Ballistic Missile Defense
Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European Sites Gao ID: GAO-09-771 August 6, 2009The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) estimated in 2008 that the potential costs of fielding ballistic missile defenses in Europe would be more than $4 billion through 2015. Planned ballistic missile defenses in Europe are intended to defend the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies against ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East. They are expected to include a missile interceptor site in Poland, a radar site in the Czech Republic, and a mobile radar system in a still-to-be-determined European location. GAO was asked to evaluate the Department of Defense's (DOD) plans for missile defense sites in Europe and address to what extent DOD has (1) planned for the sites' implementation and (2) estimated military construction and long-term operations and support costs. Accordingly, GAO reviewed key legislation; examined policy and guidance from MDA, the Army, the Air Force, and the Army Corps of Engineers; analyzed budget documents and cost estimates; and visited sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.
DOD has begun planning for the construction and implementation of the European missile defense sites, including coordinating with international partners and U.S. stakeholders; however, several challenges affecting DOD's implementation of ballistic missile defenses in Europe remain. First, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified key bilateral agreements with the United States, limiting DOD's ability to finalize key details of the sites, such as how security will be provided. Second, DOD's efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. stakeholders for the European sites remain incomplete because MDA and the services have not yet made important determinations, such as establishing the criteria that must be met before the transfer of the European missile defense sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force. Since 2002, MDA has been directed by DOD to begin planning for the transfer of missile defense elements, including the direction to coordinate with the services on resources and personnel needed to provide an effective transition of responsibility. Without clear definitions of the roles that MDA and the services will be responsible for and agreement on criteria for transfer, DOD will continue to face uncertainties in determining how the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained over the long term. DOD's cost estimates for military construction and operations and support have limitations and do not provide Congress complete information on the true costs of ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Key principles for cost estimating state that complete cost estimates are important in preparing budget submissions and for assessing the long-term affordability of a program. Further, according to DOD military construction regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers typically certifies that key construction design milestones have been met and verifies military construction cost estimates before the estimates are submitted as budget requests. However, DOD's original military construction estimates in the fiscal year 2009 budget did not include all costs, primarily because MDA submitted the estimates before accomplishing key design milestones and without a review by the Army Corps of Engineers. Consequently, DOD's projected military construction costs for the interceptor and radar sites could potentially increase from DOD's original $837 million estimate to over $1 billion. DOD operations and support cost estimates are also incomplete because they do not include projected costs for base operations that will be managed by the Army and Air Force. Key cost factors that will affect these estimates, such as how security will be provided at the sites, remain undefined. In addition, MDA and the services have not yet agreed on how the operations and support costs for the interceptor and radar sites will be funded over the long term. As a result, Congress does not have accurate information on the full investment required for ballistic missile defenses in Europe.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-771, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European Sites
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2009:
Ballistic Missile Defense:
Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information on Construction and
Support Costs for Proposed European Sites:
GAO-09-771:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-771, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) estimated in 2008 that the potential
costs of fielding ballistic missile defenses in Europe would be more
than $4 billion through 2015. Planned ballistic missile defenses in
Europe are intended to defend the United States, its deployed forces,
and its allies against ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East.
They are expected to include a missile interceptor site in Poland, a
radar site in the Czech Republic, and a mobile radar system in a still-
to-be-determined European location.
GAO was asked to evaluate the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) plans for
missile defense sites in Europe and address to what extent DOD has (1)
planned for the sites‘ implementation and (2) estimated military
construction and long-term operations and support costs. Accordingly,
GAO reviewed key legislation; examined policy and guidance from MDA,
the Army, the Air Force, and the Army Corps of Engineers; analyzed
budget documents and cost estimates; and visited sites in Poland and
the Czech Republic.
What GAO Found:
DOD has begun planning for the construction and implementation of the
European missile defense sites, including coordinating with
international partners and U.S. stakeholders; however, several
challenges affecting DOD‘s implementation of ballistic missile defenses
in Europe remain. First, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic has
ratified key bilateral agreements with the United States, limiting DOD‘
s ability to finalize key details of the sites, such as how security
will be provided. Second, DOD‘s efforts to establish the roles and
responsibilities of key U.S. stakeholders for the European sites remain
incomplete because MDA and the services have not yet made important
determinations, such as establishing the criteria that must be met
before the transfer of the European missile defense sites from MDA to
the Army and Air Force. Since 2002, MDA has been directed by DOD to
begin planning for the transfer of missile defense elements, including
the direction to coordinate with the services on resources and
personnel needed to provide an effective transition of responsibility.
Without clear definitions of the roles that MDA and the services will
be responsible for and agreement on criteria for transfer, DOD will
continue to face uncertainties in determining how the European
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be
sustained over the long term.
DOD‘s cost estimates for military construction and operations and
support have limitations and do not provide Congress complete
information on the true costs of ballistic missile defenses in Europe.
Key principles for cost estimating state that complete cost estimates
are important in preparing budget submissions and for assessing the
long-term affordability of a program. Further, according to DOD
military construction regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers
typically certifies that key construction design milestones have been
met and verifies military construction cost estimates before the
estimates are submitted as budget requests. However, DOD‘s original
military construction estimates in the fiscal year 2009 budget did not
include all costs, primarily because MDA submitted the estimates before
accomplishing key design milestones and without a review by the Army
Corps of Engineers. Consequently, DOD‘s projected military construction
costs for the interceptor and radar sites could potentially increase
from DOD‘s original $837 million estimate to over $1 billion. DOD
operations and support cost estimates are also incomplete because they
do not include projected costs for base operations that will be managed
by the Army and Air Force. Key cost factors that will affect these
estimates, such as how security will be provided at the sites, remain
undefined. In addition, MDA and the services have not yet agreed on how
the operations and support costs for the interceptor and radar sites
will be funded over the long term. As a result, Congress does not have
accurate information on the full investment required for ballistic
missile defenses in Europe.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOD clarify roles and responsibilities, refine
military construction cost estimates, and define who is responsible for
operations and support costs for the European sites. DOD generally
agreed, stating that steps are being taken to address these issues, but
that operations and support cost estimates will not be completed in
time for the 2011 budget.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771] or key
components. For more information, contact John Pendleton at 404-679-
1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Made Progress in Planning for Ballistic Missile Defenses in
Europe with International Partners and Key U.S. Stakeholders, but
Challenges Remain:
DOD's Military Construction and Operations and Support Cost Estimates
for Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe Have Limitations and Do Not
Provide Congress Complete Information:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Status of Key Bilateral Agreements:
Table 2: Status of Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and Annexes:
Figure:
Figure 1: Proposed Site for Interceptor Field at Redzikowo Air Base in
Poland:
Abbreviations:
BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System:
DOD: Department of Defense:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 6, 2009:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tim Johnson:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
United States Senate:
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was created in 2002 in order to
develop ballistic missile defenses comprising land-, air-, and sea-
based elements--such as missiles and radars--working together as an
integrated system and intended to intercept ballistic missiles in all
phases of flight. MDA has spent almost $56 billion since 2002 on
developing and fielding an initial ballistic missile defense capability
and is on course to spend about $50 billion more over the next 5 years.
As part of this system, MDA plans to field a missile interceptor site
in Poland designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles launched
from the Middle East, a radar site in the Czech Republic capable of
tracking incoming missiles and guiding interceptors to their targets,
and a mobile radar system to be strategically placed in a still-to-be-
determined European location to provide additional warning of potential
ballistic missile threats. While MDA has taken the lead in developing
the sites thus far, the Army has been designated the lead military
service to operate and support the European Interceptor Site in Poland
and the mobile radar system, and the Air Force has been designated lead
military service for the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech
Republic. MDA estimated in 2008 that the potential costs of the planned
ballistic missile defenses in Europe through 2013 would be more than $4
billion--approximately $837 million for military construction; $612
million for operations and support at the sites; and $2.6 billion for
development, testing, and procurement costs.
Although the Department of Defense (DOD) is moving forward with
planning and site analysis for the ballistic missile defense sites in
Europe, the new administration indicated in 2009 that it is reviewing
U.S. national policy on missile defense and has not yet stated its
plans for the future of ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Some
critics of the proposed ballistic missile defenses in Europe argue that
testing of the system to date has been insufficient to verify that it
will function as intended. In light of those concerns, Congress has
placed limitations on the use of funds for the acquisition or
deployment of missiles at a European site until the Secretary of
Defense certifies that the proposed interceptors have demonstrated a
high probability of working in an operationally effective manner and
the ability to accomplish the mission.[Footnote 1] Further, the
deployment of the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe has been
the subject of debate in the parliaments of both Poland and the Czech
Republic, and the Russian government has adamantly protested U.S. plans
in those countries. However, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has indicated its support for ballistic missile defenses in
Europe and is pursuing ways to link its own missile defense efforts
with those of the United States.
We have previously reported on a number of challenges facing DOD as it
develops and fields ballistic missile defenses. For instance, we
recently testified that to meet President Bush's goal of putting in
place an initial set of ballistic missile defense capabilities
beginning in 2004, the Secretary of Defense granted MDA a significant
amount of funding and decision-making flexibility, exempting the agency
from many traditional DOD requirements for weapon system development,
acquisition, and oversight. Although this exemption allowed MDA to
quickly develop an initial ballistic missile defense capability, this
approach has also resulted in several management challenges.[Footnote
2] For example, MDA has not yet provided baselines necessary to measure
its progress on cost, schedule, and testing. Further, some of MDA's
production and fielding decisions have gotten ahead of its testing
schedule, raising concerns about system efficacy.[Footnote 3] Finally,
DOD's plans for long-term operations and support are incomplete, making
the transition and transfer of the ballistic missile defense elements
from MDA to the services difficult.[Footnote 4]
In requesting this review, you expressed interest in the completeness
of DOD's plans for the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe,
including questions about whether MDA's initial $4 billion estimate for
the planned European capabilities includes the full costs associated
with construction and operations and support of the sites. In this
context, you asked GAO to evaluate DOD's plans for the ballistic
missile defense sites in Europe and address to what extent DOD has (1)
planned for the initial implementation of ballistic missile defenses in
Europe, to include coordination with key international partners and
U.S. stakeholders, and (2) estimated total military construction and
long-term operations and support costs for ballistic missile defenses
in Europe.
For both objectives, we reviewed key legislation related to ballistic
missile defenses in Europe, DOD policy and guidance on military
construction and estimating costs, and DOD's overall approach for
preparing to support ballistic missile defense. To determine to what
extent DOD has planned for the initial implementation of ballistic
missile defenses in Europe, we conducted site visits in Poland and the
Czech Republic; met with DOD, State Department, and host nation
officials to discuss the efforts under way to plan for the sites; and
examined key documents, including agreements with the host nations,
memorandums of agreement between key U.S. stakeholders, and MDA, Army,
Air Force, and Army Corps of Engineers documents for planning and site
preparation. We evaluated the collaboration efforts among the agencies
to determine whether DOD, Army, Air Force, and State Department
officials followed key practices that can help agencies enhance and
sustain their collaborative efforts.[Footnote 5] To determine the
extent to which DOD has estimated total costs for ballistic missile
defenses in Europe, we examined budget documents, including DOD's
fiscal year 2009 Future Years Defense Program (including budget data
for fiscal years 2008-2013), MDA's fiscal year 2009 military
construction cost estimates, MDA's fiscal year 2010 budget submission,
and the Army's projected military construction cost estimates, and
reviewed key principles for developing accurate and reliable cost
estimates.[Footnote 6] We also discussed the cost estimates with MDA,
the Army, the Air Force, and the Army Corps of Engineers-Headquarters
and Europe District to determine the completeness of the military
construction and operations and support costs. We discussed the results
of our analyses on these objectives with DOD and State Department
officials. Our scope and methodology is discussed in more detail in
appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 to August 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
DOD has begun planning for the construction, implementation, and
operations and support for the European missile defense sites,
including coordinating with international partners and U.S.
stakeholders; however, several challenges remain that are affecting
DOD's plans for ballistic missile defenses in Europe. First, neither
Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified the bilateral Ballistic
Missile Defense Agreements and bilateral supplementary agreements to
the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. The ratification votes remain
delayed, in part, because of a desire on the part of both the Polish
and Czech parliaments to wait for an indication from the new U.S.
administration on its policy toward ballistic missile defenses in
Europe. As long as these agreements remain unratified, DOD's ability to
finalize key details about how the sites will operate, such as whether
security will be provided by the host nation, will be limited. Second,
DOD's efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of key U.S.
stakeholders for the European sites remain incomplete because MDA and
the services have not yet made important determinations, such as
establishing the criteria that must be met before the transfer of
specific European missile defense sites to the services. MDA has been
directed by DOD since 2002 to begin planning for the transfer of
missile defense elements, including the direction to coordinate with
the services on resources and personnel needed in order to deliver an
effective transition of responsibility. In addition, our prior work
assessing interagency collaboration has shown that agreed-upon roles
and responsibilities that clarify who will do what, organize joint and
individual efforts, and facilitate decision making are important to
agencies' capability to enhance and sustain their collaborative
efforts. While the Army has been designated lead service for the
European Interceptor Site and the Air Force has been designated lead
service for the European Midcourse Radar Site, the specific
responsibilities related to these roles remain undefined. Roles and
responsibilities for these missile defense elements are to be
established in Overarching Memorandums of Agreement between the
services and MDA and annexes to those agreements specific to each
missile defense element, but these important agreements remain
incomplete because MDA and the services have not yet made important
determinations, such as establishing the criteria that must be met
before the transfer of specific European missile defense sites to the
services. Without establishing specific roles and responsibilities for
the sites and defining key criteria that will guide the transfer of the
elements from MDA to the Army and Air Force, uncertainty will persist
about how the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse
Radar Site will be sustained over the long term. The delay in
ratification creates an opportunity for DOD and MDA to address some of
the planning challenges DOD faces for the European sites. We are
therefore recommending that MDA, the Army, and the Air Force use this
time to finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement that detail
the specific roles and responsibilities for the European sites and
clearly define the criteria that must be met before the transfer of
those sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force.
Although DOD has provided congressional decision makers with some
information on the military construction and operations and support
costs for the European Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar
Site, DOD's estimates have limitations and do not provide Congress
complete information on those costs. Key principles for cost estimating
state that complete cost estimates are important in preparing budget
submissions and for assessing the long-term affordability of a program.
MDA's initial cost estimates for total military construction and
operations and support costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe
have significant limitations.
* DOD's original estimate to construct both sites did not include all
costs. The $837 million estimate did not fully account for the cost of
power and utilities at the sites, among other things. This was
primarily because MDA submitted the estimates for its 2009 budget
before accomplishing key design milestones and without a review by the
Army Corps of Engineers. According to DOD military construction
regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers, as construction agent,
typically certifies that key construction design milestones have been
met and verifies military construction cost estimates before the
estimates are submitted as budget requests. Additionally, DOD's initial
military construction cost estimates did not include any Army or Air
Force base operating support facilities costs, such as housing, or
account for possible currency fluctuations. Consequently, DOD's
projected military construction costs for the European Interceptor Site
and the European Midcourse Radar Site are expected to increase
significantly from DOD's original $837 million estimate in the fiscal
year 2009 budget. In May 2009, an Army Corps of Engineers official
estimated that military construction costs for the sites could
potentially increase to over $1 billion. Despite the expected increase
in military construction costs, DOD has not provided Congress updated
military construction estimates since the initial estimates were
submitted in February 2008 with the fiscal year 2009 budget request. As
a result of these limitations in the initial estimates, DOD and
congressional decision makers do not have accurate information on the
full military construction investment required for ballistic missile
defenses in Europe.
* Total operations and support costs are also uncertain. DOD estimated
operations and support costs totaling $612 million for the European
Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar Site in its fiscal years
2008-2013 Future Years Defense Program. However, these estimates are
incomplete because DOD's operations and support cost estimates, for
example, do not include estimates for base operations managed by the
Army and Air Force. Although MDA and the Army and Air Force have
initiated the development of total operations and support cost
estimates, key cost factors that will affect these estimates, such as
how security will be provided at the sites, remain undefined.
Furthermore, MDA and the Army and Air Force have not yet agreed on how
the operations and support costs for the European Interceptor Site and
the European Midcourse Radar Site will be funded over the elements'
life cycles or who will pay for these costs. This has been a persistent
issue that is important to address as these costs are typically over 70
percent of a system's total lifetime cost.
Without credible and complete military construction and operations and
support cost estimates, DOD and congressional decision makers will have
difficulty making funding decisions and assessing the affordability of
ballistic missile defense plans over the program's life cycle. To
provide military construction costs for ballistic missile defenses in
Europe that are based on the best available data, we are recommending
that MDA, in coordination with the Army and Air Force, provide Congress
annually, in alignment with the budget, updated military construction
cost estimates for the European Interceptor Site and the European
Midcourse Radar Site that among other things reflect the data gathered
from all site design efforts since project initiation and account for
all projected military construction costs for the sites, including Army
and Air Force base support facility requirements. To provide for more
complete military construction estimates for future ballistic missile
defense sites, such as the still-to-be-determined European site for the
mobile radar system, we recommend that MDA follow DOD military
construction regulations by utilizing the Army Corps of Engineers to
complete required site design and analysis work and verify all military
construction cost estimates before submitting cost estimates to
Congress. We further recommend that MDA and the Army and Air Force
complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates for the
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site and
clearly define who is responsible for funding these operations and
support costs over the elements' life cycles.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three
and partially concurred with two recommendations. DOD concurred with
our recommendation for MDA and the Army and Air Force to finalize
Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and element-specific annexes. DOD
also concurred with both of our recommendations to improve military
construction cost estimates for ballistic missile defense sites. DOD
partially concurred with our two recommendations to improve fiscal
stewardship of DOD's operations and support resources. In general, DOD
stated that it is taking steps to address the issues we identified in
the report, but that life cycle operations and support cost estimates
would not be complete in time for the fiscal year 2011 budget
submission. By implementing our recommendations to improve planning and
information on construction and support costs for the proposed European
sites, DOD would be better positioned to prepare for the near-and long-
term sustainment of the sites and congressional decision makers would
have enhanced ability to evaluate the investment required to implement
ballistic missile defenses in Europe. The department's comments are
reprinted in appendix II.
Background:
When MDA was given the mission to develop a global integrated Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS), DOD's intention was for MDA to develop
missile defense elements, such as the proposed interceptor and radar
sites in Europe, and then transfer the elements to the lead services
designated to operate and support them. We have previously reported
that the transition process may, for some missile defense elements, end
at a point that DOD calls transfer--which is the reassignment of the
MDA program office responsibilities to a service.[Footnote 7] According
to MDA and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics officials, not all BMDS elements will
ultimately transfer; the decision to transfer them will be made on a
case-by-case basis and the conditions under which this may happen will
be identified in agreements between MDA and the services for each
element.
In September 2008, we reported that DOD has taken some initial steps to
plan for long-term operations and support of ballistic missile defense
elements, but planning efforts to date are incomplete because of
difficulties in transitioning and transferring responsibilities from
MDA to the services and in establishing operations and support cost
estimates.[Footnote 8] We noted that DOD has established limited
operations and support cost estimates for ballistic missile defense
elements in its Future Years Defense Program, DOD's 6-year spending
plan; however, the estimates do not fully reflect the total life cycle
cost of the BMDS. As a result, we reported that the operations and
support costs that had been developed were not transparent to DOD
senior leadership and congressional decision makers and recommended
that DOD establish a standard process for long-term support planning
for the BMDS and a requirement to estimate BMDS operations and support
costs.
DOD Has Made Progress in Planning for Ballistic Missile Defenses in
Europe with International Partners and Key U.S. Stakeholders, but
Challenges Remain:
DOD has begun planning for the construction and implementation of the
European missile defense sites; however, challenges affecting DOD's
implementation of ballistic missile defenses in Europe remain. First,
neither Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified key bilateral
agreements with the United States, limiting DOD's ability to finalize
key details of the sites, such as how security will be provided.
Second, DOD's efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of
key U.S. stakeholders for the European sites remain incomplete. Without
clear definitions of the roles that MDA and the services will be
responsible for and agreement on criteria for transfer, DOD will
continue to face uncertainties in determining how the European
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be
sustained over the long term.
DOD Has Made Progress in Planning for European Missile Defenses:
DOD has made progress in planning for the construction, implementation,
and operations and support for the European missile defense sites. In
2002, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive 23
that called for missile defense capabilities to protect the United
States, its deployed forces, and its allies.[Footnote 9] As part of
that direction, MDA considered several European sites where it could
base a missile defense capability to provide additional U.S. protection
and could provide a regional defense for its European allies against a
missile launch from Iran. DOD approached both Poland and the Czech
Republic about basing elements of its proposed European missile defense
system, and MDA briefed the President about the potential capability in
2003. Both U.S. and Polish officials told us that Poland was a likely
host site because many of the trajectories from Iran went through
Poland. In May 2006, the Czech government sent a formal letter to the
United States to request that the United States consider placing
missile defense assets in the Czech Republic. DOD has completed site
selection and begun site design for the European Interceptor Site in
Poland and the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic.
European Interceptor Site:
The proposed European Interceptor Site is located outside of Slupsk,
Poland, near the Baltic Sea. The site is planned to consist of 10 two-
stage, silo-based interceptors--modified versions of the three-stage
interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg,
California. The site is designed to protect the U.S. homeland and U.S.
allies from incoming ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.
The initial MDA estimate indicated that the site would be operational
by 2013, and the Army is the lead service that will be tasked with
operating and supporting the interceptor site once it becomes
operational. Site analysis is under way at the European Interceptor
Site, but no physical site preparation or construction has begun. The
photograph in figure 1 was taken at the site in February 2009 and shows
the area where the planned interceptor field will be located.
Figure 1: Proposed Site for Interceptor Field at Redzikowo Air Base in
Poland:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
European Midcourse Radar Site:
The proposed European Midcourse Radar Site is located at the Brdy
military training area, approximately 90 kilometers southwest of
Prague, Czech Republic. This land-based X-band radar will provide
ballistic missile tracking data to the European Interceptor Site as
well as the greater BMDS. The radar proposed for deployment to the
Czech Republic is currently located at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall
Islands. The radar will undergo an upgrade before its installation in
the Czech Republic. The Air Force is the lead service that will be
tasked with operating and supporting the radar site once it becomes
operational, which MDA initially estimated would occur in 2013. Site
analysis is under way at the European Midcourse Radar Site, but no
physical site preparation or construction has begun.
Mobile Forward-Based Radar:
As part of ballistic missile defenses in Europe, DOD is considering the
placement of an AN/TPY-2 mobile forward-based radar at another site in
Europe in addition to the European Interceptor Site and the European
Midcourse Radar Site. The transportable, land-based X-band radar is
being considered in order to provide additional warning of ballistic
missile launches from a location that is closer to Iran. The site for
this radar has not yet been proposed, and at this time, negotiations
with potential host nations have not been authorized.
DOD Has Begun Negotiations and Planning with International Partners and
U.S. Stakeholders:
The State Department and DOD have negotiated the key bilateral
Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements necessary to move forward on the
European interceptor and radar sites. In 2008, the United States,
Poland, and the Czech Republic signed bilateral Ballistic Missile
Defense Agreements that formally approved the basing of the European
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site, and both
agreements are now waiting for ratification by the Polish and Czech
parliaments. The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements are the first of
several necessary agreements expected to govern the fielding of
ballistic missile defenses in each country. The Ballistic Missile
Defense Agreements establish the rights and obligations of the United
States, Poland, and the Czech Republic specific to each site and
provide general guidelines on personnel, construction, and land use,
among other things.
A second key set of agreements, supplementary arrangements to the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement, are expected to govern ballistic missile
defense at both sites. The overall NATO Status of Forces Agreement was
created soon after the NATO alliance was established in 1949 and sets
the general status of forces for member nations as they operate in each
others' territories. The supplementary Status of Forces Agreement adds
mission-specific matters addressed only broadly in the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement, such as the legal status of U.S. civilian and
military personnel working at each site. The Czech Republic and the
United States have negotiated a supplementary Status of Forces
Agreement, and it is now waiting for ratification by the Czech
parliament. However, the supplementary Status of Forces Agreement with
Poland had not been completely negotiated as of June 2009. After the
Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements and supplementary Status of Forces
Agreements are ratified by each host nation's parliament, implementing
arrangements will be negotiated. The implementing arrangements will
serve as the executing documents for both of these agreements and
address the day-to-day working relationship between the countries on a
range of issues, including security.
NATO's overall role in European ballistic missile defense is still
under consideration. Although NATO has not been party to the bilateral
negotiations between DOD and the host nations, DOD and NATO have worked
together to begin addressing interoperability of the U.S. BMDS and
NATO's Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system. NATO
has also taken recent steps to show support for the European
Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar Site. For example, NATO's
2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration recognized that ballistic missile
proliferation poses an increasing threat to NATO, and recognized that
the European missile defense sites would provide a "substantial
contribution" to NATO's protection. NATO stated that it is exploring
ways to link U.S. missile defense assets with current NATO missile
defense efforts.
DOD has also made progress in coordinating with key U.S. stakeholders
and by establishing the Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District as the
construction agent for both sites. DOD has established lead services
for both the interceptors and the radar and the Army and Air Force have
identified which command will be specifically tasked to lead each
ballistic missile element. The Army's Space and Missile Defense Command
has been assigned as the lead command for the European Interceptor Site
and the Air Force Space Command is the lead command for the European
Midcourse Radar Site. As lead services, both the Army and Air Force
have conducted planning sessions and negotiation of roles and
relationships with MDA. For example, MDA and the Army and Air Force are
establishing roles and responsibilities for the long-term operations
and support of the European sites through negotiation of Overarching
Memorandums of Agreement and ballistic missile defense element-specific
annexes to the overarching agreements. However, with the exception of
the Overarching Memorandum of Agreement between MDA and the Army,
completed in January 2009, these agreements are not yet complete.
In addition, the Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District is the
construction agent for both the European Interceptor Site and the
European Midcourse Radar Site. As such, the Corps is responsible for
issuing and commissioning site preparation and construction contracts
for the sites. The Corps will manage the contracts to ensure that the
sites are developed and constructed to meet MDA and service facility
requirements. However, no contracts can be issued or site preparation
commissioned until the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements and
supplementary Status of Forces Agreements with the host nations are
signed and ratified. For the Czech Republic, construction may begin
after ratification of agreements between the United States and the
Czech Republic; however, for Poland, construction may begin only after
ratification of the agreements by both countries. MDA officials told us
that since Poland and the Czech Republic did not ratify their
respective agreements by spring 2009, both sites will experience
construction delays based on target construction completion dates of
the first quarter of fiscal year 2013 for the radar site and the second
quarter of fiscal year 2013 for the interceptor site.
Delayed Ratification of Key Agreements with Host Nations and Incomplete
Agreements between MDA and the Services Present Challenges to DOD's
Planning and Implementation of Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe:
While DOD has made progress with key international partners and U.S.
stakeholders on the planning and implementation of missile defenses in
Europe, several challenges affect DOD's ability to carry out its plans
for the ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Neither Poland nor the
Czech Republic has ratified either its overall Ballistic Missile
Defense Agreement or a supplementary Status of Forces Agreement. The
lack of ratified agreements limits DOD's ability to negotiate specific
details, such as security, that are expected to be formalized in
implementing arrangements to each overall agreement. Table 1 shows the
status of these key documents.
Table 1: Status of Key Bilateral Agreements:
Key agreements: Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement complete?
European Interceptor Site (Poland): Yes;
European Midcourse Radar Site (Czech Republic): Yes.
Key agreements: Supplementary Status of Forces Agreement complete?
European Interceptor Site (Poland): Negotiations ongoing;
European Midcourse Radar Site (Czech Republic): Yes.
Key agreements: Agreements ratified?
European Interceptor Site (Poland): No;
European Midcourse Radar Site (Czech Republic): No.
Key agreements: Implementing arrangements complete?
European Interceptor Site (Poland): To be negotiated after
ratification[A];
European Midcourse Radar Site (Czech Republic): To be negotiated after
ratification.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] The United States and Poland are currently negotiating a land use
implementing arrangement before ratifying the agreements, per the
European Interceptor Site Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement.
[End of table]
U.S. and Polish officials also told us that the ratification process in
Poland is on hold until the supplementary Status of Forces Agreement is
negotiated and the new administration establishes its policy toward
ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Additionally, U.S. officials
indicated that the ratification process is also on hold in the Czech
Republic pending the new administration's policy. While DOD's $7.8
billion fiscal year 2010 budget proposal for missile defense reflects
an increased emphasis on bolstering near-term capabilities to respond
to specific theater threats, as opposed to an overall long-term global
ballistic missile defense capability, DOD officials have stated that
the European missile defense capability in particular will be
reevaluated as part of DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review, which is
expected to be completed in early 2010.
In the interim, the lack of negotiated and ratified agreements affects
many aspects of DOD's ability to plan for the sites, ranging from the
services' ability to plan for the numbers of personnel that will be
required to the types of support infrastructure that will be needed for
the personnel. For example, the exact numbers of security personnel
needed at each site will not be finalized until the implementing
arrangements are complete and decisions are made regarding the extent
to which the Polish and Czech governments will contribute security
personnel to the sites. In addition, U.S. European Command is leading
meetings, working groups, and consultations on land use considerations
in Poland, but the specific topics included in the land use
implementing arrangement cannot be finalized until Poland and the
United States have agreed on the contents of the bilateral
supplementary Status of Forces Agreement.
Moreover, Congress has placed restrictions on DOD's ability to fund
procurement, site activation, military construction, and deployment of
a missile defense system at the sites until the agreements have been
ratified. Both the 2008 and 2009 National Defense Authorization Acts
prohibit DOD from funding such activities at the radar site until the
Czech parliament ratifies and the Prime Minister approves the missile
defense and supplementary status of forces agreements. However, in
Poland such activities can begin only after ratification and approval
of agreements by both countries. Once DOD is able to begin,
construction of both European sites is expected to take approximately 3
years to complete. Completion of the sites' weapon systems
installation, integration, and testing will continue after completion
of construction.
Finally, DOD's efforts to finalize roles and responsibilities for the
European sites remain incomplete because MDA and the services have not
yet made important determinations, such as establishing the criteria
that must be met before the transfer of specific European missile
defense sites to the services. MDA has been directed by DOD since 2002
to begin planning for the transfer of missile defense elements,
including the direction to coordinate with the services on resources
and personnel needed to deliver an effective transition of
responsibility. In addition, our prior work assessing interagency
collaboration has shown that agreed-upon roles and responsibilities
that clarify who will do what, organize joint and individual efforts,
and facilitate decision making are important to agencies' abilities to
enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts. While the Army was
designated lead service for the European Interceptor Site in October
2006 and the Air Force was designated lead service for the European
Midcourse Radar Site in August 2007, the specific responsibilities
related to these roles remain undefined. MDA and the services have
begun to establish these roles and responsibilities through Overarching
Memorandums of Agreement, with the purpose to outline the general
delineation of responsibilities for the ballistic missile defense
development and ongoing operations and support, as each element
transitions and transfers from MDA to the services. While the Army and
MDA completed their Overarching Memorandum of Agreement in January
2009, negotiations between the Air Force and MDA on their Overarching
Memorandum of Agreement are ongoing.
In addition, the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement are expected to
include element-specific annexes for each of the ballistic missile
defense elements, including the European Midcourse Radar Site and the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, which will include details on the
European Interceptor Site. The annexes are expected to specifically
state the criteria that must be met by MDA before the elements transfer
to the Army and the Air Force and detail specific roles and
responsibilities for each organization. Further, the annexes will
indicate the extent to which MDA will retain control of a missile
defense element's materiel development and the services will assume
control of the remaining supporting responsibilities, such as doctrine,
organization, training, leader development, personnel, and facilities.
However, MDA and the Army and Air Force are still negotiating the
annexes for the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense and the European
Midcourse Radar Site and it is unclear when these annexes will be
complete. As a result, the roles and responsibilities specific to the
European sites remain undefined because MDA and the services have not
yet agreed to the terms of transfer that are to be established in these
annexes. Table 2 shows the status of the Overarching Memorandums of
Agreement and element-specific annexes being negotiated between MDA and
the Army and Air Force.
Table 2: Status of Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and Annexes:
Key agreement: Overarching Memorandum of Agreement;
MDA/Army: Signed by MDA and Secretary of the Army in January 2009;
MDA/Air Force: Negotiations ongoing.
Key agreement: Element-specific annex;
MDA/Army: Negotiations ongoing for Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
Annex, to include details on the European Interceptor Site;
MDA/Air Force: Negotiations ongoing for European Midcourse Radar Site
Annex.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Until specific roles and responsibilities for the sites are established
and key criteria that will guide the transfer of the elements from MDA
to the Army and Air Force are defined, uncertainty will persist in how
the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site
will be sustained over the long term. The delay in ratification creates
an opportunity for DOD and MDA to address some of the planning
challenges DOD faces for the European sites.
DOD's Military Construction and Operations and Support Cost Estimates
for Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe Have Limitations and Do Not
Provide Congress Complete Information:
DOD's initial cost estimates for total military construction and
operations and support costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe
had significant limitations. First, DOD's fiscal year 2009 military
construction estimates did not fully account for all costs at the
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site and
consequently could increase significantly. Second, DOD's operations and
support cost estimates are not complete and it is unclear how these
costs will be funded over the elements' life cycles. Without full
information on total military construction and operations and support
costs for the European missile defense sites, DOD and congressional
decision makers do not have a sound basis on which to evaluate the
investment required to implement plans for ballistic missile defenses
in Europe.
DOD's Fiscal Year 2009 Military Construction Cost Estimates Do Not
Include All Costs:
DOD's initial military construction cost estimates for ballistic
missile defenses in Europe have significant limitations and restrict
Congress's ability to evaluate the investment required to implement
plans for ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Key principles for cost
estimating state that complete cost estimates are important in
preparing budget submissions and for assessing the long-term
affordability of a program.[Footnote 10] However, DOD's fiscal year
2009 estimates, the first military construction estimates for ballistic
missile defenses in Europe, did not fully account for all costs at the
sites. MDA initially submitted military construction cost estimates for
the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site to
Congress in February 2008 for inclusion in DOD's fiscal year 2009
budget. MDA projected that a total of $837.5 million would be required
to complete site preparation and construction activities at the sites--
$661.4 million for the interceptor site in Poland and $176.1 million
for the radar site in the Czech Republic. However, the initial
estimates did not include all costs primarily because MDA developed and
submitted the military construction estimate to Congress before key
site design work had been completed and without an Army Corps of
Engineers review of the estimate. MDA stated that its approach was
based on initial congressional authorization to field ballistic missile
defense capabilities with research, development, testing, and
evaluation funds; however, the fiscal year 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act required that MDA begin using military construction
funds for ballistic missile defense site construction for the fiscal
year 2009 budget.
Military construction regulations stipulate that a military
construction program should reach the 35 percent design phase, a key
construction design milestone, and that the Army Corps of Engineers
should review the military construction estimates before they are
submitted to Congress.[Footnote 11] However, MDA, asserting that it had
statutory authority enacted by Congress to field initial ballistic
missile defense capabilities with research, development, testing, and
evaluation funds, developed and submitted its fiscal year 2009 military
construction estimates without following traditional military
construction requirements. MDA officials told us that MDA, in an effort
to meet budget and construction timelines, developed and submitted its
initial military construction estimates to Congress without completing
key site design work. Army Corps of Engineers officials--although not
involved in the development of the initial fiscal year 2009 military
construction estimates--reaffirmed that the initial estimates were done
without completing key site design work and that MDA based its
estimates on assumptions and previous design experience from Fort
Greely and other overseas operations, such as Shariki, Japan, rather
than design data from the European sites, and did not have complete and
accurate information about the sites when it submitted its estimates to
Congress for the 2009 budget. For example, the initial figures
overestimated the availability of local resources at both sites, such
as local power supply, water and wastewater treatment facilities, and
emergency support services. Army Corps of Engineers officials said that
the Corps did not have the opportunity to provide input to or
independently review MDA's initial military construction estimates
before they were submitted, as would typically be required under DOD
military construction regulations. MDA's initial military construction
estimates were submitted in February 2008, but the Corps did not begin
providing input to the design for the European Midcourse Radar Site and
the European Interceptor Site until after it was issued design
directives for the sites in September and October 2008, respectively.
An Army Corps of Engineers official told us that the Corps has since
made significant input to MDA's military construction estimates and has
worked with MDA to refine the cost estimates based on updated data.
However, an Army Corps of Engineers official stated that had the Corps
been involved in the early planning and development of the military
construction cost estimates for the sites, given its experience and
prior work in Eastern Europe, the Corps may have been able to influence
the initial military construction estimates. According to this
official, the Corps would have likely recommended that more studies of
the sites be performed, and subsequently, more actual data from the
site studies would have been used to influence the estimates before
they were submitted to Congress for the fiscal year 2009 budget.
Additionally, DOD's initial military construction estimates for the
interceptor and radar sites do not include Army and Air Force base
operating support costs, such as military personnel housing. The Army,
as the lead service designated to operate the European Interceptor
Site, has begun planning for base operating support facilities and
estimates that it will need $88 million in military construction funds
to build the facilities that it requires for the Army personnel who are
expected to be at the site. However, the Army's estimated facility and
personnel requirements are based on assumptions that may change. For
example, the estimate assumes that Poland, the host nation, will
contribute military personnel for security at the interceptor site,
even though the United States and Poland have not yet agreed on
Poland's security personnel contribution. The implementing arrangements
to be negotiated between the United States and Poland will determine
the number of security personnel that Poland will contribute to the
site, and this, in turn, will drive the Army's personnel and facility
requirements at the site. Until these implementing arrangements are
negotiated and Army personnel determinations are finalized, Army base
support construction estimates for the interceptor site will be based
on assumed host nation contributions for security and the total Army
military construction requirements at the European Interceptor Site
will not be confirmed.
Conversely, the Air Force, as the lead service for the European
Midcourse Radar Site, has not yet developed any military construction
estimates for base support facilities at the site. Air Force officials
have acknowledged that the Air Force will require, at a minimum, dining
facilities; some form of military housing; and morale, welfare, and
recreation services at the radar site to support Air Force personnel,
but the Air Force has not yet determined its total base support
facility requirements because Air Force personnel requirements are not
finalized. The Air Force is anticipating that the Czech Republic will
contribute personnel to assist the United States in providing security
at the site, but it is unclear how many personnel the Czech government
will provide. The implementing arrangements that will be negotiated
between the United States and the Czech Republic are expected to
determine the number of security personnel that the Czech Republic will
contribute to the site, which will drive the Air Force's personnel and
facility requirements at the site. Accordingly, the total Air Force
military construction requirements at the European Midcourse Radar Site
will not be confirmed until the implementing arrangements are
negotiated and the Air Force personnel concept is finalized. Until that
point, a DOD official stated that any Air Force base support
construction estimates for the radar site will be based on assumed host
nation contributions for security. As a result, DOD's current military
construction cost estimates for base support facilities at the European
missile defense sites should be considered preliminary.
Another military construction cost that has not been included in the
initial estimates is the cost to protect the European Midcourse Radar
Site against a possible high-altitude electromagnetic pulse event. The
Air Force believes that protection of the radar against a high-altitude
electromagnetic pulse event is important to ensuring survivability of
the site and has included it as part of its required criteria for
transfer. However, Air Force officials told us that MDA is not planning
to protect the site against this type of event and has not accounted
for those costs in its military construction estimates for the site.
MDA and the Air Force have not reached agreement on whether the site
will include these protective measures and, if so, who will pay for
them. Air Force officials told us that the costs to protect the site
could increase the total military construction cost for the radar
mission facilities by 10 to 20 percent if the protective steps are
included in the design phase and construction of the radar. If the
protective action is done after the radar site has been constructed,
the cost could be much higher.
Further, MDA did not account for foreign currency fluctuations in its
estimates. Unfavorable currency exchange rate fluctuations could
increase the total cost of construction as military construction funds
will be obligated in U.S. dollars and site preparation and construction
contracts will be awarded in euros. Although it is possible that
currency fluctuations could occur in DOD's favor, an Army Corps of
Engineers official estimated that an additional 20 percent of the total
military construction cost estimate should be set aside for possible
currency fluctuations. Without accounting for possible changes in the
exchange rate, DOD risks exceeding its budgeted military construction
funds if currency rates fluctuate unfavorably.
As a result of the above limitations, DOD's projected military
construction costs for the European Interceptor Site and the European
Midcourse Radar Site are expected to increase significantly from DOD's
original $837.5 million estimate in the fiscal year 2009 budget. In May
2009, an Army Corps of Engineers official told us that after analyzing
design data, the Corps recommended that MDA increase its military
construction estimates for the European sites to almost $1.2 billion--
$803 million for the European Interceptor Site and $369 million for the
European Midcourse Radar Site. Whether MDA will accept this
recommendation and the extent to which total military construction cost
estimates at the European sites will increase remains unclear. Despite
the expected increase in projected military construction costs, MDA has
not provided Congress updated military construction estimates since the
initial estimates were submitted for the fiscal year 2009 budget in
February 2008. Without complete information on the total military
construction costs for the European missile defense sites, DOD and
congressional decision makers do not have a sound basis on which to
evaluate the investment required to implement plans for ballistic
missile defenses in Europe or the extent to which those plans could
divert resources from other national security priorities.
MDA was appropriated $151.1 million in military construction funds for
fiscal year 2009--$42.6 million for the European Interceptor Site and
$108.5 million for the European Midcourse Radar Site. However, MDA will
likely be unable to obligate any of these appropriated funds in fiscal
year 2009 for site activation or military construction activities at
the interceptor and radar sites as key bilateral agreements have not
been ratified by the Polish and Czech parliaments. Moreover, the future
of the sites is pending the outcome of the ongoing DOD review of plans
for ballistic missile defense. According to MDA officials, MDA plans to
request DOD and congressional authority to reprogram $50 million to $80
million of the $151 million to use for planning and design efforts at
the European missile defense sites, but as of June 2009, no formal
action had been taken.[Footnote 12] However, MDA plans to retain the
residual military construction funds--an estimated $70 million to $100
million--to preserve DOD's options for potential construction at those
sites as the schedule for construction is determined.
DOD's Operations and Support Cost Estimates for Ballistic Missile
Defenses in Europe Are Not Complete, and It Is Unclear How These Costs
Will Be Funded over the Long Term:
DOD's operations and support cost estimates for ballistic missile
defenses in Europe are not complete because they do not include
operations and support costs for base operations managed by the Army
and Air Force. While MDA has estimated the operations and support costs
it will need for the interceptors and radar--an estimated $612 million
in the 2008-2013 Future Years Defense Program--this estimate does not
include funds that the services may require to provide basing and
support of the sites, such as facilities support, housing costs, and
administration. Additionally, MDA and the Army and Air Force have not
yet determined the full extent of these operations and support costs.
Although MDA and the Army and Air Force have initiated the development
of total operations and support cost estimates for the interceptor and
radar sites, these estimates are not yet complete as key cost factors
that will affect those estimates remain undefined. For example, the
total number and distribution of U.S. military personnel, civilian
contractors, and host nation-contributed military personnel that will
be required to operate, support, and secure the sites will drive total
operations and support costs, but has not yet been determined. These
determinations depend on the number of personnel that Poland and the
Czech Republic will contribute for security at the sites, to be
negotiated as part of the implementing arrangements. Without complete
information on the true costs of operating and supporting the European
sites, the usefulness of information regarding those sites in DOD's
Future Years Defense Program for congressional decision makers will be
limited.
Moreover, MDA and the Army and Air Force have not yet agreed on how the
operations and support costs for the European Interceptor Site and the
European Midcourse Radar Site will be funded over the elements' life
cycles or who will pay for these costs. As we have previously reported,
operations and support costs are typically over 70 percent of a
system's total lifetime cost.[Footnote 13] Therefore, the future costs
to operate and support the European sites over their lifetimes could
reach billions of dollars. In September 2008, we reported that MDA and
the services had not yet agreed on which organization(s) will be
responsible for funding operations and support costs for the European
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site after fiscal
year 2013 and over the elements' life cycles.[Footnote 14] Although MDA
and the Army have agreed on the overarching terms and conditions for
the transition and transfer of elements from MDA to the Army, this
agreement does not provide specific details on how operations and
support costs will be funded following transfer of the European
Interceptor Site. For the European Midcourse Radar Site, the Air Force
and MDA are drafting an agreement that will establish, among other
things, which organization(s) will have funding responsibilities for
the radar, but it is unclear when this agreement will be complete.
As part of DOD's ballistic missile defense life cycle management
process established in September 2008, DOD intends to pay for ballistic
missile defense costs, including operations and support costs, other
than those already agreed to be paid by the services, through
defensewide accounts. In theory, these defensewide accounts would allow
all ballistic missile defense costs to be clearly identified and would
alleviate the pressure on the services' budgets to fund operations and
support for ballistic missile defense programs. However, MDA and the
services have not yet determined the amount and duration of funding for
the individual ballistic missile defense elements, such as the European
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site, that will come
from the defensewide accounts and there are disagreements about what
costs should be covered by these accounts. For example, according to
Air Force officials, the Air Force position is that the defensewide
accounts should cover all costs for the radar over its life cycle,
whereas MDA officials told us that all Army and Air Force base
operating support requirements related to the missile defense sites in
Europe should be paid for by the services. Until MDA and the Army and
Air Force determine which organization(s) will be responsible for
funding European missile defense operations over the life cycles of
those elements, these costs will not be reflected in the Future Years
Defense Program. As a result, DOD and congressional decision makers
will have difficulty assessing the affordability of the plans for
missile defenses in Europe over time and uncertainty will persist
regarding how these elements will be supported over the long term.
Conclusions:
DOD has made progress in planning for the implementation of the
proposed ballistic missile defense sites in Europe. However, the future
of the sites is currently unclear and largely depends on the outcome of
DOD's ongoing review of the ballistic missile defense program. This
has, in turn, limited the willingness of Poland and the Czech Republic
to complete and ratify necessary agreements with the United States. The
delays in ratification of key agreements with Poland and the Czech
Republic, however, create an opportunity to consider how MDA and the
Army and Air Force should collaborate in the implementation of
ballistic missile defenses in Europe and the future operations of the
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site. An
opportunity now exists to more clearly define roles and
responsibilities for the sites as well as establish key criteria that
will guide the transition and transfer of the elements from MDA to the
Army and Air Force. Planning for transition and transfer of the
ballistic missile defense elements from MDA to the military services
has been a persistent challenge that has hindered DOD's ability to plan
for the long-term support of the system. Without agreement on how the
elements will transfer and clear definitions of the roles that MDA and
the services will be responsible for, DOD will continue to face
difficulties in determining how the European Interceptor Site and the
European Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained in the near and long
term.
These sites will require a significant investment, but DOD has not yet
provided Congress with an updated estimate of the costs for European
ballistic missile defenses, restricting its ability to prepare for and
weigh the trade-offs of a proposal that will likely cost billions of
dollars over the long term. To date, MDA has not assessed the full
costs of the sites, to include not only mission-related costs incurred
by MDA over the long term, but also some base operating support costs
that may be borne by the services. Given the program's limited
information on costs to date, potential increases in military
construction costs, and other uncertainty surrounding future costs,
such as the extent of host nation contributions to security, as the new
administration considers its position on missile defenses full
information on the true cost of the European missile defense sites is
increasingly important for decision makers as they evaluate policy
options. It is therefore critical that congressional decision makers
are regularly provided complete cost information with which to evaluate
budget requests in the near term and future to determine whether
fielding plans are affordable over the long term. Until DOD develops
accurate, realistic, and complete cost estimates for military
construction and operations and support for ballistic missile defenses
in Europe, the credibility of its budget submissions will continue to
be a concern. Moreover, until MDA and the Army and Air Force reach
agreement on how missile defense operations and support costs for the
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be
funded over the long term, DOD risks that the services may not be
financially prepared to operate and support these elements.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five
actions:
* To improve planning for the long-term support of the ballistic
missile defense sites in Europe, direct MDA, the Army, and the Air
Force to finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and element-
specific annexes that detail the specific roles and responsibilities
for the European sites and define the criteria that must be met before
the transfer of those sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force.
* To provide for military construction cost estimates for ballistic
missile defenses in Europe that are based on the best available data,
direct MDA, in coordination with the Army and Air Force, to provide
Congress annually, in alignment with the budget, updated military
construction cost estimates for the European Interceptor Site and the
European Midcourse Radar Site that reflect the data gathered from all
site design efforts since project initiation; have been independently
reviewed and verified by the Army Corps of Engineers; account for all
military construction costs for the sites, including Army and Air Force
base support facility requirements, recognizing that certain
assumptions about host nation contributions will have to be made; and
include costs for possible currency fluctuations.
* To provide for more complete military construction estimates for
future ballistic missile defense sites, such as the still-to-be-
determined European site for the mobile radar system, direct MDA to
follow military construction regulations by utilizing the Army Corps of
Engineers to complete required site design and analysis and verify
military construction cost estimates before submitting cost estimates
to Congress.
* To improve fiscal stewardship of DOD resources for ballistic missile
defense, direct MDA and the Army and Air Force, in time for the fiscal
year 2011 budget submission, to:
- complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates for the
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site and:
- clearly define who is responsible for funding these operations and
support costs over the elements' life cycles.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three
and partially concurred with two of our recommended actions. The
department's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that MDA, the Army, and the Air
Force finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and element-
specific annexes that detail the specific roles and responsibilities
for the European sites and define the criteria that must be met before
the transfer of those sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force. In its
comments, DOD stated that the element-specific Army annexes are in
coordination for estimated completion in calendar year 2009 and the Air
Force Overarching Memorandum of Agreement is expected to be signed by
the end of calendar year 2009. We believe these are positive steps. As
noted in our report, we believe that an opportunity exists for DOD to
clearly define roles and responsibilities for the sites as well as
establish key criteria that will guide the transition and transfer of
the elements from MDA to the Army and Air Force. Since the element-
specific annexes are expected to specifically state the criteria that
must be met by MDA before the elements transfer to the Army and the Air
Force and detail specific roles and responsibilities for each
organization, it is important for DOD to meet its estimated dates to
finalize the Army annexes and complete the MDA-Air Force Overarching
Memorandum of Agreement, and further, to negotiate Air Force element-
specific annexes to ensure that the crucial details that will guide the
long-term support of the European sites are clearly defined. Until MDA
and the Army and Air Force reach agreement on how these elements will
transfer, DOD will continue to face difficulties in determining how the
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be
sustained in the near and long term.
DOD concurred with both of our recommendations to improve military
construction cost estimates for ballistic missile defense sites. DOD
concurred with our recommendation that MDA provide Congress annually
updated military construction cost estimates for the European
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site. DOD stated that
the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process and the associated BMDS
Portfolio provide an opportunity for MDA, the Army, and the Air Force
to integrate military construction cost estimates. DOD noted that the
BMDS military construction projects and associated estimates will
continue to be coordinated with the Army Corps of Engineers for
certification, independent cost estimating, and reviews for scope
completeness and technical sufficiency. Furthermore, DOD stated that
Army and Air Force base support facility requirements will be planned,
programmed, budgeted, and executed by the services and will not be
included in MDA's BMDS Portfolio. Rather, DOD stated that the budgets
for these sites will be collated and provided by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense from the coordinated requirements submitted by
MDA, the Army, and the Air Force. However, until the BMDS Life Cycle
Management Process and the BMDS Portfolio are fully implemented, it is
unclear whether they will facilitate improved military construction
estimates for the European sites. Further, DOD did not set a date by
which it would annually provide Congress updated military construction
estimates for the sites. Our report explains the importance of
providing complete BMDS military construction cost information to
congressional and DOD decision makers on a regular basis, which is the
impetus for this recommendation. Also, DOD concurred with our
recommendation that for future ballistic missile defense sites, MDA
follow military construction regulations by utilizing the Army Corps of
Engineers to complete required site design and analysis and verify
military construction estimates before submitting cost estimates to
Congress. In its comments, DOD stated that it is MDA's policy to follow
appropriate regulations in execution of design and construction of BMDS
sites and that MDA recognizes the Army Corps of Engineers as the DOD
military construction agent for these projects, will follow military
construction policy, and will remain responsive to DOD direction in
deploying BMDS assets.
DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations to improve fiscal
stewardship of DOD's operations and support resources. DOD partially
concurred with our recommendation that MDA and the Army and Air Force
complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates for the
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site in time
for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. In its comments, DOD stated
that MDA will not be able to complete these cost estimates before the
fiscal year 2011 budget submission, but that MDA will include available
information on life cycle operations and support cost estimates in the
fiscal year 2012 submission. DOD noted that information needed to
complete a life cycle cost analysis will not be available until host
nation ratifications are signed, site design is complete, and
administration policy is set. While we understand the limitations that
DOD faces in developing complete operations and support cost estimates
before all of the details of the sites have been finalized, we continue
to believe that it is crucially important for congressional decision
makers to have the most up-to-date information on the long-term costs
of the sites in order to assess the affordability of the proposed
ballistic missile defenses in Europe. We continue to believe the
recommendation is valid for MDA, the Army, and the Air Force to provide
estimates of all known operations and support costs for the sites in
the 2011 budget. DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation
that MDA and the Army and Air Force clearly define who is responsible
for funding operations and support costs over the elements' life cycles
in time for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. DOD noted that MDA
will continue to work with the Army and Air Force to define
responsibility for future operations and support cost funding, and
reiterated that the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement between the
lead services and MDA, which define responsibility for life cycle
costs, have not yet been finalized. Determining responsibility for the
long-term operations and support costs of the BMDS elements has been a
persistent challenge for DOD and until MDA and the Army and Air Force
determine which organization(s) will be responsible for funding
European missile defense operations over the life cycles of those
elements, these costs will not be fully reflected in DOD's Future Years
Defense Program and DOD risks that the services may not be financially
prepared to operate and support these elements.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Director, Missile Defense Agency; the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and other interested parties.
The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has
planned for the initial implementation of ballistic missile defenses in
Europe, including coordination with key international partners and U.S.
stakeholders, we conducted site visits, reviewed key documentation, and
interviewed relevant DOD, State Department, and host nation officials.
During this review, we focused on the European Interceptor Site in
Poland, the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic, and
the planned mobile forward-based radar to be fielded in a still-to-be-
determined location. We conducted site visits and toured the base
located outside of Slupsk, Poland, that is the proposed European
Interceptor Site and the Brdy military training area, which is the
proposed location of the European Radar Site. We met with DOD, State
Department, and host nation officials to discuss the efforts under way
to plan for the sites and examined key documents, including ballistic
missile defense agreements with the host nations, memorandums of
agreement between key U.S. stakeholders, and Missile Defense Agency
(MDA), Army, Air Force, and Army Corps of Engineers documents for
planning and site preparation. Using GAO key principles for management,
we evaluated the collaboration efforts among the agencies to determine
whether DOD, Army, Air Force, and State Department officials followed
key practices that can help agencies enhance and sustain their
collaborative efforts to determine what aspects of planning may be
missing that would hinder the implementation of ballistic missile
defenses in Europe.[Footnote 15] For both objectives, we reviewed key
legislation related to ballistic missile defenses in Europe[Footnote
16] and DOD's overall approach for preparing to support ballistic
missile defense.
During our review of the ballistic missile defenses in Europe, GAO
contacted agency officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
the State Department; the Joint Staff; U.S. Strategic Command; U.S.
Northern Command; U.S. European Command; U.S. Army Europe; U.S. Air
Force Europe; MDA; the Department of the Army; Army Space and Missile
Defense Command; the Department of the Air Force; Air Force Space
Command; U.S. Embassy Warsaw; U.S. Embassy Prague; the U.S. Mission to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the European Interceptor Site
in Poland; and the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic.
To assess whether DOD has estimated the total costs, including military
construction and long-term support costs for the ballistic missile
defenses in Europe, we examined budget documents, including DOD's
fiscal year 2009 Future Years Defense Program (including budget data
for fiscal years 2008-2013), MDA's fiscal year 2009 military
construction cost estimates, and the Army's military construction cost
estimates. We reviewed DOD policies related to estimating military
construction costs and key principles for cost estimating as well as
our best practices for developing and managing capital program costs.
[Footnote 17] We interviewed DOD officials to determine how the cost
estimates were developed. We discussed the status of military
construction cost estimates with officials from MDA, the Army, and the
Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District. We also interviewed Air Force
officials to determine whether military construction cost estimates had
been developed for the radar site. In addition, to determine whether
DOD has estimated long-term operations and support costs for ballistic
missile defenses in Europe, we assessed key documents, such as the
Ballistic Missile Defense Life Cycle Management Process memo and the
Army's Ballistic Missile Defense System Overarching Memorandum of
Agreement with MDA, to determine the extent to which MDA and the Army
have agreed to fund operations and support costs for ballistic missile
defenses in Europe and confirmed our understanding with MDA and the
Army. We interviewed Air Force officials to determine whether long-term
operations and support cost estimates had been developed and the extent
to which MDA and the Air Force have agreed to fund operations and
support costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe. We discussed
our findings with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; MDA; the Army; and
the Air Force.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 to August 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Undersecretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
July 27, 2009:
Mr. John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-09-771, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to
Improve Planning and Information on Construction and Support Costs for
Proposed European Sites," dated June 23, 2009 (GAO Code 351279).
The DoD concurs with three of the draft report's recommendations and
partially concurs with one. The rationale for the DoD's position is
enclosed.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Technical
comments were provided separately for your consideration. Should you
have any questions, please contact Mr. David Crim, Strategic Warfare
Office, (703) 697-5385, david.crim@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated June 23, 2009:
GAO-09-771 (GAO Code 351279):
"Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed To Improve Planning And
Information On Construction And Support Costs For Proposed European
Sites"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that to improve planning for the
long-term support of the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe, the
Secretary of Defense direct the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Army,
and Air Force to finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and
element specific annexes that detail the specific roles and
responsibilities for the European sites and define the criteria that
must be met before the transfer of those sites from MDA to the Army and
Air Force.
DoD Response: Concur. The Army Overarching Memorandum of Agreement
(OMOA) was signed on January 23, 2009, by the Secretary of the Army and
January 28, 2009, by the Director, MDA. Specific Army annexes are in
coordination for estimated completion in CY 2009. The Foreign Military
Sales annex to the OMOA is complete. We anticipate the Air Force OMOA
to be signed by end of CY 2009.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that to provide military
construction cost estimates for ballistic missile defenses in Europe
that are based on the best available data, the Secretary of Defense
direct the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), in coordination with the Army
and Air Force, to provide Congress annually, in alignment with the
budget, updated military construction cost estimates for the European
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site that reflect the
data gathered from all site design efforts since project initiation;
have been independently reviewed and verified by the Army Corps of
Engineers; account for all military construction costs for the sites,
including Army and Air Force base support facility requirements,
recognizing that certain assumptions about host nation contributions
will have to be made; and include costs for possible currency
fluctuations.
DoD Response: Concur. The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Life
Cycle Management Process and the associated BMDS Portfolio provide an
opportunity for the MDA, the Army and the Air Force to integrate
military construction cost estimates (including assumptions about host
nation contributions and currency fluctuation). The estimates for
Military Construction (MILCON) efforts that are/will be planned,
programmed, budgeted and executed by MDA incorporate all construction
requirements with consideration of all aspects of the GAO
recommendation. These MILCON projects and associated estimates will
continue to be coordinated with the Army Corps of Engineers for
certification, independent costs estimating and reviews for scope
completeness/technical sufficiency, with intended discussion at an
upcoming Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). MDA also continues to
involve the Army and Air Force in planning for these efforts. That
military construction to be planned, programmed, budgeted and executed
by the Services (base support facility requirements) will not be
included in the MDA BMDS Portfolio. Rather, the comprehensive,
integrated, and aligned budgets for these sites will be collated and
provided by OSD from the coordinated requirements submitted by the MDA,
Army, and Air Force.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that to provide for more complete
military construction estimates for future ballistic missile defense
sites, such as the still-to-be-determined European site for the mobile
radar system, the Secretary of Defense direct the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) to follow military construction regulations by utilizing
the Army Corps of Engineers to complete required site design and
analysis and verify military construction cost estimates before
submitting cost estimates to Congress.
DoD Response: Concur. It is the MDA policy to rigorously follow
appropriate regulations in execution of design and construction of
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) sites. The MDA recognizes the
Army Corps of Engineers as the DoD Military Construction (MILCON) agent
for these projects and is executing accordingly. MDA will follow MILCON
policy and remain responsive to Departmental direction in deploying
BMDS assets.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that to improve fiscal stewardship
of DoD resources for ballistic missile defense, the Secretary of
Defense direct the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Army, and Air
Force, in time for the FY 2011 budget submission, to:
* complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates for the
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site, and;
* clearly define who is responsible for funding these operations and
support cost over the elements' life cycles.
DoD Response:
Part A. Partially Concur. MDA will include available information on
life cycle operations and support cost estimates in the FY 2012 budget
submission. The information needed to complete a life cycle cost
analysis will not be available until Host Nation Ratifications are
signed, site design is complete and Administration policy has been set.
MDA will not be able to complete these cost estimates prior to the FY
2011 budget submission.
Part B. Partially Concur. MDA will submit a budget request for FY 2011
that includes available information on current operations and support
costs. MDA will continue to work with the Army and Air Force to define
responsibility for future operations and support cost funding.
Currently, the relationship between the lead service and MDA is being
defined. The memoranda of agreement between the lead services and MDA,
which define responsibility for life cycle costs, have not yet been
finalized. Furthermore, implementing arrangements between the U.S. and
the host nation will further define life cycle costs and those
agreements will not be defined until after ratification.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John H. Pendleton, (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Marie A. Mak, Assistant
Director; Pat L Bohan; Tara Copp Connolly; Susan C. Ditto; and Kasea L.
Hamar made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When Considering
Changes to Missile Defense Agency's Roles and Missions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T]. Washington, D.C.: March 26,
2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense
Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338]. Washington, D.C.:
March 13, 2009.
GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing
and Managing Capital Program Costs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 2009.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates
for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068]. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2008.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for
Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-740]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but
Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-448]. Washington, D.C.: March 14,
2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency's Flexibility Reduces
Transparency of Program Cost. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-799T]. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2007.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting
Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-430]. Washington, D.C.: April 17,
2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between
Flexibility and Accountability. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-727T]. Washington, D.C.: April 11,
2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates
Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-387]. Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2007.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and
Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-473]. Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability
but Falls Short of Original Goals. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-327]. Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for
Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-817]. Washington, D.C.:
September 6, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify
New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-962R]. Washington, D.C.:
August 4, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify
New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-540]. Washington, D.C.:
June 30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in
2004. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-243]. Washington,
D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency of
DOD's Projected Resource Needs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-514]. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-409].
Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing
Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-254]. Washington, D.C.: February 26,
2004.
Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for
Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-600]. Washington, D.C.: August 21,
2003.
Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and
Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-597]. Washington, D.C.: May 23,
2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but Risks
Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-441].
Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce Risks
in Developing Airborne Laser. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-631]. Washington, D.C.: July 12,
2002.
Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National
Missile Defense Flight Test. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-124]. Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2002.
Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New
Patriot Missiles to Buy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-153]. Washington, D.C.: June
29, 2000.
Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be
Revised to Reduce Risk. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-121]. Washington, D.C.: May
31, 2000.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-181, § 226 (2008), and Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 233
(2008).
[2] GAO, Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When
Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency's Roles and Missions,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 26, 2009).
[3] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile
Defense Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than
Planned, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2009).
[4] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost
Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 25, 2008).
[5] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[6] Key principles for developing accurate and reliable cost estimates
are drawn from DOD guidance and our Cost Estimating and Assessment
Guide. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost
Analysis Improvement Group, Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide
(Washington, D.C., May 1992 and October 2007), and GAO, GAO Cost
Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and
Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068].
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068].
[9] The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 23,
National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense (Dec. 16, 2002).
[10] Key principles for developing accurate and reliable cost estimates
are drawn from DOD guidance and our Cost Estimating and Assessment
Guide. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost
Analysis Improvement Group, Operating and Support Cost-Estimating
Guide, and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP].
[11] Under DOD military construction regulations, the Army Corps of
Engineers serves as the Army's construction agent and is typically
required to review military construction estimates after a military
construction program reaches the 35 percent design phase and before the
estimates are submitted to Congress. The Army is assigned as the
construction agent for most of Europe, including Poland and Czech
Republic. DOD Directive 4270.5, Military Construction, para. 3.2;
4.4.1, enc. 1 (Feb. 12, 2005). Further, the DOD Financial Management
Regulation requires the design of all construction projects be at least
35 percent complete, or alternatively that a parametric cost estimate
based on a 15 percent complete design be completed before submission to
Congress. DOD 7000.14-R, Military Construction/Family Housing
Appropriations, vol. 2B, ch. 6, para. 060301.B.2 (July 2008).
[12] According to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Comptroller, in order to reprogram appropriated military construction
funds for planning and design efforts, the MDA Executive Director must
first send a formal request letter to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to reprogram the military construction funds to planning and
design funds. After the request letter is received, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense notifies the Office of Management and Budget and
the request is reviewed. If the request is approved by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget,
appropriate congressional committees must also approve the request to
reprogram the military construction funds to planning and design funds.
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068].
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068].
[15] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[16] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-181, § 226 (2008); Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 233 (2008); and
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, Div. E, Title I (2008).
[17] DOD Directive 4270.5, Military Construction (Washington, D.C.,
Feb. 12, 2005); Army Regulation 420-1, Facilities Engineering: Army
Facilities Management (Washington, D.C., Feb. 12, 2008); Unified
Facilities Criteria 3-700-01A, Programming Cost Estimates for Military
Construction (Washington, D.C., Mar. 1, 2005); Unified Facilities
Criteria 3-700-02A, Construction Cost Estimates (Washington, D.C., Mar.
1, 2005); Unified Facilities Criteria 3-701-07, DOD Facilities Pricing
Guide (Washington, D.C., July 2, 2007); and GAO, GAO Cost Estimating
and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing
Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
[End of section]
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