater of
operations often receive extensive equipment from theater-provided
equipment stocks;
Training support: Units usually have an opportunity to review previous
training, train on equipment that is only available in theater, and
learn from the unit they are replacing.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Army information.
[A] Initial notification of assigned mission is supposed to occur 2
years prior to mobilization but actual notification dates have varied
widely. The information in this chart is tied to events rather than to
specific dates or times.
[End of figure]
According to the reserve component training strategy, units have their
yearly training increased during the 2 years prior to mobilization--up
to 45 days, and up to 109 days, 1 year prior to mobilization. Because
this increased pre-mobilization training is focused on the same
assigned missions as the units' post-mobilization training, the Army
has been able to reduce the amount of post-mobilization training.
Furthermore, in the later stages of the cycle, mission requirements are
generally stabilized and the Army has traditionally stabilized unit
personnel levels through the use of "Stop Loss" policies, which prevent
personnel from leaving units. This stabilization allows the Army to
conduct effective unit training that builds teamwork and unit cohesion.
Units train the way they intend to operate--with the people who will
deploy and on the missions they will perform. Under DOD's Stop Loss
policy Army reserve component units were subject to stop loss 90 days
prior to mobilization. However, the Army recently announced a
comprehensive plan to eliminate stop loss, beginning in August 2009,
while retaining the authority for future use under extraordinary
circumstances.
Personnel from units in our sample indicated that they preferred to
conduct unit training later in the training cycle. They indicated that
their units generally had increased personnel levels during the later
stages of the cycle. Of the 22 units in our non-probability sample, 21
received additional personnel from other units to help them achieve the
units' required deployment strengths. The brigade combat teams that we
met with also received significant numbers of personnel from other
units to help prepare them for their deployments in 2009. In each of
these cases, the units received the additional personnel during the
later part of the training cycle--in the year prior to the units'
mobilizations or at the mobilization station. Personnel from the units
we sampled also noted that equipment is more available in the later
stages of the training cycle when units also receive additional
training support including personnel who support unit training events
by acting as observers, controllers, and trainers. Furthermore, the
Army has found that the later stages of the cycle are the optimum times
to conduct unit training. In the Army's 2009 Posture Statement, the
Army indicated that an extended training period close to, or contiguous
with, mobilization station arrival, enabled commanders to attain the
highest levels of readiness and unit capability.[Footnote 15]
Additionally, two February 2009, Army Audit Agency reports on Army
National Guard and Army Reserve pre-mobilization training found that
the best practice for completing required pre-mobilization training
tasks was to conduct the majority of those tasks immediately prior to
mobilization when mission specific equipment is more available.
Finally, in a May 2009 letter to the Secretary of Defense, the
Adjutants General Association of the United States stated that training
late in the cycle just prior to mobilization is often required to
enhance soldier readiness.
Availability of Unit Training Enablers Varies throughout the Training
Cycle:
As noted previously in table 1, the Army is unable to set the
conditions required for effective unit training during the early years
of the cycle, when units are focused on primary mission training.
Training time, personnel, equipment, and training support are key
enablers of effective unit training, but the Army faces challenges that
are associated with each of these enablers during the early stages of
the training cycle. In addition, our current and prior reviews have
found that units that are not scheduled to deploy receive lower
priorities for resources and training support. Therefore, a number of
reasons make it unlikely that units would be adequately prepared to
deploy and conduct their primary missions following a reduced post-
mobilization training period such as the one called for under the
current strategy.
First, units are receiving the same level of primary mission training
as they were under the former strategy that called for more lengthy
post-mobilization training periods. Second, annual reserve component
attrition rates that typically approach 20 percent limit the
effectiveness of unit training that is conducted to build teamwork and
unit cohesion. Because the training strategy calls for a 5-year
training cycle and attrition occurs each year, unit training that is
conducted early in the cycle and designed to build teamwork and unit
cohesion will become less beneficial with each passing year, as team
members depart the unit. DOD reports indicate that attrition rates for
the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have ranged from 17 percent to
22 percent from fiscal years 2003 through 2007. Because of these
attrition rates, a significant percentage of the unit personnel who
train on the units' primary missions during the early stages of the 5-
year cycle will not be in the unit at the end of the cycle when the
unit is available to deploy. Third, units that are training for primary
missions during the early stages of the cycle also experience personnel
and equipment shortages, often because they are tasked to give up
personnel and equipment to support deploying units.
Personnel shortages result from a variety of reasons. Some personnel
are not available for training because they are recovering from
injuries or illnesses, while others are unavailable because of pending
disciplinary actions. In addition, many soldiers have not met
individual training requirements. According to the Army's 2009 Posture
Statement, the Army National Guard had 67,623 soldiers who were non-
deployable in fiscal year 2008 because of incomplete initial entry
training, medical, or other issues.[Footnote 16] For the same period,
the Army Reserve had 36,974 soldiers who were non-deployable for
similar reasons.[Footnote 17] These personnel shortages can directly
impact the level of unit training that a unit is able to achieve prior
to mobilization.
In addition, equipment and support issues are also a concern early in
the training cycle when units are training for their primary missions.
In his March 2009 statement before the Senate Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Personnel, the Director of the Army National Guard
stated that the lack of equipment availability for training remains an
issue. Further, the 2008 Army Reserve Posture Statement noted that the
Army Reserve was forced to expend significant resources to move
equipment between units and training locations to address shortages.
Units in our sample also experienced equipment challenges during the
early stages of the training cycle when they were training for their
primary missions. Specifically, 12 of the 22 units in our sample faced
equipment shortages that impacted their ability to train early in the
cycle. Furthermore, training support is limited during the early years
of the cycle. For example, the Army's active component does not provide
observers, controllers, and trainers to reserve component units to
support their primary mission training, which is conducted early in the
cycle.[Footnote 18]
DOD's Mobilization Policy Has Presented Challenges as the Army Trains
and Deploys Its Reserve Component Forces:
While DOD's 12-month mobilization policy has not hindered the Army's
overall ability to train its reserve component forces and has reduced
the length of deployments, it has not fully achieved its intended
purpose of reducing stress on the force by providing predictability.
According to testimony by the Secretary of Defense, the intended
purpose of DOD's mobilization policy was to reduce stress on the force
by, in part, improving predictability.[Footnote 19] While the policy
has led to shorter deployments, it has also caused units to mobilize
and deploy more frequently, and units are also spending more time away
from home in training when not mobilized.
The 12-Month Mobilization Policy Reduces Many Deployments to Less Than
10 Months:
The 12-month mobilization policy has significantly reduced the length
of deployments for the Army's reserve component forces. Because units
must spend part of their mobilization periods training for their
assigned missions, they are actually deployed for only part of the time
that they are mobilized. Under the previous mobilization policy,
reserve component mobilizations were limited to 24 cumulative months
and many reserve component units were deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan
for 12 to 15 months. Under the current policy, which limits
mobilizations to 12 months, deployments are averaging 9 to 10 months.
Reduced Deployment Times Lead to More Frequent Deployments:
Because the demand for reserve component forces has remained high and
reserve component force levels have remained fairly stable, the 12-
month mobilization policy, which has resulted in shorter deployments,
has also resulted in more frequent deployments. Figure 4 illustrates
the relationship between the length of deployments and the number of
deployments when requirements and force structure are steady. It shows
that 12-month deployments, which were typical under the previous
policy, result in 3 deployments over a 36-month period. However, 9-
month deployments, under the current policy, require 4 deployments to
support the same requirements over a 36-month period.
Figure 4: Deployment Rotation Requirements Based on 12-and 9-Month
Deployments:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Rotations: first deployment;
9-month deployment: at 0 months;
12-month deployment: at 0 months.
Rotations: second deployment;
9-month deployment: at 9 months;
12-month deployment: at 12 months.
Rotations: third deployment;
9-month deployment: at 18 months;
12-month deployment: at 24 months (end at 36 months).
Rotations: fourth deployment;
9-month deployment: at 27 months (end at 36 months).
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
More Deployments Result in Less Time at Home to Conduct Training:
As previously noted, the Army's reserve component strategy calls for
reserve component units to have 4 years of training between
deployments, but the 12-month mobilization policy, with its associated
shorter deployments and more frequent mobilizations, has led to
situations where units do not have 4 years available to conduct
training. Demands for certain occupational specialties have remained
particularly high. Army leadership recently testified that reserve
component soldiers are experiencing less than 3 years between
deployments,[Footnote 20] and personnel in some high demand units, such
as civil affairs units, are receiving as little 13 months between
deployments. For example, personnel from one of the units in our
sample, an aviation battalion, experienced frequent deployments.
Personnel from the battalion returned from deployment in 2008 and were
notified that the unit will be mobilized again in 2011.
Reduced Time at Home Leads to Additional Training under the Current
Training Strategy:
As previously noted, under the Army's reserve component strategy, unit
training requirements build from 39 days in the first 2 years of the
training cycle to as high as 109 days in the year prior to
mobilization. However, the 12-month mobilization policy is leading to
more frequent deployments, and units are mobilizing and deploying after
3 years at home rather than after 4. Because units are supposed to
receive initial notification of their assigned missions two years prior
to mobilization, the extended assigned mission training that is
scheduled to occur after notification is still maintained under the
compressed schedule, but the 39 days of primary mission training that
is scheduled to be conducted in the second year of the training cycle,
just prior to notification, is often eliminated. Therefore, since the
extended training periods are maintained and the shorter training
periods are eliminated, units are required to spend a higher proportion
of their "at home" time conducting training.
Flexible Approaches Provide Better Predictability Than the Firm 12-
Month Mobilization Policy:
As part of its mobilization policy, DOD has established a goal that
calls for reserve component forces to be mobilized for 1 year and
demobilized for 5 years. However, the Army's reserve component forces
are not meeting this goal because of high operational requirements,
stable force structure, and the 12-month mobilization policy that is
causing more frequent deployments. When the Secretary of Defense
testified that the mobilization policy was intended to reduce stress on
the force by, in part, improving predictability in the mobilization and
deployment process, he also noted that the department is not achieving
its goal of 1 year mobilized to 5 years demobilized.[Footnote 21]
Earlier, in September 2007, the Defense Science Board evaluated DOD's
mobilization policy and concluded that the goal of 1 year mobilized and
5 years not mobilized could not be achieved given the level of
operational demand and the end-strength increases that had been
planned.[Footnote 22] Thus, for the foreseeable future, DOD's goal will
be difficult to achieve because operational demands for reserve
component forces are expected to remain high and force structure levels
are expected to remain relatively constant. Furthermore, the Army does
not expect to reach the goal of 1 year mobilized and 5 years not
mobilized in the near future. In its 2009 Posture Statement, the Army
indicated that it expected to progress to 1 year mobilized to 4 years
demobilized by 2011 due, in part, to the drawdown in Iraq. However, the
statement does not address the impact that increased operations in
Afghanistan may have on the projected progress.
Leaders and soldiers in one of the larger units we contacted said that
the 12-month mobilization policy, which has led to more frequent
deployments and training periods, has actually increased stress and
decreased predictability. Specifically, they stated that they would
prefer to be away from home for a single longer period of time rather
than many shorter periods of time. However, in our other readiness
work, we have found that the Air Force has developed an alternative
approach to provide better predictability for its deploying active and
reserve component personnel. The Air Force deployment model groups
occupational specialties into 5 different "tempo bands" based on
ongoing operational requirements. Personnel in the first band should
expect to be deployed about the same length of time as they are home
between deployments. Personnel in bands two, three, four, and five can
expect to respectively be home two, three, four, or five times longer
than they are deployed.[Footnote 23] The Air Force expects this model
to increase predictability for its forces.
Reserve Component Forces Assigned Missions in Support of Ongoing
Operations Have Access to the Training Needed, But Constraints Delay
and Limit Training Opportunities for Some Forces:
In accordance with DOD Directive 1200.17, which directs the Secretaries
of the military departments to ensure that facilities and training
areas are available to support reserve component training requirements,
reserve component forces are generally receiving the access to training
facilities that is necessary to prepare them for their assigned
missions. However, the Army's training facilities lack the capacity
necessary to prepare all of the Army's forces for the full range of
individual and unit training requirements, including those associated
with primary as well as assigned missions. In addressing its capacity
shortages, the Army has given priority access to personnel and units
that have established mobilization dates or assigned missions. As a
result, active and reserve component forces without assigned missions
often experience delays in gaining access to training needed to prepare
them for their primary missions. While the Army is exploring or has
several initiatives under way to address training constraints, it has
not identified the total requirements associated with its reserve
component training strategy or the training capacity necessary to
support the strategy.
Reserve Component Forces That Have Assigned Missions in Support of
Ongoing Operations Have Necessary Access to Training Facilities:
DOD Directive 1200.17 directs the Secretaries of the Military
Departments to ensure facilities and training areas are available to
support reserve component training requirements.[Footnote 24] It also
directs the Secretaries to allocate resources where required to support
a "train-mobilize-deploy" construct. As previously discussed, reserve
component forces undergo individual training as well as collective
(unit) training at various times in their training cycles in order to
prepare them for their primary and assigned missions. Individual
training is typically conducted at military schools or other
specialized training sites while collective training occurs at larger
training centers, such as the Combat Training Centers, and mobilization
sites where units complete their final deployment preparations. Once
units are assigned missions in support of ongoing operations, they are
granted necessary access to training facilities. According to officials
from the Army's Training and Doctrine Command,[Footnote 25] missions
and mobilization dates are two key factors that drive individual
training opportunities and access to training facilities. U.S. Forces
Command[Footnote 26] officials also said that priority access to
training facilities is based on units' mobilization and latest arrival
in theater dates, rather than their status as part of the active or
reserve component.
Based on information from the units we contacted, we found that units
generally had access to training facilities once they were assigned
missions. Personnel from the units in our sample and the brigade combat
teams we met with reported that they had been granted priority access
to individual and collective training once their units were assigned
missions. Specifically, in preparing for their most recent missions, 23
of the 24 units reported that they did not have access issues involving
collective training facilities and 22 units reported that they did not
have access issues involving individual training facilities. Officials
from one of the units that reported access issues explained that this
was because their soldiers did not receive necessary orders until a few
days before they were mobilized. Officials from one of the other units
explained that the access issues were because of the fact that the unit
was under tight time constraints because it was part of the 2007 surge
force that deployed to Iraq. Officials from the third unit that
reported access issues explained that it trained using a motor pool to
simulate a detention facility because it could not access a more
appropriate training facility.
Constraints in Capacity Delay and Limit Training Opportunities for Some
Forces at Individual and Collective Training Facilities:
Capacity constraints involving personnel, equipment, and
infrastructure, limit training opportunities for some forces at
individual and collective training facilities. In some cases, the Army
is exploring or has ongoing initiatives that are intended to help
address constraints on individual and collective training.
Individual Training Facilities:
Because deploying forces have higher priority and existing training
facilities do not have sufficient capacity to accommodate all training
needs, reserve component forces that have not been assigned missions
often experience delays in gaining access to individual training needed
to prepare them for their primary missions. While both the Army Reserve
and Army National Guard are limited in their ability to fully train all
soldiers on individual tasks within desired time frames, the effect of
these limitations is particularly significant for the Army National
Guard. The Army National Guard's individual training goal is to have no
more than 15 percent of its soldiers awaiting individual training at
any given time. However, table 3 shows that the Army National Guard has
not been able to achieve this goal since 2001, as a result of the
individual training capacity limitations.
Table 1: Percentage of Army National Guard Soldiers Awaiting Individual
Training:
Fiscal year: 2001;
Percentage awaiting training: 27%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Percentage awaiting training: 24%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Percentage awaiting training: 20%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Percentage awaiting training: 17%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Percentage awaiting training: 17%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Percentage awaiting training: 23%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Percentage awaiting training: 23%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Percentage awaiting training: 22%.
Fiscal year: March 2009;
Percentage awaiting training: 22%.
Source: GAO presentation based on Army National Guard data.
Note: Individual training includes basic training, advanced individual
training, and change of specialty training.
[End of table]
Although the percentage of Army National Guard soldiers awaiting
individual training declined to 17 percent in 2004 and 2005, it has
remained at or above 22 percent since that time. Furthermore, Army
National Guard training officials stated that they do not expect the
number of soldiers awaiting training to change their specialty to
decrease from the March 2009 level. In March 2009, 80,000 Army National
Guard soldiers were awaiting various types of individual training, of
whom 35,000 were awaiting training to change their specialty, such as
from aviation to infantry.
In both the active and reserve components, incoming recruits often
prefer to sign contracts to begin basic training in the summer. This
Army-wide preference exacerbates capacity constraints at individual
training facilities during the summer months. While the number of
soldiers awaiting training decreases over the summer months because
most soldiers begin training at that time, Army officials said backlog
could be reduced further if the Army fully accounted for this summer
surge during its planning process, but the Army plans as if individual
training requirements are evenly distributed across the fiscal year.
The Army National Guard expects to reduce the number of soldiers
awaiting basic training from 30,000 to 10,000 by September 30, 2009,
but this number could be reduced even further if capacity constraints
were addressed. While capacity is not an issue during the fall and
winter months, Army officials expect the number of soldiers awaiting
training to increase during those months because incoming recruits
generally do not want to begin training during those months. Army
officials said they are exploring ways to even out the training demand
such as offering bonuses for soldiers to enlist and attend basic
training outside of the summer months. Additionally, the Army formed an
integrated process team specifically to develop options for mitigating
the summer surge, including options to expand capacity. At the time of
our review, the team's work was ongoing, and it was too soon to know
what, if any, actions would be taken as a result of its efforts.
The delays in individual training opportunities that are caused by
capacity constraints are distributed across the Army in both the active
and reserve components. The Army has a review process that compares
Army-wide individual training requirements to the training capacity at
the Army's active training facilities and allocates training quotas to
the active and reserve components.[Footnote 27] The 2008 data from the
process is depicted in table 4 and shows that the active and reserve
components have approximately the same level of unmet training
requirements at Army Training and Doctrine Command schools.
Table 2: Number of Schools Where Required Seats Exceed Reserved Seats:
Active Army: 17;
Army Reserve: 15;
Army National Guard: 18.
Source: GAO based on Army data.
Note: Total Number of Training and Doctrine Command Schools: 54.
[End of table]
Collective Training Facilities:
Capacity constraints at collective training facilities such as the
Army's combat training centers[Footnote 28] and mobilization stations
have limited training opportunities for both active and reserve
component units. As we have previously reported, the Army's strategy
requires that all brigade combat teams be trained at the combat
training centers prior to deployment.[Footnote 29] Because the combat
training centers do not have adequate capacity, training opportunities
are now limited to only those active and reserve brigade combat teams
that have been assigned missions requiring them to control battle-
space. As a result, most active and reserve components units, including
brigade combat teams that are assigned detainee operations or convoy
security missions, do not train at the combat training centers. These
units conduct training at other locations such as the Army's
mobilization stations.
In the past, capacity constraints have also limited reserve component
access to facilities at certain mobilization stations. For example,
officials from First Army, which is responsible for training mobilized
reserve component units, stated that facilities have not always been
accessible at sites such as Ft. Bragg and Ft. Dix because they were
being used by active component forces. Because of this, First Army is
realigning its resources and will no longer be using the constrained
facilities to train mobilized reserve component forces. First Army
officials expect the realignment to increase training capacity because
its resources will be concentrated at mobilization stations where it
has greater control over scheduling. However, DOD's 2008 Sustainable
Ranges Report identified shortfalls at a number of major collective
training facilities, including the mobilization stations that First
Army plans to continue to use. These shortfalls involve land and
airspace, ranges, infrastructure and feedback/scoring systems, as well
as a number of other resources. Four of the 24 units we contacted
identified shortfalls at the mobilization stations where they conducted
collective training in preparation for their most recent missions. Two
of these units stated that their mobilization stations did not have
adequate infrastructure, citing shortfalls in maintenance and hangar
facilities respectively. The other two units stated that their
mobilization stations were in geographic locations that hindered
training because of the terrain, explaining that Mississippi and
western Oklahoma did not realistically replicate conditions in
Afghanistan and Iraq respectively. Army Reserve officials told us that
similar shortfalls characterize many of the collective training
facilities owned by the reserve components because the Army employed
tiered resourcing for several years, which relegated reserve component
requirements to a lower priority for funding than active component
requirements. These facilities are commonly used by reserve component
units to execute collective training prior to mobilization.
Initiatives to Help Address Training Capacity Constraints:
The Army has several initiatives under way to help address individual
and collective training capacity constraints. For example:
* The Army has developed a database, which is intended to account for
both active and reserve component individual training facilities under
a "One Army School" system. However, the Army has not accounted for
reserve component individual training facilities when filling training
requirements, and in its 2007 Training Capacity Assessment,[Footnote
30] the Army's Training and Doctrine Command found that a significant
reserve component infrastructure was available to meet individual
training requirements.
* The Army is attempting to address individual training capacity
constraints through the use of mobile training teams. These mobile
training teams contain transportable training assets--facilities,
equipment, and personnel--which deploy to units' home stations to
provide individual training. Mobile training teams are currently being
used to provide classes that are in high demand, such as professional
military education, foreign language, and cultural awareness. These
mobile training teams partially relieve capacity constraints resulting
from limited infrastructure at training facilities.
* The Army National Guard has established an Exportable Combat Training
Center program, to address facility, personnel, and equipment
limitations that impact pre-mobilization collective training for Army
National Guard units. The program enhances training by providing
instrumentation to collect and record individual and unit performance,
exercise control personnel, opposition forces, and civilians on the
battlefield; program officials also coordinate the use of appropriate
facilities. Exportable Combat Training Center events are intended to
serve as the culminating collective training event prior to a unit's
mobilization and are designed to validate training proficiency up to
the company level. The Army National Guard conducted four Exportable
Combat Training Center program training events from 2005 through 2008,
and it intends to conduct 5 training events from 2009 through 2010.
* The Army Reserve has a concept plan for a Combat Support Training
Center to address capability constraints in combat support and combat
service support collective training 1 to 2 years prior to a unit's
mobilization. This concept has been approved at the Department of the
Army level but is currently unfunded. The Combat Support Training
Center would leverage existing active and reserve component combat
support and combat services support expertise and thus not have to
compete with active component forces capabilities. The Combat Support
Training Center program is expected to provide instrumentation, an
operations group, opposition forces, civilians on the battlefield,
interpreters, media teams, and realistic training environments, similar
to Combat Training Centers such as the National Training Center at Ft.
Irwin, California. The first Combat Support Training Center event is
scheduled to occur in July 2009 at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.
The Army Has Not Identified the Total Personnel, Equipment, and
Facility Requirements Needed to Meet Reserve Component Training
Requirements:
While the Army has a number of initiatives intended to relieve training
capacity constraints, it has not identified the total personnel,
equipment, and facility resources needed to support its reserve
component training strategy. As previously discussed, DOD Directive
1200.17 directs the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure
facilities and training areas are available to support reserve
component training requirements. It also directs the Secretaries to
allocate resources where required to support a "train-mobilize-deploy"
construct. In November 2008, the Secretary of Defense directed the
Secretaries of the Military Departments to review the capacity of their
training institutions to determine if they are properly resourced to
prepare all military members to meet mission requirements.[Footnote 31]
The Army has ongoing efforts to address this tasking, but these efforts
do not fully address all individual and collective training
requirements. In June 2009, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command is
scheduled to produce an update to its 2007 Total Army Capacity
Assessment of individual training requirements. However, both the 2007
and 2009 assessments focus exclusively on training infrastructure, and
neither assessment addresses personnel and equipment constraints that
have limited training in the past. Further, the Army's efforts to
identify collective training requirements are affected by inaccurate
assumptions regarding the use of ranges. Specifically, the Army Range
Requirements Model, which is used to determine Army range requirements,
calculates requirements based on an assumption that reserve component
forces will be mobilized for 1 of 6 years. Since reserve component
forces are being mobilized more frequently--about 1 of 3 years,
according to Army officials--the model understates actual training
requirements. The model also understates active component range
requirements since it calculates requirements based on planned
operational tempos rather than the actual higher tempos that are
occurring to support ongoing operations. Because the model understates
current requirements, it does not accurately project the full magnitude
of capacity constraints at the Army's ranges.
Conclusions:
In recent years, reserve component units have successfully deployed for
a wide range of assigned missions, and the training and preparation for
these assigned missions, which is conducted in the later stages of the
Army's 5-year cycle, was generally effective. However, collective
training for primary missions, conducted in the early stages of the 5-
year cycle, generally is not optimized because of various challenges.
Such challenges include limited training time, changing personnel
because of attrition, personnel and equipment shortages, and limited
training support. Given that ongoing operations are expected to
continue for some time, it is imperative that the Army has a strategy
that is executable and provides for efficient use of training
resources. Otherwise, units may continue to use limited training time
and resources to build teams that are unlikely to deploy together and
to train units for collective tasks that they may not perform. In light
of the continued high demand for reserve forces and the Army's existing
force structure levels, DOD's 12-month mobilization policy is likely to
continue to result in more frequent and less predictable deployment and
training periods, particularly for personnel in high demand
occupational specialties, raising questions about the need to
reevaluate the policy and consider alternatives. Furthermore, without
complete information concerning the personnel, equipment, and
facilities support that is necessary to execute reserve component
training strategy, the Army will not be able to identify total
requirements for its strategy, establish priorities and related
resource needs, and be assured that current initiatives are addressing
priority needs.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the Army's training strategy and DOD's mobilization policy
for Army reserve component personnel, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense take the following three actions:
To better ensure the Army has an executable strategy for effectively
training its reserve component forces, we recommend the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to reevaluate and adjust its
reserve component training strategy to fully account for the factors
that limit the effectiveness of unit training for primary missions in
the early years of the 5-year cycle. Elements that should be considered
in re-evaluating the training strategy should include:
* Whether the total training days allotted for reserve component
training are adequate to train units for both primary and assigned
missions, which may require significantly different resources and
skill.
* Whether consolidating collective training later in the training
cycle, as opposed to spreading it through the cycle, would enhance the
effectiveness of the training and increase predictability.
To better ensure DOD's mobilization policy is having the intended
effect of providing reserve component personnel with predictable
training, mobilization, and deployment schedules while also improving
DOD's ability to effectively train and employ its reserve component
forces, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense reevaluate
DOD's mobilization policy for Army reserve component personnel and
consider whether a more flexible policy that allows greater variations
in the length of mobilizations or which establishes deployment goals
based on occupational specialty or unit type would better meet DOD's
goals to reduce stress on the force and improve predictability for
personnel.
To better ensure that the Army has a reserve component training
strategy that it is able to execute, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to determine the range of
resources and support that are necessary to fully implement the
strategy. Elements that should be accounted for include:
* the personnel, equipment, and facilities required to fully support
individual training requirements;
* the range space required to fully support individual and collective
training requirements; and:
* the full support costs associated with the Army reserve component
training strategy--including personnel, equipment, and facilities.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or
partially concurred with all of our recommendations. Specifically, DOD
concurred with the element of our first recommendation that calls for
the Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Army to
consider, when reevaluating the Army's reserve component training
strategy, whether the total training days allotted for reserve
component training are adequate to train units for both primary and
assigned missions. DOD noted that reserve component units do not always
have sufficient time in their baseline training year to prepare for
both a primary and assigned mission when those missions are
substantially different. DOD also stated that today's global demand for
Army forces prevents reserve component units from sustaining their 5-
year training cycle, since the Army must continuously balance its
strategic depth against available resources to meet current operational
requirements. DOD, however, did not state that it would take any
action. We agree with DOD's comments, and in fact, these comments
reflect the same conditions that led us to conclude that current
operational realities necessitate a reevaluation of the Army's reserve
component training strategy, including the adequacy of training time
allotted for reserve component training. Therefore, we continue to
believe our recommendation has merit. DOD partially concurred with the
second element of our first recommendation that the department, in
reevaluating its training strategy, consider whether consolidating
collective training later in the training cycle, as opposed to
spreading it through the cycle, would enhance the effectiveness of the
training and increase predictability. In comments, DOD noted that
concentrating training later in the cycle compounds the existing
resource-constrained environment and accentuates competition for
limited training resources, facilities, equipment, and ranges. DOD,
however, did not state that it plans to take any specific action. As
noted in our report, the Army faces challenges associated with training
time, personnel, equipment, and training support during the early
stages of the training cycle and is, therefore, unable to set the
conditions required for effective unit training during the early years
of the cycle. Further, units we sampled indicated they preferred to
conduct collective training later in the training cycle when personnel
and equipment levels are more stable. The Army has also acknowledged,
in its 2009 Posture Statement, that an extended training period close
to or contiguous with arriving at the mobilization station allowed
commanders to achieve the highest levels of readiness and unit
capability. We continue to believe that collective training should be
conducted when training enablers such as personnel and equipment are
present to ensure the training is most effective and that the Army
should reevaluate its current approach.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the
Secretary of Defense reevaluate DOD's mobilization policy for Army
reserve component personnel and consider whether a more flexible
policy, which allows greater variations in the length of mobilization
or which establishes deployment goals based on occupational specialty
or unit type, would better meet DOD's goals to reduce stress on the
force and improve predictability for personnel. In DOD's response, the
department noted the Secretary of Defense will continue to evaluate
those circumstances that warrant changes or exceptions to the
mobilization policy but commented that the 1-year mobilization has
reduced stress on service members, their families and employers. DOD
also acknowledged the challenge associated with implementing a 5-year
training and preparation cycle and identified several innovations
designed to enhance predictability and reduce stress on reserve
component soldiers and units including the Regional Training Centers
developed by the Army Reserves to assist units in preparing for
mobilization and the consolidation of its training support structure at
six mobilization training centers to better support all deploying
units. Our report acknowledges department initiatives to increase
training capacity and support to units through initiatives like those
pointed out by the department. However, we also note that in spite of
these initiatives, DOD's mobilization policy is not achieving the
intended purpose of reducing stress on the force by providing
predictability. For example, our report discusses how the 1-year
mobilization, while limiting the amount of time reserve component
soldiers and units are deployed, is resulting in more frequent
deployments and is, therefore, not reducing stress on soldiers and
units. We continue to believe the mobilization policy needs to be
reevaluated to determine whether a more flexible approach that
recognizes variances in deployment frequency based on occupational
specialty and unit type would improve predictability.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to determine the
range of resources and support that are necessary to fully implement
the Army's strategy for training its reserve components. In comments,
DOD noted that an all volunteer force trained to meet its persistent
operational requirements will require sufficient resources in order to
be trained and ready. To do so, DOD further noted, will require a
holistic approach that leverages the consolidation of training
locations in conjunction with the utilization of live, distributed
learning, virtual, and constructive technologies to deliver more
training to home station locations. DOD also stated the Army will need
to prioritize the allocation of funds supporting training initiatives
while embedding the costs to implement them in its Program Objective
Memorandum. We agree that the Army's various training initiatives, many
of which are discussed in our report, should be prioritized and the
costs associated with those initiatives should be reflected in the
Army's Program Objective Memorandum. However, we believe the Army must
first determine the full range of resources and support required to
implement its training strategy in order to establish priorities and
resource needs in order to be assured that current initiatives are
addressing priority needs.
The full text of DOD's written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, this report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Army is able to effectively
implement its strategy for training Reserve Component forces, we
reviewed documentation outlining the Army's approach to training its
reserve component forces such as Field Manual 7.0, Training for Full
Spectrum Operations and Department of the Army Executive Order 150-08,
Reserve Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre-and Post-
Mobilization Training Strategy. Additionally, we discussed the training
strategy, factors that limit execution of the strategy, and initiatives
under way to address any limiting factors with officials responsible
for training including officials from the Department of the Army
Training Directorate, U.S. Army Forces Command, the Army National Guard
Readiness Center, First Army, the Army Training and Doctrine Command,
and the U.S. Army Reserve Command. To determine the impact personnel
levels have on training effectiveness, we obtained and reviewed data on
attrition. To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed
documentation and interviewed officials and determined these data to be
sufficiently reliable.
To assess the extent to which mobilization and deployment laws,
regulations, goals, and policies impact the Army's ability to train and
employ Reserve Component forces, we reviewed laws, regulations, goals,
and policies that impact the way the Army trains and employs its
reserve component forces such as relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32
of the U.S. Code and DOD's January 2007 mobilization policy.
Additionally, we interviewed Army officials from organizations such as
U.S. Army Reserve Command, the National Guard Bureau, and U.S. Joint
Forces Command to discuss the impact of mobilization and deployment
documents. Lastly, we reviewed and analyzed data from units and various
Army offices, including data showing trends in pre-and post-
mobilization training time, to assess how mobilization and deployment
laws, regulations, goals, and policies may be impacting reserve
component units and personnel.
To determine the extent to which access to military schools and skill
training, facilities. and ranges affect the preparation of reserve
component forces to support ongoing operations, we reviewed
documentation such as DOD's 2008 Sustainable Ranges Report, the 2007
Total Army Training Capacity Assessment, and outputs from DOD's
Structure Manning Decision Review. To determine how training
requirements are prioritized, we also interviewed officials from the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command.
These commands schedule units and soldiers to attend individual and
collective training. Further, we reviewed documentation and interviewed
officials to determine initiatives that the Army has under way to
address capacity constraints and to assess total training requirements.
We also obtained and reviewed data on Army National Guard soldiers
awaiting individual training. We assessed the reliability of these data
by reviewing existing documentation and interviewing knowledgeable
officials and found these data to be sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. Lastly, we observed Training at the Army's National Training
Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Army National Guard's
exportable training conducted at Camp Blanding, Florida.
To inform all three of our objectives, we sent a list of questions to
U.S. Central Command and to Northern Command and held a follow-on video
teleconference to discuss in more detail Northern Command's response to
our questions. Additionally, we surveyed a non-probability sample of 22
Army National Guard or Army Reserve units and conducted follow-up
interviews with officials from 15 of these units. While the results of
our survey and discussions are not projectable to the entire reserve
component, we chose units of different types and sizes for our sample.
In addition, we chose the proportion of Army National Guard and Reserve
units for our sample based on the proportion of mobilized forces from
each of the components. Our surveys and interviews addressed a range of
issues including: deployment and notification timelines; the timing and
effectiveness of pre-deployment, post-deployment, and in-theater
training; and access to training facilities, schoolhouses, and ranges.
Additionally, we interviewed commanders and personnel from two Army
National Guard brigade combat teams that were training at the National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and at Camp Blanding,
Florida. Of the total of 24 units in our non-probability sample, 22 had
returned from supporting on-going operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or
Kosovo, and 2 were preparing for deployment. We conducted this
performance audit from September 2008 through June 2009 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Reserve Affairs:
Washington, DC 20301-1500:
July 1, 2009:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
411 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548
Dear Ms. Pickup,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-09-720, "Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Reevaluate its
Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces," dated
June 1, 2009 (GAO Code 351237)." The Department has comments on the
draft report, and concurs/partially concurs with the recommendations.
The Department's comments are attached.
The primary action officer within DOD for this report is COL Bernard J.
Hyland, He can be reached at (703) 693-8611.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Dennis M. McCarthy
Attachment: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report - Dated June 1, 2009:
GAO Code 351237 /GAO-09-720:
"Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Reevaluate its Approach to Training and
Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1; The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to reevaluate and adjust its reserve
component training strategy to fully account for the factors that limit
the effectiveness of unit training for primary missions in the early
years of the 5-year cycle. Elements that should be considered in re-
evaluating the training strategy should include:
* whether the total training days allotted for reserve component
training is adequate to train units for both primary and assigned
missions, which may require significantly different resources and
skill; and;
* whether consolidating collective training later in the training
cycle, as opposed to spreading it through the cycle, would enhance the
effectiveness of the training and increase predictability.
DOD Response:
1. Concur. Reserve Component (RC) units do not always have sufficient
time in their baseline training year to prepare for both a primary and
assigned mission when those missions are substantially different. This
accounts for the expansion in training days upon alert notification for
units with an assigned mission that does not match their primary
mission, Today's global demand for Army forces prevents RC units from
sustaining their five-year training cycle, since the Army must
continuously balance its strategic depth against available resources to
meet Combatant Command capability requirements for current operations.
2. Partially Concur. Consolidating collective training later in the
training cycle reflects adaptive practices that have evolved to meet
the current demand for forces. Such conditions promote reliance on
increased supplemental funding and training immediately prior to
mobilization and deployment. Consolidating training later in the cycle
compounds the existing resource constrained environment, accentuating
competition for access to limited training resources, facilities,
equipment, and ranges. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model
provides enhanced predictability while increasing training and
readiness over time. It further embodies a degree of flexibility, which
provides the Army with the essential ability to accommodate both cyclic
and unforeseen deployment requirements.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
reevaluate DoD's mobilization policy tot Army reserve component
personnel, and consider whether a more flexible policy, which allows
greater variations in the length of mobilizations, or which establishes
deployment goals based on occupational specialty or unit type would
better meet DoD's goals to reduce stress on the force and improve
predictability for personnel. (Page 28/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Partially Concur.
The Army developed the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to
establish a cycle of training and preparation that promotes
predictability for individuals and units of each of the Army's three
components (Active, Guard, Reserve). Transforming the Army's force
structure and resetting the force while providing capabilities to
multiple Overseas Contingency Operations and sustained forward
deployments throughout the world, presents a set of challenges to the
Army's ability to rapidly convert to the five-year ARFORGEN model. To
meet this challenge, the Department of Defense and the Army have
implemented a number of quality initiatives since January at' 2007.
Several examples of those innovations, specifically designed to enhance
predictability and reduce stress on individual Reserve Component (RC)
soldiers and units, include:
1. The Department is partnering with the Joint Staff and the Services
to increase unit alert and notification times prior to mobilization,
which increases predictability and accelerates the flow of funding for
training and readiness to deploying units.
2. Through rebalancing initiatives, the Army is consolidating its
training support structure at six Mobilization Training Centers to
better support all deploying units.
3. DoD and the Services have implemented support programs such as
Yellow Ribbon and Wounded Warrior and established outreach services
that did not previously exist.
4. The Department is promoting new approaches to managing the RC as an
operational three. such as continuum of service initiatives, volunteer
incentives and accelerated rebalancing initiatives to address High
Demand/Low Supply force structure.
5. The Army Reserve has developed Regional Training Centers to assist
units in preparing for mobilization and to maximize in-theater boots on
the ground time, which has reduced the average training time for
mobilized Army Reserve units by as much as 30 days.
6. DoD and the Army have moved to eliminate previous stop loss
policies.
7. DoD and the Services have partnered to develop a wide array of joint
solutions for training, equipping. and sourcing Combatant Command
capability requirements.
8. the Department has taken steps to leverage innovative technologies
in training simulations and delivery methods to reduce pre-mobilization
training time.
The Secretary of Defense Hill continue to evaluate those circumstances
that warrant changes or exceptions to the mobilization policy. However,
the Department has found that the one-year mobilization has reduced
stress on service members. their families and employers.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to determine the range of resources
and support that are necessary to fully implement the strategy.
Elements that should be accounted for include:
* the personnel, equipment, and facilities required to fully support
individual training requirements;
* the range space required to fully support individual and collective
training requirements; and;
* the full support costs associated with the Army reserve component
training strategy - including personnel, equipment and facilities.
DOD Response: Partially Concur.
An all volunteer force trained to meet its persistent operational
requirements will require sufficient resources in order to be trained
and ready. This requires a holistic approach that leverages the
consolidation of training locations in conjunction with the utilization
of live, distributed learning. virtual and constructive technologies to
deliver more training to home station locations. Through exportable
training technologies, a larger Reserve Component (RC) training
audience may be reached at or near their home station location. The
Army should prioritize the allocation of hinds to these initiatives,
and the costs to implement them should be embedded in the Program
Objective Memorandum. This may drive the need to increase the Army's
Total Obligation Authority to preclude decrementing other readiness
accounts.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Michael Ferren, Assistant
Director; Grace Coleman; Nicole Harms; Ron La Due Lake; Susan Tindall;
Nate Tranquilli; and John Vallario made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Army's reserve component forces include the part-time forces of
both the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. Army Reserve
forces support federal missions while Army National Guard forces
support both federal and state missions.
[2] In this report we refer to training that supports the core
competencies that the units are organized and designed to perform as
"primary" mission training, and we refer to training that is conducted
to support the specific requirements of an upcoming mission as
"assigned" mission training. In some cases, assigned mission training
may closely resemble primary mission training, particularly for combat
support and combat service support forces.
[3] For example, see GAO, Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army
Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1109T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21,
2006).
[4] Army National Guard forces typically trained 39 days per year--one
weekend per month and 15 days of annual training per year. Army Reserve
forces typically trained 38 days per year--one weekend per month and 14
days of annual training per year.
[5] Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel
and equipment, activating or federalizing units and members of the
National Guard and Reserves for active duty, and bringing the armed
forces to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency.
Demobilization is the process necessary to release from active duty
units and members of the National Guard and Reserve ordered to active
duty.
[6] Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Utilization of the Total Force
(Jan. 19, 2007). The policy set out by the Secretary is implemented by
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum,
Revised Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for
Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the
World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks (Mar. 15, 2007). The authority
for mobilizing servicemembers under these policies is granted by 10
U.S.C. §12302.
[7] Although DOD's mobilization policy limits mobilizations to 12
months, it allows for some exceptions to be made, at the service's
discretion, for individual skill training required for deployment and
post-mobilization leave.
[8] Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417 (2008).
[9] Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Recommendations of the Commission
on the National Guard and Reserves, (Nov. 24, 2008).
[10] This strategy was formalized with the issuance of HQ Department of
the Army Executive Order 150-8, Reserve Component Deployment
Expeditionary Force Pre-and Post-Mobilization Training Strategy (March
2008).
[11] Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Utilization of the Total Force
(Jan. 19, 2007). The policy set out by the Secretary is implemented by
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum,
Revised Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for
Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the
World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks (Mar. 15, 2007). The authority
for mobilizing servicemembers under these policies is granted by 10
U.S.C. §12302.
[12] Although DOD's mobilization policy limits mobilizations to 12
months, it allows for some exceptions to be made, at the service's
discretion, for individual skill training required for deployment and
post-mobilization leave.
[13] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Final Report to
Congress and the Secretary of Defense, Transforming the National Guard
and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force (Jan. 31, 2008).
[14] U.S. Army Audit Agency, Army National Guard Pre-Mobilization
Training Requirements (Feb. 19, 2009) and U.S. Army Reserve Pre-
Mobilization Training Requirements (Feb. 20, 2009).
[15] Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and Chief of Staff of the Army,
General George W, Casey Jr., statement to the committees and
subcommittees of the United States Senate and House of Representative,
May 2009.
[16] These 67,623 personnel constitute approximately 19 percent of the
Army National Guard's 351,300 authorized end-strength in fiscal year
2008.
[17] These 36,974 personnel constitute approximately 18 percent of the
Army Reserve's 205,000 authorized end-strength in fiscal year 2008.
[18] First Army mobilizes, trains, validates, and deploys reserve
component units in accordance with DOD and Army directives. During post-
mobilization training, when units are training for their assigned
missions, First Army provides extensive support to the units both in
terms of resources and by providing observers, controllers, and
trainers for scheduled training events.
[19] Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, January, 27, 2009.
[20] Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Chiarelli,
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on
Readiness and Management Support, April 22, 2009.
[21] Secretary of Defense testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, January 27, 2009.
[22] Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the
National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism, September
2007.
[23] For active component forces the ratios cover deployed to non-
deployed time periods. For reserve component forces the ratios cover
mobilized to non-mobilized time periods.
[24] Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve
Components as an Operational Force (Oct. 29, 2008).
[25] The Army's Training and Doctrine Command oversees individual
training.
[26] U.S. Army Forces Command trains, mobilizes, deploys, and sustains
Army forces in support of Combatant Commander requirements.
[27] The Army's Structure Manning Decision Review.
[28] The Army's combat training centers include the National Training
Center at Fort Irwin, California and the Joint Reserve Training Center
at Fort Polk, Louisiana.
[29] GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the
Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address
Implementation Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-936] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6,
2007).
[30] Total Army Training Capacity Assessment was limited to training
facilities and did not assess personnel and equipment requirements.
[31] Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Recommendations of the Commission
on the National Guard and Reserves, (Nov. 24, 2008).
[End of section]
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